

THE UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Shifting Priorities: the evolution of Canada's relations with French Africa, 1945-1968

by

Robin Stewart Gendron

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2001

© Robin Stewart Gendron 2001



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Acquisitions et  
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file Votre référence*

*Our file Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-64861-3

## Abstract

In the 1940s and 1950s, the Canadian government viewed developments in France's African dependencies through the prism of the Cold War, the importance to Canada of its relations with France, and France's membership in the North Atlantic alliance. All of these factors influenced Canadian policy towards the French African territories as they progressed towards independence from France. In the 1960s, however, the Canadian government became increasingly aware of the need to pursue substantive relations with the newly independent French African countries as a result of the government of Quebec's growing interest in pursuing its own autonomous international identity. By the end of the 1960s, Canada and Quebec were engaged in an open and vigorous competition over which of them had the right to speak for Canada's French-speaking people within the French-speaking international community known as *la francophonie*. The Canadian government has been criticised for ignoring French Africa until the crises of the late 1960s were virtually upon it, but this perspective fails to take into account the degree to which Canada did take an interest in this part of the world prior to the late 1960s, and the factors that inhibited the Canadian government from developing its relations with French Africa more fully, such as the fear of offending the French government.

### Acknowledgements

There are many people who helped bring this dissertation to completion and who made the process less painful and more enjoyable. First of all, I would like to thank Dr. David J. Bercuson for his example, his assistance, and his steady hand at the helm. He also generously provided financial assistance towards the research for this project, as did the University of Calgary and the Association for Canadian Studies. This assistance is gratefully acknowledged, as is the help provided me by the efficient and friendly staff in the National Archives of Canada, the *Archives nationales du Québec* and the *Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la France* without whom the research would have been much more time consuming than it was. Father Jacques Monet, s.j., graciously allowed me access to the Jules Léger papers at the National Archives of Canada and I would like to thank John Hilliker, Hector Mackenzie, Greg Donaghy, and the rest of the Historical Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for their advice, their assistance and their patience over the years. I would also like to thank the members of the Department of History at the University of Calgary, and Drs. Douglas Francis and Donald Smith in particular, for their congeniality and encouragement through this stage of my academic career. I would be greatly remiss if I did not acknowledge the tremendous debt that I and all the other graduates of the Department of History owe to Karen McDermid, Olga Leskiw, Marjory McLean and the rest of the office staff past and present for all they do to help students through their ordeals.

I hope my family considers this final product worthy of the years that I have spent



away from them, but I nonetheless appreciate the love and support that they have given so steadfastly throughout. Their faith in me has given me the courage to complete what once seemed an impossible task. It was made easier by the fact that I was also welcomed into another wonderful family in Calgary. Thanks and love to all, but especially to Kelly whose influence over the past five years can not be measured in mere words.

## Table of Contents

Approval Page.....	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER ONE: HESTITATING ON THE EDGE OF A NEW WORLD.....	11
CHAPTER TWO: TEMPERED SYMPATHY .....	51
CHAPTER THREE: CANADA AND FRENCH NORTH AFRICA, 1958-1962.....	88
CHAPTER FOUR: CANADA AND THE FRENCH COMMUNITY IN AFRICA, 1958-1963.....	125
CHAPTER FIVE: THE LIBERALS AND FRENCH AFRICA, 1963-1966.....	165
CHAPTER SIX: QUEBEC AND FRENCH AFRICA, 1960-1966 .....	203
CHAPTER SEVEN: CANADA AND THE ORIGINS OF <i>LA FRANCOPHONIE</i> .....	234
CONCLUSION.....	276
Bibliography .....	293
Appendices.....	303

## INTRODUCTION

In January 1968, Quebec's Minister of Education accepted an invitation on behalf of his government to attend a meeting between the ministers of education of France and the French African states in Libreville, Gabon. What was remarkable about Jean-Guy Cardinal's participation in this meeting in February was the fact that the invitation had been addressed to the government of Quebec alone. Canada's federal government had pointedly not been invited, nor had it been asked to re-direct the invitation to Cardinal, a clear contravention of accepted diplomatic practices. The result of this incident was an increasingly open and public airing of the domestic constitutional difficulties between the federal and Quebec governments on the international scene. The Libreville Conference was just one of several international meetings from 1968 to 1971 whose broad purpose was to establish an international association of French-speaking countries roughly equivalent to the English-speaking Commonwealth. During this period, Canada and Quebec competed fiercely for the right to participate in these meetings in Libreville, Kinshasa, Paris and Niamey.

During this contest, the governments of Quebec and Canada targeted the approximately 20 French-speaking countries in Africa whose support they both needed in order to fulfil their ambitions: Quebec to secure its own autonomous identity within the francophone community and Canada to prevent Quebec from doing so. Thus, for several years coinciding with Quebec's increased interest in establishing its own ties with the international community, the need to cultivate relations with French Africa occupied a

principal place in the evolution of Canadian foreign policy. These French-speaking countries, however, did not just suddenly appear on Canada's horizon. By 1968, they had been sovereign, independent countries for at least seven years, some of them for over a decade. Furthermore, because of the way these countries had gained their independence from France, some acrimoniously, others less so, the international community had been observing and dealing with issues related to French Africa since the early post-Second World War years. The Canadian government itself had a history of trying to come to terms with French Africa well before the crises of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

This history has never been fully acknowledged in the Canadian foreign policy literature. There have been no monographs on the subject of Canada's relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa and the limited attention devoted to this topic in general analyses of Canadian foreign policy focuses, perhaps not surprisingly, on the period after the mid-1960s, the Libreville conference and its aftermath. This was the case, obviously, for Jack Granatstein and Robert Bothwell's examination of the Trudeau years, which did not begin until mid-1968.<sup>1</sup> Even those works that study Canada's relations with the international francophone community known as *la francophonie*, such as the articles by Jean-Philippe Thérien or Wifrid-Guy Licari, touch only briefly upon the mid-1960s while focusing instead upon the 1970s.<sup>2</sup> John P. Schlegel's *The Deceptive Ash*, a book

---

<sup>1</sup> J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, *Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> Jean-Philippe Thérien, "Déterminants internes et externes de la participation canadienne à la francophonie," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, 26(4), 53-74 and Wifrid-Guy Licari, "L'Élaboration et la pratique de la politique canadienne en Afrique," *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 18(2), 417-422.

that studies the Canadian government's attempts to demonstrate Canada's bilingual character in its foreign policy, only discusses Canada's relations with French African countries beginning in the mid-1960s. In contrast, Schlegel traces Canada's relations with places such as Nigeria to the 1950s.<sup>3</sup>

In part, this situation is understandable. Canada did not have substantive relations with most of the French-speaking countries of Africa, or any relations at all, until the early to mid-1960s. Most of the French African colonies, in fact, did not achieve their independence until 1960 or 1961 and even then they found it difficult to attract attention from Canada. As a result, most discussions of Canada and French Africa in the 1960s occur in the context of other questions, most notably Canada's relations with France and the growing constitutional dispute between the governments of Canada and Quebec during this period. One of the best of these discussions, for example, can be found in the chapter in John English's biography of Lester B. Pearson that examines the events surrounding Charles de Gaulle's visit to Quebec in 1967.<sup>4</sup> Dale Thomson has similarly studied some of these issues in such books as Vive le Québec libre and Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution.<sup>5</sup> These types of works, while adequately presenting the broad outlines surrounding the evolution of Canada's relations with French Africa in the 1960s, generally oversimplify the complexity of the situation.

---

<sup>3</sup> John P. Schlegel, The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism and Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa (Washington: University Press of America, 1978).

<sup>4</sup> John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972 (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), ch 9.

It is broadly true that the Canadian government's interest in French Africa bore close ties to its interest in France and that the beginnings of Canada's formal relations with French African countries corresponded with the growth in Quebec's desire to explore its own international personality. Examining the one through the prism of the other, however, obscures the complex evolution of Canada's relations with French Africa. Focusing on the Canada-Quebec dispute over foreign policy and relations with French-speaking countries, for example, creates the assumption that the Canadian government only became interested in French Africa as a result of pressure from the government of Quebec. The implication here is that the federal government ignored the needs of Canada's French-speaking people in its foreign policy until forced to do otherwise by the Lesage government in the early 1960s. This assumption is particularly prevalent in studies of Quebec's international activities, and is widely used by former Quebec officials to justify Quebec's challenge to federal control over foreign policy in this period.<sup>6</sup>

The depiction of federal neglect of French Africa overlooks the interest that the Canadian government did take in this part of the world even before the 1960s. It also fails to consider the obstacles that impeded the Canadian government from developing relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa as quickly as some observers

---

<sup>5</sup> Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre* (Toronto: Deneau, 1988) and *Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984).

would have liked. In his book, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, John Bosher wrote that France systematically used *la francophonie* to attack Canada by promoting independence for Quebec in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He further argued that the Canadian government did nothing to counter this and subsequent attacks by France over the next 30 years.<sup>7</sup> Bosher takes a limited view of Canada's interests and activities in this field in the 1960s, and uses it to sustain his accusation about federal indifference to attacks upon Canada via France, French Africa and *la francophonie*. This blanket charge, however, ignores the nature of Canada's relations with the French African states, *la francophonie*, and France itself during this period.

To understand Canada's relations with the French African states and the international francophone community known as *la francophonie* in the late 1960s, we must consider how these relations evolved from their origins. It is not sufficient to examine the mid-to-late 1960s and the crisis surrounding Quebec's attendance at the Libreville Conference. Almost from the moment when the Canadian government began its active involvement in world affairs during and after the Second World War, it was forced to consider a variety of issues and questions relating to France's colonial dependencies in Africa. Parts of French Africa thus existed for Canada as early as the late 1940s, and the way that the Canadian government approached these issues influenced

---

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, André Patry, Le Québec dans le monde (Ottawa: Leméac, 1980) and Claude Morin, L'Art de l'impossible (Montreal: Les Éditions Boréal, 1987). See also Louis Balthazar, Louis Bélanger, Gordon Mace et collaborateurs, Trente ans de politique extérieure du Québec 1960-1990 (Montreal: Les Éditions Septentrion, 1993).

subsequent developments in Canada's relations with the French-speaking African peoples. In short, the considerations of the 1940s and 1950s helped condition the nature and the evolution of Canada's relations with the French African states in the 1960s. The Canadian government did not ignore or neglect French Africa. Its interests in the region prior to the mid-1960s just did not correspond with those anticipated by nationalists in Quebec and subsequent scholars.

It is unfortunate that there have been no in-depth studies of Canada's involvement in French African issues covering the 30-year period following the end of the Second World War. By its nature, a study of Canada's relations with French Africa from 1945 to 1968 necessarily involves a discussion of many of the most interesting and important issues to scholars of Canadian foreign policy. It touches upon, for example, Canada's relations with France, one of its principal Western partners and also a country with which Canada enjoyed somewhat turbulent relations over several decades. It reveals aspects of Canada's involvement in both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the United Nations (UN), two important pillars of Canadian foreign policy during the post-war years. It also provides another perspective on Canada's commitment to the Western struggle against communism and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, though it balances this by highlighting the shift towards reflecting domestic considerations in Canadian foreign policy that took place well before the Trudeau years. Furthermore, it

---

<sup>7</sup> John Boshier, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999).



traces the evolution of Canada's relations with some of the world's developing countries, an often-overlooked component of Canada's foreign relations. Finally, this topic examines the Canadian government's attempts to reflect Canada's cultural and linguistic diversity in its foreign policy and its attempts to cope with provincial challenges to federal constitutional powers in the 1960s. This topic, therefore, allows us to discern some of the considerations that dominated the formulation of Canadian foreign policy from the origins of the Cold War until the end of the 1960s.

Broadly, the evolution of the Canadian government's interest in and relations with the French-speaking territories in Africa from 1945 to 1968 was characterised by conflicting foreign policy impulses. Did the decolonisation of its European allies' colonial empires damage the West's interests or did it give Western countries more opportunities to cultivate ties with the newly independent developing countries? Was it preferable to focus on the short-term losses that accompanied the process of decolonisation or the potential long-term gains? Was Canada more interested in preserving its relations with its established Western partners like France than in developing relations with Third World countries like India or Egypt? To what extent should idealist or realist considerations govern Canada's foreign policy behaviour? With few direct ambitions or interests in Africa, what formed the basis for Canada's relations with African countries? Were they governed by Cold War or humanitarian considerations? Were the French-African states of international or domestic importance to Canada? Finally, to what extent could the federal government tolerate provincial interest, especially from Quebec, in participating in Canada's relations with French

Africa without undermining its own rights and prerogatives? These types of questions shaped the evolution of Canada's relations with French Africa at various times and to varying degrees from 1945 to 1968.

This study is divided into two sections. The first four chapters examine the Canadian government's perceptions of and policies towards France's African dependencies as they fought for and achieved their independence. Though most of the French African states had gained their independence by 1960 or 1961, this section ends only with the achievement of independence from France by Algeria in 1962 after eight years of war and bloodshed. It studies the Canadian government's attempts to cope with the decolonisation of a large part of Africa and the effect this had upon Canada, France, NATO, and the international environment at large. Demonstrating that Cold War considerations and concern for NATO unity and stability dominated Canada's policies towards French Africa during these years, the study contributes to the recent re-assessments of Canada's so-called 'Golden Age' of diplomacy by such scholars as Steven Lee.<sup>8</sup> The Canadian government was neither more tolerant of communism than,<sup>9</sup> nor necessarily more friendly to Third World countries and their interests than its allies.<sup>10</sup> Nor did the Canadian government display a great deal of independence in its policies towards

---

<sup>8</sup> Steven Lee, Outposts of Empire (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).

<sup>9</sup> This claim has already been refuted by, for example, David Bercuson, "A People so Ruthless as the Soviets': Canadian Images of the Cold War and the Soviet Union, 1946-1950," in David Davies ed., Canada and the Soviet Experiment, (Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994).

French Africa, often, in fact, subordinating its own interests or inclinations to maintain NATO's united front.

The French considered the countries of French Africa their own *chasse gardée* even after their independence from France. The Canadian government's habit of deferring to the French government's sensitivities regarding its colonial possessions in Africa, developed in the 1940s and 1950s, continued to affect Canada's policies towards the independent French African states. The second section of this study examines Canada's relations with these countries in the first years after their independence, from the early 1960s to the Libreville Conference in 1968. In this later period, the Canadian government increasingly recognised that, in addition to their international importance, the French African countries were also important to Canada for domestic reasons related to the constitutional dispute with Quebec. This shift in perspective became most noticeable under the Liberal government after 1963 but had begun even earlier. The succeeding years witnessed the Canadian government's desire to improve its direct relations with the French-speaking African states, though its deference to France continued to hamper its efforts. Instead of neglecting French Africa, the Canadian government overcame its previous inhibitions and, ultimately, campaigned openly and vigorously for French Africa's support and friendship in the dispute with both Quebec and France in the late 1960s.

---

<sup>10</sup> Robert Bothwell, for one, claims that Canada was perhaps the best friend to non-aligned countries among the West during the early decades of the Cold War. Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 49.

Canada's relations with French Africa throughout the 1950s and 1960s were thus not one-dimensional. By 1968, they had evolved through several stages involving both international and domestic, idealist and realist, humanitarian and political considerations. The international organisation known as *la francophonie* was created between 1969 and 1971 in a series of international meetings in Kinshasa, Paris and Niamey. Canada's successes and failures during these later years, beyond the scope of this study, owed much to the nature of its relations with the French African states and the way that they had evolved during the previous decades. Even the intensity with which Quebec pursued membership in *la francophonie* and the bitterness of its dispute with the federal government over responsibility for foreign affairs originated in the early and mid-1960s in part as a result of clashes over relations with French Africa. This entire issue, therefore, can only be fully understood by examining the totality of Canada's relations with French Africa, starting with the years before there were French African countries with which to have relations.

## **CHAPTER ONE: HESITATING ON THE EDGE OF A NEW WORLD**

With the notable exception of missionary activities, Canadians had few contacts with France's colonial empire from 1763 to the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>11</sup> Between the First and the Second World Wars the Canadian government had little interest in, or capacity for pursuing extensive relations with most countries beyond Britain and the United States.<sup>12</sup> It was not until the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 that the Canadian government accepted that Canada had direct interests at stake beyond the confines of North America and began to follow events in places such as France's colonial territories in Africa. Nevertheless, it remained the responsibility of the British and American governments to respond to the new strategic and symbolic importance of the French overseas colonies after the fall of France in June of 1940.<sup>13</sup> It was the British Royal Navy, for example, that attacked the French fleet in the harbour at Oran in Algeria in July 1940 and it was British forces that attempted to rally French West Africa and Madagascar to the Allies in 1940 and 1942 respectively. Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of Morocco and Algeria in November of 1942, was an American and British operation. Canadians largely watched these and similar events from the sidelines.

---

<sup>11</sup> For an examination of the Canadian missionary presence in French Africa, please see Chapter 4 below.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, C. P. Stacey's account of Canada's inter-war foreign policy in Canada and the Age of Conflict, Volume 2: 1921-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).

<sup>13</sup> For the complete story of the involvement of the French colonial empire in the Second World War, see Martin Thomas, The French Empire at War, 1940-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

Canada's military contribution to affairs in the French Empire during the Second World War was limited. It consisted mainly of three RCAF bomber squadrons operating from Tunisia in June 1943, seventeen RCN corvettes escorting convoys from the UK to North Africa after the fall of 1942 and the 350 Canadian Army officers and non-commissioned officers who fought with the British Army in North Africa until 1943.<sup>14</sup> Canadian political involvement with French colonial affairs was equally limited. The Canadian government did take an active role in discussing the problem of St. Pierre and Miquelon in the months before Admiral Muselier brought the islands under the Free French banner in December of 1941.<sup>15</sup> St. Pierre and Miquelon, however, lay just off the coast of Newfoundland. The entire Atlantic Ocean separated Canada from France's African colonies and minimised the incentive for Canadian involvement in the problems of these more distant French territories. The Canadian government had had to tread carefully between competing British and American wishes over St. Pierre and Miquelon. It was not willing to run afoul of the conflicting British and American attitudes towards Charles de Gaulle and his Free French movement over colonies in Africa where Canada had no direct interests. Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King confined his

---

<sup>14</sup> David J. Bercuson, Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada's Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1995), 151.

<sup>15</sup> The most recent account of Canadian involvement in this question may be found in Thomas, The French Empire at War, 134-139, and Martin Thomas, "Deferring to Vichy in the Western Hemisphere: The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affair of 1941," The International History Review Vol. 19 (November 1997), 808-835. See also Derek John McLellan, Canada-France Relations, 1940-1947 (MA Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1993).

involvement in French African affairs merely to warning Canada's allies about actions that might compel Vichy France to enter the war on the side of the Axis.<sup>16</sup>

There were, however, some Canadians indirectly engaged in affairs involving France's African colonies during the war. Canadian diplomat Pierre Dupuy, for example, visited Vichy France at the request of the British government three times between November 1940 and August 1941 in order to sound out the possibility of the Vichy government rejoining the fight against the Axis powers. Dupuy spent ten days in the Vichy capital in the fall of 1940, met with Marshall Pétain, Admiral Darlan and other senior officials and obtained from them the suggestion that Vichy might 'apply for [British] support in material and men at a later stage' to help organise the defence of French North Africa.<sup>17</sup> He was also told, however, that such Vichy-British co-operation to keep Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria out of German hands depended on the security of the French colonies in Africa from occupation by the Free French. Dupuy's report of the visit concluded that any further attempts against the French territories in Africa by de Gaulle's forces would be a mistake and might only give the Germans a pretext to intervene in the Vichy colonies.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>16</sup> Such was the case, for example, concerning the British and Free French landing at Dakar in 1940. King warned Winston Churchill of the potential seriousness of a break with Vichy France that might result from an Allied invasion of French West Africa. King feared the effect on domestic harmony in Canada of Vichy France's declaring war on the British Empire. Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre*, 35-6.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>18</sup> NAC, RG 25 [Department of External Affairs], Vol. 5694, file 1-V(s). *Report on Monsieur Dupuy's Visit to Vichy as Chargé d'affaires ad interim – November-December 1940*. 7 January 1941.

Winston Churchill prevailed upon Mackenzie King to let Pierre Dupuy return to Vichy in January of 1941 to pursue the idea of Vichy-British co-operation in the French colonies. He was also to have visited Algiers to report on the situation there and discuss the help that might eventually be offered should the French colonies in North Africa resume hostilities against the Axis, yet Admiral Darlan, the Vichy naval commander and Foreign Minister, refused to allow the trip.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, Dupuy did meet again with Pétain and Darlan and discussed the possibility of relaxing the naval blockade to allow more foodstuffs to reach France from its colonies. It is not clear from the record whether Dupuy discussed Churchill's proposal for joint action in North Africa with the Vichy authorities but Dupuy was reassured that the Vichy government would not allow German military or naval units to pass to North Africa.<sup>20</sup>

As Vichy France increasingly fell under the sway of Germany, Dupuy's usefulness as an intermediary diminished. He never made another trip to wartime France following his third trip in July and August of 1941. By the fall of 1942 the Allied invasion of Morocco and Algeria had shifted the focal point of French political affairs to North Africa. De Gaulle had convened the Consultative Assembly of the Provisional Government of France, established by the French Committee of National Liberation, in Algiers and it was thus to Algiers that the Canadian government posted Major General Georges Vanier as Minister to the French Provisional Government. Despite the Anglo-

---

<sup>19</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5694, file 1-V(s). *Report by Monsieur Pierre Dupuy, Canadian Chargé d'affaires ad interim on his visit to Vichy, January-March 1941*. 8 April 1941.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* and Thomson, 38.



American dispute over whether to recognise de Gaulle or General Giraud as the representative of fighting France in North Africa after the fall of 1942, Vanier pleaded for Canadian recognition of the provisional French Government based in Algiers. He believed that Communists would dominate post-war French politics if the provisional government was not quickly and firmly recognised as the French government.<sup>21</sup> Vanier received his appointment on 1 October 1943 and spent eight months in Algiers reporting on all developments as seen from French North Africa. During this period, Vanier repeatedly tried to convince the Allied leadership to include at least one French Division in the force that was scheduled to invade Northwest Europe in the spring and summer of 1944.<sup>22</sup>

Both Dupuy and Vanier considered France's colonies and overseas territories incidental to a greater cause. They were a means through which to pursue victory against the Axis powers, offering the potential for first Vichy and then the Free French to renew the war against Germany and Italy.<sup>23</sup> For the Canadian government, as for the other allies, the colonies had no independent existence outside of France. The colonies were France and France was its colonies.

Such was the practical Canadian view of the French colonies during the Second World War. In the abstract, there remained to be decided what would happen to all of the

---

<sup>21</sup> Robert Speaight, Vanier: Soldier, Diplomat and Governor General (Bungay, Suffolk: Collins and Harvill Press, 1970), 255.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 278.

<sup>23</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5692, file 1-A(s) pt 1. Mes[sage] EX-3182, S[ecretary of] S[tate for] E[xternal] A[ffairs] to Canadian Minister, Washington. 9 December 1942.

world's dependent territories in the aftermath of the great war for freedom being waged by the Allies. The Atlantic Charter, proclaimed by the Allies on 1 January 1942, promised among other things that the "opportunity to achieve independence for those peoples who aspire to independence shall be preserved, respected and made more effective."<sup>24</sup> To what extent were the world's colonies entitled to the same consideration as occupied countries such as France, Belgium or the Netherlands? Some Canadians at least believed that colonies should enjoy the liberation their mother countries did. The members of the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order in Toronto, for example, urged Mackenzie King to "... support in Canada's external affairs the implementation of the Atlantic Charter in relation to the colonial areas of the world..."<sup>25</sup> The Fellowship argued that true peace would follow the Second World War only if all colonies were granted self-government and if they were provided with sufficient economic assistance to raise their standards of living.

Though Canada was not a colonial power Canadian officials did take an active interest in colonial questions during the war. Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, had acknowledged as early as March of 1943 that it was the duty of colonial powers to help dependent peoples move progressively towards self-government.<sup>26</sup> Yet only a few months earlier, officials within the Canadian Department of External Affairs had

---

<sup>24</sup> A draft memo on colonial issues from Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, noted the importance of the Atlantic Charter to colonial issues. NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel[egram] WA-1535. Canadian Minister, Washington to SSEA. 31 March 1943.

<sup>25</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 8491, file 4734-A-40. R. A. Cameron to Prime Minister. 10 February 1944.

expressed keen dissatisfaction with the British attitude towards colonial issues. The British, claimed Louis Rasminsky, said the right things about self-government for colonies but appeared more intent on preserving their own national interests in their colonies than on fulfilling the aims of the Atlantic Charter.<sup>27</sup> Rasminsky, and others of like mind in the Department, believed that the Canadian government should actively encourage the United Kingdom to adopt a more progressive attitude towards the administration of its colonies.<sup>28</sup> The political masters of the Department of External Affairs did not share this view.

Despite some misgivings within his government about the substance of British colonial proposals Mackenzie King was not prepared to advise the British government on colonial matters. In December of 1942, King informed the British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs that colonial policy must remain the responsibility of the British and other governments that controlled colonial territories. King's principal concern was that differences over colonial policy did not disrupt Anglo-American relations.<sup>29</sup> As long as colonial issues did not rupture Anglo-American relations the Canadian government

---

<sup>26</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel WA-1535. Canadian Minister, Washington to SSEA. 31 March 1943.

<sup>27</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Memo. Louis Raminsky to Hume Wrong. 15 December 1942.

<sup>28</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Memo. J. R. Barker to A. D. P. Heeney. 15 December 1942. Barker claimed that "as a disinterested third party, Canada is in a good position to make strong representations to the United Kingdom on this matter, pointing out the unsatisfactory nature of the proposals and possibly making counter-suggestions."

<sup>29</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel 274. SSEA to UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London. 23 December 1942. President Roosevelt had told King in late 1942 that he felt the need to combat American criticism of British colonial policy by progressive declarations and measures. NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel 2395. SSEA to High Commissioner, London. 24 December 1945.

elected not to participate in discussions about the nature of post-war colonial policy. This remained Canadian policy throughout the Second World War. When invited to comment on the latest colonial proposals by the British in late 1944, King again replied that responsibility for colonial policy rested with the colonial powers.<sup>30</sup> Even invitations to participate in the formulation of colonial policy could not overcome the reluctance of the Canadian government to become involved in colonial questions.

Colonialism was destined to be among the most contentious issues before the international community by the closing stages of the Second World War. Japanese conquest and propaganda had severely weakened European rule and encouraged nationalism/anti-colonialism in large parts of Asia. Elsewhere, circumstances had forced the colonial powers to recognise new freedom for parts of their empires such as the British promise of Dominion status for India in 1942 or the independence of the French mandates in Syria and Lebanon. For the most part, the colonial powers themselves recognised that their responsibilities to their colonies included helping them progress towards self-government.<sup>31</sup> Neither the British nor the French, however, were prepared to relinquish their empires completely. Winston Churchill, for example, observed in

---

<sup>30</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel 30. SSEA to UK Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London. 3 February 1945.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, the previously cited draft memo wherein Lord Halifax acknowledges Britain's responsibility to its colonies as reproduced in NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Tel WA-1535. Canadian Minister, Washington to SSEA. 31 March 1943. Charles de Gaulle revealed his thoughts on this subject at the Brazzaville Conference in January, 1944 when he said "Even before the present war, it had been recognised that the colonial question would have to be placed on a new basis, both with regard to the condition of the native populations and the exercise of French sovereignty." NAC, RG 25 Vol. 3265, file 6227-40. Des[patch] 17. Georges Vanier to SSEA. 31 January 1944.

November 1940 that “I have not become the King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”<sup>32</sup> To such men, the colonies remained a vital source of markets, resources and prestige for European nations battered by the Second World War.

By the mid-1940s, Britain was reconciled to granting self-government to India, though movement away from Empire in the subcontinent was an attempt to preserve Britain’s influence in the new Dominions created in 1947 while the British government focused on the new strategic and economic importance of its African territories.<sup>33</sup> The French government placed even more importance on its colonial empire. Colonies had been identified with national power and grandeur in France since the beginning of the Third Republic, an attitude amplified by the humiliation of defeat in 1940. For many French citizens at the end of the war, the colonies were expected to help regenerate France politically, economically and morally.<sup>34</sup> Reforms had been promised at the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 yet de Gaulle and other French leaders rejected outright independence for the colonies. Instead, imperial authorities at Brazzaville proposed to give the French colonies representatives in a new federation of the colonies and Metropolitan France called the French Union. France’s interests, however, “preclude[d] any idea of autonomy and all possibility of evolution [for the colonies] outside the French

---

<sup>32</sup> As quoted in Anne Orde, The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 142.

<sup>33</sup> W. David McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-1997: When, Why and How did the British Empire Fall? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 86 and Orde, 170.

<sup>34</sup> Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 14-15.

imperial bloc.”<sup>35</sup> The French colonial impulse may have been liberal but it did not include emancipation.

Such attitudes on the part of the colonial powers conflicted with the anti-colonialism of the United States. The American people and their government were deeply suspicious of colonialism and did not hesitate to tell their allies so. On 12 October 1942, for example, *Life* magazine addressed an ‘Open Letter’ to the ‘People of England’ stating that not all Americans agreed on war aims but that all Americans did agree that “One thing we are sure we are not fighting for is to hold the British Empire together.”<sup>36</sup> American policy never officially endorsed the dismantling of the British or other Empires after the Second World War but Britain, France and the other imperial powers had to bear in mind the anti-colonialism of their American ally when considering their post-war colonial policies.<sup>37</sup> Failure to do so might jeopardise continued European colonial rule in parts of Africa and Asia, such as President Roosevelt’s reluctant agreement to the restoration of French rule in Indochina following the defeat of Japan.

Under these circumstances, the reluctance of the Canadian government to become involved with colonial issues during and after the war is easily understood. Functionalism, the principle with which the Canadian government claimed an active role in the making of Allied policy during the war, held in part that “the influence of the

---

<sup>35</sup> Jean-Pierre Rioux, *The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958*, Godfrey Rogers trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 87.

<sup>36</sup> As quoted in Orde, 141-2.

various countries should be greatest in connection with those matters with which they are most directly concerned.”<sup>38</sup> Since Canada possessed no colonial territories its influence over colonial policy should consequently have been minimal. Adherence to the functional principle in this case allowed the Canadian government to avoid issues that divided Canada’s main friends and allies. Canada’s post-war future lay closely tied to friendship between the United States and Britain and, to a lesser extent, other Western countries such as France. With few direct interests at stake, Canada had little to gain through involvement in colonial issues that would likely only antagonise one or both of Britain and the United States. For the Canadian government, it was more important to safeguard the Anglo-American relationship than to contribute to the making of colonial policy.

The reluctance of the colonial powers to agree to international supervision of their mandated territories, let alone their colonies, meant that the position of all dependent territories in the future United Nations Organisation would be a major issue during the San Francisco negotiations in 1945. Canada’s aim in these discussions was clear. According to Canadian diplomat John Holmes, “Canada is interested in seeing that the colonial problem is not a source of friction between the United States and the United Kingdom or a cause of ill-will towards the United Kingdom on the part of Canadians.” Holmes added that the developed countries had to be concerned first of all with raising

---

<sup>37</sup> Churchill warned de Gaulle about the potential consequences of American anti-colonialism in Marrakech in 1944. Georges Vanier, reported on this conversation between Churchill and de Gaulle in NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5693, file 1-A(s). Tel 14. Vanier to SSEA. 20 January 1944.

<sup>38</sup> This articulation of one half of the functional principle belongs to Hume Wrong. As quoted in Stacey, 333.

the prosperity of the world's dependent peoples to prevent future wars, and that not even the anti-colonialism of the American public could subvert this goal. Canada, he felt, should "support a system which will be in accord as far as possible with American demands [for colonial reforms] but at the same time give the [British] Colonial Office the guarantees it legitimately requires" to fulfil its obligations to the colonies.<sup>39</sup>

In practice, the attempt to maintain a balance between the British and Americans on colonial policy limited Canada to explaining the American position to Britain and the other Commonwealth members. Following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, for instance, the Canadian government informed the British Foreign Office that its current colonial proposal did not offer enough international supervision or sanctions against recalcitrant states to satisfy American demands.<sup>40</sup> On another occasion, a Canadian representative met with other Commonwealth representatives in Washington and "endeavoured to interpret the United States view and pressed for co-operation with the United States."<sup>41</sup> The Canadian government feared that Anglo-American disagreements over colonial policy would only benefit the Soviet Union.<sup>42</sup> With Cold War tension mounting, the West could not allow its solidarity to be undermined by conflicting views on colonialism.

---

<sup>39</sup> NAC, RG 25 Vol. 5772, file 180(s). Letter A-90. High Commissioner, London [signed John Holmes] to SSEA. 20 March 1945.

<sup>40</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5772 file 180(s). Memo – *Territorial Trusteeship*. George Ignatieff to Hume Wrong. 22 March 1945.

<sup>41</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5772 file 180(s). Memo. Embassy, Washington to L. B. Pearson. 18 April 1945.

<sup>42</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5772 file 180(s). Tel H-238. U[nder] S[ecretary of] S[tate for] E[xternal] A[ffairs] in San Francisco to SSEA. 25 May 1945.



While the British Colonial Office kept the Canadian government well informed of developments in the British Empire after 1945, the lack of similar information on the French Empire prompted Laurent Beaudry to request a comprehensive study of France's imperial problems in October 1947.<sup>43</sup> This request elicited regular reports from the Canadian Embassy in Paris regarding developments in the French colonial territories, the first of which compared French imperial evolution with the evolution of the British Commonwealth. Canada's Ambassador in Paris observed that France's practice of granting its colonies representation in such bodies as the French National Assembly, the Council of the Republic and the High Council of the French Union while maintaining an overall preponderance of votes in those bodies reflected centralising trends incompatible with the experience of the British Commonwealth. Vanier concluded that the British Commonwealth and Empire and the French Union were developing along distinctive lines and that "Dominion status as an ultimate state of colonial development is not within the ambit of French thinking."<sup>44</sup> It was not until 1948 that events compelled the Canadian government to take the first steps towards developing its own policy towards the French Empire. By then, the Canadian government was considering joining a military alliance in peacetime, an alternative that had been anathema only a decade before.

As the communist threat loomed over Western Europe by 1948, following the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, Soviet pressure against the independence of Finland

---

<sup>43</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3283 file 6938-B-40. Des 737. Laurent Beaudry to Chargé d'affaires, Paris. 14 October 1947.

<sup>44</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3283 file 6938-B-40. Des 810. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 16 December 1947.

and Norway and Communist electoral prospects in France and Italy, Western Europe, Canada and the United States began to consider measures for their own collective security. It is not necessary here to undertake a close examination of the negotiations leading to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 or Canada's role therein. It is enough to note that for the first time Canada became a member of a peacetime military alliance.<sup>45</sup> Twelve nations, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States, made a firm commitment to mutual defence in the event of an attack on any of the members. The Treaty also committed the United States to a leading role in the global struggle against communism and the Soviet Union, unlike its retreat into isolationism after the First World War. For Canada, the alliance offered protection and the hope that multilateral ties with Europe would reduce American influence over Canada's security arrangements.

Though the Canadian government considered European membership in the Atlantic alliance necessary to offset the influence of the United States, it was occasionally difficult to reconcile the interests of some of the European states with those of the North American states. When the French government insisted on including its North African territories in the Treaty it forced the Canadian government to develop, for the first time, a policy towards French colonialism. This issue threatened to scuttle the entire deal during contentious negotiations between December 1948 and March 1949. The Brussels Treaty

---

<sup>45</sup> The best analysis of the negotiations from the Canadian perspective remains Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977).

between Britain, France and the Benelux countries, the forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty, had purposefully excluded non-European, i.e. colonial, territories from the areas covered by the pledge of mutual assistance. The American, British and Canadian governments therefore assumed during their tripartite security talks in March 1948 that the Atlantic pact would similarly exclude colonies.<sup>46</sup> As late as the summer of 1948, the six countries involved in the Washington Talks agreed that since the Brussels Treaty excluded North Africa from its coverage area then so too would the North Atlantic treaty.

Despite the reservations of the other members of the Brussels pact, the French government requested protection for all of Africa north of 30 degrees North, including parts of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, by the Atlantic treaty at the Washington negotiations in November 1948.<sup>47</sup> The British had been lukewarm to this proposal, but Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands opposed it. Yet the French persisted. French rule dated to 1912 and 1881 in Morocco and Tunisia respectively while France had conquered Algeria in 1830. Parts of Algeria had even been incorporated into Metropolitan France in 1871. During the summer of 1948 the French government concluded that the intimate political, military, economic and legal ties between France and its North African dependencies merited their inclusion in the proposed Atlantic

---

<sup>46</sup> During these discussions, Gladwyn Jebb, Under-secretary in the British Foreign Office, pointed out that "the smaller participating countries would probably object if the [Atlantic] pact were to become operative in the event of attacks delivered, for example, in the Near and Far East." As quoted in Reid, 213-4.

<sup>47</sup> This request was included in a draft treaty submitted to the Washington talks by the Brussels powers. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 282(s) pt 4.2. Mes[sage] Ex-2788. USSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Washington. 4 December 1948.

treaty.<sup>48</sup>

The French request generated as little enthusiasm in Washington in late December 1948 as it had among the Brussels powers. The Canadian government instructed its representative in Washington that “it is important that the guarantee [of mutual assistance] be limited, in general, to the metropolitan areas of member states... .”<sup>49</sup> It was concerned that if France’s colonies received protection under the Atlantic pact then other colonial powers would want similar treatment for their colonies. The Belgian Minister in Washington, M. Taymans, raised this prospect on December 17 when he stated that public opinion in Belgium might require the inclusion of the Belgian Congo in the pact if North Africa received such consideration.<sup>50</sup> The question of the territorial coverage of the treaty proved so difficult that the Working Group reached no agreements during two separate meetings and sent its report to the Ambassadors’ Group without recommending a solution to this problem.

At the Ambassadors’ meeting on December 22, M. Bonnett, the French representative, urged the Atlantic powers to include the French territories of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in the treaty. Of all the participants only Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador, endorsed the French request though he stated that the British government would not insist on the inclusion of its bases in Egypt and the Suez Canal

---

<sup>48</sup> Reid, 219.

<sup>49</sup> Letter. SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Washington. 16 December 1948 in Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, D[ocuments on] C[anadian] E[xternal] R[elations] Volume 14, 1948 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1986), 468.

<sup>50</sup> *Minutes of Meeting of Working Group, Washington*. 17 December 1948 in Canada, DCER Vol. 14, 470.

zone in deference to the reluctance of the North American states. The American representative objected to this proposal because of the need to secure congressional approval of the treaty and the need to place a logical limit on the extent of the treaty. The US government believed that the inclusion of North Africa would make it difficult to refuse membership to other non-Atlantic countries like Turkey, Greece or even Iran. It was also concerned that the Senate would not ratify the treaty if it was broadened in this way. The Belgian and Dutch representatives similarly questioned the wisdom of extending the pact beyond its North Atlantic core. In turn, Hume Wrong expressed his government's belief that the same territorial limits would apply for the European members as per the Brussels Treaty.<sup>51</sup> By the end of the meeting, the problem of the area to be covered remained the only point of critical importance in the negotiations to be settled.

Opposition to its request regarding French North Africa only hardened the French position. By early January 1949 the situation was such that Hume Wrong reported the possibility of deadlocked negotiations on the North African issue between France and Canada, the United States, Belgium and the Netherlands.<sup>52</sup> Wrong had originally expressed Canada's opposition to the French plan diplomatically enough that Canada could agree to the inclusion of North Africa if necessary. Instructions from Ottawa, however, forced Wrong to adopt a more rigid position. On January 4, 1949, Lester

---

<sup>51</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. *Washington Exploratory Talks on Security – Tenth Meeting*, 22 December 1948.

Pearson discussed the Atlantic pact negotiations with Louis St. Laurent and recommended continued opposition to the inclusion of North Africa in the treaty lest it jeopardise the acceptance of the Atlantic pact in both Canada and the United States. Pearson also worried about possible colonial difficulties for the alliance in the future if North Africa was included.<sup>53</sup> With St. Laurent's support, Pearson told Wright in Washington to take a stronger stand against the inclusion of any part of North Africa in the treaty area.

The Canadian position stemmed from several sources. Louis St. Laurent, a product of the anti-imperialist culture in Quebec and Lester Pearson, shaped by liberal Methodist impulses, genuinely sympathised with colonial peoples denied self-government by their European rulers.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, neither the Prime Minister nor the Secretary of State for External Affairs wanted Canada associated with the perpetuation of colonial regimes, particularly in the event that France called upon Canadian assistance to suppress a nationalist uprising in a colony protected by the Atlantic alliance.<sup>55</sup> On a more immediate level, St. Laurent, Pearson and many other members of the Canadian government believed that anti-colonialism existed in large parts of Canadian society and

---

<sup>52</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. Tel Wa-16. Ambassador, Washington to SSEA. 5 January 1949.

<sup>53</sup> Memo. SSEA to Prime Minister. 4 January 1949 in Canada, *DCER Vol. 15, 1949*, 478.

<sup>54</sup> Dale Thomson, *Louis St. Laurent: Canadian* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), 203-5 and John English, *The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson 1949-1972* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1992), 108.

<sup>55</sup> Robert Ford reported from London that Gladwyn Jebb, a senior official in the British Foreign Office, believed that "the French are intent on getting support [through the Atlantic alliance] against some possible nationalistic uprising in North Africa in the future." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. Tel 113. Acting High Commissioner, London to SSEA. 14 January 1949.

that adding a colonial dimension to the treaty would make it harder for the government to make the Canadian public accept it.<sup>56</sup> In retrospect, it appears that this concern was overblown since coverage of the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty in the Canadian press, for example, did not reveal any concerns about a potential colonial dimension to the alliance. Even *Le Devoir*, the newspaper that expressed the most reservations about the alliance did not consider anti-colonial concerns among its reasons for opposing the treaty.<sup>57</sup> Such concerns, however, induced the government to resist the inclusion of North Africa in the treaty.

Hume Wrong informed Armand Bérard of the French Embassy in Washington of Canada's more rigid opposition at a meeting in the evening of January 4, 1949. In response, Bérard indicated that his government was adamant about including at least Algeria in the area covered by the treaty since it was legally a part of Metropolitan France and thus deserving of the same protection as Florida or Alaska.<sup>58</sup> Surprised at the intransigence of the French negotiators in Washington, and assuming that Bérard had exceeded his instructions, Wrong then suggested that Georges Vanier ask the French

---

<sup>56</sup> John Holmes writes of the more general sympathy for colonial peoples in the Canadian government in *The Shaping of Peace*, Vol. 2, 117-8. There have been as yet, however, no systematic studies of broader Canadian attitudes towards colonialism in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Brooke Claxton referred to the hostility towards the Atlantic pact among French-Canadian journalists in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 4.2. Letter. Acting SSEA to Ambassador, Washington. 9 December 1948. St. Laurent's comments are recorded in *Minute by Ambassador in United States*. 4 January 1949 in Canada, *DCER Vol. 15, 1949*, 489.

<sup>57</sup> John Macfarlane, "French-Canadian Views on Collective Security, 1945-1950," Paper given to the Canada and War Conference, Ottawa, May 2000. Newspapers surveyed regarding this matter included *Le Devoir*, *La Presse*, the *Globe and Mail*, and the *Winnipeg Free Press* for the months of March and April 1949.

Foreign Minister to modify France's position.<sup>59</sup> In Paris, both Robert Schuman and Jean Chauvel told Vanier that given the political and military importance of Algeria to France, the French government could not accept the exclusion of Algeria from the treaty.<sup>60</sup> Sources in London and Washington similarly confirmed that the French would not modify their position.

On January 12, 1949, the same day that Vanier met with Schuman, the French government made a final bid to overcome the opposition of the other countries. The French indicated they would drop their request to include Tunisia and Morocco but stressed that they could not accept the exclusion of France's Algerian departments from the treaty. The French government felt so strongly that it indicated that failure to satisfy this reduced demand would result in France declining membership in the alliance.<sup>61</sup> Faced with the prospect of proceeding without France, the opposition of the other delegations crumbled. On January 14, the Belgian and Dutch ambassadors agreed to accept the inclusion of Algeria while the British indicated that they would do so as well provided that the United States government also agreed. Only Canada and the United States remained firmly opposed to the inclusion of any colonial territories in the pact. Wrong personally believed that "the inclusion of Algeria would make no real difference

---

<sup>58</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. Tel Wa-16. Ambassador, Washington to SSEA. 5 January 1949.

<sup>59</sup> Wrong's despatch of 12 January 1949 refers to the "rash" statements made about Algeria by the French representative at the negotiations. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. Tel Wa-76. Ambassador, Washington to Escott Reid. 12 January 1949.

<sup>60</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4800 file 283(s) pt 5.2. Tel 24. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 12 January 1949.



in the operation of the Treaty, although it might add an undesirable ground for public criticism of its provisions.”<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, he cabled Ottawa for advice on how to handle the situation in Washington.

Since France would not alter its position the Canadian government had to choose between acquiescing to the reduced French demand or continuing its opposition even to the point where France might refuse to join the alliance. Given these alternatives, Pearson and St. Laurent decided to accept France’s Algerian departments in the Atlantic alliance. “Algeria,” said Louis St. Laurent, “was not a matter of great importance in relation to the main purposes of the Treaty, but France was essential.”<sup>63</sup> In the final analysis the necessity of France’s participation in the alliance against Soviet aggression greatly outweighed any difficulties that the inclusion of Algeria in the treaty area might provoke for Canada. On January 18, though he still hoped for concessions from the French, Pearson informed Wrong that Canada was prepared to include Algeria in the alliance.<sup>64</sup> By the 24<sup>th</sup> of January, the Canadians learned that the American government had reached a similar conclusion.

When the final treaty was signed in April 1949, Article 5 pledged the members of the alliance to mutual self-defence in the event of an attack upon any of the allies and

---

<sup>61</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5801 file 283(s) pt 6.1. Tel Wa-121. Ambassador, Washington to SSEA. 15 January 1949.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> As quoted in John A. Munro and Alex Inglis eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2 (1948-1957) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 55.

<sup>64</sup> NAC, RG 25. Vol. 5801 file 283(s) pt 6.2. Mes Ex-132. SSEA to Ambassador, Washington. 18 January 1949.

Article 6 extended that pledge to cover the three Algerian departments of France. Though France had won a great diplomatic victory, it was limited since the guarantee only protected Algeria from external invasion. A nationalist uprising in Algeria would not trigger the collective security provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. Yet in another sense, the victory was even greater than the French themselves had expected. After April of 1949 Canada, the United States and the other North Atlantic states were closely allied to France and had a strong interest in maintaining its capacity to contribute to the Western alliance. In the years following the creation of the North Atlantic alliance, France obtained support from allies that might otherwise have strongly opposed France's colonial policies in Africa and Asia.

The North Atlantic Treaty was the main component of the West's strategy to prevent further Soviet expansion in Europe. The communist threat, however, affected the entire world. The United States was just as concerned about communism undermining Western economic and political power around the world as it was about the threat to Europe. Yet limited resources forced the United States to rely on such countries as Britain and France to help contain communist expansion in the developing world. In the early years of the Cold War, the Americans expected British and French power to maintain Western spheres of influence in their colonies and former colonies.<sup>65</sup> Necessity thus compelled the United States to help its war-weakened European allies maintain their influence in their colonies without losing sight of the long-term dangers inherent in

---

<sup>65</sup> Stephen Lee, *Outposts of Empire*, 6.

supporting the European colonial regimes.

American policymakers worried that if the colonial powers denied the ambitions of moderate colonial nationalists they would turn to communism to secure nationalist aims, thereby ultimately upsetting the balance of power between the West and the Soviet Union.<sup>66</sup> This consideration reinforced traditional American anti-colonialism and spawned contradictory impulses in American foreign policy in the early years of the Cold War. The United States balanced short-term political and military support for its European allies with encouraging them in the long-term to adopt liberal colonial policies to maintain the pro-Western outlook of colonial nationalists. The Central Intelligence Agency observed in December 1948 that the continued decline in the influence of the colonial powers appeared inevitable and that the Soviet Union would take advantage of this weakness to extend its sway into traditionally Western spheres of influence. According to the CIA, the European powers needed to establish “a new relationship with their colonial and semi-colonial peoples more quickly than the USSR could exploit the breakdown of previous authority.”<sup>67</sup> The reluctance of the European powers to undertake colonial reforms, however, made it difficult to find an acceptable balance between these contradictory short and long-term policies.

The Canadian government exhibited signs of contradictory policies similar to those of the American government in the early years of the Cold War. Though Canada’s

---

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>67</sup> Truman Library, Truman Papers, PSF, box 205, CIA memo, *Review of the World Situation*, 16 September 1948 as quoted in Ibid, 6.

first concern was the communist threat to the North Atlantic community and the rest of Europe by 1950 it became increasingly involved with developments on the periphery of the North Atlantic. The victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea in 1950 and the Communist-led insurgency in French Indochina, for example, focused the attention of the West on East Asia. Denis Stairs demonstrated that even if the Canadian government disagreed with the United States about aspects the conduct of the Korean War, it supported completely the conflict's anti-Communist agenda.<sup>68</sup> Similarly, Steven Lee has recently compared American, British and Canadian policy towards Southeast Asia in the early 1950s and concluded that the Canadian government recognised the need to sustain "indigenous centres of pro-Western influence" in order to contain the Communist threat in East Asia.<sup>69</sup>

The threat of Communist expansion was obviously greatest in the Far East in 1950 yet was not negligible elsewhere in the developing world. In June 1951, the North Atlantic Council of Deputies concluded that the Soviet Union would exploit colonial nationalism wherever nationalists felt frustrated by the slow pace of colonial reform. The allies believed that the Soviets intended to champion colonial peoples in the United

---

<sup>68</sup> Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974). For a recent account of Canada's military involvement in Korea, see David J. Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: the Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

<sup>69</sup> Lee, 27. See also James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Volume 5: Indochina, Roots of Complicity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983) and Douglas Ross, In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984).

Nations, to extend their influence through Communist-led nationalist movements and to weaken the colonial powers by striking at their bases of political and economic power.<sup>70</sup>

The Canadian, British and American governments also believed that France's colonies were particularly vulnerable to anti-Western propaganda because of France's reluctance to adopt meaningful reforms leading to colonial self-government.

After the Second World War, Britain anticipated that its colonies would eventually become self-governing members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The French envisaged a much more formal relationship with its dependent territories even after colonial reform. The French Union, established in 1946, established a federal union of France, its colonies and territories, but France maintained control of the Union's foreign, defence and economic policy.<sup>71</sup> The French considered the Union a step towards the creation of a greater France and declared it one and indivisible. With France opposed to significant measures of colonial self-government, nationalists in several French colonies began to chafe under French rule.

Like Indochina, French North Africa rapidly attracted the attention of the members of the North Atlantic alliance in the early 1950s. Technically, neither Tunisia nor Morocco was a French colony. Treaties signed with the Sultan of Morocco in 1912 and the Bey of Tunis in 1881 allowed the French to conduct foreign affairs and some

---

<sup>70</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4539 file 50030-AF-40 pt 2. United States Document. *Main Basis for Soviet Foreign Policy*. 16 June 1951, NAC RG 25, Vol. 4539 file 50030-AF-40 pt 2. Brief for the UK Deputy on the North Atlantic Council of Deputies. *Main Basis of Soviet Foreign Policy*. 16 June 1951 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4539 file 50030-AF-40 pt 2. Memo from European Division. *Soviet Foreign Policy*. 18 June 1951.

<sup>71</sup> John Chipman, *French Power in Africa* (Cambridge, Ma: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989), 93-7.

internal affairs for the two protectorates but did not surrender formal sovereignty to France. Nevertheless France exercised virtually untrammelled rule in Tunisia and Morocco through its Resident-Generals in Tunis and Rabat, its control of the political process and through the influential French minorities in each protectorate.<sup>72</sup> Inspired by the wave of nationalism in and the decolonisation of several Arab states, including Pakistan in 1947 and the proposed creation of an independent state in Libya in 1952, nationalist movements increasingly demanded an end to French rule in Tunisia and Morocco in the early 1950s.

Canadian officials sympathised with the nationalists in North Africa. France, wrote Canadian Ambassador to France Georges Vanier, granted too few concessions to the nationalists and he believed the situation would deteriorate unless the French found “the imagination and the courage” to accommodate Tunisian and Moroccan nationalism.<sup>73</sup> Vanier praised France’s political, social and economic initiatives in North Africa, but observed that the French needed to initiate substantial reforms by including a greater number of native Arabs into the administration of Tunisia and Morocco as well as promising them future independence.<sup>74</sup> In dealing with nationalism in this way, Vanier

---

<sup>72</sup> In Tunisia, for example, the French Resident-General possessed a veto over all legislation, French members held a majority of the positions on the Council of Ministers until August 1950 at which time the membership was evenly divided between French and Tunisians, and the small French population of 150,000 supplied approximately 75% of Tunisia’s civil servants. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.1. Des D-820. *Political Situation in Tunisia*. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 11 September 1950.

<sup>73</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.1. Des 10. *Political Situation in Tunisia: Tunisian Nationalism*. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 15 January 1951 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3283 file 6938-B-40. Des 1568. *French policy in Morocco*. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 30 October 1951.

<sup>74</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3012 file 3618-C-40 pt 1. Des 649. *Political Situation in Morocco: Moroccan nationalism*. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 27 April 1951.

believed that France could maintain a close relationship with and at least indirect influence over its North African protectorates. Failure to satisfy nationalist demands in Tunisia and Morocco, argued Vanier, would provoke bad feelings towards France among the North Africans as well as some of France's NATO allies. It would also offer the Soviet bloc "tempting opportunities for trouble-making."<sup>75</sup> There was not likely to be an armed uprising in the protectorates, but the West could not afford to ignore the strength of nationalist sentiment in a region whose strategic importance was growing during the Cold War. This became even more evident as Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists gained support from an increasing number of Third World states.

In October 1951 the governments of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen complained to the United Nations that France had violated the UN's Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by its rule in Morocco. These states wanted the United Nations to hold a debate on Morocco. After discussing whether or not to add a Moroccan item to the UN's agenda, the Assembly adopted a Canadian proposal to defer consideration of this question.<sup>76</sup> The issue could not be put off forever, however. The outbreak of nationalist riots and violence in Tunisia in January 1952 provoked repressive measures by the French to restore order. The French reinforced their military in Tunisia with elements of the Foreign Legion, censored the press, banned the Neo-Destour nationalist party and arrested many Tunisian leaders including Habib Bourguiba

---

<sup>75</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3283 file 6938-B-40. Des 1568. *French policy in Morocco*. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 30 October 1951.

and the Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Chenik.

On January 14, 1952, Prime Minister Chenik appealed to the President of the UN's Security Council to bring the situation in Tunisia to the attention of the Council. In April, eleven African and Asian states similarly requested an immediate session of the Security Council to discuss the deteriorating situation in Tunisia.<sup>77</sup> David Johnson, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN, foresaw problems for the United Nations whether or not the Security Council considered the dispute. According to Johnson, discussing Tunisia would open a Pandora's Box of nationalist agitation and increase the difficulties facing France, Britain and the other colonial powers in the United Nations. On the other hand, he also recognised that "the resulting animosity within the United Nations between the colonial and anti-colonial countries [was] scarcely likely to be less than if the case is heard."<sup>78</sup> In the end, the Security Council denied the request for a special session on Tunisia. France and Britain had voted against it while the United States, Greece, the Netherlands and Turkey, the other NATO members on the Council, abstained.

Disappointed with the narrow-mindedness of the Security Council, Jawaharlal Nehru sent an *aide memoire* to Canada and the other Western countries expressing his view that denying the wishes of a large group of Third World nations based on the narrow self-interests of one country jeopardised the Third World's faith in the United

---

<sup>76</sup> For a more detailed description of this subject, see Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1951-52 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1952), 26-8.

<sup>77</sup> See Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1952-53 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1953), 16-9.



Nations.<sup>79</sup> The Indian government wanted Canada and the other Western states to support the next attempt to raise the Tunisian issue in the General Assembly of the United Nations in the summer of 1952. Louis St. Laurent had great respect for Nehru and others within the Canadian government firmly believed that democratic India could play a vital role in bridging the gap between the West and the other Asian and Third World states.<sup>80</sup> Indian support for Tunisian and Moroccan nationalism thus forced the Canadian government to consider how its policy towards North African issues at the United Nations would affect its relations with India and the rest of the Third World.

In the spring of 1952, Morley Scott of the United Nations Division compiled the arguments in favour of Canadian support for a special session on Tunisia. Scott argued that since the required majority of 30 states would likely endorse the special session, the NATO members should not oppose it as they had done in the Security Council.<sup>81</sup> Scott reminded his superiors that while NATO members were a majority on the Security Council, they had only 12 of 60 votes in the General Assembly and would be in the minority if they opposed the Tunisian motion. Canadian support for the motion on Tunisia, in contrast, would prove to the Third World states that Canada was prepared to

---

<sup>78</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.2. Mes 149. *Security Council – Tunisia*. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York to SSEA. 3 April 1952.

<sup>79</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.3. Mes 2. *Tunisia*. High Commissioner, New Delhi to SSEA. 23 April 1952.

<sup>80</sup> Escott Reid was one of the most ardent supporters of a 'special relationship' between Canada and India within the Department of External Affairs. See Escott Reid, *Envoy to Nehru* (London: Oxford University Press, 1981).

<sup>81</sup> In the Security Council, France and Britain voted against while the United States, Greece, the Netherlands and Turkey all abstained on the Afro-Asian motion.

listen to their grievances in the United Nations and it would allay Third World suspicions that NATO members would unite to prevent the embarrassment of one of their allies. Given the competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds of the Third World, Scott believed that the West could not afford to be arrayed against the majority on such an important issue as Third World nationalism.<sup>82</sup> Finally, Scott also argued that Canada had always taken the position that Article 14 of the UN's Charter gave the General Assembly wide authority to discuss subjects that posed a danger to the international community. He cited then Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent's 1946 statement that the "United Nations should review any situation, no matter the origin, which it deems likely to impair general welfare or friendly relations among nations."<sup>83</sup> Canada's interests, as seen from the UN Division, thus compelled it to support a motion to discuss Tunisia in the United Nations.

In response to Scott's memo Charles Ritchie argued that Canada should oppose the Afro-Asian motion on Tunisia. Ritchie argued that while colonialism was outdated and that the desire of the North Africans for independence could not be resisted indefinitely, Canada's immediate interests pointed in the opposite direction to that endorsed by Scott. Canada, wrote Ritchie, might "win friends and influence people" in the Arab and Asian states by supporting them on Tunisia, but doing so would jeopardise its relationship with France, one of the mainstays of the North Atlantic Alliance in

---

<sup>82</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.2. Memo. *Tunisia and the United Nations*. S. Morley Scott to Acting USSEA. 21 April 1952.

<sup>83</sup> As quoted in *ibid*.

Europe. Ritchie felt that Canada's policy on Tunisia should be guided by the effect a special session on Tunisia would likely have "on the capacity of France to play its part in the defence of Europe and of South-East Asia."<sup>84</sup> Even Trygve Lie, the Secretary General of the United Nations, confidentially viewed the situation in these terms. Earlier in April Lie had told Canada's representative to the UN that "the vital issue facing free peoples is preventing the spread of Communism. A strong France and a strong United Kingdom ... are essential bulwarks in this cause."<sup>85</sup>

According to Ritchie, the object of Canadian policy should be to avoid weakening France by giving the Communists and Arab and Asian nationalists a forum to attack French policy in North Africa. Ritchie also argued that the French would clearly regard Canadian support for a special session on Tunisia as an unfriendly act, aggravating the bitterness they felt over the burden they felt France was already bearing on behalf of the West in Indochina. The Tunisian issue had the potential to harm NATO if the allies did not try to prevent the United Nations from discussing France's North African difficulties. Instead, Ritchie wanted the Canadian government to trade its opposition to a special session on Tunisia in the United Nations for the opportunity to consult with France about its North African policies in the private confines of the North Atlantic Council.<sup>86</sup>

In its reply to the Indian *aide memoire*, the Canadian government clearly

---

<sup>84</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.3. Memo. *Tunisia and the United Nations*. C. S. A. Ritchie to Acting USSEA. 22 April 1952.

<sup>85</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.2. Mes 195. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York to SSEA. 18 April 1952.

demonstrated that it considered the unity of the North Atlantic alliance more important than its relations with Third World states and Third World nationalism. Canada had to balance “the longer term and fundamental issue of progress toward self-government and freedom against the short-term problem of preserving a strong and united Western European and North American peace coalition against the aggressive and subversive designs of international communism acting as the spearhead of Russian imperialism.”<sup>87</sup> Consequently, the Canadian government decided not to support a special session to discuss the Tunisian problem in the United Nations in the spring and summer of 1952.<sup>88</sup> Cold War considerations of alliance compelled the Canadian government to support France against the nationalist threat to its rule in North Africa. All other considerations, including the importance of Canada’s relations with India and Pakistan, were secondary.

Canadian officials hoped that the French could be persuaded to liberalise their policies towards their North African protectorates before the nationalist issue was raised again in the United Nations in the fall of 1952. The Americans were known to be pressuring the French government to grant autonomy to Tunisia and Morocco.<sup>89</sup> The Canadian government likewise considered airing its concerns about North Africa in the North Atlantic Council. Yet the intransigence of the French government undermined

---

<sup>86</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 1.3. Memo. *Tunisia and the United Nations*. C. S. A. Ritchie to Acting USSEA. 22 April 1952.

<sup>87</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 2.1. *Oral Statement in reply to Indian Aide Memoire of April 23*.

<sup>88</sup> Canada was one of 27 countries that voted against the Afro-Asian motion versus 23 in favour with two abstentions.

<sup>89</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 2.1. Memo. Escott Reid to SSEA. 10 May 1952.

Canadian and American hopes for successful intervention. M. Lacoste, Deputy French Representative in New York, told his Canadian counterpart that France would never leave North Africa and that any reforms had to be accomplished within the framework of French rights there. René Pleven, the French Foreign Minister, also warned the Canadian government that France foresaw a grave crisis in Franco-American relations if the United States did not relent from its support of nationalist movements in Tunisia and Morocco.<sup>90</sup> Because they worried about how the French would react, both the Canadian and American governments decided against discussing the situation in North Africa in the North Atlantic Council in mid-1952.

The need to bolster France, and thus preserve the unity of the Atlantic alliance, guided Canadian policy when the Tunisian and Moroccan items were again raised in the United Nations in the fall. Canadian officials worried that criticism of its North African policies by its NATO allies would cause France to reject the European Defence Community treaty or to withdraw from Indochina. Even worse, criticism could lead to the fall of the present French government and its replacement by one more inimical to NATO.<sup>91</sup> Concern for French sensitivities thus led Pearson to reject the American suggestion that Canada join the United States in urging the French to adopt reforms in

---

<sup>90</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 2.2. Mes 397. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York to SSEA. 30 June 1952 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8387 file 11033-40 pt 2.1. Mes 482. Ambassador, Paris to SSEA. 22 May 1952.

<sup>91</sup> See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40 pt 4.1. Memo. SSEA to Cabinet. *Tunisian and Moroccan questions at the 7<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly of the United Nations*. 6 October 1952 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40. Memo. *Tunisia*. L. D. Willess to SSEA. 26 August 1952.

North Africa.<sup>92</sup> Pearson believed that France would resent unsolicited advice from Canada on what it should do either in North Africa or the United Nations.

The Canadian government did attempt to achieve some balance in its treatment of the North African issues at the United Nations in the fall of 1952. Unlike the spring, the Canadian government did not oppose inscription of Tunisian and Moroccan items on the UN's agenda in October 1952. Several factors motivated this decision. The Department of External Affairs' own legal advisers, for example, concluded that the United Nations had ample authority under Article 10 of its Charter to discuss Tunisian and Moroccan affairs, the French objection about interference in its domestic jurisdiction notwithstanding.<sup>93</sup> The government may also have been influenced by expressions of support for discussions of Tunisia and Morocco in the Canadian press.<sup>94</sup> Nevertheless, the government hoped that a simple discussion of the Tunisian and Moroccan situations and Canadian support for "mild and constructive moves which might encourage the French to press on with measures leading in the direction of self-government for Tunisia" would satisfy the Arab and Asian states.<sup>95</sup> Canada would do what it could, however, to prevent the adoption of resolutions that severely criticised France.

The Cabinet instructed the Canadian delegation to the seventh session of the

---

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40. Memo. *Tunisia: Competence of the General Assembly to Discuss and Intervene*. Legal Division. 27 August 1952.

<sup>94</sup> The *Globe and Mail* and the *Winnipeg Free Press*, for example, both editorialised that the United Nations could play a beneficial role in helping to ease tensions over Tunisia and Morocco and other such difficult issues. See *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 10 October 1952, 6, *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), 15 December 1952, 6 and *The Winnipeg Free Press* 24 October 1952, 21.

United Nations that it should endeavour “to prevent any severe or malicious criticism of France [over Tunisia and Morocco] which might produce a crisis in that country.”<sup>96</sup> Canada thus adopted a middle line between the Soviet and Afro-Asian blocs on the one hand who sought self-government for Tunisia and Morocco, and the French, British, Australians, Belgians and South Africans who argued that the United Nations had no authority to intervene in France’s domestic jurisdiction. Canada voted against resolutions that urged France to establish normal relations and normal civil liberties in its North African protectorates and called for a committee of good offices to assist in the negotiations between France and the North African nationalists. Canada did vote in favour of resolutions expressing confidence that France would continue the development of free institutions in North Africa.<sup>97</sup> The Canadian delegation expressed faith in France’s intentions towards Tunisia and Morocco and stressed that it should be allowed to fulfil them without interference from the United Nations.<sup>98</sup> Ultimately, a majority of the still-Western dominated United Nations supported the mild resolutions and France escaped censure.

During the debate on Tunisia in the UN’s First Committee Paul Martin Sr., then Minister of National Health and Welfare, stated that Canadians “know the irresistible

---

<sup>95</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40. *Tunisia – Policy Guidance*. 2 October 1952.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> Canada, *Canada and the United Nations, 1952-53*, 18.

<sup>98</sup> French officials repeatedly told the Canadian government that “France is determined to lead Morocco and Tunisia to democratic self-administration” but they insisted that responsibility for this lay with France and its protectorates, not with the United Nations. See for example NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40 pt 4.1. Memo. *The French Position on Tunisia and Morocco*. L. D. Wilgress to SSEA. 29 October 1952.

strength – because we have felt it ourselves – of the urge for freedom which develops in all national groups still subject to external control.”<sup>99</sup> The Canadian government also knew that “our interests will probably not be served best by blind support of the French ‘presence’ in Tunisia” and that France needed to reach an accommodation with the nationalists in North Africa in the long-term.<sup>100</sup> Such long-term considerations, however, played a secondary role in the formulation of Canadian policy. As long as France remained adamant on maintaining its position in North Africa Canada had to protect France from its attackers. Britain and the United States reached similar conclusions about the need to support France. The alternative risked alienating a key Western ally and weakening the ability of the North Atlantic alliance to contain the aggression of the Communist bloc. The importance of keeping France a strong and loyal member of the anti-Communist Western alliance outweighed all other considerations.

France also experienced difficulties with nationalism in Indochina where the Communist Viet Minh sought to eliminate all vestiges of French rule from Vietnam and the entire region. Steven Lee has demonstrated that though the United States, Canada and Britain maintained suspicions about continued French colonialism in Indochina the United States was convinced that France needed aid in its operations against communism in order to prevent the complete collapse of Western influence in Southeast Asia.<sup>101</sup> The

---

<sup>99</sup> *Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin in the First Committee on the Tunisian Question*, 9 December 1952 in Canada, Department of External Affairs. *Statements and Speeches*.

<sup>100</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40. *Tunisia – Policy Guidance*. 2 October 1952.

<sup>101</sup> Lee, *Outposts of Empire*, 49.



United States was prepared to sacrifice its long-term interest in the promotion of stable, pro-Western nationalist governments in Indochina to the short-term necessity of using French troops to combat Communism on behalf of the entire Western community. Lee has shown that Britain and Canada also supported the French position in Indochina in order to deny Vietnam to the Communists. The Canadian government was reluctant to see military force used to contain communism in Indochina but genuinely believed in the importance of “establishing a pro-Western state on China’s southern periphery.”<sup>102</sup> The Canadian government agreed with the Americans that the West’s long-term interests in Indochina required France to devolve even more power to the moderate nationalists like Bao Dai in Vietnam, but in the short-term Canada was prepared to support France in its struggle against the Viet Minh.

Canadian policy towards Indochina in this period thus mirrored its policy towards French rule in North Africa, with one important difference. The French were actively engaged in military operations against armed insurrectionists in Indochina, a situation which had not yet arisen in North Africa. Furthermore, the French government believed that it was fighting in defence of the interests of the entire North Atlantic alliance in Indochina. Consequently, it expected its NATO allies to provide military aid to help France conduct the war. On December 17, 1952 the French government succeeded in having the NATO Council accept that “the campaign waged by the French forces in

---

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 135.

Indochina deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.”<sup>103</sup> The United States provided over one billion dollars worth of aid to the French effort in Indochina between 1951 and 1953 and France expected similar help from Canada.<sup>104</sup> The *Defence Appropriation Act* of 1950, however, limited the use of military supplies from Canada to the defence of Western Europe. This law did not prevent the French government from asking, in June 1952, for Canada’s permission to divert Canadian Mutual Aid equipment including anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition to Indochina.<sup>105</sup>

Lester Pearson believed that France’s war against communism in Indochina deserved Canada’s support. Prime Minister St. Laurent and Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton, however, worried that sending Canadian military supplies to help France retain colonial control in Southeast Asia would provoke public criticism in Canada.<sup>106</sup> In July and August 1952, St. Laurent tried to find a way to meet France’s request without explicitly implicating Canada in the use of force against France’s rebel colony. St. Laurent himself proposed to his Cabinet that the French either purchase the equipment outright or that France replace the Canadian equipment sent to Indochina so that French forces in Europe were not deprived of adequate supplies.<sup>107</sup> Neither of these options proved practical. Consequently, when the NATO Standing Group indicated that

---

<sup>103</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4886 file 50115-J-40 pt 2. Mes 757. *Ministerial Meeting of the Council*. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Paris to SSEA. 17 December 1952.

<sup>104</sup> Lee, *Outposts of Empire*, 126.

<sup>105</sup> James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume 4: Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 150.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

<sup>107</sup> NAC, RG 2 [Privy Council Office Records], Series A-5-a. *Cabinet Minutes*. 31 July 1952.

transferring the equipment to Indochina would benefit French forces in Europe, thus fulfilling the intentions of the *Defence Appropriations Act*, St. Laurent's Cabinet colleagues approved the transfer.<sup>108</sup>

Despite St. Laurent's reservations, which stemmed in part from assurances he had made to the House of Commons in 1948 and 1949 that Canada would not support the defence of European control of their dependencies through NATO,<sup>109</sup> the Canadian government endorsed France's efforts to subdue the communist insurgency in Indochina. The Cabinet agreed to send the Mutual Aid equipment that France wanted to France itself. The French were told, however, that what they did with the supplies once they arrived in France was of no concern to the Canadian government.<sup>110</sup> St. Laurent had allowed the transfer of Canadian military equipment to Indochina to proceed, but he insisted that Canada distance itself from the use of its equipment against movements for national liberation. If the French government sent the equipment to Indochina without telling the Canadian government of its intentions, Canada could deny any responsibility for the way France used its military equipment.

The desire of dependent peoples around the world for self-government profoundly shook the global community in the aftermath of the Second World War, challenging the established global order and demanding an end to European rule in large parts of Africa and Asia. The process of establishing independent states from the wreckage of the

---

<sup>108</sup> NAC, RG 2, Series A-5-a. *Cabinet Minutes*. 14 August 1952.

<sup>109</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4508 file 50030-L-5-40. *Cabinet Defence Committee Minutes*. 26 August 1952.

French, British and other colonial empires, however, was neither rapid nor painless and often provoked bitter struggles between colonial nationalists and their European rulers. Like the rest of the world, the Canadian government was forced to try to adapt to the changes brought on by nationalist pressures in the developing world. Yet the post-war period also witnessed the intensification of the Cold War between the West and the East. Consequently, the Canadian government had to balance its desire to embrace the principle of self-determination for dependent peoples against its need for security from communist aggression. The Canadian government spoke about the need to accommodate colonial nationalism, but its policy towards colonial issues never corresponded to the level of its rhetoric.

---

<sup>110</sup> Thomson, Louis St. Laurent, 203-5

## **CHAPTER TWO: TEMPERED SYMPATHY**

Bolstered by the international support their cause had garnered among Third World states, nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco continued to agitate for independence from France throughout the early 1950s. Heightened tension between the North African nationalists and the French settlers and the government of France led to increasing acts of repression and violence in the two protectorates. In August 1953 the French deposed the pro-nationalist Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef, and both nationalists and French settlers committed a series of retaliatory killings in Tunisia throughout the summer of 1953.<sup>111</sup> The desperate situation in North Africa convinced the Arab-Asian states that the United Nations had to intervene again to force the French government to acquiesce to the demands of the Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists.

When the Arab-Asian states raised this issue in the United Nations in the fall of 1953, the French again denied the competence of the United Nations to interfere in France's domestic affairs. The United States, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Australia all supported France's legal interpretation of the limits to the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The Canadian delegation, however, continued to uphold the right of the General Assembly to discuss issues such as the problems in North Africa while endeavouring to protect its French ally from embarrassing or harmful resolutions. In

---

<sup>111</sup> For a description of the internal history of the nationalist movements in Tunisia and Morocco, see for example Stéphane Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, 1943-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) or Dwight L. Ling, Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative History (Washington: University Press of America, 1979).

practice, this meant that the Canadian delegation voted in favour of discussing the Tunisian and Moroccan items, but voted against the resolutions put forth by the Arab-Asian members designed to condemn the French for failing to negotiate independence with the North African nationalists.<sup>112</sup> In the meantime, the French government gradually recognised that its repressive tactics had only provoked nationalist violence and that its attempts at reform had failed to mollify either the nationalists or the French settlers. When Pierre Mendès-France, the Prime Minister of France, visited Tunisia on 31 July 1954 he therefore announced that his government would grant Tunisia complete internal sovereignty while only retaining control of its foreign and defence policies.<sup>113</sup> This announcement came only ten days after the signing of the Geneva Accords on the partition of Indochina. Similar concessions to Morocco took longer, but also followed within another year.

It thus appeared that within a few short months the French government had committed itself to withdrawing from its dependencies in Indochina and in North Africa. Yet by acting to resolve its problems with nationalism in Morocco and Tunisia, the French government only provoked similar nationalist agitation in the third, and most important, of the French territories in North Africa. Algeria, sandwiched between Morocco and Tunisia, could not remain unaffected by the currents engulfing its neighbours. The great majority of its native people shared the Arabic language, the

---

<sup>112</sup> See the discussion of the Tunisian and Moroccan items in 1953 in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1953-54, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1954), 20-23.

Islamic religion and many aspects of a common cultural heritage with the Moroccans to the west and the Tunisians to the east. They too felt the upsurge in Arab nationalism that took place in the Middle East and North Africa following the Second World War and they too could look to the newly formed Arab League and Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt for inspiration and support. It was thus only natural that Algerian nationalists would crave the same self-government that the government of Mendès-France had recently conceded to Tunisia. On 1 November 1954, a band of from 700 to 3,000 Algerian guerrillas opened their military campaign to wrest Algeria's independence from France.<sup>114</sup>

Algeria, however, was neither Morocco nor Tunisia. While the French government had proven itself willing, if reluctant, to move towards self-government for Tunisia and Morocco several factors compelled a vastly different response towards Algerian nationalism. Firstly, Algeria possessed a different legal status than either Tunisia or Morocco. France had obtained rights in Tunisia and Morocco as a result of treaties it signed with the Bey of Tunis in 1881 and the Sultan of Morocco in 1912, but these two states were both nominally sovereign countries. Algeria, on the other hand, had never been an independent country and French rule stemmed from the conquest of Algiers and its surrounding territory in 1830. Furthermore, the coastal lands of Algeria had been organised into three departments and incorporated into Metropolitan France itself in 1871. The French government claimed it could no more countenance the

---

<sup>113</sup> Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, 1944-1968, Elaine Halperin trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 150.

<sup>114</sup> Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), 79.

independence of these departments than it could the independence of Normandy, Brittany or Corsica. Secondly, there were one million French settlers out of a total population of approximately ten million people in Algeria by 1954. Many of their families had lived in Algeria for several generations and most of them considered it, and not France, their home. Their determination to remain in Algeria made the *pieds-noir* a very vocal group that was able to exercise tremendous political power to shape the Algerian policy of successive French governments to their liking. By comparison, the French settler populations in Morocco and Tunisia were much smaller and less politically influential. Thirdly, the French had built up a larger pool of economic investments in Algeria than in any other of France's colonies, making it, by far, France's richest colony.

One cannot discount the effect that considerations of France's glory, prestige and honour also had on arousing the hostility of many French people towards Algerian nationalism in 1954. Algeria was France's oldest and richest colony and many in France believed that France's international prestige would not survive its loss. For over a century prior to the Second World War, colonial possessions had bolstered Europe's dominance in the world and many in France found it difficult to accept that this situation had changed. For them, France's power and the respect it commanded internationally depended upon the maintenance of French rule in Algeria.<sup>115</sup> This belief was especially prominent among those officers and soldiers who wanted to redeem the French Army's

---

<sup>115</sup> The French were not alone in this belief. Some members of the foreign policy establishment in Ottawa, such as Henry Davis, also believed that losing Algeria would diminish the influence of France in world events. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7043 file 6938-40 pt 9. Des 1091. H. F. Davis to SSEA. 6 June 1955.



honour and reputation after the humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May of 1954.<sup>116</sup> When the powerful French settlers in Algeria demanded the suppression of the Algerian revolt after November of 1954, the French government, the French Army and a majority of the French people rallied to their cause. What ensued was a bitter war between France and the Algerian nationalist movement that lasted from 1954 to 1962, costing tens of thousands of French and Algerian lives and hundreds of millions of dollars in damages and expenditures. It also seriously undermined the political stability of France, occupied a prominent place in the affairs of the United Nations and affected the relations between France and its NATO allies throughout this eight-year period.

France's determination to remain in Algeria posed a significant problem for the Canadian government. In 1952 and 1953, the Canadian government had endorsed negotiations between France and nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco in order to bring about the gradual independence of the two protectorates. How could it now deny that the principle of self-determination applied to the people of Algeria as well? Yet France's vehement opposition to the nationalist uprising in Algeria raised the prospect that the Canadian government would have to continue placating its NATO ally despite its support for the principle of self-determination. Canadian sympathy for the aspirations of the Algerian people would have to be tempered by "the basic fact that the outcome of events

---

<sup>116</sup> Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, chs. 2-4. These chapters give a complete analysis of the roots of French resistance to the idea of an independent Algeria.

in French North Africa directly affects European and North Atlantic security.”<sup>117</sup>

Guided by this consideration, Canadian officials seemed content to let France try to suppress the rebellion in Algeria for most of 1955. Strategically, French-controlled Algeria contributed to NATO’s interests in the Mediterranean area. It helped secure Western lines of communication through the Mediterranean Sea; it contributed to the operations of the Strategic Air Command; and it augmented France’s capacity to meet its military obligations to NATO and the Supreme Allied Command – Europe [SACEUR]. Jules Léger, then the Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, worried that a serious disturbance of French authority in Algeria could have an adverse affect on NATO’s position in the Mediterranean and even Western Europe.<sup>118</sup> Many Canadian officials also believed that the maintenance of France’s international power depended on a favourable solution to its Algerian difficulties and that French authority in North Africa was the only alternative to anarchy.<sup>119</sup> Finally, French rule ensured that Algeria remained Western-oriented instead of succumbing to anti-Western forces such as communism or the Arab League led by Egypt. The West thus had much at stake, at least in the short term, in France maintaining its position in Algeria. Had France succeeded in pacifying the Algerian nationalists quickly, the Canadian government would have had no great cause

---

<sup>117</sup> Canadian diplomat M. N. Bow expressed this thought in the summer of 1955. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, European Division to USSEA, 21 July 1955.

<sup>118</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, USSEA to European Division, 6 September 1955.

<sup>119</sup> These latter points were articulated by M. N. Bow, one of those in the Department of External Affairs who took a strongly realist view of the Algerian conflict. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, European Division to USSEA, 21 July 1955. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, European Division to USSEA, 23 August 1955.

for complaint.

At first, the American and British governments shared this attitude towards the rebellion in Algeria. Prior to mid-1955, the United States was also prepared to tolerate France's colonial aims in North Africa so long as the nationalist troubles there were disposed of quickly and quietly.<sup>120</sup> Britain, as a colonial power itself, was even more solidly behind the French efforts to restore peace and calm to Algeria. The British recognised that if it did not support France, their own colonial interests might suffer a similar attack from the international community. Consequently, British officials pledged their government's complete political and moral support for France's policies in Algeria and North Africa more generally.<sup>121</sup> Both the American and British approach to these issues would change in subsequent years, but all of France's principal allies were prepared to give the French government free rein to suppress the nationalist movement during the initial stages of the Algerian revolt.

The French, however, realised that pronouncements of support for France often masked their allies' ambivalent feelings towards France's commitments in North Africa, especially since other Western governments could not prevent criticism of France from reaching the French government. Henry Davis, a Canadian diplomat in Paris, noted the difficulties Western governments had in convincing the French of the sincerity of their support. "Soothing declarations from Messrs. Dulles and Dillon may reassure the French

---

<sup>120</sup> Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, France and the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago 1978), 204.

government,” observed Davis, “but are just not sufficient to offset the wide and damaging publicity of *Time* and *Life* magazines, roving senators and other influential Americans who allegedly grasp at any occasion to distort facts or give a one-sided picture of the situation [in Algeria].”<sup>122</sup> Suspicious of the fidelity of its friends, the French government remained sensitive to indications that the United States, Britain, Canada and the other NATO allies opposed French policy towards Algeria.

France was not able, however, to suppress the Algerian revolt and this failure began to alter the way Canadian and other Western officials perceived the conflict. In September 1955, Jules Léger began to argue that France’s unrealistic policies in Algeria “... could have disastrous effects” including prolonged bloodshed, chaos and the creation of weak states in North Africa controlled by the Arab League. “It is in our interests,” wrote Léger, “that such developments be avoided.”<sup>123</sup> Léger expressed his belief that France should maintain some control over Algeria’s foreign and defence policies, but like the rest of Africa Algeria would almost assuredly achieve self-government within a generation. The large number of new states created from Europe’s empires would then be in a position to affect Western interests adversely if the NATO countries could not maintain their friendship or at least benign neutrality. Given this, Léger thought that

---

<sup>121</sup> The British government informed the Canadian government that this reasoning would guide the British delegation during the United Nations’ debates on Algeria in the fall of 1955. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, United Kingdom Commonwealth Relations Office to DEA, 8 October 1955.

<sup>122</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 7.1, Letter 1333, *Tunisia – A Test Case of French Policy*, H. F. Davis (in Paris) to USSEA, 11 July 1955. See also the accounts of Franco-American and Franco-British relations during this period in Martin Thomas, *The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations 1945-1962* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).

encouraging France to deal liberally with the demands of the Algerian nationalists would serve NATO's interests better than a drawn out nationalist conflict. This argument became even more persuasive as Canadian officials realised that France could only maintain its position in Algeria at the expense of its commitments to NATO.

Two events in 1955 helped convince the Canadian government to adopt a long-term analysis of the conflict in Algeria. The first was the inauguration of the non-aligned movement in world affairs at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 by such Third World states as India, Pakistan and Egypt. At this conference, Third World states condemned colonialism and announced their intention to agitate for the independence of Europe's remaining colonies in Africa and Asia.<sup>124</sup> This anti-colonial position threatened to drive a wedge between the Third World states and the Western powers. The Canadian government desired friendly relations with Third World countries but began to fear that it would be implicated in its allies' colonial policies.<sup>125</sup> The second incident occurred in May 1955 when France reinforced its troops already in Algeria by withdrawing one of its Divisions from Germany.<sup>126</sup> The removal of the French troops to North Africa weakened NATO in Western Europe and exposed Canadian troops stationed in Germany to greater risks. It also convinced Lester B. Pearson, Jules Léger and others in Ottawa that France's

---

<sup>123</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, USSEA to European Division, 6 September 1955.

<sup>124</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7720 file 12173-40 pt 2.1, USSEA to Prime Minister, undated.

<sup>125</sup> In his book on Canada and the Cold War, Robert Bothwell depicts Canada's desire to maintain friendly relations with the growing number of Third World countries as one of the principal objectives of Canadian foreign policy during this period in the Cold War. Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Concord, Ont: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 49.

position in Algeria could only be maintained at the expense of its commitments to the defence of Europe.<sup>127</sup>

The anti-colonialism of the Bandung conference and the removal of French troops from NATO persuaded the Canadian government that France's approach to Algeria undermined Western interests. Independence for Algeria, on the other hand, would preserve the West's standing in North Africa and the Afro-Asian world while returning French troops to their duties in Europe. Crushing the rebels would not permanently solve the nationalist problem in Algeria. In March of 1956, Pearson himself wondered "if we hold colonial territories against the wishes of their inhabitants are we going to be stronger or weaker in the long run?"<sup>128</sup> A broad view of Western interests thus convinced the Canadian government to favour the eventual independence of Algeria. Some members of the Department of External Affairs resisted this change in policy,<sup>129</sup> yet the government decided to try to encourage France to respect the nationalist demands and stop the fighting in Algeria in the months following the Bandung Conference. The anti-colonialism of the Third World states in the aftermath of the Bandung Conference had a

---

<sup>126</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, R. A. D. Ford to Defence Liaison 1 & 2 Divisions, 25 May 1955.

<sup>127</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, European Division to USSEA, 23 August 1955, and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6846 file 3616-C-40 pt 2.1, USSEA to SSEA, 15 February 1956.

<sup>128</sup> Lester B. Pearson, "Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Press Conference, 21 March 1956" in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 1948-1962.

<sup>129</sup> M. N. Bow, for one, suggested that Canada follow the British example and pledge complete political and moral support for France's position in Algeria and North Africa. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4421 file 12177-40 pt 1, European Division to USSEA, 21 July 1955.

similar effect upon the government of the United States.<sup>130</sup> In this period, both the Canadian and the American governments planned to use the North Atlantic Council to counsel France to resolve the conflict in Algeria. Yet neither government anticipated the strength of France's opposition to outside interference in what it considered its domestic affairs.

The French had good reasons for being sensitive about the way their allies treated the Algerian problem in 1955. France itself was increasingly divided over the issue. The Communist Party in France advocated independence for Algeria but the parties of the Right were committed to maintaining *l'Algérie française*. Between them, they scuttled all attempts to reform the administration in Algeria.<sup>131</sup> Meanwhile, French citizens became more and more polarised between those demanding France's withdrawal from Algeria and those demanding all-out efforts to keep Algeria French. The impasse between these two extremes undermined France's political stability to such an extent that some observers anticipated the collapse of the French political system.<sup>132</sup> The French government worried that an open rift between itself and its NATO allies over Algeria

---

<sup>130</sup> After mid-1955, the American government became increasingly committed to urging France to grant self-determination to the Algerian people. The Americans also, however, respected the French government's sensitivity to interference in its affairs. Duroselle, *France and the United States*, 204 and Irwin M. Wall, "The United States, Algeria and the Fall of the Fourth Republic," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 18 (Fall 1994): 490.

<sup>131</sup> The political Left objected to reforms that fell short of complete independence for Algeria, while the political Right rejected reforms that weakened French rule the North African territory. See Frederick Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire* (Westport: Praeger, 2000).

<sup>132</sup> In January of 1956 Gladwyn Jebb, a senior official with the British Foreign Office, called the long-term prospects for stability in France "thoroughly disturbing" and worried that a coup might bring the Communists to power in Paris. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7043 file 6938-40 pt 9, United Kingdom Report, Gladwyn Jebb to Selwyn Lloyd, 30 January 1956.

would only exacerbate France's internal turmoil.

The French reaction to events at the United Nations in the fall of 1955 demonstrated the intensity of French feeling regarding Algeria. Earlier that year, 13 Afro-Asian states had tried to place a discussion of the situation in Algeria on the UN's agenda. France, Britain and the United States all argued that this proposal would violate Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations, the clause prohibiting United Nations' intervention into a member-states' domestic affairs. During the earlier debates on Tunisia and Morocco, the Canadian delegation had argued that the General Assembly could discuss any situation that it considered likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations between states. Nevertheless, the Canadian government also voted against inscribing an Algerian item on the UN's agenda, principally because it feared the French reaction to an affirmative vote. Subsequent events in New York proved the accuracy of this fear.

After the United Nations agreed to discuss an Algerian item by the slimmest of margins, the French delegation withdrew in protest from the General Assembly.<sup>133</sup> Only a compromise, partly orchestrated with Canadian help, whereby the UN decided not to proceed with the discussion on Algeria persuaded the French delegation to rejoin the General Assembly. This episode revealed the depths of French feelings about Algeria and determined the basic limits of Canada's approach to the Algerian issue for the next

---

<sup>133</sup> The Afro-Asian motion passed by a vote of 28 for to 27 opposed (including Canada) with 5 abstentions. Canada. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations 1954-55 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1956), 19.



several years because it demonstrated that above all, the Canadian government would be guided by the need to mollify France. It did not abandon its hope of encouraging France to adopt more liberal policies in Algeria yet it realised that France's intransigence on this issue severely limited the prospects of doing so. In the meantime, Article 2(7) allowed the Canadian government to cloak support for France in terms of respect for its domestic jurisdiction and expressions of sympathy for the plight of the colonial peoples.

As the conflict in Algeria dragged on into 1956, however, France experienced further difficulties convincing its allies that Algeria remained a problem for France alone to solve. With Communist-bloc support, Algerian nationalism was becoming a symbol in the Cold War struggle between East and West.<sup>134</sup> Egypt's financial and material support of the Algerian nationalists also worried Western officials.<sup>135</sup> Together, communist and Egyptian influences raised the spectre of the loss, one way or another, of Algeria to anti-Western forces. Even more damaging for Canada were accusations by the governments of Egypt and India that NATO provided military support for France's campaign against Algerian nationalism.<sup>136</sup> The longer the war in Algeria lasted the more NATO's prestige in Africa and Asia suffered by association with France. This situation worsened after 22

---

<sup>134</sup> Pearson wrote the Canadian Ambassador in Paris that "Arab nationalism is clearly one of the key battlegrounds in the new competition which is emerging between the Soviet bloc and NATO." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4887 file 50115-J-40 pt 8, Mes S-437, SSEA to Canadian Ambassador in Paris, 24 April 1956.

<sup>135</sup> In October 1956, the French Navy intercepted a shipment of arms bound for the Algerian rebels that had originated in Alexandria, Egypt. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 158.

<sup>136</sup> On 29 August 1955, the Canadian Chargé d'affaires in Cairo received an oral statement from the Egyptian government to the effect that the "Egyptian government considers the use of NATO forces and equipment in North Africa to be a hostile action directed against all Arabs, not only by France but also by all countries participating in NATO that acquiesced in these matters." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6858 file 4283-40 pt 5.1, Weekly Divisional Note, *Morocco and Algeria*, RAD Ford, 7 September 1955.

October 1956, when the French military forced a plane carrying five leaders of the Algerian *Front de libération nationale* from Morocco to Tunisia to land in Algiers. The arrest of the Algerian leaders caused anti-France and anti-Western riots throughout the Arab world.<sup>137</sup> For arguably little benefit, the French had only antagonised Arab and Afro-Asian sentiment. This was the type of incident that damaged the West as much as France and which prompted Canadian officials to begin considering plans to resolve the Algerian conflict multilaterally before the region was lost to communists or the Arab League.

One proposal that reached the Canadian Cabinet in 1956 advocated the creation of an independent but Western-oriented Maghreb state in North Africa encompassing Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Another suggested that the West should “plan with a view to relieving France of some of her [economic] burdens [in North Africa] and thus checking any communist initiative to take over France’s role in this area.”<sup>138</sup> The French government, however, never gave Canada the chance to proceed with these or any other suggestions about ways to resolve the conflict in Algeria. In March 1956 the French government withdrew another of its Divisions from Europe to cope with the deteriorating situation in Algeria. At the same time, the French asked the North Atlantic Council to declare its unqualified support for French aims in Algeria and North Africa. The Canadian government had intended to use the March meeting of the North Atlantic

---

<sup>137</sup> See, for example, the coverage of these riots in *The Globe and Mail*, 23 October to 2 November 1956.

Council to encourage the French to accept the principle of self-government for the Algerian people. Instead, fearful of giving the impression that NATO supported the suppression of colonial nationalism, the Canadian delegation to NATO was forced to dissipate its time working against the declaration of support for France.<sup>139</sup> By this stratagem, the French pre-empted any action the Canadian government may have taken at this time. In the end, though NATO never endorsed the removal of French troops from Europe, a total of two French Divisions and three Air Battalions were transferred to Algeria from NATO command.

This episode highlighted the contradictory policies that France pursued towards Algeria and its protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia that dismayed the Canadian government. While France increased its military presence in Algeria it was completing negotiations with Morocco and Tunisia to end the dependent status of these two countries. France had conceded internal autonomy to Tunisia in July 1954 and put this concession into effect in June 1955. French authorities had also restored the pro-nationalist Mohammed ben Youssef as Sultan of Morocco and proclaimed Morocco's independence in November of 1955. By protocols signed on March 2 and March 20, 1956, the French government formally acknowledged the independence of Morocco and

---

<sup>138</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6847 file 3618-C-40 pt 2.2, Cabinet Documentary Note (Supplementary), *North Africa*, 23 May 1956, and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6116 file 50378-40 pt 1.2, *Canadian Mission to Morocco and Tunisia*, P. Beaulieu.

<sup>139</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7722 file 12177-40 pt 2, Mes S-252, SSEA to Canadian Delegation, North Atlantic Council, Paris, 20 March 1956.

Tunisia respectively.<sup>140</sup> The contrast between the liberality of France's Moroccan and Tunisian policies and its intention to crush the nationalist movement in Algeria was strikingly apparent in early 1956.

The developments in Tunisia and Morocco compelled the Canadian government to reconsider its interests in North Africa. Canadian officials realised in 1955 that there might soon be two new independent countries in this region about which they knew very little and that the West could not continue to ignore Tunisia and Morocco if it wanted to maintain their Western orientation. The friendship of these two states for the West could not be taken for granted once they achieved their independence. Concerned about the Department of External's Affairs complete lack of information about North Africa, the Canadian Ambassador to France suggested that a member of his staff should visit Tunisia and Morocco as a way of establishing contacts with North African officials.<sup>141</sup> The visit by Mr. Chatillon, the Second Officer from the Embassy in Paris, to Tunisia in February 1955 initiated a series of visits by Canadian officials to Tunisia and Morocco in 1955 and 1956. The Ambassador himself visited Morocco in May 1955. Nevertheless, these visits remained exploratory in nature and limited in both scope and frequency in the period prior to the independence of the two protectorates.

From 1955 until Morocco and Tunisia were granted their full independence in mid-1956, the French government discouraged its allies from making gestures that could

---

<sup>140</sup> Ling, Morocco and Tunisia, 126-131.

be taken as offering premature recognition of the independence of the two protectorates. The French government remained anxious that its allies did not encourage the pretensions of North African officials until France had finished negotiating their independence. The French asked their allies for patience and understanding until the final details of Tunisian and Moroccan independence were settled and ratified by the French National Assembly.<sup>142</sup> For the most part their allies complied, though some did so with more reluctance than others. The British, for example, believed that the West had “every interest in trying to ensure that French influence in Tunisia and Morocco remains as strong as possible; otherwise it [would] inevitably be replaced by that of the Soviet Union and the Arab League.” The Americans, on the other hand, believed that France needed to relinquish its hold over the North African territories more expeditiously.<sup>143</sup>

Nevertheless, as Tunisia and Morocco edged towards full independence, Western governments devoted more attention to the nature of their relations with the new countries. In early 1956, Habib Bourguiba, the Tunisian Prime Minister, stated that he

---

<sup>141</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8388 file 11033-40 pt 6.2, Letter S-181, USSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 16 February 1955 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 7.1, Letter 468, USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 27 April 1955.

<sup>142</sup> One of the most contentious issues involved whether France would be allowed to maintain armed forces in Tunisia following the latter’s independence. The French government insisted on retaining the right to occupy its key naval and military bases in the country. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 7.2, Memo prepared by the Embassy of France in Ottawa, 16 July 1956.

<sup>143</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 7.1, Tel 597, *Recognition of Tunisia and Morocco*, Canadian High Commission, London to External, 2 May 1956 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6858 file 4283-40 pt 5.1, Letter 1480, *United Kingdom Views on Developments in North Africa*, Canadian High Commission, London to External, 30 August 1955.

wanted Tunisia associated with NATO,<sup>144</sup> but Western officials recognised that intense pressure from the Arab League or the continued problems in Algeria could undermine the Western orientation of Tunisia and Morocco. Given the strategic and military importance of North Africa, this would have caused grave problems for the West.<sup>145</sup> Yet how could Canada and the other Western countries demonstrate their interest in Tunisia and Morocco without antagonising France? As long as the North Africans insisted that France withdraw all of its armed forces from the new countries and the French insisted upon maintaining a military presence after their independence, this would remain a delicate proposition.

In April 1956 Jules Léger again suggested using the North Atlantic Council as a forum to discuss how best to preserve the West's relationship with Tunisia and Morocco. By July 1956, however, Léger conceded that he did not see how the Council could help

---

<sup>144</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6846 file 3618-C-40 pt 2.1, Memo, *French North Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 10 April 1956.

<sup>145</sup> In August of 1956, General Charles Foulkes, the Chairman of Canada's Chiefs of Staff Committee, prepared an analysis of the strategic importance of Tunisia. Foulkes concluded that a complete French withdrawal from Tunisia would mean the loss to France of all air, ground and naval bases in Tunisia, the loss to France and the USA of bases in Algeria and Morocco, the eventual loss to the British and the US of bases in Libya and further demands for the evacuation of Western interests throughout Arab and African countries. The end result, according to Foulkes, "could be an extension of Arab influence, led by Egypt, across North Africa bringing in its train eventually, perhaps, USSR influence and domination. The result could be an unfriendly or even hostile South Mediterranean coast line which together with an unfriendly Egypt might put the NATO alliance in danger in the whole Mediterranean area." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6115 file 50378-40 pt 1.1, Memo, *Military View of the Strategic Importance of Tunisia*, General Charles Foulkes to USSEA, 7 August 1956. In September of 1956, the Chiefs of Staff Committee prepared a similar assessment of the strategic importance to the West of Morocco. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6115 file 50378-40 pt 1.1, Memo, *Military View of Strategic Importance of Morocco and Libya*, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff to USSEA, 27 September 1956.

reconcile the divergent French and North African expectations.<sup>146</sup> And while the Canadian government determined that it could not entirely support the French position regarding their post-independence rights in Tunisia,<sup>147</sup> it also decided that it would not actively seek to undermine the maintenance of French influence in North Africa. In the end, Canadian policy towards Tunisia and Morocco's independence was broadly shaped by the interests of France, as can be seen from Canada's decision to postpone recognising the independence of the two countries upon France's insistence. Despite their compelling interest in quickly establishing relations with the new states, the Canadian, British and American governments all acquiesced to the French demand that they withhold official recognition until France ratified the necessary agreements. Canada recognised the independence of Tunisia and Morocco on 19 June 1956, but according to Pearson "Were it not for the reluctance of the French government to see their friends recognise Tunisia and Morocco formally until the conventions defining their independence have been negotiated and presented to the French Parliament ..., we should probably have given *de jure* recognition already."<sup>148</sup>

The Canadian government continued to defer to France regarding North Africa even after the independence of Tunisia and Morocco. In July 1956 Laval Fortier,

---

<sup>146</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6846 file 3618-C-40 pt 2.1, Memo, *NATO and North Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 25 April 1956 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 7.2, Memo, USSEA to SSEA, 24 July 1956.

<sup>147</sup> In July of 1956, Jules Léger told Lester Pearson that the provisional protocols on independence signed between France and Tunisia contained no definite provisions for the maintenance of French armed forces in Tunisia. Therefore, he argued, Canada could not support the French position because France had no legal grounds for insisting that its troops remain in Tunisia. *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6847 file 3618-C-40, Mes S-511, SSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 23 May 1956.

Canada's Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, wanted to send a team to evaluate some of the 6,000 French citizens resident in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco who had applied for immigration to Canada. French officials had already denied Canada permission for a similar mission in April, but Fortier believed that the trip could proceed now that Morocco and Tunisia had achieved their independence from France. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration placed a high priority on this mission because of the desirability of the applicants involved – mostly farmers, professionals and industrialists.<sup>149</sup> The Department of External Affairs, however, regarded this project with concern.

Lester Pearson and Jules Léger both realised that Canada had potential immigration and trade interests in North Africa but they also felt that Canada's overriding interest in the area was to maintain its friendship for the West by supporting the continuation of the region's close ties with France. They did not believe that promoting the exodus of several thousand French citizens from North Africa would help achieve this goal. Nor would it endear Canada to the French government, whose Ambassador told Léger that France would consider overt recruitment of immigrants by Canada in North Africa an unfriendly act since France wanted to maintain substantial French communities and economic interests in the region.<sup>150</sup> Finally, they worried that a Canadian mission that recruited only French citizens for entry into Canada was not the best way to initiate

---

<sup>149</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6115 file 50378-40 pt 1.1, Letter, Laval Fortier, Department of Citizenship and Immigration to USSEA, 24 July 1956.



relations with the two new North African countries.<sup>151</sup> Pearson therefore vetoed the proposed immigration mission. Instead, Léger proposed a solution that would meet some of the needs of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. His idea involved sending a three-man team, including Paul Bealieu from External Affairs, R. Brunet from Citizenship and Immigration and R. Campbell Smith from Trade and Commerce, on an exploratory visit to Tunisia and Morocco. The official purpose of the mission would be to explore with Tunisian and Moroccan officials the range of Canada's relations with the two new countries and as such could be pursued without antagonising the French. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration could gather information it wanted about the applicants for emigration to Canada, but it would not be able to make any commitments on behalf of the Canadian government.<sup>152</sup>

The Canadian mission visited Morocco from 18 to 28 October and Tunisia from 29 October to 6 November 1956. The French government remained leery about the mission, but accepted it after being assured that Canada did not want to attract attention to the mission's immigration component or to encourage a mass exodus of French

---

<sup>150</sup> [Les] A[rchives du] M[inistère des] A[ffaires] É[trangères, Paris], [Série] Am[érique 19]52-63, [Sous-série] Canada, Vol. 180, Let 241, J. Binoche à Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 18 avril 1956.

<sup>151</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6115 file 50378-40 pt 1.1, Memo, *Immigration from North Africa and Canada's Relations with North Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 15 August 1956.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

citizens from North Africa.<sup>153</sup> Jean Désy, Canada's Ambassador to France, stressed this position to the team, and especially to Brunet, during its stopover in Paris. Canadian officials in Ottawa and Paris hoped this would suffice to "keep the immigration aspects of the visit from becoming embarrassingly conspicuous."<sup>154</sup>

Despite this warning, the Department of External Affairs could not prevent public discussions of Canada's interest in immigrants from North Africa. The day of the mission's arrival in Morocco, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast that "A three man Mission is on its way to North Africa to make arrangements to obtain French speaking immigrants for Canada. ... A number of French-speaking residents of [Tunisia and Morocco] have made application for permission to emigrate to Canada, and it is hoped that the Mission will be able to make arrangements to deal speedily with these requests."<sup>155</sup> Given their assurances to the French, Canadian officials were embarrassed by this story. The story had been given to the reporters by officials in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and did not, however, prevent the successful completion of the mission in North Africa.

During their three weeks in Tunisia and Morocco Beaulieu, Smith and Brunet met

---

<sup>153</sup> In September of 1956, a French official informed his counterparts in the Canadian Embassy in Paris that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christian Pineau, hoped "that [Canada] would not at this time embark on an immigration campaign which would attract publicity which, in turn, the French would consider unhelpful to them in the particular period of the development of their relations in North Africa." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6115 file 50378-40 pt 1.1, Tel 656, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 15 September 1956.

<sup>154</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6116 file 50378-40 pt 1.2, Letter, H. F. Davis, Paris to R. A. D. Ford, Ottawa, 18 October 1956.

<sup>155</sup> The text of the bulletin was quoted in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6116 file 50378-40 pt 1.2, Letter 510, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid to USSEA, 24 October 1956.

with numerous Tunisian and Moroccan officials, representatives of the embassies of France, the United States and the United Kingdom and also with leading members of the French communities in each country. Though they did not have the authority to make commitments on behalf of the Canadian government, they concluded that Tunisia and Morocco offered interesting possibilities for Canada. They found a large pool of potential emigrants to Canada from among the European and Jewish populations in both countries, though they doubted that officials in Morocco or Tunisia would approve the mass emigration of some of the most skilled elements of the population.<sup>156</sup> They also concluded that Canada could possibly double its exports to Morocco to over \$3,500,000 annually in such products as agricultural implements or automobile parts with a Canadian trade commissioner in Rabat. The potential for trade with Tunisia, however, remained negligible due to its small market.

Beaulieu, Smith and Brunet were assured that Tunisian and Moroccan officials remained intent on close and friendly political relations with the West and France in particular, despite the irritants caused by, for example, France's maintenance of military bases such as Bizerte in Tunisia. Moreover, both countries eagerly anticipated the establishment of Canadian diplomatic missions in Rabat and Tunis. Beaulieu reported that because of Canada's own evolution from colony to nation, its membership in the Commonwealth and its international behaviour, the Canadian government would be in

---

<sup>156</sup> Because of the nature of Canada's immigration policies during this period, there was no interest in determining whether any members of the Arab communities in Morocco or Tunisia wanted to emigrate to Canada.

position to play a significant political role in both Tunisia and Morocco without the risk of being accused of colonialist objectives. He also reported that such influence by Canada would be very timely and help to counter the anti-Western influence of Egypt and to prevent the infiltration of communism into North Africa in the wake of Tunisian and Moroccan independence.<sup>157</sup>

As an initial Canadian foray into North Africa, this mission was counted a resounding success. Beaulieu, Smith and Brunet had confirmed that North Africa offered fruitful opportunities for Canada politically, in terms of immigration and possibly even in trade.<sup>158</sup> The situation, however, was not entirely free of difficulties. Tunisian and Moroccan leaders expressed their goodwill towards France, but as long as France continued its repressive policies in Algeria the relations between it and its former protectorates would deteriorate.<sup>159</sup> France had acquiesced to the nationalist demands for the independence of Tunisia and Morocco and the latter's governments demanded similar concessions for the people of Algeria, but during 1956 the French government appeared more determined than ever to crush the nationalist rebellion in its remaining territory in North Africa.

---

<sup>157</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6859 file 4283-C-40 pt 1.1, *Joint Report of the Canadian Mission to Morocco and Tunisia*.

<sup>158</sup> In the end, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's interest in immigrants from North Africa was greatly reduced by the increase in immigrants Canada received in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Hungary in the fall of 1956. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6116 file 50378-40 pt 2, Memo, *Canadian Relations with Tunisia and Morocco*, J. George to USSEA, 16 January 1957.

<sup>159</sup> The Tunisian and Moroccan governments, for example, reacted very strongly to the arrest by French authorities of five Algerian nationalist leaders in October of 1956, previously discussed, by demanding the removal of all French military forces from Tunisia and Morocco. Ling, *Morocco and Tunisia*, 157.

Though they were having little success in eradicating the nationalist rebellion, by late 1956 400,000 French troops were stationed in Algeria.<sup>160</sup> The concentration of troops in North Africa left only two under-strength French Divisions in Germany and no regular troops in France and diminished even further the already minimal forces available to the Supreme Allied Commander – Europe to deter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Nevertheless, it was important to Canada and to the North Atlantic Alliance to keep the French Army as strong and as well equipped as possible to counter a possible Soviet threat. It was for this reason that the Canadian government continued to equip the French military through large gifts of Mutual Aid.

From 1955 to 1958 the Canadian government gave France Mutual Aid that included 300,000 rounds of 20mm ammunition; 1,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition; trucks; dynamite; sub-machine guns; 90 mm shells; pistols; and Harvard training aircraft. From January of 1957 to March of 1958 alone Canada donated \$14.6 million in Mutual Aid to France.<sup>161</sup> Given that a majority of the French Army was stationed in Algeria during this period, the Canadian government could not ignore the fact that much of the military equipment it donated to France was being used to suppress the nationalist movement in Algeria. This was the type of situation, in fact, which prompted the government of Egypt's accusation that Canada and the other NATO powers provided

---

<sup>160</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7140 file 5475-DW-48-40 fp 1, *Commentary for the Guidance of the Canadian Delegation to the 11<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly*, 12 November 1956.

<sup>161</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4849 file 50105-G-40 pt 4, Department of National Defence Report, *Deliveries of Materials and Supplies*, undated.

military support for French military activities in Algeria.<sup>162</sup> Order-In-Council 1956-507, passed by in March 1956, however, allowed the Canadian government to provide France with the arms it needed while denying complicity in the suppression of independence movements in Algeria or any of France's other colonies. The Order stated that once a recipient nation accepted Mutual Aid from Canada, it also accepted the responsibility to use it to strengthen NATO's capacity to deter aggression.<sup>163</sup> The Canadian government used this Order to cloak its provision of military equipment for France's military activities in Algeria, since the recipient nation could use the arms wherever and for whatever purpose it wanted without having to ask Canada's permission to defy the limitations of the *Defence Appropriation Act*. As it had done when the French wanted to use Canadian equipment in Indochina in 1952, the Canadian government simply chose not to be informed of the uses that France and other Mutual Aid recipients found for Canada's donated armaments.

The Order-In-Council was not directed towards shipments of equipment to France alone, but with it the Canadian government accepted the use of Canadian military supplies against Algerian nationalists rather than risk offending France by restricting its use in Europe alone. Canada was not alone in this duplicity, however. The United States also gave France defence assistance in amounts up to one quarter of France's defence

---

<sup>162</sup> On August 29, 1955 the Canadian Chargé d'affaires in Cairo received an oral statement from the Egyptian Foreign Minister that the Egyptian government considered the use of NATO forces and equipment in North Africa a hostile action against all Arabs, not only by France but also by all countries participating in NATO that acquiesced in these measures. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6858 file 4283-40 pt 5.1, Weekly Divisional Note – European Division, *Morocco and Algeria*, R. A. D. Ford, 7 September 1955.

budget in the mid-1950s.<sup>164</sup> Both the Canadian and American governments contrived to support France while maintaining a public position that looked with disfavour on the use of force to suppress nationalism in Europe's colonies. While Canadian citizens may not have realised the exact extent to which their government actively supported France's Algerian campaign, some did resent any degree of Canadian support for France's military activities in North Africa. Deborah Haight of the Religious Society of Friends, for example, protested to Lester Pearson in September 1955 that "Canada as of member of NATO is contributing men, money and arms for the defense of the Western world" and that "as a member of NATO France is being defended and thus is freed to use her units [in North Africa.]" Though it did not share this opinion with Miss Haight, the Department of External Affairs conceded that there was "an element of truth" in her arguments.<sup>165</sup>

French diplomats stationed at the French Embassy in Ottawa or the Consulates in Montreal, Quebec, Toronto or Vancouver, routinely reported to their superiors in Paris that the Canadian press as a whole demonstrated very little understanding of the French position in North Africa.<sup>166</sup> The French Ambassador himself reported that Canadian

---

<sup>163</sup> NAC, RG 2 [Records of the Privy Council], Series A-5-a, Cabinet Minutes, 15 March 1956.

<sup>164</sup> Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally*, 35.

<sup>165</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3012 file 3618-C-40 pt 1, Deborah Haight, Religious Society of Friends to SSEA, 8 September 1955 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3012 file 3618-C-40 pt 1, Memo, *NATO and North Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 16 September 1955.

<sup>166</sup> Jules Beaurcy, the French Consul General in Toronto, for example, reported to the Embassy in Ottawa that an article entitled "La France à besoin d'amis" in the *Globe and Mail* of November 24, 1955 "constitue, dans toute la presse de Toronto, le premier commentaire qui embrasse avec pleine compréhension et sympathie l'ensemble de la question nord-africaine et les difficultés de la mission de la France dans cette région." AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 180, Jules Beaurcy, Consul General de France à Toronto à Gaspard de Villelume, Chargé d'affaires de France, Ottawa, 24 novembre 1955.

citizens displayed an extreme bias and even outright hostility towards French actions in North Africa, though he also reported that such hostility could be overcome by patient and forthcoming explanations by French officials of France's interests in and plans for the region.<sup>167</sup> Canada's relationship with France, however, was simply too important for the Canadian government to risk rupturing it by defying the French government's expectations of political and even military support for France's policies in North Africa, regardless of their unpopularity with some segments of the Canadian population.

The pressures for a solution to the Algerian problem were thus building throughout 1956. The West needed an end to the Algerian conflict to protect its influence in Tunisia and Morocco; to avert further criticism of the West by other Third World states; to restore French military forces to NATO duties in Europe; to restore France's political stability; and to avert the growing criticism of Western citizens disturbed by French abuses in Algeria.<sup>168</sup> The Canadian government had begun to consider ways to resolve the Algerian conflict by early 1956, yet the French government pre-empted any discussions of multilateral solutions to this conflict. The French government insisted on solving its Algerian problems itself and the Canadian government could do little in the face of such intransigence.

In the fall of 1956, the Suez Crisis diverted the world's attention away from

---

<sup>167</sup> AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Francis Lacoste, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à Christian Pineau, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, 6 juin 1956.



France's difficulties in Algeria. The Crisis itself, and Canada's role therein, has been extensively studied elsewhere. It is only necessary to note that Britain and France did not receive the support for their attempt to punish Egypt for nationalising the Suez Canal that they had had expected from their allies. Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, in particular, condemned the fading "Supermen of Europe" for trying to reassert their authority in the Middle East.<sup>169</sup> The Suez Crisis opened the biggest rift between Britain, France and the United States to that point in the Cold War. The bitterness lasted for months and the French never completely lost their sense that the United States and Canada had betrayed them and that Britain had deserted them at the first sign of disapproval in Washington.<sup>170</sup> Thereafter, French officials increasingly believed that France could no longer rely on NATO for France's security requirements.<sup>171</sup>

By the mid to late 1950s, the threat of direct invasion of Western Europe by the Soviet Union had largely receded and the Cold War had entered its symbolic phase. NATO could not afford the weakness associated with disunity. France's willing and active adherence to NATO was therefore important for symbolic reasons of Western

---

<sup>168</sup> When news of the atrocities committed by French soldiers during the Battle of Algiers from September 1956 to May 1957 began to emerge, some elements of the Canadian public became even more opposed to France's involvement in the war. French diplomats in Canada routinely commented upon this trend. See AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 99, Tel 270, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à MAE, 22 février 1957.

<sup>169</sup> Thompson, Louis St. Laurent, 485-6.

<sup>170</sup> John Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), 8.

solidarity as well as for the military capability it contributed to the alliance. The Suez Crisis threatened NATO solidarity and thus the alliance's ability to confront the Soviet bloc. Though it also disapproved of the British and French role in Suez, the Canadian government devoted much of its energy in the year following the events of October and November 1956 to repairing the rift between its principal NATO partners. NATO's strength, and by extension Canada's national security, depended on it.

The French sense of betrayal after Suez magnified their sensitivity over Algeria. General Gruenther, the retiring NATO Supreme Allied Commander – Europe, told the Canadian Cabinet in November 1956 that the feeling in France was such that “if the United Nations were to condemn France over her policies in Algeria, he thought it quite possible that she would withdraw from NATO. It was illogical for the French to feel this way, but they did and the fact had to be recognised.”<sup>172</sup> The possibility that France might withdraw from NATO after the Suez Crisis worried Canadian officials so much that the Canadian government continued to support France's Algerian policies as a way of ensuring France's continued commitment to NATO. In late 1956, therefore, the French continued their efforts to eradicate the nationalist movement in Algeria unburdened by

---

<sup>171</sup> The problem stemmed from the increasingly divergent views of the United States and France towards NATO's role in fighting world communism. The American government believed that NATO remained an alliance for the defence of Western Europe and could not be used to combat communism outside of Europe. The French, on the other hand, believed that NATO should oppose the Soviet Union wherever it was trying to attack the West, even beyond the European theatre. The French also believed that communist influences directed the nationalist rebellion in Algeria, a claim that both Canada and the United States discounted. Harrison, 40-41.

<sup>172</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4796 file 50102-P-40 pt 1, *Cabinet Discussion with General Gruenther*, 22 November 1956.

direct criticism from their principal allies, including Canada.<sup>173</sup> Military, the French armed forces succeeded in driving the Algerian rebels out of the major cities of Algiers, Oran and Constantine.<sup>174</sup> Yet the intransigence of the European *colons* and the influence they wielded in France prevented the implementation of the types of reforms that may have satisfied the majority of Algerians and ended the war. Meanwhile, the political Left in France hardened its demand for the independence of Algeria and the Algerian crisis was precipitating an internal rupture in France.

Increasingly concerned for France's political stability, Jules Léger again proposed in January 1957 that Canada try to persuade the French government to accept the eventual independence of Algeria as the basis for a negotiated end to the war.<sup>175</sup> Lester Pearson overruled his under-secretary. Pearson believed that no country could exert enough pressure at that stage to change France's Algerian policy and that any attempt to do so underestimated both the strength of French national feeling over Algeria and the bitterness that remained from the Suez Crisis.<sup>176</sup> Pearson did not want to jeopardise France's willingness to contribute to NATO by an ill-advised attempt at peace brokering

---

<sup>173</sup> Nevertheless, the Canadian government was very concerned about the effect of France's activities on important Third World states. Escott Reid reported from India, for example, that the French military's arrest of the five Algerian leaders and the Suez Crisis had simply provoked the Indian government's contempt for France. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7722 file 12177-40 pt 3.2, Des 1711, Canadian Ambassador to India to SSEA, 27 November 1956.

<sup>174</sup> Beginning in January 1957, French troops began an operation to clear rebels from the city of Algiers. The Battle of Algiers lasted until October 1957 but was ultimately successful in forcing the rebels from the capital. For a complete analysis of the events of 1956 and 1957 in France and Algeria and the pressures under which the French government operated, consult Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ch. 14.

<sup>175</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7722 file 12177-40 pt 4, Tel S48, USSEA to SSEA at Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, 28 January 1957.

in Algeria.

Pearson's cautious approach towards France governed Canadian policy on Algeria even after the John Diefenbaker-led Progressive Conservative Party defeated the Liberal Party and became Canada's government in June 1957. Diefenbaker's stated commitment to Canada's traditional alliances, friendships and associations, coupled with the Conservative leaders' inexperience with international affairs, guaranteed that Canada would continue to skirt the edges of France's delicate relationship with both Algeria and NATO.<sup>177</sup> The new government of Canada, however, faced the same mounting pressures as its predecessor. France's refusal to grant self-determination to the Algerian people defied the trend towards decolonisation that had already emancipated Tunisia and Morocco and was progressing throughout much of the rest of Africa. How much longer could France deny the aspirations of the Algerian nationalists? How much longer would France's allies continue their support while their reputations suffered from their association with France's military repression in North Africa?

In the fall of 1957, French Prime Minister Bourgès-Maunoury enacted a *loi-cadre* that promised Algerians greater internal autonomy, but the French National Assembly rejected it by a vote of 279 to 253 in September of that year.<sup>178</sup> This failure caused the Bourgès-Maunoury Ministry to resign and precipitated another political crisis

---

<sup>176</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7722 file 12177-40 pt 4, Tel 402, SSEA to USSEA, 29 January 1957.

<sup>177</sup> John G. Diefenbaker, "Statement by the Prime Minister in the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 23 September 1957" in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 1948-1962 and H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 6.

in France. The National Assembly subsequently passed another *loi-cadre* for Algeria in November 1957, but only after it had been rendered so innocuous that it contained little of substance for the Algerian nationalists. Furthermore, because it could not be implemented until three months after the end of hostilities, this measure failed to appease France's international critics.<sup>179</sup> To countries such as India, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco the *loi-cadre* was not a sincere attempt by France to address the nationalist demands in Algeria. Even Canadian officials began to lose patience with France's inability to resolve the Algerian problem. It was, according to Jules Léger, "becoming very difficult for us to continue to support the French on the Algerian issue" in the fall of 1957.<sup>180</sup>

Yet the French government remained as sensitive to interference in its affairs as ever. In the late summer of 1957, Tunisia requested help from the United States and Britain to help arm and equip the Tunisian Republic's army.<sup>181</sup> The British and the Americans were forced to balance their interest in helping Tunisia, and thus preventing its government from turning to less desirable donors, against the need to placate the sensitivities of their French ally. In November 1957, after two months of discussions with the French on this subject, the United States and Britain sent Tunisia a token shipment of

---

<sup>178</sup> This law had been, at least in part, an attempt to avert another acrimonious debate on Algeria at the United Nations that fall.

<sup>179</sup> Rioux, 295.

<sup>180</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 5.1, Memo, *The Algerian Question*, USSEA to SSEA, 11 September 1957. Expressions of sympathy for Algerian nationalism also began appearing more frequently in internal External Affairs communications during this period. See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 5.2, Letter S-258, A. J. Pick to the Canadian Embassy, Oslo, 24 September 1957.

semi-automatic rifles, machine guns and small calibre ammunition. The French reaction was swift and, from the Canadian perspective, “unexpectedly strong.” Many French officials and citizens accused the United States and Britain of “conspiring to deprive France of her special position in North Africa generally and in Algeria in particular.”<sup>182</sup> The French believed that France should be the principal point of contact between the West and Tunisia and Morocco in all matters including the provision of military aid and equipment. The French government, however, was unwilling to arm the Tunisian military as long as Tunisia continued to support the Algerian insurgents.

Tunisian and Moroccan leaders had pledged their sympathy and support for the Algerian *Front de libération nationale* from the beginning of the rebellion against French rule in late 1954. The Algerian rebels, for their part, used Tunisian and Moroccan territory as sanctuaries, crossing the border to hide from French forces after their deadly hit and run missions in Algeria. The Algerian guerrillas also received shipments of arms and ammunition from Egypt across Tunisian territory. French resentment against Tunisia’s support for the Algerian nationalists boiled over in February 1958 when the French Air Force bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef just across the border from Algeria, killing 69 people including 21 children. As a result of this incident, Tunisian and Moroccan authorities concluded that it was impossible for them to have

---

<sup>181</sup> The Tunisian monarchy was abolished and replaced by the Tunisian Republic in July 1957, with Habib Bourguiba remaining in power as President rather than Prime Minister. See Ling, Morocco and Tunisia, 135-6.

<sup>182</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4797 file 50102-S-40 pt 2, Briefing Note for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1957, *Algeria*, 4 December 1957.

bilateral military associations with France and intensified their demands that France withdraw all of its military forces from Tunisia and Morocco.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, Algeria remained the real cause of the problems between France and Tunisia and Morocco, just as it was having an increasingly deleterious effect on Western interests in North Africa as a whole.<sup>184</sup>

The American government also began questioning its approach to the Algerian issue in 1957. In July 1956, Senator John F. Kennedy had asked the President and the Secretary of State of the United States to use their influence “to achieve a solution which will recognise the independent personality of Algeria.”<sup>185</sup> President Eisenhower, however, was not willing to abandon his administration’s policy of public support for France throughout 1957. Privately, the American government’s dismay at the course of events became very heated and erupted into full anger at a NATO meeting in December 1957 when John Foster Dulles denounced the French delegation’s attempt to elicit a show of support from the United States for French aims in Algeria.<sup>186</sup> France’s allies had demonstrated a great deal of patience with France thus far over Algeria, but it was

---

<sup>183</sup> Ling, *Morocco and Tunisia*, 138.

<sup>184</sup> In March 1958, a Canadian diplomat observed that “it would be unrealistic to try to solve the current France-Tunisian difficulties without consideration of the Algerian rebellion. ... The significance of Sakiet is that it has seized world public opinion of the fact that France’s Algerian policies threaten not only France’s relations with the new states of North Africa, but may have an adverse effect on the broader strategic and political interests of France’s allies in that area.” NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4859 file 50105-L-40, Memo, *NATO and North Africa*, Defence Liaison 1 Division to USSEA, 4 March 1958.

<sup>185</sup> Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *France and the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 210 and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), 553-4.

<sup>186</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4849 file 50105-G-40 pt 3, Tel 2511, Canadian Ambassador to NATO, Paris to External, 18 December 1957.

becoming increasingly obvious that France was running out of time to find a unilateral solution to its North African problems.

By late 1957, Canadian officials had again begun to consider multilateral solutions to the situation in Algeria. As they had done in early 1956, these officials wondered whether NATO could assume some of France's burdens in Algeria by undertaking a programme of foreign aid for North Africa or by promoting the creation of a confederation of Mediterranean states including the North African states, France, and Spain. For the first time, French politicians even appeared willing to welcome the intervention of their allies in the Algerian situation. At a private luncheon on the 6<sup>th</sup> of March, 1958, for example, former French Prime Minister Guy Mollet invited France's allies to take the initiative in proposing solutions to the Algerian problem.<sup>187</sup> Though Mollet's views were yet far in advance of the official position of the French government, the Canadian and other NATO governments were sufficiently exasperated with France's inability to resolve the Algerian problem to consider confronting the French with their demands that France recognise the nationalist demands in Algeria. Once again, however, events in France denied Canada and the other allies the opportunity to intervene.

A political crisis paralysed France in the first half of 1958. Government after government fell, and numerous political parties attempted to form new governments capable of maintaining power. All of them failed. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of May, Pierre Pflimlin became Prime Minister after having publicly announced his intention to negotiate an end

---

<sup>187</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7044 file 6938-40, Tel 273, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 6 March 1958.



to the war in Algeria.<sup>188</sup> The French Army reacted immediately to Pflimlin's plan to negotiate with the Algerian nationalists and formed a Committee of Public Safety under General Salan, the Army's commander in Algeria. The Committee's goal was to oppose the Metropolitan government's plan to terminate the French presence in Algeria. The generals in Algeria also began massing troops in Corsica as the first step towards making a coup d'état against the government in France itself. The Fourth Republic seemed to be on the verge of collapse. At one point during this crisis, Canadian and British officials discussed the possibility of strengthening Pflimlin's fragile hold on power by providing British and Canadian foreign aid to boost France's economic prosperity,<sup>189</sup> but in the end, they could only watch as events unfolded in France. When the dust from the crisis finally settled in June 1958, Charles de Gaulle, war-hero and former Prime Minister of France, had again emerged to rescue his nation in its time of need. His return to power forced the Canadian government to re-evaluate its position on a range of issues, not the least of which was the continuing war for the independence of Algeria.

---

<sup>188</sup> Miles Kahler, *Decolonization in Britain and France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 5.

<sup>189</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 7.2, Tel 1001, Canadian High Commission, London to External, 16 May 1958.

### **CHAPTER THREE: CANADA AND FRENCH NORTH AFRICA,**

#### **1958-1962**

Many Western officials greeted Charles de Gaulle's return to political power in France with mixed feelings in 1958. During the Second World War, de Gaulle had been fiercely committed to reaffirming France's status as a Great Power both militarily and diplomatically in the wake of Germany's occupation of his country. Devoted to this cause, he deeply resented the junior role in the war effort the British and American governments assigned his Free French movement. He clashed frequently with British and American officials, especially President Roosevelt, and independent Free French initiatives such as the occupation of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon exacerbated the difficulties that existed between de Gaulle and the British and American governments.<sup>190</sup> After the war, de Gaulle remained committed to restoring France's power and grew increasingly uncomfortable with the dominant position in the West of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain.

Charles de Gaulle's resignation as Prime Minister of France in January 1946 had removed him from a position of direct influence over the course of France's relations with its allies, yet he continued to tower over French affairs from semi-retirement at his home of Colombey-les-deux-Églises. De Gaulle had bristled as governments in France lurched from crisis to crisis during the early and mid-1950s. He also grew increasingly

---

<sup>190</sup> For a more complete description of the difficult relations between de Gaulle and British, American and Canadian officials during the war, see Newhouse, De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons, ch 2.

uncomfortable with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation because of the way, in his view, the United States dominated the alliance.<sup>191</sup> He resented in particular the United States' monopoly on nuclear weapons and its refusal to share atomic secrets with France. By the time he returned to power in May 1958, the belief circulated among some Western diplomats that de Gaulle was anti-American, anti-German, anti-British, anti-European and anti-NATO.<sup>192</sup> De Gaulle faced too many pressing issues, such as Algeria and France's need for a new constitution, to cause any immediate problems for the West, but Jules Léger foresaw possible long-term problems given de Gaulle's views on relations with Russia and the place of France within the Western alliance. Léger told Prime Minister Diefenbaker that Canada would do well to cultivate friendly relations with the general at the beginning of his mandate in order to establish some credit for the difficult times that might lie ahead.<sup>193</sup> Whatever potential difficulties de Gaulle might cause his allies, however, France could not continue to endure the political instability and civil division it had experienced between 1955 and 1958. For good or ill, Canadian officials saw in Charles de Gaulle the only man capable of solving France's problems, including

---

<sup>191</sup> Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal 1958-62, Endeavour 1962-, Terence Kilmartin trans. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1971), 199-200.

<sup>192</sup> This view, for example, was expressed by Canadian diplomats stationed in Spain. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 7.2, Des 238, Canadian Embassy, Madrid to SSEA, 28 May 1958.

<sup>193</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4881 file 50115-1-40 pt 1, Memo, *Letter from the Prime Minister to General de Gaulle*, USSEA to SSEA, 4 June 1958.

the prolonged war in Algeria.<sup>194</sup>

De Gaulle's first task as Prime Minister was to eliminate the chronic political problems of the Fourth Republic by devising a new constitution for France. Throughout the Fourth Republic, the National Assembly had dominated France's weak executive branch of government, with the result that France's governments were very unstable in this period. The new constitution devised by de Gaulle created a strong presidency that could dominate the National Assembly and end the recurrent political crises of the type that had returned de Gaulle to power in the summer of 1958.<sup>195</sup> In September 1958, an overwhelming majority of the electorate in both Metropolitan France and its overseas territories approved the new constitution. Only Guinée, of all of France's territories and colonies voted against it.<sup>196</sup> On December 21, de Gaulle was elected President of France's Fifth Republic and a new era in the political history of France had begun.

The most important and seemingly intractable problem on France's political agenda remained its war in Algeria with the *Front de libération nationale*. De Gaulle had a reputation for liberal colonial views originating during the Second World War, but the

---

<sup>194</sup> G.G. Crean, Canadian Chargé d'affaires in Paris, observed that de Gaulle had "a better chance of finding solutions to some of France's problems than any other man presently on the political horizon." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7044 file 6938-40, Des 561, *Crisis in France: the Problems Remaining*, Chargé d'affaires, Paris to SSEA, 9 July 1958.

<sup>195</sup> For a description of the new constitution and de Gaulle's hopes for it, please see de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, ch 1 and Jean Lacouture, *De Gaulle, Volume 2: le politique, 1944-1959* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1984) ch 24.

ease with which the generals accepted him as Prime Minister in 1958 indicated their belief that de Gaulle would support *Algérie française*. De Gaulle had purposefully refrained from outlining his views on Algeria during his years of political exile, with the ambiguous result that some observers believed he was committed to keeping France in Algeria while others believed he would deal liberally with the FLN.<sup>197</sup> His visit to Algeria in June 1958 did little to clarify the ambiguity that surrounded his views on the troubles there.

The uncertainty over de Gaulle's policies for Algeria affected Canadian and other Western officials as much as it affected the people in France itself. Following de Gaulle's visit to Algeria in June 1958, Canada's Chargé d'affaires in Paris commented that though no one knew what his policy would be, "it is at least encouraging that [de Gaulle] seems to have approached the problem in a forward looking and generous spirit."<sup>198</sup> His ambiguity, however, relieved de Gaulle, at least temporarily, of the pressure to resolve the difficulties in Algeria. Canada had been only one of the countries that had begun considering ways to resolve the Algerian conflict multilaterally by early 1958. After May of that year the Diefenbaker government decided that de Gaulle "must be given his chance" to deal with the Algerian situation himself before others volunteered their own

---

<sup>196</sup> The French Foreign Ministry had asked for Canadian officials to observe the voting in Algeria, but the Department of External Affairs declined on the basis that the Arab world would resent a Canadian 'stamp of approval' on the referendum and its results. Canadian officials also disputed the usefulness of sending observers in an informal capacity, since the French government would not be bound to respect their findings. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Mes S-329, USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 8 September 1958.

<sup>197</sup> Don Cook, *De Gaulle* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1983), 314-5.

suggestions.<sup>199</sup> Even the Indian government, one of the most vocal advocates of independence for Algeria, indicated that it planned to give de Gaulle a chance to come to terms with the Algerian nationalists.<sup>200</sup>

The international community's hopes for de Gaulle's ability to resolve the Algerian problems were thus high, but so too were the stakes. The Canadian government in late 1958 believed that "the stage has been reached where the French cannot expect another chance if de Gaulle fails to find a solution." In the event that he did not, officials in Ottawa predicted that the Algerian nationalists would gain even wider international support, Tunisia and Morocco might embrace anti-Western movements, and France itself could experience either a right-wing military coup or a Communist-led Popular Front government.<sup>201</sup> The Canadian government decided to support de Gaulle's efforts to resolve the problem in Algeria in order to prevent any of these scenarios from occurring. Thus, the Canadian government continued to support France publicly in the United Nations and continued to be patient in the private councils of the North Atlantic Alliance. Some Canadian officials even felt that Canada should try to convince the Afro-Asian states to moderate their positions on the Algerian issue.

---

<sup>198</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7044 file 6938-40, Tel 598, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 6 June 1958.

<sup>199</sup> This view was expressed in the government's information for the Canadian delegation to the 12<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations in the late summer and early fall 1958. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Memo, *The Question of Algeria at the United Nations*, 15 August 1958.

<sup>200</sup> The head of the Indian mission to the UN asked Charles Ritchie, Canada's Ambassador to the UN, to pass this information along to the French mission in June 1958. Ritchie, however, expected the French to take this "with a pinch of salt." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7044 file 6938-40, Tel 949, Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, New York to External, 20 June 1958.

<sup>201</sup> *Op cit*, Memo, *The Question of Algeria at the United Nations*, 15 August 1958.

In August 1958, representatives of the Conference of Independent African States indicated that they planned to solicit support for the nationalist cause in Algeria from the Canadian government in Ottawa. Though Pierre Dupuy cautioned that the French government would resent Canada's meeting with this delegation, Jules Léger believed that declining to meet the African representatives would undermine Canada's reputation for objectivity at the United Nations. Nevertheless, Léger had no intention of debating the situation in Algeria or the wisdom of French policy. He was prepared to listen as the African diplomats outlined their views, but would then counsel the African states to allow de Gaulle to deal with the nationalists in his own way.<sup>202</sup> In the end, the officials from Africa cancelled their trip to Ottawa, but not before French diplomats in Ottawa expressed their opposition to a meeting between the Canadian government and advocates of Algerian independence.<sup>203</sup> The meeting may not have taken place, but the incident demonstrated that the new French government remained as sensitive to outside interference in its Algerian affairs as any of its predecessors.

The discovery of oil under the sands of the Sahara desert in Algeria bolstered the French government's preoccupation with the Algerian question. The first of this oil began flowing to France in January 1958 and estimates projected that Algerian sources would

---

<sup>202</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Memo, USSEA to SSEA, 11 August 1958 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177040 pt 8.1, Memo, H. F. Davis to SSEA, 21 August 1958.

satisfy all of France's oil requirements by 1980.<sup>204</sup> To profit from this discovery, however, France had to maintain some form of control over Algeria or negotiate privileged access to the oil in the event of Algeria's independence. For this to happen, France required support from its allies to counter pressure from the Afro-Asian states and the Communist-bloc. Yet privately, the Western countries were tiring of the extreme sensitivity France displayed over the Algerian issue and the diplomatic blackmail it used to compel its allies support. Relations between France and the United States, for example, had deteriorated to the point that influential Americans like Senator John F. Kennedy were convinced that only Algeria's independence could restore friendly relations between the two countries.<sup>205</sup> Even the British had begun to waver in their support for France by 1958 despite the implications for Britain's own colonial interests.<sup>206</sup> A reluctance to further disrupt the North Atlantic alliance, however, induced the United States, Britain and Canada to support France publicly.

In September 1958, the *Front de libération nationale* (FLN) established a government-in-exile in Cairo. NATO's members joined France and rejected the *Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne's* (GPRA) claim that it represented

---

<sup>203</sup> Pierre Dupuy attributed the uproar over the reception of the African delegation to the "oversensitiveness of General de Gaulle and his followers." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Tel 905, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 18 August 1958. The French reaction did not sit well with several Canadian officials. Henry Davis, for one, decried the "lingering colonialism in French relations with us" that led the French to believe that ties of friendship and sympathy required unswerving Canadian support for France's interests in Algeria. *Op cit*, Memo, H. F. Davis to SSEA, 21 August 1958.

<sup>204</sup> Home, 241-2.

<sup>205</sup> Duroselle, 211.

<sup>206</sup> Newhouse, 79.



the Algerian people and denied the rebel government diplomatic recognition. The Canadian government argued that the GPRA could not be a legal government without proving that it controlled the territory of Algeria, that it was supported by a majority of its people, and without being able to ensure law and order in Algeria. In sum, the Canadian government denied that the FLN could meet the obligations incumbent upon an independent government in a sovereign country.<sup>207</sup> More fundamentally, the Canadian government refused to acknowledge the existence of an Algerian government-in-exile for the simple reason that to do so would have infuriated the French. Canada's government took great care to deny the FLN and its claims to governmental legitimacy even the slightest degree of recognition.<sup>208</sup>

The Diefenbaker government did not try to persuade the Afro-Asian members of the British Commonwealth against granting official recognition to the Algerian rebel government, as the French had requested. The Afro-Asian states were becoming particularly effective in pressing the Algerian right to self-determination at the United

---

<sup>207</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5494 file 12177-40 pt 22, Memo, *Recognition of the FLN Government-in-Exile*, USSEA to SSEA, 24 September 1958.

<sup>208</sup> In late September 1958, for example, Canada's Ambassador in Cairo informed the Department that as the American Ambassador had received a representative of the FLN, he would do the same on a strictly informal and personal basis. Jules Léger, however, told Ambassador Kilgour to avoid all contacts with FLN representatives except at social functions and not to receive any Algerian representatives even informally as this could be taken to convey a degree of recognition to the government-in-exile and might further complicate de Gaulle's plans for Algeria. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Mes S-380, USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Cairo, 29 September 1958.

Nations in the years after 1955.<sup>209</sup> Algerian nationalism had become so symbolic of the Third World's struggle against colonialism that the Canadian government could hardly expect to persuade its Afro-Asian counterparts in the Commonwealth to abandon the Algerian cause. In any event, the Diefenbaker government did not want to jeopardise its own relations with the Commonwealth countries since it, and the West in general, needed friendly relations with the Afro-Asian bloc. So many new members had been admitted to the United Nations in the 1950s that the West no longer dominated votes in the international organisation. The Canadian government would not antagonise its influential Third World members at the behest of its increasingly unpopular French ally.<sup>210</sup>

In the end, only a handful of Arab and Muslim countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Indonesia recognised the FLN's government-in-exile. Nevertheless, the Afro-Asian bloc renewed its campaign for Algeria's independence in the General Assembly and the First Committee of the United Nations in the fall of 1958. The French government again boycotted the discussions of Algeria in the belief that the UN did not have the authority to intervene in France's internal problems. Reluctant to defend French policy in Algeria in France's absence, Western delegations, including Canada's, did not

---

<sup>209</sup> This assessment of the effectiveness of the Afro-Asian states at the United Nations was made by the United Nations Division in the Department of External Affairs in April 1959. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4220 file 5475-DW-58=D-40, *General Assessment of the 13<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, 8 April 1959.

<sup>210</sup> The Canadian government ruled out active attempts at persuasion, but it did authorise the Department of External Affairs to circulate its views about the legal validity of the GPRA to its missions in Commonwealth countries who would, in turn, pass these views on to their host government. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 8.1, Mes S-378, SSEA to Accra and other Commonwealth Capitals, 28 September 1958.

actively participate in the debate over the form of the Algerian resolution. As a result, the resolution recognised Algeria's right to independence and urged France to negotiate on this basis with representatives of the Algerian people, including the FLN's government-in-exile. This resolution, however, failed to secure the necessary two-thirds of votes for adoption in the General Assembly.

The Canadian delegation voted against the resolution because it presupposed that the Algerian people would opt for independence from France.<sup>211</sup> Most of the other NATO delegations also voted against the resolution. This support, and the failure of the resolution in the General Assembly, did not gratify the French government. The UN's fall session, in fact, embittered the French because the United States had abstained from voting on the Afro-Asian motion. The Americans believed that the French had to demonstrate more respect for the principle of self-determination in Algeria and abstained as an indication that they were becoming impatient.<sup>212</sup> The French considered this response a betrayal of France's cause in North Africa. Enraged, de Gaulle retaliated in early 1959 by, among other things, declaring that the French Mediterranean Fleet would

---

<sup>211</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 9.2, *Final Report – United Nations 13<sup>th</sup> Session, the Question of Algeria*, 19 February 1959.

<sup>212</sup> At an informal dinner in Paris, Robert Schumann, the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in France's National Assembly, asked an American representative why the United States had abstained during this vote, an act which in Schumann's view hurt the French cause in North Africa, when the United States had always voted with France under the Fourth Republic? The American representative in turn wondered why de Gaulle had not bothered to explain his policy towards Algeria to the friends of whom France expected such support? NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 9.2, Tel 295, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 23 March 1959 and Newhouse, 87.

not serve under NATO command in the event of another war.<sup>213</sup>

Algeria, however, was only one of the problems that plagued relations between France and several of its NATO allies by 1959. Historically suspicious of what he called the Anglo-Saxon powers, de Gaulle resented American and, to a lesser extent, British dominance in NATO. He believed that France's global responsibilities and interests necessitated it to share the leadership of NATO with the United States and Britain.<sup>214</sup> In September 1958, de Gaulle outlined his idea for a NATO Steering Committee, composed of representatives of the United States, Britain and France, for President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. This committee would oversee NATO's political and strategic direction. Not surprisingly, this initiative failed to appeal to the other NATO members. Anxious to preserve its own virtually unchallenged leadership in the alliance, the American government rejected changes to NATO while British officials saw de Gaulle's proposal as a threat to Britain's 'special relationship' with the United States.<sup>215</sup> The Canadian government, for its part, feared that the change would diminish Canada's already limited role in the alliance's decision making.<sup>216</sup>

The reaction to his ideas to reform the North Atlantic Alliance convinced de

---

<sup>213</sup> According to Henry Davis, the Head of the Department of External Affairs' European Division, the American government attributed de Gaulle's decision regarding the French Fleet to his bitterness over the American abstention during the debate on Algerian in the United Nations during the previous fall. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 7.1, Mes S-303, H. F. Davis to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 21 July 1959.

<sup>214</sup> See, for example, de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 202.

<sup>215</sup> Newhouse, 78-79 and Marvin R. Zahniser, *Uncertain Friendship: American-French Diplomatic Relations Through the Cold War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975), 272-285.

<sup>216</sup> Trevor Lloyd, *Canada in World Affairs, Volume X: 1957-1959* (Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968), 156.

Gaulle that France could no longer rely upon the United States and NATO for France's national security needs. The failure to secure an American nuclear reactor for a French submarine, despite the fact that the United States had recently provided the Royal Navy with one, simply bolstered the growing antagonism between the French and American governments. Following what the French considered the American betrayal at the UN debate on Algeria in 1958, these incidents exacerbated the reluctance of the French government to co-operate with NATO. De Gaulle had already announced that France's Mediterranean Fleet would not serve under NATO command in the event of hostilities, but compounded this by resisting the integration of French air forces into the NATO command structure and by pursuing France's own nuclear programme in opposition to American strategic policy.<sup>217</sup> Under de Gaulle's leadership, France increasingly adopted policies that diverged from those of its principal North Atlantic allies. Henceforth, it was impossible to ignore the strains that undermined France's enthusiasm for the NATO alliance.

The nuclear issue in particular divided Canada and France. Howard Green, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs after June of 1959, vigorously opposed the French nuclear programme. In the interests of limiting nuclear proliferation, Green even directed the Canadian delegation to vote against French nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert at the United Nations in the fall of 1959.<sup>218</sup> This vote angered the French even

---

<sup>217</sup> de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 202-206.

<sup>218</sup> Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canada and the United Nations – 1958* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1959), 5-6.

further. The fundamental problem remained, however, that France had a different conception of its place in the world than the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The governments of the latter countries continued to view world affairs through the prism of the Cold War struggle between East and West, while de Gaulle sought a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and freedom for Europe from the dominance of the superpowers. These divergent views precipitated a mounting crisis that culminated in France's withdrawal from NATO's military command in 1966. In the meantime, relations between France and its allies continued to deteriorate. Distressed by this situation, the Canadian government tried not to exacerbate France's waning enthusiasm for NATO.

Nevertheless, the Canadian government could only do so much to placate French sensibilities regarding the problems in Algeria. Canadian police and immigration authorities were told to be on the alert for agents of the FLN trying to operate on Canadian soil, but the government could do little to prevent Canadian news organisations from presenting the views of Algerian nationalists to the Canadian public.<sup>219</sup> On the 24<sup>th</sup> of May and the 4<sup>th</sup> of June 1959, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) aired interviews with M. Chanderli, the FLN's agent in New York, and two Algerian students in Montreal respectively. Francis Lacoste, France's Ambassador in Ottawa, complained that Canada's public broadcaster had damaged France's interests by disseminating the

subversive views of rebels against the lawful authority of the French government. He could not understand how the Canadian government could allow such attacks upon its ally and wanted the federal government to ensure that the CBC did not continue to broadcast this type of anti-France propaganda.<sup>220</sup>

Though sympathetic to the Ambassador's concerns, there was little that the Department of External Affairs could do to prevent the CBC from presenting both sides of an important international issue. Senior officials offered to co-operate with the CBC in order to avoid similar problems with foreign missions in Canada, like they already did with the National Film Board.<sup>221</sup> Howard Green even discussed with George Nowlan, the minister responsible for the CBC, the negative effect that lack of support on Algeria by its allies had on the French government. Nowlan listened to his colleague's concerns, but his hands were tied. The CBC dismissed the French Ambassador's accusation that it was biased against France and refused to consult with the Department of External Affairs

---

<sup>219</sup> In May 1958, the Canadian government was informed that a M. Chanderli would request entry into Canada with the purpose of establishing an office of the FLN in Montreal. The RCMP was asked to provide the government with information regarding the FLN's representative and his activities in Canada. The request proved unnecessary, however, because Chanderli surfaced in New York as the FLN's unofficial representative to the United Nations rather than in Montreal. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 7.2, Letter, USSEA to Commissioner, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 9 May 1958.

<sup>220</sup> Lacoste said that "*la passivité du Gouvernement canadien est incompréhensible et ne peut manquer de heurter profondément le sentiment national français.*" AMAÉ, M[ission] L[iasion] A[lgérienne], Action Extérieure, Vol. 117, Tel 1249, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à MAE, 1 novembre 1957.

<sup>221</sup> H. Basil Robinson, the Departmental liaison in the Prime Minister's office even tried to get John Diefenbaker to write the minister responsible for the CBC about this proposal, but the letter was not sent. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 10, Draft Letter, Prime Minister to George Nowlan, Minister of National Revenue, 29 May 1959.

about its coverage of events in France and Algeria.<sup>222</sup> The independence of the CBC from direct governmental control prohibited more than a token gesture of appeasement towards the French Ambassador and his concerns.

For Canadian officials, however, the French needed to display more concern about the Canadian government's opinion than that of the Canadian public. In July 1959, M. Langlais of the French Foreign Ministry asked G. G. Crean of the Canadian Embassy in Paris whether France should "do something about" the Canadian public's perception of events in Algeria. Crean replied that propaganda directed against the Canadian people was not necessary. He added that the French "would be doing well if they convinced the Canadian government and senior officials" that France deserved Canada's support instead.<sup>223</sup> This comment reflected the Canadian government's growing exasperation that the French had yet to resolve the Algerian problem and may have been inspired by a message that had arrived at the Canadian Embassy in Paris just prior to Crean's meeting with Langlais. Henry Davis had written that the Canadian government was "not happy with the situation as it exists since we face embarrassment every time the [Algerian] question arises in the United Nations in trying to justify our support of France."<sup>224</sup> Crean took it as a positive sign, however, that the Quai d'Orsay was beginning to take an interest in discussing its Algerian policy with its friends and allies. According to Crean,

---

<sup>222</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7724 file 12177-40 pt 10, Letter, SSEA to George Nowlan, Minister of National Revenue, 12 June 1959.

<sup>223</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 7.1, Tel 709, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 24 July 1959.



this presented the Canadian government with an ideal opportunity to suggest that unless the French demonstrated their good faith by participating in the upcoming debate on Algeria at the United Nations, Canada might not be able to defend France publicly as it had done in the past.<sup>225</sup>

To this point, Charles de Gaulle had not yet revealed his policy towards Algeria, though it was clear that the French government expected its allies' complete and unquestioning support. De Gaulle's period of grace, however, was drawing to a close. The upcoming session of the United Nations in the fall of 1959 promised to be very difficult for France. The Afro-Asian states were expected to renew their pressure for Algeria's independence, and France's allies were wavering in their commitment to France's support. The United States had demonstrated that it would not blindly support France at the previous session of the United Nations and now both Canada and Britain indicated that they had reservations about supporting France as well.<sup>226</sup> It appeared that the French government needed to make a dramatic gesture towards the nationalist element in Algeria to avoid the criticism of the United Nations.

Fortunately for France, de Gaulle dealt with this situation by announcing, on September 16, 1959, a plan for resolving the Algerian conflict. He promised to allow the Algerian people to determine their own future within four years, providing that the

---

<sup>224</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 7.1, Mes S-303, H. F. Davis to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 21 July 1959.

<sup>225</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7723 file 12177-40 pt 7.1, Mes S-321, H. F. Davis to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 30 July 1959.

<sup>226</sup> See Thomas, *The French North African Crisis*, 97.

fighting had stopped. He offered the Algerian people three choices: complete independence; the integration of Algeria into greater France; or de Gaulle's own preference, an internally autonomous Algeria associated with France in matters of economic development, defence and foreign policy.<sup>227</sup> De Gaulle had decided that France could no longer afford the enormous economic, military, political and psychological burdens it carried in Algeria. Even if the Algerian people chose independence, de Gaulle believed that France would be better off than if it relied upon military occupation to preserve its influence in the North African territory.<sup>228</sup> Implicit in de Gaulle's announcement was the recognition that extensive colonial empires no longer bolstered a country's power or its prestige. On the contrary, de Gaulle acknowledged that the repression of nationalism in Algeria had severely undermined France's international standing. He expected the transition to be difficult, but believed that the time had come for France to loosen its hold on its oldest colony.

With this announcement, the French president removed one of the greatest sources of tension within the NATO alliance. For five years, the French had demanded support for policies that the Canadian government had felt contravened the best interests of France and NATO. De Gaulle's new policy, however, "made it possible for the allies of France to support her, at least to the extent of opposing a motion of censure in the

---

<sup>227</sup> For a more complete description of de Gaulle's pronouncement, see John Talbot, The War Without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 151-3.

<sup>228</sup> de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, ch. 4.

General Assembly.”<sup>229</sup> For the first time since 1955, the Canadian government agreed with the basic direction of French policy towards Algeria, and no longer needed to be pressured into supporting France at the United Nations.<sup>230</sup>

The offer of self-determination for the Algerian people took place after an item on Algeria had already been inscribed upon the UN’s fall agenda and it had a profound effect upon the course of debate in the international body. The announcement “dispel[led] most if not all of the doubts of France’s friends.” The British government, which like other NATO members had been increasingly critical of France’s inability to resolve the Algerian crisis, now believed that the French had to be protected from criticism by the United Nations or de Gaulle’s efforts to find peace in North Africa would be damaged. Both the United States and the United Kingdom voted for resolutions favourable to France while Greece and Turkey abandoned their public criticism of France.<sup>231</sup> Even the Afro-Asian states simply noted that the right of self-determination for Algeria had been accepted and urged France to negotiate with the Algerian nationalists as quickly as possible. In the space of two months, the international community had abandoned its criticism of France and endorsed de Gaulle’s plan to end the hostilities in Algeria.

---

<sup>229</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7725 file 12177-40 pt 11.2, Memo, Yvon Beaulne to H. F. Davis, 25 September 1959.

<sup>230</sup> The Canadian government had been prepared to vote with France again during the debate on Algeria in the 14<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly, but mostly to compensate for the hard feelings created by Canada’s vote against France during the previous session’s debate on nuclear tests in the Sahara Desert. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5142 file 5475-DW-64-D-40 pt 1 [file pocket], *Final Report – 14<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, 15 September – 13 December 1959*.

<sup>231</sup> *Op cit*, Memo, Yvon Beaulne to H. F. Davis, 25 September 1959 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7725 file 12177-40 pt 11.2, Tel 1241, Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York to External, 27 September 1959.

The new enthusiasm regarding the immediate prospects for peace in Algeria proved short-lived. The French settlers in Algeria viewed the offer of self-determination to the Algerian people as a betrayal of *Algérie française* and their hostility culminated in a settler revolt against the government in Algiers in January 1960. More troubling still, the leaders of the French army in Algeria disdained to use force against the very people whose interests they had been defending since 1954.<sup>232</sup> Political protests by the *colons* had previously succeeded in shaping the French government's policy towards Algeria but on this occasion Charles de Gaulle refused to submit. Deprived of the support in France itself that the *colons* had previously mustered, the settlers' insurrection collapsed in the face of de Gaulle's determination. The French people had largely tired of the war by 1960 and were no longer prepared to sacrifice peace to defend the interests of the French minority in Algeria. Their political protest having failed, some of the most militant *colons* founded the *Organisation de l'armée secrète* and turned to terrorism to disrupt the peace process set in motion by de Gaulle. The FLN also continued its war against the French army both because the rebels doubted de Gaulle's sincerity and as a means of strengthening the nationalist position when the French government ultimately opened negotiations about Algeria's future.<sup>233</sup> Negotiations between the French government and the Algerian nationalists did begin in March 1960, but the cycle of bloodshed continued and even intensified.

---

<sup>232</sup> See Horne, 362-372.

<sup>233</sup> Talbot, chs. 7-10.

Thus, the situation in Algeria remained unstable despite the start of the peace process. The reaction of the *colons* to the prospect of independence for Algeria, the still uncertain reaction of the French military to de Gaulle's policy, and continued extremist violence by both settlers and nationalists ensured that Algeria remained a source of international concern into the early 1960s. This continuing uncertainty overshadowed all other developments in North Africa, including the evolution of Canada's relations with Tunisia and Morocco. The governments of both of these states ardently supported the FLN and the prolonged conflict in Algeria continued to have an adverse effect upon their relations with France.<sup>234</sup> The French, however, remained determined to maintain Tunisia and Morocco within France's orbit. They welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Morocco and other Western governments, but resented attempts by other states to undermine France's special position in these North African states. This determination explains, for example, the French government's reaction when the United States and Britain supplied Tunisia with military equipment in 1958.

The Canadian government neither wanted to nor could usurp the dominant position of France in the foreign and economic relations of Tunisia and Morocco following their independence. It recognised their importance as Western bastions in North Africa and the Middle East, but Canada's direct interests in Tunisia and Morocco

---

<sup>234</sup> Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France, 150-1.

were slight in this period.<sup>235</sup> Due to its abundant natural resources, Morocco did offer prospects for relatively substantial trade with Canada, but only in the long term. Tunisia, a primarily agricultural country, offered even fewer opportunities for Canadian exporters and businesses. As a result, officials within the Department of Trade and Commerce recommended directing Canada's trade missions to other, more potentially rewarding countries.<sup>236</sup> Furthermore, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration's interest in recruiting immigrants from Tunisia and Morocco had declined in the years since its initial overtures towards this region had been rebuffed in 1956. Repeated crises in North Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s did induce immigration officials to enquire about potential immigrants in the French settler and the Jewish populations in Tunisia and Morocco, but without a great deal of conviction or persistence.<sup>237</sup> Neither department believed that the current state of affairs warranted a large investment of Canada's diplomatic capital in either of these states.

The Canadian government did undertake some humanitarian activities in Tunisia and Morocco in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but its interest in the two North African

---

<sup>235</sup> Commenting on a forthcoming visit by Tunisia's Ambassador to Canada to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, the Secretary of State for External Affairs observed that "despite all the difficulties with France in recent years, [Tunisian President] Bourguiba's friendly feelings for the West and his persistent efforts to keep Tunisia in the Western family of nations deserve, I believe, full recognition." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 8.1, Memo, USSEA to Prime Minister, 10 July 1958.

<sup>236</sup> NAC, Record Group 20 [Department of Trade and Commerce], Vol. 2871 file 310-M9-1, *Report of Trade Tour – North Africa*, William Brett, Assistant Commercial Secretary, Canadian Embassy Paris, February 1960. Regarding Canada's trade with Tunisia, a senior official in the Department of Trade and Commerce commented that "we see little prospect for a major improvement in this situation in the short run." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7838 file 12791-40, Letter, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Commerce to USSEA, 24 September 1958.

states remained overwhelmingly political and strategic during this period.<sup>238</sup> Though friendly to the West, both Morocco and Tunisia faced pressure from anti-Western elements. Tunisia in particular was vulnerable to the appeal of Arab unity from the Arab League, but Western officials also believed that Communist countries were trying to woo both Tunisia and Morocco. The Canadian government realised that the West needed to act quickly lest these countries turn to the Eastern bloc for the political and economic support they needed.<sup>239</sup> Furthermore, many Canadian officials believed that Canada had an important role to play in maintaining Western influence in Tunisia and Morocco. Algeria had undermined the relations between France and its ex-protectorates and many Tunisians and Moroccans suspected that France, Britain and the United States harboured imperialist designs against their countries' newly won independence. A middle power without a history of colonialism towards developing countries, Canada did not arouse such suspicions.<sup>240</sup> Nevertheless, Canada did little to help keep Tunisia and Morocco in

---

<sup>237</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Tel S-39, *Treatment of Jews in Morocco and Tunisia*, External to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 29 January 1960.

<sup>238</sup> The Canadian government, for instance, authorised the Canadian Red Cross to grant a total of \$35,000 in supplies and cash to assist Algerian refugees located in Tunisia and Morocco in 1958 and 1959. The Canadian government also dispatched a doctor, six nurses and three tons of medical supplies on an RCAF transport to the town of Agadir in Morocco when it was destroyed in the spring of 1960 by two earthquakes and a tidal wave with the loss of over 2,000 lives. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6969 file 5475-EA-7-40 pt 2.1, Memo, G. F. Bruce, Economic Division II to USSEA, 23 April 1959 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6859 file 4283-C-40, Letter, Marshal Steanns, D. Bruce Shaw and W. S. Stanbury, Canadian Red Cross to Prime Minister.

<sup>239</sup> Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, for one, demonstrated a willingness to play the West off against the East in March of 1959 when he informed the British government that if he could not "get the arms he requires from the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., he would have to turn elsewhere." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7586 file 11044-DH-40 pt 1, Savingram 111, United Kingdom Document, *Arms for Tunisia*, 23 March 1959.

<sup>240</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, *Time-table for Expansion 1959-61 intended solely as a basis for discussion*, 10 June 1959.

the Western camp in the years following their independence.

By 1959, both the Soviet Union and Communist China had built large diplomatic missions in Rabat and Tunis. The Canadian government relied upon its larger Western partners to bear the burden of matching the Eastern bloc's diplomatic manoeuvres. Shortly after their independence in 1956, the Canadian government considered opening resident missions in Tunisia and Morocco as well as Nigeria and Rhodesia yet the Department of External Affairs' scant resources prohibited the plan. Rapid expansion of Canada's diplomatic representation abroad would have severely taxed the Department both financially and in terms of personnel.<sup>241</sup> Most importantly, the Department lacked sufficient French-speaking officers to staff new missions in countries like Tunisia or Morocco.<sup>242</sup> The Canadian government would have to wait to open missions in Tunisia and Morocco. Until Canada was able to open these missions, it expected the United States, Britain and France to represent the West in North Africa.

The Department of External Affairs continued to place a high priority on opening missions to boost the Western presence in Tunisia and Morocco. At first, there was very little to choose between the two countries in terms of importance to Canada. Morocco offered better long-term potential for Canadian trade, but their political and strategic importance was roughly equivalent. They were both strategically important gateways to

---

<sup>241</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Proposed New Missions*, W.D. Matthews to European Division, 14 November 1958.

<sup>242</sup> For a description of the difficulties the Department experienced in recruiting French-speaking diplomats, see Don Barry and John Hilliker, *Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 187.



the Middle East and Africa, they were both heavily involved in the Arab world and in the continuing problems in Algeria, they both bore friendly feelings for the West, and they were both targets of communist encroachment. Nor could Canada seem to favour one of the countries, since this would only antagonise the other one.<sup>243</sup> Limited resources, however, made the opening of two missions in North Africa impossible at this stage, and Tunisia gradually emerged as the focus of attention within the Department of External Affairs.

Tunisia, argued Henry Davis, the Head of the Department's European Division, offered Canada a unique opportunity to exert influence in North Africa. He observed that

While the present [Tunisian] government is anxious to preserve its Western orientation, and has been exercising an effective moderating influence in the Arab world, we should not forget that it is under constant pressure from vocal segments of the population to turn Eastward. Without exaggerating the role that Canada, as a middle power, could play in improving relations with the West and providing an additional hedge against Arab nationalism and Soviet diplomatic pressures, there is no doubt that few countries would have at this time a better opportunity of gaining a sympathetic hearing in Tunis.<sup>244</sup>

Davis realised that the same reasoning could be applied to Morocco as well, but argued that Tunisia had proven more eager to develop diplomatic relations with Canada than its neighbour. With only eight missions abroad, the Tunisian government had nevertheless chosen to assign an Ambassador to Canada, though he resided in Washington.

---

<sup>243</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6859 file 4283-C-40, Memo, *Opening of New Posts*, European Division to H. F. Davis, 28 January 1960.

Furthermore, the Tunisian Ambassador actively consulted Canadian officials on a wide range of important issues including North African affairs, the disposition of the French base at Bizerte in Tunisia, and pending issues at the United Nations like nuclear testing in the Sahara Desert.<sup>245</sup> In turn, Canadian officials lobbied the Tunisian Ambassador for support regarding the Law of the Sea Conference and the 1967 World Fair that Canada wanted for Montreal.<sup>246</sup> Morocco, on the contrary, had not responded to the Canadian government's informal overtures and was not as willing as Tunisia to cultivate ties with Canada.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Morocco remained a much-debated subject within the Department of External Affairs in 1960 and 1961. Howard Green stressed Tunisia's influence in Africa to justify Canada's exchange of diplomatic representation with the small African country. Green would have liked to do more, but as he told Habib Bourguiba Jr., the Tunisian Ambassador to Canada, in April 1961, his Department could not find the resources for even one resident mission in

---

<sup>244</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Memo, *Extension of Representation Abroad*, H. F. Davis to E. Gill, 5 February 1960.

<sup>245</sup> On 4 March 1960, for example, the Tunisian Ambassador lobbied Howard Green for Canada's support of a special session of the United Nations to consider France's programme of atomic tests in the Sahara in the spring of 1960. He also explained Tunisia's position on Bizerte and asked for Canada's help to reach an agreement with the French. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 8.2, Memo, H. F. Davis to USSEA, 4 March 1960.

<sup>246</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 8.2, Memo, Marcel Cadieux to USSEA, 4 March 1960 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Memo, *1967 World Fair in Montreal – Request for Tunisia's Support*, H. F. Davis to USSEA, 4 March 1960.

French Africa.<sup>247</sup> In the end, though Tunisia remained a priority for the establishment of a Canadian diplomatic mission, the Canadian government would only accredit non-resident Ambassadors to both Tunisia and Morocco in early 1961. Canada's Ambassador to Bern, Switzerland was appointed non-resident Ambassador to Tunisia while the Canadian Ambassador in Spain was also appointed to Morocco. Tunisia's and Morocco's importance in the context of the Cold War did not yet justify the cost of establishing resident missions in either of these countries. Even the beginnings of a small Canadian aid programme for French-speaking countries in Africa in 1961 did not compensate for the fact that Canada had few direct political or economic interests in these North African countries.<sup>248</sup>

The Canadian government's interest in these countries remained general at best and overwhelmingly shaped by the continued uncertainty surrounding the fate of Algeria. Even Tunisian and Moroccan officials recognised that this question dominated all other issues facing their own countries.<sup>249</sup> The Algerian problem preoccupied Canadian officials even after de Gaulle had agreed in September 1959 to allow the Algerian people to exercise their right to self-determination. Despite the fact that the Canadian

---

<sup>247</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Memo, *Draft Memo to Cabinet on Representation in Tunisia*, Ross Cambell to European Division, 13 January 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Tunisian Ambassador's Call on the Minister*, African and Middle Eastern Division to USSEA, 19 April 1961.

<sup>248</sup> The Canadian educational aid programme for French Africa will be addressed in Chapter 4.

<sup>249</sup> In June 1960, for example, Canadian diplomat G. G. Crean visited Tunisia to meet with the Tunisian President, Foreign Minister and Secretary General of Tunisia's Foreign Ministry. Asked by Crean to outline the principal problems facing his government, the Secretary General "at once proceeded to discuss the Algerian War and never left the subject during our half hour conversation." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7334 file 11033-40 pt 8.2, Tel 670, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 16 June 1960.

government now agreed with the basic nature of French policy towards Algeria, the government continued to risk embarrassment by the on-going difficulties there. Some Canadians still questioned Canada's support for France at the United Nations. Lawrence Ryan from Victoria, B.C., for example, denounced the hypocrisy of the Diefenbaker government's support for France at the same time that it pressed for a Canadian Bill of Rights.<sup>250</sup> There were as yet no indications that the majority of Canadian people blamed their government for its actions in support of France. Yet Canadian officials knew that this could change if Canadians ever learned the extent to which their government had contributed to France's military activities in North Africa.

From 1950 to March of 1960, the Canadian government sent France a total of \$127,679,000 in military equipment under the Mutual Aid programme.<sup>251</sup> Because it had chosen not to enquire about the destination of its Mutual Aid, the Canadian government had no idea how much of this equipment had been used by the French military in Algeria. As early as 1952, the Canadian government had made it clear that it would prefer not to know if France used Canadian Mutual Aid supplies against nationalist insurgents in French colonies like Indochina or Algeria. Order-In-Council P.C. 1956-507 reinforced this position. Thus, when Carleton professor Douglas Anglin asked the Department of External Affairs in March 1960 if Canadian equipment had been used against the

---

<sup>250</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7725 file 12177-40 pt 12.2, Letter, Lawrence Ryan to John Diefenbaker, 9 January 1960.

<sup>251</sup> This total included \$27 million in armaments; \$28 million in ammunition; \$8 million in vehicles; \$13.5 million in communication equipment; \$20 million in aircraft and aircraft parts; and \$26.5 million in ships. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4508 file 50030-L-5-40 pt 3, Memo, *Mutual Aid for France*, L. P. Tardif, 28 November 1960.

nationalist rebellion in Algeria, Canadian officials could not provide him with an answer.<sup>252</sup>

Anglin's enquiry had the potential to embarrass the Canadian government greatly because, according to officials in the Defence Liaison I Division, the Canadian government could neither confirm nor safely deny that the French military had ever used Canadian equipment during the war in Algeria. W.H. Barton explained that France had accepted the condition that Canadian Mutual Aid must be used to strengthen the capacity of NATO to deter or resist aggression, but that Algeria's Mediterranean coastline had been included in the territories covered by the North Atlantic Treaty. Nothing prevented the French, therefore, from using Mutual Aid equipment in the part of Algeria included within the NATO area.<sup>253</sup> Nevertheless, Barton observed that the Canadian government could not convincingly claim that none of its Mutual Aid had been used in Algeria as long as a majority of the French armed forces was stationed there. This situation made Canada, like the rest of NATO, vulnerable to accusations of complicity in France's use of force to suppress colonial nationalism in Algeria.

The Canadian government continued to give France political and military support for its problems in North Africa following the announcement of self-determination for Algeria in September of 1959. The difficulty lay, as always, in trying to ensure that Canada's support for France did not antagonise either other states such as Tunisia or

---

<sup>252</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4508 file 50030-L-5-40 pt 3, Memo, W. H. Barton to USSEA, 3 March 1960.

<sup>253</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6142 file 50405-A-40 pt 3.2, Memo, *The Algerian War and NATO*, W. H. Barton to Middle Eastern Division, 20 October 1960.

Morocco or the Canadian people. The Canadian government took what measures it could to demonstrate its friendship for the two North African states. In late 1960, for example, the Canadian government transferred its commercial official responsible for Tunisia to the Canadian embassy in Switzerland from the embassy in Paris after the Tunisian government objected, given the deteriorating relations between France and Tunisia at this time.<sup>254</sup> The Canadian government similarly undertook to waive visa requirements on a reciprocal basis between Canada, Tunisia and Morocco during this period because it saw “political advantage in making at this time friendly gestures towards Morocco and Tunisia.”<sup>255</sup> Such gestures of friendship were necessary because the delay in granting self-determination to Algeria continued to undermine relations between these countries and the West.<sup>256</sup>

Harold Green in particular worried about the detrimental effect that support for France’s policies in Algeria had on Canada’s relations with Tunisia, Morocco and the Afro-Asian states in general. Green even considered abstaining during the United Nations debate on Algeria in December 1960 as a way of appeasing the Afro-Asian states. Ross Campbell and G.S. Murray, however, argued that France attached the greatest importance

---

<sup>254</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Letter, Mongi Slim, Tunisian Ambassador to Canada to SSEA, 14 November 1960.

<sup>255</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6859 file 4283-C-40, Memo, European Division to Consular Division, 29 November 1960.

<sup>256</sup> British officials observed that because of the deteriorating diplomatic relationship between France and its former North African protectorates as a result of the Algerian problem, Tunisia and Morocco were more inclined to seek military assistance from the Soviet Union rather than from France or other Western states. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5541 file 12529-40, Tel 3496, *Soviet Arms for Morocco*, Canadian High Commission, London to External, 17 November 1960.

to its allies' support in the United Nations. Green accepted this analysis of the situation, but was still committed to balancing Canada's interests by supporting France without antagonising the governments of the increasingly numerous and important developing countries.<sup>257</sup> During the debate itself, the Afro-Asian states introduced a resolution calling upon the United Nations to hold a referendum to allow the Algerian people to determine the destiny of their country. The Canadian delegate endorsed the principle of self-determination for Algeria, as well as the interest of the United Nations in a peaceful resolution to this problem, but rejected the call for an explicit role for the international body in conducting a referendum as beyond its competence. When the paragraph calling for a United Nations supervised referendum was dropped from the final version of the text, Canada voted with 63 other states in favour of the resolution against 8 opposed and 27 abstentions.<sup>258</sup> The Canadian government had thus demonstrated its willingness to work with the Afro-Asian states on issues of concern to them, but in a way that did not adversely affect French interests.

Representatives of the French government had met with the Algerian nationalists in mid-1960 at Melun in France, but they had made little progress regarding the timing of a referendum in Algeria and the situation remained delicate. Canadian officials worried that any interference in this process, even by the United Nations, could jeopardise the

---

<sup>257</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5493 file 12177-40 pt 16, Memo, G. S. Murray to USSEA, 13 December 1960.

<sup>258</sup> Canada, Canada and the United Nations, 1960 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961), 14-15.

negotiations.<sup>259</sup> They similarly worried that the French military in Algeria would finally turn against de Gaulle's government and side with the extremist *colons* in their attempts to maintain the French presence in Algeria. Not even a military revolt in Algeria, however, sufficed to derail the arduous peace process that de Gaulle had set in train in September 1959.<sup>260</sup> By March 1962, the French government and the *Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne* had announced a cease-fire followed quickly in June 1962 by a referendum in which the Algerian people overwhelmingly voted for complete secession from France. The O.A.S. continued its campaign of terror against Algerian independence, but both the Algerian and French people had had enough of this war and one of the bloodiest anti-colonial conflicts of the post-Second World War period had come to an end.

In the meantime, relations between France and Tunisia continued to deteriorate. Following Tunisia's independence in 1956, the French had retained military bases in Tunisia, the most prominent of which was the naval base at Bizerte. Throughout the early 1960s, nationalist elements within Tunisia had pressured President Bourguiba to assert Tunisia's sovereignty over Bizerte and eject the remaining French forces from the country. By July 1961, this pressure culminated in a public march upon the base at Bizerte during the course of which a shot was fired, French paratroopers rushed from the

---

<sup>259</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>260</sup> The leadership of the French Army in Algeria revolted against Metropolitan authorities in April of 1961 following a referendum in January 1961 in which 75% of French citizens responded that they favoured the granting of self-determination to the Algerian people. The revolt, however, collapsed within several days. Carmoy, 205.



base and a four-day battle ensued resulting in 1,300 Tunisian casualties.<sup>261</sup> This incident provoked an international crisis similar to the issues that had been raised during the Algerian war. With the support of other Afro-Asian states, the Tunisian government demanded an immediate session of the United Nations to address France's violence against the Tunisian people. Once again, the Canadian and other Western governments were forced to balance their interests in establishing close and friendly relations with African and Asian countries against the importance of their alliance with France and France's military and political influence in North African.

Canadian officials worried that the Bizerte crisis would drive Tunisia even further into the Afro-Asian group and perhaps even the Soviet bloc, a possibility raised by the Tunisian Ambassador to Canada himself.<sup>262</sup> Western support for France during this incident also provoked criticism among several important elements of Canadian society. The Canadian Labour Congress, for example, urged the Canadian government to recognise Tunisia's territorial integrity and the right of the Tunisian government to exercise full sovereignty over all Tunisia. Even the Globe and Mail editorialised that, by failing to condemn France's attacks upon Bizerte the United States, Britain and other Western countries proved that their support for France transcended even the basic

---

<sup>261</sup> Ling, Morocco and Tunisia, 139.

principles of national sovereignty.<sup>263</sup> Canadian officials believed that both Tunisia and France used Bizerte as a pawn to achieve their own, very different ends, but the issue nonetheless presented difficulties for Canada.

Canadian staff at the embassy in Paris wanted to punish President Bourguiba for provoking the current crisis. Officials in Ottawa, however, recognised that criticising Bourguiba would forfeit any influence Canada could exert on Tunisian policy.<sup>264</sup> They also realised that if the UN answered Tunisia's appeal for a special session, France's friends and allies would have to defend France against Afro-Asian attacks even at the risk of being criticised themselves.<sup>265</sup> The Canadian government, therefore, again tried to navigate between two competing interests. Having concluded that nothing useful would come from a bitter debate in the United Nations, the government opposed a special session of the United Nations to discuss the situation in Bizerte. Instead, the Canadian delegate argued that France and Tunisia should resolve their dispute through bilateral

---

<sup>262</sup> On 8 August, 1961, Habib Bourguiba Jr. visited the Department of External Affairs and said that the most distressing aspect of the present crisis was that "Tunisia was losing its faith in the West and the way the latter defends the basic tenets of its ideology. France was guilty in Bizerte and deserved a 'good spanking,' but because she was a member of the Atlantic club all the other members sided with her and feared taking a firm stand in public in favour of Tunisia." He added that the crisis called for a re-appraisal of Tunisia's pro-Western orientation. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40, Memo, *Bizerte Crisis*, J. Fournier to USSEA, 11 August 1961.

<sup>263</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40, Letter, Donald Macdonald, Secretary-Treasurer of the Canadian Labour Congress to SSEA, 16 August 1961 and "Politics and Principle," The Globe and Mail, 24 August 1961.

<sup>264</sup> The Ambassador in Paris suggested, for example, that the Canadian government withdraw its support for Mongi Slim's candidature for the presidency of the United Nations General Assembly during its upcoming session. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7335 file 11033-40 pt 8.3, Memo, *Tunisian Crisis and the U.N. Elections*, U.N. Division to USSEA, 26 July 1961.

<sup>265</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40, Memo, *Special Session of the General Assembly – Tactical Appraisal*, USSEA to SSEA, 15 August 1961.

negotiations.<sup>266</sup> Following a well-established pattern, the French delegate did not participate in the discussion of the Bizerte incident at the United Nations in August 1961. France's allies did what they could, but 66 countries voted for a resolution that condemned the French attacks on the town and people of Bizerte. Canada, the United States, Britain and the rest of the NATO states all abstained, with the exception of Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Turkey.

Ultimately, the crisis occasioned by President Bourguiba's attempt to expel French military forces from the naval base at Bizerte passed though it was not until October, 1964 that the last of France's troops were withdrawn from Tunisia. Canadian policy had been guided by a desire to limit the damage to France while preserving as far as possible its friendly relations with Tunisia and the other African and Asian states. In this, the policy was reasonably successful. The French government, for one, appreciated Canada's position and realised that, given the desire to offend neither France nor the Afro-Asian states, abstention was all that could be expected from France's allies.<sup>267</sup> Nor did Canada's relations with Tunisia suffer unduly during and after the Bizerte affair. France continued to supply by far the largest portions of technical, economic and military assistance required by the Tunisian government. The latter, however, was understandably

---

<sup>266</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40, Memo, *Bizerte at the United Nations*, USSEA to Prime Minister, 2 August 1961.

<sup>267</sup> On 28 August, 1961, M. Levasseur, the French Chargé d'affaires in Ottawa, called Norman Robertson to express the French Embassy's appreciation of Canada's stand in the United Nations on the controversy between France and Tunisia. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40, Memo, *Canada's Stand on the Tunisian Issue*, USSEA to SSEA, 28 August 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5409 file 11033-40 pt 9, Tel 1110, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 31 August 1961.

leery of French aid during this period of Franco-Tunisian tension and actively sought other donors. During 1961 and 1962, the Tunisian government began looking to Canada as a potential supplier of large amounts of aid.

The Tunisian government wanted general economic assistance from Canada, but it also sought specific types of aid that had previously been provided by France. In August 1961, for example, Tunisian officials supplied Canada's Ambassador to Tunisia with a list of 1,481 teaching vacancies that needed to be filled and for which their government was unwilling to approach the French government on the eve of the discussion of Bizerte in the United Nations. Similarly, in February 1962 the Tunisian government sought Canada's help to train officer cadets for the Tunisian army now that it was politically undesirable to have them receive training in France. Despite the advantages Canadian officials perceived in cultivating relations with Tunisia, two factors prevented Canada from meeting these two requests. Firstly, Canada did not have the resources with which to satisfy the Tunisian requests. H. Feaver, Canada's Ambassador to Tunisia, doubted whether Canada, Switzerland and Belgium combined could find enough French-speaking teachers to fill the vacant posts in Tunisia. Nor did Canada possess a French-language military college capable of supplying adequate training to Tunisian cadets – even *Collège militaire St. Jean* was a bilingual institution that would require the Tunisian students to speak English as a condition of enrolment. Secondly, the Canadian government did not want to cause a permanent disruption in Franco-Tunisian

relations. As one Canadian official said, “We do not think that Canada should contribute to the severance of links between France and Tunisia.”<sup>268</sup> The Canadian government believed that France should remain the West’s principal agent in French North Africa and was unwilling to risk antagonising the French by imposing upon that prerogative.

On 1 July 1962 the people of Algeria voted overwhelmingly in favour of independence from France. Two days later Charles de Gaulle proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Algeria. That same day, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker officially recognised the existence of the new country by saying “It is with a deep sense of satisfaction that, on behalf of the Government and people of Canada, I welcome Algeria to the comity of free and independent nations.”<sup>269</sup> The Canadian government greeted with relief this conclusion to a colonial problem that had bedevilled France and the West in general from 1954 to 1962. In 1961, a Radio Tunis reporter had asked Howard Green if Canada had a double standard on anti-colonialism because it had opposed the repression of the Hungarian people by the Soviet Union but it had consistently refused to support the Algerian people in their struggle for independence. Green denied that Canada had such a double standard.<sup>270</sup> He did not explain, however, that the Canadian government judged colonial issues in the 1950s and early 1960s by

---

<sup>268</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 3, Letter 254, *Tunisia – Educational Assistance*, Canadian Ambassador, Bern to USSEA, 16 August 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 3, *Tunisian Request for Military Assistance*, Jean Fournier to Defence Liaison I Division, 16 February 1962.

<sup>269</sup> Archives of the Diefenbaker Centre, Saskatoon, Canada, Diefenbaker Papers file MG01/xxii/458 Vol. 7, Press release, Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, 3 July 1962.

<sup>270</sup> Howard Green, “Review of Canadian Foreign Policy – Transcript of the CBC Programme *Inquiry*, 14 November 1961,” in Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, 1948-1962.

their impact on NATO and the Cold War rather than with an eye to promoting freedom for all dependent peoples. The Canadian government had endorsed the Hungarian cause because the Soviet use of force to suppress Hungarian nationalism in 1956 rallied international opinion against the Soviet Union. In Algeria, however, anti-colonialism threatened NATO unity and its ability to defend the West from communism so that Canada was compelled to support the efforts to maintain France's influence in Algeria.

Nevertheless, the last of France's North African dependencies had achieved its independence in 1962. The Algerian war for independence, however, left a bitter legacy that transcended Algeria's geographical boundaries. The war devastated Algeria economically, politically and socially; it strained France's ordinarily amicable relations with its former North African territories as well as with other Afro-Asian states; it exacerbated the growing rift between France and its North Atlantic allies; and it facilitated the infiltration of anti-Western forces into a region that was of great strategic value to the West during the Cold War.

**CHAPTER FOUR: CANADA AND THE FRENCH COMMUNITY IN**  
**AFRICA, 1958-1963**

Following the Second World War, France's colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the same growth of nationalism as the French territories in North Africa and the dependent world in general. Nationalists in Madagascar, for example, attacked French military barracks in March 1947 and sparked a mass insurrection that was not completely extinguished until December 1948.<sup>271</sup> Yet the African and Malagasy colonies were generally less developed politically and did not cause France the same degree of problems as Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria after 1945. French authorities controlled political developments in the African colonies to an extent unattainable in North Africa during the 1950s. Nevertheless, the colonies of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Guinée, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Upper Volta in French West Africa, Chad, Oubangui-Chari, Gabon and Middle Congo in Equatorial Africa, and the French mandated territories of Togo and Cameroon could not remain unaffected by the broader world.

The Canadian government paid little attention to events taking place in France's colonies in Africa during the late 1940s and most of the 1950s since these colonies generally offered fewer opportunities for Canada than the French territories in North Africa. Canadian trade with the regions was negligible, with only small markets for Canadian goods in some of the colonies and few prospects for improvement after the

Second World War. Madagascar, for example, purchased Canadian wheat, gin, boots and shoes, automobile parts, lead and batteries worth \$263,430 in 1946, up from \$9,099 in 1938. Yet Canadian post-war credits to France funded these purchases and the Department of Trade and Commerce did not believe they accurately reflected the long-term prospects for Canadian trade.<sup>272</sup> The French colonies simply could not pay for Canadian goods after the war. By early 1947, France had virtually exhausted Canada's post-war gift of credit, and its limited reserves of foreign currency compelled the French government to restrict its colonies' purchases from dollar countries like Canada and the United States.

Canadian exporters thus only temporarily increased their sales to Madagascar as France's import restrictions limited Canadian trade with its African colonies after 1945. Canada's exports of wheat and rolled oats to Madagascar, for example, fell from a value of 4,159,000 francs in 1945 to 189,000 francs in 1946.<sup>273</sup> Canadian traders wanted to establish Canada's commercial presence in French Africa, but France had no desire to bolster Canadian exports to its colonies. Even international agreements like Bretton Woods and the Marshall Plan had little effect upon France's colonial purchases and Canadian officials worried that Canada's already small market share in French Africa

---

<sup>271</sup> For more details on the rebellion in Madagascar and on political developments in French Africa in general after 1945, see Robert Aldrich, Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), chapter 8.

<sup>272</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2787 file 810-M1-1, Letter, *Canadian Exports to Madagascar*, G.R. Heasman, Director Trade Commissioner Service to Canadian Commercial Secretary, Capetown, 24 March 1947.

<sup>273</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2787 file 810-M1-1, Letter, M. W. Mackenzie, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to Edmund Oldfield, 20 November 1948.



would be eliminated entirely.<sup>274</sup> The Canadian government did establish a trade office in Leopoldville in the resource-rich Belgian Congo in 1946, but here too Canadian exports faced import restrictions and strict competition from other countries. In all of 1947, Canada exported \$920,791 in goods to the Belgian Congo, with canned fish and automobiles accounting for more than one-third of the total value, but remained only in 18<sup>th</sup> place among the list of the colony's suppliers.<sup>275</sup> Thus, though several of them offered potential for the future, the French-speaking colonies of Africa barely registered with the Canadian government in terms of their overall importance to the Canadian economy.

Canadian companies similarly had few direct investments in the Belgian and French African colonies. Canadian mining companies did find a niche helping French and Belgian concerns exploit the colonies' natural and mineral resources after 1945 but here too obstacles limited the potential for profit by Canadian businesses. Both the Belgian and the French governments wanted their own nationals to maintain control of economic developments in their territories, so Canadian companies could accept at most minority stakes in projects.<sup>276</sup> More importantly, the Canadian government restricted the

---

<sup>274</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2787 file 810-M1-1, Letter, *Trade with Madagascar*, G. R. Heasman to Canadian Commercial Secretary, Capetown, 17 July 1947.

<sup>275</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2301 file 7-C17-1 pt 5, Report, *Economic Conditions – Belgian Congo*, L. H. Ausman, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Leopoldville, 4 October 1948.

<sup>276</sup> French and Belgian citizens, and their newspapers, did occasionally criticise the participation of foreign companies in developmental projects in French or Belgian Africa, however. In the mid-1950s, for example, *Libre Belgique* decried the presence of American and Canadian – through the Aluminium Company of Canada – interests in a project to develop the hydro-electric and aluminium potential of the Belgian Congo. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3270 file 6386-40 pt 1, Des 279, C. P. Hébert, Canadian Ambassador, Brussels to SSEA, 18 May 1955.

export of capital from Canada after the war since Canada itself imported extensive amounts of capital.<sup>277</sup> Thus, companies like Frobisher Limited needed the Canadian government's approval to invest in an iron ore project in the French colony of Mauritania. Frobisher had discovered a large deposit of iron ore near Fort Gouraud, 220 miles from the coast in French West Africa, in the early 1950s. Frobisher owned 40% of the project to develop the resource, but it also had to contribute 40% of the development costs and the company needed permission from Canada's Foreign Exchange Control Board to invest in Mauritania.<sup>278</sup> Frobisher received the Board's approval, but lack of capital likely did have an adverse effect upon the ability of Canadian companies to invest in French Africa.

During the late 1940s and 1950s, Canada had little interest in attracting immigrants from French West and Equatorial Africa. These colonies had fewer settlers of European descent than French North Africa and their relative political stability did not force them from their homes. And since the Canadian government had not yet eliminated the colour bar in its immigration policies, non-Caucasian people from Africa were not considered desirable immigrants.<sup>279</sup> There were thus few potential immigrants for Canada in French Africa. Even so, Canadian officials would likely have encountered the same reluctance on the part of the French to endorse emigration from French West and

---

<sup>277</sup> Kenneth Norrie and Doug O'ram, A History of the Canadian Economy, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996), 257.

<sup>278</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3178 file 4794-40, Letter, H. H. Hemming, Vice President Frobisher Limited to A. D. Heeney, USSEA, 1 June 1951.

Equatorial Africa as in French North Africa during the mid-1950s. Similarly, Canada had few consular needs in these colonies because British offices met the needs of the few Canadians, overwhelmingly missionaries, in this part of the world.

The best source for information on Canadian missionaries in French Africa remains Lionel Groulx' treatise *Le Canada français missionnaire*, first published in 1962. Obviously, by focusing solely on French Canadian Catholic missionaries, Groulx does not reveal the true extent of the missionary work undertaken by all of Canada's missionaries around the world. Despite its limitations, however, *Le Canada français missionnaire* does reveal an interesting trend. Groulx found that 925 French Canadian missionaries served in all of Africa in 1953 and that by 1959 this number had risen to 1,500 missionaries from a total of 48 religious societies.<sup>280</sup> These missionaries worked in 22 different parts of Africa and nine of them served as bishops in African dioceses. The others served as teachers, nurses and administrators while also trying to administer to the spiritual needs of their congregations among the African people. Yet Groulx reveals that the vast majority of French Canadian missionaries in Africa served in British and ex-British territories, protectorates and colonies. Only a small minority of these French-speaking Canadians pursued their vocations in French-speaking parts of Africa.

The largest community of French Canadian missionaries in Africa belonged to the *Pères Blancs*. Of the 330 French Canadian *Pères Blancs* in Africa in 1959, only 109

---

<sup>279</sup> See Valerie Knowles, *Strangers at our gates: Canadian immigration and immigration policy, 1540-1995* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

<sup>280</sup> Lionel Groulx, *Le Canada français missionnaire* (Montréal: Fides, 1962), 263.

served in French-speaking territories including 94 in the *Fédération de l'Afrique centrale*, 6 in French West Africa, 9 in French North Africa and 4 in the Belgian Congo. The rest of the White Fathers, 221 in all, lived and worked in English-speaking Africa. This trend was even more apparent for other missionary orders in Africa such as the *Oblats de Marie-Immaculée* that had 151 missionaries in English-speaking Basutoland in 1959, but only 6 in French Cameroon. Of the 48 missionary orders that sent French-Canadians to Africa in the 1950s, it appears that only two directed the majority of their efforts towards French Africa. The *Frères des Écoles chrétiennes* worked mostly in the French territories of Cameroon, Togo and Dahomey after 1948, while the *Frères du Sacré-Coeur* were active in Cameroon, Guinée, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar.<sup>281</sup> Even these orders, however, had missions in English-speaking Africa as well.

While French Canadian missionaries served in virtually all the French and Belgian colonies in Africa during the 1950s, most of them lived, worked and proselytised in non-French speaking lands. Groulx himself observed that the White Fathers, “*pour leur aptitude sans doute à parler plus facilement la langue anglaise, et parce que, un temps, sujets britanniques, travaillent surtout ... dans les possessions ou anciens protectorats anglais.*”<sup>282</sup> Apparently, even those missionary orders based in France believed that their French Canadian members would be most useful in the British territories. It is interesting to wonder whether national jealousies in France and Belgium

---

<sup>281</sup> Ibid., 263-329.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid., 267-8.

limited the desirability of French Canadian missionary activities in the French and Belgian African colonies. In 1946, the newspaper *La Libre Belgique* criticised the Belgian government for allowing non-Belgian missionaries to teach children in the Belgian Congo because these foreigners would not instil the Congolese with Belgian nationalism.<sup>283</sup> Whatever the cause of this situation, the number of Canadians present in French-speaking parts of Africa, though relatively large in some cases, did not yet justify the opening of Canadian consular offices in this part of the world.<sup>284</sup>

In the absence of substantial Canadian economic, immigration or consular interests in French Africa, political considerations governed the Canadian government's interest in this region throughout the 1950s. Two separate yet intertwined international trends conditioned this interest – looming African independence and the competition between the West and the Soviet Union for the allegiance of the newly independent countries. British promises of independence to Ghana in 1956 and Nigeria in 1958 prompted Canada's Department of External Affairs to reconsider Canadian policy towards 'Black Africa' in 1955. Canadian officials worried in particular that the Soviet Union would exploit the withdrawal of the European powers from Africa. Jules Léger and Robert Ford, for example, also believed that the independence of some British colonies would create problems elsewhere in Africa that allowed the Soviet Union to

---

<sup>283</sup> *Les Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Bruxelles*, file A.F. 1-1, 1946-7, Article, *Prestige belge au Congo*, *La Libre Belgique*, 10 December 1946 and AMAÉB, file A.F. 1-1, 1946-7, Note, Direction Générale (P), 12 December 1946.

position itself as a supporter of African emancipation, to meddle in African affairs, and to undermine Western influence in the continent.<sup>285</sup>

Canadian diplomats believed that the West could not count upon maintaining the Western orientation of the African colonies once they achieved their independence. In fact, they recognised that the prestige of all of the Western countries could suffer because of the close military and political ties that linked them with the former colonial powers. The West, they argued, had to prove to the people of Africa that it valued their friendship. Léger thus suggested to Pearson in late 1955 that the Canadian government open a diplomatic mission in Ghana no later than 1957-58 even though other areas such as South East Asia faced more imminent Communist threats.<sup>286</sup> Léger argued that this mission would demonstrate Canada's acceptance of African countries as full members of the Commonwealth and the world community and could be used to counter the propaganda of the Soviet Union and the anti-colonial powers. Other Canadian posts in Africa would be opened as permitted by the Department's resources.

Even more than diplomatic recognition, the new countries of Africa required economic assistance. Western economic aid, wrote Léger, would "have the effect both of holding the line against Communism in Africa and removing from the West the taint of

---

<sup>284</sup> In the Belgian Congo, for instance, there were 249 Canadians, most of them Protestant missionaries, registered with Canada's trade office in Leopoldville in the late 1950s. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40 pt 2.3, Report, *Canada and Africa*.

<sup>285</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 165 file 12354-40 pt 1, Memo, *Canadian Relations with an Awakening Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 9 December 1955.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*

colonialism.”<sup>287</sup> All of Africa, however, needed this assistance and Léger thus argued that Canada had to expand its aid programmes beyond the Commonwealth, which in late 1955 still received the vast majority of Canadian external aid.<sup>288</sup> Léger did not yet advocate bilateral economic assistance from Canada to Africa. Instead, he felt that channelling the aid through the United Nations and its agencies would insulate the West from accusations that it practised neo-colonialism through the provision of aid.<sup>289</sup> Despite Léger’s arguments, economic assistance for Africa remained a low priority for the Canadian government at this time compared to, for example, South East Asia.

Even though the Communist threat to Africa was not considered imminent, Canada’s diplomats recognised that decolonisation in Africa offered the Communist bloc in general ample opportunities to undermine the West’s interests in the continent. Canadian officials also knew that “to do too little is to ensure that the Russians will have the last word.”<sup>290</sup> This fear conditioned the Canadian government’s perception of events in France’s colonies in Africa. It also made some Canadian officials worry that the pace of events was developing beyond the control of Western countries. Robert Ford, for instance, criticised Britain for “rushing ahead too fast in the plans to give independence to a number of colonies which have very little in the way of either civilisation or training at self-government behind them. I should think they are opening the way for interference

---

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> Hilliker and Barry, 223.

<sup>289</sup> *Op cit.*, Memo, *Canadian Relations with an Awakening Africa*, 9 December 1955.

<sup>290</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Expansion of Commonwealth Membership*, G. L. Seens and G. C. McInnes, 7 November 1955.

on a large scale by the Russians on the one hand and probably by the Indians on the other.”<sup>291</sup> Canadian officials believed in the inevitability of emancipating the African colonies, but wanted to preserve Western interests in Africa at the same time.

To prepare for the eventuality of dealing with independent African countries the Canadian government needed up-to-date information about their political, social and economic affairs. Yet the Department of External Affairs found its knowledge of African affairs woefully inadequate in the mid-1950s, especially with regards to France’s African colonies. In early 1956 Jules Léger asked Canada’s Ambassador in Paris to gather information on French West Africa and Equatorial Africa as part of a broader effort to build up a fund of information on the principal African territories. Léger sought details about French Africa’s political parties, the participation of African deputies and senators in the parliament in Paris, African leaders’ views about their future relationship with France, economic developments and the colonies’ transportation network.<sup>292</sup> Stung by French sensitivity over North Africa, however, Léger suggested that Embassy staff in Paris take care when gathering the information lest they provoke the French by seeming to interfere in France’s domestic concerns.

Luckily, the French themselves presented the Canadian Ambassador with an opportunity to gain the information on French Africa that officials in Ottawa desired. Early in 1956, Gaston Defferre invited Jean Désy to visit French West Africa. Désy and

---

<sup>291</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Expansion of Commonwealth Membership*, R. A. D. Ford to Commonwealth Division, 21 November 1955.



his wife left Paris at the end of March for a ten-day tour of Senegal, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Guinée, Upper Volta and Mauritania. During their rapid progression through French West Africa the Désys were impressively entertained at receptions, banquets, dinners and breakfasts and made the acquaintance of many colonial deputies, functionaries, elected officials, magistrates and administrators, both French and African. The Ambassador also had the opportunity in Guinée to familiarise himself with some of the issues involved in the construction and operation of an aluminium smelter in the Boké region in which the Aluminium Company of Canada had a small interest.<sup>293</sup>

Désy's primary purpose was to gather background information on French West Africa and this vast region's great diversity conditioned his impressions. The Ambassador visited small straw hut villages and ultra-modern cities; humid and arid areas; barren and fertile land; high mountains and low river valleys. He also noticed the contrast between African artisans and farmers and the European-dominated industrial concerns and large cash-crop agricultural producers.<sup>294</sup> The people of this vast region included the nomads who occupied the Sahel in Niger, Mauritania and Mali, the settled agriculturists of the savannah and those who collected the cocoa and bananas that grew in the forests of the Ivory Coast and Guinée. They came from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and spoke 30 major languages and dialects. Ten million of them were

---

<sup>292</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4432 file 12530-40 pt 1, Des K-186, *French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa*, USSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 1 March 1956.

<sup>293</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4432 file 12530-40 pt 1, Des 379, *Proposed Visit to French West Africa*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 27 March 1956.

animists, seven million followed Islam, and one million were Christians.

Reflecting this diversity, French West Africa had evolved into eight separate colonies in the years following the ‘Scramble for Africa’ beginning in the 1880s. In 1956, however, the difficulties in North Africa prompted reforms to the French administration in both West and Equatorial Africa. Désy’s visit to West Africa took place shortly before the French National Assembly adopted Gaston Defferre’s *loi-cadre* reforming the administration of France’s sub-Saharan colonies in June 1956. This *loi-cadre* gave all French citizens throughout the empire the right to vote and abolished the double electoral colleges by which the European minorities had maintained their dominant positions in the colonies. The law also increased the powers of local elected assemblies and the powers of government councils elected by the territorial assemblies. Electoral equality between European and native peoples and responsible government gave France’s colonies more autonomy than any other African colonies at this time.<sup>295</sup>

To Canadian observers, these reforms demonstrated France’s determination to loosen its hold over its African subjects, signalling the end of centralised rule from Paris. The French government had thus abandoned Greater France in favour of a type of federal structure for the empire.<sup>296</sup> The French, it seemed, had decided to loosen the bonds of empire in the hope of maintaining close ties between the metropole and its African

---

<sup>294</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4432 file 12530-40 pt 1, Des 744, *Voyage officiel en Afrique occidentale française*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 29 June 1956.

<sup>295</sup> Aldrich, 301.

<sup>296</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 3283 file 6938-B-40, Des 859, *Movement towards self-government in French territories overseas*, H. F. Davis, Paris to SSEA, 30 July 1956.

dependencies. These reforms mollified Canadian concerns that France would suppress nationalism in French Africa like it was trying to do in Algeria. In February 1957, the French Minister of the Overseas Territories invited Jean Désy to witness the progress of the Defferre reforms during a three week tour of French Equatorial Africa. This trip also marked the beginning of more frequent reports from the Canadian Embassy in Paris upon political, economic and social conditions in French Africa.

Following Désy's trip to French Equatorial Africa, for example, Canadian diplomats in Paris reported extensively on economic developments in French Africa.<sup>297</sup> These diplomats also reported on the elections for the territorial assemblies in all of French Africa and Madagascar at the end of March 1957. The Defferre reforms had satisfied moderate African nationalists to the extent that the *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA), a moderate nationalist party with branches throughout French Africa, formed the government in many of the African colonies.<sup>298</sup> The RDA sought complete internal autonomy for the French African colonies but wanted to maintain close links with France. Canadian observers now believed that the reforms undertaken by France since 1956 decreased the likelihood that its African colonies would seek to cut all of their ties with France.<sup>299</sup>

---

<sup>297</sup> See, for example, the reports on projects to dam the Kouilou-Niari River and on bauxite and aluminium production in French Africa. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4432 file 12530-40 pt 1, Des 702, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 30 July 1957 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4432 file 12530-40 pt 1, Des 747, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 13 August 1957.

<sup>298</sup> Aldrich, 301-2.

<sup>299</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7792 file 12529-40, Des 291, *French Overseas Territories: Political Evolution*, H. F. Davis, Canadian Embassy Paris to SSEA, 2 April 1958.

For some Canadian officials this was an important development because they did not believe that the French African colonies were ready for complete independence. G.G. Crean observed from Paris that “given the scarcity of political and administrative knowledge in the African territories and the low stage of economic development, most objective observers would agree that a further period of tutelage and of large-scale economic assistance is desirable if chaos is to be avoided in the area.”<sup>300</sup> The liberality of the French approach to devolution in French Africa impressed Crean, yet he also worried that moderate African nationalists might lose control of the pace of evolution to the detriment of the ties between France and French Africa. The independence of Ghana in 1957 in particular provided a catalyst for more extreme nationalist elements that the moderate French African political leaders found difficult to control.<sup>301</sup> It remained to be seen how long they would be satisfied with internal autonomy alone.

The next impetus for change in French Africa came from the French government itself. Following his return to power in mid-1958, Charles de Gaulle devised a new constitution for France and its overseas territories. The new constitution created a Community of associated states in place of the old French Union. It took away, however, much of the substance of the Defferre reforms of 1956 by greatly reducing the powers given to the elected assemblies and government councils in each of the territories in

---

<sup>300</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7792 file 12529-40, Des 660, Canadian Chargé d'affaires, Paris to SSEA, 7 August 1958.

<sup>301</sup> Crean reported that “responsible African political leaders admit they are forced to adopt more extreme positions than they think wise in order to keep from being swept aside completely by the younger extremist elements.” Ibid.

French Africa.<sup>302</sup> It ensured that France continued to control the Community's foreign affairs, defence, currency, economic and financial policy, justice, higher education and overseas transport through the Community's executive and legislative branches. Strictly Community institutions, such as its Senate and its high court, had only vague and ill-defined powers. Unlike some of his immediate predecessors, de Gaulle planned to reassert France's control over its overseas possessions.

De Gaulle did ask the inhabitants of the overseas territories to vote upon the constitution and its changes to the administration of the French Empire. A vote in favour of the constitution accepted membership in the Community under the leadership of France. A majority of votes against the constitution indicated that the territory opted for complete independence from France. De Gaulle made it clear, however, that if a state opted to separate itself from France it would sacrifice all the financial and technical assistance it received from the metropole.<sup>303</sup> This threat proved to be a powerful argument in favour of continued association with France, and the majority of African politicians endorsed French Africa's membership in the new Community. On 28 September 1958, most of France's overseas territories voted for the new constitution of the Fifth Republic and the Community. Only Sékou Touré in Guinée persuaded a majority of voters to reject the proposed constitution. Guinée thus became, almost immediately, an independent country and, as promised, de Gaulle withdrew France's aid

---

<sup>302</sup> Aldrich, 302.

<sup>303</sup> de Gaulle, *Memoirs of Hope*, 56.

from the new country.

By and large, the referendum's results vindicated the French President's decision to allow the African territories to accept or reject France's continued tutelage. Yet many observers believed that France's victory could only be temporary. Pierre Dupuy, Canada's new Ambassador to France, reported that even if they voted in favour of joining the Community, "the day of eventual independence for the African territories is no more than postponed."<sup>304</sup> Dupuy argued that France could not hold nationalism in check for long and that the colonies would eventually demand complete independence from France. He just hoped that, with France's help, the French African territories would improve their political and economic prospects before this happened. If not, he wrote, the territories risked "... economic chaos and political instability which would make them an easy prey for Communist penetration."<sup>305</sup>

The creation of the French Community in 1958/59 occurred when Western governments worried about communist gains in Africa. In late 1958, the North Atlantic Council created a new committee to study the problem of communist penetration in Africa.<sup>306</sup> By March of 1959 the committee reported that "the Soviet attempt to penetrate

---

<sup>304</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7792 file 12529-40, Des 719, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to SSEA, 29 August 1958.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

<sup>306</sup> The Canadian government supported the creation of this committee, but it rejected proposals, like that of the Secretary General's, that it be allowed to operate independently of the political advisors' committee within NATO. Canada sent no Africa expert to the committee's first meetings, and did not want this committee, on which the Canadian government had no voice, making policy for the entire alliance that was not reviewed by another alliance organ on which Canada was represented. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4859 file 50105-L-40, Mes DL-999, *Working Group on Africa*, External to Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris, 4 December 1958.

Africa south of the Sahara constituted a real and imminent threat to Western strategic, political and economic positions on the African continent.”<sup>307</sup> The Communist bloc was establishing diplomatic missions in, completing trade deals with and providing economic, technical and military assistance to the newly independent countries of Africa on a large scale in this period. The West needed decisive measures to counter the Communist efforts, including greater Western diplomatic representation in African countries and large-scale economic aid.

The independence of Guinée presented the West with an early test of commitment to Africa. Under the leadership of Sékou Touré, Guinée displayed an ideological preference for Marxism. With France’s withdrawal from the country, this predilection gave the Communist bloc an opening in French Africa and it responded by sending technical advisors and Czechoslovakian weapons to the new state. Initially, the French government hampered Western efforts to match the Communist-bloc’s efforts. Anxious to force Guinée to return to France’s sphere, the French discouraged their allies from accepting Guinée’s membership in the United Nations in late 1958 and frowned upon Western aid to replace that which France had cut off.<sup>308</sup> The prospect of losing Guinée to communism, however, forced the French government to reconsider and by mid-1959 it had endorsed the American donation of 8,000 tons of rice and wheat to help feed the

---

<sup>307</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4859 file 50105-L-40, Tel 1097, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris to External, 1 June 1959.

country's starving people.<sup>309</sup> France even began encouraging other Western countries and Canada in particular, to establish diplomatic relations with Guinée.

Though fear of Communist advances dominated the Canadian government's interest in Guinée throughout 1958 and 1959, it did recognise the importance of Canada's other interests in the French African country. The Aluminium Company of Canada possessed bauxite interests in Guinée through its French subsidiary, *Les Bauxites du Midi* and protecting this company's investment also concerned the Canadian government. In October 1958, John Diefenbaker received an awkwardly worded message from Sekou Touré that seemed to imply that his government would punish Alcan if Canada did not recognise the independence of Guinée.<sup>310</sup> The Canadian government officially recognised the Republic of Guinée on 1 November 1958 but the company continued to worry about the security of its investments. By early 1959, Alcan operated bauxite mines on the Île de Los and was building facilities to exploit the bauxite deposits in Boké. Its investment in

---

<sup>308</sup> The French were extremely grateful that the Canadian government displayed the same understanding of the French position over Guinée as it had previously done over France's North African problems and non-recognition of the GPRA. AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 100, *Note sur la politique étrangère du Canada*, 30 octobre 1958.

<sup>309</sup> In May 1959, the French representative to NATO's Political Advisers' Committee told her Canadian counterpart that while her government "still hoped to maintain what they could of a special position in Guinée, they now realised that only by some degree of collective Western effort could the Western orientation of Guinée be preserved." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4850 file 50105-G-40 pt 6, Tel 941, *Rice for Guinea*, Canadian Delegation to NATO, Paris to External, 7 May 1959.

<sup>310</sup> The message read: "*Gouvernement République Guinée accuse réception votre message 11 courant. Confirme validité engagement économique liant Guinée et Canada avec espoir que relations se développeront dans sécurité accrue au profit tous capitaux canadiens investis où à investir. Vous demande préciser conformément notre message 2 octobre intention votre gouvernement à l'égard république Guinée ayant que celle-ci ne prenne certaines décisions d'ordre économique.*" NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Tel, President, Republic of Guinée to Prime Minister of Canada, 13 October 1958.



these projects totalled 30-35 million dollars.<sup>311</sup>

Early in 1959, however, Alcan decided to discontinue its programme of investment in Guinée. In January, the company's president, Nathaniel Davis, told Sékou Touré that falling demand for aluminium in the world reduced the need for bauxite from Guinée. Davis promised to continue building the facilities already under way for twelve months, but told Touré that Alcan could not afford its operations in Boké given the current market conditions.<sup>312</sup> Davis was more candid with Canadian officials. He told them that Touré's only concern with economic matters was their bearing upon his political success and that the president's unpredictable decrees made it impossible for foreign companies to make long-term plans in Guinée. Davis also indicated that political uncertainty and the demands that the government made upon foreign companies – that, for example, companies locate their head offices in Guinée – undermined the business climate in Guinée. He drew attention, in particular, to the state-owned *Comptoir Guinéen du Commerce Extérieur* that controlled according to Marxist principles the production and sale of bananas, coffee, palm products and groundnuts to the Eastern bloc. Davis feared the extension of this type of governmental control to other areas of the economy.<sup>313</sup> In sum, Alcan's executives decided to focus on a project in Ghana, which they considered a more politically stable country.

---

<sup>311</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, *Memorandum on Aluminium Limited's Investments in Guinea*, J. H. Bailey, Canadian Commercial Secretary, Paris, 4 March 1959.

<sup>312</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, *Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Sékou Touré, President of the Republic of Guinea*, Nathaniel Davis, 28 January 1959.

<sup>313</sup> *Op cit.*, *Memorandum on Aluminium Limited's Investments in Guinea*, 4 March 1959.

Alcan did not give up on its interests in Guinée. Despite its temporary halt in production, the company retained plans to invest a further \$112 million in the country over three to four years ultimately enabling the Boké region to supply a large part of the company's future bauxite needs. For this reason, company officials wanted Canada to establish a diplomatic mission in Conakry.<sup>314</sup> The company wanted to ensure that it would have the Canadian government's assistance when it renewed its efforts in Guinée and in the meantime it wanted the government to help prevent Guinée from allowing the Soviet Union or another Eastern country access to the Boké deposits.<sup>315</sup> As part of its campaign to maintain its position in Guinée, the company even invited Sékou Touré to visit its operations in Arvida, Quebec, during the Guinean President's visit to the United States and Britain in the fall of 1959. Despite the awkwardness of this invitation, the Canadian government felt compelled to invite Touré to Ottawa because of the importance of Alcan's interests in Guinée.<sup>316</sup>

---

<sup>314</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Letter, Canadian High Commissioner, Accra to G. de T. Glazebrook, Commonwealth Division, 16 February 1959.

<sup>315</sup> The President of Alcan's French subsidiary, *Bauxites du Midi*, spoke about the strategic need to preserve the West's access to important resources such as Guinée's bauxite. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Memo of Conversation, G. G. Crean, Canadian Embassy, Paris and M. Eichenberger, President *Bauxites du Midi*, 21 May 1959.

<sup>316</sup> Given Alcan's interests in Guinée and the political desirability of keeping Guinée away from Communist entanglements, Diefenbaker and Howard Green felt compelled to invite Touré to Ottawa despite his Marxist leanings, Communist government and Guinée's extensive friendly contacts with the Eastern bloc. The government, according to Howard Green, would probably "not have considered such an invitation had it not been for the action of Aluminium Limited." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Memo, *Suggested Visit by the President of Guinea*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 27 August 1959. In the end, Touré cancelled his visit to Canada, citing internal security problems that required his presence at home. The Canadian Ambassador to the UN, however, discovered that there were no security problems in Guinée and that Touré had proceeded with his plans to visit Britain. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Tel 1649, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York to External, 7 November 1959.

Despite the pressure exerted by the Aluminium Company of Canada, the Canadian government assigned a low priority to a diplomatic mission in Conakry. The Canadian government, in fact, devoted little attention to French Africa as a whole at this time. The region maintained its general importance to Canada as a field of Cold War competition, but the Diefenbaker government seemed to believe that other Western countries were better positioned to counter Soviet initiatives in this part of the world.<sup>317</sup> Preparations to extend Canada's relations with French Africa, however, accelerated as the remaining members of the French Community in Africa neared their independence in 1960. The creation of the Community had not satisfied French Africa's desire for autonomy and in September 1959 the African heads of state asked Charles de Gaulle to transfer all of France's remaining powers to their governments. Events proceeded fairly rapidly after this and by mid-1960 the first of the French African states achieved their independence. By 1961, all of the former French colonies of West and Equatorial Africa – Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, the Congo, Gabon, the Central African Republic and Chad – as well as Madagascar, Cameroon and Togo became fully independent states.<sup>318</sup> The French Community ceased to exist.

The Canadian government followed the evolution of the French Community closely in late 1959 and early 1960. Canadian officials reported from Paris on

---

<sup>317</sup> The government, for example, remained leery of intruding upon France's sphere of influence in Africa. When considering whether or not to invite Sékou Touré to Canada in the fall of 1959, the Department of External Affairs took care to ascertain the favourable reaction of the French government before issuing the invitation. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7830 file 12700-A-40 pt 1.1, Mes K-125, *Invitation to the President of Guinea*, H. F. Davis, Ottawa to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 15 September 1959.

developments in the French African associated states and supplemented their information with visits to Africa. D.S. McPhail, Canada's Second Secretary in Paris, visited most of French Africa from 15 November to 22 December 1959, and Ambassador Dupuy undertook a more important trip through French Africa in November 1960. These visits helped the Canadian Embassy in Paris evaluate Canada's interests in the independence of the French African states. McPhail discovered a remarkable amount of goodwill towards Canada in French Africa. To leaders such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Canada was an ex-colony that enjoyed good relations with its former ruling powers, had overcome severe developmental problems, and that could offer much needed assistance to Africa. They also viewed Canada as the only developed French-speaking country outside of Europe and one that was free from the taint of neo-colonialism.<sup>319</sup> McPhail believed that this goodwill and the language they shared offered strong prospects for Canada's future relations with the French African states.

McPhail recognised that French Africa's immediate conditions did not yet justify expanding Canada's relations with the region. The potential for Canadian exports to French Africa remained extremely limited and the Canadian government had little interest in immigrants from this part of the world. He believed, however, that Canada had to build upon French Africa's goodwill or risk losing it. Like many others, McPhail believed that the Communist bloc was poised to capitalise on Western weaknesses in

---

<sup>318</sup> Aldrich, 303.

<sup>319</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5232 file 6938-B-40 pt 2, Letter, D. S. McPhail, Paris to Henry Davis, Ottawa, 11 March 1960.

Africa. He argued that Canada could help prevent French Africa from succumbing to the Soviet Union by expanding its diplomatic efforts therein. Nevertheless, McPhail believed that Canada should approach French Africa cautiously lest it disrupt its ties with France. He believed that French Africa needed large amounts of assistance from France in order to prevent post-independence political, social and economic collapse. If the West were to prevent the rest of French Africa from turning to the Communist bloc like Guinée, countries like Canada had to avoid undermining France's relations with its former African colonies.<sup>320</sup>

Pierre Dupuy's more extensive trip through Africa in late 1960 confirmed McPhail's impressions of the situation in French Africa. He visited all of the French African states as well as Sudan, Kenya, Rhodesia, Nigeria and Ghana in November and December. This trip, however, followed the independence of most of the French African states earlier in the year. Dupuy's recommendations about Canada's interests in French Africa, therefore, reflected the region's altered circumstances. Unlike McPhail, Dupuy perceived an urgent need for Canadian representation in Africa. His report dwelt extensively upon the large Soviet missions in the new countries, Eastern bloc offers of economic and technical assistance, and other indications of Communist interest in the continent. In fact, Dupuy compared Communist activities in countries like Guinée and Mali to the manner in which the Soviet Union had ultimately created states in Eastern

---

<sup>320</sup> McPhail wrote Henry Davis that "One Guinea [sic] at a time is enough." Ibid.

Europe after 1945.<sup>321</sup> Dupuy thus believed that the West faced a dire situation throughout Africa in the early 1960s even if Western influence still predominated. The Ambassador recommended that Canada urgently need to open diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa to cover Ethiopia, Sudan and Madagascar; in Yaoundé to cover Cameroon, Togo and Gabon; and in Abidjan to cover Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey. Canada's missions in Accra and Leopoldville would be responsible for the remaining countries in French Africa.

Like McPhail, Dupuy recognised that economic and technical assistance would dominate the early years of Canada's relations with the French African countries. To demonstrate Canada's interest in French Africa Dupuy also recommended awarding scholarships for African students to study at Canadian universities.<sup>322</sup> The Canadian government had begun to grant aid to the emerging African members of the British Commonwealth in 1959 but by 1960 the exclusivity of Canadian aid for the Commonwealth attracted criticism from French Canadians.<sup>323</sup> Federal officials thus came to see a small programme of aid for French Africa as a means to demonstrate the federal government's commitment to keeping Africa friendly while also proving that it responded to the needs of Canada's French-speaking community.

---

<sup>321</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 11041 file 20-1-2-AFR file pocket, Report, *Canadian Mission to Africa, November-December 1960*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 22.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>323</sup> In 1960, for example, the Junior Chamber of Commerce of Montreal submitted a report to the federal government asking that aid be extended to French-speaking under-developed countries as well as to members of the Commonwealth. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 1, "*Aider les pays sous-développés de langues française comme les autres*," *Le Devoir*, 17 December 1960.

The origins of Canada's assistance programme for French Africa lay in the gifts the federal government planned to mark the independence of the members of the French Community in 1960 and 1961. The Diefenbaker government originally planned to offer the new countries a small number of one-time only scholarships tenable at Canada's universities. Marcel Cadieux and Norman Berlis, both senior officials in the Department of External Affairs, instead proposed sending Canadian teachers to French Africa as a more effective way to improve educational standards in the new countries.<sup>324</sup> With Norman Robertson's support, they also suggested that one-time only gifts were insufficient and that \$600,000 should be budgeted for an ongoing commitment from Canada to French Africa. In their view, this proposed aid programme for French Africa would balance the commitment that Canada had previously made to Commonwealth Africa.

Their suggestion of an aid programme for French Africa encountered stiff opposition within the Canadian government. The Department of Finance, in particular, did not want to establish bilateral aid programmes for French Africa though it did endorse the idea of providing scholarships to French Africa through the United Nations.<sup>325</sup> The Secretary of State for External Affairs himself seemed disposed both to limit Canadian aid to scholarships and to allow non-French speaking African states such as Sudan and Libya access to the funds. This position followed Green's earlier decision to halve the

---

<sup>324</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 1, Memo, *Canadian Educational Assistance to French-speaking African States*, USSEA to SSEA, 19 October 1960.

programme's proposed funding to \$300,000 for reasons of economy. Green's proposal to train Sudanese Foreign Service Officers with the aid budgeted for French Africa dismayed Norman Robertson, Marcel Cadieux, and several other senior officials who argued that \$300,000 spread the aid thinly enough among the 16 newly independent French African states without adding additional recipients to the mix.<sup>326</sup> Robertson, however, finally persuaded Green to omit the Sudanese project from the aid scheme for French Africa by the time the proposal reached the Cabinet.

Like Cadieux, Robertson believed in the political importance to the federal government of an aid programme devoted exclusively to the new French-speaking countries of Africa. He believed that the African states would naturally turn to French-speaking Canada as they looked to reduce their political, economic and cultural dependence on France and that if Canada did not respond it risked having French Africa turn to the Communist bloc. Yet Robertson also tried to convince Green that French Canadians would respond favourably to the extension of aid to French Africa.<sup>327</sup> These two arguments finally persuaded Howard Green that French Africa deserved its own

---

<sup>325</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 1, Memo, *Educational Assistance for French-speaking African states*, 21 November 1960.

<sup>326</sup> In February, according to Cadieux, Green insisted that the Department set aside \$50,000 from the \$300,000 budgeted for French Africa to train Foreign Service officers from the Sudan. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 2.1, Memo, *Educational Assistance for French-speaking African states; and training of Sudanese Foreign Service Officers*, N. F. Berlis to USSEA, 23 February 1961.

<sup>327</sup> Robertson made these observations in a draft memo to Cabinet he prepared for Green's approval. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 1, Draft Memo to Cabinet, *Educational Assistance for French Speaking African States*, SSEA, 30 December 1960.



exclusive programme of Canadian aid.<sup>328</sup> In April 1961, the Cabinet approved the \$300,000 educational assistance programme to provide scholarships for African students and to send Canadian teachers to French Africa. The Canadian government now had proof that Canadian aid was no longer focused solely on the British Commonwealth.<sup>329</sup>

The Canadian press greeted the new aid programme with enthusiasm. Even the English-Canadian press generally approved of the plan to dispense aid to French Africa. Most of the editorial comments in English language newspapers focussed on the need to cement the West's position in important parts of Africa. Others mentioned the desirability of using the aid programme to associate French Canadians with Canadian external aid to promote domestic harmony during the early upheavals of the Quiet Revolution. French language newspapers also generally applauded the government's initiative though they also criticised the relative tardiness of its creation. In November 1960, when the government announced its intention to provide aid for French Africa, Professor Jacques Morin of the University of Montreal wrote *Le Devoir* that

our gratitude for this generous gesture does not prevent us from stating that the money needed for the implementation of this programme comes from the French-speaking tax payers and from regretting that these scholarships were not announced at the same time as the Commonwealth

---

<sup>328</sup> Marcel Cadieux credited Robertson alone with convincing Green of the importance of the proposed educational assistance programme for French Africa. NAC, M[anuscript] G[roup] 32 A 3, Vol. 56.6, Letter, Marcel Cadieux to Jules and Gaby Léger, 20 February 1961.

<sup>329</sup> Still leery of intruding upon the French sphere of influence, however, Green had been careful to discuss his Department's tentative plans for a programme of assistance for French Africa with French Foreign Minister Couvé du Murville when the latter visited Canada with Charles de Gaulle in April 1960.

scholarships, two years ago.<sup>330</sup>

Other commentators similarly criticised the relatively paltry \$300,000 for the French African countries compared to the \$3.5 million that the government gave to African members of the Commonwealth.

It quickly became apparent to Canadian officials that \$300,000 was not enough to satisfy all of the requests for help that Canada received from French Africa. In March 1961, Mali alone submitted a list of 107 teaching positions that it needed to fill. Later that year, Member of Parliament Emilien Morissette reported from a conference in Ethiopia that Senegal, Gabon, Cameroon, Madagascar, Niger, Togo, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Tunisia, and the Belgian Congo all hoped to receive educational assistance from Canada as well.<sup>331</sup> Furthermore, these countries expressed a distinct preference for having Canadian teachers sent to their countries rather than having their students brought to Canada on scholarship.<sup>332</sup> This preference caused problems for the educational assistance programme. To meet the needs of the French African countries, the federal government found fewer than 10 teachers to send to French Africa in 1961-2.

---

<sup>330</sup> This passage was translated by the Information Division, Department of External Affairs. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 1, Letter, *Scholarships for French-Speaking African Countries*, Jacques Ivan Morin to *Le Devoir*, 12 November 1960.

<sup>331</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 2.1, Note, *Besoins de la République du Mali en professeurs*, Le Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale, Mali, 27 March 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 2.2, Report of Addis Ababa Conference May 15-25, 1961, Emilien Morissette.

<sup>332</sup> Habib Bourguiba Jr., the Tunisian Ambassador to Canada, told Marcel Cadieux that "it is much more economical to send a professor at the cost of, say, \$3,000 a year, rather than to provide scholarships to students which cost very seldom less than \$3,000 to \$4,000 a year. A good teacher or professor can educate hundreds of students within a few years." Scholarships educated only one student at a time. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5410 file 11033-C-40 pt 2, Memo, *Educational aid to French-language African states*, Marcel Cadieux to Information Division, 19 April 1961.

In the end, the Canadian government sent only six teachers to Cameroon and one teacher to Mali in the first year of the aid programme. A six-week recruiting drive in Quebec yielded only seven suitable candidates for service in French Africa and no suitable candidates were found in Ontario or New Brunswick.<sup>333</sup> Nevertheless, the Canadian government had trouble finding suitable placements for even this small number of teachers. It had originally planned to send teachers to Tunisia, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville) and Mali. The Tunisian government, however, wanted technical teachers which Canada had not been able to recruit; the government of Chad decided, at the last moment, not to accept any teachers; and delays by the Congo (Brazzaville) forced the Canadian government to commit its teachers elsewhere for the 1961-62 academic year. A similar pattern of events again forced the External Aid Office to reallocate some of the second wave of six teachers to new host countries in 1962-63.<sup>334</sup>

The problems experienced by the educational assistance programme did not end with the arrival of the teachers in French Africa. Of the six teachers sent to Cameroon in 1961-62, five remained living in a hotel several weeks after their arrival because the apartments they had been promised by the Cameroonian authorities were not considered acceptable by Canadian officials. The next year, two of the six new teachers sent to

---

<sup>333</sup> There had actually been eight qualified candidates, but one was a woman and the EAO decided against sending a woman to Africa on her own in the initial wave of Canadian teachers. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 3, Mes J-928, *Canadian Plan of Educational Assistance to French-Speaking African States*, N. F. Berlis to Cadieux, New York, 22 September 1961.

French Africa returned to Canada in part because of a lack of suitable accommodations for them in the Congo (Brazzaville).<sup>335</sup> Canadian teachers also experienced professional problems stemming from their difficulties fitting into French-style educational systems staffed by thousands of French teachers and administrators. While the authorities in Paris welcomed Canadian aid to their former colonies,<sup>336</sup> local officials and teachers in Africa often resented Canadians intruding into what many of them still considered a French preserve. These officials also tended to minimise the qualifications of the Canadian teachers.<sup>337</sup> As a result, Canadian teachers often found themselves teaching unfamiliar subjects, at levels beneath their expertise and in positions only available because no French teacher wanted them. Still, the External Aid Office recognised that the Canadian teachers bore some responsibility for the problems they experienced and needed to be carefully screened for their suitability for living and working in French Africa.<sup>338</sup>

---

<sup>334</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 5, *Progress Report of the Canadian Programme of Educational Assistance to the French-speaking African States*, 20 July 1962 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 –t 5, Letter, H. O. Moran, External Aid Office to Canadian High Commissioner, Accra, 15 November 1962.

<sup>335</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Tel XAO-53, *Teachers in Cameroun Republic*, T. Carter to External Aid Office (EAO), 13 April 1962 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Memo. *Educational Assistance for the Independent French-speaking African States: report of the activities under the programme since its inception*, H. J. Hodder, EAO to H. O. Moran, 19 February 1963.

<sup>336</sup> The French endorsement of Canadian aid for French Africa must be qualified. Firstly, the French government recognised that there was little it could do to oppose it and secondly, it believed that the aid proposed was so limited as to pose little threat to French interests. Nevertheless, some French officials worried as early as the fall of 1960 that Canadian aid for French Africa might someday become substantial enough to inconvenience France. AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 177, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à Direction des affaires culturelles et techniques, 22 novembre 1960.

<sup>337</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 5, Letter XAO-25, *Programme of Educational Assistance for Independent French-speaking African States*, H. O. Moran to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 11 December 1962.

<sup>338</sup> *Op cit*, Memo, Hodder to Moran, 19 February 1963.

In total, the Canadian educational assistance programme for French Africa experienced many problems in its early years and only a fraction of the \$300,000 was actually dispersed.<sup>339</sup> Undeterred, some officials argued that the “imbalance between the aid available to four Commonwealth African states and that available to 16 French-speaking states” most seriously hampered the aid programme for French Africa.<sup>340</sup> Yet financial constraints precluded new funding for aid for French Africa since any increase in funding for this programme could only be taken from the funds already appropriated for the Commonwealth. Herbert Moran, however, rejected this suggestion and complained that the External Aid Office had no interest in administering more aid for French Africa since other parts of Africa required Canadian assistance more urgently.<sup>341</sup> More importantly, the Secretary of State for External Affairs himself also rejected the appeal for more aid for French Africa.

Norman Robertson and Marcel Cadieux continued to lobby for an increase in Canadian aid to French Africa, highlighting the region’s strategic and political importance but also the need to address French Canadians’ concerns. French Canadians, wrote Cadieux in early 1962,

are going through a period of intense nationalism. In their present mood they are critical of the degree of influence that they have in national affairs and in particular in the

---

<sup>339</sup> In its first three years of the programme, only \$539,000 of the total \$900,000 available was spent on providing aid for French Africa. Hilliker and Barry, 336.

<sup>340</sup> A Departmental review of Canadian aid reached this conclusion in December of 1961. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Draft Memo, *Aid to Africa*, 29 December 1961.

<sup>341</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Memo, *Aid to French-speaking Africa*, R. E. Collins to M. Cadieux, 17 April 1962.

field of external affairs. If a scheme of aid for African states should be developed in such a fashion as to provide an outlet to the French-Canadian interests in French-language states, the results in terms of national unity might be quite substantial.<sup>342</sup>

In the spring of 1962 Robertson, Cadieux and all the assistant Under-secretaries urged Howard Green to increase the aid for French Africa, but Green rejected their appeals because “there could be no question of an increase at the expense of external assistance to other areas, particularly to the Commonwealth.”<sup>343</sup> The Diefenbaker government remained too unsure about French Africa’s direct importance to Canada to make more than a token gesture towards providing them with assistance. Throughout its remaining mandate, the Diefenbaker government kept its aid for French Africa at a nominal \$300,000 per year.

Though other forms of aid were suggested by the Canadian government and requested by various French African states, educational aid remained the principal form of contact between Canada and the countries of French Africa throughout the early-to-mid 1960s. When insufficient teachers were found to send to French Africa, the Diefenbaker Cabinet agreed that the aid could be used to survey suitable sites for pedagogical research centres in Cameroon; to supply schools with texts and audio-visual aids; and to help create a bilingual civil service in Cameroon. The Canadian government,

---

<sup>342</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Memo, *Aid to Africa*, M Cadieux to African and Middle Eastern Division, 3 January 1962.

<sup>343</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Tel 439, *Aid to French-speaking Africa*, SSEA (in Geneva) to External, 18 March 1962.

for example, sent three French-speaking members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to help establish a federal police force in Cameroon in November 1961.<sup>344</sup> Several of the French African states also approached the Canadian government for help with their own projects. The President of the Ivory Coast wanted an expert from the Canadian Film Board to teach film techniques to a group of Ivoirian youths while Upper Volta sought Canadian radios or film laboratories to help disseminate educational directives from Ouagadougou to the outlying regions of the country.<sup>345</sup> The External Aid Office, however, usually rejected these types of requests due to the limited funds available for Canadian aid to French Africa.

Visits by Canadian diplomats to French Africa and by French African officials to Canada bolstered the initial contacts between the Canada and French Africa in the early 1960s. President Hamani Diori of Niger visited Canada in November 1961, for example, followed by a goodwill mission led by Dahomey's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emile Derlin Zinsou, that visited Canada in late October 1962. These missions generally solicited Canadian aid though Zinsou also expressed Dahomey's interest in cultural exchanges with Canada.<sup>346</sup> Shortly after his visit, President Diori proposed a Treaty of

---

<sup>344</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 3, Record of Cabinet Decision, Meeting of 31 July 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5594 file 12882-3-40 pt 1, Tel 2845, *Technical Assistance to Cameroon*, Canadian Delegation to the United Nations, New York to EAO, 21 November 1961.

<sup>345</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 542 file 12529-B-1-40 pt 1, Letter, President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast to Prime Minister of Canada, 6 October 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5542 file 12529-B-4-40 pt 1, Letter UN-126, *Assistance for French-speaking African states – Upper Volta*, Canadian Permanent Representative to UNESCO, Paris [Lionel Roy] to USSEA, 13 October 1961.

<sup>346</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5542 file 12529-2-40 pt 1, Memo, *Visit of the Dahomey Goodwill Mission*, Jacques Monpetit to G. Glazebrook, 9 November 1962.

Friendship and Technical Co-operation between Niger and Canada.<sup>347</sup> The Canadian government in turn sent Paul Beaulieu, its Ambassador in Beirut, throughout French Africa in January of 1962 to gather information for the educational assistance programme. Canada even dispatched two of its naval vessels, the HMCS New Waterford and HMCS Fort Erie, on a goodwill visit to the capital of Ivory Coast in February 1962. Such events signalled the growing reciprocal interest in relations between Canada and French Africa.

The establishment of direct diplomatic relations between Canada and the French African states, however, progressed slowly during this period. In 1960, Canada possessed only four full diplomatic missions in all of Africa: High Commissions in South Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria; and an Embassy in Egypt. A small office in the Belgian Congo, raised to the status of a Consulate General in August 1960, gave the Canadian government a limited claim to representation in French-speaking Africa. Yet at the end of 1961, 29 sovereign states existed in Africa, though Canada had negligible interests in many of these states. Still, limited personnel and financial resources dictated that Canada could only open one additional mission in Africa in 1961. Norman Robertson recommended one of the 12 French African states, stressing that a mission there “would

---

<sup>347</sup> Most officials within External Affairs viewed this proposal as an attempt by President Diiori to formalise the provision of Canadian technical assistance to his country. Some Canadian officials viewed it as a way of demonstrating Canada’s interest in Niger without incurring real commitments. Green and Diefenbaker ultimately rejected the proposed treaty, however, because it would set a precedent and encourage similar proposals for treaties from other countries. They also did not want to encourage President Diiori to expect more technical assistance than Canada was prepared to give. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5542 file 12529-1-40 pt 1, Memo, SSEA to Prime Minister, 8 February 1963.



be interpreted as evidence of our real sympathy for and good-will towards the whole group...,” an important consideration given French Africa’s increasingly active role at the United Nations and in the Afro-Asian bloc. Robertson believed that it “would also be welcome to a large part of our domestic population.”<sup>348</sup>

Robertson preferred Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, for Canada’s new mission in French Africa. Howard Green, however, did not agree about the need to locate an embassy in French Africa. Green himself preferred Tanganyika (now Tanzania), a newly independent member of the British Commonwealth. Robertson argued that opening another mission in Commonwealth Africa without making a similar gesture to French Africa could indicate to French African officials that Canada had little interest in cultivating their friendship and enflame French-Canadian opinion as well.<sup>349</sup> With these arguments Robertson convinced Green to approve two new Canadian missions in Africa, one for Dar es Salaam and one in a French African country. Green himself selected Yaoundé, the capital of Cameroon, rather than Abidjan as the location of the embassy in French Africa. Cameroon was the only country in Africa that had adopted both French and English as official languages and Green enjoyed pleasant relations with Cameroon’s leaders, next to whom he sat at international meetings. The Americans and the British both viewed Abidjan as the more suitable of the two cities for a mission and senior officials from Canada preferred Abidjan, but in November 1961 the Canadian

---

<sup>348</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Establishment of a New Canadian Diplomatic Mission in West Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 3 March 1961.

government acquiesced in Green's preference for Yaoundé.<sup>350</sup> This new mission was expected to cost \$100,000 a year in operating expenses in addition to \$72,000 in initial capital expenses.

This gesture did not quell the pressure upon the Canadian government to establish direct diplomatic relations with the countries of French Africa. By July 1961, five French African states had made overtures about exchanging ambassadors with Canada. Niger had even formally asked the Canadian government to accept its representative to the United Nations in New York as Ambassador to Canada as well.<sup>351</sup> The Canadian government tried to dampen French African expectations by informing the French African states through Canada's representative to the United Nations that personnel and other problems prevented rapid expansion of Canada's representation in Africa.<sup>352</sup> Still, the Canadian government did increase its diplomatic representation in French Africa through dual accreditation. Canada's new Ambassador to Cameroon, for example, was also accredited to Chad, the Central African Republic, Gabon and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). By December 1961, the government had also accredited Canada's

---

<sup>349</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Memo, *Extension of Canadian Representatives Abroad*, USSEA to SSEA, 20 July 1961.

<sup>350</sup> In August 1961, R. E. Collins of the African and Middle East Division asked Canadian officials in London and Washington to solicit American and British opinions as to the relative merits of Adibjan and Yaoundé as sites for diplomatic missions. He received replies to his enquiries in September. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5542 file 12529-B-1-40 pt 1, Tel 2951, *Canadian Representation in Africa*, Canadian Embassy, Washington to External, 20 September 1961, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5542 file 12529-B-1-40 pt 1, Tel 3425, *Ivory Coast Camerouns Administrative Information*, Canadian High Commission, London to External, 21 September 1961 and Hilliker and Barry, 177.

<sup>351</sup> *Op cit*, Memo, USSEA to SSEA, 20 July 1961.

<sup>352</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748 file 12354-40, Tel ME-362, *Proposed Mission from Republic of Niger*, USSEA to Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, 18 July 1961.

Ambassador to Spain as Ambassador to Morocco; its High Commissioner in Ghana as Ambassador to Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Togo and Guinea; and its High Commissioner in Nigeria as Ambassador to Senegal, Niger and Dahomey. These measures extended Canada's diplomatic relations with all but three of the former French colonies in Africa – Madagascar, Mali and Mauritania the exceptions – at a minimal cost in terms of personnel and financial outlay.<sup>353</sup> In 1962, the government also raised Canada's Consulate General in the Congo (Leopoldville) to an Embassy though it remained under the guidance of a non-resident ambassador.<sup>354</sup> The Department viewed this as another way to increase Canadian representation in French-speaking Africa at very little additional cost.

The announcement in December 1961 of the government's plans for an embassy in Cameroon and the dual accreditation of Canada's Ambassadors elsewhere in French Africa was favourably received throughout Canada. The French language press, in particular, approved. André Patry wrote the only major discordant note for *Le Nouveau Journal* of Montreal on 13 December. Patry acknowledged the new embassy in Cameroon, Canada's first in French Africa, but criticised Canada's overall relations with French Africa as inadequate. Dual accreditation, he wrote, did not adequately satisfy

---

<sup>353</sup> The Department of External Affairs estimated that the three Heads of Mission could carry out their additional duties in the eight countries named for a total of \$15,000 per year, including travel expenses and representational expenses in their second posts. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5504 file 12354-40 pt 3, Memo to the Cabinet. *Establishment of Canadian Diplomatic Relations with French-speaking States in Africa*, SSEA, 19 December 1961.

<sup>354</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5504 file 12354-40 pt 3, Memo, *Establishment of an Embassy instead of the present Consulate-General in Leopoldville*, USSEA to SSEA, 19 December 1961.

Canada's interests in Morocco and other important French African states. According to Patry, Canada needed resident missions in Morocco, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Guinée to protect Canadian interests "not only from the political but also from the economic point of view."<sup>355</sup> He believed that opening missions in these French African countries would help preserve Western influence in Africa and help strengthen Canadian ties "with a continent rich with promise." Cold War concerns about Western influence in French Africa thus fuelled Patry's concerns at this time though this would later change.

Cold War concerns played a prominent, if secondary role in the most important event to take place in a French-speaking African country in the early 1960s. In June 1960, Belgium granted independence to its colony in the Congo. Belgium, however, had never developed an educated cadre of Congolese to assist in the administration of this colony with the result that the Congo was ill prepared for the independence which Belgium thrust upon it so quickly in 1959 and 1960. To replace the thousands of Belgian administrators and technicians who fled the Congo, there were fewer than twenty Congolese university graduates and no trained professional or official cadres. The result was chaos. Within a week of independence, Congo's police force mutinied against its Belgian officers and touched off a period of civil disorder, skyrocketing unemployment and starvation.<sup>356</sup> Ultimately, Belgium sent its troops back to the Congo to restore order

---

<sup>355</sup> André Patry, "Canada en Afrique," *Le Nouveau Journal*, 13 December 1961 as quoted in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5504 file 12354-40 pt 3, Memo, *Opening of Mission in Yaoundé – French Language Press Coverage*, USSEA to SSEA, 19 December 1961.

<sup>356</sup> Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Canada and the United Nations, 1960* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961), 21.

and ensure the protection of Belgian nationals. The situation was further complicated when the province of Katanga, the mineral-rich source of much of the federal government's revenue, announced its secession from the Republic of the Congo.

Canada's involvement in the Congo deserves an in-depth study of its own. Two broad considerations, however, dominated the Canadian government's perceptions of the disorder in the Congo. Firstly, the government wanted to maintain the authority of the Congo's federal government against separatist threats. Secondly, Canadian officials feared Soviet or Communist advances as a result of the civil war in the Congo.<sup>357</sup> When the Secretary General of the United Nations called upon the UN for peacekeepers to replace the Belgian forces, the Canadian government dispatched a signals detachment to maintain communications for the UN contingent. Several Canadian officers from peacekeeping missions in Palestine and Gaza also volunteered to perform staff and technical duties for the UN's commander, and the Canadian Red Cross sent two teams of French-speaking medical personnel to the Congo.<sup>358</sup>

Thus, by the time the Diefenbaker Conservative Party had lost power in Canada to the Liberal Party in April 1963, Canada had begun to expand its diplomatic, political, aid and economic relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa though progress had been slow. Despite appeals for Canadian assistance from these new countries, France remained their principal point of political and economic contact with the West. This was

---

<sup>357</sup> See, for example, the statements of Canadian interests in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5208 file 6386-40 pt 6, Memo, S. M. Scott to Arnold Smith, 13 July 1960 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5208 file 6386-40 pt 7, Memo, Congo, Ross Campbell to USSEA, 18 July 1960.

a situation which the Diefenbaker government accepted and even endorsed. The danger of Communist penetration in these countries necessitated some efforts to demonstrate Canadian interest in and friendship for French Africa, but the Diefenbaker government felt free to make relations with Commonwealth countries a higher priority in Africa during its mandate. Events both within Canada and within Africa, however, increasingly compelled Canadian officials to take a stronger interest in French Africa beginning in the early 1960s.

---

<sup>358</sup> Canada, Canada and the United Nations, 1960, 21-2.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE LIBERALS AND FRENCH AFRICA,**

### **1963-1966**

The Liberal government of Prime Minister Pearson and Secretary of State Paul Martin inherited an increasingly difficult foreign policy environment upon its return to office in April 1963. After six years in opposition, the Liberals had to adjust to the full recovery of Europe and Japan from the Second World War and its adverse effect upon Canada's influence in the world. They had to address the growing fractiousness of Canada's relations with the United States and of relations within the North Atlantic alliance. They also faced challenges caused by the independence of large numbers of colonies during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Domestically, the provinces began to challenge federal responsibility for foreign affairs and the Canadian public itself was beginning to question Canada's commitments to the United Nations, NATO, the Commonwealth, and the United States.<sup>359</sup> The deteriorating relations between Canada and France and Quebec's aggressive pursuit of its own international identity, however, caused perhaps the most difficulties for Pearson and Martin after 1963.

In the early to mid-1950s, France's expectations of support for its policies in North Africa had caused problems for the Canadian government that the return to power of Charles de Gaulle in 1958 had only exacerbated. The French government had already begun to distance itself from its allies, through the development of its own nuclear

---

<sup>359</sup> Hilliker and Barry, 257.

weapons capability, for example, but with the end of the war in Algeria in 1962 the French government had more time and energy to devote to its other international activities. Thereafter, as France cultivated ties with the Soviet Union and the Third World, its relations with its allies deteriorated, culminating in France's withdrawal from NATO in 1966. The story of the troubled Franco-Canadian relationship in the 1960s is very familiar.<sup>360</sup> Canada, like the other Western countries, experienced France's increasing hostility towards NATO and its pursuit of a European union independent of British and American influences. It also experienced problems in its strictly bilateral relationship with France, including Trans-Canada Airlines' rejection of the French-made Caravelle in 1963 and France's failed attempt to buy uranium from Canada in 1964 and 1965.

Despite these types of irritants, the Canadian government still placed tremendous importance upon its relations with France. France's apparent willingness to encourage the ambitions of the government of Quebec in the mid-1960s, however, seriously strained Canada's goodwill towards France. By 1963, the province of Quebec was in the midst of the 'Quiet Revolution,' a term which, at its broadest, has come to mean the modernisation of Quebecois society and culture accompanied by a vast extension of the powers of the government of Quebec. The Quiet Revolution also witnessed the rise of significant

---

<sup>360</sup> See, for example, Thomson, Vive le Quebec libre and John English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972 (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993), 314-345. For personal accounts of these years from some of those more directly involved, see Paul Martin, A Very Public Life, Volume 2 (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1985), ch 18 and Eldon Black, Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996).



separatist sentiment among those Quebecois eager to strengthen the province as a French-speaking bastion in anglophone North America. Many Quebecois also looked to France for support and encouragement during this tumultuous period in Quebec's history.

In July 1963, Jean-Marc Léger, a journalist and committed separatist, argued in *Le Devoir* that Quebec should pursue its own international contacts with foreign countries in provincial fields of jurisdiction.<sup>361</sup> The Lesage government had already demonstrated its interest in developing its own international identity and in this endeavour France was Quebec's natural partner. In October 1961, Quebec opened a *délégation générale* in Paris.<sup>362</sup> Quebec was not the first province to open an office in a foreign country, but it led to increasingly frequent ministerial visits between Paris and Quebec City and to the conclusion of a cultural entente between Quebec and France in February 1965. The federal government viewed this entente in particular as a challenge because it had been concluded without any federal input, reminiscent of the way that Canada itself had secured independence from Britain forty years previously. Federal officials thus considered France's willingness to deal directly with Quebec a possible threat to Canada.

Most of these incidents had not yet taken place when the Liberal government took office in 1963, but the potential difficulties inherent in Quebec's relations with France could not be ignored. Pearson and Martin wanted to prove to French-speaking Canadians

---

<sup>361</sup> See, for example, *Le Devoir*, July 13, 1963.

that the federal government worked for them as well as for English-speaking Canadians. After 1963, the federal government increased the use of French in the federal government and recruited more French-speaking Canadians into the federal bureaucracy. Pearson also created the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to demonstrate the government's commitment to cultural and linguistic duality. Pearson and Martin also wanted to enhance Canada's relations with France rather than let Quebec occupy the field by default. The federal government increased the size of the Canadian Embassy in Paris, increased the frequency of ministerial exchanges between Ottawa and Paris, intensified technical and cultural exchanges with France and negotiated its own accord with the French government. Canada never enjoyed the intimacy of Quebec's relations with France, however.<sup>363</sup>

Improved relations with other French-speaking countries offered the federal government another way to reflect French Canada's interests in Canada's foreign policy. The French-speaking countries of Africa in particular presented the Pearson government with the chance to build ties with French-speaking countries and balance the success that Quebec was having with France. The Diefenbaker government's initial gestures in this

---

<sup>362</sup> All official contacts between Quebec's Agent General and French officials was supposed to have been cleared through the Canadian Embassy in Paris, but this diplomatic requirement was not observed. Quebec's delegate general in Paris, in fact, often received better treatment from French officials than the Canadian Ambassador. This was especially true in the period following the falling out between de Gaulle and Léger in 1964.

<sup>363</sup> President de Gaulle himself seems to have begun the French practice of favouring Quebec. His foreign minister, Couvé de Murville seemed well-disposed to Canada and was anxious to reassure Canadian officials, especially Paul Martin, of France's goodwill but he could do little to alter the nature of French policy in this instance. For the most part, French officials followed the lead of their president in terms of relations with Quebec and Canada. Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life*, 576.

direction had been relatively grudging, and Canada only had embassies in the Congo and Cameroon. Furthermore, the government only allocated a meagre \$300,000 in aid for French Africa. Pearson and Martin decided that Canada's interests required a more tangible demonstration of its commitment to cultivating the friendship of the new French-speaking states of Africa.

Norman Robertson and Marcel Cadieux had been pressing the Department's political superiors to expand Canada's efforts in French Africa for several years. Cadieux in particular firmly believed in the need to reflect Canada's cultural duality in the international sphere.<sup>364</sup> Though Robertson remained Under-secretary of State for External Affairs following the Liberal electoral victory in mid-1963, it was in fact Cadieux who increasingly ran the Department during Robertson's illness until he became permanent Under-secretary in May 1964. Cadieux was thus in a position to ensure that the Canadian government responded to Quebec's challenge by asserting federal jurisdiction over all aspects of Canada's relations with French-speaking countries. Accordingly, in late April 1963 Cadieux suggested enlarging and broadening the educational assistance programme for French Africa to include France, Belgium and Switzerland, thus enabling the types of exchanges with French-speaking countries that Commonwealth programmes allowed with Britain.<sup>365</sup> After seeking the advice of Maurice Lamontagne and Lionel Chevrier, two influential members of the Liberal government, Paul Martin authorised his

---

<sup>364</sup> Hilliker and Barry, 260.

<sup>365</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-15-40 pt 1., Memo, *Bi-Culturalism*, Marcel Cadieux to USSEA, 23 April 1963.

Department to solicit the informal reaction of the governments in Paris, Brussels, Bern and London to this idea.

Canada's missions in France, Belgium, Switzerland and Britain reported in late summer 1963 that a multilateral programme of cultural relations between Canada and the French-speaking countries of Europe and Africa would not be feasible. The biggest obstacle to a programme of this kind remained France, which used cultural relations as an important instrument of its national policy and did not want them subsumed within a multilateral programme. In many respects, this was a blessing for Canada. France's cultural and technical operations – \$74 million dollars in 1962 – would have dominated the programme and would have undermined the purpose of Canada's participation in such a project.<sup>366</sup> Still, other countries also rejected this proposal. The Belgian government, for example, did not want to exacerbate the increasingly delicate relations between its Flemish and French-speaking communities by participating in a programme targeting only one segment of its population.

The Canadian government thus had few alternatives but to strengthen its bilateral cultural and technical relations with other French-speaking countries. Consequently, Canadian officials reconsidered expanding the educational assistance programme for French Africa. The early years of this programme had been disappointing. In March 1963, for example, the External Aid Office supported only 11 Canadian teachers in all of

---

<sup>366</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-15-40 pt 1., Memo, *Programme of Cultural Cooperation with French-Speaking Countries*, M. Cadieux to SSEA, 19 August 1963.

French Africa. Even so, pressure had been mounting on the government to expand the programme.<sup>367</sup> Throughout the summer of 1963 the Department of External Affairs, the External Aid Office, and the Department of Finance thoroughly reviewed Canada's bilateral aid programmes. One of the principal purposes of this review was to explore specific ways to increase the French-speaking content of Canada's external aid.<sup>368</sup>

Paul Martin and his senior officials were concerned that French-speaking Canadians were not fully participating in the provision of Canada's external aid. An External Aid Office report in May 1962 concluded that Quebec received only 28% of all students being trained with Canadian aid in Canada; provided only 18% of all Canadian teachers and technical advisers sent abroad; its firms won only 30.5% of engineering aid contracts; and 31% of Canadian aid funds spent in Canada were made on purchases in Quebec.<sup>369</sup> Outwardly impressive, these figures may actually have overstated French Canada's involvement because the statistics did not differentiate between French or English-speaking people or institutions in Quebec. Federal officials suspected that French Canada remained severely under-represented in Canadian aid, a situation which worried the federal government given the political conditions in Quebec in 1963.

---

<sup>367</sup> During the closing days of the Diefenbaker government, G. H. Southam of the Department of External Affairs' Information Division observed that despite its discouraging aspects enthusiasm for the educational assistance programme for French Africa remained high, and not only in Quebec. He believed, therefore, that "it might be advisable for the government to expand it." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-15-40 pt 1., Memo, *Educational Aid Programme between French-speaking countries*, G. H. Southam to USSEA, 15 March 1963.

<sup>368</sup> Marcel Cadieux informed Herbert Moran, the Director of the External Aid Office, that "[t]his is a matter to which our Minister [Martin] attaches importance." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6. Letter. *Review of Canadian Aid Activities*, M. Cadieux to H. Moran, 23 August 1963.

<sup>369</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5957 file 2727-15-40 pt 1, Letter, H. Moran to M. Cadieux, 30 August 1963.

Even the Department of Finance, whose officials were notoriously leery about new financial commitments in the 1960s, recognised the need to improve the balance of Canadian aid for the Commonwealth and the French-speaking countries in Africa. Yet how could the government do so effectively and efficiently? It had had to scramble during the previous two years to spend even a portion of the \$300,000 in aid for French Africa. Canada's efforts to send teachers to French Africa had been undermined by many factors. It was hard to find suitable teachers willing to go to French Africa and those that were recruited often lived and worked in inadequate environments. The lack of Canadian missions in Africa made it difficult for the African countries to communicate their needs to Canada and for Canadian officials to administer the aid effectively. France also retained tremendous influence in the French African countries during this period and its citizens and officials often resented Canadian teachers and officials for trying to encroach upon what many of them still considered their own, closed preserves.<sup>370</sup>

The problems with the educational aid programme during its first years of operation were such that some officials doubted its viability. Officials from the Department of Finance, for example, wanted the government to abandon sending teachers to French Africa in favour of giving scholarships to French African students.<sup>371</sup> Herbert Moran, the Director of the External Aid Office, similarly considered sending teachers too

---

<sup>370</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6., Memo, *Review of Canadian Bilateral Aid Programme*, W.F. Stone to Edmonds, Information Division, 22 August 1963.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid.

administratively difficult to justify the attention of his office.<sup>372</sup> Even Canadian diplomats in Africa expressed misgivings about the educational assistance programme in mid-1963. Fulgence Charpentier, Canada's Ambassador in Cameroon, told his superiors that Canada "really [has] a very small contribution to make in the field of secondary education."<sup>373</sup> According to Charpentier, France provided more teachers to French Africa than Canada ever could and that Canada was left "to follow in [France's] wake plugging up the holes they occasionally are unable to fill." The Ambassador argued that other forms of aid would be more beneficial to Canada.

The pressure to shift the aid programme towards the provision of scholarships was bolstered by a proposal submitted to the government by the Canadian Universities Foundation in August 1963. The CUF wanted the Canadian government to provide 200 scholarships for French African students to study in Canadian universities as part of a broader effort within the entire international French cultural community.<sup>374</sup> At \$800,000 the CUF's plan cost twice as much as the proposals then being debated within the government, but the review of Canadian aid recognised the importance of this type of initiative in Canada's aid for French Africa. A draft report prepared in September recommended the inclusion of a programme to promote cultural exchanges with French-

---

<sup>372</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter, H. Moran to M. Cadieux, 30 August 1963.

<sup>373</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Letter XAO-55, *Programme of Educational Assistance for Independent French-speaking African States, 1964-65*, Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé to EAO, 17 November 1963.

<sup>374</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-15-40 pt 1, Memo, *Canadian Universities Foundation Project for a French Cultural Community Scholarship and Fellowship Plan*, USSEA to SSEA, 30 August 1963.

speaking countries worth between \$250,000 and \$500,000.<sup>375</sup>

To gauge the interest in Canadian scholarships the Canadian government offered each of 13 French African states one scholarship for the 1963-64 academic year. Only one government took advantage of the offer.<sup>376</sup> This indicated either indifference to the Canadian offer or the inability of the French African countries to field suitable candidates for the scholarships. Most French African post-secondary students attended universities in France on scholarships from the French government. This drastically reduced the need for scholarships from other countries. Additionally, many French African leaders did not want to send their brightest young citizens abroad, even temporarily, to complete their education since the students frequently preferred to remain abroad rather than return to an uncertain future in Africa.<sup>377</sup> From this perspective, scholarships from developed countries ultimately retarded the development of African countries.

A programme of Canadian scholarships for French Africa thus faced difficulties similar to those experienced by the attempts to place Canadian teachers in French-speaking Africa. Rather than focus on one of the aid schemes, in the fall of 1963 the Canadian government decided to offer a wider range of developmental assistance including an expanded programme of technical assistance, food aid and even capital

---

<sup>375</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Draft Report, *Direction of Canadian Aid*, 23 September 1963.

<sup>376</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter, H. O. Moran to M. Cadieux, 30 August 1963.

<sup>377</sup> Fulgence Charpentier, Canada's Ambassador to Cameroon, reported to Ottawa that "It is generally conceded in official circles that a large proportion of those Cameroonians studying abroad do not wish to return home and will not return home." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Letter 379, *Cameroon Students Abroad*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to USSEA, 30 July 1963.



assistance for French Africa.<sup>378</sup> Nevertheless, sending teachers remained the focus of Canada's aid for the French-speaking states of Africa. This remained the most visible Canadian aid programme in French Africa and this won it many defenders with the government and the Department of External Affairs.<sup>379</sup> In early 1964, the Canadian government also increased its aid for French Africa to \$4 million, while in 1965 the funding for French Africa reached \$7.5 million. This was tangible proof that the Liberal government planned to improve its relations with French-speaking countries.

The new funds increased the scope of Canada's aid programmes in French Africa. In the summer of 1963, for example, the government allocated \$50,000 in unused educational assistance funds to the state university of Butare in Rwanda, the former Belgian protectorate in central Africa. The president of this university, Father Georges-Henri Lévesque, former dean of Social Sciences at Laval University, had appealed for help from Canada to cover some of the university's early operating costs. The Canadian government responded by subsidising the salaries and travel expenses of eight Canadians that Lévesque had recruited for the new university.<sup>380</sup> The government had decided that since Canadians played such a prominent role in the university, as Rector, Assistant President, Secretary General, Treasurer and Director of Personnel, the venture deserved the Canadian government's support. It further demonstrated its interest in the university

---

<sup>378</sup> *Op Cit.*, Draft Report, *Direction of Canadian Aid*, 23 September 1963.

<sup>379</sup> The African and Middle Eastern Division, for example, defended the provision of teachers for French Africa despite the limitations of the programme. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8825 file 20-1-2-3, Memo, *Expansion of Aid Programme to French-speaking African States*, J. Montpetit to R. E. Collins, 13 September 1963.

in Butare by dispatching Marcel Cadieux to speak at its official opening in November 1963.

In 1964, the Canadian government gave \$500,000 in aid to Rwanda. Some of the money was for scholarships for Rwandan students but the vast majority of the \$500,000 went to Father Levesque's National University of Rwanda where 35 Canadian professors and administrative personnel worked.<sup>381</sup> Other French-speaking countries in Africa similarly benefited from increased aid from Canada in the mid-1960s. In 1965-66, the External Aid Office sent 27 teachers and their families to Morocco, an increase from 5 the previous academic year.<sup>382</sup> In 1966-67 Canada maintained 44 teachers in Cameroon and by 1967-68 the government supplied 50 teachers to Tunisia and 51 to Senegal. In all, the Canadian government sent 165 teachers to French Africa in 1965-66 with additional funds used to help build schools and provide teaching supplies throughout the region.<sup>383</sup> After 1964 the External Aid Office also supported other developmental initiatives in French Africa such as agricultural and mining projects in Morocco, cadastral surveys, or forestry, fishing and sugar projects in Tunisia.<sup>384</sup>

After 1963, Canadian aid to the French-speaking countries of Africa grew rapidly

---

<sup>380</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Memo, H.O. Moran to SSEA, 5 July 1963 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Memo to Cabinet, SSEA, 5 July 1963.

<sup>381</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10071 file 20-1-2-RWANDA pt 1, *Notes sur la République du Rwanda*, African and Middle Eastern Division, 17 November 1965.

<sup>382</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Letter 291, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Morocco*, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid to USSEA, 2 July 1965.

<sup>383</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10043 file 20-1-2-CAM pt 1, Memo, Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé to USSEA, 8 August 1966 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10057 file 20-1-2-SEN pt 1, Letter XAO-18, EAO to Canadian Embassy, Dakar, 20 March 1967.

in both scale and scope. More aid money, however, could not immediately overcome the types of problems that had plagued the Canadian educational assistance programme for French Africa in previous years. In 1964-1965, the External Aid Office only disbursed \$760,000 of the \$4,000,000 in French Africa. A report prepared by the Department of External Affairs in 1974 blamed this situation, in part, on a lack of enthusiasm within the External Aid Office for aid for French Africa. The External Aid Office, claimed the report, had practically no bilingual personnel to administer this programme and did not give it the attention it gave to Canada's other aid programmes.<sup>385</sup> Suspicions of this nature continued to surround the External Aid Office until Maurice Strong replaced Herbert Moran as Director and the appointment of Henri Gaudefroy as director of the francophone programmes in late 1966.

Similarly, the early years of Canadian aid for French Africa had demonstrated that Canada needed the co-operation of the French government, officials, and aid authorities to be fully successful. From 1961 to 1964 this co-operation had been noticeably lacking.<sup>386</sup> Officially, the French government welcomed Canadian aid to French Africa because it eased the pressure on France's own technical and cultural programmes and because it helped foster the development of the French-speaking cultural community.

---

<sup>384</sup> See, for example, *Op Cit.*, Letter 291, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid to USSEA, 2 July 1965.

<sup>385</sup> NAC, M[anuscript] G[r]oup 32 A 3, Vol. 32 file 14.2 AFRIQUE, *La Collaboration France-Canada dans le domaine de l'aide aux états francophones, 1960-1967*, L'Équipe chargée du projet de la francophonie – 1974, 14.

<sup>386</sup> In March 1963, G.H. Southam observed that “experience has shown that it is only with the full co-operation of the French government that our existing programme for French-speaking African countries can be established on a satisfactory basis.” *Op Cit.*, Memo, G. H. Southam to USSEA, 15 March 1963.

Unofficially, however, there was little incentive for France to facilitate the provision of Canadian aid to France's former colonies. Furthermore, some French aid agencies and officials continued to resent Canada's intrusion into French spheres of influence. In January 1964, Lester Pearson and Paul Martin discussed arrangements for co-operation between France and Canada on aid in Paris with President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Pompidou and Foreign Minister Couvé de Murville, and the two sides agreed in principle to co-ordinate their aid policies for French Africa.<sup>387</sup> This tentative agreement allowed Canadian officials to anticipate a more effective aid programme for French Africa and improved relations with France as well.

The political agreement of the French government did not guarantee immediate and effective co-operation regarding their aid for French Africa. At the very least, it took time for de Gaulle's agreement in principle to reach the administrative levels of the French bureaucracy. In the meantime, Canadian officials suspected that French interests continued to obstruct their attempts to establish Canada's presence in parts of French Africa. In March 1964, for example, the government of Madagascar told Canadian officials in Paris that it did not need any teachers from Canada in 1964-65 because France had already provided all of the teachers it needed. Doubtful about the accuracy of this assertion, Herbert Moran believed that French officials had pressured the Malagache government to reject Canada's assistance. He felt that even with de Gaulle's favourable

---

<sup>387</sup> The communiqué released at the end of these discussions is reproduced in the "Bulletins des Affaires extérieures," Vol. XVI (2), février 1964.

attitude “it is possible that the co-operation of French officials will not be as full and forthcoming as we might wish.”<sup>388</sup> It thus remained important for Canadian officials to implement the agreement in principle contained in the communiqué released by Pearson and de Gaulle in January 1964.

Nicholas Gwyn’s participation in a conference on West Africa in Paris in late April 1964 allowed the Department of External Affairs to initiate discussions with French officials about Canadian aid for French Africa. Gwyn, an official with the External Aid Office, discussed Canada’s desire to increase its aid programmes for French Africa with officials from France’s Ministry of Co-operation, the Secretariat for African and Malagache Affairs, and the Ministry of Education. The French officials listened attentively and even advised Canada to send a team to study French Africa’s needs and to open diplomatic missions in countries where Canadian aid was to be concentrated. They also informed Gwyn that France could not meet all of the needs of the French-speaking countries in Africa, particularly in primary education and medical assistance. Nevertheless, Gwyn detected a certain reserve towards Canada’s proposals from the French officials whose concerns focused on “... *la préservation de la culture française dans cette région*” and the maintenance of France’s ties with its former colonies.<sup>389</sup>

---

<sup>388</sup> Under the standard co-operation agreement that France signed with its ex-colonies in Africa, the recipient country had to obtain France’s concurrence before it could accept educational assistance from other sources. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10097 file 20-1-2-FR pt 1.2, Tel 493, *Educational Assistance to Algeria and Morocco*, Canadian Embassy, Paris to EAO, 1 April 1964 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10097 file 20-1-2-FR pt 1.2, Letter, H. O. Moran to M. Cadieux, 2 April 1964.

<sup>389</sup> *Op Cit.*, *La Collaboration France-Canada dans le domaine de l'aide aux états francophones, 1960-67*, 5.

Gwyn did succeed, however, in securing an offer of help for the Canadian programme of technical assistance from an official with France's Ministry of Education. M. Auba promised to provide details of Canada's educational assistance programme for 1964-65, including information on the teachers involved, to the Inspectors General of Education in the French African states so that they could help accommodate the Canadians.<sup>390</sup> With this, French and Canadian officials initiated a series of attempts to collaborate in the field of developmental assistance. When Ambassador Jules Léger first arrived at the Canadian Embassy in Paris in May 1964, he wanted to hold aid discussions with French officials every six months with French officials. The Canadian government did not consider such regularity necessary, but the two governments did consult each other about these matters on an ad hoc yet increasingly frequent basis from 1964 to 1966.

Many of these consultations took place through the Canadian Embassy in Paris and the French Embassy in Ottawa. In mid-1964, for example, Canadian diplomats in Paris consulted French officials about the need for medical specialists in French Africa. The French Ambassador in Ottawa, Raymond Bousquet, in turn contacted Canadian officials in the fall of 1964 about replacing aid French specialists in Tunisia and Morocco with Canadians.<sup>391</sup> Thereafter, Jean Basdevant, Director of Technical and Cultural Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry, visited Ottawa in May 1965, Marcel Cadieux met with French aid officials in Paris in January 1966 and the Assistant Director of the External

---

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>391</sup> See the discussion of these initiatives in *Ibid.*, 8-12.

Aid Office, P. Towe, visited Paris in October 1966. Towe's visit followed a two-day meeting in Paris in March 1966 during which French and Canadian aid officials discussed specific proposals for co-ordinating their aid programmes.

These consultations had little practical effect upon the implementation of French and Canadian aid programmes for French Africa. The two countries shared general information and made enthusiastic references to their co-operation, including a sequence of letters between Prime Minister Pearson and President de Gaulle in the spring of 1966,<sup>392</sup> but few joint ventures resulted. One of the few initiatives successfully brought to fruition followed a French government suggestion that Canadian and French specialists participate in joint training sessions about conditions to expect upon their arrival in French Africa. After discussing this idea in March 1966, the Canadian government sent 20 teachers to Paris in September for a two-week training period with French teachers being prepared for their posts in French Africa. Canadian officials who observed the sessions, however, concluded that it would be more practical to achieve the same benefits in the future by inviting French officials to speak at training sessions in Canada.<sup>393</sup>

Both French and Canadian officials remained leery about the merits of co-operating with each other. To the French, it appeared that Canada would benefit most from co-operating with France vis-à-vis aid for French Africa. Firstly, French aid to its

---

<sup>392</sup> Pearson's letter of 31 March underlined the expansion of Canada's aid programme with French Africa and enthused about the opportunities for co-operation with France that resulted, while de Gaulle's letter of 18 April noted with pleasure the increase that had taken place in contacts between Canadian and French officials and that French African issues gave the two countries another field for co-operation. Ibid., 30-31.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., 13 and 36-37.

former possessions in Africa greatly exceeded Canadian aid. Secondly, Canada did not yet have the infrastructure capable of administering its aid to French Africa effectively. To the French, therefore, Canadian aid could only plug the holes left over by the more substantial French programmes and, consequently, France could only expect a small reduction in the amount of aid it devoted to French Africa.<sup>394</sup> There were intangible benefits for France, including Canada's efforts to bolster the French cultural community in Africa, but these were lessened by fears that Canada's aid would have an adverse effect on France's traditional ties with French Africa.

Despite their misgivings, it appeared to at least some observers that French officials were more enthusiastic about co-operating with Canada on aid matters than vice versa in the mid-1960s. The Canadian report examining this subject observed that "*Tout au moins au niveau officiel, les autorités françaises semblent avoir poursuivi avec plus de vigueur que les autorités canadiennes l'idée de la coopération dans le domaine de l'aide.*"<sup>395</sup> Genuinely desirous of improving Canada's relations with France and of facilitating the implementation of Canada's aid programmes for French Africa, the Canadian government nonetheless avoided joint development assistance projects with France. This reluctance sprang from three sources. Firstly, as previously discussed, the External Aid Office devoted more attention to Canada's aid for Commonwealth countries

---

<sup>394</sup> Ibid., 12

<sup>395</sup> Ibid., 13.



than its programmes for the French African countries.<sup>396</sup> Secondly, the Canadian government needed to maintain control over its aid and the visibility of its Canadian content as proof of its interest in French Africa for its domestic audience. The government could not afford to have Canadian aid subsumed by France's much larger aid efforts. Thirdly, the Canadian government worried about how Quebec might endeavour to intrude into any foreign aid projects it undertook with France.<sup>397</sup>

Based on such considerations, the Canadian government found it difficult to co-ordinate its aid with France. Such co-operation as there was tended to be limited to the sharing of information and plans for the future and even this declined in late 1966 and into 1967. As the French government began to support the government of Quebec's aspirations overtly, the Canadian government viewed its own relations with France with considerably more suspicion. As a result, contacts between the two governments over aid for French Africa became increasingly rare following Marcel Cadieux' trip to Paris in November 1966.<sup>398</sup> They never stopped entirely, however, and in August 1967 two French officials participated in training sessions run by the Canadian government for teachers being sent to French Africa. This visit took place one month after de Gaulle's infamous "*Vive le Québec libre*" speech in Montreal. For Jules Léger, then Canadian

---

<sup>396</sup> Herbert Moran, for example, doubted whether an expanded programme of aid for French Africa was even viable, given his belief that "most French-speaking states, ..., have available to them assistance at levels close to their present or short-term absorptive capacity." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10097 file 20-1-2-FR pt 1.1, Letter, H. O. Moran to M. Cadieux, 25 March 1964.

<sup>397</sup> *Op Cit.*, *La Collaboration France-Canada dans le domaine de l'aide aux états francophones, 1960-1967*, 11.

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

Ambassador to France, this type of co-operation proved that de Gaulle's hostility towards Canada did not prevent French and Canadian officials from quietly working maintain a beneficial relationship between the two countries.

The expansion of Canadian aid for French Africa in 1964 and 1965 thus compelled the Canadian government to try to co-operate with the French government. This had been necessary, in part, because Canada only had embassies in Cameroon and Congo in all of French Africa in 1964, severely limiting the government's ability to administer aid in the other French-speaking countries of Africa. Non-resident ambassadors and missions undermined the ability of Canada's officials to make contacts with French African governments, to gauge their need for Canadian aid, and to address the problems involving the Canadians sent to French Africa through Canada's aid programmes.

The growing needs of the aid programme for French Africa illuminated the inadequacy of Canada's diplomatic representation in this part of the world. Benjamin Rogers, Canada's Ambassador to Spain and Morocco, outlined the problem for Canada's missions in the field. In 1964-65, the External Aid Office sent five Canadian professors to Morocco. In 1965-66, Rogers expected 27 teachers and up to eight health care workers in Morocco. He argued that an aid programme of that size needed an official on the spot to cope with the "multitudinous problems that are bound to arise," the ones with which non-resident officials had trouble dealing from a distance.<sup>399</sup> Lacking a direct presence in

---

<sup>399</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid to USSEA, 27 April 1965.

Rabat, Canadian officials depended upon the goodwill of the British Embassy in Morocco for consular matters and even to process applications for immigration to Canada from Moroccan citizens. While the British had been generous with their time and attention, Rogers argued that increased Canadian aid to Morocco placed undue strains upon the British Embassy. He also argued that relying upon British assistance obscured Canada's visibility in Morocco and undermined its sovereign dignity.<sup>400</sup> At least, however, Rogers could rely upon British help in Morocco. Other British diplomatic offices similarly handled some Canadian affairs, but this was an ad hoc and not completely satisfactory arrangement for either Canada or Britain

By late 1964, therefore, the Canadian government needed to expand its representation in French Africa. New embassies would help administer Canada's aid but would also help redress the discrepancy between Canada's representation in Commonwealth countries and in the French-speaking countries of Africa. In this period, Canada had resident embassies in four of the 11 former British territories in Africa and a resident trade commissioner in a fifth but only two resident embassies in the 21 French-speaking countries of Africa. Furthermore, the Canadian government did not have diplomatic relations of any kind with Madagascar, Burundi, Rwanda and Mauritania. This situation prompted accusations, especially in Quebec, that the federal government

---

<sup>400</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Letter 291, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Morocco*, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid to USSEA, 2 July 1965.

continued to ignore the needs of Canada's French-speaking population.<sup>401</sup>

With resident missions in Cameroon and the Congo, Canada already had an adequate presence in Equatorial Africa. It needed missions in North Africa and in French West Africa.<sup>402</sup> With the expansion of Canada's foreign offices expected to take place in 1965 or 1966, the Department of External Affairs needed to decide where exactly to locate Canada's new embassies in these regions. In West Africa, the government had to choose between Senegal, Guinée and the Ivory Coast, the area's three most developed French-speaking countries. In North Africa Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco each offered attractive options for a Canadian mission. Initially, the Department favoured Algeria and Senegal as the most suitable choices along with Kenya and Ethiopia for the new missions in Africa. Yet this question continued to be debated within government circles for the next year.

Canada needed more missions in Africa because of the growing importance of African states within the United Nations and world affairs, the potential trade benefits for Canada in the continent, and the needs occasioned by the government's aid programmes. From the first, political considerations dominated the decision about where to situate the

---

<sup>401</sup> The domestic motivation for expanding Canada's diplomatic representation in French Africa was referred to in, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5504 file 12354-40 pt 4, Memo, *Diplomatic Representation: Africa and Middle Eastern Division*, R. Collins to Deputy USSEA, 1 August 1963 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-AFR pt 1.5, Tel ME-94, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, External to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 3 March 1965.

<sup>402</sup> A report prepared for the Department of External Affairs in September 1964 recognised the need to open missions in these regions. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Letter 347, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, Canadian Chargé d'affaires, Leopoldville to USSEA, 27 October 1964.

new embassies.<sup>403</sup> Since Canada could not afford embassies in all of the French-speaking countries of Africa, most of its aid still needed to be administered by Canadian officials accredited primarily to another country. The need for a mission in a country that received a large amount of Canadian aid was therefore a compelling but not a determining factor. Any of the three states in the Maghreb would have suited the needs of the External Aid Office while the same would have been true of any of the larger states in West Africa. Similarly, the Department of Trade and Commerce's preferences for the new embassies did not have much impact upon the decision making process.<sup>404</sup> The fact was that Canada's non-political, non-aid interests in the French-speaking countries of Africa remained minimal in the mid-1960s.

Canada's trade with French Africa as a whole remained limited in this period. In 1963, Canada exported \$8,500,000 to and imported \$6,800,000 from French Africa. In 1966, Canadian trade with French Africa included \$4,900,000 in exports, the drop in

---

<sup>403</sup> Douglas Small, Canada's Chargé in Leopoldville, informed his superiors in Ottawa that in his view "political considerations provide sufficient reason in themselves for the extension of Canadian diplomatic accreditation. It is not necessary – and indeed might obscure the primacy of our political interest – to advance other interests such as trade, the prospects of which are likely to be very modest at best, as having a significant place at present in any proposal to increase our missions in Africa." Ibid.

<sup>404</sup> In the aftermath of the decision to open embassies in Dakar, Senegal and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Marcel Cadieux wrote J. H. Warren, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, to explain these choices. He wrote that "The reasons which have influenced their selection are mainly political; I understand that you would not wish to open a Trade Office in either of these posts at the present time. I would hope, however, that there is some trade potential in each case." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Letter, *New Diplomatic Missions in Africa*, M. Cadieux to J. H. Warren, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, 22 April 1965.

trade with Algeria accounting for most the decline, and \$7,600,000 in imports.<sup>405</sup> Furthermore, Canadian trade with most of the French African countries, with the exception of Morocco, Algeria, Congo (Kinshasa), Guinée and Ivory Coast was negligible. The amounts involved were so small that, according to the commercial counsellor in Madrid, agents in non-resident offices could easily manage them.<sup>406</sup> French Africa as a whole did offer potential for Canadian trade, the Maghreb more so than the other regions, but mostly in the distant rather than the immediate future. The Export Credits Insurance Corporation, for example, believed that Tunisia's stable government and low rate of debt created good prospects for long term investments, but that its largely agricultural economy offered few immediate investment opportunities.<sup>407</sup> Canada's K. C. Irving Co. did predict that it would eventually import up to \$3 million annually in phosphates from Morocco, but its phosphate mine had not yet even begun to produce in

---

<sup>405</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2867 file 810-F6-1, *Commerce canadien avec le Maghreb et l'Afrique francophone*, undated. For the entire list of import and export trade between Canada and French Africa from 1963 to 1967 see appendices A and B.

<sup>406</sup> M. T. Stewart made this observation in connection to the debate over whether Canada's Commercial Counsellor in Madrid or Paris should bear responsibility for Canada's commercial business with Morocco. The matter arose because the Moroccan government resented that the Commercial Counsellor in Paris retained responsibility for Canadian trade with Morocco. Stewart observed that "Our own trade with Morocco is so small, ..., that it really does not matter which office has it." NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2871 file 810-M9-1, Inter-office correspondence, *Responsibility for Morocco*, Canadian Commercial Counsellor, Madrid to Executive Director, Trade Commissioner Service, 22 October 1963.

<sup>407</sup> This attitude was reinforced by reports that other countries did not favour investments in Tunisia at this time. In the fall of 1963, for example, six German parliamentarians toured Tunisia and decided that problems with the security of investments in Tunisia and the difficulties involved in transferring funds out of Tunisia undermined the feasibility of German private investments in that country. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4074 file 11033-A-40 pt 1, *Economic Report on Tunisia*, Export Finance Division, Export Credits Insurance Corporation, 12 September 1963 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4074 file 11033-A-40 pt 1, Letter 387, *Tunisia – Economic Co-operation*, Canadian Ambassador, Bern to USSEA, 24 September 1963.

1965.<sup>408</sup> Realistically, Canada could not expect to increase its exports to French Africa unless the Canadian government gave the French African states the credit with which to purchase Canadian goods. Without these credits, Canadian companies had minimal immediate prospects for gaining market share in the French African economies.<sup>409</sup>

Trade concerns did not greatly influence the need for Canadian missions in French Africa, but unlike questions of immigration they at least formed part of the decision-making equation. Even after the elimination of the colour bar from Canada's immigration policy under the Diefenbaker government, the government had little interest in the potential pool of immigrants that existed for Canada in Africa. In part, this could be explained by the absence of Canadian missions in the continent. In all of the reasons given to justify the expansion of Canada's representation in Africa from 1964 to 1966, however, immigration remained conspicuously underrepresented. The memo that Paul Martin and Mitchell Sharp, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, submitted to Cabinet in July 1965, for example, did not mention increased immigration as a benefit of Canada's new posts in Africa. Nor did the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration co-author the memo.<sup>410</sup> Morocco was the one French-speaking country of Africa where Canadian authorities displayed an interest in recruiting immigrants, but only those from the Jewish

---

<sup>408</sup> NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2871 file 810-M9-1, Memo, *Background material on Moroccan trading practices and Canada's trade with Morocco*, C. M. Shaw, Office of Trade Relations, Department of Trade and Commerce to G. W. Green, 17 March 1965.

<sup>409</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Memo to Cabinet, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, Paul Martin and Mitchell Sharp, 26 July 1965.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid.*

community.<sup>411</sup> Canada's only substantial immigration project related to French Africa involved settling 30 families from Algeria on farms in Canada.<sup>412</sup> They were, however, French settlers repatriated to France following Algeria's independence and thus came under the jurisdiction of Canada's immigration offices in France. The Canadian government simply was not interested in immigrants from French Africa at this time.

In the final analysis, political considerations dominated the decision making process about the opening of new missions in Canada, though the importance of some considerations had declined relative to others. For most of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Canadian government's principal interest in the independent French-speaking countries of Africa had been to help secure, as far as possible, their western orientation vis-à-vis the Cold War. The memos, dispatches, and telegrams of the Department of External Affairs still reflected this concern. Both Jules Léger from Paris and Fulgence Charpentier from Yaoundé reported, for example, upon communist successes in the French African states.<sup>413</sup> The Soviet Union and China had opened large embassies in most of these and provided them with generous amounts of technical, economic and military assistance.

The threat to western interests inherent in this situation formed the backdrop to

---

<sup>411</sup> Canada's Ambassador to Morocco, Benjamin Rogers, believed that if this situation continued Canada would ultimately face accusations that it discriminated against peoples of colour in its immigration policies. *Op Cit.*, Letter 291, Canadian Ambassador, Madrid, to USSEA, 2 July 1965.

<sup>412</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10097 file 20-1-2-FR pt 1.2, Tel, *Algerian Immigration: Proposed Note to French Government*, USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Paris, 29 April 1964.



the Canadian government's plans to expand its representation in French Africa and the rest of the continent. Canadian missions could "... help these countries develop along lines friendly to the West" and help counteract the Chinese and Soviet efforts to influence or overthrow the continent's conservative governments.<sup>414</sup> Yet these considerations, while important, no longer dominated the Canadian government's relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa or the process involved in locating its new diplomatic missions. Firstly, officials like the Ambassador in Cameroon recognised that most of the states in French Africa remained sympathetic to the West, thanks largely to France's still overwhelming influence. They also recognised that the communists mostly succeeded in the smallest and least developed countries in Africa, such as the Central African Republic and Chad,<sup>415</sup> countries in which Canada could not afford a resident mission. Secondly, Canada's domestic considerations and the needs of its aid programme had begun to outweigh Cold War concerns in the making of Canadian policy.

In March 1965, the Department of External Affairs anticipated opening an embassy in French West Africa, another in Algeria and a third in either Morocco or Tunisia within two years. Together, these new embassies would improve the balance of Canada's representation in English and French-speaking countries in Africa. The location

---

<sup>413</sup> See, for example, NAC, MG 32 A 3, Vol. 1.11, Letter, Jules Léger to M. Cadieux, 27 janvier 1965 and NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2865 file 810-C15-1, Letter 272, *Les Pays francophones d'Afrique noire l'Occident*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to USSEA, 4 juin 1965.

<sup>414</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Draft Memo to Cabinet, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, 4 May 1965.

<sup>415</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter 272, *Les Pays francophones d'Afrique noire l'Occident*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to USSEA, 4 juin 1965.

of Canada's embassy in West Africa came down to a choice between Senegal, with its capital at Dakar, and the Ivory Coast and its capital of Abidjan. Both countries offered stable, moderate and pro-western governments under the leadership of Léopold Senghor and Félix Houphouët-Boigny, respectively. To some Canadian officials, Senghor appeared more likely to assert Senegal's independence from France than Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, but Ivory Coast offered slightly greater present economic opportunities and future economic potential.<sup>416</sup> On balance, either country would have served Canadian interests very well but Ivory Coast was next door to Ghana where Canada already maintained a diplomatic mission. This consideration alone made Senegal more attractive since an embassy there would spread Canada's representation across a wider geographical area and improve the administration of Canadian aid in Senegal and its neighbours. Canada's needs in Ivory Coast could continue to be met by the High Commission in Ghana.

The decision about North Africa posed greater difficulties for the Canadian government in the spring of 1965. Algeria was the biggest, richest and most powerful of the Maghreb states but it had become one of the most radical and anti-Western states in Africa after its bloody struggle for independence. France dominated Algeria's economy and gave it large amounts of aid, but exercised little influence and Canadian officials

---

<sup>416</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Memo, *Location of New Missions in Africa*, African and Middle Eastern Division, 7 April 1965.

recognised the need to broaden Algeria's contacts with the West.<sup>417</sup> Consequently, senior officials designated Algeria Canada's highest priority for a new mission in February 1965.<sup>418</sup> Yet despite Algeria's importance, Canadian officials worried that conditions within the country were still too uncertain, its government too unstable and Canada's potential effect on Algerian affairs too small to justify the expense of a new embassy.<sup>419</sup> Algeria remained key to the Department's long-term plans in Africa, but in mid-1965 the Department allocated a higher priority to a mission elsewhere in the Maghreb.

The choice between Morocco and Tunisia was difficult for the Canadian government in 1965 since both Rabat and Tunis offered advantages to Canada. By August, when the Cabinet approved six new embassies in Africa by 1967/68, the Department had not yet decided between the two countries.<sup>420</sup> Both countries offered stable and generally moderate governments that maintained mainly friendly relations with the West. During the early 1960s, Morocco's claim to territory in the neighbouring country of Mauritania had led it to join a group of more radical African states, known as the Casablanca group, but by 1965 the Moroccan government had again begun to favour

---

<sup>417</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Tel 582, *Representation in the Maghreb*, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 31 March 1965.

<sup>418</sup> This meeting, under the direction of Assistant Under-secretaries Arnold Smith and Bruce Williams, decided that Canada should place its first priority on opening a mission in Algeria, followed by one in East Africa, Senegal, Thailand, Hungary, and then another post in Africa. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10064 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 1.5, Memo, *New Posts – 1965/66 and 1966/67*, D.R. Taylor, Personnel Division to USSEA, 29 March 1965.

<sup>419</sup> Canadian officials in the embassy in Paris held that 1965/66 was not the time to open a mission in Algeria since the benefits to Canada and to the West in general were not yet worth the costs involved. *Op Cit.*, Tel 582, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 31 March 1965.

<sup>420</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Record of Cabinet Decision, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, Meeting of August 18, 1965.

the West in its foreign policy.<sup>421</sup> Furthermore, the administrative needs of Canada's aid programme in the two countries were roughly equal, since the Canadian government maintained between 30 and 35 teachers in both Morocco and Tunisia.

To decide between the two countries, Marcel Cadieux sought the input of numerous officials in the Departments of External Affairs, Trade and Commerce and Citizenship and Immigration. In the early stages of the debate, Morocco garnered the most support since, according to Cadieux, Morocco had 12 million people compared to Tunisia's 4 million. It had abundant mineral wealth and greater economic prospects than Tunisia, and Cadieux expected that Morocco would be more likely to develop close relations with Canada.<sup>422</sup> Morocco also enjoyed more extensive diplomatic relations with other countries, with 51 resident diplomatic missions in Rabat compared to only 39 in Tunis, and thus offered Canada more scope for political activities and information gathering. Tunisia, in contrast, mainly offered the active role that its diplomats played at the United Nations and in the Arab world and its more overt interest in cultivating relations with Canada.<sup>423</sup> On balance, therefore, Cadieux recommended Rabat for Canada's new mission in North Africa.

---

<sup>421</sup> Marcel Cadieux informed the SSEA that the change had occurred because the Moroccan government was "well on the way to abandoning [the Mauritanian] claim and [because of] the conservative nature of the regime, its mistrust of communism and reliance on assistance from France and the West ..." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Memo, *Proposed Diplomatic Mission in North Africa in fiscal year 1966-67 – Choice Between Morocco and Tunisia*, USSEA to SSEA, 9 August 1965.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>423</sup> The Tunisian government had expressed its desire for a Canadian mission in Tunis, but Canadian officials suspected that Tunisia wanted closer relations with Canada as a means of attracting greater amounts of Canadian assistance.

The Departments of Trade and Commerce and Citizenship and Immigration similarly preferred Rabat to Tunis. For J.H. Warren, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, Morocco offered better prospects for trade with Canada than Tunisia. He cited Morocco's plentiful natural resources but stressed the importance of Morocco's more diversified economy and the shipping ties that linked Canada to Morocco. Warren predicted that Canada's exports to Morocco could double within several years whereas he expected little growth in exports to Tunisia.<sup>424</sup> According to R.B. Curry, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Immigration, Morocco also offered better prospects for immigration to Canada than Tunisia since Canada received 30 times more immigrants from Morocco than Tunisia annually and immigration authorities could use an office in Rabat to expand their efforts in Morocco beyond the Jewish community. Curry also argued that an office in Rabat would relieve the British Embassy of the need to process the early stages of applications for immigration to Canada.<sup>425</sup> Neither of these Departments, however, planned to post officials to the new mission anywhere in North Africa for at least several years.<sup>426</sup> Within the Department of External Affairs, the European Division and the Ambassador to Morocco also endorsed Morocco over Tunisia.

---

<sup>424</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Letter, J. H. Warren, Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce to M. Cadieux, 12 October 1965.

<sup>425</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Letter, R.B. Curry, Assistant Deputy Minister – Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration to M. Cadieux, 26 October 1965.

<sup>426</sup> Trade and Commerce did not believe a commercial office in North Africa was necessary at this point, while Citizenship and Immigration expected visiting immigration attachés from other Canadian embassies to continue to address its interests in North Africa. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Memo, *Opening of New Canadian Diplomatic Missions in Africa during 1966-67*, USSEA to SSEA, 16 December 1965.

Morocco thus appeared to be the leading candidate for Canada's new mission in North Africa in the fall of 1965. Tunisia, however, did not lack for its own advocates in this debate. The External Aid Office preferred Tunisia, largely because Tunisia offered more potential for the implementation of Canadian aid projects than Morocco. With the expansion of Canadian aid for French Africa, funds were becoming available for capital and developmental projects and Herbert Moran argued that Tunisia's advanced developmental planning enabled Canada to proceed with more projects more quickly.<sup>427</sup> The African and Middle Eastern Division of the Department of External Affairs also favoured Tunisia because of its greater interest in cultivating relations with Canada and because of Tunisia's greater involvement in world affairs. Canada's ambassador in Paris similarly endorsed Tunisia over Morocco, but it was Ambassador Garneau in Switzerland who raised the issue that ultimately swung the decision in Tunisia's favour.

The government of Quebec had recently tried to cultivate its own ties with Tunisia as part of its efforts to establish contacts with other French-speaking peoples around the world.<sup>428</sup> Garneau observed that the Tunisian government remained susceptible to overtures from Quebec. Tunisia greatly needed development assistance, he argued, and this could compel Tunisia to accept an offer of aid from Quebec despite the trouble it would cause for Canada.<sup>429</sup> Garneau implied that establishing an embassy in

---

<sup>427</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Letter, H. O. Moran to M. Cadieux, 13 October 1965.

<sup>428</sup> For an analysis of these efforts, see chapter 6 below.

<sup>429</sup> NAC, RG25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Tel 347, *Ouverture d'une mission en Afrique du Nord*, Canadian Ambassador, Bern to External, 22 November 1965.

Tunis would reinforce the Canadian government's influence with the Tunisian government and could help prevent it from accepting what would be for Canada an embarrassing and potentially damaging offer of assistance from Quebec. Quebec had already expanded its political, social, technical and cultural ties with France. The prospect of Quebec establishing similar ties with Tunisia terrified federal officials and this factor alone convinced the government to establish an embassy in Tunisia instead of Morocco.

When Marcel Cadieux submitted the recommendation about the proposed mission in North Africa to Paul Martin in December 1965, he observed that many of the factors, such as long-term trade and immigration potential, favoured Morocco over Tunisia. He nevertheless reversed his previous recommendation and proposed Tunisia as the site of the new mission. Cadieux offered two basic reasons for his change of opinion. One was the argument advanced by the External Aid Office that Tunisia offered more scope for an expanded aid programme. It is clear, however, that this consideration, while important, was secondary. The dominant consideration that shaped this decision was the threat to Canadian national interests posed by Quebec's approaches to Tunisia.<sup>430</sup> Morocco demonstrated little interest in Quebec but Tunisia remained a natural field of interest for the province. The Canadian government, therefore, had little alternative but to strengthen its influence with this particular North African country. In the words of Thomas Carter,

---

<sup>430</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, *Opening of New Canadian Diplomatic Missions in Africa during 1966-67*, USSEA to SSEA, 16 December 1965.

head of the African and Middle Eastern Division, “as far as the establishment of special relationships with the province of Quebec is concerned, we can better afford to leave Morocco uncovered than Tunisia.”<sup>431</sup>

The Canadian government opened embassies in Senegal, Tunisia and Ethiopia in 1966 and another one in Kenya in 1967. A mission in Algeria remained a goal of the Department of External Affairs, yet but not until conditions within that country stabilised. Each of the new missions cost \$120,000 to open and \$217,500 in annual operating expenses, including the salaries of the ambassador, two foreign service officers, an administrative officer, two clerks, two stenographers, a communicator and locally engaged staff.<sup>432</sup> At the same time, External Affairs strengthened its existing posts in Cameroon and Congo by adding one more senior officer to the complement of diplomats stationed in these countries. These developments strained the Department’s resources, both human and material, and the increased expenditures worried the Treasury Board in particular. The Department of External Affairs had originally submitted estimates of \$39.158 million for its operating and capital costs for fiscal year 1966-67. This amount did not include provisions for the costs of opening the new posts in Africa. The Treasury Board had wanted to reduce the Department’s original operating and capital costs by \$2.85 million and complained that the additional \$1.4 million for expansion made the

---

<sup>431</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.2, Letter, *Opening of New Missions in Africa in 1966-67 – Morocco or Tunisia and Kenya*, T. Carter to USSEA, 2 December 1965.

<sup>432</sup> *Op Cit.*, Draft Memo to Cabinet, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, 4 May 1965.



lower target impossible to achieve.<sup>433</sup> Paul Martin, however, convinced his Cabinet colleagues of the need to expand Canada's representation in Africa, especially in French Africa, and the opening of Canada's new missions proceeded as planned.<sup>434</sup>

The new missions greatly expanded Canada's diplomatic representation in French Africa and eased the administration of Canada's aid programmes to these French-speaking countries. Over the previous six years, Canada's aid had been plagued by problems caused, in part, by trying to spread finite amounts of aid too thinly between a large number of recipient states and the inability to administer the aid effectively from non-resident diplomatic missions. The review of Canadian external assistance conducted in the summer of 1963 had concluded that to be effective, the Canadian government needed to concentrate its aid on a limited number of recipients.<sup>435</sup> The new embassies in French Africa bolstered the ability of the External Aid Office to administer aid programmes in Tunisia and Senegal, but did not alter the difficulties inherent in administering aid for countries without a resident Canadian mission. In late 1966, therefore, the Canadian government decided to focus its external assistance for French-speaking African countries on Senegal, Tunisia and Cameroon, where Canadian

---

<sup>433</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Report to the Cabinet from the Treasury Board, *Canadian Diplomatic Representation in Africa*, 12 August 1965.

<sup>434</sup> Martin was particularly effective in defending the need to expand in Africa to Walter Gordon, the Minister of Finance, who believed that Canada's interests in other parts of the world should take precedence. Regarding Canada's relations with French-speaking countries in Africa, Martin argued that this was a matter "of particular concern to me at this time and there is a compelling need for us to move with some alacrity in the extension of our formal relations with them." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-2-AFR pt 2.1, Letter, SSEA to Walter Gordon, Minister of Finance, 15 July 1965.

<sup>435</sup> *Op Cit.*, Draft Report, *Direction of Canadian Aid*, 23 September 1963.

diplomats were on hand to oversee and implement the aid projects.<sup>436</sup> The Congo, where Canada also had an embassy, was not included in this plan because it still received Canadian assistance through United Nations operations and because of the unsettled conditions in the country. The remaining French-speaking states of Africa continued to receive some Canadian teachers, scholarships and other limited forms of Canadian aid, but Canada's larger capital and developmental projects were largely directed elsewhere. This decision may have caused some resentment among those states left out, but it did improve the implementation of Canadian aid for French African countries.<sup>437</sup>

The interest in expanding relations between Canada and French-speaking countries in Africa was not strictly one-sided on the part of the Canadian government. The French African states themselves wanted to establish their own contacts with Canada through requests for resident Canadian missions, requests for the exchange of diplomatic relations, officials visits by officials and statesmen from French Africa to Canada, and even the opening of their own resident missions in Canada. The Algerian Foreign Minister, for example, expressed his government's desire for a Canadian diplomatic mission in Algiers in late 1962, while both the Rwandan and Malagasy governments requested the accreditation of Canadian ambassadors to their countries in 1965. The

---

<sup>436</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8825 file 20-1-2-3, Memo, *Aid Programme in Africa – Geographical Distribution*, T. Carter, African and Middle Eastern Division to Economic Division, 23 December 1965.

Malagasy Ambassador to Canada, resident in Washington D.C., visited Ottawa in July 1965 to press this point and to solicit Canadian help in developing some of his country's vast mineral and natural resources.<sup>438</sup> This was not unusual. The Canadian government received many requests for assistance from the French African states in this period. By far, however, it was Tunisia that demonstrated the greatest interest in expanding its ties with Canada. Tunisia had accredited its Ambassador to the United States as dual Ambassador to Canada several years earlier, but in late 1965 the Tunisian authorities informed the Department of External Affairs of their intention to establish a resident diplomatic mission in Ottawa.<sup>439</sup> The Tunisian mission would be run by a resident *Chargé d'affaires*, but the Tunisian government also planned to name honorary consuls in Montreal and possibly another Canadian city.

The years from 1963 to 1966 thus witnessed the extension and intensification of Canada's relations with the French-speaking states of Africa. Canada's economic and trade interests in this part of the world remained limited during this period, but Canadian political, cultural and especially aid contacts with these countries experienced rapid and

---

<sup>437</sup> In the first three years of the Canadian aid programme for French Africa, only \$539,000 of \$900,000 was actually dispersed by the External Aid Office. In 1964-65, over \$2,700,000 remained out of the \$4,000,000 available for French Africa at the end of the fiscal year. With the establishment of embassies in Senegal and Tunisia, however, the capacity to deliver aid to French Africa improved and in 1966-67, over \$10,000,000 was spent out of a budget of \$11,100,000. Hilliker and Barry, 336.

<sup>438</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, *Diplomatic Representation: African and Middle Eastern Division*, R.E. Collins to Deputy USSEA, 1 August 1963, NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2787 file 810-M1-1- pt 1, Memo, *Visit of the Ambassador of the Malagasy Republic*, A.M. Baldwin to File, 6 July 1965 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10065 file 20-1-2-AFR pt 2.1, Memo, *Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Rwanda*, A. E. Ritchie to SSEA, 22 July 1965.

<sup>439</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, *Opening of New Canadian Diplomatic Missions in Africa during 1966-67*, M. Cadieux to SSEA, 16 December 1965.

profound growth. During the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the Canadian government's interest in these countries had been dominated by its desire to preserve their western orientation in the context of the Cold War. In this context, the establishment of Canadian relations with these countries proceeded slowly because the Canadian government recognised that France had the largest role to play and the greatest capacity to succeed in this goal. It gradually became apparent, however, that in addition to their Cold War importance, Canada needed close ties with the French-speaking states of Africa to prove that it addressed the needs of Canada's own French-speaking population. The Liberal government of Lester Pearson and Paul Martin noted the new importance to Canada of the French African states and moved rapidly after 1963 to try to maintain Canada's domestic harmony by more accurately reflecting its cultural duality in its foreign policy. The Canadian government's relations with France were souring by the mid-1960s, but it could and increasingly did point to its expanding ties with French Africa as proof of its commitment to strengthening the French fact in Canada itself.

## **CHAPTER SIX: QUEBEC AND FRENCH AFRICA, 1960-1966**

The people of Quebec grew increasingly resentful of the parochialism of Quebec society and the Duplessis government towards the end of the 1950s. The Liberal Party's victory under Jean Lesage in the provincial election of 1960 unleashed a flurry of governmental and societal activity that, over the succeeding decade, modernised and secularised Quebec society and challenged the established order both within the province and Canada in general.<sup>440</sup> During the 1960s, Quebec's government greatly expanded its powers and assumed new prominence in virtually all aspects of Quebec society including education, social welfare, the economy and cultural and linguistic affairs. In short, the provincial government quickly became one of the principal agents of change in the province as it promoted the interests of the Québécois. The desire to strengthen French Canadian culture, in particular, induced the government of Quebec to attempt to establish its own contacts with the governments of other French-speaking people in the 1960s. Naturally, the government and the people of France were the targets of Quebec's initial endeavours in this field.

From the opening of Quebec's delegation general in Paris in 1961 to the France-Quebec technical and cultural accords in 1965, relations between the governments of

---

<sup>440</sup> For a general description of the Quiet Revolution, see Léon Dion, *La Révolution déroulée, 1960-1976* (Montreal: Les Éditions Boréal, 1998), Pierre Godin, *La Fin de la grande noirceur* (Montreal: Les Éditions Boréal, 1991) and Dale Thomson, *Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984).

France and Quebec expanded rapidly in the first half of the 1960s.<sup>441</sup> France provided Quebec with encouragement and the support it needed during the province's period of self-renewal while it rejoiced in the dynamism and prosperity of the French-speaking people in English-dominated North America, proof of the vitality of the French language and culture. Mutual benefit and admiration, therefore, characterised France's relations with Quebec in the 1960s, the growing intimacy of which owed much to Charles de Gaulle. It has been well established that throughout most of the 1960s, France's policy towards Quebec originated primarily in the Élysée Palace, the office of the President of France.<sup>442</sup> De Gaulle encouraged his ministers to visit Quebec; he pressed for closer links between the two governments; and he treated dignitaries visiting Paris from Quebec in a manner befitting the representatives of a sovereign nation. France also sympathised with Quebec's protracted efforts to secure the right to conduct its own relations with foreign countries in the face of opposition from the Canadian government.

Quebec's leaders naturally looked first to France when they sought to foster contacts with other French-speaking peoples but they also gradually became aware of the existence of a larger French-speaking international community of which the newly independent states of French Africa formed such a large part. Interest in French Africa developed slowly in Quebec during the early 1960s, but several individuals and non-governmental agencies sought to strengthen ties with the French-speaking states in Africa

---

<sup>441</sup> See, for example, Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible* and Louis Bélanger, "La France" in Louis Balthazar, Louis Bélanger, Gordon Mace et collaborateurs, *Trente ans de politique extérieure du Québec 1960-1990*.

<sup>442</sup> See Bosher, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997*, chs 2-3.

as a way to strengthen and express Quebec's culture. In September 1961, for example, Mgr Irénée Lussier, the rector of the Université de Montréal, convened a conference for representatives of 42 of the world's 51 French-language universities in Montreal. The delegates included officials from the universities of Algiers, Brazzaville, Cameroon, Dakar, Elisabethville, Tananarive, Rabat, Tunis and Lovanium in French Africa and even Gabon's Minister of National Education attended as an observer.<sup>443</sup> This conference resulted in the creation of the AUPELF, the *Association des universités entièrement ou partiellement de langue française*, which subsequently persistently lobbied governments including that of Canada to promote French-language education.<sup>444</sup> In the summer of 1963, for example, the Canadian members of the AUPELF lobbied the Canadian government for 200 scholarships to bring French-speaking students from around the world to study at Canadian universities.<sup>445</sup> The *Comité Afrique-Canada* similarly promoted exchanges between Canada and the French African countries, and in September 1962 this non-governmental organisation was instrumental in helping 22 women from Gabon come to Canada to begin secretarial studies in Montreal.<sup>446</sup>

The *Comité Afrique-Canada* had as its first president Jean-Marc Léger. Léger was also a journalist for *Le Devoir* and he became one of the most vocal advocates of

---

<sup>443</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-14-40 pt 1, *Délégation au 1er congrès international des universités de langue française*, le 7 septembre 1961.

<sup>444</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-14-40 pt 1, Memo, *First International Congress of French-speaking Universities*, J. G. Maranda to P. A. Q. Gillan, Information Division, 28 September 1961.

<sup>445</sup> In this instance, however, the formal approach to the federal government came from the Canadian Universities Foundation rather than the AUPELF. Canada's French-speaking universities belonged to both organisations. See chapter 6 above.

improving Canada's, and Quebec's ties French Africa. In the early 1960s, Léger, like many of his compatriots, discovered that "*il n'y a pas que la France et le Québec à parler français, mais des dizaines d'autres pays et que cet usage d'une langue commune ouvre de vastes perspectives d'échanges et de collaboration.*"<sup>447</sup> Léger believed that French Africa offered opportunities for Canada's French-speaking people to become part of a dynamic linguistic community and, in July 1963, he severely criticised the Canadian government for the inadequacy of its efforts towards these countries. He criticised in particular its lack of diplomatic representation in French Africa and the paltry sum of \$300,000 it gave as aid to the region.<sup>448</sup> He also argued that the government of Quebec needed to conduct its own relations with the French African states as the best way to satisfy the needs of French-Canadians in contacts with other French-speaking peoples.<sup>449</sup> Léger's articles had a tremendous affect on the Canadian government, and federal officials cited them as proof of the need to expand Canada's aid for French Africa during the summer of 1963.

In contrast, the government of Quebec demonstrated little interest in pursuing contacts with the French-speaking peoples of Africa in the early 1960s, despite their shared linguistic heritage. Jean Lesage himself envisaged international contacts during this period in terms of inviting foreign capital and foreign industries to invest in the

---

<sup>446</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 6, Letter, Jean-Marc Léger to SSEA, 4 April 1963.

<sup>447</sup> As cited by Pierre Guillaume, "Aide au développement et présence canadienne en Afrique," in Année africain 1976, 198.

<sup>448</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5057 file 2727-15-40 pt 1, Memo, *Articles by Jean-Marie [sic] Léger in Le Devoir on "Quebec in the French language world,"* M. G. Dench for USSEA to SSEA, 25 July 1963.



province, something beyond the capabilities of the French African states.<sup>450</sup> Only pressure exerted upon Lesage by several of his closest friends and advisers, including Jean-Marc Léger and André Patry, convinced him to devote any attention at all to French Africa.<sup>451</sup> Patry, like Léger, believed that Quebec needed to expand its presence internationally to reflect that French Canadians belonged to a broader linguistic and cultural community.<sup>452</sup> In late 1961, he wrote Lesage to propose the creation of a diplomatic corps to co-ordinate Quebec's relations with foreign countries and suggested that the province should maintain cultural agents in Dakar and Abidjan in French Africa as well as in Paris, Brussels and Geneva. He believed both that Canada's constitution entitled the provinces to conduct their own international affairs in matters of provincial jurisdiction and that as the 'national' state of French Canadians Quebec had the right to its own relations with other French-speaking countries. Like many other Québécois, Patry wanted to respect the rights of the federal government at the same time that he wanted Quebec to challenge federal authority and powers.<sup>453</sup>

Patry was a professor of international relations at the University of Montreal in

---

<sup>449</sup> *Le Devoir*, July 1963.

<sup>450</sup> Thomson, *Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution*, 114.

<sup>451</sup> Lyne Sauvageau et Gordon Mace, "Les Relations extérieures du Québec avec l'Afrique et le Moyen-Orient," in Balthazar, Bélanger et Mace, *Trente ans de politique extérieure du Québec, 1960-1990*, 256.

<sup>452</sup> Patry wrote that the "*movement d'émancipation des Canadiens d'expression françaises*" inspired his views, but this choice of phrase refers to the emancipation of French-Canadians from the parochialism of their past rather than to any support for the separatist movement in Quebec. See Archives Nationales du Québec, P422 S2, 3A 011 03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Article 2, file 4, Letter, André Patry to Jean Lesage, 25 octobre 1961 and ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 4, Letter, André Patry to Jean Lesage, 9 décembre 1961.

<sup>453</sup> These were the same types of ambiguities that characterised Quebec's initial approaches to French Africa. Sauvageau and Mace, 256.

the early 1960s. In 1963, however, he became senior advisor on Quebec's international affairs to Premier Lesage. Within the government, he joined other officials like Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Quebec's Minister of Youth, and Claude Morin, Deputy Minister of Intergovernmental affairs, as forceful advocates of Quebec's autonomous international identity. Together, these three individuals pressured Lesage to adopt more active international policies. In 1961, for example, Gérin-Lajoie stated during a speech in Montpellier, France, that Quebec wanted to establish its own aid programmes for French Africa and to welcome French African students into Quebec's universities.<sup>454</sup> Similarly, Patry continuously pressured Lesage to establish Quebec's own cultural and technical ties with other French-speaking peoples and to establish direct contacts with such international organisations as UNESCO.<sup>455</sup>

Despite the pressure exerted by such individuals as Léger, Patry and Gérin-Lajoie, Jean Lesage's government made few approaches to French African states during the early 1960s. In 1961, officials from Quebec met with representatives of Morocco, Tunisia and the Algerian provisional government at the United Nations in New York to acquaint them with the federal government's recently announced educational assistance programme for French Africa and the opportunities it enabled for exchanges with Quebec.<sup>456</sup> Only the Tunisian representative, however, expressed interest. Subsequent approaches by the

---

<sup>454</sup> According to Dale Thomson, this speech reflected Gérin-Lajoie's personal aspirations rather than the policy of the government of Quebec. Thomson, 142.

<sup>455</sup> ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011 03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 1, Memo, *Canadian Aid to French-speaking African States*, André Patry to H.O. Moran, EAO, 4 July 1963 and ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 1, Letter, André Patry to H. O. Moran, 21 January 1964.

government of Quebec proved equally disappointing. Though it did provide scholarships to the Gabonese students brought to Canada with the help of the *Comité Afrique-Canada*, Quebec's next initiative failed to deliver the anticipated results.

In the fall of 1963, André Patry approached the government of Morocco, through Canada's Embassy in Spain, about Quebec operating a medical clinic in the North African country. Patry wanted the federal government to pay the costs involved, through its aid programme for French Africa, while Quebec supplied the personnel and administered the project.<sup>457</sup> This would allow the External Aid Office to retain overall jurisdiction for the clinic while giving Quebec a high profile role in the delivery of an aid project that clearly fell within the province's sphere of responsibility. At Patry's instigation, a senior official from Quebec's Ministry of Health traveled to Spain to enlist Canada's Ambassador to Morocco, Jean Bruchesi, in the project. Bruchesi then approached the Moroccan authorities and discussed Patry's proposal with them in a private and personal capacity.<sup>458</sup> Unfortunately, Bruchesi had little success with the Moroccan Minister of Public Health in December 1963. The Minister rejected Quebec's offer of a health clinic in Morocco in favour of sending Moroccan doctors and nurses to

---

<sup>456</sup> André Patry, *Le Québec dans le monde*, 71.

<sup>457</sup> ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 1, Letter, André Patry to Dr. Paul Claveau, Ministère de la Santé du Québec, 24 septembre 1963.

<sup>458</sup> Herbert Moran had informed Patry and Bruchesi that the proposal did not need authorisation from the Department of External Affairs to be raised privately and informally with the Moroccans. ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 1, Letter, H.O. Moran to André Patry, 24 October 1963.

Quebec for training instead.<sup>459</sup> This suggestion, however, would have denied Quebec a high profile project in North Africa, and the idea was therefore abandoned.

With the failure of this initiative, the government of Quebec turned its attention to securing a substantial role in the federal educational assistance programme for the French-speaking countries of Africa. The government of Quebec had participated in the planning and the delivery of this aid programme from its establishment in April 1961. Politically, this co-operation allowed the federal government to demonstrate its commitment to working with the provinces in the provision of external aid. Practically, it enabled the External Aid Office to use the provincial authorities' expertise to find and evaluate teaching candidates for service overseas. Moreover, such co-operation was necessary since Quebec supplied almost all of the teachers sent to French Africa by the federal government in the early 1960s.

The government of Quebec thus played an important role in Canada's educational assistance programme for French Africa by recruiting and evaluating the teaching candidates. Between September 1961 and February 1962 the provincial authorities found, for example, almost 50 teachers willing to be sent to French Africa. Of these, however, only 13 were deemed suitable for employment overseas by Quebec's educational authorities and only 7 of these were actually employed by the External Aid Office in the

---

<sup>459</sup> ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art 5, file 1, Letter, Jean Bruchesi, Canadian Ambassador to Morocco, to André Patry, 22 décembre 1963.

first year of the educational aid programme.<sup>460</sup> In addition, officials from Quebec helped design the aid programme on a joint working committee with officials from the External Aid Office, the Department of External Affairs and representatives of Quebec's French-language universities. In 1962, Paul Gérin-Lajoie tried to gain control for Quebec of this working group, to maximise Quebec's influence,<sup>461</sup> but Quebec's government appeared largely satisfied with its secondary role in this federal aid programme.

Yet by 1964, Quebec had begun to demand a more prominent role in the delivery of Canadian aid for French Africa. Not coincidentally, these demands occurred after the federal government increased to \$4 million the amount of money it allocated to this type of aid. Previously, the \$300,000 devoted by the Diefenbaker government had limited the attractiveness of federal aid to the government of Quebec but the new funds allotted by the Liberal government greatly increased the scope and the scale of Canada's aid for French Africa after 1964.<sup>462</sup> They also attracted the attention of Paul Gérin-Lajoie and André Patry who began to see the increasingly large federal aid programme for French Africa as the means to challenge federal exclusivity in external affairs and to give Quebec its first international presence in Africa.

---

<sup>460</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5258 file 8260-15-40 pt 3, Letter, N. Berlis to M. Cadieux, New York, 6 October 1961 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Memo, H. O. Moran, EAO to USSEA, 5 February 1962.

<sup>461</sup> In the spring of 1962, Gérin-Lajoie suggested that the government of Quebec should have more representatives on this committee than the federal government, that all of its discussions and correspondence should be conducted in French, and that Quebec's Department of Youth should bear the responsibility for evaluating the needs of the French African states because, since they shared a culture, Quebec had a greater understanding of their requirements than the federal government. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5259 file 8260-15-40 pt 4, Letter, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Minister of Youth, Quebec to SSEA, 21 March 1962.

<sup>462</sup> See Chapter 5 above.

Gérin-Lajoie and Patry, among others, argued that Quebec deserved a prominent role in the Canadian aid programme for French Africa for two basic reasons. Firstly, they contended that Canada's constitution did not give the federal government exclusive responsibility for foreign affairs, as proven by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council's 1937 ruling that the federal government could not implement an international treaty in a field of provincial jurisdiction without the concurrence of the provinces.<sup>463</sup> This ruling implied that the federal government's responsibility for foreign affairs was only absolute in areas of its own exclusive jurisdiction. Consequently, the provinces themselves retained the exclusive ability to represent themselves internationally in areas of provincial competence. It followed that an international foray by Quebec involving education, for example, would not violate Canada's constitution.<sup>464</sup> Many of Quebec's officials also believed, however, that if Quebec allowed the federal government to act for the province internationally in fields like education, Ottawa could then claim that the provinces had ceded their exclusive jurisdiction in those fields. This would allow the federal government to encroach upon provincial responsibilities domestically as well.<sup>465</sup> Fearful of this possibility, several officials in Quebec believed that the province had to

---

<sup>463</sup> The ruling came in the *Labour Conventions* case. Edward McWhinney, *Quebec and the Constitution, 1960-1978* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 38-9.

<sup>464</sup> André Patry used this argument with Jean Lesage in the fall of 1961. *Op Cit.*, Letter, Patry to Lesage, 25 October 1961. See also Louise Beaudoin, "Origines et développement du rôle international du Gouvernement du Québec," in Paul Painchaud, ed. *Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1977), 453.

assert its right to an international voice in education or risk losing it to the federal government.<sup>466</sup>

Secondly, many in Quebec also believed that Confederation had been the result of a bicultural compact between the peoples of the French and English linguistic communities.<sup>467</sup> By the 1960s, Quebec's leaders argued that the bicultural compact theory and its 'spirit' of Confederation meant that since Quebec was home to the overwhelming majority of Canada's French-speaking people, it was the representative of one of Canada's two founding nations. As such, the government of Quebec needed special powers to protect the French Canadian language and culture. By implication, this argument also indicated that the government of Quebec had a special need for direct relations with other French-speaking states. Many of Quebec's officials therefore increasingly believed that Quebec had a legal right, through its responsibility for education, and a moral right, as the government of French Canadians, to assume control for Canada's educational assistance programme for French Africa.

The federal government rejected these arguments, claiming that international law

---

<sup>465</sup> This argument was raised, for example, by the senior official in charge of international co-operation in Quebec's Ministry of Education in ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5.1A, Memo, *Objectifs à atteindre dans la négociation avec le Bureau fédéral de l'aide extérieure au sujet de la participation du Ministère de l'Éducation à l'envoi d'enseignants à l'étranger*, Gaston Cholette to Paul Gérin-Lajoie, 8 février 1965. See also Beaudoin, 454.

<sup>466</sup> The fears of these provincial officials may have been justified. In the spring of 1967, Pierre Trudeau commented that the federal government could be entitled to use its 'power of the purse' in the field of education as a consequence of Quebec's attempts to use its own 'power of the purse' in terms of foreign aid. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10638 file 26-1 pt 3, Memo, *Report on a trip to certain French-speaking African states*, Pierre Trudeau to Prime Minister, undated.

recognised only the central government of a federal state as a sovereign entity capable of entering into international agreements.<sup>468</sup> The federal government also argued that the constitution reserved external affairs as a federal power under the residual clause and that it had inherited all of the rights and privileges exercised by Britain from 1867 to 1931. Pearson expressed his willingness to co-operate with the provinces, but insisted that Canada could only speak with one voice internationally since the alternative risked fracturing Canada's unity.<sup>469</sup> The federal government similarly denied that Quebec alone represented French-Canadians and pointed to the representation of French-Canadians in the House of Commons and the existence of substantial French-speaking minorities in provinces other than Quebec as proof. The federal government could, and did according to Pearson, represent all of Canada's French-speaking people. Consequently, the Pearson government insisted on retaining overall administrative and operative responsibility for the educational assistance programme for French Africa.

The government of Quebec had been recruiting and screening potential candidates for the External Aid Office for service in the French African countries since 1961. By 1964, Paul Gérin-Lajoie wanted to expand Quebec's role in the programme. To begin with, he wanted all of the teachers and professors recruited in Quebec for service in

---

<sup>467</sup> This view proved popular with many historians as well in the 1960s and 1970s, even those from English Canada. See Ralph Heintzman, "The Spirit of Confederation: Professor Creighton, Biculturalism and the Use of History," in *Canadian Historical Review* 1971, 52(3), 245-275.

<sup>468</sup> See, for example, the federal Attorney General's response to the government of Prince Edward Island in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 4375 file 11589-40 pt 1, Letter, Ed Fulton to Attorney General of Prince Edward Island, 26 January 1962.



French Africa to be employed by Quebec's Department of Education. Next, Gérin-Lajoie insisted that the Department of Education participate in all decisions relating to Quebec's teachers and that the Minister of Education co-sign all correspondence sent to the teachers and the recipient countries as well.<sup>470</sup> In effect, the Minister of Education wanted joint responsibility for and a highly visible role in the educational aid programme for French Africa. At the instigation of his advisers, Premier Lesage even sought from Prime Minister Pearson the right for Quebec's officials to obtain directly from the French African governments information necessary for the aid programme.<sup>471</sup> Joint responsibility, however, was just the first of the province's ambitions in this field. Ultimately, Quebec's officials believed that the province should operate, on its own, most of Canada's aid programmes for the French-speaking countries of Africa.<sup>472</sup>

The governments of Canada and Quebec negotiated over their respective roles vis-à-vis educational aid for French Africa between October of 1964 and June of 1965 but could not resolve their differences. The federal government conceded that Quebec could hire the teachers for secondment to the External Aid Office for the duration of their contracts and even agreed to allow Quebec to pay these teachers, subject to federal

---

<sup>469</sup> Elliot J. Feldman and Lily Gardner Feldman, "The Impact of Federalism on the Organisation of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Publius* Vol. 14 (Fall 1984), 49.

<sup>470</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, Cholette to Gérin-Lajoie, 8 février 1965.

<sup>471</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 1, Letter, Jean Lesage to Lester B. Pearson, 19 February 1965.

<sup>472</sup> Gaston Cholette, the director of co-operation in the Ministry of Education, suggested, for example, that because Quebec was home to 80% of Canada's francophones, Quebec should administer 80% of the funds for francophone countries. *Op Cit.*, Memo, Cholette to Gérin-Lajoie, 8 février 1965.

reimbursement.<sup>473</sup> It rejected, however, similar arrangements for university professors since they did not ordinarily fall under the jurisdiction of Quebec's Department of Education. The federal government also refused to allow provincial officials to enter into direct contact with foreign governments. Federal officials insisted that Quebec use the Department of External Affairs as an intermediary to obtain the information it wanted on teaching conditions in French Africa.<sup>474</sup>

In the end, the federal government refused to diminish its overall responsibility for educational aid for French Africa since it maintained that external aid was an integral part of Canadian foreign policy. Federal officials like Herbert Moran and Marcel Cadieux realised that Quebec's actual intent was to operate the programme itself, with federal involvement restricted to its financing and some few administrative tasks.<sup>475</sup> For those like Cadieux who considered the federal aid for French Africa vital for Canada's national unity, giving Quebec responsibility for it was not a viable option.<sup>476</sup> For the federal government, Quebec should only continue to recruit the teachers that the External Aid

---

<sup>473</sup> This concession displeased Paul Martin who believed that allowing Quebec to pay their salaries directly gave the impression that it was Quebec who supplied the aid rather than the federal government. His displeasure, however, did not change the agreement because federal officials expected too much trouble if they tried to renegotiate this clause. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10140 file 30-12-QUE pt 1, Memo, *Proposed Agreement with Quebec – Recruitment of Teachers for EAO Programmes*, USSEA to SSEA, 30 July 1965.

<sup>474</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-01-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 3, Note, *La Politique de coopération technique du Québec*, 13 décembre 1965.

<sup>475</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 1, Memo, *Proposed Agreement with Quebec – Teacher Programme*, H. O. Moran to SSEA, 10 July 1965.

<sup>476</sup> Cadieux also suspected that the goal of many officials within Quebec's government was in fact independence from Canada, a suspicion reinforced by Claude Morin who, in May 1966, told Cadieux that Quebec wanted to establish its international identity in the same way that Canada had achieved its own independence from Britain, through a series of small precedents. Claude Morin, *Les Choses comme elles étaient* (Montreal: Les Éditions du Boréal, 1994), 191-2.

Office wanted to send to French Africa.

Claude Morin and Paul Gérin-Lajoie denounced the fact that the federal government was unwilling to concede either administrative responsibility for the teachers or joint responsibility for educational assistance for French Africa to Quebec. They had wanted to use this programme to begin establishing Quebec's international identity in Africa and refused to dilute their demands. The fact that they suspected that the federal government had deliberately delayed its response to Quebec's proposal until late August 1965, just weeks before the teachers had to leave for Africa in September, did little to encourage Morin and Gérin-Lajoie to soften their position. They believed that the federal government had waited until the last moment to respond to deny Quebec the opportunity to renegotiate the agreement before the teachers departed for their overseas posts.<sup>477</sup> The government of Quebec thus rejected a deal for 1965-66, but prepared to renew its demands the following year.

In the spring of 1966, Jean Lesage again approached Lester Pearson about an agreement to define Quebec's role in the educational assistance programme, though federal officials discerned few differences in this new proposal from the one they had previously rejected.<sup>478</sup> The only significant difference lay in Quebec's stated intention to establish its own aid programme for the French-speaking countries of Africa, a

---

<sup>477</sup> ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5.1A, Memo, *Entente avec le Bureau de l'aide extérieure sur l'envoi d'enseignants dans les pays francophones*, Claude Morin to Jean Lesage, 27 August 1965.

<sup>478</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 3, Memo, *Co-operative Arrangements with Quebec and Other Provinces – External Aid*, USSEA to SSEA, 10 May 1966.

suggestion that struck federal officials as ominous. Still, the Department of External Affairs agreed to negotiate on the basis of this draft proposal. Aside from informal discussions between senior officials like Morin and Cadieux, however, formal negotiations never took place. Because of the election expected in Quebec in the summer of 1966, Cadieux advised Martin and Pearson that formal consideration of Quebec's proposal should be delayed until the fall.<sup>479</sup> On no account did the federal government want the progress, or lack thereof, in negotiations on this subject raised as an issue during Quebec's electoral campaign.

The surprising victory of the Union Nationale Party over Jean Lesage's Liberals ended all possibility of resolving the differences regarding external aid that existed between the federal government and the new government of Quebec. Fundamental disputes about their respective responsibilities vis-à-vis educational assistance and about Quebec's right to pursue its own international identity had prevented the Pearson government from reaching an agreement with the Lesage Liberals. How could the federal government now reach an agreement with a more overtly nationalist government led by a man, Daniel Johnson, who had written a book entitled Equality or Independence? After two years of on and off attempts at reaching an agreement, Quebec's role in the provision of teachers for French Africa remained largely what it had been in the fall of 1964.

The failed negotiations only compelled the government of Quebec to search for

---

<sup>479</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 3, Memo, *Agreement with Quebec concerning External Aid*, USSEA to SSEA, 27 May 1966.

another way to realise its ambitions. Increasingly embittered, Patry and Morin suggested that Quebec needed its own programme of aid for French Africa. This idea was not new. Patry had discussed the desirability of aid directly from Quebec in the summer of 1964. At that time, he had told Gérin-Lajoie that many of his contacts among officials from French Africa expressed doubts about accepting Canadian aid because they considered Canada an Anglo-Saxon country that ultimately aimed to undermine French culture in Africa. Patry argued that aid from Quebec would alleviate this worry for the French African states.<sup>480</sup> Gérin-Lajoie even discussed the idea of Quebec aid for French Africa with the French Minister of Co-operation in Paris in March 1965.<sup>481</sup> Earlier in the decade, the French had had some doubts about the desirability of Quebec establishing contacts with French Africa to the detriment of France's own influence there, but by the mid-1960s they were actively encouraging the French African states to take a greater interest in Quebec. Nevertheless, the French still thought it preferable to try to direct any Quebec aid programme towards the anglophone countries of Africa.<sup>482</sup>

By the fall of 1965, Patry, Gérin-Lajoie and Morin were searching for suitable partners for Quebec's first independent initiatives in Africa. Patry had trouble finding an

---

<sup>480</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B 01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 4, Letter, André Patry to Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Minister of Education, Quebec, 12 July 1964.

<sup>481</sup> M. Tribouchet evidently expressed some doubts about this idea, but Jean Chapdelaine assured Gérin-Lajoie that the French minister's views contrasted with those of the rest of his government. This conversation was related to the Canadian Minister in Paris by Chapdelaine. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10492 file 55-3-1-FR-QUEBEC pt 2.1, Letter, J. G. H. Halstead, Canadian Minister, Paris to USSEA, 5 March 1965.

<sup>482</sup> AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 113, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à Direction Amérique, 10 juin 1961, AMAÉ, Am 52-63, Canada, Vol. 97, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à MAE, 4 décembre 1963 and AMAÉ, Am 64-70, Canada, Vol. 243, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 15 mai 1965.

interested government in French West or Equatorial Africa, but in North Africa Tunisia proved receptive to the idea of technical assistance from Quebec. Tunisian Ambassador Taieb Slim had visited Jean Lesage in Quebec City earlier that spring and expressed his government's desire for an accord regarding technical co-operation with Quebec. Slim also invited Quebec's Minister of Education to visit Tunisia to discuss what projects Quebec and Tunisia could undertake. Anxious to solidify this agreement, Gérin-Lajoie planned to visit to North Africa in October 1965 to sign an entente with the Tunisian government. He expected that a deal with Tunisia would demonstrate Quebec's international competence in matters of provincial competence and also force the federal government to recognise that the province was Ottawa's equal partner in international matters involving provincial jurisdiction.<sup>483</sup>

The federal government, however, considered the proposed agreement between Quebec and Tunisia a threat to its own interests and quickly marshaled its influence to block the accord. In late September and early October 1965, Paul Martin met with both the Tunisian Foreign Minister and Ambassador Slim at the United Nations in New York to discuss the rumours that Quebec intended to sign an entente with Tunisia. Martin reminded the Tunisians that only Canada's federal government had the power to sign international agreements with foreign governments and convinced his listeners that the federal government strongly opposed direct negotiations or a direct agreement between

---

<sup>483</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 5, Memo, *Projet d'entente avec la Tunisie*, Paul Gérin-Lajoie to Jean Lesage, 7 octobre 1965.

Tunisia and Quebec.<sup>484</sup> Faced with such a strong reaction from Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Tunisian Foreign Minister assured Martin that his government had no intention of signing an accord with the government of Quebec. Ambassador Slim subsequently told Patry that under the circumstances, the Tunisian government would not negotiate directly with Quebec and that an entente would not be signed during Gérin-Lajoie's visit to Tunisia in October of 1965.<sup>485</sup>

Patry tried to salvage the project by suggesting that Gérin-Lajoie discuss in Tunis the substance of a deal to be signed later in Quebec City, but the Tunisian authorities rejected this appeal and Quebec's hopes for an agreement with Tunisia in the fall of 1965 collapsed.<sup>486</sup> Though disappointed, Quebec's officials continued to pursue the means to assert the province's international competence and from the fall of 1965 to the spring of 1966 pressured Jean Lesage to allocate funds for the creation of Quebec's own programme of direct technical assistance for French Africa. The idea had been under consideration for several years but officials like Patry and Morin believed that the federal government needed a further demonstration of the seriousness of Quebec's intentions. In April 1966, Lesage's Cabinet included \$300,000 in the budget of the Ministry of

---

<sup>484</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10140 file 30-6-QUE pt 1, Tel 1557, *Gérin-Lajoie en Tunisie*, SSEA in New York to External, 22 September 1965.

<sup>485</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-01-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 5, *Entretien avec l'Ambassadeur de Tunisie*, André Patry, 14 octobre 1965.

<sup>486</sup> André Patry told Ambassador Slim that the government of Quebec was committed to obtaining for Quebec the right to negotiation and sign international accords in its own jurisdictions. *Ibid.*

Education for aid projects with the French-speaking states in Africa.<sup>487</sup> This decision, taken on the eve of Jean Lesage's attempt to renew negotiations regarding the educational assistance programme, can be seen as a warning to the federal government to accommodate the province's demands or risk having Quebec proceed with its own aid scheme in retaliation.

Following the collapse of the deal with Tunisia, the government of Quebec also organised a tour of four countries in French Africa for a group of engineers from Quebec. From 24 November to 11 December 1965, Marcel Robidas, the Chief of Commercial Missions in Quebec's Department of Industry and Commerce, and 10 engineers toured Tunisia, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Cameroon with brief stops in Nigeria and Kenya.<sup>488</sup> Ostensibly, Robidas and the engineers intended to "ascertain in what way the Quebec authorities might best assist the Canadian aid programme in Africa" and to investigate investment opportunities for Canadian businesses.<sup>489</sup> Federal officials, however, suspected that Quebec had an ulterior motive for this tour. Robidas never discussed the prospect of aid from Quebec with the officials that he met, but federal officials knew that he gained information and made contacts useful in the event that Quebec ever did offer

---

<sup>487</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 2, Letter, André Patry to René Maheu, Director General UNESCO, 15 avril 1966.

<sup>488</sup> For an itinerary of the tour, see NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 2, Mes E-2563, *Quebec Engineering Mission to Francophone Africa*, J. R. McKinney to Canadian Embassies in Paris, Rome, Yaoundé, Accra, Lagos and Bern, 17 November 1965.

<sup>489</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 2, Memo, *Aid to Francophone Africa*, Canadian Permanent Delegation, UNESCO to External Aid Office, 17 December 1965.



aid to Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Senegal or Cameroon.<sup>490</sup> Canada's officials, therefore, viewed Robidas' tour of French Africa in late 1965 with trepidation. The fact that the government of Quebec had not informed the External Aid Office of the tour's objective did not help ease the concerns of Canada's diplomats.<sup>491</sup>

If the government of Quebec had intended to use this tour of French Africa as part of its campaign for a greater role in the educational assistance programme, the results were disappointing. The threat implied by Robidas' tour of French Africa and the more overt threat contained in budgetary approval for Quebec's own programme of technical assistance inspired the federal government to resist even more strongly Quebec's aspirations in French Africa.<sup>492</sup> Throughout 1966, the federal government remained determined to maintain its overall responsibility for all of Canada's external assistance. In July 1966, faced with this determination, Claude Morin informed Quebec's new premier, Daniel Johnson, that the time had come to proceed with Quebec's own aid projects in

---

<sup>490</sup> See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 2, Tel 2508, *Mission d'ingénieurs Québécois en Afrique*, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 20 December 1965 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 3, Letter 40, *Quebec Engineering Mission to Francophone Africa*, Canadian Embassy, Yaoundé to External, 8 February 1966.

<sup>491</sup> This observation was made by Georges Thériault of the Quebec City engineering consultant firm of Gauthier, Poulin, Thériault et Ass. who nonetheless assured Graham McInnes of Canada's delegation to UNESCO in Paris that he and his colleagues intended to visit Ottawa early in 1966 to co-ordinate their findings with the Department of External Affairs and the External Aid Office. *Op Cit.*, Memo, Canadian Permanent Delegation to UNESCO to EAO, 17 December 1965.

<sup>492</sup> For the federal government, one of the most contentious parts of Quebec's draft proposal regarding educational assistance in the spring of 1966 was its attempt to secure tacit federal recognition of Quebec's right to institute its own aid programme and to enter into direct relationships with foreign governments on matters of aid. The federal government refused to accept this aspect of the proposal. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 3, Memo, *Co-operative Arrangements with Quebec and the Other Provinces – External Aid*, USSEA to SSEA, 10 May 1966.

Africa because the province's threats had not moved the federal government.<sup>493</sup> Not all of Quebec's officials agreed with this view of events. Jean Chapdelaine, Quebec's Delegate in Paris, believed that Quebec could not afford the expense of its own aid programme for French Africa.<sup>494</sup> Such notes of caution, however, did not resonate with the new premier or Morin and Patry who continued to exercise enormous influence over Quebec's nascent international policies.

Consequently, the government of Quebec renewed its efforts to negotiate its own project of technical assistance with a foreign government in the late summer and early fall of 1966. Again, the government targeted Tunisia as the most likely partner for its initiative and in August Patry offered Ambassador Slim \$150,000 in aid for a project of the Tunisian government's choice.<sup>495</sup> As the representative of a country in desperate need of external assistance, the offer naturally appealed to Taieb Slim. According to Patry, Slim even agreed on behalf of his government to conclude a verbal accord with Quebec

---

<sup>493</sup> ANQ, E42, 2A 014-01-06-001A-01, 1988-08-001 Art. 16, file 4.5.3, Memo, *Bureau de l'Aide extérieure*, Claude Morin to Premier of Quebec, 8 juillet 1966.

<sup>494</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 6, Letter, *Aide technique aux pays sous-développés*, Jean Chapdelaine, Quebec Delegate General in Paris to Minister of Education, 28 mars 1966.

<sup>495</sup> Patry's memo outlining this meeting provides a useful summary of his perspective on Quebec's demands vis-à-vis the federal government. After complaining about the systematic obstruction of Quebec's tentative efforts to reach out to French Africa in matters dealing with education, he wrote that "*Quand les autorités fédérales découvriront l'opération, elles comprendront subitement que nous sommes déterminés à faire respecter la constitution et elles devront alors nous offrir un projet d'entente au lieu de se borner à refuser chaque année les termes – biens inoffensifs – de l'accord que nous leur proposons, à savoir: 1) le droit de recruter nous-mêmes tous les enseignants qui partent pour l'étranger avec des crédits du Bureau de l'Aide Extérieure; 2) le droit de pouvoir communiqué directement avec les États étrangers où sont nos enseignants, afin d'obtenir d'eux les renseignements dont nous avons besoin concernant le travail et la compétence de nos propres professeurs, en vue de leur avancement professionnel.*" ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-001A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 4, file 6, *La coopération technique avec l'Afrique*, André Patry, undated.

to govern this project. For Quebec, this meant that the accord could be kept secret, and free from federal obstruction, until Quebec presented the federal government with a fait accompli. Patry anticipated that this deal would clearly demonstrate Quebec's commitment to pursuing educational and technical projects with the French-speaking states of Africa. He also felt it would punish the federal government for its reluctance to acknowledge Quebec's rights in this area.

Unfortunately for the government of Quebec, it is very difficult to keep secrets of this magnitude and it is here that the federal government's wisdom in focusing its attention upon Tunisia rather than Morocco in 1965 and 1966 paid dividends.<sup>496</sup> In early September 1966 René Garneau, Canada's Ambassador to Switzerland and Tunisia, met with M. Mestiri, the Secretary-General of Tunisia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who informed him of Quebec's offer of \$150,000 in aid. Mestiri explained that his government wished to clear the matter with Canada's government but that if it agreed, the Tunisian government would direct the aid to public health.<sup>497</sup> This information caught federal officials by surprise and A.J. Pick, who was scheduled to become Canada's first resident Ambassador in Tunis later that month, called Ambassador Slim to confirm the story, but Slim denied all knowledge of Quebec's offer. The next morning, Slim phoned Pick and reiterated that the Tunisian government would not negotiate an agreement with

---

<sup>496</sup> See Chapter 5 above.

<sup>497</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10058 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 1, Tel 317, *Quebec Offer to Tunisia*, Roberts, Canadian Embassy Bern to External, 8 September 1966.

Quebec without obtaining the federal government's approval.<sup>498</sup> Federal officials were not convinced by Slim's disavowals.

At first, federal officials recognised the possibility that André Patry had made the offer without authorisation from the government of Quebec, "one of those independent initiatives by Quebec officials." Had the government of Quebec approved the offer Claude Morin should have communicated its intent to the federal government.<sup>499</sup> Subsequent events, however, undermined this thesis. On 19 September, Garneau reported from Bern that two officials from Quebec had recently visited Tunis. M. Massé, a senior official with Quebec's Ministry of Education, and M. Beaulieu, Premier Johnson's Chief of Staff, requested an invitation to Tunis while on vacation on the Côte d'Azur. The Tunisian government had agreed to a strictly unofficial visit, but at a dinner for the two Quebec officials Massé

*avait déclaré que l'aide canadienne aux pays de langue française le privait de plusieurs de ses enseignants puisque tout le personnel de langue français à l'emploi du [Bureau d'Aide Extérieure] dans ces pays venait naturellement de Québec. Massé avait ajouté que Québec désirait avoir un contrôle direct sur les enseignants affectés aux projets d'aide extérieure.*<sup>500</sup>

<sup>498</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 4, Memo, *Quebec Offer to Tunisia*, A.J. Pick to M. Wershof, 13 September 1966 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 4, *Quebec Offer to Tunisia*, A. J. Pick to M. Wershof, 14 September 1966.

<sup>499</sup> This had been the substance of an agreement between Canada and Quebec in March 1966. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10141 file 30-12-QUE pt 4, *Quebec Offer of Aid to Tunisia*, Memo, H. B. Robinson to SSEA, 16 September 1966.

<sup>500</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10058 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 1, Tel 327, Canadian Ambassador, Bern to External, 19 September 1966.

This visit, therefore, was part of a campaign by the government of Quebec to solicit Tunisia's help achieve Quebec's right to an international identity in such fields as education and health.

The Tunisian government, however, viewed Quebec's approaches with caution. It wanted to accept Quebec's aid but did not want to antagonise Canada's federal government in the process. Thus, throughout September 1966, Tunisian officials repeatedly assured the Canadian government that Tunisia would only deal with Quebec with the federal government's approval.<sup>501</sup> Habib Bourguiba Jr., Tunisia's Foreign Minister, expressly told Alfred Pick upon his arrival in Tunis in late September 1966 that Tunisia would only have formal dealings with the federal government. Pick had not raised the matter of Quebec's offer of aid explicitly with Bourguiba Jr., but had only commented that Canada "attached a great deal of importance to our programme of technical co-operation in Tunisia and I expected it would develop further."<sup>502</sup> Nevertheless, the Tunisian government proved anxious to mollify Canada with regards to Quebec.

Several factors likely conditioned the Tunisian government's reaction in this situation. Firstly, international protocol dictated that all foreign governments interested in establishing contacts with Canada's provinces do so through the federal government.

---

<sup>501</sup> Following Massé's comments at the dinner for him and Beaulieu in Tunis, M. Mestiri responded by reaffirming "*la position tunisienne et déclarer que toute forme d'aide canadienne doit recevoir au préalable l'approbation d'Ottawa et pouvoir s'inscrire dans le cadre de l'entente canado-tunisienne en matière d'aide extérieure avant d'être acceptée par la Tunisie.*" Ibid.

Secondly, Canada's officials had established enough beneficial contacts with their Tunisian counterparts over the decade since Tunisia's independence, largely through the Embassy in Bern and the United Nations in New York, to counter the influence of André Patry and other representatives of Quebec. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is very likely that the Tunisian government recognised that its relations with Canada would suffer if it defied the federal government and dealt directly with Quebec. Canada had just established an embassy in Tunis and Canadian aid to Tunisia was expanding rapidly. Simply put, the government of Quebec could not match Canadian aid and the Tunisian government would have been hard-pressed to forego the one for the other. Had the Tunisian authorities shown any disposition to bypass Ottawa in their relations with Quebec, the federal government was in fact prepared either to deduct Quebec's contributions from federal aid to Tunisia or to end it completely.<sup>503</sup> Federal officials never explicitly stated this position to the Tunisian government, but Tunisia's readiness to abide by Ottawa's wishes indicated that the Tunisian authorities understood very well the choice they faced. Tunisia could not receive aid from both Canada and Quebec, so it chose Canada.<sup>504</sup>

---

<sup>502</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10058 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 1, Letter, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to M. Wershof, 27 September 1966.

<sup>503</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10058 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 1, Tel 3932, *Quebec Offer to Tunisia*, USSEA in London to M. Wershof, 9 September 1966.

<sup>504</sup> Ironically, the government of Quebec was also prepared to demand that recipients of aid from Quebec refuse aid from Canada in fields of provincial jurisdiction. See ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 3, Document de travail, *Quelques aspects d'une politique de coopération du Québec avec les pays en voie de développement*, Gaston Cholette, Directeur général de la coopération internationale, Ministère de l'Éducation, Québec, 7 septembre 1966.

Thus, the Tunisian government agreed that it would not accept aid from Quebec until the two Canadian governments negotiated how the project fell under the umbrella of Canada's relations with the North African country. Unfortunately, this agreement never occurred and domestic politics within Canada prevented Tunisia from receiving the funds that it had hoped to use to build and staff a medical training centre. Ahmed Ounais, the head of the Cultural and Technical Co-operation Division of Tunisia's Foreign Ministry, did ask about aid from Quebec in December of 1966, but for the most part it appears that the Tunisian government accepted that it would not receive aid from Quebec in the near future.<sup>505</sup> Quebec officials like André Patry, Claude Morin and Gaston Cholette blamed the federal government for the pressure it had exerted upon Tunisia. From their perspective, the federal government had intervened twice to scuttle Quebec's attempts to reach tentative agreements with the North African country, once in the fall of 1965 and again in the fall of 1966. These individuals did not abandon their international aspirations for Quebec, but realised that that they faced a difficult task in meeting their goals. The federal government had proven itself very capable of countering Quebec's initiatives in French Africa, and Patry and his colleagues knew that they had to proceed cautiously lest

---

<sup>505</sup> A. J. Pick concluded that Ounais, who was very friendly with André Patry, had raised this issue on his own rather than on behalf of the Tunisian government. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8792 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 2, Letter 163, *Quebec Offer of Aid to Tunisia*, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to USSEA, 21 December 1966.

they subject Quebec to further humiliation at the hands of federal officials.<sup>506</sup>

From the end of 1966, the government of Quebec continued to contemplate ways to initiate its own aid programme with the French-speaking states of French Africa. During 1967, for example, it considered extending aid to the Congo, Rwanda and Senegal.<sup>507</sup> The federal government remained similarly vigilant to prevent the provincial government from entering into direct agreements with foreign governments.<sup>508</sup> Thus, the failure to negotiate a satisfactory agreement between the federal government and the government of Quebec regarding Quebec's participation in the federal educational assistance programme for French Africa initiated a cycle of increasing tension and bitterness between the two governments. What Quebec perceived as federal intransigence regarding Quebec's powers over provincial affairs provoked escalating attempts to

---

<sup>506</sup> Gaston Cholette, for example, wrote that "*On sait avec qu'elle efficacité Ottawa peut faire échouer toute tentative officielle du Québec auprès des gouvernements étrangers. ... À mon avis, il faut présentement éviter tout ce qui hérisse instinctivement Ottawa afin de ne pas exposer le Québec à de nouvelles humiliations et là l'échec dans ses initiatives auprès es pays en voie de développement.*" ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5 A, Memo, Gaston Cholette to Claude Morin, 12 décembre 1966.

<sup>507</sup> See ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5 A, Letter, *Projet d'échanges entre le Québec et le Congo Kinshasa*, Julien Aubert, Ministère de l'Éducation du Québec to Claude Morin, 3 avril 1967 and ANQ P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-005B-01, 1995-01-008 Art 3, file 5, *Déclaration Commune du Président du Rwanda et du Premier Ministre du Québec*, 11 août 1967.

<sup>508</sup> In December of 1966, for example, Paul Martin circulated a note to all diplomatic missions in Canada reiterating that the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations held that all activity by a foreign government with their host country must be conducted through the Foreign Ministry, or in Canada's case the Department of External Affairs. Marcel Cadieux sent this note to Claude Morin. ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 3, Letter, Marcel Cadieux to Claude Morin, 8 décembre 1966.



establish its own international identity in defiance of the federal government.<sup>509</sup> Quebec's efforts, on the other hand, appeared to federal officials like an assault upon federal authority and even upon Canada's national unity, particularly in that it emanated from a province already gripped, to some degree, by separatist ideologies. The inability of the governments of Canada and Quebec to reconcile their differences thus prompted Quebec to make ever more bold attempts to secure powerful international allies that would not be so easily intimidated by the Canadian government.

It must be noted, however, that despite their differences the governments of Canada and Quebec co-operated on the educational assistance programme for the French-speaking countries of Africa throughout the 1960s. Officials from Quebec had participated in designing the programme along with federal officials since 1961 and by the mid-1960s officials from the federal and provincial governments conducted joint briefing sessions to prepare the teachers for their assignments in Africa. Nevertheless, Quebec's largest contribution to the aid programme came through its control of the recruitment and selection of teachers for secondment to the External Aid Office. By 1967, 239 French-speaking teachers from Quebec worked in Africa under the auspice's

---

<sup>509</sup> In October 1966 Claude Morin told a federal official that Quebec's recent offer of \$150,000 in aid to Tunisia, and the decision not to inform the federal government of it, stemmed directly from "what the Quebec government considers as a failure on our part to respond to the proposal made by Mr. Lesage in letters ... concerning possible arrangements with the provinces in the field of external aid. ... The Quebec authorities have therefore reached the conclusion that if they could not participate in [federal] external aid they would at least attempt to have an aid programme of their own." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8792 file 20-1-2-TUN pt 2, Memo, *Quebec Offer of Aid to Tunisia*, USSEA to SSEA, 13 October 1966.

of federal external aid for French Africa.<sup>510</sup> Quebec's Department of Education held sole responsibility for finding the candidates and evaluating their suitability for service overseas. These teachers were the principal means by which Canada hoped to introduce itself to the countries and people of French Africa and both the governments of Canada and Quebec had an interest in ensuring that the teachers reflected well upon the donor governments.

Quebec, through its control of the recruitment process, thus bore a heavy responsibility for the success of the entire Canadian operation. The government of Quebec never did play the high profile role that Paul Gérin-Lajoie, André Patry and others had wanted it to, but this does not negate Quebec's importance in making Canada's aid programme for French Africa a success. Even during the acrimonious period during and after the failed negotiations between 1964 and 1966 Quebec continued to recruit teachers for the federal government. At times, some of Quebec's officials considered revoking the province's assistance in this endeavour, and the province did in fact stop participating in federal briefing sessions for the teachers in August 1966 to protest the federal government's failure to recognise Quebec's demands.<sup>511</sup> Nevertheless, political conflict between the two levels of government did not affect the operation of the educational assistance programme that had been in existence since 1961 because co-

---

<sup>510</sup> ANQ, E42, 2A 014-01-06-001A-01, 1988-08-001 Art. 16, file 4.5.3, *Coopération entre le Québec et les pays en voie de développement*, Charles Bilodeau, undated.

<sup>511</sup> ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-011-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5.1.B, Note, Gaston Cholette to Claude Morin, 20 septembre 1966 and ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5.1B, Letter, Arthur Tremblay, Ministère de l'Éducation du Québec to P. M. Towe, EAO, 25 août 1966.

operation served the interests of both governments better than conflict.

The province already had the mechanisms in place to find the teachers and the expertise in evaluating their qualifications that the federal government did not. For the federal government, relying on Quebec's Department of Education greatly simplified the task of finding suitable candidates for service in French Africa. It also demonstrated federal willingness to work with the province in the provision of external aid. Co-operation similarly benefited Quebec given that the province's officials knew that they could not prevent teachers from accepting a federal offer of employment. Federal control of the recruitment process, however, could have undermined the government of Quebec's ability to minimise the impact of removing dozens, and then hundreds of teachers from Quebec's own expanding educational system.<sup>512</sup> Furthermore, Quebec's officials also believed that sending teachers from Quebec to work in French-speaking countries abroad would have an important effect on French-Canadian nationalism, an intangible benefit by which the government of Quebec expected to profit at the expense of the federal government.<sup>513</sup> Both the federal government and the government of Quebec, therefore, had sufficient interests at stake to ensure that their political competition over responsibility for Canada's educational assistance programme for French Africa did not affect its year to year and day to day operation.

---

<sup>512</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5, file 5, Letter, André Patry to Jean Lesage, 25 décembre 1965.

<sup>513</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 5, Memo, *La politique du Québec dans le domaine de la coopération technique*, André Patry, 6 septembre 1965.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: CANADA AND THE ORIGINS OF

### LA FRANCOPHONIE

Late in 1965, Presidents Bourguiba of Tunisia and Senghor of Senegal began promoting the idea of a commonwealth of the African countries with a shared French linguistic and cultural heritage.<sup>514</sup> This initiative founded a movement that ultimately resulted in the creation of *la francophonie*, though no one yet envisioned an association of all of the world's French-speaking states at that time.<sup>515</sup> Instead, Bourguiba and Senghor wanted to create a formal institution like the British Commonwealth to help French Africa preserve its common language, promote the vitality of its culture, and cooperate on a wide variety of political, economic and social matters, though their ideas had not yet been fully formed.<sup>516</sup> Still, the idea of a francophone community attracted enough interest from other governments that the proposal gradually expanded beyond its originally anticipated dimensions.<sup>517</sup> From Paris, Jules Léger warned Ottawa that the Canadian government would, consequently, likely be drawn into the plans for an expanded *francophonie*.

---

<sup>514</sup> Robert Aldrich, *Greater France*, 323.

<sup>515</sup> Jules Léger believed, in fact, that Bourguiba's proposal reflected an attempt to heal the rift that the Bizerte crisis of 1961 had caused in Franco-Tunisian relations rather than a sincere desire to create a French African community. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Letter 2149, *Un Commonwealth à la Française*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 16 décembre 1965.

<sup>516</sup> NAC, MG 32 A3, Vol. 1.12, Letter, Jules Léger to M. Cadieux, 18 janvier 1966.

<sup>517</sup> Even French Ministers Edgar Fauré and Michel Dèbre mused about the desirability of a Francophone community, despite their government's overall reluctance to discuss this matter publicly. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Letter 56, *Un Commonwealth francophone*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 14 janvier 1966.

The idea of an international association of French-speaking states did not appeal to all French-speaking statesmen or governments, however. President Houphet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, for example, doubted the need for another international organisation, even a French-speaking one.<sup>518</sup> Nor were Morocco, Algeria, or Guinée anxious to re-establish closer ties with France when they had already suffered so much to sever them. Similarly, the French were reluctant to endorse this association for fear that they would be accused of harbouring neo-imperialist ambitions towards French Africa and de Gaulle himself doubted the viability of the project.<sup>519</sup> Nevertheless, many individuals believed that Canada could play a constructive role in bringing the community to life. Mustapha Tlili, a reporter with *Jeune Afrique*, for example, wanted the Canadian government to convene a conference to discuss the evolution of the francophone commonwealth.<sup>520</sup> This idea appealed to Jules Léger, who believed that Expo 67 in Montreal would be the ideal opportunity to hold such a meeting.

Canadian officials in Ottawa, however, remained divided about the desirability for Canada of participating in a francophone community. Thomas Carter of the African and Middle Eastern Division favoured Canada's membership in a cultural and educational organisation because this would allow the federal government to "manifest its interest in

---

<sup>518</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter, J. Léger to M. Cadieux, 16 décembre 1965.

<sup>519</sup> For an analysis of the French attitude, see ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011 03-02-005B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 3, file 5, Letter, *Francophonie*, Jean Chapdelaine, Quebec Délégué Général, Paris to Claude Morin, 11 juillet 1966 and *op cit.*, Letter, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 14 janvier 1966.

<sup>520</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter, J. Léger to M. Cadieux, 18 janvier 1966.

*la francophonie* and develop closer links with French-speaking Africa.”<sup>521</sup> But he also realised that the community would raise difficult issues related to Quebec, since “the advocates of a more independent attitude for Quebec would consider [the francophone community] as a natural forum in which to promote their cause.”<sup>522</sup> In all, he believed that Canada might find *la francophonie* more palatable if it included exclusively federal jurisdictions like economic assistance, but was not yet convinced that the benefits of a francophone commonwealth justified Canada’s active interest or participation.

The Canadian government expected a francophone community to help consolidate Western influence in numerous under-developed countries; to advance democratic practices in places like Africa; and to bolster Canada’s influence with the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations. It also believed that joining the community it would enable it to become “a useful bridge” between the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the French-speaking states. Domestically, it would also reinforce the government’s commitment to a bilingual and bicultural foreign policy and help “counter the separatist tendencies [in Quebec] and consolidate the country’s unity.”<sup>523</sup> Federal action in this sphere would also help deny the government of Quebec the opportunity to fill a void left by the central government.

Yet the government also recognised that the francophone community might create

---

<sup>521</sup> Carter observed that the “domestic advantages of this are too obvious to note.” NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Memo, *Possible Canadian Initiative Regarding a French Commonwealth*, T. Carter to J. George, European Division, 28 January 1966.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid.

difficulties for countries like Canada, Belgium and Switzerland with vocal and increasingly disgruntled French-speaking minorities. Algeria, Morocco, and the Indochinese states, on the other hand, considered the French language a painful reminder of colonial subjugation and had no desire to promote its use. The Canadian government also worried that the French African states would try to use Canada as a counterweight to offset France's influence while the francophone community simultaneously encouraged Quebec's own international ambitions.<sup>524</sup> Given the difficulties that might be aroused by *la francophonie*, the European Division concluded that Canada might prefer to develop its relations with French-speaking countries, especially those in Africa, on a bilateral basis alone.

For the government, however, one basic consideration fuelled Canada's policy towards *la francophonie*. As explained by Marcel Cadieux,

unless the federal government is able to be forthcoming in this matter encouragement will be given to those in Quebec who agitate for a separate international role. [The federal government] can not let the feeling develop that federal policies do not take sufficient account of the aspirations and requirements of French Canada in the international sphere.<sup>525</sup>

The growing rivalry between the governments of Canada and Quebec over foreign affairs determined that Canada's position on *la francophonie* was "one of sympathetic and active

---

<sup>523</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Report, *A French Commonwealth or a Francophone Community*, European Division, 14 July 1966.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid.

<sup>525</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Tel 3935, USSEA [in London] to External, 11 September 1966.

interest.”<sup>526</sup> Moreover, this factor made it desirable for the Canadian government to take a leading role in bringing *la francophonie* to fruition, thus reassuring French Canadians of its interest while allowing it to try to shape the organisation to meet federal interests and needs.

In order to ensure that it remained Canada’s principal agent for *la francophonie*, the Canadian government wanted to ensure either that the community was just an umbrella organisation for private associations or that it included a formal structure and federal responsibilities like economic aid. A country like Belgium might have endorsed a looser structure for *la francophonie*, since it would not entail a large governmental commitment and it could thus avoid the appearance of favouring the Walloons in Belgium, but the Canadian government wanted a more formal institution.<sup>527</sup> Yet other governments did not share Canada’s perspective. Quebec’s government, for example, also concluded that a more formal, political organisation would benefit the federal government at the expense of Quebec’s own aspirations whereas “*dans une association lâche, des plus flexible, ..., nous [le Québec] avons un jeu à mener.*”<sup>528</sup> Quebec, however, needed a sponsor to advance the province’s interests, since it did not yet have the means

---

<sup>526</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Memo, *Visit of President Senghor, September 19-21 – La Francophonie*, USSEA to SSEA, 13 September 1966.

<sup>527</sup> The Canadian position was discussed at a Department of External Affairs chaired by Thomas Carter in July 1966. See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Memo, *Senghor and Bourguiba Proposal for a French-speaking Commonwealth*, African and Middle Eastern Division, 28 July 1966. For the Belgian attitude, see NAC, RG25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 1, Tel 612, *Francophonie*, Canadian Embassy, Brussels to External, 25 August 1966.

<sup>528</sup> This observation was made by Jean Chapdelaine, Quebec’s Agent General in Paris. ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011 03-02-005B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 3 file 5, Letter, *Francophonie*, Jean Chapdelaine, Paris to Claude Morin, 11 juillet 1966.



to plead its own case internationally. This ally had to be strong enough to resist Canada's influence and influential enough to compensate for the fact that Ottawa had vastly greater resources at its disposal for relations with French Africa than Quebec.

For Quebec, France obviously fulfilled this role. The past several years had proven that the French were willing to encourage Quebec's aspirations in the international sphere and to accept, consequently, strained relations with Canada.<sup>529</sup> France's withdrawal from NATO in mid-1966 merely reinforced the tension that already existed between France and its erstwhile allies and also indicated that relations between France and Canada were not likely to improve quickly. Quebec's government thus believed that "*c'est en fait au départ de Paris, ..., que nous pouvons nous attendre à pénétrer le mieux le monde francophone.*"<sup>530</sup> From their perspective, the French also wanted *la francophonie* to adopt a very loose and decidedly non-political structure since this would help defuse African suspicions of France's motives,<sup>531</sup> and because France already maintained intimate political relations with most of their former African territories. The French foresaw no benefits to France from allowing other countries to

---

<sup>529</sup> See, for example, Boshier, The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997 and Alain Peyrefitte, De Gaulle et le Québec (Montreal: Stanké, 2000).

<sup>530</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter, Jean Chapdelaine to Claude Morin, 11 juillet 1966.

<sup>531</sup> The President of Guinée, for example, opposed the creation of a francophone community because "*elle cachait, à son avis, un retour de l'impérialisme français en Afrique.*" As quoted in *ibid.*

intrude into these relations on a multilateral basis.<sup>532</sup> They wanted *la francophonie* to operate in the fields of linguistic, cultural and social development, and thus expected Quebec to play a significant role in the organisation because of its jurisdiction over these fields within Canada.

In July 1966, Canadian diplomat Jean Coté discussed Canada's interest in *la francophonie* with President Senghor in Senegal. They discussed in particular the Canadian government's position that only it had the right to represent Canadians in international organisations. Subsequently, Senghor informed Coté through his aide that he respected Canada's constitutional problems and that "neither General de Gaulle nor himself" wished to encourage separatism in Canada.<sup>533</sup> Since he had not spoken of either the French President or separatism in Quebec with Senghor, Coté concluded that de Gaulle and Senghor had discussed Canada, Quebec and *la francophonie* in Paris on the 20<sup>th</sup> of July. Senghor's message thus failed to reassure the Canadian government. De Gaulle obviously discussed the brewing Canada-Quebec dispute with other French-speaking leaders and, according to Quebec's interpretation of Canada's constitution, the province did not need to separate from Canada in order to pursue its international identity in provincial spheres of jurisdiction.

---

<sup>532</sup> Regarding the possibility of multilateral co-operation on technical assistance, for example, M. Jurgensen of the Quai d'Orsay told Jules Léger that "*c'est là un terrain de chasse gardé, ..., et nous sommes portés à croire que la France préfère maintenir ses contacts d'aide et d'assistance sur une base bilatérale.*" NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Tel 1852, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 31 August 1966.

<sup>533</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10057 file 20-1-2-SEN pt 1, Letter, *President Senghor's Visit*, Jean Coté, Dakar to Thomas Carter, 3 August 1966.

By the late summer of 1966, the Canadian government realised that France would likely support Quebec in the province's attempt to secure a role in *la francophonie*. It could not, therefore, afford to let the French African governments remain unaware of the constitutional implications for Canada of Quebec's desire to participate in the French-speaking international community. Allan Gotlieb, Legal Counsellor for the Department of External Affairs, concluded that only the Canadian government could belong to an association of French-speaking states and that allowing Quebec, or any other province to join states would acknowledge that Canada's provinces had their own international identities. He also concluded that membership for Quebec in an international organisation would "constitute 'recognition' by the members of that organisation that Quebec is a 'state' in the international sense."<sup>534</sup> Gotlieb argued that Canada could not allow Quebec independent membership in international organisations without fracturing Canada's international identity and threatening the unity of the country as a whole.

The visit of President Senghor to Ottawa and Quebec City in September 1966 demonstrated for the federal government the importance of pressing upon French African leaders its position regarding *la francophonie*. In Ottawa, Senghor described for Pearson and Martin his conception of the francophone community, which he expected would encompass three progressively broader groups of members starting with France and the French African states and ending with all of the French-speaking countries in the world

---

<sup>534</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Memo, *Constitutional Implications of Quebec's Participation in the Proposed French Community*, A. E. Gotlieb to European Division, 27 September 1966.

including Canada, Belgium and Switzerland. While France and its former colonies would regularly hold discussions on a range of political and economic issues, he anticipated that Canada would only be included in a very loose institution for such cultural and educational organisations as the AUPELF and associations for French-speaking lawyers and doctors.<sup>535</sup> Disappointed with the restricted role that Senghor foresaw for Canada in *la francophonie*, Pearson and Martin nevertheless appreciated Senghor reiterating that he did not want *la francophonie* to cause difficulties for Canada or to encourage Quebec towards independence. In Quebec City, however, he was sufficiently impressed with Premier Johnson's argument about Quebec's constitutional responsibility for education and culture to agree to send a representative to the meeting that Quebec proposed to convene for francophone countries to discuss the teaching of the French language.<sup>536</sup>

Federal officials concluded that Senghor had tried to avoid becoming entangled in Canada's constitutional questions but that "the delicate issues of Canadian federal-provincial relations had somewhat caught the Senegalese unaware."<sup>537</sup> The President had maintained that independence was not a solution for French Canadians but he had been willing to accept Johnson's argument about Quebec's constitutional powers. Federal officials had also failed to convince him that French-speaking communities existed

---

<sup>535</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Memo, *La Francophonie – President Senghor's Visit*, USSEA to SSEA, 27 September 1966 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Tel 1988, *Communauté francophone*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 19 September 1966.

<sup>536</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, USSEA to SSEA, 27 September 1966.

<sup>537</sup> This was the assessment of Jean Coté who had travelled with the President throughout his stay in Canada. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Memo to File, *Senghor Visit – Departmental Meeting to Review Visit*, Thomas Carter, African and Middle Eastern Division, 3 October 1966.

throughout Canada and not just in Quebec. More troubling still, Senghor had indicated that Senegal would like to pursue relations with Quebec governed by the same type of accord that permitted Quebec to pursue direct relations with France.<sup>538</sup> Senghor's willingness to consider Quebec's aspirations reinforced the task the Canadian government faced in persuading French African leaders that it alone could represent French Canadians in the francophone community.

Many countries remained leery about becoming involved in *la francophonie* in late 1966 and early 1967. Both the Swiss and the Belgian governments, for example, feared that an international organisation that catered to only one of their linguistic communities would provoke domestic tension and division.<sup>539</sup> Even some French African states remained hostile to the project, as indicated to Canadian officials by diplomats from Guinée and Algeria.<sup>540</sup> Yet other countries had warmed to the idea of a francophone community. France, most notably, announced in November 1966 that while it would not lead any initiatives vis-à-vis *la francophonie* it would respond favourably to all invitations it received from others.<sup>541</sup> This change in attitude represented a major boost to

---

<sup>538</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo to File, African and Middle Eastern Division, 3 October 1966.

<sup>539</sup> The Swiss in particular worried about *la francophonie* because their federal government had no responsibilities at all in the fields of education and culture, even internationally. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Memo, *La Suisse et la Francophonie*, J. G. H. Halstead to USSEA, 27 décembre 1966.

<sup>540</sup> Guinée's attitude was likely conditioned by its resentment of French influence in Africa while the Algerian position stemmed, according to Garneau, from a desire to protect Algeria's privileged place in France's relations with North Africa. The Algerian government considered *la francophonie* an attempt by Tunisia to increase the aid it received from France. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Note for File, *Francophonie*, 22 December 1966 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Tel 38, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Bern to External, 6 février 1967.

<sup>541</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 2, Tel 2470, *Position française sur la francophonie*, Canadian Embassy, Paris to External, 15 novembre 1966.

*la francophonie*'s promoters and renewed their optimism about the prospects of such projects as an association of French-speaking parliamentarians, a conference of ministers of education, and the *Institut international de droit des pays d'expression française*.

The Canadian government's biggest concern regarding these projects remained that invitations to participate in them were addressed to Ottawa rather than Quebec City. In early December 1966, Marcel Cadieux told the French Ambassador to Canada that the Canadian government would only support *la francophonie* if it was not used to intervene in Canada's domestic affairs and that the Canadian government would not tolerate attempts to put Quebec in Canada's place.<sup>542</sup> When the Ambassador asked how the Canadian government could be represented at meetings dealing with education, for example, Cadieux responded that it had been doing so for 20 years in UNESCO. He also stated that Canada's representation at international meetings remained a domestic matter for the Canadian government to determine without foreign interference.

Paul Martin believed that Canada's problems regarding *la francophonie* stemmed almost entirely from pressures exerted by nationalists in Quebec upon other French-speaking leaders and governments. From his perspective, the French and French African governments simply did not appreciate "the complexities of the Canadian constitutional situation," a situation that the Canadian government could correct by explaining to them the nature of Canada's constitution and the federal government's expectations regarding

---

<sup>542</sup> Cadieux told the Ambassador that "there was only one address in Canada for correspondence relating to Francophonie and that was Ottawa." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Memo, *Francophonie*, J. G. H. Halstead to A. E. Gotlieb, 10 December 1966.

contacts between foreign countries and Canada's provinces.<sup>543</sup> Others within the Canadian government, however, believed that the French were much more actively involved in encouraging Quebec's aspirations. Jules Léger, for instance, felt that de Gaulle had a "predominant, not to say unbalanced, interest in the French-Canadians of Quebec"<sup>544</sup> while Marcel Cadieux believed that France displayed a clear and constant will to intervene in Canada's internal affairs.<sup>545</sup> Nevertheless, all three individuals agreed that in order to prevent Quebec from gaining its own representation in *la francophonie*, Canada had to convince the other interested parties to respect the federal government's constitutional position as the representative of all of Canada's French-speaking people.

Léger advocated a three-pronged approach to *la francophonie* for Canada. Firstly, he acknowledged that since France was likely to support Quebec,<sup>546</sup> Canada needed to cultivate the French African states. Secondly, Léger believed that the Canadian government should try to make *la francophonie* more favourable to the federal authorities in Canada by including within it fields of federal rather than provincial responsibility such as a francophone Colombo Plan. Thirdly, Léger argued that the federal government

---

<sup>543</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10045 file 20-1-2-FR pt 5, Memo, *France-Canada and France-Quebec Relations*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 24 January 1967.

<sup>544</sup> Léger's observations about France-Canada relations were attached to the end of the above memo. Ibid.

<sup>545</sup> Cadieux made this comment regarding the French decision to receive Premier Johnson officially during Johnson's trip to Paris in the spring of 1967, a decision of which the Canadian government learned through the press rather than from the French themselves. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10140 file 30-6-QUE pt 1, Memo, *Visit to France by Premier Johnson*, USSEA to SSEA, 11 April 1967.

<sup>546</sup> Léger argued that until de Gaulle left the scene, it would do more harm than good for Franco-Canadian relations to condemn openly French interference in Canada's affairs. He believed that the Canadian government should defend itself from French attacks, but discretely and indirectly, by focusing mostly upon the other French-speaking states. *Op Cit.*, Memo, SSEA to Prime Minister, 24 January 1967.

needed to reach an agreement with Quebec to allow the province to participate in the French-speaking community since he believed that Quebec's participation in *la francophonie* only threatened Canada's interests if it took place in defiance of the Canadian government.<sup>547</sup> An agreement, however, would let Quebec join the organisation while respecting the federal government's overall responsibility for foreign affairs.

Given the difficult history of the Canada-Quebec dispute over foreign policy from 1964 to 1966, federal officials did not expect to reach an agreement with Quebec over *la francophonie* quickly or easily. The two governments discussed this subject informally in the summer of 1966, but never came close to formal negotiations.<sup>548</sup> In the meantime, Quebec's Justice Minister was invited to participate in the meeting of the *Institut international de Droit des Pays d'Expression française* in Lomé, Togo in January 1967.<sup>549</sup> A non-governmental international association, the IDEF was sponsored by Justice Ministers from 15 French-speaking countries who rarely contributed to the IDEF. Nonetheless, the Canadian government worried about allowing Quebec alone to represent French Canadians in an international organisation. Marcel Cadieux discussed Canada's concerns with a senior official in the French Foreign Ministry in mid-November, but with little success. Subsequently, Canadian diplomats in Paris approached the President of the

---

<sup>547</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Letter 171, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 7 février 1967.

<sup>548</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10057 file 20-1-2-SEN pt 1, Letter, Thomas Carter to Jean Coté, Dakar, 25 August 1966.

<sup>549</sup> The French Ambassador in Ottawa told Canadian officials that the *Secrétariat des Affaires africaines et malgaches* in the *Élysée*, the French President's Office, was responsible for handling the affairs of the IDEF and had inspired the invitation for Quebec. *Étude sur la Colloque de l'IDEF à Lomé*, 8.



IDEF, René Cassin, directly and asked him to invite Lucien Cardin, the federal Justice Minister, to Lomé as well. They explained that Canada was a French-speaking country and that *“non seulement la justice est un domaine qui relève au Canada autant de la compétence du gouvernement fédéral que des provinces, mais lorsqu’il s’agit de participation gouvernementale à des activités internationales dans quelque domaine que ce soit, c’est du gouvernement fédéral que la question relève en premier lieu.”*<sup>550</sup> Cassin welcomed the Canadian government’s interest in his institution, apologised for any embarrassment it may have caused by inviting Quebec alone, and promptly arranged for an invitation to be sent to Cardin.

Cardin, however, was unable to attend the conference. Instead, Paul Martin asked Pierre Trudeau, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, to make the trip to Africa.<sup>551</sup> Martin believed that Trudeau was well suited to the task of emphasising Canada’s interest in the IDEF and clearing up the confusion surrounding the division of powers between the Canadian and Quebec governments that obviously existed among some French and French African leaders.<sup>552</sup> Trudeau and the two official delegates of the Canadian section of the IDEF, Albert Bohémier and Jacques Boucher, left for Togo on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January 1967. Bohémier and Boucher participated in all of the conference’s sessions and stressed the role of such meetings in fostering international co-operation

---

<sup>550</sup> As quoted in *ibid.*, 12.

<sup>551</sup> Quebec’s Justice Minister did not intend to send a representative to Lomé, though his Deputy observed that the Premier might designate one of the two IDEF delegates from Canada as the Minister’s official representative. *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>552</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

among French-speaking jurists in North America, Africa or elsewhere. They also raised the possibility of a future IDEF meeting in Canada. Trudeau participated in the IDEF sessions as well, but he also visited Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tunisia and France on behalf of Pearson and Martin at the end of the meeting. The purpose of these informal visits was to explain to the leaders, ministers and officials he met Canada's interest in *la francophonie* as well as its bilingual character and constitutional framework.<sup>553</sup>

Wherever he went in Africa, Trudeau encountered mistaken perceptions about Canada and Quebec. Senegal's President, for example, told Trudeau that he intended to invite a representative from Quebec to a meeting of francophone ministers of education, despite the fact that Senghor had been informed of the federal government's constitutional position during his recent visit to Canada. Reiterating that the federal government enjoyed full responsibility for all aspects of foreign affairs, Trudeau finally convinced Senghor to address the invitation to the Canadian government instead.<sup>554</sup> Similarly, he had to persuade President Bourguiba of Tunisia that the French language and culture thrived throughout Canada and not just in Quebec.<sup>555</sup> In Cameroon, however, Trudeau argued that Canada's participation in *la francophonie* had to be organised at the

---

<sup>553</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Memo, *Report on a trip to certain French-speaking African states*, Pierre Trudeau to Prime Minister, 15 February 1967.

<sup>554</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Tel 39, *Trudeau Visit*, Canadian Ambassador, Dakar to External, 8 February 1967.

<sup>555</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Letter 69, *Visit of Parliamentary Secretary of the Prime Minister*, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to USSEA, 10 February 1967.

federal level in order to preserve Canada's unity against an increase in tribalism.<sup>556</sup> This argument resonated with many French African leaders faced with the task of integrating different ethnic, linguistic and religious communities into one national entity.

Trudeau had not wanted to 'export' Canada's constitutional difficulties to the countries he visited, but he had tried to inform French African leaders about Canada's interest in *la francophonie*, its bilingualism, the breadth of the francophone community across Canada, and the federal government's responsibility for foreign affairs. He doubted that he had eradicated all of the confusion about Canada and Quebec in French Africa,<sup>557</sup> but he considered his trip a successful step towards securing Canada's rights in the evolving French-speaking community. He nevertheless concluded that Canada had to devote more attention and resources to its relations with the French African countries or risk letting Quebec fill the void.<sup>558</sup> Interestingly, Trudeau reached another conclusion during his time in French Africa. As a member of the federal Cabinet's Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations, he had worried about permitting the provinces to control their own foreign affairs or to set up their own aid programmes. In French Africa, however, he met with many Canadians aid workers whose experiences convinced him

---

<sup>556</sup> According to Trudeau, this argument also struck a chord with France's Ambassadors in the French African countries, who understood that the best way to 'scuttle' plans for a francophone community in Africa was to give African leaders cause to fear that the institution might be used, in some quarters, to sow the seeds of national disunity. *Op Cit.*, Memo, Trudeau to Prime Minister, 15 February 1967.

<sup>557</sup> Neither Trudeau nor Ambassador Pick in Tunis were convinced, for example, that President Bourguiba of Tunisia fully appreciated the significance of Trudeau's remarks about French Canadians in Canada and the respective powers of the federal and provincial governments. *Op Cit.*, Letter 69, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to USSEA, 10 February 1967.

that provincial aid programmes did not threaten federal interests. Trudeau concluded that provincial aid in Africa could only be implemented with the help of Canada's missions in the field and would be "so marginal, and so dependent on federal co-operation, as to present very little danger to Canadian unity." Trudeau was so struck by the strength of feeling towards the Canadian government among the Canadians in French Africa, in fact, that he remarked "I would guess that not one man in a hundred would remain separatist after a year with our External Aid programme."<sup>559</sup>

In March 1967, Paul Martin gave a speech before Montreal's Junior Chamber of Commerce in which he outlined the Canadian government's desire to lead an initiative regarding *la francophonie*. After highlighting his government's efforts to express Canada's duality in its foreign policy and its expanded relations with French-speaking countries and French Africa in particular, Martin announced that the Canadian government wanted to sponsor a conference to create a privately organised *Association internationale de solidarité francophone*.<sup>560</sup> The idea was to invite representatives of French-speaking countries to Canada to discuss an umbrella organisation to co-ordinate non-governmental associations promoting the French language and culture. For Martin, this would demonstrate the federal government's interest in the francophone community and reassure French Canadians that it would not allow Quebec's claims about its

---

<sup>558</sup> Following Trudeau's report of his trip, Marcel Cadieux requested the assignment of five new foreign service officers to handle the work associated with *la francophonie*. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 3, Memo, *Francophonie – Establishment Requirements*, USSEA to Personnel Division, 24 February 1967.

<sup>559</sup> *Op Cit.*, Memo, Pierre Trudeau to Prime Minister, 15 February 1967.

responsibilities to pass unchallenged. It would also help the federal government fend off Quebec's interest in *la francophonie* since the focus on groups of private or non-governmental associations would help ensure that all governments including Quebec's would be kept at arm's length.

In the months following Martin's speech, Canada's diplomats discussed his proposal with numerous French-speaking leaders and officials. Most French-African countries proved generally receptive, if somewhat cautious, to the idea of a conference called by Canada. The Ivory Coast, for example, welcomed the Canadian initiative and its emphasis on non-governmental associations while the Foreign Ministers of Upper Volta and Togo expressed their personal support for the conference.<sup>561</sup> The Tunisian government, on the other hand, expressed concerns about the proposal because, according to Canada's Ambassador in Tunis, Tunisia's extremely limited private sector could not support the type of non-governmental organisations that Martin foresaw.<sup>562</sup> The French similarly doubted the feasibility of Martin's proposal. Ambassador Leduc told Canadian officials in March 1967 that, in his opinion, many French African governments were not ready for this type of initiative and expressed his government's surprise that Canada

---

<sup>560</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2-CDA pt 1, Speech, *Canada and la francophonie*, SSEA, Montreal, 11 March 1967.

<sup>561</sup> The governments of both of these countries had recently undergone dramatic changes. Togo was still recovering from a coup d'état in January and President Lamizana of Upper Volta had greatly reorganised his government in the weeks prior to Hart's visit. Both of these governments were preoccupied with more pressing internal political and economic problems than with international issues. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Tel 443, *Francophonie – Reactions in Ivory Coast and Upper Volta*, Canadian High Commissioner, Accra, 8 May 1967 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Tel 523, *Togo – Francophonie*, Canadian High Commissioner, Accra to External, 25 May 1967.

would proceed with this idea at that time.<sup>563</sup>

Undaunted, the Canadian government planned to discuss its plans for a francophone conference with the French African leaders who visited Canada for Expo 67. In the meantime, the government recognised that something had to be done to reconcile itself with Quebec over *la francophonie*. Léger still believed that the federal government had to allow Quebec to fulfil its ambitions while maintaining federal predominance in foreign affairs but Martin and Cadieux were not yet prepared to concede to Quebec the right to its own international identity.<sup>564</sup> Nor were they prepared to cede the federal government's claim that it alone could represent Canada's French-speaking people at the international level.<sup>565</sup> Martin and Cadieux took a dimmer view of Quebec's international aspirations than Léger. They were prepared to allow the provinces a role in Canada's foreign policy but remained determined to preserve federal authority over all aspects of

---

<sup>562</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Tel 30, *French Association for Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to External, 9 March 1967.

<sup>563</sup> James George, the Canadian Minister in Paris, thought there was more to the French reaction than was revealed by Leduc. Raymond Bousquet, a French politician, had just established a 'private' committee on *la francophonie* in Paris which, according to the Canadian Embassy, the French government expected to take part in leading the evolution of the francophone community. George therefore considered the French reaction to Martin's proposal as motivated, at least in part, by irritation that the Canadians had stolen the initiative from the French. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10045 file 20-1-2-FR pt 5, Letter, James George, Paris to J. G. H. Halstead, Ottawa, 22 March 1967.

<sup>564</sup> *Op Cit.*, Letter 171, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 7 février 1967.

<sup>565</sup> In early 1967, Jules Léger was asked to contribute an article on Canada-France relations for an issue of the *International Journal*, published by the Canadian Institute for International Affairs. Cadieux and Martin refused to allow the article to be published because they felt that "the article seems to envisage Canadian policy vis-à-vis French-speaking states as one which should be directed towards allowing Quebec to play an international role rather than building up the role of the Canadian government as the instrument for the expression of Canadian foreign policy in terms of the bicultural and bilingual character of the country." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10045 file 20-1-2-FR pt 5, Memo, *Article by Mr. Léger for the International Journal*, USSEA to SSEA, 30 March 1967.

that policy.<sup>566</sup> In April 1967, Lester Pearson told Premier Johnson that the federal government wanted to co-operate with Quebec regarding the French-speaking world, but only if Quebec respected the federal government's own rights.<sup>567</sup> Nevertheless, in May 1967 the Canadian government signed a cultural accord with Belgium. The accord, designed to compel Quebec to work with the federal government if it wished to develop cultural relations with Belgium,<sup>568</sup> was seen in Quebec as a clear threat to the province's interests since the federal government could use it as a model for agreements with other French-speaking countries, effectively preventing Quebec from establishing its own relations with them. That the federal government had concluded the accord without consulting Quebec added insult to injury.<sup>569</sup>

The federal government still believed that it could persuade other countries not to deal directly with Quebec. It wanted a negotiated agreement with Quebec, but not at any cost. Regardless, negotiations between Canada and Quebec about *la francophonie* were unlikely to succeed as long as the two governments maintained opposing views about their respective international rights and their ability to represent French Canadians

---

<sup>566</sup> Pierre Trudeau reiterated this determination to the Secretary of State in charge of co-operation in the Quai d'Orsay, for example. *Op Cit.*, Tel 413, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 13 février 1967.

<sup>567</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10045 file 20-1-2-FR pt 5, Memo to the Prime Minister, *France-Canada and France-Quebec Relations*, 14 April 1967.

<sup>568</sup> According to Marcel Cadieux, this accord "compels Quebec and the other provinces if they wish to develop a programme of cultural relations with Belgium to do this in consultation with and through the federal authorities." NAC, MG 32 A3, Vol. 14.7, Report, *Accord Culturel Canada-Belgique – 8 mai 1967*, L'Équipe chargée du projet sur la francophonie, 1974, 63.

abroad. Both governments lacked the incentive to make the concessions necessary to reach an agreement. The federal government did not want to set a precedent that undermined its powers in the international sphere. It also worried about provoking greater demands from Quebec if it did compromise. Quebec, on the other hand, drew strength from the support that it received from other governments. At the AUPELF meeting in Montreal in early May 1967, for example, representatives from Senegal, Ivory Coast, Dahomey and Congo (Kinshasa) all stated that they wanted Quebec to participate in the next meeting of francophone ministers of education in early 1968.<sup>570</sup> Even more importantly, Quebec continued to enjoy support from Charles de Gaulle who had recently received Premier Johnson in Paris with the ceremony reserved for heads of state and who had also already indicated that Quebec was to be the focus of his visit to Canada for Expo 67 instead of Ottawa. This type of support bolstered the government of Quebec's belief that it could defy the federal government vis-à-vis the francophone community.

In August 1966, Daniel Johnson had tried to insist that Quebec would officially invite the guests attending Expo 67 in Montreal to visit Quebec City. He ultimately compromised with Pearson and allowed Quebec's invitations to be included with Canada's own, but he refused to co-ordinate arrangements for the visits to Quebec with

---

<sup>569</sup> The incident provoked the government of Quebec to try to prevent Canada's Ambassador to Belgium from accompanying the Prince and Princess of Belgium to Quebec for Expo 67. See ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011 03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5 file 4, Letter, Lester Pearson to Daniel Johnson, 9 May 1967 and ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011 03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5 file 4, Letter, Daniel Johnson to Lester Pearson, 9 May 1967.



the federal authorities. From his government's perspective, Ottawa had no authority to intervene in the visits to Quebec's capital. Furthermore, André Patry, Quebec's new Chief of Protocol, informed the consular agents in Quebec City that they had to make all arrangements for visits to Quebec City directly with his office and that any requests received via the federal government would be ignored.<sup>571</sup> Since the federal government released its own instructions about contacts between foreign diplomats and Canada's provincial governments shortly thereafter in December 1966, foreign governments were, in essence, forced to choose between Ottawa and Quebec City. Most of the French African states chose to deal directly with Quebec in this instance rather than sacrifice the chance to meet with members of Quebec's government.<sup>572</sup>

In the aftermath of the Canada-Belgium accord of May 1967, the federal government worried that Quebec would try to retaliate by signing its own agreements with as many French African states as it could during the summer of Expo 67.<sup>573</sup> At the very least, Quebec's leaders were expected to use their meetings with the French Africans to argue that Quebec had the right to its own international identity in certain fields. The federal government, therefore, believed it could not afford to let its own opportunities to

---

<sup>570</sup> ANQ, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420 file 4.5 A, Note, *Discussions avec des ministres Africains de l'Éducation nationale*, Julien Aubert, directeur de la Service de la coopération avec l'extérieur, Ministère de l'Éducation, Québec à Claude Morin, 15 mai 1967.

<sup>571</sup> NAC, MG 32 A3, Vol. 43, file AFRIQUE 1974 14.1, Étude, *Visites d'état de pays francophones d'Afrique au Canada à l'occasion de l'exposition universelle de Montréal, 1967*, L'Équipe chargée du projet sur la francophonie – 1974, 5-6.

<sup>572</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

reiterate Canada's position towards *la francophonie* for its French African guests pass by.<sup>574</sup> In all, 13 French African states sent representatives to Canada for Expo 67 from June to October. The first two visits – those of Tunisia and Madagascar in June – were limited to the participation of the Tunisian Under-secretary for Industry and Commerce and the Malagasy Ambassador to Canada in the ceremonies celebrating their countries' official day at Expo. Neither the federal government nor the government of Quebec held discussions with either of these representatives.<sup>575</sup> With the visit of Charles de Gaulle to Quebec City and Montreal beginning on the 24<sup>th</sup> of July, however, the dynamic of the situation changed for both Canada and Quebec.<sup>576</sup> With his “*Vive le Québec libre*” speech, de Gaulle publicly declared his sympathy for Quebec's nationalist plight, intentionally or not. Rebuked by the federal government, de Gaulle quickly returned to France, but thereafter the Canadian government worried that French African leaders would follow his example and that Quebec would take as many advantages from their

---

<sup>573</sup> Claude Morin told a federal official that Quebec's Cabinet was considering “[des] mesures draconiennes qui pourraient être prises pour embarrasser le gouvernement fédéral dans les relations étrangères.” NAC, RG 25, Vol. [?] file 30-7-QUE pt 2, Memo to the Prime Minister, 9 May 1967.

<sup>574</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2 pt 1, Memo, *Tunisian Visit to Canada (June 11-16) – Briefs*, Deputy USSEA to Legal, Economic, United Nations, and African & Middle Eastern Divisions, 16 May 1967.

<sup>575</sup> *Op Cit.*, Étude, *Visites d'état de pays francophones d'Afrique au Canada à l'occasion de l'exposition universelle de Montréal, 1967*.

<sup>576</sup> For a more complete description and analysis of the events surrounding this incident, see Dale Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre* and John English, *The Worldly Years*, ch. 9.

visits to Quebec City as it could.<sup>577</sup>

In the aftermath of de Gaulle's visit, the Canadian government redoubled the attention it devoted to the French African leaders who had not yet come to Canada for Expo in order to demonstrate that the incident had altered Canada's interest in French Africa or the francophone community.<sup>578</sup> The visits of the Gabonese and Moroccan representatives, however, proceeded without incident. They both visited Ottawa before proceeding to Quebec City, discussed a range of subjects with the two governments, and avoided becoming involved in Canada's domestic problems despite being informed about Canada's and Quebec's competing constitutional positions.<sup>579</sup> Yet when the President of Rwanda visited Quebec City on August 11<sup>th</sup>, he precipitated another round of conflict between Ottawa and Quebec City by having Rwanda's Minister of Planning sign, on his behalf, a joint declaration with Premier Johnson. Fairly innocuous, the declaration simply referred to the mutual desire of the two governments to improve cultural exchanges between their two peoples and Quebec's commitment of \$150,000 over three years to the

---

<sup>577</sup> In a letter to Lester Pearson, André Patry accused the Prime Minister of behaving poorly towards de Gaulle. He compared de Gaulle's speech and Pearson's reaction thereto to President Senghor of Senegal's speech at a dinner hosted by the government of Quebec in September 1966 during which Senghor similarly intervened in the domestic problem between Canada and Quebec, but on the federal side. Instead of rebuking Senghor publicly, Patry reminded Pearson, Premier Johnson had chosen to meet privately with the President the next day in order to correct discretely the views that he had heard in Ottawa. ANQ, P422 S3, 3A 011-03-02-002A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 5 file 4, Letter, André Patry to Lester Pearson, 31 juillet 1967.

<sup>578</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. [?] file 20-IVORY-9, Tel ME-748, External to Canadian High Commission, Accra, 4 août 1967.

<sup>579</sup> Regarding the constitutional issue, federal officials judged that Gabon was one of the states that ignored the federal government's role in external relations, especially with regard to *la francophonie*. Morocco, on the other hand, was very receptive to the federal position. *Op Cit.*, Étude, *Visites d'état de pays francophones d'Afrique au Canada à l'occasion de l'exposition universelle de Montréal, 1967*.

University of Butaré.<sup>580</sup> The declaration had been decided upon between private meetings between Grégoire Kayibanda and Johnson, at the instigation of Père Lévesque, where federal officials had been excluded. Johnson was anxious to prove that Quebec could enter into direct relations with countries other than France and hoped that a public declaration would make it harder for Kayibanda to renounce Quebec's aid once it was accepted.

Predictably, the federal government perceived this declaration as inimical to its interests, though it was not entirely sure just what the declaration signified. The press in Quebec, for example, considered it the same as the formal agreement that the province had signed with France in 1965.<sup>581</sup> Quebec's government could be expected to interpret the declaration as an international accord, but legal analysts for the Department of External Affairs concluded that an agreement only became an international treaty if both participants believed that they had created legally binding rights and obligations.<sup>582</sup> In the weeks following the signing of the joint declaration, Canadian officials thus repeatedly tried to determine the Rwandan government's interpretation of the declaration it had issued with Quebec. In November, George Ignatieff of Canada's delegation to the United Nations in New York finally obtained a note from the Rwandan representative in which his government declared that it only considered the joint declaration an expression of

---

<sup>580</sup> See the text of the joint declaration as reproduced in *ibid.*

<sup>581</sup> *La Presse*, for example called the declaration an *entente culturelle*. *La Presse*, 14 août 1967.

<sup>582</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. [?] file 30-14-QUE pt 2, Memo, USSEA to SSEA, 8 septembre 1967.

friendship between Rwanda and Quebec.<sup>583</sup> It added that the declaration could not have been a binding international accord since it had been concluded without the Canadian government's approval or assistance. No doubt, the \$750,000 that Canada gave to Rwanda and the University of Butaré annually helped convince the Rwandans to adopt this position.

Nevertheless, the Rwanda-Quebec joint declaration of 11 August 1967 impressed upon the federal government the need to persuade its French African guests not to sign any agreements with Quebec without its approval. After Rwanda, eight more French African delegations were scheduled to visit Canada, including Ivory Coast, Senegal, Cameroon, and Niger and to impress them, federal authorities hastily arranged further meetings between these visitors and senior Canadian politicians and officials and arranged for even more French Canadian Cabinet ministers to attend the official dinners and functions in their honour.<sup>584</sup> Despite the federal government's fears, however, there were no more incidents during the rest of Expo 67. Premier Johnson's illness forced his government to cancel all official visits to Quebec City in October but Marcel Massé, the Minister of Education, nevertheless promoted Quebec's cause to all who would listen in Montreal. Still, the federal government was satisfied with the results of the French African visits to Canada in the summer and fall of 1967. There had been some

---

<sup>583</sup> See the text of the note transmitted to Ottawa in NAC, RG 25, Vol. [?] file 30-14-QUE pt 2, Tel 3695, Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, New York to External, 30 November 1967.

misunderstandings, but the Canadian government had made valuable contacts with French African leaders and had pursued its interest in *la francophonie*.<sup>585</sup> Quebec, however, had just as much cause for satisfaction in the aftermath of Expo 67.

Charles de Gaulle had demonstrated that he considered Quebec the voice of French Canadians in Canada and that he could therefore be expected to support Quebec's campaign to speak for them in *la francophonie*.<sup>586</sup> This expectation, and de Gaulle's prestige, raised delicate problems for Canada as proven by an editorial in the Senegalese newspaper *Dakar-Matin* that depicted de Gaulle as the champion of Quebec's embattled French-speaking people and concluded that he had been unjustly criticised in the French and international press.<sup>587</sup> This editorial had likely been vetted by President Senghor's press secretary, a French citizen, and by other officials acting under instructions from the President himself and thus represented Senegal's official view of de Gaulle's visit to

---

<sup>584</sup> Obviously upset that these measures were being taken at the last possible moment, Prime Minister Pearson said that these matters should have been considered a long time before. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10041 file 20-1-2-AFR pt 1, Memo, *Visit of President Houphouët Boigny, August 22-26*, H. Basil Robinson to Prime Minister, 17 August 1967.

<sup>585</sup> This was the conclusion drawn by the study prepared in the Department of External Affairs in 1974. *Op Cit.*, Étude, *Visites d'état de pays francophones d'Afrique au Canada à l'occasion de l'exposition universelle de Montréal, 1967*.

<sup>586</sup> France's support for Quebec in late 1967, however, might have had other causes as well. In 1967, France no longer possessed the resources to aid Quebec financially. Consequently, many French officials believed that France should give Quebec all the verbal support or aid it could since this did not cost France anything. See AMAÉ, Am 64-68, Canada, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à MAE, 2 août 1967.

<sup>587</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8879 file 20-SEN-1-3, Letter 175, *Senegalese Reaction to de Gaulle's Visit to Canada*, Canadian Chargé d'affaires, Dakar to USSEA, 3 August 1967.

Quebec.<sup>588</sup> The editorial, however, also decried the exploitation of French Canadians in Canada and their second class status and endorsed their struggle for equality. Canada's Chargé d'affaires could only console his superiors that the editorial was unsigned, indicating that Senegal did not want to offend Canada unduly.

Like many French African countries, Senegal largely followed France's foreign policy lead. This was due to its close personal and historic ties with France,<sup>589</sup> the esteem with which many French African leaders held de Gaulle and the extent to which they relied on France for financial and technical assistance. The Canadian Chargé in Dakar explained to his superiors in Ottawa that "on such a touchy, almost personal issue as this the Senegalese could ill-afford to offend the policy-maker-in-chief of the country on which they are so dependent."<sup>590</sup> French support for Quebec's aspirations towards *la francophonie* thus continued to be the biggest problem facing Canada, especially since de Gaulle largely determined France's policy towards Quebec himself.<sup>591</sup> As long as de

---

<sup>588</sup> Canada's Chargé d'affaires in Dakar told his superiors in Ottawa that Senghor exercised almost complete control over the media in Senegal. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8879 file 20-SEN-1-3, Letter 175, *Senegalese Reaction to de Gaulle's Visit to Canada*, Canadian Chargé d'affaires, Dakar to USSEA, 3 August 1967.

<sup>589</sup> In discussions between the Canadian Ambassador in Yaoundé and Cameroon's President on 28 August 1967, President Ahidjo indicated that "he thought that after an initially hostile reaction to de Gaulle's statements in Canada, the French press was coming around to recognise that de Gaulle was after all justified in what he said." This echoed the opinion of several other officials in Cameroon, including that of the Archbishop of Yaoundé, Monseigneur Zoa. Embassy officials concluded that "*Le Monde* [a French daily newspaper] is avidly read every day by these people and that its interpretation of the consequences of de Gaulle's statements in Canada is taken as little less than gospel truth." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10043 file 20-1-2-CAM pt 1, Letter 350, *Cameroonian Reactions to General de Gaulle's Visit*, L. Bailey, Canadian Embassy Yaoundé to USSEA, 5 September 1967.

<sup>590</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>591</sup> Léger reported this conclusion after visiting with many French cabinet ministers after he returned to Paris from Canada after Expo. NAC, MG 32 A3, Vol. 1.12, Letter, Jules Léger to Marcel Cadieux, 20 September 1967.

Gaule reigned over French politics, federal officials knew that Canada could do little to alter French policy towards Canada and Quebec.<sup>592</sup> Yet Martin, Cadieux and Léger agreed that Canada needed to pursue aggressively its relations with other French-speaking countries. Martin therefore consequently authorised his officials to search for ways for Canada to play a high profile role in *la francophonie* and he also created a Division within External Affairs to co-ordinate the government's francophone activities.

Despite French opposition, the Canadian government continued to push Martin's idea for a governmental conference regarding an organisation for private and semi-private associations within French-speaking countries. The approach of the meeting of ministers of education of France and the French African states, scheduled for February 1968 in Libreville, however, denied Canada the opportunity to take the initiative. Unbeknownst to the Canadian government, Marcel Massé had solicited an invitation to this meeting Gabon's delegate to Expo the previous summer and in November Canada's outgoing Ambassador to Niger learned that President Diori intended, as President of OCAM, to issue an invitation to Quebec.<sup>593</sup> Diori indicated that the invitation would be addressed to Quebec, but sent to Ottawa. Subsequently, President Senghor of Senegal told Ambassador Coté that this formula had been designed by France's Minister of

---

<sup>592</sup> Martin, Cadieux and Léger agreed, however, that Canadian officials needed to solidify their relations French functionaries, ministries and agencies other than the Élysée Palace. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10046 file 20-1-2-FR pt 9, Mes S-1243, *Franco-Canadian Relations*, SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 16 October 1916.

<sup>593</sup> According to French diplomats in Niamey, Diori had said that he considered Quebec "*comme porte-parole de fait du Canada français*." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 2039, *La Francophonie*, Canadian High Commissioner, Lagos to External, 6 November 1967.



Education and Niger's President to cope with the fact that Canada, unlike Quebec, did not have a minister of education.<sup>594</sup>

The Canadian government reacted quickly to the information from Niger. When the new Ambassador to Niger, M. Malone, presented his credentials to Diori, he told the President that it would be inappropriate to invite Quebec in any capacity to an intergovernmental meeting and that the Canadian government wanted the invitation addressed rather than just sent to Ottawa.<sup>595</sup> Malone also informed Diori that not all French-speaking Canadians lived in Quebec, an argument that came as a revelation to Diori.<sup>596</sup> While Malone reported with pleasure that Diori had agreed to invite Canada to the meeting instead of Quebec, he nevertheless cautioned that the decision might yet be reversed again since Diori was devoted to de Gaulle and that this, plus the \$8 million in aid Niger received from France might make him susceptible to French pressure. Despite the fact that Canada had successfully averted a threat from Niger, the Canadian government still worried about the indications coming from both Niger and Senegal that the French were attempting to orchestrate Quebec's participation at the meeting of francophone ministers of education.

---

<sup>594</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 4, Memo, *Jean Côté's call on President Senghor*, G. Riddell to USSEA, 30 November 1967.

<sup>595</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2-CDA pt 1, Tel Mes ME-1062, *Francophonie*, SSEA to Canadian High Commissioner, Lagos, 15 November 1967.

<sup>596</sup> Malone's description of the demographic situation in New Brunswick in particular surprised Diori, who called over other Ministers and dignitaries attending Malone's presentation of credentials and asked them whether they were aware that not all French-speaking Canadians resided in Quebec. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 2130, *Canada/Niger – Francophonie*, Canadian High Commissioner, Lagos to External, 27 November 1967.

Presidents Diori and Senghor displayed no hostility towards Canada. On the contrary, Coté and Malone considered them reasonable, friendly, and willing to accept Canada's explanations of the situation regarding Quebec and Canada's interest in *la francophonie*. They believed that the French African leaders simply misunderstood Canada's political and demographic environment and relied upon the French to interpret it for them. Malone had successfully interceded with Diori, however, and this success prompted Marcel Cadieux to instruct Canada's representatives to other French African countries to make similar attempts to explain to their host governments Canada's constitutional position and the dangers involved in allowing Quebec to participate in international associations.<sup>597</sup> Between December 1967 and January 1968, therefore, Canadian diplomats toured French Africa trying to convince its governments that only Ottawa could represent French Canadians at international meetings.<sup>598</sup>

This campaign of persuasion generally succeeded. Leaders like Houphouët-Boigny, Bourguiba, President Lamizana of Upper Volta and others all indicated that they were unwilling to intervene in Canada's domestic affairs. Guinée's representative to the United Nations even encouraged the Canadian government to stand up to France's

---

<sup>597</sup> Cadieux recognised, however, that it would be futile for the Canadian Embassy in Paris to make similar efforts towards the French government given the latter's open support for Quebec. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Mes FR-1, *Francophonie*, USSEA to Canadian High Commission, Lagos, 30 November 1967.

<sup>598</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10689 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 1, Mes FR-2, *Francophonie Meeting of Education Ministers*, USSEA to Canadian High Commission, Accra, 1 December 1967.

encouragement of separatism in Canada.<sup>599</sup> Under de Gaulle, however, the French government still appeared determined to send, or rather to influence the host country to send, a separate invitation to Quebec for the conference.<sup>600</sup> Canadian officials therefore remained unsure of the extent to which Canada could rely upon the goodwill of the French African states if France pressed Quebec's case fully.

Despite the anxiety caused by this situation, the dispute between Ottawa and Quebec City over which of them would attend the conference remained fundamentally an internal conflict between the governments of Canada and Quebec. Until the end of 1967, the federal government tried to settle the dispute by convincing other governments not to deal directly with Quebec. Marcel Cadieux still expected this approach to succeed,<sup>601</sup> but the federal government now realised that it needed to reach an agreement with Quebec about *la francophonie*. Contacts between the two governments on this matter over the previous two years had been sporadic, unofficial and uneventful, but on December 1, 1967, Lester Pearson wrote Daniel Johnson to say that Canada could not fulfil its own interest in the francophone community without Quebec's active participation therein. He therefore proposed that at francophone meetings dealing with subjects within the federal government's jurisdiction, Canada's delegation would include provincial representatives

---

<sup>599</sup> Achkar Marof reminded Ignatieff that his country was inhabited by three different ethnic peoples, each of which could also be played one against the other to the detriment of Guinée's national unity. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 3695, *Francophonie – talk with Marof*, Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York to External, 1 December 1967.

<sup>600</sup> Cadieux made this observation to Prime Minister Pearson in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10689 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 1, Memo, *Francophonie*, USSEA to Prime Minister, 27 December 1967.

<sup>601</sup> *Ibid.*

in a subordinate role.<sup>602</sup> For meetings concerned with provincial powers, on the contrary, Quebec's representative would play a leading role, perhaps even lead, Canada's delegation. Without expressly saying so, Pearson implied that the federal government accept the participation of Quebec's Minister of Education at the conference in Gabon provided that he went as the leader of Canada's delegation.

Pearson's offer came too late to change Quebec's plans. Just before Christmas, Claude Morin told France's Ambassador Leduc that Quebec would reject any invitation it received through the federal government even if its representative was chosen to lead the Canadian delegation.<sup>603</sup> The Canadian government's offer to reach an agreement with France had also been rejected.<sup>604</sup> When Johnson did not respond to Pearson's overture, the federal government dispatched Marc Lalonde in early January 1968 to ask Jean-Guy Cardinal, Quebec's Minister of Education, to lead Canada's delegation to the Libreville conference. Cardinal replied, however, that he had no intentions of going to Gabon.<sup>605</sup> Additionally, Cadieux instructed Canada's diplomats in Washington, New York, Paris and throughout Africa to renew their efforts to convince French African leaders and

---

<sup>602</sup> ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-005B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 3, file 5, Letter, Lester Pearson to Daniel Johnson, 1 December 1967.

<sup>603</sup> According to Morin, Leduc replied that "*la France, qui 'inspire' le Gabon dans les circonstances, ferait exactement ce que nous [Quebec] voulions et que nous aurions donc une invitation directe d'ici peu.*" ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-001A-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 4, file 7, Memo, Claude Morin à Daniel Johnson, 22 décembre 1967.

<sup>604</sup> In October, Cadieux told Ambassador Leduc that France could have a great deal of latitude in its dealings with Quebec from the Canadian government in return for a promise not to encourage Quebec to undertake independent international initiatives. AMAÉ, Am 64-70, Canada, Vol. 200, Ambassadeur de France au Canada à MAE, 14 octobre 1967.

<sup>605</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10689 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 1, Memo, A.E. Blanchette to USSEA, 5 janvier 1968.

officials against allowing Quebec to participate directly in Libreville.<sup>606</sup> Though the diplomats generally convinced many French African leaders that the federal government should be the first point of contact for any approaches to Canada's French-speaking people,<sup>607</sup> the Canadian government made no progress with Quebec, France or Gabon.

The French Foreign Ministry wanted to resolve the impending crisis without offending either Canada or Quebec, but the opportunity to do so had already been lost.<sup>608</sup> The invitation for Quebec's Minister of Education to attend the meeting of ministers of education in Libreville in February was dated January 5, 1968. From this point on, Canada could do nothing to avert the coming crisis.<sup>609</sup> Gabon's officials claimed that Cardinal had been invited in a purely personal capacity and that the invitation had been a mistake,<sup>610</sup> but federal officials learned in fact that the French had advised Gabon to send

---

<sup>606</sup> See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 5, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Tunis to External, 8 January 1968, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 131, *Francophonie*, Canadian Embassy, Washington to External, 9 January 1968, and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 45, *Francophonie*, Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York to External, 9 January 1968.

<sup>607</sup> This was the view as expressed, for example, by the Counsellor in Ivory Coast's Embassy in Washington. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 165, Canadian Embassy, Washington to External, 10 January 1968.

<sup>608</sup> On 11 January 1968, Jurgensen and Bettencourt of the French Foreign Ministry told Quebec's Agent General in Paris that the problem could be solved if the federal government appointed Cardinal as its observer at the conference. For Chapdelaine, this indicated that "*naturellement, le Quai d'Orsay aurait préféré contenter tout le monde et puis son père.*" ANQ, P422 S2, 3A 011-03-02-004B-01, 1995-01-008 Art. 2, file 8, Letter, Jean Chapdelaine to Claude Morin, 11 janvier 1968.

<sup>609</sup> Canada's newly appointed Ambassador to Gabon discussed Canada's position and its interest in *la francophonie* with Gabon's Foreign Minister on 9 January. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10689 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 1, Tel 34, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to External, 11 January 1968.

<sup>610</sup> This was the substance of conversations between Ambassador Hart and Gabon's Minister of State and Foreign Minister in Niamey on January 13 and between Blouin and the Gabonese Ambassador to Canada in Washington on the January 25. See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Tel 124, Canadian High Commissioner, Accra to External, 24 January 1968 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Memo, A. E. Blanchette, 26 January 1968.

the invitation to Quebec.<sup>611</sup> Nevertheless, Paul Martin instructed Canada's newly appointed Ambassador to Gabon to return to Libreville in late January and ask its President and its Foreign Minister to invite Canada to the conference. Had this approach succeeded, Martin would have treated the incident as an unfortunate misunderstanding.<sup>612</sup> Ambassador Thibault was denied the chance to speak with the President, however, on the excuse that he had not yet presented his credentials as Ambassador to Gabon and could not, therefore, meet with members of Gabon's government. Even appointing Thibault Canada's Chargé d'affaires in Gabon, an attempt to circumvent the problem about the credentials failed to secure an appointment for him with President Bongo.<sup>613</sup> With this, Canada lost its final hope of being invited to Libreville. It also demonstrated that Quebec's invitation had not been either a mistake or a purely personal or private affair.<sup>614</sup>

Quebec's delegation to Libreville included Jean-Guy Cardinal, his Deputy Minister Arthur Tremblay and Julien Aubert. It played a very prominent role in the

---

<sup>611</sup> This was confirmed by the Secretary of State at the Quai d'Orsay. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10046 file 20-1-2-FR pt 1.2, Memo, *France-Canada Relations*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 17 January 1968.

<sup>612</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Mes FR-32, *Libreville Conference*, SSEA to Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé, 26 January 1968 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Tel 292, *Projet de protestation au gouvernement français*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to USSEA, 26 January 1968.

<sup>613</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Tel 74, *Libreville Conference*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to External, 30 January 1968 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Memo, *Libreville Conference*, USSEA to Prime Minister, 2 February 1968.

conference proceedings, and Quebec's flag was displayed prominently throughout the city with those of the sovereign participants.<sup>615</sup> For the Canadian government, this represented clear interference in Canada's domestic affairs; it remained only for the federal government to respond to these attacks. In late December 1967 Marcel Cadieux had recommended a very forceful federal response in the event that Quebec alone received an invitation to Gabon. He suggested that either Pearson or Martin should issue a formal protest to the conference organisers about foreign interference in Canada's affairs. He also suggested that Canada could punish Quebec and France by undermining Quebec's credit in the United States; challenging Quebec's actions in the Supreme Court; cancelling the sale of plutonium to France; abrogating visa and trade agreements with France; or even breaking diplomatic relations with France.<sup>616</sup> He argued that Canada had to respond strongly or accept the fact that Quebec had won, at least temporarily, its own international status in some spheres. Unwilling to accept this, he wanted to "let the

---

<sup>614</sup> Thibault thought it was possible that Gabon was reluctant to lose face by publicly admitting that it had made a mistake regarding the invitation to Quebec. He also believed that Gabon might be trying to ingratiate itself with France, its principal source of aid. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Letter 47, *Francophonie – Libreville Conference*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to USSEA, 6 February 1968. According to France's Ambassador in Gabon, however, the only mistake involved in sending the invitation to Quebec stemmed from the fact that the invitation had been routed through Gabon's Embassy in Washington rather than through Quebec's Agent General in Paris. AMAÉ, D[irection] des affaires A[fricains et] M[algaches] 1959-69, Gabon, Vol. 9, Ambassadeur de France au Gabon à MAE, 29 janvier 1968.

<sup>615</sup> After being rebuffed in his attempt to speak with President Bongo on January 31, Thibault went to the American Embassy in Libreville. On his way, he could not fail to notice Quebec's flag flying in front of Libreville's City Hall. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Letter 47, *Francophonie – Libreville Conference*, Canadian Ambassador, Yaoundé to USSEA, 6 February 1968. See also John P. Schlegel, "Containing Quebec Abroad: The Gabon Incident, 1968" in Don Munton and John Kirton eds., *Canadian Foreign Policy, Selected Cases* (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1992).

<sup>616</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10689 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 1, Memo, *Francophonie*, USSEA to Prime Minister, 27 December 1967.

French and the world know that there is still some life left in us and that we will react with all the vigour and strength at our command to protect ourselves against external intervention.”<sup>617</sup>

Though Martin agreed about the need for a strong response, he cautioned against confronting the French since “no amount of escalation [on Canada’s part] will budge [de Gaulle] on the essentials of his ill-inspired policies.”<sup>618</sup> Martin believed, in fact, that de Gaulle would take Canada’s vigorous response as an excuse to ignore the Canadian government entirely, and he sanctioned an oral protest to the French government, but no more.<sup>619</sup> Instead, Martin believed that the problem could be solved within Canada by cooperating with the government of Quebec. Aware of the futility of confronting the French and anxious not to spoil the chance of compromising with Quebec, Martin’s government could only turn its anger upon one target. The French had used Gabon as their surrogate in the Libreville affair; the Canadian government chose to send its own message to Paris through the same surrogate. When Gabon’s Ambassador to Canada justified his government’s invitation to Quebec by stating that “... Quebec enjoys autonomy in the cultural field ...,” the federal government acted. Pearson suspended Canada’s diplomatic relations with Gabon, forbade Canada’s Ambassador to present his credentials to

---

<sup>617</sup> Ibid.

<sup>618</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10046 file 20-1-2-FR pt 12, Memo, *France-Canada Relations*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 17 January 1968.



President Bongo and refused to let Gabon's Ambassador present his credentials in Ottawa.<sup>620</sup> In contrast, Jules Léger delivered an oral protest to the French government on 20 February.

This was only one part of the federal government's response to the Libreville crisis, however. The federal government was now in the uncomfortable position of having to rely upon other countries to uphold Canada's rights vis-à-vis *la francophonie*, and in the aftermath of Libreville it knew that it desperately needed to woo the French African states.<sup>621</sup> For this task, the Canadian government had only one valuable tool with which to prove the value of its friendship, its external assistance. Fortunately, the "francophone African states [were] very much interested in [Canada's] aid programmes."<sup>622</sup> Though it could not match the aid that France gave French Africa, the Canadian government had to convince these countries that it was a much more generous potential member of *la francophonie* than Quebec could ever be.

If the suspension of diplomatic relations with Gabon represented the stick in

---

<sup>619</sup> At the end of January 1968, Martin told Pearson that "great as the temptation may be in the particularly frustrating circumstances at the moment, I feel that we cannot afford the luxury of gestures of mere annoyance or even retaliation against France if their side effects in Canada are likely to prejudice the prospects for a successful solution to the current constitutional debate." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10046 file 20-1-2-FR pt 12.2, Draft Memo, *France-Canada Relations*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 31 January 1968.

<sup>620</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Memo, *Libreville Conference*, SSEA to Prime Minister, 8 February 1968 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Mes FR-42, *Libreville Conference*, USSEA to Canadian Embassy, Washington, 16 February 1968.

<sup>621</sup> On January 11, Léger observed that "*nous sommes actuellement forcés de compter sur les pays d'Afrique d'une manière qui nous paraît très dangereuse pour la sauvegarde de nos positions.*" NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685 file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 131, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris to External, 11 January 1968.

<sup>622</sup> Marcel Cadieux made this comment to Paul Martin in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10684 file 26-2-CDA pt 1, Memo, *Francophonie*, USSEA to SSEA, 8 February 1968.

Canada's response to the Libreville conference, the Chevrier Mission represented the carrot. Henri Gaudefroy, the director of francophone programmes in the External Aid Office, had originally planned to send an aid mission to Tunisia, Cameroon and Senegal in early 1967.<sup>623</sup> After Expo 67 and with the growing Canada-Quebec dispute over the Libreville conference in the fall of 1967, however, Gaudefroy's technical mission assumed a much larger and increasingly political nature. This followed earlier decisions to double to over \$23 million the amount of aid it reserved for French Africa for 1968-69 and to overturn the EAO's plans to end Canadian aid for nine of the French African countries.<sup>624</sup> Thus, in October 1967, Paul Martin asked Lionel Chevrier, a former Cabinet Minister, High Commissioner to Britain and Commissioner General for Expo 67 to lead the mission and give it stature. He was accompanied by Henri Gaudefroy of the External Aid Office and Jacques Dupuis from Canada's Embassy in Paris. The federal government did ask in September 1967 whether Quebec wanted to send one of its officials on the mission, but received no response.<sup>625</sup> Chevrier, however, demanded and received full authority to commit the Canadian government to new aid projects.

The Mission left Canada on the 9<sup>th</sup> of February 1968, did not return until the end of March – it thus began just as the Libreville Conference ended – and stopped in France,

---

<sup>623</sup> NAC, MG 32 A3, file 14.3, Report, *Le Canada et l'Afrique francophone 1960-1970*, L'Équipe chargée du projet sur la francophonie, juin 1975, 26-28.

<sup>624</sup> The countries to be phased out were Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinée, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Upper Volta. Given President Diiori's important role in the evolution of *la francophonie*, Niger's exclusion was considered particularly dangerous by Canadian officials. *Ibid.*, 45-47.

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid.*, 49-50.

Morocco, Tunisia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Niger and Senegal.<sup>626</sup> Though Pearson allowed the mission to stop in Paris, he refused to let it consult the French about Canadian aid in French Africa.<sup>627</sup> Similarly, despite its original intentions, the Chevrier Mission pointedly ignored Gabon. Chevrier and his colleagues spent several days in each of the seven French African countries discussing potential and actual Canadian aid. In Morocco, Chevrier committed Canada to aid projects totalling \$9.4 million in loans and grants over five years.<sup>628</sup> In previous years, Morocco had only received approximately 20 teachers from Canada and about the same number of scholarships. Chevrier was equally lavish with the other countries he visited, committing Canada to over \$35 million in grants and loans over several years. Such largesse did not come without a price. Chevrier took advantage of his meetings with French African leaders to reiterate Canada's position about its constitutional responsibilities for foreign affairs and that Quebec had no constitutional responsibilities therein. The message to the French African states was clear. If they respected Canada's position they could expect increasing amounts of Canadian aid. If not, they risked, like Gabon, the withdrawal of Canadian aid and worsened relations with Canada.

The Canadian government's dual response to the Libreville crisis elicited mixed

---

<sup>626</sup> For a description of this mission, see Mabel Tinkiss Good, Chevrier (Montreal: Stanké Ltd, 1987), ch. 14.

<sup>627</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-83. It was just as well that the Canadian government did not ask for help from the French. They had decided that since, according to Quebec, the Canadian government had not consulted Quebec about the Mission, France would not facilitate Chevrier's trip to Africa. AMAÉ, Am 64-70, Canada, M. Alphand, Direction Amérique à Ambassadeur de France au Canada, 1 février 1968.

results. Many French African governments resented what they considered harsh treatment of Gabon, especially since Canada had not responded in like manner to France, the real instigator of the crisis.<sup>629</sup> Nevertheless, this opinion was not universal in French Africa. According to Canadian diplomats, Canada's crisis with Gabon received little attention in most French African countries while Chevrier reported that the reaction in places like Ivory Coast and Cameroon was not unfavourable to Canada.<sup>630</sup> In fact, at least one French African government understood Canada's message. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of March, a Congolese diplomat told Ambassador Coté in Dakar that, since the next meeting of the French and French African ministers of education would be held in Kinshasa, his government was worried about what to do about Canada and Quebec. The Ambassador said "Canadian aid was too important to his country for [it] to risk it by acting as Gabon did and he wondered what his government should do." This conversation indicated to Coté that "the Canadian government's decision about Gabon may already be bearing fruit."<sup>631</sup>

The Canadian government could not rest upon its laurels, however. There

---

<sup>628</sup> The projects were: the DERRO project; a cadastral survey; a hospital in Rabat; a centre for mining research; and a tourism development project in Tanger. *Ibid.*, 89-90.

<sup>629</sup> Max Yalden wrote Cadieux that Canada would be well within its rights to take firm action against Gabon, but that "we would of course be using our ammunition on the wrong target to a large extent." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Memo, *Libreville Conference*, Max Yalden to USSEA, 1 February 1968.

<sup>630</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8651 file 20-1-2-GABON pt 1, Tel 40, *Gabon Incident*, Canadian Embassy, Tunis to External, 12 March 1968 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 8651 file 20-1-2-GABON pt 1, Tel 349, *Canadian-Gabonese Relations*, Lionel Chevrier [Canadian High Commission, Accra] to External, 13 March 1968.

<sup>631</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 3, Tel 98, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Dakar to External, 9 March 1968.

remained many French African countries that either wanted Quebec to participate in *la francophonie* or were especially vulnerable to pressure from France. In the months following the Libreville Conference the Canadian government therefore maintained its diplomatic offensive to prevent Quebec from being included in other meetings of French-speaking governments.<sup>632</sup> In this struggle, the Canadian government benefited from its growing aid programme, the sympathy that many French African states felt for a central government faced with the prospect of internal disunity, their inherent respect for international practices, and their reluctance to submit to pressure from France. Nevertheless, the Canadian government could expect continued opposition from France and Quebec.<sup>633</sup> The Libreville Conference thus represented only one skirmish in the struggle between Canada and Quebec that conditioned every aspect of Canada's relations with the French African countries from the late 1960s until the early 1970s.

---

<sup>632</sup> In mid-March 1968, the African and Middle Eastern Division in the Department of External Affairs ranked the French African countries in terms of their sympathy for the Canadian position *vis-à-vis la francophonie*. It determined that Congo (Kinshasa), Algeria, Morocco and Cameroon were the most sympathetic countries to Canada's difficulties, but that Tunisia, Senegal and the Ivory Coast were the most important countries in terms of their influence on *francophonie* affairs. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683 file 26-1 pt 5, Memo, African and Middle Eastern Division to USSEA, 14 March 1968.

<sup>633</sup> After the Libreville Conference, for example, Arthur Tremblay and Julien Aubert conducted their own tour of several French African states, ostensibly to visit teachers from Quebec stationed there by the External Aid Office. See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10690 file 26-4-CME-1968 pt 2, Tel 64, *Francophonie*, Canadian Ambassador, Dakar to External, 17 February 1968.

## CONCLUSION

The evolution of Canada's relations with the countries of French Africa prior to 1968 can be roughly divided into two distinct yet overlapping periods. The first lasted from the late 1940s to approximately 1963 and witnessed the independence of France's protectorates and colonies in Africa. This process, however, was dominated by the Algerian war for independence and broadly defined by heightened Cold War competition in Africa and the increasingly important role of the non-aligned countries in international affairs. The second period began to take shape during the late 1950s, but crystallised after 1963. This period coincided with the Canadian government's initiation of diplomatic, political, aid and trade relations with the newly independent French-speaking African states. It is, however, impossible to examine the developments of this second period without taking into account the lessons that the Canadian government learned from its experience with French African issues during the 1950s.

After the Second World War, France and the other colonial powers largely considered their colonies vital sources of markets, resources and prestige necessary for the battered European nations to rebuild their economies and regain their place in the world. Imperial statesmen conceded the need for reforms in colonial administration to help prepare the colonies for eventual self-government, but were generally not anxious to hasten the process of devolution. The French in particular believed that France needed its colonies for its own political, economic and moral regeneration. While the Canadian government, like that of the United States, generally sympathised with the desire of dependent peoples to achieve self-government, it nevertheless approached colonial issues

cautiously after the war, aware that they had the potential to impair relations between the Western powers.

The pattern of Canada's policy towards matters involving France's colonies developed early in the post-war years. France's insistence upon including French North Africa in the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948-49 and the discussions initiated by important Arab and Third World states about France's colonial rule in Morocco and Tunisia at the United Nations in 1950-51 confronted the Canadian government with similar dilemmas. The St. Laurent government did not want to have colonies protected under NATO's umbrella, but how could it insist upon their total exclusion when the French government threatened to abandon the alliance entirely if its demands about Algeria at the very least were not met? Similarly, by endorsing United Nations' discussions on Tunisia and Morocco the Canadian government could have demonstrated its innate sympathy for colonial nationalism, its respect for the rights of the United Nations and its desire to court important Third World countries such as India. Doing so, however, risked alienating France, a key Western partner and a bastion of the North Atlantic alliance against communist aggression in Western Europe.

In both cases, the Canadian government had to choose between, broadly, the principle of self-determination for colonial peoples and winning the goodwill of non-aligned states, and the need to maintain the loyalty of one of the most important members of NATO. In both cases, the latter consideration triumphed. Canada ultimately accepted the inclusion of Algeria within NATO in 1948-49 and it predicated its behaviour during the Tunisian and Moroccan discussions in 1950-51 at the United Nations on the need to

defend France against its attackers. As Louis St. Laurent had explained after acquiescing to the French demand about the inclusion of Algeria within the North Atlantic alliance, “Algeria was not a matter of great importance in relation to the main purposes of the Treaty, but France was essential.”<sup>634</sup> France may have been willing to use force to repress nationalism and maintain control of its colonial dependencies, as was clearly the case in both Tunisia and Morocco, but Canada could not afford to antagonise this ally.

Canada and the other NATO members needed France’s political stability, its military strength and its enthusiasm for the North Atlantic alliance, all of which could have suffered if its allies had broken ranks with France’s conception of its own interests in North Africa. In the context of the Cold War, France’s political and military contribution to NATO greatly outweighed the negative consequences Canada, the United States and the others expected to derive from their association with the unsavoury aspects of France’s colonial policies. These types of considerations conditioned the Canadian government’s view of France’s colonial developments throughout the 1950s, including the Algerian war for independence from 1954 to 1962. This war involved hundreds of thousands of French troops, costs thousands of lives and millions of dollars in damages, and severely undermined France’s political stability and its international standing because of the brutalities committed against the Algerian nationalists by French soldiers.

Again, the Canadian government largely sympathised with the aspirations of the Algerian nationalists for self-government from France. It also recognised that the war

---

<sup>634</sup> As quoted in Munro and Inglis, *Mike*, Volume 2, 55.



damaged France's standing with Third World countries and weakened NATO by diverting French troops away from the all-important front in Western Europe. The Canadian government's views of the war were thus conditioned by the belief that France's attempt to suppress nationalism in Algeria hurt France, Canada and the West in general. Yet the Canadian government found it nearly impossible to act upon its belief that France needed to withdraw from Algeria. It was repeatedly compelled to abandon its attempts to counsel the French in this direction because of the French government's reaction.<sup>635</sup> As long as the French remained committed to maintaining France's control of Algeria, it expected complete political and military support from its allies for this policy and greatly resented attempts by other countries to intervene in France's affairs.

From 1955 to 1961, Canada voted with France against nine resolutions seeking independence for Algeria in the United Nations. Throughout this period, the Canadian government also supplied France with over \$100 million in military equipment through the Mutual Aid programme, much of which was likely used in Algeria, the location of most of the French Army after 1955.<sup>636</sup> It did all of this because of the need the Canadian government felt to ensure NATO's strength and solidarity by placating France. France's enthusiasm for NATO waned during the 1950s, particularly after the Suez Crisis and

---

<sup>635</sup> The Canadian government, for example, had intended to encourage France to accept the principle of self-determination for the Algerian people at the NATO Council meeting in March 1956. It did not do so, however, because France used the same meeting to ask NATO to endorse the transfer of even more French troops to North Africa. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7722, file 12177-40 pt 2, Mes S-252, SSEA to Canadian Delegation, North Atlantic Council, Paris, 20 March 1956.

<sup>636</sup> Robin S. Gendron, "Tempered Sympathy: Canada's Reaction to the Independence Movement in Algeria, 1954-1962," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 1998, Vol. 9, 237-239.

Charles de Gaulle's failure to secure a prominent role for France in the direction of the alliance in 1958.<sup>637</sup> The Canadian government believed that opposing France's policies towards Algeria would only have exacerbated this situation. The Canadian government thus deferred to French sensitivities regarding Algeria despite the fact that its conception of Canada's own interests in the problem pointed in another direction.

This pattern of deferring to France regarding French Africa persisted throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Tunisia and Morocco achieved their independence from France in 1956, for example, yet France insisted upon retaining its predominant position as the new countries' most important political, economic and military partner and discouraged its allies from attempting to undermine it. The Canadian government was well aware of France's resentment of what the French government considered intrusion into its sphere of influence and accepted France's desire to remain at the centre of North African affairs as both appropriate and necessary. Canadian officials believed that Canada had an important role to play in helping to maintain the Western orientation of Tunisia and Morocco and in preventing communist infiltration in North Africa.<sup>638</sup> They also believed, however, that France's relations with Tunisia and Morocco offered the West as a whole its best chance to maintain the North African countries' allegiance and

---

<sup>637</sup> Newhouse, *De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons*.

<sup>638</sup> Canadian officials, for example, reported that Canada enjoyed a favourable reputation in these countries because of its own evolution from colony to developed nation, its membership in the Commonwealth, its international behaviour and its lack of neo-colonialist ambitions. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 6859, file 4283-C-40 pt 1.1, *Joint Report of the Canadian Mission to Morocco and Tunisia*, undated.

were unwilling to jeopardise this opportunity.<sup>639</sup> A similar belief that only France could protect Guinée from succumbing to Marxist or communist influences conditioned the caution with which the Canadian government approached that country after its precipitous independence from France in 1958.

In the mid-1950s, Canadian officials recognised that decolonisation challenged Western interests in such parts of the world as Africa, allowing the Soviet Union to position itself as a supporter of African emancipation, to meddle in African affairs, and to undermine Western influence in the continent.<sup>640</sup> By the late 1950s, NATO had become very concerned about Communist penetration of Africa and the concern about the potential loss of Western influence in Africa dominated the Canadian government's conception of its interests in Africa. This region's importance to Canada was thus general, insofar as it bore upon broader Western interests during the Cold War, rather than reflective of issues of particular relevance to Canada alone. The Cold War context of Canada's interest in French Africa directly affected the government's perception of the need to pursue diplomatic and other forms of relations with the emerging French African states. The Canadian government believed that it could help maintain Western influence in the region, through diplomatic relations and developmental assistance, for example, but in general it believed that the United States or the former colonial powers bore most of the responsibility for maintaining the West's position in Africa.

---

<sup>639</sup> *Op Cit, Immigration from North Africa and Canada's Relations with North Africa*, 15 August 1956.

<sup>640</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 165, file 12354-40 pt 1, Memo, *Canadian Relations with an Awakening Africa*, USSEA to SSEA, 9 December 1955.

Accordingly, Canada did not need extensive relations with the French African states after their independence because France already enjoyed well-established ties with its former colonies. Canadian officials who visited France's African colonies between 1959 and 1961 noted the basis for amicable and beneficial relations between Canada and French Africa – largely Canada's economic development, its use of the French language, and its lack of neo-imperialist ambitions<sup>641</sup> – but only over a relatively long period of time. As long as France was capable of maintaining, and indeed jealously guarded, its position as the principal instrument of contact between the West and French Africa, there was little need for Canada to expand its efforts in this part of the world. This was especially true given that French Africa offered limited immediate prospects for profitable relations with Canada in terms of trade, investment opportunities for Canadian businesses, or potential immigrants to Canada.<sup>642</sup>

For the Canadian government, therefore, France secured the West's interests in French Africa and Canada could develop its own relations with the region slowly, as the need arose and as permitted by the resources given to the Department of External Affairs. This situation satisfied Canada's basic interests in French Africa given the Cold War competition between the Eastern and Western blocs for the allegiance of newly independent countries. It also allowed the Canadian government to defer to French

---

<sup>641</sup> NAC, RG 25, Vol. 5232, file 6938-B-40 pt 2, Letter, DS McPhail, Paris to HF Davis, Ottawa, 11 March 1960.

sensitivities about France's position in its colonies and former colonies. Canada's cautious approach to expanding relations with French Africa in 1960 and 1961 was thus intended to help strengthen the Western alliance by preserving France's international influence. Its desire not to antagonise France by intruding upon its French African affairs was also an attempt to contain the erosion of France's enthusiasm for NATO.

It is important not to discount other factors that limited the extent to which the Canadian government pursued relations with French Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That the vast majority of France's colonies did not gain independence until 1960 and 1961 was obviously one such limiting factor. The French government vigorously defended its prerogatives in its colonies prior to their independence and even resisted its allies' efforts towards the three French territories that did achieve their independence prior to 1960. It is also true that the Canadian government lacked both the resources and, in many respects, the will to establish extensive diplomatic and other relations with French Africa in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this period, the Department of External Affairs faced burgeoning requirements for Canadian representation around the world and few resources with which to meet them.<sup>643</sup> The Department lacked, in particular, enough suitably trained French-speaking diplomats to establish missions in numerous French-speaking countries. Finally, the Diefenbaker government demonstrated

---

<sup>642</sup> D.S. McPhail made this observation during his tour of French Africa in late 1959 and Pierre Dupuy, Canada's Ambassador to France, returned from his own visit to parts of French Africa with similar conclusions in late 1960. *Ibid.*, and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 11041, file 20-1-2-AFR file pocket, Report, *Canadian Mission to Africa, November-December 1960*, Canadian Ambassador, Paris, 22.

a distinct Commonwealth preference in its foreign policy.<sup>644</sup> All of these factors, together with Canada's scant economic and other interests in the region militated against the rapid expansion of Canada's relations with French Africa prior to 1963. Nevertheless, as long as France secured the West's interests in French Africa, there was no need for greater efforts by Canada.

Even so, some senior Canadian officials began to reconsider the importance of Canada's relations with French Africa as early as 1959 when Canada increased the aid that it provided for the Commonwealth countries of Africa. The lack of a similar programme of aid for French-speaking countries in Africa provoked criticism within the Department of External Affairs and the broader French-speaking Canadian public.<sup>645</sup> As a result, Under-secretary of State Norman Robertson and Legal Counselor Marcel Cadieux prevailed upon Howard Green to initiate a small programme of educational assistance for French Africa. The small \$300,000 programme, announced in April 1961, was to be both a gesture by Canada towards maintaining French African's Western orientation and proof that the federal government addressed the needs of French Canadians.

The Diefenbaker government accepted the symbolic importance of a friendly gesture towards the newly independent French-speaking states of Africa at this time, but Robertson, Cadieux and other officials failed to convince Green or his colleagues that

---

<sup>643</sup> See, for example, the discussion of this type of problem in Hilliker and Barry, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II.

<sup>644</sup> See Robinson, Diefenbaker's World.

they needed to do more to reflect Canada's linguistic dualism in its foreign policy. From 1960 to 1963 the Department of External Affairs lobbied extensively to entrench and then to expand the aid programme for French Africa, but to no avail. From 1961 until the Diefenbaker government was replaced by the Pearson Liberals in 1963, the funding allocated to the educational assistance programme for French Africa remained fixed at \$300,000, a fraction of the \$3.5 million Canada gave to Commonwealth Africa. Nevertheless, Robertson did persuade Green late in 1961 that for reasons of domestic harmony, the government also needed an embassy in French Africa if it was going to open a diplomatic mission in a Commonwealth country in Africa.<sup>646</sup> The result of this pressure was the decision in November 1961 to open Canadian embassies in both Cameroon and Tanganyika.

There was thus within the Canadian government and the Department of External Affairs in particular a growing recognition by the early 1960s that French Africa was important to Canada and not just to the West at large. It was not yet enough to compel the government to pursue expanded relations with French-speaking states in Africa in defiance of the obstacles that impeded such relations, but this too began to change after 1963. Lester Pearson and Paul Martin took office committed to the notion that the federal government represented all Canadians, including French-speaking ones, and committed

---

<sup>645</sup> The Junior Chamber of Commerce of Montreal, for example, criticised the Commonwealth focus of Canadian aid and asked for aid to be given to French-speaking countries as well in 1960. *Le Devoir*, 17 décembre 1960, "Aider les pays sous-développés de langue française comme les autres."

to reflecting more accurately Canada's bilingual character in its domestic and foreign policies.<sup>647</sup> These commitments resulted in the expansion of the scale and the scope of Canada's relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa, marking the beginning of the second phase of Canada's relations with French Africa.

The developments of this second phase included increased funding for aid to French Africa and the establishment of new diplomatic missions in several French African countries. In early 1964, the government increased to \$4 million its aid for the French-speaking countries in Africa. In 1965, the aid programme for French Africa received \$7.5 million, and even more in subsequent years. The new funds redressed the imbalance that had previously existed between Canadian aid for French and English-speaking African countries and allowed the Canadian government to expand its aid activities in French Africa rapidly.<sup>648</sup> The Canadian government reinforced this effort on the diplomatic front by opening embassies in Tunisia and Senegal in 1966. This period also witnessed more frequent exchanges and official visits between Canada and the French African countries, culminating in the participation of numerous French African states in Expo 1967 in Montreal.

The impetus for the Liberal government's expanded interest in French Africa after 1963 arose from several interconnected sources. Firstly, French Canadians in Quebec

---

<sup>646</sup> Robertson argued that an embassy in French Africa "would also be welcome to a large part of our domestic population." NAC, RG 25, Vol. 7748, file 12354-40, Memo, *Extension of Canadian Representatives Abroad*, USSEA to SSEA, 20 July 1961.

<sup>647</sup> Hilliker and Barry, 249.



were by this time loudly criticising what they considered to be their limited voice in Canada's governmental and societal affairs. Secondly, several provinces had begun to challenge the powers of the federal government by seeking to conduct aspects of international relations for themselves. The government of Quebec in particular came to believe that it had a moral right as the representative of Canada's French-speaking people and a legal right under Canada's constitution to establish its own ties with other French-speaking peoples around the world.<sup>649</sup> Beginning with the opening of its delegation general in Paris in 1961, the government of Quebec increasingly exerted this right throughout the 1960s, though it achieved its greatest successes with France. The government of Quebec's interest in establishing ties with French Africa took longer to develop. In fact, the federal government itself precipitated Quebec's attempts to claim responsibility for a share of Canada's relations with French Africa, not the other way around, when the allocation of more aid for this part of the world in 1964 made such efforts attractive for Quebec.<sup>650</sup> Thirdly, Canada's deteriorating relations with France

---

<sup>648</sup> See Robin Gendron, "Educational Assistance for French Africa and the Canada-Quebec Dispute over Responsibility for Foreign Affairs, 1960-1966" *International Journal* Winter 2000-2001, 19-36.

<sup>649</sup> See, for example, the analyses of Quebec's growing interest in international affairs in Morin, *L'Art de l'impossible* and Balthazar, Bélanger, Mace et collaborateurs, *Trente ans de politique extérieure du Québec, 1960-1990*.

<sup>650</sup> The government of Quebec's desire to assume responsibility for a large part of the educational assistance programme for French Africa, for example, manifested itself in late 1964, after the federal government had greatly increased the size of the aid programme and its impact on French Africa. Faced with the now substantial federal aid programme for French Africa, some of Quebec's officials began to argue that because Quebec was home to 80% of Canada's francophones, Quebec should be responsible for 80% of all of Canada's aid for French-speaking countries. Archives Nationale du Québec, E42, 2C 012-04-01-003B-01, 1990-09-002 Art. 420, file 4.5.1A, Memo, *Objectifs à atteindre dans la négociation avec le Bureau fédéral de l'aide extérieure au sujet de la participation du Ministère de l'Éducation à l'envoi d'enseignants à l'étranger*, Gaston Cholette to Paul Gérin-Lajoie, 8 February 1965.

precipitated the need to strengthen relations with other French-speaking countries as a way of proving that the federal government responded to the needs of French Canadians.<sup>651</sup> Together, these factors drove the Canadian government's interest in expanded relations with French Africa.

The focus of the Canadian government's interest in French Africa after 1963 thus shifted from its international Cold War context to the domestic context of promoting harmony between French and English-speaking Canadians, maintaining national unity, and preserving the powers of the federal government from provincial challenges. These motives gave the Canadian government a direct need for strong ties with French Africa, something that still did not exist in terms of trade, investment, immigration or other opportunities. Nevertheless, the shift in focus was not so abrupt or severe that Canadian officials ignored the Cold War struggle for influence in the French African countries. Similarly, the Canadian government remained anxious after 1963 to co-ordinate, as far as possible, its policies towards French Africa with France, in order not to intrude too far into a French preserve. The French government officially encouraged Canadian efforts towards French Africa,<sup>652</sup> but Canadian officials nonetheless detected reluctance by some French officials to countenance the erosion of France's influence in the region. Consequently, Canadian officials frequently considered ways for Canada to work with

---

<sup>651</sup> During the 1960s, the French government increasingly encouraged Quebec's efforts to establish its own international identity. J. F. Bosher, *The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997*, chs. 2-3.

<sup>652</sup> In January 1964, Charles de Gaulle and Lester Pearson issued a joint communiqué following Pearson's visit to Paris wherein they declared Canada and France's intention co-ordinate their aid policies for French Africa. "Bulletins des Affaires extérieures," Vol. XVI (2), février 1964.

France in the provision of developmental assistance to the French-speaking countries of Africa and even consulted with French officials to this effect on an increasingly frequent basis from 1964 to 1967. There were, however, few concrete results from these consultations.<sup>653</sup>

The Canadian government had hoped that these discussions would improve the effectiveness of Canada's aid for French Africa. It was also hoped that co-operation in the field of development assistance would help improve Canada's relations with France, which had continued to deteriorate as France grew more disenchanted with NATO and as Charles de Gaulle appeared willing to encourage the aspirations of the government of Quebec.<sup>654</sup> The withdrawal of France from NATO in 1966 and the signing of an entente between the governments of France and Quebec in 1965, however, indicated to Canadian officials that Canada's relations with France were not likely to improve, at least in the short term. This realisation had two important consequences for Canada's relations with the French-speaking countries of Africa. It increased the importance of relations with French Africa as an alternative way for the federal government to reflect Canada's bilingualism and bi-culturalism in its foreign policies. It also helped overcome the Canadian government's reluctance to intrude upon France's sphere of influence in Africa.

Thus, by 1967, the federal government was fully prepared to defend its interests

---

<sup>653</sup> The results of these discussions were limited because the French believed that Canada had more to gain from co-operation than France. Canadian officials, on the other hand, worried that France's much larger aid programmes would subsume Canadian aid, eliminating the visibility of the Canadian content and undermining Canadian control over its aid. *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>654</sup> See Thomson, *Vive le Québec libre*.

through a vigorous campaign for influence with the French African states. The effects of Charles de Gaulle's visit to Quebec during Expo 67 and the de Gaulle inspired invitation for Quebec to participate in Libreville Conference compelled the Canadian government to act. It had been campaigning since 1966 for its right to participate in any international association of French-speaking countries but in late 1967, worried that Quebec might be invited to join these associations, Canadian politicians and diplomats redoubled their efforts to cultivate French Africa.<sup>655</sup> When Quebec's Minister of Education was invited to Libreville, the Canadian government responded with both a carrot and a stick. It severed diplomatic relations with Gabon and sent Lionel Chevrier to the rest of French Africa with promises of increased aid from Canada. The threat of Canadian displeasure was reinforced by the fact that Gabon did not receive any commitments from the Chevrier mission.

Thereafter, the Canadian government engaged in an open struggle with the governments of France and Quebec over the latter's participation in the emerging international community known as *la francophonie*. This struggle necessitated strong ties between Canada and the French African countries in order to secure their support for Canada and to prevent Quebec from achieving its own independent membership in this community. The process of securing these ties however, had already been under way for

---

<sup>655</sup> From November 1967 to January 1968 Canadian diplomats visited all of the French African governments to explain the Canadian government's position that it, not Quebec, should be invited to the conference in Libreville. See, for example, NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10685, file 26-2-CDA-QUE pt 1, Tel 2130, Canadian Ambassador, Lagos to External, 27 November 1967 and NAC, RG 25, Vol. 10683, file 26-1 pt 4, Memo, *Jean Coté's call on President Senghor*, G. Riddell to USSEA, 30 November 1967.

several years, beginning with the creation of the educational assistance programme for French Africa and the opening of Canada's first embassy in a French African country in 1961. Yet, it must be remembered that two factors conditioned the evolution of Canada's relations with French Africa during the 1950s and the 1960s: the shift in emphasis from the international to the domestic context for French Africa's importance to Canada and the nature of Canada's relations with France. Until the federal government became convinced of the need to pursue substantial relations with French Africa for reasons relating to the political environment within Canada itself, there was little incentive to establish direct relations with French-speaking African countries. Even then, the federal government had to balance its interest in French Africa against its desire to maintain friendly relations with France.

John Boshier argued that the Canadian government tolerated Gaullist support for Quebec separatists in the mid-to-late 1960s and thereafter. Boshier based this contention on his belief that Canada failed to respond to Gaullist aggression. He ignores, however, the degree to which the federal government recognised the futility of confronting France directly and instead responded to Quebec and France's initiatives by reaching a *modus vivendi* with the government of Quebec regarding *la francophonie* and by courting the French-speaking states of Africa. It had taken more than a decade for the Canadian government to develop the capacity and the will to pursue its interests through relations with the French African states, but by the end of the 1960s it had determined upon a proactive policy of active engagement in and with French Africa as one way to defend Canada's sovereignty and interests. Despite some initial uncertainty about the nature of

Canada's involvement in French Africa, the Canadian government had finally acknowledged the need for extensive and intimate ties with the region.

## Bibliography

### **Archives Nationales du Quebec (ANQ):**

E 42 – Fonds de la Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales

P 422 – Fonds Andre Patry

P 688 – Fonds Jean Lesage

### **Archives of the Diefenbaker Centre (ADC), University of Saskatchewan:**

MG 01 – Diefenbaker Papers

### **National Archives of Canada (NAC):**

MG 32 A 3 – Jules Léger Papers

RG 2 – Privy Council Office

RG 20 – Department of Trade and Commerce

RG 24 – Department of National Defence

RG 25 – Department of External Affairs

### **Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, France:**

Série Amérique 1945-52, Sous-série Canada

Série Amérique 1953-62, Sous-série Canada

Série Amérique 1963-70, Sous-série Canada

Série Mission Liaison Algérienne, Sous-Série Action Extérieure

### **Unpublished theses and papers:**

Audet, Jean-Pierre. Le Canada et l'OTAN, 1949-1956: L'émergence d'une politique extérieure canadienne. Mémoire de Maîtrise. Université de Sherbrooke, 1995.

- Delaney, Patrick J. The Canadian Decision to Enter NATO: A Case-Study in Bureaucratic Politics. MA Thesis. Dalhousie University, 1983.
- Deleuze, Magalie. (Universite de Montreal), *Le Québec et la guerre d'Algerie (1954-64): L'apport des medias en histoire des relations internationales*. 1998 Conference of the Canadian Historical Association, Sherbrooke.
- Gagnon, Richard. Le Québec dans le monde. MA Thesis. University of Ottawa, 1980.
- Gendron, Robin S. A Question of North Atlantic Security: Canada's Reaction to the Independence Movement in Algeria, 1954-1962. MA Thesis. University of Calgary, 1996.
- Macfarlane, John, "French-Canadian Views on Collective Security, 1945-1950," Paper given to the Canada and War Conference, Ottawa, May 2000.
- McLellan, Derek John. Canada-France Relations, 1940-1947. MA Thesis. University of New Brunswick, 1993.

**Published Primary Sources:**

- Canada. *Canada and the United Nations*.
- Canada. *Documents on Canadian External Relations*.
- Canada. *Statements and Speeches*.
- JW Pickersgill. *The Mackenzie King Record*.

**Newspapers:**

- Le Devoir*
- The Globe and Mail
- La Presse*
- The Winnipeg Free Press

**Published Secondary Sources:**

- Ageron, Charles-Robert. La décolonisation française. Paris: Armand Colin, 1991.
- Aimaq, Jasmine. For Europe or Empire? French Colonial Ambitions and the European



- Army Plan. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
- Aldrich, Robert. Greater France: A History of French Overseas Expansion. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996.
- Andrew, Arthur. Rise and fall of a middle power. Toronto: J. Lorrimer, 1993.
- Balthazar, Louis, Bélanger, Louis, Mace, Gordon et collaborateurs. Trente ans de politique extérieure du Québec 1960-1990. Sillery: Les éditions du Septentrion, 1993.
- Bastien, Frédéric. Relations particulières: La France face au Québec après de Gaulle. Montreal: Boréal, 1999.
- Bercuson, David J. Blood on the Hills: the Canadian Army in the Korean War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.
- Maple Leaf Against the Axis: Canada's Second World War. Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1995.
- Bergeron, Gérard. Incertitudes d'un certain pays: le Québec et le Canada dans le monde (1958-1978). Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1979.
- Bernard, Stéphane. The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, 1943-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Berstein, Serge. The Republic of de Gaulle. Peter Morris trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Black, Eldon. Direct Intervention: Canada-France Relations, 1967-1974. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996.
- Bosher, John. The Gaullist Attack on Canada, 1967-1997. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999.
- Bothwell, Robert. The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War. Concord, Ont.: Irwin Publishing, 1998.
- Bourgi, Robert. Le Général de Gaulle et l'Afrique Noire, 1940-1969. Paris: R. Pichon & R. Durand-Auzias, 1980.
- Bozo, Frédéric. La politique étrangère de la France depuis 1945. Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 1997.
- Bridges, Roy ed. Imperialism, Decolonization and Africa. New York: Palgrave, 2000.
- Carmoy, Guy de. The Foreign Policies of France, 1944-1968. Elaine P. Halperin trans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Cerny, Philip G. The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Chester, Edward W. Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1974.

- Chevrier, Bernard. Lionel Chevrier: un homme de combat. Vanier, Ont.: Les Éditions L'Interligne, 1997.
- Chikeka, Charles O. Britain, France and the New African States. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1990.
- Chipman, John. French Power in Africa. Cambridge, Ma.: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989.
- Cook, Don. Charles de Gaulle. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1983.
- Corbett, Edward M. The French Presence in Black Africa. Washington D.C.: Black Orpheus Press, Inc., 1972.
- Dalloz, Jacques. La France et le monde depuis 1945. Paris: Armand Colin, 1993.
- Davies, David ed. Canada and the Soviet Experiment. Toronto: University of Toronto Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994.
- Dion, Léon. La Révolution déroulée, 1960-1976. Montreal: Les Éditions Boréal, 1998.
- Dronne, Raymond. Vie et mort d'un empire. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1989.
- Duignan, Peter and Gann, L.H. The United States and Africa: a History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Eayrs, James. In Defence of Canada, Vol. 3: Peacemaking and Deterrence. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.
- In Defence of Canada, Vol. 4: Growing Up Allied. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.
- In Defence of Canada, Vol. 5: Indochina, Roots of Complicity. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.
- English, John. The Worldly Years: the Life of Lester Pearson, 1949-1972. Toronto: Vintage Books, 1993.
- Feldman, Elliot J. and Gardner Feldman, Lily, "The impact of federalism on the organization of Canadian foreign policy," Publius 14 (autumn 1984).
- Fieldhouse, D.K. Black Africa, 1945-80: Economic Decolonization and Arrested Development. London: Allen & Unwin Publishers Ltd., 1986.
- Friedman, Norman. The Fifty-Year War: Conflict and Strategy in the Cold War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000.
- de Gaulle, Charles. Memoirs of Hope. Terence Kilmartin trans. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.
- Gendron, Robin S., "Educational Aid for French Africa and the Canada-Quebec Dispute over Foreign Policy in the 1960s," in International Journal, Vol. 56 (1). 19-36.
- "Tempered Sympathy: Canada's Reaction to the Independence Movement in Algeria, 1954-1962," in Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 1998, Vol.

9. 225-231.

- Gérin-Lajoie, Paul. Combats d'un révolutionnaire tranquille. Montreal: Centre Éducatif et Culturel, Inc., 1989.
- Giles, Frank. The Locust Years: The Story of the Fourth French Republic, 1946-1958. London: Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1991.
- Gingras, Marcel. Diefenbaker et le Canada français. Vanier, Ont.: Les Éditions L'Interligne, 1997.
- Girard, Charlotte S.M. Canada in World Affairs, Volume 13: 1963 to 65. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1972.
- Godin, Pierre. La Fin de la grande noirceur: La Révolution tranquille. Montreal: Boréal, 1991.
- Golan, Galia. The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
- Good, Mabel Tinkiss. Chevrier. Montreal: Stanké, 1987.
- Granatstein, J.L. Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.
- Granatstein, J.L. and Bothwell, Robert. Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian foreign policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Gros d'Aillon, Paul. Daniel Johnson: l'égalité avant l'indépendance. Montreal: Stanké, 1979.
- Groulx, Lionel. Le Canada français missionnaire. Montréal: Fides, 1962.
- Guillaume, Pierre, "Aide au développement et présence canadienne en Afrique," Année africain 1976.
- Harrison, Alexander. Challenging de Gaulle: The OAS and the Counterrevolution in Algeria, 1954-1962. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Harrison, Michael M. The Reluctant Ally: France and Atlantic Security. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981
- Harrison, W.E.C. Canada in World Affairs, Volume 6: 1949 to 1950. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1957.
- Heintzman, Ralph, "The Spirit of Confederation: Professor Creighton, Biculturalism and the Use of History," Canadian Historical Review 52(3), 245-275.
- Hilliker, John and Barry, Donald. Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.
- Hitchcock, William I. France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954. Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North

- Carolina Press, 1998.
- Holmes, John W. The Shaping of Peace, Vol. 1: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.
- The Shaping of Peace, Vol. 2: Canada and the search for world order, 1943-1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982.
- Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. New York: The Viking Press, 1977.
- James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
- Julien, Charles-André. L'Afrique du nord en marche. Paris: René Julliard, 1972.
- Kahler, Miles. Decolonization in Britain and France. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Kaplan, Lawrence S. The Long Entanglement: NATO's First Fifty Years. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999.
- Keirstead, B.S. Canada in World Affairs, Volume 7: 1951 to 1953. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Kent, John. The Internationalization of Colonialism: Britain, France and Black Africa, 1939-56. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
- Knowles, Valerie. Strangers at our gates: Canadian immigration and immigration policy, 1540-1995. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
- Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970. Alan Sheridan trans. London: Harvill, 1991.
- De Gaulle: Le Politique, 1944-1959. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1984.
- Lacroix-Riz, Annie. Les protectorats d'Afrique du Nord entre la France et Washington. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1988.
- Ledwidge, Bernard. De Gaulle. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., 1982.
- Lee, Steven Hugh. Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995.
- Legault, Albert. Une diplomatie de l'espoir: le Canada et le désarmement, 1945-1988. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1989.
- Léger, Jean-Marc. La Francophonie: grand dessein, grande ambiguïté. Montréal: Hurtubise HMH, 1987.
- Lescop, Renée. Le pari québécois du général de Gaulle. Montréal: Les Éditions du Boréal Express, 1981.

- Lewis, William H. ed. French-Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity. New York: Walker and Company, 1965.
- Ling, Dwight L. Morocco and Tunisia: A Comparative History. Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1979.
- Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.
- Lloyd, Trevor. Canada in World Affairs, Volume X: 1957-1959. Toronto: Canadian Institute for International Affairs, 1968.
- Loiselle, Jean. Daniel Johnson: Le Québec d'abord. Montreal: VLB éditeur, 1999.
- de Lusignan, Guy. French-Speaking Africa Since Independence. London: Pall Mall Press, 1969.
- Lyon, Peyton V. and Ismael, Tareq. Canada and the Third World. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976.
- Lyon, Peyton V. Canada in World Affairs, Volume 12: 1961 to 63. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Mackenzie, Hector. "Canada, the Cold War and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty." In Diplomatic Documents and Their Users. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1995.
- Martin, Paul. A Very Public Life, Volume II. Toronto: Deneau, 1985.
- McIntyre, W. David. British Decolonisation, 1946-1997. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.
- Merom, Gil. "A 'Grand Design'? Charles de Gaulle and the End of the Algerian War." In Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 25 (2), Winter 1999. pp 267-288.
- Morin, Claude. L'Art de l'impossible. Montreal: Les Éditions du Boréal Express, 1987.
- Les Choses comme elles étaient. Montreal: Boréal, 1994.
- Morris-Jones, W.H. and Fischer, Georges eds. Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1980.
- Munro, John A. and Inglis, Alex eds. Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Volume 3. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975.
- Munton Don and Kirton John eds. Canadian Foreign Policy, Selected Cases. Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1992.
- Newhouse, John. De Gaulle and the Anglo-Saxons. New York: Viking Press, 1970.
- Norrie, Kenneth and Owrap, Doug. A History of the Canadian Economy, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1996.
- O'Neill, Pierre and Benjamin, Jacques. Les Mandarins du pouvoir: l'exercice du pouvoir

- au Québec de Jean Lesage à René Lévesque. Montreal: Éditions Québec/Amérique, 1978.
- Orde, Anne. The Eclipse of Great Britain: The United States and British Imperial Decline, 1895-1956. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- Pagedas, Constantine. Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960-1963. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
- Painchaud, Paul ed. Le Canada et le Québec sur la scène internationale. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1977.
- From Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: forty years of Canadian diplomacy, 1945-1985. Quebec: Laval University Press, 1989.
- Patry, André. Le Québec dans le monde. Ottawa: Éditions Leméac Inc., 1980.
- Pervillé, Guy. De l'Empire français à la décolonisation. Paris: Hachette, 1991.
- Peyrefitte, Alain. De Gaulle et le Québec. Montréal: Stanké, 2000.
- Planchais, Jean. L'Empire embrasé, 1946-1962. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1990.
- Preston, Richard A. Canada in World Affairs, Volume 11: 1959 to 1961. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Quinn, Frederick. The French Overseas Empire. Westport: Praeger, 2000.
- Reid, Escott. Envoy to Nehru. London: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1977.
- Renwick, Robin. Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War. New York: Random House Inc., 1996.
- Rioux, Jean-Pierre. The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958. Godfrey Rogers trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Robinson, H. Basil. Diefenbaker's World. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989.
- Ross, Douglas. In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam, 1954-1973. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984.
- Ruscio, Alain. La décolonisation tragique, 1945-1962. Paris: Éditions Messidor, 1987.
- Schlegel, John P. The Deceptive Ash: Bilingualism in Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa. Washington: University Press of America, 1978.
- Schlesinger Jr., Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965.
- Schraeder, Peter J. United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

- Smith, Denis. The Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988.
- Smith, Tony. The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978.
- Sorum, Paul Clay. Intellectuals and Decolonization in France. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977.
- Speaight, Robert. Vanier: Soldier, Diplomat and Governor General. Suffolk: Collins and Harvill Press, 1970.
- Stairs, Denis. The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974.
- Stacey, C. P. Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies Volume 2, 1921-1948. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981.
- Thomas, Martin. The French Empire at War, 1940-1945. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998.
- The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations 1945-1962. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
- Thomson, Dale C. Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984.
- Louis St. Laurent: Canadian. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968.
- Vive le Québec libre. Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1988.
- Tint, Herbert. French Foreign Policy since the Second World War. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Ltd., 1972.
- Valette, Jacques. La France et l'Afrique, volume 2: L'Afrique française du Nord 1914-1962. Paris: Sedes, 1994.
- La France et l'Afrique, volume 1: L'Afrique subsaharienne de 1914 à 1960. Paris: Sedes, 1994.
- Vinen, Richard. France, 1934-1970. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996.
- Wall, Irwin, "The United States, Algeria and the Fall of the Fourth Republic," Diplomatic History 18 (Fall 1994).
- Whitaker, Reg and Marcuse, Gary. Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.
- White, Nicholas J. Decolonisation: The British Experience Since 1945. New York: Longman Limited, 1999.
- Wood, Robert S. France in the World Community: Decolonization, Peacekeeping and the United Nations. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1973.

Young, John W. France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Zahniser, Marvin. Uncertain Friendship: American-French Diplomatic Relations Through the Cold War. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975.



## Appendices

## Appendix A

Canada's Exports to French Africa, 1963-67 (in thousands of dollars)					
Country	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Algeria	3,970	1,220	228	965	2,674
Cameroon	24	39	157	199	249
Congo (Kinshasa)	921	1,127	872	956	586
Ivory Coast	17	66	49	88	246
Dahomey	--	--	--	161	120
Gabon	14	146	31	294	560
Guinea	--	4	81	728	42
Madagascar	--	--	108	45	32
Morocco	963	667	391	297	3,725
Mauritania	258	168	657	123	114
Senegal	--	--	--	184	1,314
Togo	349	443	317	585	354
Tunisia	1,970	327	86	196	93
Others	91	214	226	117	291
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$8,558</b>	<b>\$4,421</b>	<b>\$3,203</b>	<b>\$4,938</b>	<b>\$10,300</b>

Source: NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2867 file 810-F6-1, *Commerce canadien avec le Maghreb et l'Afrique francophone*.

## Appendix B

<b>Canada's Imports from French Africa, 1963-67 (in thousands of dollars)</b>					
<b>Country</b>	<b>1963</b>	<b>1964</b>	<b>1965</b>	<b>1966</b>	<b>1967</b>
Algeria	458	79	97	47	245
Cameroon	147	43	121	57	106
Congo (Kinshasa)	1,921	1,911	1,661	1,081	1,374
Ivory Coast	227	622	247	814	700
Dahomey	--	--	--	--	5
Gabon	859	687	274	1,064	317
Guinea	2,501	1,707	1,066	2,088	2,265
Madagascar	--	--	668	538	250
Morocco	540	1,162	278	1,406	2,465
Mauritania	--	--	--	--	12
Senegal	--	--	--	340	13
Togo	--	--	6	--	1
Tunisia	2	19	19	12	512
Others	310	1,263	68	201	31
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$6,865</b>	<b>\$7,493</b>	<b>\$4,505</b>	<b>\$7,648</b>	<b>\$8,296</b>

Source: NAC, RG 20, Vol. 2867 file 810-F6-1, *Commerce canadien avec le Maghreb et l'Afrique francophone.*