An Intelligence Advantage: Collective Security Benefits gained by Canada through the sharing of Military Intelligence with the United States of America

Major H.A. Skaarup CD
Intelligence Branch # 296

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The War Studies program at RMC has provided the opportunity for many Canadian Forces officers like myself to take advantage of a post-graduate program. Without it, the opportunities for such an education are difficult to come by. As an Army officer I've had the privilege of being a member of the Intelligence Branch, whose motto is "E Tenebris Lux", which translates from Latin as "Out of Darkness, Light". The motto could equally apply to the RMC War Studies Program.

ABSTRACT:

"Canada has close formal intelligence relationships with a number of countries. The closest of these were forged during the Second World War and solidified during the Cold War. Links remain particularly strong with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand." Intelligence products, analyses and assessments are exchanged, and technical assistance is provided by each to the others. Through these relationships, "Canada is provided with information and technological resources that would otherwise be unobtainable" with current resources.[1]

A wide range of general military cooperation is necessary before intelligence cooperation can begin. Canada obtained a head start with America when the Permanent Joint Board for Defence (PJBD) was set up in 1940. Both nations wisely chose to continue this cooperation after the war. To ignore or refuse the benefits gained by this continuing cooperation would endanger the lives of the many Canadians presently deployed overseas. Many other countries (such as those from the former Warsaw Pact) would gladly seize the chance to participate in the benefits and privileges of intelligence sharing enjoyed by Canada with the Americans. This paper will explore the background on how Canada came to have a solid base in the field of military intelligence and why arrangements for intelligence sharing with the United States have been beneficial.

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[1] *Auditor's Report on the Canadian Intelligence Community, 1996*, INTERNET, 25 February 1997.

INTRODUCTION:

> **A great part of the information obtained in War is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgement can give. The law of probability must be his guide.**[2]

Intelligence. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines it as "information, news; (persons employed in) collecting information, especially that of military value."[3] The "persons" referred to, are often called intelligence officers, operators, or analysts. Although the personal characteristics of these people are varied, they often have much in common. Brigadier-General Oscar W. Koch, the G2 Intelligence officer for General George Smith Patton Jr., noted that each of the intelligence officers he worked with,

> possessed imagination, initiative and mental flexibility. Each was a willing worker, a methodical detail man and organizer. Each was able to work quietly and in harmony with others; none was a worrier, unable to relax. Every one got along well with and could supervise others, and was able to think on his feet and express himself well.[4]

Koch stated that "liaison visits and the exchange of ideas with other headquarters" were essential to the gathering of first hand intelligence. He put his strongest emphasis on the key ingredient necessary for an intelligence officer, "matter-of-fact

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[2] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (London, Penguin Books, 1957, 1992), [Vom Kriege, 1832], p. 162.

[3] J.B. Sykes, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, Seventh Edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 521.

[4] Brigadier-General Oscar W. Koch, *G2: Intelligence for Patton*, (Philadelphia, Whitmore Pub. Coy., 1971), p. 121-122.

feet-on-the-ground common sense."[5] Koch noted that the concept of a G2 Intelligence team was of critical importance, as "no one individual could handle all intelligence affairs and provide all the answers to all the questions that required answers."[6]

Colonel Peter E.R. Wright, who was the senior army G2 Intelligence Officer in the First Canadian Army overseas during World War II noted, however, that "the primary duty of Intelligence is to give the Commander whatever information he requires about the enemy and to bring any significant changes to his notice immediately."[7] He further noted that "intelligence in any formation is based on confidence", and that there must be "direct access to the Commander and his principal staff officer." This in turn means that "the Intelligence Officer, who is as subject to error as anyone else, must always be prompt and clear in admitting his mistakes."[8]

The idea of teamwork and intelligence sharing at the tactical level is not a new one, nor is defence cooperation between allied nations at the strategic level. Intelligence sharing between Canada and the United States however, is not often discussed in the literature presently available. Military cooperation between the two nations officially began in 1940,

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[5] Ibid, p. 123.

[6] Ibid, p. 123.

[7] Colonel P.E.R. Wright, *First Canadian Army Final Intelligence Report*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), p. 5.

[8] Ibid, p. 6.

when "the Prime Minister and the President met to discuss their mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. The two leaders agreed to set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence" (PJBD).[9]

Intelligence cooperation with the United States, Britain and Australia is conducted on a regular basis. The seventh meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group on Intelligence for example, which took place in August 1996 "provided an excellent means of exchanging information on operational and technological advances and challenges in the area of intelligence", according to the delegates attending.[10] National presentations at this meeting included updates on "US conceptual thinking and intelligence planning for the next century; the Canadian Intelligence Master Development Plan, (IMDP); Australian intelligence development within their Army; and the UK development of a Joint Headquarters and a Joint Contingency Force."[11]

One question that will be dealt with in this paper is: do the collective security benefits gained by Canada through the exchange of military intelligence with the United States result

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[9] The Ogdensburg Declaration, 18 Aug 1940. Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 9.

[10] *American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program, Memorandum For Record, Seventh Meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group on Intelligence (7 QWG INT)* at Fort Huachuca Arizona, USA, 26-30 August 1996, covering page.

[11] Ibid, p. vii.

in greater security for Canada? This thesis will argue that they do. There are many overlooked and often misunderstood aspects of Canadian military intelligence cooperation with the United States. It is argued that Canada has benefitted from active defence cooperation within the alliance since at least 1940. This cooperation has not been free. It requires that Canada also supply information as the price of cooperation, but it is an acceptable price. It will be demonstrated that there has been no compromise of Canada's sovereignty and, in fact, the security of the nation and particularly of its soldiers has been enhanced because of the benefits accrued.

As will be demonstrated, there are a great number of participants within the American Intelligence Community, each of which may offer a widely varying (and often conflicting) assessment of specific events requiring intelligence analysis. This is a major reason why Canada must make its own determinations and judgements concerning the validity of all shared intelligence products. Shared information may be provided not necessarily because it meets the end user's needs, but because it may also suit the providers best interests. Canada has been made acutely aware that when data is exchanged between nations, political, military, economic and practical concerns must be considered. This is particularly true whenever decisions that are made based on the data provided involve a risk in lives, national security or the commitment of scarce resources.

Although Canada's Armed Forces have a long military history,

the subject of military intelligence organizations within them has largely been ignored by historians. Perhaps because of its secretive nature, intelligence must play a less than visible role in the eyes of the nation. There are many advantages to this state of affairs, but also certain drawbacks. The Canadian government for example, continues to deploy its Armed Forces personnel on increasingly dangerous missions overseas. To carry out these various missions with any degree of safety (not to mention success) requires a considerable amount of foreknowledge, planning and preparation to deal with the variety of life threatening situations likely to be found when they get there. This in turn means that there is an even greater need for the provision of thoroughly analyzed information which has been processed and disseminated in a useful form of intelligence to the Canadian government and its military decision makers. If the means available to aid in the decision making process are not acknowledged and utilised, then decisions made to deploy forces overseas will be based on a weak information foundation. This endangers the lives of the personnel being sent.

This paper will demonstrate that Canada has enjoyed a high level of security in the past and continues to maintain it, both for the nation and for its roughly 2,100 servicemen and women abroad. This is partly due to the fact that Canada and its leaders have been forward looking and forward thinking in their decisions to gain and maintain military cooperation in general, particularly with its American ally and specifically in the field

of military intelligence. When Canada and the United States set up formal ties for military cooperation in the form of the PJBD in 1940, both nations began to progressively set in place a series of bi-lateral agreements to exchange intelligence information without either nation sacrificing a significant degree of sovereignty. Similar agreements are also in place with other allies, including the UK, Australia and New Zealand.

Although it will be shown that there are specific cases where Canada appears to have relinquished some degree of sovereignty (in the NORAD treaty agreement for example), it is also the case that in the process, its American partner has had to some extent done the same. The end result has been a higher degree of security for both nations.

This thesis also demonstrates that although the various bi-lateral defence agreements included arrangements for intelligence sharing, they did not necessarily lock-step Canada into US defence policy. Although there were sacrifices made by both nations in fulfilling these agreements, the benefits have far outweighed the drawbacks and in fact, continue to do so.

These benefits will be outlined in the following pages through a pre and post World War Two historical overview and, an examination of Canadian intelligence sharing with its American ally through the offices of NORAD, Maritime Command and NATO.

CHAPTER I

CANADIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE:

> **What enables an intelligent government and a wise military leadership to overcome others and achieve extraordinary accomplishments is foreknowledge.**[12]

One of the earliest recorded examples of intelligence gathering can be found in the Bible. Sometime between 1280 and 1250 BC Moses guided his people from Egypt towards a new land to the North East. In the book of Numbers it is recorded that he sent a leader from each of the 12 tribes of Israel to spy out the land of Canaan.[13] He gave very specific direction to his information gathering "reconnaissance" scouts and it is no coincidence that commanders to this day do the same. Commanders in the Canadian Forces (CF) must have a solid understanding of what intelligence is and, more importantly, what it can do for them. They are therefore required to provide firm direction to their intelligence staffs in order to obtain the best results from the reconnaissance assets available to them.[14]

The CF defines Intelligence as:

> the product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the

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[12] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Thomas Cleary (Boston: Shambala, 1991), p. 110.

[13] Although these spies succeeded in their mission, they deliberately exaggerated the threat. The consequence of this was the commencement of a forty year tour of the Sinai by the Israelites. *The Holy Bible*, Numbers Chapter 13, verses 2-19.

[14] Personal observation.

activity which results in the product and to the organization engaged in such activity.[15]

The planning and successful conduct of any military operation requires the provision of accurate and timely intelligence well before the mission begins. "Military intelligence" staffs are therefore tasked to "provide the specific intelligence required by commanders to enable them to carry out the missions inherent in the tasks assigned to them."[16]

There are three key pieces of intelligence data that a commander must know before engaging in battle. Estimates and appreciations must be completed on the **enemy** (or in peacetime parlance, the opposing forces [OPFOR] he is required to deal with), the ground (or "**terrain**") he will be required to operate on, as well as the **weather** conditions at the time of his mission.

A large variety of intelligence gathering sources and agencies are used to support a modern combat commander. It is his job to direct the focus of these resources. His direction begins the process known as "the intelligence cycle" wherein the required information is collected, processed (collated and interpreted) and disseminated in a practical manner designed to aid the commander in his decision making. A highly sophisticated Intelligence Collection and Analysis Centre (ICAC) operated by 1st Canadian Division Intelligence Company (1 Cdn Div Int Coy)

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[15] *B-GL-315-002/FT-001* Combat Intelligence (First Draft), (FMC HQ, July 1988), p. 1-2.

[16] FMCO 25-1, *(Force Mobile Command Order 25-1)*, (St Hubert, Quebec, 1985), p. 1.

provides "all source intelligence to the Division Commander through the G2" (intelligence staff officer).[17]

Intelligence Sections in operation throughout the Land, Sea and Air elements of the CF produce a staggering amount of useful intelligence product on areas to which CF personnel must be prepared to deploy. These areas have recently included Croatia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Golan Heights, El Salvador and Guatemala.[18]

Although ground based reconnaissance patrols are still the most reliable intelligence collection asset used by the CF, a vast array of electronic hardware and computer software is now a required part of any Command Post (CP).

> Automatic Data Processing (ADP) facilities are increasingly being provided to assist military staff in the exercise of their command control and intelligence (C2I) duties. Communications provide reliable access to these ADP facilities and maintain the accuracy and mutual consistency of the distributed data bases on which operational decisions are made. In any situation, a commander must be able to depend on good command, control and communications (C3) over his work forces so that his fighting assets are optimised.[19]

Good C2I and C3 provide the modern Canadian battle commander with the effective support that is instrumental in bringing his plans to a successful conclusion.

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[17] *1 Intelligence Company, ICAC Standing Operating Procedures, Vol 1, Operations*, (LFC ICAC SOP 1001, 1996) Section 103, para 1.

[18] Canadian Forces Situation Reports 1996-97.

[19] A.M. Wilcox et al, *Command, Control and Communications (C3)*, (Toronto: Brasseys Defence Publisher, 1983), p. 1.

Learning the business of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) did not begin overnight in the CF. Canada's security requirements have caused it to establish a long and highly successful pattern of military intelligence cooperation with its allies, particularly with Britain and the United States. As argued below, this cooperation in intelligence sharing has in fact, been essential throughout Canada's history.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

Cooperation has always been a critical component of the intelligence process, not just between military personnel, but also between nations. Canada and the United States have often shared intelligence of mutual value, much as they have shared a common history up to the days before the American Revolution.

The present "Canadian Military Intelligence Community traces its" specific origins back "to those British and French officers who were employed at various times in the early history of Canada as scouts, guides, agents, liaison officers and on other similar duties."[20] Early cooperation between Britain and Canada in America occurred during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), when "a unit named the 'Yankee Rangers' was employed in a reconnaissance role and conducted scouting duties." In the "planning" for the "seizure of Quebec, General Wolfe kept most" of the available "Intelligence in his own hands, personally interrogating

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[20] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Intelligence Corps*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), p. 2.

deserters, questioning spies and Rangers, reading intercepted letters and conducting his own reconnaissance."[21]

"The British Army of the 19th Century, which included the Canadian colonial militia, owed much of its organization and procedures to principles laid down by the Duke of Wellington." Wellington had observed "Napoleon's" reconnaissance forces known as the *"Corps des Guides-Interprètes"* in action during his campaigns and formed a similar "Corps of Guides" on 02 June 1809. Wellington's Guide units were composed of irregular light horsemen tasked to observe enemy movements and to collect information. "A small group of specialist junior officers" made "maps and sketches" of "local terrain."[22]

"Wellington's Guides disappeared at the end of the Napoleonic Wars" in 1814, but a similar organization known as the *Indian Corps of Guides* was brought into effect by Sir Harry Lawrence on "14 December 1846" to keep the North-West Frontier of India "under surveillance."[23] Canada took note of India's Guides and determined that a similar mounted unit would be highly effective on the Canadian frontier. "The *4th Troop of Volunteer Cavalry of Montreal* (or *Guides*), was formed on 07 February 1862." The "Guides were called out to help repel Fenian raiders"

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[21] Anthony Clayton, *Forearmed, A History of the Intelligence Corps*, (London: Brasseys (UK), 1993), p. 2.

[22] Ibid, p. 3-4.

[23] Major Robert Stuart Elliot, *Scarlet to Green: Canadian Army Intelligence 1903-1963*, (Toronto: CISA, 1981), p. 2.

attacking Canada from the United States in 1866. The Guides fought well, but were later disbanded on 13 August 1869.[24]

The Fenian raids sparked an increased interest in national security on the part of the newly formed government of Canada. Thus the earliest agreement between Canada and the United States concerning defence "cooperation", can found in the 1871 *Treaty of Washington*. The document was drafted as a "Treaty Between the United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty for an Amicable Settlement of all Causes of Difference Between the Two Countries." Many more such agreements and treaties for military cooperation would be signed between the two nations.[25]

Among the forces Canada sent to deal with Louis Riel's uprising in the Canadian Northwest in 1884, were various *irregular* cavalry used as scouts. Canada's Minister of Militia and Defence authorized the formation of one such unit "from the Dominion Land Survey department." "Militia Orders called the unit the *Intelligence Corps*, the first such identification in the British Empire."[26] During the North West campaign, "the Scout units" carried out "long-range reconnaissance patrolling, to locate and report on parties of Indians."[27]

7,300 Canadians fought in the South African conflict or

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[24] Ibid, p. 3.

[25] Treaty of Washington, 08 May 1871. Canada Treaty Series, (Toronto: CFCSC Library Collection, 1967), p. 200.

[26] Major R.S. Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 6.

[27] Ibid, p. 9.

"Boer" war (1899-1902). Many of them served in British regular and irregular scout units including "*Howard's Scouts*", "*Ross's Scouts*", or the "*Canadian Scouts*" and *Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)*.[28] Several Canadians trained and served "with the large intelligence organization fielded by the British Army." This organization included a "Director of Military Intelligence" and 63 officers engaged in intelligence staff and field duties.[29]

The success of this intelligence establishment brought it to the attention of the serving "General Officer Commanding (GOC) Canadian Militia, Major-General R.H. O'Grady Haly, C.B., D.S.O., who was attached from the British War Office." Based on his recommendation a similar organization was added to the Canadian Department of the Quarter-Master General. On 06 February 1901, the Canadian Militia appointed its "first Intelligence Staff Officer (ISO), Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Brereton Rivers."[30]

Lieutenant-Colonel Rivers was the first Intelligence officer to serve in the organization that would eventually evolve into the CF Intelligence Branch. His staff work led to the formation of the "*Canadian Corps of Guides*" as authorized by "General Order 61, 01 April 1903."[31] "During active operations the Guides were

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[28] The *Lord Strathcona's Horse* is perpetuated in the present day CF as an armoured unit (LdSH). Ibid, p. 11.

[29] Hart's Army List, 1902-1903; Ibid, p. 11.

[30] LCol Rivers, R.C.A. was a career soldier and a veteran of the battles of Fish Creek and Batoche. Ibid, p. 11-12.

[31] Dan R. Jenkins, *The Corps of Guides, 1903-1914, article, Canadian Military History*, (Vol 5, No 2, Autumn 1996), p. 88.

to act as a combat intelligence force for the Canadian Army in the field, and to provide commanders with intelligence at both the operational and tactical level." The Guides would provide its members with "training and a background in intelligence that would prove indispensable during World War I."[32]

General Order 61 specifically directed that there would be a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) in "each of the 12 Military Districts across Canada, whose duties included command of the Corps of Guides in his District."[33] Each Military District was sub-divided into local Guide Areas. The head of this organization was the "Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI), under the control of the GOC." The first DGMI was "Brevet-Major William A.C. Denny, of the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) psc", a veteran of South Africa. His staff included "Lieutenant-Colonel Rivers as ISO" and "two AISOs, (Captain A.C. Caldwell and Captain W.B. Anderson) responsible respectively for the Information and Mapping Branches", three lieutenants, a Sergeant and two NCOs. "All officers and men in the Districts were Militia."[34] This was the basic organization for military intelligence with which Canada entered the Great War.

Canada was not the only Commonwealth country interested in

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[32] Ibid, p. 88.

[33] These Districts were numbered from 1 to 13, with the number 9 deleted. Major R. S. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 11-12.

[34] Canada's Militia as late as 1913 generally consisted of less than 3000 men. Ibid, p. 14.

forming its own military intelligence organization. In 1905 Australia sent a defence representative (Mr Bridges) to observe the mobilization procedures employed by Canada and other countries with a view to drawing up similar plans for Australia. He found that the system of administration used by the Canadian Army was "similar", in particular with regard to the Intelligence Department.[35]

WORLD WAR I

As part of the British Empire when Britain declared war on 4 August 1914, Canada too found itself at war. "The machinery of strategic intelligence" was at that time "located in, responsible to and managed by" Britain's "Whitehall". "The Canadian Director General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) had been required since 1903 "to gather information on foreign armies, militia and military engineering" and to prepare reports for any army in the field." Militia Headquarters in Ottawa however, "had no direct access to official foreign sources" and agencies and "there were no Canadian offices abroad."[36]

Prior to the war, Ottawa had periodically forwarded

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[35] Bridges prepared a report for the Australian Defence Department recommending the appointment of a Director of Director of Intelligence. He pointed to the Canadian example as a sound arrangement to emulate. C.D. Coulthard-Clark, *The Citizen General Staff-The Australian Intelligence Corps 1907-1914*, (Canberra: Military Historical Society of Australia, 1976), p. 10.

[36] Major R.S. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 23.

intelligence gathered on Canada's military resources to the Colonial Office for use by the Committee of Imperial Defence. This surrender of national secrets and military intelligence clearly demonstrates Canada's continuing colonial status in relation to Great Britain at the time. No independent nation would countenance such action. The forwarding of intelligence to great Britain also highlights the fact that it would have been very unlikely that Canada would have stood aside even if it had a choice, when the British Empire went to war. In fact, Canada specifically endeavoured to "acquaint the Imperial authorities with the material [Canadian] resources upon which the Empire might reckon in the event of a great war".[37]

When the Great War broke out, "the Corps of Guides volunteered for service in a body and a concentration...moved to Valcartier as part of the general mobilization" then in progress. It quickly became evident however, "that the Corps could not be employed under the conditions of warfare" for which it had been designed. General Sir Arthur Currie recorded that:

> The Corps of Guides was absorbed into existing Units and formations. Officers to the number of about thirty were absorbed into Staff posts and various regimental and special duties. Owing to their special training in reconnaissance and scout duties generally, the officers appointed to Staff duties were utilized essentially as Staff Captains for Intelligence and General Staff Officers. Non-Commissioned Officers and men were absorbed into cavalry, horse artillery and various other Staff duties and, subsequently, into the Cyclist Corps which later became the natural

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[37] Militia Report, 31 March 1908. Dan R. Jenkins, *The Corps of Guides*, p. 97.

channel for the absorption of the Guide personnel.[38]

"Canadian Army personnel were also attached to the British Intelligence Corps for employment in intelligence duties such as liaison and counter-intelligence."[39] In spite of their limited training, the Guides were still better prepared than their English counterparts for the mud of Flanders. "Their very existence kept the importance of battlefield intelligence highly visible", which may explain why "Canadian formations tended to employ more Staff Officers on Intelligence duties than their British equivalents did."[40]

The *Canadian Corps of Cyclists* were employed in a wide range of duties other than cycling due to the nature of the fighting on the Western front, "including spells as infantry in the front-line trenches."[41] "They came into their own" in 1918 "as liaison and reconnaissance units", but "suffered heavy casualties while keeping the Canadian Command in touch with the rapidly changing disposition of both sides."[42]

Canadian Corps Headquarters had an Intelligence Staff which

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[38] Major J.E. Hahn, *The Intelligence Service Within the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918*, (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd, at St. Martin's House, 1930), p. xiii-xiv.

[39] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 5.

[40] Dan R. Jenkins, *The Corps of Guides*, p. 97.

[41] Melissa Parsons, *The Iron Cavalry: The History of the Canadian Corps Cyclists in the Great World War*, (BA Thesis, Mount Allison University, May 1995), p. 41.

[42] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 29.

included a "GSO2 responsible for Corps Intelligence policy and for overseeing the exploitation of all sources of information." The staff conducted interrogations and issued an Intelligence Summary at regular intervals. This "INTSUM" contained "all known enemy information, including translations from captured documents." Intelligence was considered to be "part of Operations on the Divisional Staff; and 1st Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div) overseas added a GSO3 and an interpreter to be responsible for intelligence organization and functions. An intelligence officer (IO) and an interpreter were appointed to each brigade."[43]

1 Cdn Div in France in 1915 had "its intelligence organization attached" to and receiving "instruction from its counterparts" in the British Second Army. It was therefore given the opportunity to learn about intelligence battle procedure (now called "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield" (or IPB)), before it had to put it into practice in the line of fire. In mid-March 1915, 1 Cdn Div intelligence staff produced an INTSUM that General Currie later claimed "was about the first instance of the issue of a regular, daily Intelligence Summary from a Division in the British Army at that time".[44] (Many more would follow and, in fact, INTSUMs are produced to this day in daily and weekly formats for dissemination throughout the present

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[43] Major R.S. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 25.

[44] Ibid, p. 25-26.

Canadian Forces). By the end of the Great War in 1918, the Canadian Army's intelligence organization had become an efficient and successful system.

A Counter-Espionage Section designated "Intelligence (b)" was added to the Canadian Corps establishment in 1918. I(b) was mainly composed of Canadians who had trained and served as linguists or policemen in the various British armies. They successfully identified and arrested hundreds of enemy agents involved in clandestine activity.[45] Those members of the Guides who fought as Cyclists however, had a very hard time of it. Of the 1,138 men who served in the five battalions of the Canadian Cyclist Corps, 261 were casualties.[46] The post war Corps formed an Association, but of the roughly 700 survivors, none are alive today.[47]

"In the field, the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) fought as a subordinate formation within the British Command structure. As such, even in the later stages of the war", the CEF "had no direct access to senior sources and agencies", but instead had to "conform to the GHQ assessments. Because of the much more rigid

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[45] Ibid, p. 45.

[46] William Humber, *Freewheeling, The Story of Bicycling in Canada*, (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1986), p. 75.

[47] *The Cyclone*, (Toronto, Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion Association, April 1983), p. 18., and W.D. Ellis, *Saga of the Cyclists in the Great War 1914-1918*, (Toronto: Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion Association, November 1965), p. 92. Captain Bill Ellis was the last survivor, (interviewed in 1992). He died in 1996.

and immobile character of WWI, this lack of direct access was less restrictive than it would have been" in WWII.[48]

BETWEEN THE WARS (1919-1938)

After the war, the Guides units in Canada were also converted into cyclist companies.[49] The years between the wars were lean ones for Intelligence as the Guides lost their appeal and funding was cut. They were disbanded on 31 March 1929 under General Order 191.[50] This left only a small staff in Ottawa and some districts carrying out the intelligence functions. This in turn caused the Canadians to examine their options for maintaining the ability to produce intelligence. Canada's allies were considered, but they did not necessarily include the United States at this time.

Prior to 1940, intelligence operations involving Canada and the United States were not for mutual benefit. Between the wars, Canada maintained a position for a Director of Military Operations and Intelligence (DMOI) of the Canadian Army. One of the first DMOIs from 1920 to 1927, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Stewart (Buster) Brown, became convinced that the main military threat facing Canada was an American invasion. His plan for dealing with it could essentially be summarized as "we should invade them

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[48] Major R.S. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 23.

[49] Ibid, p. 55.

[50] Ibid, p. 62.

first". If war with the United States became likely, his "Defence Scheme Number One" planned for the launching of a pre-emptive attack by the Canadian Army deep into the United States. "Lieutenant-Colonel Brown actually conducted a reconnaissance by car around the northern United States accompanied by other senior Canadian staff officers in disguise, to survey the positions he wanted to capture."[51] "Brown was not acting on his own in preparing Defence Scheme Number One." "He was carrying out the directives of the Army Chief of the General Staff and the responsible ministers of the crown." His plans therefore "survived virtually intact until 1931 when they were scrapped as 'anachronistic'."[52]

The business of preparing for war with its neighbour was not confined exclusively to Canada. In 1928 "the U.S. War Department's War Plans Division (responsible for formulating American strategic plans for future wars), arrived at the odd conclusion that America's most probable future enemy was Great Britain. The division prepared a complex plan for a future conflict, during which the United States would seize Canada and

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[51] LCol Brown's purpose in planning to seize large parts of the northern U.S. by surprise at the very outbreak of war, was designed to win time for reinforcements from Britain to reach Canada before U.S. troops could pour across the Canadian border and overwhelm us. In reality, it is unlikely that Britain could have responded in any practical manner. Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen, *The Defence of Canada, In the Arms of the Empire*, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p. 315-316.

[52] J.L. Granatstein, *Yankee Go Home, Canadians and Anti-Americanism* (Toronto: Harper Collins Pub Ltd, 1996), p. 81.

British possessions in the Western Atlantic," and "then invade Great Britain itself from Ireland." This idea "was not formally scrapped until 1939," when the U.S. "Secretary of War pronounced it 'wholly inapplicable to present conditions'."[53]

In 1924 the Americans drafted invasion plans for Canada entitled "*War Plan Red*". War Plan Red stated that "Blue (American) intentions are to hold in perpetuity all Crimson (British) and Red (Canadian) territories gained. The policy will be to prepare the provinces and territories of Crimson and Red to become states and territories of the Blue Union upon the declaration of peace. The Dominion government will be abolished..." A final draft of these plans was approved by the U.S. Secretaries of War and Navy on 10 May 1930. Although War Plan Red was designed for a possible war with Great Britain it was almost totally focused on the conquest of Canada.[54]

"In 1935...senior" American "officers responsible for strategic planning", including "Brigadier-General Kilbourne, (Head of the War Plans Division); General F.M. Andrews, (Commander of the Army Air Force); Colonel W. Krueger, (Assistant Chief of Staff serving the Joint Board); and Captain H.L. George, (Air Corps Practice School);" "argued that three new air bases were needed for surprise attacks against air fields in Canada." Two of the "new bases" were to be established "on the east and

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[53] Ernest Volkman, *Warriors of the Night, Spies, Soldiers and American Intelligence*, (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1985), p. 30.

[54] Ibid, p. 12.

west coasts" and "camouflaged" to represent "coastal defence bases." A third base "in the Great Lakes region was to be camouflaged as a civilian airport but capable of dominating the industrial heart of Canada."[55]

In spite of these staff checks and contingency preparations for a "worst case scenario" for war between the two nations, examples of Canadian-American intelligence cooperation can be found during the same period. As early as 1926 the American Military Intelligence Branch provided the chief impetus behind a successful move to obtain an agreement for the exchange of military information between the US and Canadian governments, "something heretofore lacking and very much desired."[56]

There were severe reductions in Canada's armed forces between 1919 and 1939. The elimination of the Corps of Guides had left only a small staff in Ottawa and some districts carrying out intelligence functions for the Canadian Army.[57] Even then,

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[55] U.S. President Roosevelt denied any military planning against Canada and spoke of "permanent peace, generations of friendship and the disarmament of our three thousand miles of common boundary." Roosevelt claimed that the military officers involved had been presenting personal opinions not national policy. Despite the President's denials however these base recommendations were consistent with War Plan Red which was national military policy at that time. Floyd W. Rudmin, *A Cognitive History of Canadian Avoidance of American Threats, 1910 - 1990*, Psychology Dept., University of Tromsø, Tromsø, Norway, Internet article, 13 December 1996, p. 11.

[56] Colonel Bruce W. Bidwell, U.S. Army (retired), *History of the Military Intelligence Division, Department of the Army General Staff, 1775-1941*, (University Pub. of America Inc., 1986), p. 266.

[57] General Order 191, 01 December 1928.

more economy of force was required. General Order Number 240, issued on 20 May 1932 stated that: "A combined Military and Air Force Intelligence Section will be formed under the direction of the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, with effect 22 April 1932."[58] The order amalgamated the Air Intelligence Staffs of the newly formed Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) with the remaining Military Intelligence Staffs of the Canadian Army.

On 19 March 1938, Colonel Harry Crerar (then serving as DMOI at NDHQ), "suggested to the three Service Chiefs that a Joint Service...Intelligence Section should be formed, to operate possibly as a Sub-Committee of the Joint Staff." He was concerned about the serious situation developing in Hong Kong:

> With the world situation as it is, Intelligence duties are becoming of increasing importance and it may be that greater efficiency might result from a merger [of the Army, Navy and Airforce Intelligence organizations].[59]

Although each organization sought to control its autonomy, all agreed that a degree of collaboration was desirable. "Colonel Crerar sent his proposals" for amalgamation "to the Joint Staff Committee" for approval, but the Committee chose not to act on them.[60] For a few more years, as far as intelligence was concerned, Canada's three Services went their separate ways. It was much later before they met again and agreed to a joint defence organization.

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[58] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 68.

[59] Ibid, p. 81.

[60] Ibid, p. 82.

WORLD WAR II

The pre-war Munich Crisis prompted Canada's Defence Department to take major steps to improve its ability to collect intelligence. DND secretly hired and trained former telegraph operators to act as telegraph censors. The moment war was declared, these people were installed in the offices of major telegraph companies to vet all messages leaving Canada. Lieutenant-Colonel W.W. (Jock) Murray, a veteran of the First World War and a Parliamentary reporter with the Canadian Press news agency before the war began, was recruited to head this shadow organization.[61] Murray's counterpart and Canada's Director of Naval Intelligence at that time was a Royal Navy specialist in merchant shipping, Commander Eric S. Brand.[62]

"The Canadian Army mobilized on 01 September 1939," just before Canada's declaration of war on 10 September.[63] The government determined that "the Canadian force to be sent abroad" should be similar to the "British Army formations" they would be working with, including intelligence. "Considerable effort" was therefore "made within DMOI" to conform with "British War

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[61] Lieutenant-Colonel William W. Murray MC & bar, was 49 at the time and a veteran of the Great War. John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret, Canadian Secret Intelligence in the Second World War*, (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1993), p. 10.

[62] The small Canadian Naval Intelligence organization consisted of Commander Brand, his assistant Lieutenant Commander John Barbe-Pougnet de Marbois of the Royal Navy Reserve and Lieutenant C.H. Little, a Canadian Naval Reservist. Ibid, p. 12.

[63] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 82.

Establishments." In 1939 Intelligence Sections were "separate serials within the Divisional organization."[64]

The Intelligence Section at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London was an important link in the Canadian Intelligence chain during the Second World War. It was located at the centre of where the highest Allied planning and control took place. CMHQ acted as a "listening post" for both National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa and for the Canadian Army Overseas. Canada's first GSO1 at CMHQ (Lieutenant-Colonel E.L.M. Burns) was required to maintain close liaison with the War Office and with the GOC CF in the theatre of operations. He was also to provide information on military questions to the High Commissioner for Canada. The first intelligence exchanged with the British War Office by CMHQ took place on 11 November 1939.[65]

"The CMHQ Intelligence Section gathered information on British plans and policies for Ottawa and for Canadian formations in Britain. It initially controlled the cipher protection of Army messages between Ottawa and London." It was also "the agency responsible for security liaison between Canada, the Canadian formations in England and the Security agencies in Britain. It was directly involved in Censorship" and later "had charge of all aspects of recruiting for the Intelligence establishments it helped form." It was also responsible for "the

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[65] The data concerned details of the Intelligence Sections in 1st Cdn Div and its three brigades. Ibid, p. 86.

training and professional development of all Canadian Intelligence personnel", as well as the handling of "Canadian and enemy prisoners of war."[66]

As Canadian units moved overseas, personnel who appeared suitable for intelligence duties were selected and sent to British Intelligence Schools. Handling of cipher messages was one of the first priorities and the initial Canadian personnel to be trained came from "1st Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div) which had arrived in England in December" 1939. "Communications facilities were inadequate" for handling the message traffic they had to deal with and, therefore, on 23 February 1940 the Canadian GSO3 (Major N.E. Rodger), "arranged...for Army messages to be passed by the British Air Ministry radio." Although politically awkward, the Canadians would use this means until well into 1941. As message traffic increased, so did the requirements for staff. To offset this requirement for additional personnel, the CMHQ Signals Section later assumed some of the Canadian Army's enciphering and deciphering duties "in September 1941."[67]

Brigadier-General Harry Crerar with the Canadian Army in Europe recommended that the Chief of General Staff (CGS) be provided with current intelligence "at least weekly" and advised Colonel Burns to

> visit the War Office daily" to be kept up to date. At this time "CMHQ routinely received the daily Summary given

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[66] Ibid, p. 85.

[67] Ibid, p. 87.

> to the High Commissioner by the Dominions Office, the notes from the weekly meeting between the Director of Military Operations (War Office) and the BGS, a weekly Intelligence Commentary, weekly Intelligence Summaries on China and Japan, a daily Intelligence Signal and a weekly report from the foreign-broadcast monitoring service of the BBC. At "irregular intervals", the War Office issued tactical and technical notes on the German Army which were sent both to Ottawa and to 1 Cdn Div.[68]

Although the British Chiefs-of-Staff Committee members were not prepared to "release their full reports to Canada", in January 1940 they did "allow a Canadian representative to see them and to extract anything that Ottawa needed" from then onward.[69]

THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

The formation of the first formal defence alliance between Canada and the United States came about as an indirect result of a request to President Franklin D. Roosevelt from Prime Mackenzie-Minister King for a "personal interview between the heads of state". This request led to a historic meeting between the two leaders aboard the presidential train near Ogdensburg, New York, in 1940. The private "conversation between these two heads of state resulted in the following press release" (the "*Ogdensburg Declaration*") on 18 August 1940:

> The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States. It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall be set up at once by the two countries.
>
> This Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall commence

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[68] Ibid, p. 87.

[69] Ibid, p. 88.

> immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material. It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.
>
> The Permanent Joint Board on Defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.[70]

"The first meeting of the Board took place" just over a week later "in Ottawa, on 26 August 1940." During this meeting seven of the 33 recommendations made during the war were passed.[71] "The bulk of the board's work during the war was concerned with the defence of the coastal regions of the northern half of North America", although "recommendations were also passed on such subjects as the *exchange of information*, the allocation and flow of material resources, the safety of navigation through the Sault Ste. Marie canals, the co-ordination of aviation training and the disposition of defence facilities."[72]

During WWII the "service members of the PJBD prepared two Basic Defence Plans (BDP). The first of these, the "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan-1940", considered what measures would be required for the defence of North America should Britain be defeated or lose control of the North

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[70] DND Handbook, *A Brief History of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940 to 1960*. (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960), p. 4-5.

[71] The meeting was co-Chaired by Prime-Minister W.L. Mackenzie King and Mayor F.H. La Guardia of New York City, with at least 13 other delegates in attendance. Ibid, p. 7.

[72] Ibid, p. 9.

Atlantic."[73] The war had gone very badly for the British forces as the Autumn of 1940 approached. Churchill advised his "Commander-in-Chiefs" that "plans have been made for the Sovereign and the Royal Navy to be based in Canada", although Britain would "go on fighting until we can attract powerful allies to meet our common enemy."[74]

The second BDP, "commonly known as "ABC-22", considered" the action to be taken when and if the United States joined the war. In a "worst case scenario", "Canada was prepared to accept American "strategic direction", but under the conditions of ABC-22 the co-ordination of the military effort of the two countries" would be provided for by "mutual co-operation".[75] The PJBD's work was considered to be mutually beneficial and both governments would later determine that it should play a useful role in the post-war period.

INTELLIGENCE WARFARE:

On 10 May 1940, the Germans began their lightning war, assaulting into Belgium and France.[76] Shortly afterwards, on 20 June, Italy invaded France. In the fall of 1940, "Colonel Murray

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[73] Ibid, p. 11.

[74] Martin Young & Robbie Stamp, *Trojan Horses, Deception Operations in WWII*, (London: Bodley Head, 1989), p. 205.

[75] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 11.

[76] John Terraine, *The Right of the Line, The Royal Air Force in the European War*, (Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), p. 119.

was transferred out of Telegraph Censorship and put in charge of the Army's Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) program." Here he worked with "Lieutenant E.N.(Ed) Drake" at Rockcliffe listening to "Spanish wireless stations" and successfully assembled Spanish order-of-battle (ORBAT) data. "In early November 1940, Drake, now" promoted "to Captain," liaised with the American "Chief Signals Officer...in charge of the U.S. Army's cryptanalysis unit" for assistance in setting up Canada's "own cipher-breaking bureau."[77]

In June 1941, Herbert O. Yardley, an American cryptanalysis expert came to Ottawa to talk to Canada's fledgling cryptographic committee. "Hugh Keenlyside from the Department of External Affairs (DEA) chaired the meeting." Also present were "T.A. Stone, the DEA representative on the Censorship committee, Colonel Murray for Army Intelligence, while Captain Brand and Lieutenant Little attended on behalf of Naval Intelligence." This meeting would later lead to the formation of "the National Research Centre's (NRC) Examination Unit (EU)" in June 1941.[78]

Yardley did good work for Canada, but Britain wanted to replace him with a British agent instead. In spite of objections raised by Colonel Murray, the British eventually succeeded in

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[77] Canada's Naval Intelligence Department under Captain Brand had rejected the idea at the time. John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 26-27.

[78] Ibid, p. 53-54.

replacing Yardley.[79] Agent "Oliver Strachy" became the new supervisor of the NRC in January 1942.[80]

One of the initial functions of the EU "was the interception and decoding of communications traffic between German Abwehr controllers in Hamburg and their agents in South America." The NRC interceptions were possible because of "favourable reception conditions" for its small intercept station at Rockcliffe.

> By the end of 1941, the activities of 52 agents were being monitored and 740 messages had been read. These messages warned of danger, instructed agents to stop transmitting immediately and told of invisible ink, shipping activities, or bribes needed to pay off police officers.[81]

Radio transmissions from Vichy France were also monitored and decoded.[82]

The placement of Oliver Strachey with the Canadian organization also "led to closer cooperation with the United States and Britain." Both nations now "shared their keys to Vichy codes with Canada, as well as copies of intercepts that the British Security Coordination (BSC) obtained from their receiving stations."[83] "In addition, BSC acquired actual copies of the

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[79] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 102.

[80] Alan Stripp, *Codebreaker in the Far East*, (London, Frank Cass, 1989), p. 97.

[81] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 68.

[82] Ibid, p. 68.

[83] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 68. BSC was a wartime intelligence agency operating in the U.S. under the direction of Canadian businessman William Stephenson. William Stevenson, *A Man Called Intrepid, The Secret War*, (Toronto: Ballantine Books, 1976), introduction.

Vichy codebooks and passed them on to the EU", enabling them "to identify important intercepts that would assist the Allies in their plans for the invasion of North Africa in November 1942."[84]

In August 1941 the EU was directed "at Britain's request" to intercept Japanese communications and ocean surveillance activity." The RCN "had developed (some) expertise in the interception of Japanese communications" and, therefore, "the EU was able to read low-level Japanese codes by November 1941." In December 1941, "the British High Commissioner in Ottawa requested that the Canadians immediately switch their SIGINT focus to the Pacific Theatre", concentrating on transmissions by Japanese agents."[85]

In 1942, the NRC took control of several intelligence collecting operations. The Canadian "Army's Discrimination Unit" which identified "significant from insignificant messages, was moved into the same building as similar units" which came under the direction of the RCN and RCAF. "The Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS) of the Navy, which was working on low-level Japanese traffic, was also transferred to the NRC." The "Royal Canadian Signal Corps (RCSC) was given permission to upgrade its interception facilities and, therefore, all messages received from the Canadian receiving stations were channelled to the EU."[86]

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[84] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 68.

[85] Ibid, p. 68-69.

[86] Ibid, p. 69.

In addition to these movements, a "Special Intelligence Section from DEA was established with the NRC in September 1942." Its function was "to prepare intelligence reports from the EU's material and other sources, on Japan and the Far East." The Special Intelligence Section was soon being tasked with "specific research topics, such as the possible effects of Germany's acquisition of" strategic war supplies. In January 1945, the Special Intelligence Section was removed by DEA.[87]

In the summer of 1942 Colonel Murray was made Canada's Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) and Little was promoted to Lieutenant-Commander after successfully coordinating Canadian and British SIGINT interests. The organization of "Military Intelligence" agencies in Canada "now assumed the structure" they were to "retain throughout the war."[88] The sub groups of the Army, Navy and Airforce Intelligence elements were divided into the following departments:

MI1 "dealt with intelligence on military operations and monitored the war situation world-wide." MI1 "relied mainly on the reports of Canadian Army intelligence officers in the field and those attached to the Allied Commands." MI1 "was sub-divided into five sections" covering "Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, Asia and Australia and, a library and map department." "Canadian battlefield commanders were

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[87] Ibid, p. 69.

[88] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 142.

...subordinate to the British or the Americans," thus MI1's "usefulness was mainly confined" to "providing background information to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff."[89]

MI2 "consisted of three Special Wireless Stations" (located in "Ottawa, Point Grey, and Victoria) and a headquarters section" in Ottawa "called the Discrimination Unit" (DU), "all under Captain Drake" with a "total staff" of "about 100." The DU was collocated with the EU in a house on "Laurier Avenue," but it later moved to "Bank Street", where it "received the raw intercepts from the Army's three listening stations, attempted to identify" the radio messages "and then passed on the raw material to the appropriate Canadian, American, or British authorities."[90]

MI3 was concerned with "Army Security." "Set up in 1940 under Lieutenant Eric Acland," it dealt mainly with the problem of "counter-espionage and security with respect to Army personnel and classified information. It maintained close liaison with U.S. Military Intelligence (G2), British Security Coordination (BSC) and Britain's MI5. Its primary job was to keep an aggressive watch on Canadian soldiers" with "suspected subversive backgrounds."[91]

MI4 "was responsible for prisoner-of-war camps and POW

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[89] Ibid, p. 142.

[90] Ibid, p. 143.

[91] Ibid, p. 143.

mail."[92]

MIx "was set up in the last year of the war to record information" on all people in Canada, whether Canadian, British, or American, who were engaged in counter-espionage."[93]

"Both Naval Intelligence and Air Force Intelligence had similar security sections." The Navy called its security section Navy Intelligence 4 (**NI4**) and the Air Force named theirs Air Military Police and Security Section A (**AMP S/A**).[94]

The individual "directors of intelligence for" each of "the three" armed "services began to meet regularly to discuss their mutual security concerns and to advise the Canadian Chiefs of Staff accordingly." They called "themselves the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), but had a much more restricted role" in comparison with the size and scope of the British JIC. The Canadian JIC proved to have "a useful inside track to the Chiefs of Staff."[95]

As the war progressed the requirements for additional Canadian Military intelligence staff overseas began to expand. Many Canadians were active in the intelligence field as early as 1939. Major John Page GSO3 (Intelligence) at CMHQ in Ottawa was tasked "to evaluate intelligence and consider how to promote the

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[92] Ibid, p. 143.

[93] Ibid, p. 143.

[94] Ibid, p. 145.

[95] Ibid, p. 145-146.

idea that the Canadian Army should form its own *Canadian Intelligence Corps* (C Int C)."[96] His proposals were initially refused or set aside and it was not until 29 Oct 1942, that Canadian Army Intelligence was officially recognized as a Corps. The initial organizational elements of the C Int C included the "Intelligence Sections at HQ 1st Canadian Army, 1st Canadian Corps; 1st, 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions, 5th Armoured Division; No. 1 and No. 2 Canadian Special Wireless Sections Type B; seven Field Security Sections (Army, Nos. 1,2,3,7,11,12); I9X at CMHQ" and the Intelligence "Pool". Additional field units were in service in Canada, such as the "Security Intelligence Sections at the Districts."[97]

With the formation of the "1st Canadian Army (1 Cdn Army) in Europe on 06 April 1942 and 2nd Canadian Corps (2 Cdn Corps) on 14 January 1943", additional intelligence staff were required and in due course added to the Canadian military establishment. Intelligence staff duties at CMHQ also continued to expand, as it became the clearing house for all security-clearance cases initiated in Canada and investigated in Britain.[98]

The increase in cooperation and information sharing between

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[96] Major John Page formerly with the Toronto Scottish, was one of the few Canadian Intelligence Officers to have had Staff College training in the UK. He "was the man who, more than any other, put Canadian Intelligence on a firm administrative footing." Major R.S. Elliot, Scarlet to Green, p. 92.

[97] Ibid, p. 94.

[98] Ibid, p. 98.

Canada and the United States (as a direct result of the Ogdensburg Agreement) led the achievement of tangible practical results at the tactical level. "On 21 June 1941" for example, Major John Page (then serving in the UK) reported that he needed information concerning Soviet influence over members of the Canadian Army. He was advised that "the United States had a list of Soviet agents operating in Canada." A request from Major Page through CMHQ was sent to the United States via the liaison office and, in response a copy of the list was forwarded to Major Page in England.[99] A considerable degree of discretion was required by both Canada and the United States during the exchange of such intelligence up to 7 December 1941, because the Americans were not yet officially at war. To facilitate cooperation "throughout the period of hostilities, personnel in the Canadian Intelligence Corps formed part of the Canadian Army Staff in Washington and worked in close co-operation with the Intelligence Staff of the United States War Department." They were linguists for the most part, proficient in German, Japanese and many other foreign languages.[100]

Canada's Naval and Air Intelligence Staffs were equally busy fighting the war. Canadian Naval Intelligence Officers studied German Naval Telecommunications, exchanging through 1943 for example, a daily U-boat Situation Report. Special Intelligence

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[99] Ibid, p. 101.

[100] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 3.

from the UK was also provided to Ottawa and Washington. The level of cooperation between the three nations and their Naval Intelligence (NI) organizations was extremely close and both the American and Canadian officers paid visits to the Senior British Naval Intelligence Officer. All three nations promulgated the processed information to ships and commands within their zone of control. The UK recorded that formal integration of the three nation's NI staffs was never necessary, because the Anglo-American organization worked as one against the U-boat threat.[101]

Throughout the war, foreign radio messages were being intercepted by Canadian Army, Navy (RCN), Air Force (RCAF) and Department of Transport (DOT) Radio Division stations, located in places such as Forest (and later Winnipeg), Manitoba and, Point Grey, British Columbia. Following the collapse of France in 1940 for example, the RCN continued to monitor French naval frequencies at Britain's request in order to determine the fate of the French fleet. German communications intercepted by the Canadians also "helped the British in mounting" their "successful attack on" the famous battle-cruiser *"Bismark"* in May 1941.[102]

Intelligence successes were not all one-sided. "In February 1942," the "German cryptanalytic organization, the *"B Dienst* scored one of its greatest triumphs of the war." B Dienst broke

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[101] Patrick Beesley, *Very Special Intelligence, The Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre 1939-1945*, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1977), p. 169-170.

[102] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1988), p. 67.

"the American-British-Canadian Naval Cipher Three" code, "which was being used by the Allies to control routing and rerouting of the North Atlantic convoys."[103] The German U-boat fleet made good use of the intelligence extracted from the Allied cyphers.

In May 1943, as well as receiving the intelligence summaries issued by Whitehall to the naval commands at home and overseas, the (radio interception) Tracking Room in Ottawa began to receive a full series of Enigma decrypts. The material allowed Ottawa to carry on a completely free exchange of communications by direct signal link with the Tracking Room in the Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC). The results were such that, "Canadian...intercept stations and Direction Finding (DF) organizations...made an indispensable contribution to the Allied North Atlantic SIGINT network."[104]

The Intelligence Staffs of both the First and Second Canadian Divisions in England and other newly inducted C Int C personnel in theatre, continued to be sent to British Intelligence schools for advanced training. On conclusion of their courses, they were attached to the intelligence staffs of some of the more experienced British formations, while their places in the Canadian Army were filled temporarily by British

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[103] Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals, and the Most Secret Special Relationship 1940-1946*, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 118.

[104] F.H. Hinsley, in assessing Canada's World War II contribution to intelligence. Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, p. 70.

intelligence officers. As the Canadians became more proficient, they gradually replaced their British colleagues. By 1943, all the intelligence appointments in the First Canadian Army were filled by Canadian personnel.[105]

C Int C personnel were included in the organisations of "1st Canadian Division (1 Cdn Div) and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade (1 Cdn Armd Bde)." These "were the first Canadian formations to embark on a regular campaign during the war from the landings in Sicily in 1943" and through the fighting in both "Sicily and Italy." Shortly afterwards, "1st Canadian Corps went to Italy and took part in the fighting there" along "with 5th Canadian Armoured Division." Intelligence operations continued in this theatre until all of the "Canadian Mediterranean Force moved to Belgium in 1945" and then went back "into action in Holland."[106]

Many C Int C personnel went into Europe with the "3rd Canadian Infantry Division (3 Cdn Inf Div) under 1st British Corps (1 Brit Corps)" when it "landed in Normandy on D-Day." Subsequently, additional intelligence staff with the "2nd Canadian Corps (2 Cdn Corps)" participated in the operations at Caen while "under the command of the 2nd British Army." From 23 July 1944, senior C Int C staffs worked in the "Headquarters of the 1st Canadian Army, which was at that time in command of both British and Canadian Corps composed of a great variety of Allied

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[105] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 6.

[106] Colonel Peter E.R. Wright, *First Canadian Army Final Intelligence Report*, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), p. 2.

forces."[107] Intelligence coordination and passage of information between the British and Canadian formations was successfully conducted at all levels of command.[108]

Canada-US intelligence sharing became a practical necessity particularly at the tactical level where Canadian and American soldiers lives were directly at stake. In the Brigade sized combined Canada-United States 1st Special Service Force (FSSF), which operated in Kiska and in Italy for example, the unit Intelligence Officer was an American (Major R.D. Burhans) throughout the units WWII service.[109]

The Canadian Army developed "very highly skilled intelligence operators during the war."[110] C Int C personnel participated in the screening of volunteers chosen by Ottawa for service with Britain's *Special Operations Executive* (SOE). These volunteers would later take part in training at Camp X near Whitby in Ontario, although only a few actually took part in SOE operations overseas. "The best of these operatives" included Major Guy d'Artois, Jean Paul Archambault, Leonard Taschereau who

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[107] Ibid, p. 2.

[108] Ibid, p. 2.

[109] Captain Robert D. Burhans worked in the Army Intelligence Section in Washington before being promoted and becoming the FSSF G2 in July 1942. His Intelligence Assistant was Lieutenant Finn Roll. Robert H. Adleman & Col George Walton, *The Devil's Brigade*, (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1966), p. 43.

[110] Col P.E.R. Wright, *Canadian Intelligence Quarterly, 25th Anniversary Issue*, Vol 5, No 3, Summer 1967, p. 20.

operated in France and Joseph Benoit who worked in Burma.[111]

The most well known Canadian to serve in the SOE was Gustav "Guy" Bieler, a former intelligence officer of the Régiment de Maisonneuve. Bieler parachuted into France on 18 November 1942 with two other operatives, about 65 miles Northeast of Paris and established a successful resistance network known as "Le Réseau Tell". Bieler's network sabotaged German railways, cutting the Paris-Coulogne line 13 times. In January 1944 he was caught by the Gestapo and later executed by firing squad.[112]

Once the Canadian Army was "firmly established in France", its C Int C personnel made good use of "the principles they had learned in England, North Africa, Sicily and Italy." They achieved effective results "during the Canadian Army's drive through Belgium and South Holland in December 1944."[113]

"Captured enemy personnel and material were subjected to" a "thorough search, examination" and interrogation in order to provide a current data base that would "keep pace with the ever changing enemy order of battle and improvements in weapons and equipment." German radio messages were intercepted and decoded. The intelligence gleaned by C Int C staffs enabled them to gain an accurate indication of changes in the identity of enemy

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[111] David Stafford, *Camp X, SOE and the American Connection*, (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1986), p. 234-240.

[112] Gabriel Chartrand, *Bieler the Quiet Hero*, (Montréal, Maison Bieler Inc, April 1972), p. 1-2.

[113] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int Corps*, p. 8-10.

formations facing them. These indications were supported by all available sources and agencies, including debriefing reports provided "from Canadian reconnaissance patrols, tactical air reconnaissance pilots, air photographs, as well as captured documents" and enemy equipment (CED & CEE).[114] All collected information was carefully processed and examined for useful information and then disseminated to the decision makers for further direction using the "Intelligence Cycle" process.[115]

"After the defeat of the German armies, personnel of the C Int C" remained in Germany to assist in "the liquidation of the German Intelligence Services, the disbandment of the Nazi party in all its manifestations and the de-Nazification of German institutions." Similar activity took place "in Holland where large German forces whose escape to Germany had been cut off by the Canadians were "screened". Those whose names appeared on specially prepared "lists" were arrested and held for trial."[116]

Cooperation with American and British agencies took place in many forms and it included the fight against the threat of biological warfare. According to U.S. Army Colonel Murray Sanders, a highly qualified bacteriologist with the U.S. Chemical

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[114] Ibid, p. 9. No. 2 Canadian Special Wireless (SW) Section for example, operated from a Bedford truck under Major R. Grant as it fought its way towards and into Germany. Hugh Skillen, *The Enigma Symposium, 1992*, (Pinner, Middlesex, Hobbs, 1992), p. 54, 56.

[115] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 9.

[116] Ibid, p. 10.

Warfare Service (CWS) at Camp Detrick in Maryland, "the cooperation [with Britain and Canada], the sharing of discovery and conjecture was total...we were more cautious with the French and we told the Soviets nothing."[117]

By "the end of the war, the C Int C was several hundred strong and its personnel were scattered throughout the world." Many of its members had been seconded to British and American organizations and were employed in a wide variety of activities including clandestine operations in Europe and Asia. C Int C specialists also assisted in interrogations and document research during and after the surrender of Japan.[118] The contributions of the C Int C to the security of Canada, however, did not cease with the close of WWII.

> **In war, the necessity for military intelligence is obvious; in peace, even in spite of the prevalence of violence in the world today, it is not. But without Intelligence no government can determine policy on what the military should do; nor can the military staffs properly plan the operations, including peacekeeping, that they may be called upon to perform. So the organization for dealing with Intelligence may be allowed to wither. It is often forgotten that organization and skills, once lost, take time to redevelop. [There is a continuing] need for a strong, efficient, dedicated, and professional Intelligence staff at each level of Canada's armed forces.[119]**

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[117] The CWS was formed in reaction to intelligence reports on biological warfare activity elsewhere in the world. Peter Williams and David Wallace, *Unit 731, Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II*, (New York: The Free Press, 1989).

[118] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 10.

[119] E.L.M. Burns, Professor of Strategic Studies, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1981.

CHAPTER II

POST WAR INTELLIGENCE:

Canada's strategic and political position in the world in 1945 had undergone considerable change from where it had been in 1939. "The requirement for intelligence and security in the Canadian Army after the war was recognized and the Canadian Intelligence Corps was therefore included in the post-war regular army. It was one of the first such Corps to be included in the regular forces of any nation" (Britain, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa developed their regular force intelligence organizations much later). Both British and American authorities referred to the C Int C "when they eventually created their own regular Intelligence Corps some years later." "In the immediate post-war period, the Canadian Intelligence Corps was largely concerned with security duties and could almost have been called a counter-intelligence corps. The Gouzenko spy case undoubtedly had some influence on this."[120]

The Canadian intelligence community went through many changes in 1946. Prior to that year, counter-intelligence and counter-subversion functions had been the responsibility of the Intelligence Section of the RCMP Criminal Investigation Branch. The Gouzenko incident led to the creation of a separate Special Branch to handle such activity. "As of 1946 however, the

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[120] *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS PRECIS 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 15.

Canadian intelligence and security community consisted of the NRCEU, the Special Branch of the RCMP, the Army's Directorate of Intelligence, the Navy's Directorate of Intelligence", the RCAF's "Directorate of Security and the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence of the Department of National Defence.".[121]

In "December 1945 the Chief of the General Staff" (CGS) attempted to amalgamate the various Canadian intelligence agencies by proposing "the establishment of a National Bureau of Intelligence." This "proposal" was not accepted, but one "that fared better" "called for the" formation "of a Joint Intelligence Bureau" (JIB). The JIB was established in 1950 and "administered by the Defence Research Board" (DRB). The JIB "was responsible for intelligence common to all users on such subjects as topography, communications, economics and logistics." Later, the JIB was divided into two elements, "with its non-defence functions performed by a Special Research Bureau (later called the Economic Intelligence Bureau" (EIB)) "and transferred to the Department of External Affairs (DEA)."[122]

Canada's regular forces were greatly reduced after the war "in order to conform to the nation's peacetime requirements. The officers and men of the active component of the C Int C either continued to be employed in intelligence duties" or served on "tours of duty with other branches of the army in order to

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[121] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence*, p. 70-71.

[122] Ibid, p. 71.

acquire a broader knowledge of military affairs."[123]

The greatest threat to the post war Canadian Intelligence Community came from within, when personnel in DEA attempted to have the SIGINT Examination Unit disbanded.[124] "Colonel Murray, Commander Little and Group Captain H.R. (Ronnie) Stewart" argued emphatically that "Canada's position in world affairs required the existence of a cryptographic organization." The Directors of Army and Naval Intelligence "felt that Canada could not expect to obtain" useful intelligence "information" at an adequate "level from the UK", the United States or anywhere else "without making some effort" to look after collection of intelligence for "itself." They suggested that "not only would it be undignified" to depend entirely on other nations and in effect beg for information, but it might well mean Canada would be denied essential "intelligence in the very critical period following the war."[125]

Colonel Murray prepared a formal request to the "Chiefs of Staff to retain a peacetime cryptanalysis and intercept organization." "He wrote a lengthy TOP SECRET paper which outlined the history of Canada's SIGINT program from its prewar beginning" to 1945. "He described how it had begun as a simple adjunct of the British worldwide" SIGINT program known as the "Y

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[123] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 15.

[124] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 242.

[125] Ibid, p. 243.

network", and "how it had grown to become by 1945 a full-fledged SIGINT service, complete with intercept stations, traffic analysis and code- and cipher-breaking." "He also mentioned the (communications channel known as) HYDRA, run by British Security Coordination (BSC)." He discussed "the sharing of assignments for intelligence collection among the three countries, and the exchange of raw intercepts and decrypts between Ottawa, the Government Code and Cypher School" in the UK "and the US Army's "Special Security Agency" in Washington."[126]

Colonel Murray had seen that the Americans wanted a fair exchange for the information they provided. When Canada didn't contribute its share, Murray suspected that it had often been left out of meetings and discussions concerning the conduct of the war. Strategy and planning sessions may have been his chief concern. Murray was sensitive to any possibility of Canadians again being at an intelligence disadvantage. He was likely aware of the observations that had been made by Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, Major R.C. Unwin and Major P.E.R. Wright's who participated in the Dieppe assault as a ship-borne intelligence officers. These IOs had witnessed the devastating effects on Canadian soldiers in terms of lost lives and heavy casualties that may have owed much to weak planning based on poor intelligence. Canadian losses at Dieppe included ten

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[126] Ibid, p. 266.

intelligence personnel.[127]

The Canadians realized that they had relied too much on allied intelligence and not enough on their own resources. "Intelligence recommended that":

> for future occasions where a unit or formation of the Canadian Army is involved in a similar operation...a senior Intelligence Officer of HQ 1st Canadian Army should be appointed to act as direct liaison between Planning Staff and GHQ Intelligence...not...to insert an extra link in the chain...but rather to ensure that best use is made of the direct and constant liaison that is maintained between this HQ and GHQ Intelligence.[128]

Murray resolved that Canadians should not be put at risk again because of lack of access to allied sources of intelligence (although the Germans had not known in advance about the raid, they were well prepared and quickly reacted to the raid in a highly competent manner). Murray advised Ottawa in clear terms as to what advantages accrued from being a full and contributing partner in intelligence sharing. "After explaining that collaboration with Britain and the United States on a *quid pro quo* basis had given Canada access to" valuable and sensitive intelligence, "Murray went on to observe" the need for close cooperation and equal contribution of intelligence by stating:

> The advantage of this approach was clearly impressed [on Canada] during the early war years. When our contribution was nil, we received nothing from either Bletchley or Washington. When, in agreement with them, our

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[127] Captain Insinger was killed when his LCT was blown up and Captain Morgan was killed shortly after he came ashore. CSM Milne, Sgt Holt and Sgt Carson were killed and five others were taken prisoner. Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 173.

[128] Ibid, p. 175.

> contribution became substantial, we received ample return - a seat in their counsels and a regular budget of valuable intelligence. If we contribute to the pool we shall draw something from it in the form of finished products; if we fail to contribute, we shall receive nothing.[129]

Canadian Ultra customers during the war included "Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar," who "had set up his headquarters at Lord Beaverbrook's house near Leatherhead" in Surrey. "At Crerar's request," "General Guy C. Simonds, one of his Corps commanders, was also put in the picture;" he "was to prove" to be "not only a brilliant commander, but also an enthusiastic Ultra customer."[130]

Colonel Murray recommended that "a postwar SIGINT organization be" kept in operation and that it should retain "the Army and Navy intercept stations and a Discrimination /Examination Unit." In his view, "the Americans and the British were going to continue the activity" and, therefore, Canada should do so as well. As his recommendations were being reviewed, a sharp increase in government attention to the subject developed in an unexpected quarter. On 05 September 1945, a "Russian cypher clerk named Igor Gouzenko rifled the message files in the code room of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa" and defected to Canada.[131]

Colonel Murray's recommendations were discussed on 20

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[129] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 266-267.

[130] F.W. Winterbotham, *The Ultra Spy*, (London: MacMillan, 1989), p. 123-124.

[131] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 267.

September 1945, at a meeting of "the newly expanded Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee" (JIC). The JIC membership "consisted of the three service directors of intelligence, which included Murray (Army), Brand (replacing Little for the Navy) and Stewart (RCAF), plus Glazebrook (DEA) and Superintendent Rivett-Carnac (RCMP Security Division). Colonel Acland (C Int C) of the Army's Security Service also attended. All would have known about the developments following the defection of Igor Gouzenko."[132]

At this meeting it was "agreed that Colonel Murray's memo to the Chiefs of Staff on (SIGINT) should be amended to make DEA responsible for cryptanalysis policy." A "complete overhaul of Canada's procedures for handling secret intelligence" was also discussed. One of the results of the meeting was the submission of a second "memo from Murray entitled "Foreign Intelligence in Peacetime"."[133]

In his second memo, Murray described "in detail how cryptanalysis, general intelligence, security, and counter-espionage had been the scattered responsibility of various government departments during the war." He "proposed the creation of a new body, a Joint Coordination Bureau for Intelligence, which would receive and process all secret intelligence from whatever source." "The Army, Navy, and Air

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[132] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 278-279.

[133] Ibid, p. 279

Force plus DEA and the RCMP would all contribute." "Non-military intelligence would also have to be gathered and special security precautions" would have to be implemented that were similar to those used "during the war to protect the "ULTRA" secret." The Chiefs of Staff wrote back to the JIC "to say that they supported retention of the (SIGINT) stations and the Discrimination Unit" and, that further details and direction would follow.[134]

In November 1945, Colonel Murray advised the CGS "that Canada would not engage in clandestine acquisition of information, but would perform the legitimate military function of collecting it openly." He listed a variety of sources, some of them under "Canadian control, such as diplomats, travellers, foreign press and radio, and those sources under Allied control which might be available to Canada."[135] Murray was concerned about how little the Canadian government and its Armed Forces knew about the emerging Russian threat. He believed that Canada had to look out for its own interests and should not rely solely on its allies to keep it informed on matters concerning Canada's security. He made the recommendation that:

> Where we have common defensive interests with the Commonwealth and the United States we should, within our limitations, exploit our own facilities...to [make] an acceptable contribution on the basis of *'quid pro quo'*.[136]

"Colonel Murray stressed the implications of the

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[134] Ibid, p. 279.

[135] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 520.

[136] Ibid, p. 520.

geographical contiguity of the Soviet Union" and observed how little Canadians knew about their own Northern territory. He anticipated that there would be "trouble with China." He noted "some of the political and military considerations that exchanges of information with Britain and the United States" were likely "to raise, and mentioned that (Canada's) reputation was good." He observed that "the British Army was...basing much of the content of" their new training "manuals on the *First Canadian Army's Intelligence Report*."[137] He predicted "a continuing need to "study, correlate and assess Intelligence in order to equip ourselves for the future"." Regarding the subject of Security of Information, Colonel Murray "detailed the need for control over Canadian information, and for the protection of future plans and operations" as well as "material still on the Secret list." He also "saw a continuing requirement for close liaison with the British and American authorities in the areas outlined and in the allied field of Counter-Intelligence."[138]

Colonel Murray believed "that the Canadian Intelligence Corps" should continue to exist after the war as "an administrative cadre within the Regular Force, with its main strength in the Reserves."[139] In conjunction with the

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[137] Colonel P.E.R. Wright produced a Canadian Army Intelligence World War II After Action Report (AAR) entitled *First Canadian Army Final Intelligence Report*, (Ottawa, 1946).

[138] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 520-521.

[139] Ibid, p. 521.

recommendations in Colonel Peter Wright's[140] *First Canadian Army Final Intelligence Report*, Colonel Murray proposed "the establishment of an Intelligence Battalion" which would form an essential "part of a mobilized peacetime Field Army." His intention was, that the C Int C be used as the basic organization "to retain all (intelligence) specialist personnel."[141] Nearly "all of Colonel Murray's recommendations" were "adopted."[142]

The new Army Chief of Staff, General Charles Foulkes, was very interested in revamping Canada's defence organizations to meet the Soviet threat. In December 1945, he drafted a "Proposal for the Establishment of a National Intelligence Organization", which "was distributed to his fellow Chiefs of Staff", stating:

> To be most effective, the appraisal of international affairs, in relation to its political and economic influence, must be from a national viewpoint. Any system whereby the appraisal is made from incomplete intelligence acquired from other countries, or acceptance of another nation's appraisal in so far as it relates to itself, cannot possibly satisfy the Canadian requirement. Such a system would presuppose a degree of political, economic and military dependence incommensurate with the national outlook.[143]

One of the greatest threats to the Canadian intelligence community at this time was the almost blind trust Canadian

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[140] Colonel P.E.R. Wright was Gen Crerar's Chief Intelligence Officer in the field (1943-1945). *Canadian Intelligence Quarterly, 25th Anniversary Issue*, (Vol 5, No 3, Summer 1967), p. 20.

[141] Ibid, p. 521.

[142] Colonel Murray retired on 16 February 1946. He was replaced by Colonel W.A.B. Anderson. Ibid, p. 527.

[143] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 288.

officials in non-military departments had in the willingness of the United States to keep Canada informed of all threats to its security and sovereignty. Economic self-interest alone would have made it necessary for the United States to look after its own concerns first. It became absolutely imperative that this "wilful blindness" to overarching dependence on American willingness to share intelligence, be balanced with an independent Canadian assessment of all potential threats to Canada. Murray for one understood that the US would look after its own needs first and cooperate with Canada "if it chose to", but certainly not because "it had to". If the US received nothing of intelligence value to its own interests, then it had little to gain by providing the same to Canada for free. If Canada chose not to reciprocate, then the US was free to turn off the intelligence tap at will. If it had continued to neglect its own intelligence assets, then Canada would been even more at the mercy of allied vice national assessments of world affairs. The events that would unfold in Korea, Vietnam, the Suez, Cuba and the Congo not long after World War Two, could have led to the Canadian government's reliance on other nations with different goals and interests for the information that would be used as the basis for committing Canadian soldiers lives to war-zones.

"In other words, Canada's sovereignty was intimately tied to developing its own sources of intelligence. Other countries, even great allies, could not be trusted to supply Canada with the kind of information it needed to make its own decisions." General

Foulkes argued for Canadian "independence" in spite of "the willingness of External Affairs to rely on others."[144]

Meanwhile, the British worked hard to protect their own interests. Two British negotiators ("Sir Edward Travis and Dr. Henry Hinsley") met with American "Signal Security Agency" staff to discuss post war sharing of cryptanalytic traffic. The British attempts to cut Canada out of the arrangement caused immediate difficulties, as the UK tried to put itself forward as the representative for both itself and Canada. "Washington strongly favoured full bilateral agreements with" its Canadian ally "on all intelligence matters." In December 1945 the United States Director of Military Intelligence informed the British that due to "Canada's strategic position with respect to the United States and Russia, it is believed that all consideration of U.S. intelligence relations with that nation should be made independently."[145]

It would appear that the Americans didn't like the idea of single-source intelligence anymore than Canadians did. So long as a comparison or "cross-check" of all data is possible from "other" sources and agencies, the provider of any form of intelligence product must be prepared to have the validity of the product questioned. This of course puts the provider's credentials and therefore credibility to the test of comparison

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[144] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 288-289.

[145] Bradley F. Smith, *The Ultra-Magic Deals*, p. 218.

or "challenge". Credibility (and by inference "face") are paramount when it comes to getting a particular intelligence product accepted by the end user. When a provider loses credibility, it takes a very long time to restore. Multi-sourcing is essential and in Canada's case, an absolute necessity. To maintain credibility, Canadians must make use of their own intelligence resources to form their own opinions and make reasonable deductions as to the accuracy of any intelligence data provided. Within its limited resources, the Canadian intelligence community carries out its own independent analysis very well. The United States and Great Britain have the same reasons for ensuring that their own assessments are based on credible information.

The more often a source or agency (such as Canada's present Intelligence Branch) proves correct in its assessments, the higher its rating of credibility rises. Obviously, errors in assessments are made, but when they are found or detected the inaccuracies are quickly reported to all end users so that necessary corrections can be made quickly and effectively. There can be no room for "embarrassment" when national security is at stake. Personnel in intelligence cannot be "yes men" telling decision-makers only what they think they want to hear, they must provide the information their commander's need to know, however painful or embarrassing that information may be. If the decision-maker who receives the intelligence chooses to ignore it, he or she does so at their peril. (The recent case of

Canadian troops deploying to Africa without making the best perceived use of readily available intelligence from personnel with recent experience in theatre, is a major case in point). The situation in Canada in December 1945 with respect to understanding how to make best use of warning intelligence has changed little with the passage of time. Leaders who choose not to make the best use of all available intelligence pay the price in embarrassing media headlines.

INTELLIGENCE RE-ORGANIZATION:

"On 01 September 1946", the Communications Branch, National Research Council, "was ostensibly set up to police the security of government cyphers. Its real job (its ULTRA task) was to analyze and break the enciphered traffic of foreign governments." In effect, "it was the Canadian government's equivalent of the US Army's Signal Security Agency" and the British "Government Code and Cipher School."[146] "Although the wireless traffic of the Soviet Embassy was the initial target, operations were soon expanded to include radio communications in the northern USSR."[147]

"In one of his last acts as Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Norman Robertson approved the formation of a Canadian Joint Intelligence Bureau." "The new Undersecretary,

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[146] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 300.

[147] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 70

Lester Pearson", backed the organization.[148] Unfortunately it was to be headed by an Englishman named Ivor Bowen, in spite of the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff who had put forward some 20 qualified Canadian candidates.[149]

The JIC "became Canada's central coordinating authority for secret intelligence." "Each member of the committee" was a senior representative "for the agency or department that he represented." Specific "intelligence responsibilities were divided as follows:

a. Chairman, External Affairs - political;

b. Director, Naval Intelligence - Navy (RCN);

c. Director, Military Intelligence - Military (Army);

d. Director, Air Intelligence - Air Force (RCAF);

e. Director General, Defence Research - scientific;

f. RCMP -counter-intelligence;

g. Joint Intelligence Bureau - topographical and economic.

Each department also contributed personnel to a small permanent Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) charged with writing intelligence appreciations as required."[150]

Other agencies in Canada that dealt with intelligence went through major changes. Military Intelligence at NDHQ for example, became MI1 in 1946. On 11 August 1953 it was renamed

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[148] John Bryden, *Best Kept Secret*, p. 288-289.

[149] Ibid, p. 301.

[150] Ibid, p. 302-303.

the Foreign Intelligence Section (FIS), and headed by a GSO1 (Lieutenant-Colonel).[151] FIS was responsible for producing assessments for "selected countries in depth" and for maintaining an intelligence watch on the rest of the world. "These assessments were passed upward within the Department through the JIS and the JIC, where they contributed first to Departmental and then to inter-Departmental decision-making. A series of agreements between the Department and its counterpart intelligence agencies abroad led to work on narrowly specialized subjects", often using a great deal of "raw material provided by these other agencies."[152] The finished intelligence products that were produced by the Canadian Intelligence agencies were provided to Canada's Allies in return or "payment" for the items received by but which would not otherwise be accessible to Canada. This practice continues to this day between Canada, the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand. (These partners are called the AUSCANUKUSNZ community). Much hard work is put into the production of these professional assessments, the quality of which results in the reproduction (quotes) and retransmissions of the Canadian material in intelligence reports produced by Allied intelligence agencies.[153]

All participants strive to provide high quality intelligence

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[151] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 525.

[152] Ibid, p. 526.

[153] Ibid, p. 526. Personal observation.

assessments of any given situation of interest. Comparisons are made in every case and on every subject to determine whether a national perspective is required. Assessments that are determined to be at wide variance with previously known or updated data, are questioned or challenged at length within the AUSCANUKUS community. Although there is good communication between the agencies and analysts within the alliance, very few assessments are released to the "customer" without an informed comment.

A Canadian perspective on an international issue (such as Cuban relations with North America) may often be quite opposite to an American one. In one case, an American assessment of large numbers of troops on the move in a foreign country (based on satellite imagery), led their analysts to suggest that there was a mobilization ongoing and possibly a major threat building up. A Canadian analyst used his experience, cultural acumen and useful contacts to determine that a major famine had taken place in the subject country. Troops were being brought in to bring relief and bury the large numbers of casualties, not to present a potential threat. The Canadian analysis of the same data led to a very different assessment, one that later proved to be correct. This is not always the case, but it highlights the need for a national/Canadian assessment in most cases, particularly when it may involve the commitment by the Canadian government of scarce and valuable resources in manpower and foreign aid.

CONTINUATION OF THE PJBD:

The armed forces of both Canada and the United States had enjoyed an unprecedented level of co-operation throughout the war. This successful working relationship, both on the battlefield and within their counterpart intelligence departments, was primarily due to the effective arrangements made possible by the formation of the PJBD. "The valuable work done by the Board during the war convinced both governments that it could play a useful role in the post-war period."[154]

The initial base for "post-war Canadian defence cooperation with the United States" was laid by the "Advisory Committee on Post-Hostility Problems." On 28 February 1945, this committee recommended "a series of broad principles" that were adopted by the Canadian Cabinet on 19 Dec 45. The recommendations specified the agencies that represent Canada in "joint defence planning" with the United States and laid out the broad objectives Canada intended to accomplish. The difficult job of getting both countries to agree to these aims was undertaken by the PJBD between 07 Nov 45 and 29 Apr 46. They formulated the principles for "a revision of ABC-22, the Basic Canada-United States Defence Plan which had governed defence cooperation during World War Two." The result was "Recommendation 35 of the PJBD," which called for "close collaboration between the two countries in

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[154] DND Handbook, *A Brief History of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940 to 1960*. (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960), p. 13.

defence planning, the *sharing of intelligence*, joint manoeuvres and testing as well as the right of transit." Prime Minister Mackenzie King was initially against it, because at this stage in Canada's relations with the US, he believed that it was "the long range policy of the Americans to absorb Canada."[155]

In the summer of 1946 the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) drafted an "Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-United States Security" and a "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Security Plan".[156] Recommendation 35 was reconsidered on 19 Sep 46 by the PJBD and several amendments were approved, but their implementation was delayed until 16 Jan 47. At this time it had been "relabelled Recommendation 36 of the PJBD."[157] Presidential approval followed on 04 Feb 47 and "on 12 February 1947, Canada and the United States issued a joint statement to the effect that military co-operation between them would continue and that the PJBD would be kept in existence."[158]

"As the number of measures of bilateral co-operation increased," it became necessary "to define some" of the "principles of collaboration." The 1947 agreement consisted of

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[155] David Bercuson, *Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50: Solving the Canadian Dilemma*, article, *The Cold War and Defense*, edited by Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock (Praeger, New York, 1990), p. 155. (DHist, File 112.2M2(D212) PJBD "Canada-U.S. Collaboration", Memo to CGS, 20 January 1946 with attachments).

[156] Ibid, p. 158.

[157] Ibid, p. 159.

[158] *A Brief History of the PJBD*, p. 13.

"five elements":

a. there should be an interchange of personnel between the two countries to promote mutual familiarity with the two defence establishments;
b. there should be general cooperation and exchange of observers for military exercises and for weapon tests and development;
c. standardization of arms, equipment, organization and methods of training should be promoted;
d. there should be "mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; and,
e. in all co-operative projects, the sovereign control of each country over activities within its boundaries was affirmed.[159]

The most obvious continuation of this agreement is the PJBD which continues to function up to the present day, with the most recent meeting taking place "02-04 April 1996."[160]

Although the Board provides a visible representation of the Canada-U.S. defence relationship, it is strictly an "advisory body and takes no executive action." The PJBD "has no authority to enforce decisions or to take implementing action on substantive matters. Through the Chairman, it reports directly to the Prime Minister and to the President." "Detailed military planning for North American defence is undertaken" by an offshoot of the PJBD called "the Military Cooperation Committee" (MCC) which was formed in 1946. The Board has also "played both a

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[159] Jon B. McLin, *Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 11.

[160] *Journal of Discussions and Decisions for the 197th Meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held at Fort Monroe, Virginia, 02-04 April 1996*. Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) NDHQ, Ottawa, p. 3.

direct and indirect role in the development of" more than "145 bilateral defence fora and the 646 defence agreements (treaty status and memoranda of understanding [MOUs]) which currently exist." The PJBD has been a good example of continuing defence cooperation between Canada and the United States since its inception in 1940.[161]

"Canada exercises considerable autonomy in its international relations concerning both security and non-security questions. That Canada is not totally dependent on the United States in these issues contributes to the countries policy independence."[162]

The current PJBD "is comprised of two national sections."

> Each section includes: a Chairman appointed by the Prime Minister and President respectively; Members at the Major-General rank or equivalent level representing the Department of Foreign Affairs and International trade (DFAIT), the State Department, the DoD and DND; and, Members at the Brigadier-General level representing the three environmental services." On the American side, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are also represented by senior military officers. The environmental Members are supported by Assistant Members at the Colonel/Captain (Navy) level. Department advisors and embassy staff participate on a selective basis and State and Foreign Affairs provide representatives to act in a secretarial capacity for their departments. The formal arrangements for meetings are coordinated by Canadian and U.S. military secretaries. Canada provides all of this representation and support within the existing staff structure. In the U.S., there is a dedicated staff that

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[161] Ibid, p. 1.

[162] *The Defence Policies of Nations, A Comparative Study*, edited by Douglas J, Murray and Paul R. Viotti, (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 478.

supports both the Board and MCC activities.[163]

> The Board has proven to be a most useful channel of communication for facilitating links between Canada and the U.S., at the Government to Government, Minister of National Defence to Secretary of Defense, Department to Department, Chief of the Defence Staff to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military to military service levels. It is a complementary vehicle dedicated specifically to North American security matters and, because of the special access privilege of the Chairmen to the highest level of Government, one through which informal expediting action can be taken on key items under study in normal channels. The Board provides a forum in which a preliminary exchange of information may be conducted on subjects and issues of concern to either nation.[164]

Problems which are likely to be "awkward to deal" with through more "official channels" can be unofficially "discussed and explored with" the aim of finding practical and workable "alternative solutions to any difficulties encountered."[165]

A "Journal of Discussions and Decisions" is produced following each of the semi-annual meetings. The Journal is used to define "national positions which" have been decided at the board's meetings. The Journals are "forwarded to the President and Prime Minister by the Chairmen" of the PJBD. The Journals usually consist of relatively bland statements and proposals, but they are based on "carefully" drafted and well "coordinated parallel staff work" on the part of the military staffs of both nations. "What is not reflected in the published product is the

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[163] *Journal of Discussions and Decisions for the 197th Meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence*, p. 1.

[164] Ibid, p. 2.

[165] Ibid, p. 2.

important personal contacts and relationships that are developed, and the valuable, informed debate which invariably takes place."[166]

"On the informal side, the Board functions at several levels: 'off the record' comments" allow for the "clarification or elaboration" of the true meaning of a formal position statement and the "background" behind it. "Informal discussions" often take place "between senior counterparts on matters of a sensitive or exploratory nature" to either or both nations. The aim of the discussions is "often related to finding a method or approach that will assist in expediting substantive matters being processed in official channels." "Informal discussions" are also conducted "between assistant members and secretaries on detailed and procedural matters with a view to improving the knowledge and sensibilities on specific subjects, procedures or anticipated developments."[167]

The subject matter discussed at "the 196th meeting" of the PJBD, "hosted by Canada at CFB Kingston from 10-12 October 1995," was typical of many of the gatherings of the Board.[168] "In addition to the formal Defence Policy, Foreign Policy and service statements, the agenda included:

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[166] Ibid, p. 2.

[167] Ibid, p. 2.

[168] The present Canadian Co-Chairman is Mr. Jesse Flis, MP, a current Member of Parliament and the former parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. Co-Chairman is Mr. Dwight Mason. Ibid, p. 2.

a. Defence Policy presentation by the Minister of National Defence;
b. NORAD Command presentation by DCINC NORAD;
c. Reinvigoration of NATO in North America brief;
d. Rwanda Peacekeeping Experiences/Future Vision for Humanitarian Operations; and,
e. a round-table discussion on the Defence Ministerial of the Americas."[169]

Agenda items for the 197th meeting "hosted by the U.S. Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia on 02-04 April 1996" included:

> several presentations by the U.S. Army focusing on military activities (including Intelligence) to the year 2010; the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Canada-U.S. Relationship; the Canadian Defence Budget and its Implications; Defence Policy Statements; Joint Staff Statements; NORAD Operations and Environmental Management - The Way Ahead; an Agreements Update/Review (CFMETR Agreement); and, a Management Command & Control Re-engineering Team (MCCRT) Overview.[170]

Statements were also made by the four departments represented.[171]

The PJBD continues to function effectively and it is unlikely that its usefulness will terminate in the near future. Many of the discussions at the PJBD over the years have led to the development of various MOUs concerning the exchange of intelligence between Canada and the United States.[172] These agreements make it possible for the two nations to exchange items of intelligence on a continuous basis. Canadian Forces service flights for example, collect and deliver bulky items of interest

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[169] Ibid, p. 2-3.

[170] Ibid, p. 3.

[171] Ibid, p. 3.

[172] Personal observation.

from and to Ottawa and Washington on a regular basis.[173]

It has been noted in the past that

> the high interdependence of some states (as in the case of Western Europe), locks them into a cooperative system and so may the dependence of one state on another as in the case of the United States and Canada. The close but asymmetric intermingling of their affairs affords the United States many ways of exerting influence. The US does not have to substitute force for persuasion. The imbalance of capabilities makes it unnecessary to do so. Each party, moreover, recognizes that its interests are better served by negotiating differences than by openly quarrelling over them.[174]

TRAINING, RESERVES, KOREA & THE COLD WAR:

One important early development of concern to the C Int C was the establishment and operation of an intelligence training school at Camp Petawawa in 1947. Courses were conducted at the Canadian School of Military Intelligence (CSMI) for both active and later Reserve force personnel of all Corps. The training of Reserve personnel became a requirement in 1948, when "the Canadian Militia was authorized six Intelligence Training Companies."[175]

The "Militia Intelligence Training Companies were formed" in major centres "across Canada" and were eventually designated by unit numbers. No. 1 was located in Montreal, No. 2 in Toronto,

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[173] Personal observation.

[174] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Conflict in World Politics*, article in *Comparative Defense Policy*, edited by Frank B. Horton III et al, (Baltimore & London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 507.

[175] *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 15.

No. 3 in Halifax, No. 4 in Vancouver, No. 5 in Winnipeg and No. 6 in Edmonton.[176]

> The basic aim of these companies was to provide a pool of trained manpower to augment the Regular Force. Many of these militia personnel were taken into the regular force in the early 1950s with the onset of the Korean War. It was during this same period that Field Security Sections and other Corps representatives were dispatched to both Korea and Germany.[177]

During WWII Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) maintained a close relationship with Canadian and other Commonwealth SIGINT organisations. The relationship continued after the war in the form of regular liaison between GCHQ and CSE.[178] Canada's other allies have also maintained Intelligence links, some of which have proven to be vital to the security of the more than 2,000 Canadian Forces personnel presently deployed on 15 different missions overseas.

In 1947, Canada, Australia and New Zealand joined the UK and the U.S. in a security agreement known as AUSCANUKUSNZ. "Their objectives were to define common areas of interest and to standardise working methods and security procedures." The AUSCANUKUSNZ community shared the "common interest of thwarting Communist" aggression against the western world.[179]

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[176] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 560.

[177] *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 16.

[178] Nigel West, *G.C.H.Q. The Secret Wireless War, 1900-86*, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987), p. 309-310.

[179] Ibid, p. 310.

Elements of the C Int C were provided as part of Canada's contribution to the United Nations forces in Korea with the inclusion of No. 1 Field Security Section (FSS) within 24th Canadian Infantry Brigade. This section was recruited throughout Quebec and the Central Commands and included representatives of both active and Reserve Forces. In 1951 "a Canadian Army FSS was given the overall Security responsibility in the Commonwealth area" of "Korea, although this commitment was reduced in 1952.[180] A "tri-service and Anglo-American-Canadian study team" also analyzed "the experiences of prisoners taken by the Chinese," later "formulating guidelines for resistance to interrogation training."[181]

27th Canadian Infantry Brigade was formed in the same period for duty with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and with it came the newly mobilized No. 1 Reserve Force Intelligence Training Company of Montreal, which provided the basis of the formation of No. 2 FSS for operations in Europe.[182] This section was perpetuated in the 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4 CMBG) FSS and later 1st Canadian Division FSS up until its disbandment in 1992. With the formation of 1 Cdn Div, 4 CMBG was reduced to a Canadian Mechanized Brigade (CMB). 4 CMB was formally disbanded on its departure from Lahr, Germany on 31

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[180] Anthony Clayton, *Forearmed*, p. 215.

[181] Ibid, p. 217.

[182] Edmond Cloutier, *The Canadian Int. Corps*, p. 11.

August 1993. The Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe (HQ CFE) Intelligence Section had been directed by the Commander of CFE to maintain close links with its NATO allies. In practice, the Intelligence Staff for the Commander of CFE enjoyed an excellent working relationship with its U.S. and UK counterparts in locations such as Stuttgart, Ramstein and Heidelberg.[183]

Other Intelligence staffs/sections that were formed in the early 1950s became part of the RCAF's 1st Air Division (1 Air Div) in Europe. 1 Air Div later became 1st Canadian Air Group (1 CAG) until its disbandment in Germany in 1992. The Air Intelligence staff for 1 CAG were either Intelligence Officers or Navigators employed in intelligence duties. Frequent exchanges were conducted with their American counterparts on a variety of stations in Germany.[184]

> In 1952, intelligence training activities in Petawawa were moved to Camp Borden, Ontario, where the Canadian School of Military Intelligence (CSMI) opened. The school was the centre for training Corps members of both the Regular force and the Militia, as well as personnel from other corps and services. The school was regarded as the home of the Corps.[185]

"During the 1950s and 1960s, members of the Corps were engaged in a variety of intelligence functions" throughout Canada. "A small counterintelligence detachment was located in

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[183] Personal observation as SO3 Intelligence for HQ CFE 1981-1983 and as 4 CMBG G2 Operations, Lahr, Germany, 1989-1992.

[184] Personal observation.

[185] *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 17.

Germany and officers and men were attached to allied formations on exchange duties in the United Kingdom, the United States and" with the United Nations "in Cyprus." A number of C Int C officers and men worked "in security duties, but an increasing number were involved in imagery interpretation and strategic and combat intelligence duties."[186] Many of the interpreters took their courses and received practical training while on exchange with American or British forces.[187]

Liaison between the Army and the RCMP continued as the intelligence tasks for both departments underwent change. "In 1956 the" RCMP's "Special Branch was renamed the Directorate of Security and Intelligence, or I Directorate. In 1970, as the result of a report by the Mackenzie Commission, the directorate was given enhanced status within the RCMP and renamed the Security Service."[188] Considerable cooperation is conducted between the Army and the RCMP and, a Canadian Forces Liaison Officer (CFLO RCMP) is attached to the RCMP HQ in Ottawa.[189]

> Canadian photo interpreters had been trained in the United Kingdom during WWII, but starting in 1948, a separate school was formed at Rivers, Manitoba called the Joint Air Photo Interpretation School (JAPIS). In 1950, the Air Photo Interpretation Centre (APIC) was formed at Rockcliffe, near Ottawa, Ontario. Three Lancaster long-range patrol aircraft flown by the RCAF's 408 Squadron, flew photo reconnaissance missions covering northern airfields and mapping the north.

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[186] Ibid, p 17.

[187] Interviews with DIE Photo Interpreters in 1985.

[188] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org.*, p. 71.

[189] Personal observation.

> In 1953, the Army Photo Interpretation Centre, called the Number One Army Photo Interpretation Section (APIS) was formed and co-located at Rockcliffe with APIC. APIS also covered naval areas of interest. In 1960, the school at Rivers closed and the remaining elements were amalgamated with APIC and APIS to form the Joint Photographic Interpretation Centre (JAPIC), which became fully responsible for training photo-interpreters (PIs).[190]

Many Canadian PIs were also given advanced instruction at American Air and Satellite Imagery PI Schools in Ohio.[191]

> In 1959, the Directorate of Air Intelligence (DAI) became responsible for photo analysis. DAI was located in Beaver Barracks in downtown Ottawa, while the C Int C staff and Intelligence staff for the Navy were located in NDHQ under the Director General Intelligence (DGI). In 1965 a further integration took place and JAPIC became the Defence Photographic Interpretation Centre (DPIC). Between then and 1974, DPIC changed to the Canadian Forces Photo Interpretation Unit (CFPIU), although two groups of PIs were detached to DGI to work on special projects. In 1975, these two groups along with desk analysts joined to form the Directorate of Defence Intelligence, Section 2-7 (DDI 2-7) and moved to Tunney's Pasture in Ottawa. In 1978, CFPIU also moved to the same location and, in 1980, on instruction from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), CFPIU was disbanded and amalgamated with DDI 2-7 to form DDI-6. In 1986, an expansion of DDI-6 lead to the formation of the Directorate of Imagery Exploitation (DIE).[192]

INTEGRATION 1968

In March 1967, the "Piquet Report" made several recommendations concerning the unification of the "Police,

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[190] Personal interviews with Cy Kelly, DDI-6, Ottawa, January 1986, data recorded in *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 17-18.

[191] Personal observation.

[192] Interviews with Mr. Cy Kelly, civilian head of DDI-6, and Colonel Vic Ashdown, DDI, March 1984-June 1986. Data recorded in *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 18.

Security and Intelligence in the Canadian Forces." One of these recommendations was that "the Directorate of Security be placed in the VCDS Branch under the Director General Intelligence (and Security)."[193] On 01 January 1968, the three separate arms of the Canadian Forces Army, Navy and Air Force, were formally integrated by an Act of Parliament. The unification of the military services eliminated their separate intelligence units. "Instead, a Director General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS) in DND oversaw all intelligence and security functions for the military. Subsequently, the Directorate of Scientific and Technical Intelligence (DSTI) of the Defence Research Board was absorbed into DGIS.[194]

Integration also led to the formation of the Canadian Forces (CF) Security Branch. Until this time, intelligence personnel for the Canadian Army were provided by the C Int C. The RCAF employed personnel from the Clerk-Intelligence (Clerk-Intel) trade and the Royal Canadian Navy used operational personnel to conduct intelligence duties. On the integration of these services into the Canadian Forces in 1968, members of the C Int C and the Clerk-Intel trade were amalgamated, along with members of the Canadian Provost Corps (C Pro C) and the Air Force Police,

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[193] *Report of Study Piquet, Concerning Unification of Police, Security and Intelligence in the Canadian Forces*, (Ottawa, March 1967), p. iii.

[194] Jeffrey T. Richelson, *Foreign Int. Orgs*. p. 71.

into the Security Branch of the Canadian Forces.[195]

Unification resulted in some fifteen Security, Intelligence and Police Trades of the former services being combined into two trades. The 1967 *Piquet Study* had at one point recommended that the two services be combined into one trade.[196] (This study was later shelved). Members of the Security Branch were designated as Military Policemen (MP 811) or as Intelligence Operators (Int Op 111) and, as Security Officers (Sec MP 81B) or Intelligence Officers (Sec Int 81D). All members wore the newly designed "Thunderbird" insignia. The theory, at the time, was that personnel would be cross-trained; ie, an officer with primary training and experience in intelligence duties could eventually be given training in and posted to security duties. In practice, this seldom occurred.[197]

Even before the formal integration of the CF had taken place, "the C Pro C School and the RCAF Service Police School had been ordered to co-locate in September 1966." On 18 September 1967, orders were issued authorizing "the disbandment of the Canadian Provost Corps School and the Canadian School of Military Intelligence and the formation of a new unit called the Canadian

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[195] *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 19.

[196] LCol G.W. Field, LCol R.I. Luker & Major R.H. Murphy, editors, *Securitas, The Journal of Canadian Security*, Vol 1, No 1, Winter 1968, p. 11.

[197] Personal observation, 1972 to present.

Forces School of Intelligence and Security (CFSIS)."[198]

In the 30 years since its formation, CFSIS has provided training for significant numbers of personnel to carry out both specialist and non-specialist security and intelligence duties. CFSIS is also considered the home of the present day Intelligence Branch and it provides a focal point for Intelligence personnel from all three operational environments.[199]

DISINTEGRATION 1982

> During the period 1968 to 1981, at least three formal studies were conducted to assess the efficiency and the effectiveness of grouping the security and intelligence functions into one branch.[200] Eventually, in late 1981, the CDS became convinced that a sufficient disparity in duties existed and that the two functions of Policing and Intelligence should be separated. The CDS therefore concurred with a study recommending that the existing Security Branch be split into two separate Branches. The Security and Police functions were to remain in the Security Branch and a new Intelligence Branch was to be created.[201]

An Honourary Colonel has been appointed to represent the Intelligence Branch's best interests.[202] Intelligence insignias

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[198] LCol R.I. Luker, Comdt CFSIS, *Securitas, The Journal of Canadian Security*, Vol 1, No 2, Spring 1969, p. 12.

[199] Personal observation as Officer Commanding, Intelligence Training Company, CFSIS, 1993.

[200] These included the *Study on the Structure of the Security Branch*, (Ottawa, July 1981).

[201] Personal interviews with Vic Ashdown, DDI, March 1984-June 1986, data recorded in *A Short History of Canadian Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(A), January 1987, p. 19.

[202] Sir William Stephenson, CC, MC, DFC, a famous Canadian businessman and liaison officer between Churchill and Roosevelt, and who had also been the wartime head of the British Security

(based on a silver North Star) were rapidly designed and received Royal Assent. The Security badges (now worn exclusively by the Military police) were exchanged for the new Intelligence badges and the reborn Intelligence Branch members put them up for the first time on 29 October 1982.[203]

PRESENT INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Since the "disintegration", the CF Intelligence Branch has gone through a considerable period of evolution. The present CF J2/Director General Intelligence (J2 DG Int) is an Army Brigadier-General. There are three sub-divisions under the J2 DG Int: the J2 Operations, J2 Plans & Policy and, J2 Geomatics. DG

Coordination (BSC) intelligence agency in America, accepted the appointment as first Colonel-Commandant of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch. His immediate successor was Major-General Reginald J.C. Weeks, CD, (Retired) an Army Intelligence officer who took part in the Third Canadian Division landings in Normandy and who rose to the rank of Major-General in various intelligence appointments throughout his career.

The current Colonel Commandant Intelligence Branch is Major-General J.E. Pierre Lalonde, CD, (Retired), a past Commander of 4 CMBG (1986) and former Director General Intelligence at NDHQ (1991-92), was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), a position he held until his retirement in 1994. *Sinister Sam's Notebook, Canadian Military Intelligence Branch Association Newsletter*, (Ottawa: Edition 1/97, March, 1997), p. 4.

[203] The official date designated by the CDS for the formation of the new Branch was 01 October 1982. However, members of the Intelligence community successfully argued to have the actual re-badging held on 29 October 1982, the 40th anniversary of the formation of the original Canadian Intelligence Corps.

Int is supported by the J2 Secretariat.[204]

Within J2/DG Intelligence is an American Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) Liaison Office (DIALO) which includes a civilian Chief, a military Deputy Chief (D/DIALO) USN Captain or equivalent rank and a civilian assistant. CSE also maintains a Liaison Office (CSE LO) with two civilians.[205]

The current J2 Ops is an Intelligence Branch Colonel. He is also the "Intelligence Branch Advisor". Within his organization there are five sub-divisions, including J2 Current Intelligence, (Lieutenant-Colonel); J2 Imagery, (Lieutenant-Colonel); J2 Scientific and Technical Intelligence (J2 STI), (a civilian Doctorate); J2 Strategic and Regional Assessments, (Commander); and, the Canadian Forces Photo Unit (CFPU). J2 Ops is also responsible for Deployed National Intelligence Elements. J2 STI is the Scientific Advisor with direct access to J2/DG Int.[206]

The current head of J2 Plans and Policy is an Army Colonel. He is also the Photo Tech Branch Advisor. Within his organization there are five sub-divisions, with J2 Plans & Policy 2, (Major); J2 Plans & Policy 3, Exercises, (Lieutenant-Commander), responsible for Doctrine, International Customer Relations & Memorandums of Understanding (MOU); J2 Plans & Policy

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[204] Unclassified data, "Intelligence Link Commonwealth AUS/CAN/UK/US" a secure INTERNET connection for exchange of intelligence between Canada and its allies, commonly referred to as INTELINK-C. Ref FAX J2 Plans 4 to CTC G2, 15 Oct 96.

[205] Ibid, p. 2.

[206] INTELINK-C, 15 Oct 96.

4, (Major), responsible for Requirements Collection, Publication and Dissemination/CCIRM; and J2 Plans and Policy 5, (Major), responsible for Imaging Services. Also working within J2 Plans and Policy are the Canadian Forces Intelligence Liaison Officers in Washington (CFILO(W)-USA) and London (CFILO(L)-UK). The CFILOs in Washington consist of an Intelligence Branch Lieutenant-Colonel, an Intelligence Branch Lieutenant-Commander and an Intelligence Warrant Officer. CFILOs can contact the DG Int directly on pure intelligence matters. The Canadian Forces also supports an Intelligence Branch liaison officer (CFLO), (Major), on exchange duties at Fort Huachuca in Arizona.[207]

J2 Geomatics is headed by an engineering officer, (Lieutenant-Colonel) and has two sub directories: J2 Geo Ops and J2 Geo Engr. The Mapping and Charting Establishment (MCE) also reports to J2 Geomatics, although it is a field unit.[208]

Each of the Land, Sea and Air services of the Canadian Forces have members of the Intelligence Branch serving in the field. The senior land force intelligence officer (formerly the G2) is now Director Land Force Readiness 4 (DLFR 4) with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He reports directly to the DLFR, (Colonel), who in turn reports to the DGLFR, (Brigadier-General). There are additional Army Intelligence DLFR staff members in Ottawa, Kingston and Gagetown. The G2 for 1st Canadian Division

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[207] INTELINK-C, 15 Oct 96.

[208] INTELINK-C, 15 Oct 96.

Intelligence Company (1 Cdn Div Int Coy) in Kingston reports directly to the Division Commander.[209]

1 Cdn Div Int Coy is designed "to provide a deployable, all-source, multi-discipline combat unit capability to support 1st Canadian Division HQ "(1 Cdn Div HQ) "in all its roles, or any other formation as directed by the Commander." The unit trains and organizes "itself to be able to carry out its mission of deploying by air, sea or land anywhere in the world within 14 days notice, ready to provide the combat intelligence support of 1st Cdn Div or any other formation to accomplish its mission."[210]

"In maintaining relations with US military intelligence units, educational exchanges are often made with 110 MI Battalion at Fort Drum." Liaison visits are also conducted with "the US Military Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca" and 1 Cdn Div Int Coy has participated in "joint and combined" exercises "with 1st Surveillance Recon Intelligence Group at Camp Pendleton."[211]

Intelligence operations overseas include the "Canadian National Intelligence Cell (CNIC) in Sarajevo, Bosnia." The staff of the CNIC consists of a major, lieutenant and three senior NCOs. The CNIC works within a multinational environment at Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) HQ. The CNIC also works very closely with the "5th Canadian Multi-National Brigade" (5

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[209] Personal observation, to April 1997.

[210] 1st Cdn Div Int Coy, article, *CF Intelligence Branch Association Newsletter*, Edition 2/96, November 1996, p. 11.

[211] Ibid, p. 11.

CAMNB) G2 staff and their "Forward Intelligence Support Team" (FIST) provided by 1 Cdn Div Int Coy. The unit provides "administrative support to all CF personnel in the Saravejo area" and to "J2 Geomatics" who work with "the Geographic Support Group" (GSG) "in Kiseljak" and to staff in "Mostar and Tuzla."[212] The CNIC is collocated with its American counterpart in Bosnia.[213]

Intelligence officers and their staffs work throughout the remainder of the Army in various G2 positions with 1st, 2nd and 5e Brigade, the Combat Training Centre (CTC), the Land Force Area (LFA) HQs and designated units throughout the CF. The majority of "Army" intelligence positions are connected by a computer Land Area Network (LAN) and correspond via e-mail, unclassified INTERNET, FAX and STU III telephone. Annual "Acorn" conferences are held to maintain general interface and network updating.[214]

Canada's naval elements are served by a Navy Commander, who is designated the Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence for Maritime Command (MARCOM) and Maritime Atlantic (MARLANT) operating in Halifax. He reports to the Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic. When the Chief of Maritime Staff "stands up" in Ottawa at some point after 01 April 1997, all naval intelligence officer positions in Ottawa will be cease. The Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence will however, continue to function as the Maritime

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[212] Lt Jim Godefroy, article , *CF Intelligence Branch Association Newsletter*, Edition 2/96, November 1996, p. 9-11.

[213] Interview with CNIC staff, March 1997.

[214] Telecon DLFR-4-3/CTC G2 17 Oct 96.

Intelligence Advisor from Halifax.[215]

Within MARCOM there is a Senior Staff Officer Intelligence (SSO Int) MARLANT, (Lieutenant-Commander) also based in Halifax. His west coast counterpart, the SSO Int Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC) is also a Lieutenant-Commander. Both SSOs Int have Intelligence officers and NCOs performing a large number of intelligence tasks for the navy. The Senior Staff Officer Surveillance (SSO Surv) in Halifax, (Naval Lieutenant) is responsible for Policy and Plans for conducting surveillance within the MARLANT area of responsibility. This work includes liaison with all government agencies including the RCMP, the Coast Guard, Department of Fisheries, Department of Environment, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada Customs and Immigration and local authorities on a daily basis. Regular communication between these agencies is effected through the CANMARNET INTERNET linking all participating organizations.[216]

Joint operations are a key component of Naval Intelligence. There is a Maritime Air Group (MAG) Intelligence Officer as well as a Collation and Training officer. MAG provides combat ready aircraft to support MARCOM missions, while the intelligence centre in MARCOM provides a 24 hour/seven days a week intelligence watch on both of Canada's coasts.[217]

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[215] Telecon SSO Int MARLANT/CTC G2 17 Oct 96.

[216] Telecon SSO Int MARLANT/CTC G2 17 Oct 96.

[217] Telecon SSO Int MARLANT/CTC G2 17 Oct 96.

The Intelligence organization in NORAD HQ is headed by a J2. The senior Canadian Air Intelligence Officer (A2) (Lieutenant-Colonel) at Air Command in Winnipeg reports to a new organization expected to "stand up" in July 1997, to be known as 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD)/Canadian NORAD Region HQ (CANR HQ).[218] 1 CAD/CANR and 22 Wing/CFB North Bay Sector Operations Centre (SAOC) are undergoing major changes. (These changes will be discussed in the chapter on NORAD).

Intelligence support to 1 CAD/CANR HQ is provided by the Wing Intelligence Officers (W Int O) of Fighter Group, 3 Ere (Wing) Bagotville, 4 Wing Cold Lake, 5 Wing Goose Bay, MAG 434 Sqn Greenwood, 414 Sqn Comox, 22 Wing SAOC and various Sqn Intelligence Officers. Air Transport Group (ATG) has a W Int O with 8 Wing Trenton and 10 Tactical Air Group (10 TAG) has an Air Int officer based in St. Hubert.[219] The majority of the day to day operations for these intelligence staffs involve intelligence functions such as 24/7 operations, the use of digital imagery and coordination of specialized organisations essential to the operational readiness of Canada's air elements.

Although the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch is relatively small in comparison with its allied counterparts, all members work collectively to provide the necessary timely and useful intelligence to military commanders required to assist

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[218] Telecon & Fax A2 FG/CANR/CTC G2 21 Feb 97.

[219] Ibid, p. 6.

them in their decision making.[220] There is no less of a requirement for the products of the intelligence cycle now, (and the sharing of them with ones allies) than there was in the age of Napoleon and Wellington. The present Intelligence Branch continues the tradition of a long line of Canadian military personnel who have served their country.

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[220] Personal observation.

CHAPTER III

OTHER CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS AND RELATED AGREEMENTS:

CANUS AGREEMENT:

"On 15 September 1950, Canada and the United States exchanged letters giving formal recognition to the 'Security Agreement between Canada and the United States of America'." This "was followed...two months later by the 'Arrangement for Exchange of Information between the U.S., U.K. and Canada'."[221]

"Negotiations for the CANUS agreement" began in 1948, although "there was some concern on the part of the American intelligence officials that the original drafts of the agreement provided for 'too much' exchange. Thus, a 1948 memorandum by the Acting Director of Intelligence of the U.S. Air Force" requested a greater restriction on the exchange of information, keeping it to "mutually agreed Communications Intelligence (COMINT) activities on a 'need to know' basis." "A more recent agreement" was "the 'Canadian-United States Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings' (CIRVIS), signed in March 1966." "This agreement" specified "the type of information to be reported by airborne or land-based observers", specifically "information concerning hostile or unidentified single aircraft or formations of aircraft which appear to be directed against the United States or Canada or their forces." CIRVIS reports covered

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[221] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 90.

missiles; Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs); hostile or unidentified submarines; hostile or unidentified group or groups of military vessels; individual surface vessels, submarines, or aircraft of unconventional design, or engaged in suspicious activity or observed in a location or on a course which may be interpreted as constituting a threat to the United States, Canada or their forces; and, any unexplained or unusual activity which may indicate a possible attack against or through Canada or the United States, including the presence of any unidentified or other suspicions ground parties in the Polar Region or other remote or sparsely populated areas.[222]

QWG

Canada maintains intelligence liaison with various nations, with a variety of multi-lateral intelligence conferences, such as the Annual Land Warfare Intelligence Conference and various Quadripartite and Quinque-partite Intelligence Working Groups (QWG INT).[223] At the 26-30 Aug 96 Seventh Meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group on Intelligence (7 QWG INT), held at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, "Major-General Charles W. Thomas, Commanding General of the United States Army Intelligence Centre and Fort Huachuca" spoke on the value of the QWGs. "He highlighted how the multinational operations within Bosnia had provided the US with the opportunity to take lessons learned from that operation and to apply them to their advantage on future operations." Major-General Thomas "emphasized the continuing need for these kinds of meetings to progress interoperability

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[222] Ibid, p. 91.

[223] *ABCA Memorandum For Record, 7th Meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group on Intelligence* (7 QWG INT), 26-30 Aug 1996, p. 1.

issues and to facilitate coalition operations." He stated that "the requirement for ABCA Armies to share intelligence information would be paramount in the future since peacekeeping operations would continue to be comprised of multinational forces." He also "emphasized the need for" ABCA "Armies to collectively work through the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process and ultimately to try and establish a true situational awareness picture for the commander."[224]

The Standing Chairman of the 7 QWG noted that the QWGs "had not only produced valuable products but equally importantly had brought" the staffs of the various Allied Armies "into meaningful discussions and contact with each other. He stated that information had been exchanged on topics outside" the work of ABCA "through the ABCA contacts" and "friendships that had been made within QWG Int." "This was a very great benefit" of the "international agreement."[225]

Canada also "has a variety of" separate "bilateral intelligence agreements" and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) "with the United States" which have led to the production of such documents as the Canada-U.S. "Joint Estimates." During the Cold War these estimates focused on the "capabilities" of the former Soviet Union and what joint action Canada and the U.S would likely take "in the event of a major Russian attack on North

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[224] Ibid, p. 1.

[225] Ibid, p. 3.

America." The "preparation of such estimates" continues "on a yearly basis under the working title *'Canadian-United States Intelligence Estimate of the Military Threat to North America'*."[226]

CSE

"Communications Security Establishment (CSE), operates under a secret directive signed by the Minister of National Defence in 1975." The "relationship between" CSE and DND is "similar to the relationship between the U.S. National Security Agency" (NSA) "and the U.S. Department of Defence" (DoD). "CSE is a 'separately organized establishment under the general management and direction of the DND'."[227]

"One of the functions of CSE is to manage and direct a communications security (COMSEC) program for the entire government" of Canada. "Another...is to collect communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). In addition to its signals intelligence responsibilities under the" AUS/CAN/UK/US/NZ agreement, "CSE intercepts electronic communications between foreign embassies in Ottawa and their capitals."[228] CSE staff regularly liaise with their American

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[226] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 90.

[227] Ibid, p. 79.

[228] Ibid, p. 79.

counterparts at NSA.[229]

There are roughly "700 employees" at CSE working within "three major" subordinate units, "Production, Security and Technology, each headed by a Director General." There are additional "units for Administration, Finance and Personnel."[230] "CSE maintains a personnel information data bank on people who are considered security risks." CSE also implements security measures "to protect the interception of high-frequency radio signals leaking from computer equipment." "CSE is responsible for protecting certain computers that process classified information, such as computer communications with other nations of NATO. CSE security measures include shielding equipment...to block electronic emissions."[231]

Intelligence agreements between Canada and the U.S. involving organizations such as CSE and the NSA have caused the media to ask "are the ties within this community...stronger than those between the agencies and the Canadian government?"[232] To observers outside the military, American influence appears to be "particularly strong in this closed inner world":

> Most of the organizations maintain liaison officers permanently with their counterparts in other countries.

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[229] V. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace, A Report on America's Most Secret Agency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Coy, 1982), p. 87 & 129.

[230] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 79.

[231] Ibid, p. 79-80.

[232] James Littleton, *Target Nation*, p. 8.

> Personnel exchanges also take place frequently. In addition to shared ideological indoctrination, strong ties of both professional collegiality and personal friendship inevitably develop. The result is that the culture of security and intelligence transcends both national boundaries and political debate.[233]

CSE activities draw considerable media attention, as

> CSE's close relationship to spy organizations in the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand...allow it to circumvent the rules. CSE has carried out missions for both London and Washington that [these nations] deemed too delicate domestically to be handled by their own intelligence agencies.[234]

At least one reporter has asked "why not the reverse? CSE purchased Scandinavian interceptions of French communications to gain information about Quebec separatists."[235]

News media have also reported their suspicions that Americans consume the majority of the intelligence produced by both nations, and that "it has been estimated that the Canadian government is able to process and use less than one percent of the data collected by Canadian security and intelligence agencies" and, that "the flow of finished intelligence a country such as Canada tends to receive is not necessarily determined by its own perceptions of its own interests."[236] This is decidedly not the case. Canadian Intelligence agencies process all

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[233] Ibid, p. 7.

[234] Michael Frost, (former CSE employee), *Maclean's, Canada's Weekly Newsmagazine*, (Toronto, Brian Segal Publisher, 02 September 1996), p. 34.

[235] Ibid, p. 34.

[236] James Littleton, *Target Nation*, p. 89-90.

collected or exchanged material as directed and disseminate the product to support government officials who request it.

Many of the intelligence agreements between Canada and the United States (and in some cases, other allied nations), exist in the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU). One example is an understanding for the exchange of SIGINT between the related organizations of the AUS/CAN/UK/US/NZ community. "Prime Minister" Trudeau "acknowledged that there is" an "exchange of information with our friends and allies on intelligence and security matters. We hope that we are the beneficiaries of such an exchange when it does take place."[237]

Trudeau was able to shed some light on Canada's attitude to the value to Canada of "being involved" in "intercepting and decoding foreign information" and the concern that this was being done "not so much for its own use," but America's. He stated that "We have assessed [the situation] from time to time and we have decided to continue any security and intelligence activities which are of benefit to Canada and to discontinue any which might be of benefit merely to a foreign power."[238]

"The American intelligence gathering agencies include:

a. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS);
b. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
c. The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;

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[237] Ibid, p. 96-97.

[238] Ibid, p. 97.

d. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT), U.S. Army;
e. The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI);
f. The Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (OAGSI), U.S. Air Force;
g. Intelligence Division, U.S. Marine Corps;
h. The Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM);
i. The Naval Intelligence Command (NIC);
j. The Naval Security Group Command (NSGC);
k. The Air Force Intelligence Agency (AFIA);
l. The Electronic Security Command (ESC), U.S. Air Force;
m. The counterintelligence elements of the Naval Security and Investigative Command (NSIC);
n. The counterintelligence elements of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI);
o. The 650th Military Intelligence Group, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE);
p. Other intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, staffs, and offices, or elements when used for foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence purposes."[239]

The exchange of intelligence requires a number of collective resources. As noted, many of the American intelligence agencies engage in a considerable amount of liaison with Canada, with particular importance attached to the NSA/CSS.[240] A curious but necessary observation has been made by many Canadian intelligence personnel concerning American intelligence reports. They quite often are at considerable variance with each other. No two agencies necessarily agree or provide the same assessment on any given subject. These obvious differences alone negate against any reliance on a single report from any allied agency (including the Americans) and, therefore, a Canadian opinion or assessment

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[239] *DoD Intelligence Components*, 24 Feb 97, Internet, http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/milintel.html, p. 1

[240] V. James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace, A Report on America's Most Secret Agency*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982), p. 129.

based on multiple sources is required despite the provision of intelligence from an ally. This difference of opinion extends across the borders both ways.

Canada and its allies often question each others reasons behind the differences in assessments provided on a given subject or field of intelligence interest. These differences often lead to interesting and healthy debates wherein a particular (CANUKUS) stand or position may be discussed or defended through a "murder board" process. Data is compared or a certain position "justified". If the assessment passes the test (guilty or not guilty) as to the likelihood of its accuracy, then it may be adopted. Often, only two out of three will agree and so the position or assessment will stand as a Canadian and/or other nation's position (rather than CANUKUS). The end result is a healthy scepticism of all exchanged intelligence and diligent cross-checking of sources to maintain accuracy (not to mention personal credibility within the international intelligence community).[241]

NSA/CSS:

The National Security Agency/Central Security Service is "responsible for the centralized coordination, direction and performance of highly specialized technical functions in support of U.S. Government activities to protect U.S. communications and

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[241] Personal observation.

produce foreign intelligence information."[242] NSA was officially "established by Presidential Directive on "04 Nov 1952" as a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense, who acts as Executive Agent of the U.S. government for the production of communications intelligence (COMINT) information."[243]

"The Central Security Service" (CSS) was established "by Presidential memorandum in 1972 in order to provide a more unified cryptologic organization within the DoD. The Director, NSA, serves as the chief of the CSS and exercises control over the signals intelligence activities of the military services."[244]

During President Harry S. Truman's term in office NSA became "the foundation upon which all past and current communications intelligence activities of the United States government are based," according to a senior official of America's National Security Council. No law has ever been enacted prohibiting the NSA from engaging in any activity, although there are laws to prohibit the release of any information about the agency. The CIA on the other hand was established by the American Congress under a public law, the National Security Act of 1947, setting out that agency's legal mandate as well as the restrictions on

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[242] *NSA/CSS*, Internet http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/index.html, 25 Apr 1997, p. 1.

[243] Ibid, p. 2

[244] Ibid, p. 2

its activities. While the NSA is free from legal restrictions, the agency has a vast amount of technological capabilities for eavesdropping (and therefore intelligence collecting).[245]

The sharing of intelligence between CSE and NSA has been facilitated by many key individuals including "Dr. Louis Tordella who ran the Puzzle Palace (NSA) for...16 years" from 1958. His long term in office provided a continuing link between "British, Canadians, and other cooperating governments." Tordella worked to ensure "that the fragile, supersensitive relations between NSA and its foreign counterparts would not be disrupted."[246]

The NSA has its own electronic early warning nerve centre called the "Defense Space and Missile Activity Centre" (DEFSMAC). "DEFSMAC is a combination of the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) with its military components and the NSA." DEFSMAC receives data from all available "assets" to provide "warning" against "any worldwide threat" to North America "from missiles, aircraft," or "other overt military activities."[247]

DEFSMAC uses its "SIGINT" resources "to detect the first sign" of a missile launch. "Once such a sign is detected," the warning is "passed" instantly "to the White House Situation Room" via "DEFSMAC's direct Critical Intelligence Message Circuits" (CRITIC). The data is also sent to "the National Military

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[245] James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace*, p. 1-4.

[246] Ibid, p. 87.

[247] Ibid, p. 190.

Command Centre at the Pentagon as well as the alternate War Rooms and, most importantly, to the space-track and early-warning analysts at the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) Headquarters, buried beneath 1,450 feet of granite at Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain." "This warning" can be provided from within "a few minutes" of a missile launching "to as much as a day" of advanced warning "and may include such valuable intelligence as the type of missile or spacecraft to be launched and its likely trajectory."[248]

> Once the launch has taken place, an early-warning satellite in geo-synchronous orbit will spot the rocket plume within one minute of liftoff and signal back to earth that a launch has occurred. From then on, watch officers at NORAD track the vehicle's flight profile closely, to ensure that it is not on a "threat azimuth."[249]

At the same time, "DEFSMAC notifies all potential listening posts and SIGINT sensors in the range of the vehicle to begin telemetry interception."[250] (Much of the work carried out by Canadian Forces personnel on exchange duties in NORAD would involve making use of the sensitive data collected through DEFSMAC).

NSA's surveillance technology continues to expand, quietly pulling in more and more communications. The end result is that there is little that crosses the airwaves that escapes the detection of Canada's southern ally.[251]

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[248] Ibid, p. 191.

[249] Ibid, p. 191.

[250] Ibid, p. 191.

[251] Ibid, p. 379.

DIA:

The CF Intelligence Branch maintains a very close working relationship with the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA is a major source of information actively used by CF personnel both at home and abroad. "DIA is a designated Combat Support Agency and the senior military intelligence component of the American Intelligence Community. The Director, DIA, reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in fulfilling his national-level and Combat Support responsibilities."[252]

Established in 1961 the DIA's mission is to "Satisfy, or ensure the satisfaction of, the full range of foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements of [its] customers in support of: Military operations in peacetime, crisis, contingency and combat; Weapons systems acquisition and planning; and, Defence policymaking."[253]

> Accomplishing DIA's mission involves the provision of support to a wide range of intelligence customers." These "communities" of customers "include national-level defence policy and decision makers, the Services, operating forces and a variety of 'special interest' customers (i.e. Congress, law enforcement agencies" [the Canadian Forces] etc.). "In concert with the intelligence components of other related Services and Combatant Commands, the DIA ensures its organization is functionally integrated with the American and allied Military Intelligence Community.[254]

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[252] *DIA*, Internet, Vector 21, http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/vector21/index.html, 25 Apr 97, p. 1.

[253] Ibid, p. 1.

[254] Ibid, p. 1.

"To achieve its mission, the DIA is organized around three centres: "the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC); the National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC); and, the National Military Intelligence Systems Center (NMISC)."[255] There are also three major directorates:

> Intelligence (J2), Policy Support (PS) and Administration (DA); and the Joint Military Intelligence College (MC), which provides specialized joint education in military intelligence. The Agency hierarchy is also supported by the Director of Military Intelligence Staff, as well as special staff elements such as legal, equal

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[255] "The NMIPC produces and manages the production of military intelligence throughout the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) community in response to the needs of the American DoD and non DoD agencies. NMIPC directorates provide: all source, finished intelligence on transnational threats and other combat support issues; assessments, basic and current intelligence, force projections, estimates, scientific & technical (S & T) and imagery-derived intelligence on regional defense issues; the aerospace, maritime and ground forces of foreign militaries, plus their associated weapons systems and, all aspects of foreign nuclear, chemical, biological and medical matters. The Director NMIPC also serves as the Functional manager for the DoD Intelligence Production Program.

The NMICC ensures the effective acquisition and application of all-source intelligence collection resources to satisfy both current and future DoD requirements by centrally managing DoD collection. The NMICC serves as the Functional manager for GDIP collection, directs human resource intelligence (HUMINT) activities and operates the Defense Attaché System. The Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Office, a component of the NMICC, is the focus for national and DoD MASINT matters.

The NMISC provides information services to DIA and the national Intelligence Community (IC). These services include automated data processing (ADP) support; systems development and maintenance; DoD Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) management; communications engineering, operations and maintenance; information systems security; imagery and photo processing; and, intelligence reference publications, dissemination, distribution and printing." Ibid, p.2.

opportunity, comptroller etc.[256]

Key areas of emphasis for the DIA include "targeting and battle damage assessment weapons proliferation warning of impending crises support to peacekeeping operations maintenance of data bases on foreign military organizations and their equipment and as necessary support to UN operations and US allies."[257] This information is critically important to both the Canadian and American forces deployed in areas such as Bosnia. In addition to providing intelligence to "warfighters" DIA "has other important customers including policymakers in the DoD and members of the JCOS."[258]

> DIA plays a key role in providing information on foreign weapons systems to US weapons planners and the weapons acquisition community. In carrying out these missions DIA coordinates and synthesizes military intelligence analysis for Defense officials and military commanders worldwide working in close concert with the intelligence components of the military services and the US unified commands."[259]

> Since the end of the Cold War and Desert Shield/Storm the DIA has undergone dramatic change. Regional priorities have changed, missions and functions have been realigned and a strategic plan has been created to reflect new global realities. Crises in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq and North Korea as well as such global challenges as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, narcotics trafficking and monitoring of arms control treaties have increased the scope of demands for intelligence in the post-Cold War world. To reconcile

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[256] Ibid, p. 2.

[257] Ibid, p. 2.

[258] Ibid, p. 2.

[259] *Defense Intelligence Agency*, Internet,http://www.dia.mil [DIA Home Page], p. 1.

> the disparity between increasing requirements and declining resources DIA has relied on a well-trained, highly motivated work force that has the flexibility and training to face a variety of new challenges. Technology has also contributed to DIA's ability to carry out its mission. New technical intelligence collection systems have provided greater access to foreign military information. New software and the ability to share data bases has allowed analysts to contrast compare and compile information quickly and efficiently. Perhaps most importantly an improved communications network has enabled efficient rapid transmission of intelligence to and from military forces around the globe.[260]

Headed by "a three-star military officer" DIA is staffed by "civilian and military personnel." DIA employees are located in several buildings around the "Washington DC area" but most work at the "Defense Intelligence Analysis Center on Bolling Air Force Base." A small number of employees work at "the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in Maryland and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Alabama." DIA's Defense Attaches are assigned to embassies around the world and "DIA liaison officers are assigned to each unified military command."[261]

CSIS:

The CF Intelligence Branch conducts a considerable amount of inter-departmental liaison with its civilian and allied counter parts. The 1981 "McDonald Commission's" inquiry into Security Service abuses resulted in major changes to the Service. One of the recommendations made by the commission was for the establishment of a civilian security service separated from the

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[260] Ibid, p. 1.

[261] Ibid, p. 3.

RCMP. Following a great deal of debate and controversy, the Solicitor General "detached" the "Security Service from the RCMP." Bill C-157 created the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in May 1983.[262] The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) is a parliamentary-appointed body (often referred to as a watch-dog agency) that reviews the work of CSIS.

CSIS has a large organizational structure with some two thousand personnel. "Under section 16" of Bill C-157 CSIS is permitted "to conduct espionage" within Canada. CSIS makes efficient use of modern technology, including "telephone" or wire "taps", "electronic surveillance" devices and measures etc, "to obtain economic or national security intelligence." "Foreign diplomats, trade officials, foreign business enterprises and foreign visitors" have been targeted.[263]

"Counter-espionage is a more prominent part of the CSIS mission" including operations against the activities in Canada of foreign "intelligence operatives from countries such as" Russia, "India, Israel, South Korea and the Philippines", as well as "violence-prone expatriate groups (such as the Sikhs from India)" etc.[264] CSIS activities in the area of counter-subversion include

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[262] The bill generated considerable protest over provisions that were considered by many as a "massive threat" to the rights and freedoms of all Canadians. "A modified version" of the bill, "designated C-9", "became law in May 1984." Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Org*, p. 73.

[263] Ibid, p. 75.

[264] Ibid, p. 75.

the maintenance of files on individuals selected by the "Target Approval and Review Committee" (TARC). TARC is "composed of senior CSIS managers" and its job is to consider and or authorize "target individuals or groups" for "specific periods of time, approving or rejecting new targets and reviving in some cases, old targets."[265]

DFAIT:

On 06 January 1986 the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) revamped some its intelligence units and merged "the Bureau of Intelligence Analysis and Security" (BIAS) with "the Bureau of Economic Intelligence" (BEI) to create "the Foreign Intelligence Bureau" (FIB).[266]

Although most of the intelligence organizations at DFAIT have been disbanded, FIB was "headed by a Director General... responsible to the Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security Affairs)." It was "responsible for collecting, analyzing and distributing political and economic intelligence both for policy-makers within" DFAIT "and for other departments concerned with foreign policy." FIB's Director General presided over "four divisions, the Economic Intelligence Division, the Interview Division, the Political Intelligence

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[265] Ibid, p. 78.

[266] Ibid, p. 73.

Division and the Intelligence Services Division."[267] All are presently inactive.

POLICE & SECURITY BRANCH:

"The Police and Security Branch" within "the Office of the Solicitor General" is also included as a "member" of the Canadian intelligence community. "The branch was created in 1971 as the Security Planning and Research Group (SPARG) of the Office of the Solicitor General." According to "Solicitor General Jean Pierre Goyer", the function of SPARG was:

> to study the nature, origin and causes of subversive and revolutionary action, its objectives and techniques, as well as to protect Canadians from internal threats; to compile and analyze information collected on subversive and revolutionary groups and their activities, to estimate the nature and scope of internal threat to Canadians and to plan for measures to counter these threats; and to advise the [Solicitor General] on these matters.[268]

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE:

"By convention, the Prime Minister...provides direction on key intelligence policy issues." The Cabinet and the "Privy Council Office" (PCO) support "the Prime Minister in his ultimate responsibility for the security and integrity of Canada and related intelligence matters."[269] "A senior official of the PCO,

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[267] Ibid, p. 81.

[268] Ibid, p. 83.

[269] *The Canadian Intelligence Community, Report of the Auditor General, November 1996, Chapter 27*, Internet, p. 1, para. 27.16.

supported by the Security and Intelligence Secretariat (SIS), has a mandate from the Prime Minister to co-ordinate the activities of the intelligence community." "The PCO also houses the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS), which both assesses and co-ordinates the assessment of political, economic, strategic and security intelligence for the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, ministers and senior officials."[270] The IAS "also supports the Intelligence Assessments Committee" (IAC). "The IAC is an interdepartmental group chaired by the Executive Director of the IAS, that co-ordinates and facilitates interdepartmental co-operation in preparing analytical and assessment reports to ministers and senior government officials."[271]

"The Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI) includes the deputy heads of the departments and agencies directly and indirectly involved in security and intelligence matters. In practice, the executive subcommittee of ICSI is currently the most senior forum at the officials' level for regular consideration of security and foreign intelligence matters and the primary interdepartmental mechanism for reviewing proposals and submissions to ministers. It also has responsibility for the management of resources to ensure that priorities are met by the various departments and agencies."[272]

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[270] Ibid, p. 1, para. 27.17.

[271] Ibid, para. 27.72, p. 1.

[272] Ibid, para. 27.74, p. 1.

"The Intelligence Policy Group (IPG) is the principal policy and operational co-ordination forum in the community. Its membership is drawn from the assistant deputy minister level in key departments and agencies of the intelligence community. It also includes the Assistant Deputy Attorney General (Criminal Law), who has functional responsibility for coordinating legal advice by the Department of Justice to the intelligence community."[273] There are also "a number of other interdepartmental committees and working groups" which "cover foreign intelligence as well as national security matters such as counter-terrorism."[274] All departments involved in foreign intelligence collection are driven by the need to support government policy and, ultimately, to ensure Canada's security.

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of National Defence (MND) require intelligence, as well as" the "knowledge of intelligence activities, that supports informed policy and operational decisions consistent with their broad mandates."[275] Other federal departments and agencies with close links to the Canadian intelligence community include "the RCMP, Citizenship and Immigration, Revenue Canada (Customs) and Transport Canada." Departments and agencies with "specialized functions relating to the work of the intelligence community include the Federal Court,

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[273] Ibid, para. 27.75, p. 1.

[274] Ibid, para. 27.76, p. 1.

[275] Ibid, para. 27.25, p. 1.

which issues warrants to CSIS to authorize the use of certain intrusive powers and, the Department of Justice which provides legal advice."[276]

The "close formal intelligence relationships" Canada has "forged...remain particularly strong with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand." "Intelligence products, including analyses and assessments, are exchanged and technical assistance is provided" in a reciprocal manner between each of the allied nations. "These and other relationships provide Canada with information and technological resources that would otherwise be unattainable with current resources."[277]

CANADIAN & AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, INDOCHINA/VIETNAM:

The necessity for intelligence sharing and co-operation between Canada and the United States was defended by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson, "when he spoke" to "the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs" on 06 April 1954 on the subject of the conflict in Indo-China (as Vietnam was then known). The Committee was essentially "interrogating" the Secretary and asking "unusually searching" questions. One of these questions was: "What is your normal source of factual information about what is going on in Indo-China?" "Pearson replied":

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[276] Ibid, para. 27.27, p. 1.

[277] Ibid, para. 27.28, p. 1.

> our source of information is varied. We get information from United States sources through our contacts in the State Department and through our contacts at the Pentagon. We get a great deal of information on Indo-Chinese matters from the French government through our embassy in Paris and from the French representatives here and, we get a good deal of information...from the United Kingdom which has a diplomatic representative in Indo-China. We are pretty well informed...of the facts of the situation.[278]

For its part, the Canadian "government" kept "Washington informed about what it had learned through diplomatic and other channels of developments in Indochina." An example of this sharing took place "on 17 and 18 November 1954" when "the U.S. Administration was told through no fewer than three sources, a telephone call" from "Pearson to the U.S. Secretary of State, a despatch from the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa and a report by the Canadian Minister in Washington of a discussion between Canadian authorities and the Prime Minister of France, Pierre Mendès-France", concerning Ho Chi-Minh (the "Canadians" were "surprised to hear" the French PM "had found Ho Chi-Minh not completely uncooperative"). Although "Canada's relations with" other members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam "deteriorated", the Canadian government continued to keep the U.S. well "informed" on ICSC activities and other events of concern as they unfolded in Indo-China.[279]

Canada provided the U.S. government with an independent view

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[278] James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada-Indochina: Roots of Complicity*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), p. 36.

[279] Ibid, p. 223.

on events and activities of concern to American national interests in Vietnam. "Information gleaned by Canadian" Forces "personnel on truce-supervisory duty in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam", was forwarded to officials in "the US State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency." The Canadian "government had instructed its Ambassador at Washington to inform the U.S. State Department that Canada would supply the United States with pertinent intelligence obtained when serving on the Indochina commissions."[280]

> Canada would become an otherwise unavailable conduit. "If the Government decided to accept, we would wish to keep the United States informed privately of the course of events," the Ambassador at Washington had told a senior official of the U.S. Department on 23 July 1954. "This we felt we could do quite properly without impinging on our responsibilities as members of the Commissions."[281]

"The official U.S." response by "Deputy Under Secretary of State, Robert Murphy," was that "such a private arrangement would work out to mutual advantage."[282]

There were many kinds of useful intelligence that Canada could gather because of its membership in the ICSC that were of interest to "the U.S. State Department and the CIA." "The earliest reports" for example, "were based on despatches and letters from the three commissioners to the Department of External Affairs." These despatches provided insider "knowledge

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[280] Ibid, p. 242.

[281] Ibid, p. 243.

[282] Ibid, p. 243.

of the state of play within ICSC Vietnam, ICSC Laos and ICSC Cambodia."[283]

As the exchange of intelligence between Canada and the U.S. on Vietnam became routine, the Americans began to make specific requests for information. "On 08 May 1956" for example, "an official of the Canadian Embassy in Washington was asked by a U.S. State department official if Ottawa would provide information about ICSC Vietnam." The official wanted to "raise a number of questions...doing so informally, in friendly fashion and without in the least imputing any criticism of the Commission and in particular of the Canadian representatives." "The Canadian official forwarded these requests to Ottawa, where they were dealt with to the best of its ability."[284]

"Intelligence obtained by the Canadians on the Indochina commissions" was "passed on to the United States" concerning "conditions in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as distinct from commission activities." The Americans, in fact, found this data quite useful. "At a meeting in the U.S. State Department on 08 October 1954," a U.S. official stated that, "we have received a great deal of unevaluated material on violations from...the Canadians."[285]

"On 19 December 1954, L.B. Pearson told the U.S. Secretary

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[283] Ibid, p. 243.

[284] Ibid, p. 244.

[285] Ibid, p. 245.

of State that, 'Canadian military officers on the Commission had been secretly instructed to take advantage of every opportunity for observing military preparations or activities in Viet Minh territory. So far they have not seen any clear signs of a build-up for a resumption of hostilities'." The CIA "came to prize snippets of news and vignettes of life in the field provided by this [Canadian] source."[286]

In fact, DEA actually redirected Canadian Forces "military reports to the United States authorities." Not all of the Canadians concerned with the activities of the military advisers, however, agreed with this activity. The first Canadian "Commissioner for the ICSC Vietnam," Sherwood Lett, wrote that he was displeased by "Ottawa's determination to have his personnel gather military intelligence."[287] Following Lett's departure from Vietnam in "July 1955," the supply of Canadian military intelligence to the U.S. "soon became routine."[288]

Canada's "acceptance of a truce supervisory task" in Southeast Asia "was strongly motivated by a desire to reduce the threat to the nuclear peace. Continued prosecution of the Franco-American intervention in 1954" for example, "would have carried with it a very high probability of eventual resort to tactical nuclear warfare and thus,...war with China and possibly

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[286] Ibid, p. 245.

[287] Ibid, p. 246.

[288] Ibid, p. 247.

the Soviet Union." "The Canadian objective" was to keep "the nuclear peace" while "preserving the fundamental harmony of Canadian-American relations."[289] Canada kept the Americans advised of the situation through the provision of intelligence, and thereby reduced the possibility of a nuclear war. This was a very small price to pay for a very strong investment in the maintenance of its security.

Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) were "duly devised for determining what items of intelligence received from" Canadian "commission team members should be forwarded to U.S. authorities in Washington." Collected "material was brought by DEA and DND before the Joint Intelligence Bureau" (JIB), which was "an interdepartmental group composed of representatives of the three armed forces and chaired by an official (from) DEA." The JIB chose "the reports it wanted to pass on" and "sought clearance...from the DEA" to forward its products. With DEA's authorization, the data was sent to the Canadian Embassy in Washington and directed to forward it "to the U.S. State Department or the CIA."[290]

"The military component" of the Indo-China Commission provided "Ottawa with a Monthly Intelligence Review." This "INTREP" contained "items of interest gathered by members of the

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[289] Douglas A. Ross, *In the Interests of Peace: Canada and Vietnam*, 1954-1973, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 378-378.

[290] James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada-Indochina*, p. 247.

inspection teams as they" patrolled "the countryside."[291] Some of these documents were "passed" on to the "UK, US and Australian Intelligence agencies by the JIB." The passage of intelligence data to the U.S. however, had limits. When the CIA asked to debrief Canadian personnel returning from "the Indochina commissions," the Canadian government turned down the request.[292]

"Eventually, the practice of clandestine transmission to U.S. authorities of political-military intelligence gathered by Canada's commission members in Indochina was exposed to public view." Canadian newspapers (including *The Montreal Star* which broke the story), accused the Canadian diplomats and soldiers in Vietnam of "betraying [the nation's] trust by acting as informants for U.S. intelligence agencies" and that "they are functioning as spies when they are supposed to be serving as international civil servants."[293] On 10 May 1967, *The Globe and Mail* reported that a CBC correspondent had "revealed that copies of the despatches of the delegation on ICSC Vietnam were passed to the U.S. Embassy in Saigon before transmission to Ottawa."[294]

That the passage of intelligence from Canada to the U.S. was a two-way process appears to have escaped the media's attention. Canada was providing intelligence data to its American ally by

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[291] Ibid, p. 247.

[292] Ibid, p. 248.

[293] Ibid, p. 249.

[294] Ibid, p. 250.

choice. This exchange was essential to both governments in support of their decision-making processes. Neither denials nor apologies were forthcoming, nor should they have been necessary.

> **The gathering of intelligence about an adversary's disposition and the provision of an accurate realtime view of the battlefield drove the early development of military reconnaissance forces to where we now recognize that we must have a constant access to space, land, ocean and sub-ocean intelligence...if you don't have intelligence, you don't have raison-dêtre.**[295]

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[295] Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Robert Dobson, "*Canada's other Military Responsibilities to the World*", article, Canadian Forces Roles Abroad, Eleventh Annual Seminar, edited by David E. Cole and Ian Cameron, (Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1995), p. 61.

CHAPTER IV

NORAD

North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) "is a binational military command responsible to the governments of both Canada and the United States for the aerospace defence of the North American continent."[296] The NORAD Agreement was renewed for the eighth time by the governments of Canada and the United States in March of 1996. According to Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister for Foreign Affairs, "NORAD is the most important bilateral security and defence agreement Canada has with the United States."[297]

The three objectives of NORAD are:

a. to assist each nation to safeguard the sovereignty of its airspace;
b. to contribute to the deterrence of attack on North America by providing capabilities for aerospace surveillance, warning and characterization of aerospace attack and defence against air attack; and,
c. should deterrence fail, to ensure an appropriate response against attack by providing for the effective use of the forces of the two countries available for air defence.[298]

NORAD forces are directly assigned to aerospace defence by

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[296] *Options For Canada-US Cooperation in Aerospace Defence, Oct 1994, A Report Directed by the NORAD Renewal Steering Group*, p. 14.

[297] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade News Release No. 44, Internet, communiqué, *CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES TO RENEW DEFENCE AGREEMENT*, *www-uvi.eunet.fr/armament-and-disarmament/nuke/disdi596.html*, 25 March 1996, p. 1.

[298] *Options For Canada-US Cooperation in Aerospace Defence, Oct 1994*, p. 14.

the two nations.[299] Canada's contribution includes the newly formed "1 Canadian Air Division/Canadian NORAD Region HQ (1CAD/CANR HQ) in Winnipeg." Canada's Air Force is undergoing major changes. By the summer of 1997, "the Air Force will be 45% smaller" than it was in 1994. At that time "all five Air Force Headquarters will close. 50% of the positions will be cut completely. A handful of the remainder will be sent to detachments on each coast to support maritime air operations, a larger handful will support the Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa and the remainder will staff the new 1 CAD/CANR."[300]

"The mission of the 1 CAD/CANR HQ Intelligence Centre is 'to provide timely, accurate and relevant Intelligence support to Air Force operations'."[301] In addition to providing intelligence support for NORAD, Air Intelligence operators support Air Force personnel on out-of-country missions by performing such duties as "analyzing potential Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) launchers on the flight path into Sarajevo," identifying "unknown radars off the coast of the Former Yugoslavia," and locating "barbed wire 'helicopter traps' in Haiti."[302]

Due to the increasing involvement of CF personnel in

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[299] Internet, www.underground.org/publications/informatik/inform-2.4.html, p. 1.

[300] Lieutenant-Colonel S. Beharriell, AIRCOM/C Int O, "*News From the Air Force*", article, *CF Intelligence Branch Association Newsletter*, Edition 2/96, November 1996, p. 17.

[301] Ibid, p. 18.

[302] Ibid, p. 18.

"coalition and other cooperative operations, Canadian Air Force personnel are training to augment coalition air operations centres."[303] Intelligence personnel are receiving "basic targeting training in Germany" and have gained "first-hand experience as part of the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy."[304]

BACKGROUND TO NORAD:

"In the early years of the Cold War" (1945-1958), both governments had determined that continental air defence cooperation was necessary for the ultimate survival of both states.[305] The United States needed Canadian territory for the deployment of its "radar" systems to "detect Soviet bombers" and Canada needed to preserve "the integrity of her airspace."[306] This cooperation was based on a continuation of the arrangements which existed at the end of the Second World War and would eventually culminate in the 12 May 1958 establishment of NORAD.[307]

Based on its wartime experience, "Washington saw Canada as

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[303] Ibid, p. 18.

[304] Ibid, p. 18-19.

[305] Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1987), p. ix.

[306] David J. R. Angell, "*NORAD and Binational Nuclear Alert: Consultation and Decision-making in the Integrated Command*", article, Defence Analysis, Vol 4 (June 1988), p. 131.

[307] Howard Peter Langille, *Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition*, (University of Toronto Press, 1990), p.18.

being a trustworthy ally" and, therefore, "many intimate details of American defence planning could be freely shared with the Canadians." "Projects deemed essential for the defence of the US" for example, "could be undertaken jointly with Canada or left in Canadian hands." The activities of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence contributed to the build-up of trust between the two nations. One result of this trust was the "intertwining" of Canadian and US air defence systems.[308]

"NORAD was established by a simple exchange of notes between the two countries."[309] "Although it was not created by treaty, NORAD can be viewed as an alliance similar to NATO." It is an agreement between two sovereign countries to collaborate militarily against a perceived common enemy." "The United States assumed the bulk of NORAD's financing" and, therefore, "the arrangement provided Canada with a measure of air sovereignty at an acceptable cost." It also "freed" scarce "Canadian defence resources for European commitments."[310]

Canada's participation in NORAD initially caused considerable tension in the Canadian government over the acquisition of nuclear weapons for its military forces between 1958 and 1963. This tension eased in the period from 1963 to

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[308] Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, p. 118.

[309] D.W. Middlemiss & J.J. Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence, Decisions and Determinants*, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 21.

[310] Ibid, p. 22.

1978 as aerial "surveillance, the exercise of sovereignty, and a prudent minimal defence became the objectives of NORAD." Since NORAD's inception there have been few problems in the "bilateral" defence "co-operation between the two countries."[311]

"Canada's air defences served American as well as Canadian interests." Both nations needed warning of an attack from Russia. The warning systems were provided in the form of radar coverage of the North, using American technology and Canadian ground. "Three major" radar "detection systems" (the Mid-Canada Line, the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line and the Pinetree Line) were constructed in Canada ("at American initiative") and the costs were shared with Canada paying one-third. Canada also authorized the stationing of "American airmen" on Canadian territory "to operate some of the stations."[312]

"The updated version of the DEW Line" known as "the North Warning System" is still an "integral" part of "the United States military Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence system (C3I)." "The main purpose" of the North Warning System "is to provide the United States 'national command authorities' with" useful and timely intelligence that will aid them in making "decisions concerning the deployment" of their armed forces.[313]

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[311] David Cox, *Canada and NORAD 1958-1978: A Cautionary Retrospective*, Aurora Papers 1, The Canadian Centre For Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985, p. 1.

[312] Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, p. 121.

[313] James Littleton, *Target Nation*, p. 84-85.

Canadian and American air force planners continued to use the Permanent Joint Board on Defence to resolve mutual defence problems through the 1950-53 period. Diplomats were consulted in both capitals about impending PJBD agenda items. In order to put the Board's recommendations into effect, approval was required from both the President of the United States and the Canadian cabinet or Cabinet Defence Committee. "The PJBD (also) provided an orderly structure for the consideration of important defence proposals."[314] The effectiveness of the PJBD declined, however, from 1953 onward as far as the air defence of North America was concerned. This change was due to the establishment of more direct links between the RCAF and the USAF. "Informal information" was passed also through these links between Ottawa and the Pentagon and eventually, also through NORAD.

In 1957, the position of Commander in Chief Air Defence, Canada - United States (CINCADCANUS) was created. The title has since changed and in 1997 he is designated the "Commander in Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD). Under CINCNORAD the two nations combined their mutual air defence networks and interception forces and placed them under a single command. The Commander is responsible "to both the Canadian and American governments." His primary task is to "provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States." He must also "provide

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[314] Joseph T. Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs*, p. 124-125.

appropriate response against air" and "aerospace attack."[315]

The NORAD "Agreement...makes it clear that" CINCNORAD is always American, while the "Deputy CINCNORAD...must be Canadian" with the authority to replace the Commander "in all his responsibilities when CINCNORAD is absent or incapacitated."[316]

The primary reason for Canadian participation in NORAD is the prevention of a nuclear confrontation or global conflict which could lead to a direct attack on Canada. The major benefit of the partnership is an increase in security for both Canada and the United States. There are additional benefits to Canada's participation in NORAD. It provides Canada with access to alliance councils where Canadian economic, political, military and arms control objectives can be advanced.

"The American concept of defence...involved Canada in at least three critically important ways: intelligence gathering; access to Canadian facilities for forward basing" of "elements of" the "U.S. Strategic Air Command" (SAC); and, "continental early warning and air defence."[317] This involvement provides Canadian defence planners and government officials with an inside look at American defence concerns and in particular the United States perception of the threat.

In its 1985 Report on Canada's Air Defence, the Special

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[315] David J. R. Angell, *NORAD and Binational Nuclear Alert*, p. 132.

[316] Ibid, p. 132.

[317] James Littleton, *Target Nation*, p. 77-78.

> Senate Committee on National Defence observed that "Whatever Canada's own perceptions of the world, this country has to aim at maintaining mutually satisfactory arrangements with the United States. In the air defence area, this means dealing with American perceptions of the threat as much as with the threat itself."[318]

The security and intelligence benefits of the NORAD agreement continue to accrue and to serve both nations.

PRESENT STATUS OF NORAD

As of 01 April 1997, NORAD consists of a binational headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado and three subordinate regions: Alaska NORAD Region (ANR) with headquarters at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska; the Canadian NORAD Region; and, the Continental United States Region. The Canadian and Continental United States Regions are further subdivided into sectors: the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) with headquarters at Winnipeg (both sectors combined) and, the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) located at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, with four sectors: Tyndall; March Air Force Base, California; McCord Air Force Base, Washington; and Griffiss Air Force Base, New York.[319]

Canadian and United States cooperation in the use of shared intelligence can be seen in the day to day activities of intelligence personnel operating in exchange positions. There are for example four Canadian Intelligence officers and one

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[318] Ibid, p. 87.

[319] NORAD Renewal Steering Group, *Options for Canada-US Cooperation in Aerospace Defence*, (Ottawa/Washington, 1994), p. 16-17.

Canadian pilot employed in intelligence analysis duties at United States Air Force (USAF) installations. Two Intelligence Captains and the pilot (Captain) work in the NORAD Headquarters Combined Intelligence Centre in Colorado on the J2 Staff as Analysts. A Canadian Major serves on the Intelligence Staff of 1st Air Force/Continental Region Headquarters (CONR) at Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), Florida. An additional Intelligence Captain serves as an analyst in the Alaska NORAD Region at Elmendorf AFB. One USAF Technical Sergeant presently works for the A2 Intelligence officer at the NORAD installation in North Bay, Ontario. As noted, the NORAD responsibilities in North Bay end on 01 April 1997 and the intelligence staff there will move to Winnipeg.[320]

Since its inception, NORAD has served to strengthen the Canada-US bilateral relationship. "Surveillance and control operations" have been "significantly less costly for each nation" because of the sharing of defence "responsibilities."[321] Benefits to Canada include access to the "numerous resources" available to NORAD, such as "atmospheric surveillance sensors; missile warning and space surveillance sensors; air defence fighters and support aircraft; command centres and operations centres; and, personnel. Each of these resources is connected through a network of Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) systems."[322]

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[320] Telecon A2 Int, North Bay and G2 CTC, 18 Feb 97.

[321] *Options For Canada-US Cooperation in Aerospace Defence, Oct 1994*, p. 4.

[322] Ibid, p. 17.

Canada is also permitted access to the Combined Intelligence Centre (CIC), which "is a shared NORAD and United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) centre."[323]

> The CIC includes an intelligence production division at Peterson Air Force Base and 24-hour intelligence operations inside Cheyenne Mountain" in Colorado. "The CIC produces in-depth analysis of foreign space operations, foreign space doctrine, strategy and tactics, foreign space operational employment, space indications and warning, space-related targeting intelligence, anti-satellite strike and damage assessment and, imagery intelligence exploitation. The CIC maintains the defence intelligence space order-of-battle (ORBAT) and the integrated data base of space-related facilities. The CIC also provides intelligence community products on foreign activity, strategic threat systems and ORBAT to develop tailored threat estimates and quick response assessments of foreign strategic activities for NORAD operations.[324]

The collective benefits of the NORAD Agreement have given Canada an intelligence advantage far beyond what it could afford within its own resources. Both nations will continue to be provided with an effective means of protection through clear and unmistakable indications and warning of potential threats. NORAD's intelligence assets permit quick and efficient action to be taken to prevent any penetration into Canadian airspace, thereby doing much to ensure Canadian security.

> **However much the threat has diminished and however much NORAD has adjusted its operations accordingly, it remains a combined effort for the purposes of facilitating extremely close Canada-U.S. aerospace defence cooperation along the lines instituted during the Cold War.[325]**

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[323] Ibid, p. 22.

[324] Ibid, p. 22.

[325] Joel J. Sokolsky, *The 1996 Renewal of NORAD*, (RMC, Kingston, 1994), p. 31.

CHAPTER V

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

"Prior to" the "integration" of Canada's Armed Forces, "Naval Intelligence in Canada...was concerned...with providing the defence department with...operational intelligence," counter-intelligence and "the naval elements necessary" to produce "joint, national and international intelligence." Naval Intelligence "formed the basis for determining the structure and operational bias of the navy," including "the types and numbers of its vessels, its diversity of weapon systems and its personnel requirements."[326]

> Until July 1940, the RCN had no formal naval liaison with the United States. At that time it was decided to exchange naval attachés and accordingly Commodore Victor Brodeur, RCN was appointed to the Canadian Legation in Washington and Captain O.M. Read, USN, joined the US Legation in Ottawa. With the establishment of a naval liaison channel between Washington and Ottawa, the Director Naval Intelligence (DNI) was called upon to play a part in Canada's traditional function as a link between the US and the UK.[327]

"After the U.S. came into the war, DNI passed all" shipping and "movements information to Washington with the result that the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was able to run a thorough plot" of the activities in the North Atlantic "for six months before (they) had (the) facilities...to do the work"

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[326] Lt(N) MacDonald, *History of Canadian Naval Intelligence*, CFSIS Precis 8-014(B), June 87, p. 2.

[327] Ibid, p. 8.

themselves.[328]

Inter-service Intelligence Cooperation within the Canadian Forces during the war has been described in the introductory history, but Commander Eric S. Brand (RCN), Lieutenant-Commander John Barbe-Pougnet de Marbois, Royal Navy Reserve (RNR) and Lieutenant C.H. (Herbie) Little (RCNR) were responsible for organizing operational intelligence in the RCN in the early stages of the war. Their work included liaison with the USN to ensure that East and West Coast SIGINT stations for the USN and RCN were closely integrated and operated smoothly.[329] After the war the RCN "acknowledged that close liaison with the RN and the USN" intelligence organizations should be continued and that the naval attachés position in Washington should be retained. This continuing arrangement has resulted in effective liaison with the American Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).[330]

Canada's Navy has a continuing major requirement for high quality intelligence products on a global level. The Commander of Maritime Command (MARCOM) is tasked to maintain combat-capable, general purpose maritime forces to meet Canada's defence objectives, including support to other government departments and participation in NATO and United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and

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[328] Ibid, p. 8-9.

[329] Major S.R. Elliot, *Scarlet to Green*, p. 12.

[330] Ibid, p. 14 & 16.

contingency operations.[331]

Canada's Navy has contributed much to the business of intelligence collection, enabling the CF to do its fair share in providing useful products to exchange with its allies. The deployment of combined forces has also proved useful in maintaining or establishing new contacts with its allies that have proven to be valuable to the nation's security.

MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY:

Canada's concerns over its sovereignty have led to a reduction in the deployment of Canadian and American military forces onto each other's territory.[332] Between 1955 and 1975 "the Canadian government took" measures "to reduce slowly the impact of the American military presence in Canada." In its 1971 white paper, *Defence in the 70s*, "the Trudeau government placed a major emphasis on sovereignty protection, making it at least nominally the first of its defence priorities."[333]

Under the Mulroney government, what was left of the U.S. military presence on Canadian territory declined. A significant exception to the reductions was the maintenance (until 1996) of a

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[331] *Maritime Command Home Page*, *www.marlant.halifax.dnd.ca/ marcom.html*, p. 1.

[332] Canada also provides training for NATO and other forces on its territory, including German armoured troops in Shilo, Manitoba; the British Combat forces at Suffield, Alberta; Norwegian and other allied aircrew at Goose Bay, Labrador, etc. Personal observation.

[333] Joseph T. Jockel, *Security to the North: Canada-U.S. Defence Relations in the 1990s*, (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1991), p. 25.

USN detachment of about 100 personnel at Argentia, Newfoundland. This detachment was responsible for the operation of part of an American underwater sound surveillance submarine detection system (SOSUS).[334] The Canadian government would like to know what is happening in its own waters and under its territorial "ice". The government is concerned because it is known that the Canadian Arctic is an operating area for foreign submarines.[335] For this reason, in cooperation with its American allies, Canada has constructed its own system of fixed seabed acoustic sensors in strategic locations.

TRINITY:

In May 1995 "the Canadian Forces Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (CFIUSS)" was put into operation "in Halifax." Codenamed "Trinity", CFIUSS provides Canada with an additional "capability to support (its) maritime security." Trinity plays a major role in support of Canada's "multi-purpose, combat-capable maritime forces."[336]

In the early days of "the cold war" the RCN's chief concern was the "threat" posed by the large and modern Russian "submarine fleet." This led the RCN to take on the business of "anti-submarine warfare" as one of its highest priorities. The end

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[334] SOSUS is a fixed undersea surveillance system with readout facilities in shore locations. Ibid, p. 26.

[335] Ibid, p. 171-172.

[336] Commander Ed Tummers, *Undersea Surveillance Systems: Part of a Balanced Maritime Force*, Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy, (Working Papers No. 2, June 1995), p. 36.

result was a closer working relationship with the RCN's "United States Navy" counterparts. Canadians and Americans joined forces "to build a highly secret underwater sound surveillance system" (SOSUS), to "detect and track submarines across wide expanses of the ocean." "The system has" increased in both "size and sophistication," with more than "30,000 miles of undersea cable," as well as "several towed-array ships and tracking stations" in place "around the world." Canadian and American naval personnel work alongside each other "in the Lieutenant-Commander Frederick A. Jones Building," which houses the "CFIUSS Centre located in Halifax."[337]

CFIUSS contributes to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty by being part of the three stages of maritime security. These stages involve surveillance, patrolling and response. "Major projects...underway to enhance" the Canadian Forces maritime capabilities include "fixed surveillance systems" on both "the east and west" coasts, and the build-up of an "oceanographic analysis function."[338]

Maritime Command recognises the importance of fixed surveillance systems as part of a balanced maritime force:

> Given the vast and remote nature of Canadian maritime spaces, it is not economical to attempt routine surveillance over all areas using ships, submarines and aircraft. As a result, the Navy maintains a system of fixed seabed acoustic sensors in strategic locations. This offers a good surface and subsurface capability at considerable savings, while

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[337] Ibid, p. 36.

[338] Ibid, p. 36-37.

allowing us to concentrate limited aircraft and vessel resources in areas of high activity.[339]

Canada acquires two major benefits with CFIUSS. "Fixed surveillance systems" aid Canada in sustaining "a multi-purpose, combat capable maritime force" and the system allows a "close working relationship" in intelligence collection with Canada's American ally "in support of (its) maritime security." CFIUSS augments "the overall coverage" of Canada's "naval" area of interest, while saving "expensive" and time-consuming "flying hours or ship-days at sea" which in turn can be put to better use in "the patrol and response functions."[340]

The mutual defence of both nations has been improved because of the implementation of the "Canada-United States Basic Security Plan" (BSP).[341] One of the "subordinate agreements" of the BSP included a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) between DND and DoD to form CFIUSS. The CFIUSS MOU recognized "common interests for the defence of North America and certain operational requirements for undersea surveillance."[342] The necessity for this kind of bi-national cooperation has been a major concern:

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[339] Maritime Command, *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada's Maritime Forces into the 21st Century*, (Halifax: 1994), p. 24.

[340] Commander Ed Tummers, *Undersea Surveillance*, p. 38-39.

[341] The first Joint Canadian-United States Defence Plan was put into effect in 1940. *A Brief History of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940 to 1960*, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), p. 5.

[342] Commander Ed Tummers, *Undersea Surveillance*, p. 39.

> We will continue to cooperate with our American counterparts in planning for the defence of North America and will maintain the ability to operate effectively with U.S. forces towards that end. This will include the joint operation of facilities like integrated undersea surveillance systems...[343]

"One of the unique aspects of the integrated undersea surveillance system is the shared command and control" between the two nations. "In practical terms, this means that" CFIUSS supports both "Maritime Command and the United States Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System."[344]

The CFIUSS sensing devices "are deployed and streamed" to provide a continuous "data" collecting network. "Acoustic analysis" is conducted by shore-based personnel who carry out a constant "watch...on all contacts within sensor range adjacent to" Canada's coasts "and beyond." In effect, they are ensuring effective control over the maritime approaches, thereby upholding "Canadian sovereignty and jurisdiction over our vast waters of national interest."[345]

> In cooperation with the United States Navy, Trinity now operates a system of underwater surveillance sensors in the maritime approaches to North America. A single array laid on the sea bed is able to detect surface, air and underwater contacts with the acoustic detection ranges of the sensor. This coverage can be maintained day and night, in good and bad weather, all year round. In some cases, the system is able to identify contacts from their acoustic signature alone. At other times, a ship, aircraft or submarine will have to be cued to search the area of probability to

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[343] The Commander Maritime Command, Vice Admiral Larry E. Murray, 1994. Ibid, p. 39.

[344] Ibid, p. 39.

[345] Ibid, p. 40.

identify the contact. Once the contact is identified, the system can be used to track the target without additional fuel expenditure. As long as the target is within sensor range, it is also possible to determine what it is through the acoustic signature received.[346]

The CFIUSS "system can (also) be used to detect other acoustic noises in the ocean. The system has been used in the past for search and rescue, pollution monitoring, seismic research, marine mammal studies, tracking major weather systems, monitoring the nuclear test ban treaty, studying global warming and, detecting illegal or unwanted maritime activities.[347] The positioning of surveillance systems is "a cost effective means of providing" the necessary "continuous surveillance" of Canada's coasts and "identification of contacts."[348]

For 1997, the CFIUSS mission is:

> to provide initial alerting and sustained support to other tactical and strategic forces through detection, classification, tracking and reporting of subsurface, surface and air maritime activities and other acoustic and ocean environmental data of national and allied interest."

The United States IUSS (USIUSS) mission is:

> to provide command and direct tactical control of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships, Naval Facilities (NAVFACs) and associated Naval Ocean Processing Facilities assigned to Commander Undersea Surveillance, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet; to support antisubmarine warfare command and tactical forces by detecting, classifying, tracking and providing timely reporting information on submarines; to gather long term oceanographic and undersea geological information; and, to maintain all ships, shore activities and staff of the

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[346] Ibid, p. 42.

[347] Ibid, p. 42.

[348] Ibid, p. 43.

command in an optimum state of training and readiness.[349]

CFIUSS and USIUSS provide accurate monitoring and intelligence reports to the governments of Canada and the United States. Seaborne vessels also provide intelligence reports (known as MERINT reports) on items of concern to both nations, such as: the "movement" of "unidentified aircraft;" "missile firings;" "movement" of "unidentified submarines...or groups of surface combatants; any airborne, seaborne, ballistic or orbiting object which the observer feels may constitute a military threat against the United States or Canada;" "individual surface ships, submarines or aircraft of unconventional design, or engaged in suspicious activities or observed in an unusual location;" and, "any unexplained or unusual activity which may indicate possible attack against or through the United States or Canada."[350]

Canadian and American Naval Intelligence cooperation is an important part of the maintenance of Canada's security. There are however, other aspects to consider and these comprise NATO and other "out of area" arrangements for intelligence sharing.

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[349] A *Main Evaluation Center (MEC)* for each fleet commander acts as headquarters and central repository for information. The data from the readout facilities is transferred to the MEC by means of high speed communications, thereby allowing a variety of users to quickly obtain the data required. This information is disseminated on a real-time basis to fleet commanders since this knowledge is a vital factor in successful tactical anti-submarine warfare and other naval operations. This data is also used to provide post operational reconstruction by integrating environmental and tactical information derived during an operation or exercise. Trinity Ops O FAX to CTC G2 18 Oct 96.

[350] Jeffrey Richelson, *Foreign Int. Org.*, p. 91-92.

CHAPTER VI

NATO & ABCA

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established by the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty commonly referred to as the Treaty of Washington. NATO's 16 member states are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany (since 1955), Greece (since 1952), Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain (since 1982), Turkey (since 1952), the United Kingdom and the United States.[351]

> The North Atlantic Alliance is a defensive alliance based on political and military cooperation among independent member countries, established in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.[352]

> NATO...is an inter-governmental organization in which member countries retain their full sovereignty and independence. NATO also provides a forum in which the individual member nations can consult together on any issues of concern and take decisions on political and military matters affecting their security.[353]

> NATO has evolved as an organization and has developed its political and military structures to take account of the transformation of the European security environment since the end of the Cold War. Changes in NATO's structures and policies reflect the common agreement between NATO member countries to maintain the political and military cooperation essential for their joint security.[354]

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[351] *NATO World Wide Web Interface*, Chris Scheurweghs, Internet, scheurwe@hq.nato.int, 21 April 97, p. 1-2.

[352] Ibid, p. 2.

[353] *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, NATO Integrated Data Service, INTERNET, 11 Dec 1996, p. 1.

[354] *NATO World Wide Web Interface*, Chris Schedurweghs, INTERNET, scheurwe@hq.nato.int, 21 April 97, p. 3.

> The alliance is organized in a manner designed to facilitate consultation and foster cooperation between member nations in political, military and economic as well as scientific and other non-military fields.[355]

NATO standards are essential to the business of international inter-service operations. In order to fight together effectively, member nations must first train together. In order to facilitate the practical applications of this training and cooperation, the member nations periodically exchange military personnel in fields such as aviation, combat forces, naval staffs and intelligence.

MAS:

NATO standards are managed by the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) which is composed of three boards (one each for the Army, Navy and Air Force). Under the Army Board there is an Intelligence inter-service Working Party (INTWP). (There is a move underway to form a Joint Standardization Board (JSB) and if formed, INTWP may move to it). The Air Reconnaissance Working Party (ARWP) is placed under the Air Board, although it works closely with INTWP. INTWP is the prime venue for intelligence standardization, although there are at present over 20 different working groups/parties dealing with such subjects as imagery exploitation, data transmission and nomenclature of equipment.[356] "Two other standardization forums outside of NATO are the ABCA

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[355] *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, NATO Integrated Data Service, INTERNET, World Wide Web site, 11 Dec 1996, p. 2.

[356] Telecon, J2 Plans/CTC G2 03 March 1997.

Armies and the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC) programs."[357]

"There are many other NATO forums of importance to the intelligence field, such as the Army, Navy and Air equipment panels of the Council of NATO Armaments Directors, the NATO Advisory Committee on Special Intelligence (NACSI) etc." "The advent of automated Command, Control and Communications Information (C3I) systems within nations and the need to maintain interoperability" between them, led to "the creation of a NATO agency" called the Allied Data Systems Interoperability Agency (ADSIA) "to control and rationalize the development of character and bit-oriented standardization for messages and communications data links."[358]

"ADSIA has several specialized working groups, one of which...is assigned the task of formatting intelligence related reports and messages." ADSIA "receives requests for formatting from NATO Working Groups such as the INTWP" or "NACSI and attempts to prepare formats in accordance with established rules which satisfy both the user and the interoperability requirements for ADP." ADSIA members meet "four times a year" to assess "imagery interpretation reporting requirements" and to prepare "ORBAT and enemy activity reports" on subject nations. "Canada,

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[357] Major G.W. Handson, "*Standardization*" (Part Two) article, *Intelligence Branch Journal*, (Number 7, Fall 1988, Ottawa), edited by Major J.H. Newman, p. 25.

[358] Telecon J2 Plans/CTC G2 03 March 1997.

with the Director Land Command and Information Systems (DLCIS)" has been "an active participant" in ADSIA since 1988.[359]

ABCA:

"Three of the NATO nations namely Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, are partners with Australia in a dynamic standardization alliance apart from the NATO forum." These allies have "combined requirements for operations in areas other than Europe." "Army, Navy, Airforce and industrial standardization programs" have therefore been "developed" within the Armies of the US, UK, AS and the CF, (ABCA Armies), as well as the Quadripartite Working Groups (QWGs) and the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC).[360]

The ABCA Armies signed the "Basic Standardization Agreement (BSA)" in 1964. "The New Zealand Army became associated in 1965." "The aims of the program are to:

a. ensure the fullest cooperation and collaboration among the ABCA Armies;
b. achieve the highest possible degree of interoperability among the signatory Armies through material and non-material standardization; and,
c. to obtain the greatest possible economy by the use of combined resources and effort."[361]

"The ABCA Armies have produced a Combat Development Guide" for operations to the year "2005." "This Guide lists the General

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[359] Major G.W. Handson, *Standardization*, p. 25.

[360] Ibid, p. 25-26.

[361] Ibid, p. 26.

capabilities (GCs) and the Quadripartite Objectives (QOs) which have been agreed as required for various types of conflicts. NATO concerns are primarily for high-level conflict and the ABCA Armies standardization work" is not designed "to duplicate the work of the MAS Army Board and its working parties. The direction and concentration of efforts within ABCA Armies is on the development of standardization and on programs concerning mid-level, low level conflicts and peace-keeping."[362]

"The aim of a QWG is to identify" and make recommendations to the allied "Armies" on "how standardization and/or interoperability should be achieved within its area of interest." "Each QWG identifies and" each Army agrees "to specific objectives towards which its work is directed. These objectives are incorporated in each QWG's Terms of Reference (TOR) which are reviewed at each meeting."[363]

QWG Intelligence has been in operation since its "inaugural meeting was held in Canada in July 1987." The QWG reviews and considers "the validity and usefulness of:

a. existing QSTAGs (ABCA Armies equivalent to a NATO STANAG);
b. working papers on intelligence, related Electronic Warfare (EW) and Battlefield Surveillance Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition (BARSTA); and,
c. existing Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) in the ABCA Armies SOP (QSTAG 831)."[364]

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[362] Ibid, p. 26.

[363] Ibid, p. 26.

[364] Ibid, p. 26.

The exchange of intelligence is designed to support NATO in its essential purpose, which is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. NATO also embodies the transatlantic (and collective) link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. Air support is critical to ensuring the continuance of this link.[365]

AIR STANDARDIZATION COORDINATING COMMITTEE (ASCC)

To achieve standardization of the allied air forces the ASCC was formed "in 1948." Its purpose is to:

a. ensure that in the conduct of combined operations there will be a minimum of operational and technical obstacles to full cooperation;
b. enable essential support facilities to be provided for the aircraft of the other ASCC air forces;
c. enable justifiable logistic support; and
d. promote economy in the use of national resources.[366]

There are roughly 20 Working Parties at any given time, the WP "of direct interest to intelligence is WP 101 - Imagery Interpretation." WP 101 "has not only adapted NATO MAS(Air) Imagery Interpretation standards (STANAGs) for use as Air Standards," but has also "developed standards for use in areas such as titling of hand-held film and reporting of data for use in dimensional analysis of imagery." WP 101 "is a valuable

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[365] Personal observation.

[366] Major G.W. Handson, *Standardization*, p. 27.

specialized forum for the exchange of ideas and the stabilization of procedures in imagery interpretation. The intelligence community benefits through formal and informal contacts on subjects as diverse as insight into new imagery interpretation equipment and systems being developed by air forces through to materials to aid in training interpreters and analysts." Canada's OPI for WP 101 is also DIE.[367]

> The fundamental operating principle of the NATO Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states based on the indivisibility of the security of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in political, military and other spheres, ensures that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realize their essential national security objectives through collective effort.[368]

These collective efforts include the sharing of intelligence.

CHANGES IN NATO

"Foreign Ministers or representatives of NATO countries and of six Central and Eastern European countries" and "three Baltic States" attended "the inaugural meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council" (NACC) "on 20 December 1991." The NACC facilitated "cooperation on security and related issues between the participating countries at all levels" and examined "the

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[367] Ibid, p. 27.

[368] *NATO Handbook: What is NATO?*, Online version, p.1, Internet www.nato.int/docu/handbook/hb00100e.htm.

process of developing closer institutional ties as well as informal links between them." "The eleven states on the territory of the former Soviet Union forming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) became participants in this process in March 1992." Georgia and Albania joined the process in April and June 1992 respectively and, by 1993, there were 22 NACC Cooperation Partners."[369] (The NACC is being superseded by the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative).

"Subsequent consultations and cooperation in the NACC have been wide-ranging but have focused in particular on political and security-related matters, peacekeeping" etc.[370] The subject of the sharing of intelligence has been of interest to all participants. How this will affect the arrangements for intelligence cooperation between Canada and the US remains to be seen. "Against the background of the crises in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, attention" has been "directed increasingly towards NATO's potential role in the field of crisis management and peacekeeping and particularly its support for UN peacekeeping activities with regard to the former Yugoslavia."[371]

In "January 1994" at a "Summit Meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government...in Brussels, Alliance leaders confirmed

> the enduring validity and indispensability of the North Atlantic Alliance and their commitment to a strong

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[369] Ibid, p. 4

[370] Ibid, p. 4

[371] Ibid, p. 6.

transatlantic partnership between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility for defence matters."[372]

"A number of additional decisions of a far-reaching nature were also taken. These included steps to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity; endorsement of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces; reaffirmation that the Alliance remains open to membership of other European countries; the launching of the Partnership for Peace initiative; and, measures to intensify the Alliance's efforts against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and, consideration of measures designed to promote security in the Mediterranean region."[373]

Canada is already involved in Bosnia, Cyprus and the Middle-East through its NATO and UN commitments and, therefore, it needs to be inside the intelligence sharing loop at all points of concern.

The NATO Council has stated that:

Enlargement of the Alliance will be through accession of new member states to the Washington Treaty in accordance with its Article 10. All new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty; and will need to accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join.[374]

Intelligence sharing with the new members will also logically have to be examined on an individual basis.

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[372] Ibid, p. 6.

[373] Ibid, p. 6

[374] NATO Fact Sheet No. 13, (March 1996), Internet p.2.

CONCLUSIONS:

This thesis has argued that Canada has enjoyed the benefits of collective security with its American ally because of the advantages of intelligence sharing. The exchange of intelligence has placed Canada in a better position to make informed decisions prior to deploying its forces on overseas missions. It has been demonstrated how important the exchange of intelligence with its American ally has been for Canada's military throughout its recent history.

Canada is "a nation which does not devote a significant amount of resources to security and intelligence activity".[375] In spite of this, the Canadian government appears to have "an increasing ability to reach independent judgements about threats from abroad, a greater mastery of the realities of domestic politics and an uncoupling of the two issues."[376] The timely use of accurate intelligence (often provided by its American partner), has helped to make this possible.

It has been argued that Canada has benefitted from active defence cooperation within the alliance since at least 1940. This cooperation has not been free. It has been required that

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[375] Wesley K. Wark, *Security Intelligence in Canada, 1864-1945: The History of a "National Insecurity State"*, article in Chapter 8, *Go Spy the Land, Military Intelligence in History*, Keith Neilson & B.J.C.McKercher, editors, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 155.

[376] Ibid, p. 172-173.

Canada also supply information as the price of cooperation, but it is an acceptable price. There has been no compromise of Canada's sovereignty and, in fact, the security of the nation and particularly of its soldiers has been enhanced because of the benefits accrued.

There are a great number of participants within the American Intelligence Community, each of which may offer a widely varying (and often conflicting) assessment of specific events requiring intelligence analysis. This is one obvious but major reason why Canada must make its own determinations and judgements concerning the validity of all shared intelligence products. Shared information may be provided not necessarily because it meets the end user's needs, but because it may also suit the providers best interests. Canada has been made acutely aware that when data is exchanged between nations, political, military, economic and practical concerns must be considered. This is particularly true whenever decisions that are made based on the data provided involve a risk in lives, national security or the commitment of scarce resources.

The Canadian government is well served by its military alliances, but it must continue to be convinced of their value. Intelligence sharing is an absolute necessity for the Canadian Forces. The Canadian government has made good use of its intelligence resources in the past. Canada should continue to make maximum use of intelligence to back both its military and civilian leadership in the decisions they make both at home and

abroad. It should also share its intelligence resources with the United States, in order to have continuing access to theirs.

The Canadian government continues to deploy its Armed Forces personnel on increasingly dangerous missions overseas. To carry out these various missions with any degree of safety (not to mention success) requires a considerable amount of foreknowledge, planning and preparation to deal with the variety of life threatening situations likely to be found when they get there. This in turn means that there is an even greater need for the provision of thoroughly analyzed information which has been processed and disseminated in a useful form of intelligence to the Canadian government and its military decision makers. If the means available to aid in the decision making process are not acknowledged and utilised, then decisions made to deploy forces overseas will be based on a weak information foundation. This endangers the lives of the personnel being sent.

Although Canada appears at times to have relinquished some degree of its sovereignty in its treaties with the United States, it has gained a higher degree of security than would be possible on its own. For Canada, the benefits of mutual cooperation with American intelligence agencies have far outweighed the costs. During the Cold War, Canada needed access to United States intelligence data, because it in fact shared their perception of the threat. It was incumbent upon the government of Canada to obtain as much information as it could about the Russian threat and to keep informed on American policies drafted to deal with

it. Far from diminishing Canadian sovereignty, such information actually enhanced it because it allowed Ottawa to make more informed decisions, or at least to be informed about decisions being taken by the Americans.

If intelligence cooperation *per se* constitutes a surrender of sovereignty, one could ask "why are so many other countries in the world anxious to have the same kind of advantage which Canada has long enjoyed?" Those who argue that this intelligence sharing compromised Canadian sovereignty, must point to specific instance where Canada was compelled to take action in something that was not in its National interests. This would require identifying something detrimental to Canada's national security for the sake of preserving access to the intelligence conduit. In the case of Vietnam for example, one could possibly argue that by giving the Americans information, Canada compromised its role as an impartial member of the UN. Ottawa knew, however, that peace in Vietnam was being threatened by the actions of the North and was concerned about the possibility of American overreaction to the point that nuclear weapons might have been used. It was essential that Canada do everything in its power to prevent the war from escalating. An expansion of the war in Vietnam (particularly tactical nuclear war) would not have been in the United States' and, therefore, Canada's best interests.

The intelligence sharing arrangements between Canada and the U.S. have been a practical defence necessity. The benefits for both nations began with the formation of the Permanent Joint

Board on Defence (PJBD) during World War II. This cooperation includes a substantial exchange of military intelligence and the benefits continue to this day. This cooperation represents forward thinking and demonstrates that Canada is the beneficiary not just of good timing, but of good judgement as well.

The Americans don't like the idea of single-source intelligence anymore than Canadians do. So long as a comparison or "cross-check" of all data is possible from "other" sources and agencies, the provider of any form of intelligence product must be prepared to have the validity of the product questioned. This of course puts the provider's credentials and, therefore, credibility to the test of comparison or "challenge".

Credibility (and by inference "face") are paramount when it comes to getting a particular intelligence product accepted by the end user. When a provider loses credibility, it takes a very long time to restore. Multi-sourcing is essential and in Canada's case, an absolute necessity. To maintain credibility, Canadians have made use of their own intelligence resources to form their own opinions and make reasonable deductions as to the accuracy of any intelligence data provided. Within its limited resources, the Canadian intelligence community carries out its own independent analysis very well. The United States and Great Britain have the same reasons for ensuring that their own assessments are also based on credible information.

Errors in assessments are made within the international Intelligence Community, but when they are found or detected the

inaccuracies are quickly reported to all end users so that necessary corrections can be made quickly and effectively. There can be no room for "embarrassment" when national security is at stake. Personnel in intelligence cannot be "yes men" telling decision-makers only what they think they want to hear, they must provide the information their commander's need to know, however painful or embarrassing that information may be. If the decision-maker who receives the intelligence chooses to ignore it, he or she does so at their peril. Canadian troops recently deployed to Africa on a decidedly unclear mission without making the best perceived use of readily available intelligence from personnel with recent experience in theatre. The decision makers must understand how to make the best use of all available intelligence to keep involvement in such difficult situations to a minimum. Leaders who choose not to make the best use of all available intelligence pay the price in expensive and inconsequential troops deployments as well as embarrassing media headlines. It is possible that "readily available" information from both Canadian and American sources could have been put to better use in support of the deployment to Africa.

At the time of writing, there are more than 2,200 Canadian Forces personnel serving in at least 15 different locations world-wide, with UN, IFOR, OSCE and other organizations. The timely exchange of useful military intelligence improves their chances for safe operations, compared to the dangers that would exist without it. Cooperation between the military intelligence

organizations of Canada and the United States has been one of the key reasons for their continuing success on operations in the field. Having access to good intelligence has generally allowed Canadian leaders to have a better understanding of events taking place overseas that may directly or indirectly affect the security of Canada's citizens and, in particular, its soldiers. The United States has usually been good about sharing intelligence, but they have also always insisted that Canada give something back. With the necessary intelligence at hand, often provided by its U.S. partner, the government of Canada is able to take informed and appropriate action where and when it is necessary. The end result has been the maintenance and improvement in the national security of Canada.

It is a Canadian tradition to expect that the military will continue to "deliver the goods" when called upon to perform its duties in time of crisis. These duties, whether they are performed in of Aid of the Civil Power, Interdiction, Peacekeeping or War, need to be supported with good intelligence. At present, one method of acquiring intelligence which we cannot gather on our own is to share and exchange it with our allies, particularly the Americans. It is but one method among many of contributing our fair share to world peace and thereby ensuring the security of Canadians.

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Vitae

Major Harold Aage Skaarup is a serving officer in the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch. Since 1971 he has had extensive experience in both the reserve and regular force, including service in the Intelligence Sections at Headquarters Militia Area Atlantic in Halifax, and Headquarters Northern Alberta Militia District in Edmonton. During his reserve service he spent four years at the Canadian Airborne Centre in Edmonton with the Canadian Forces Parachute Team (The Skyhawks) from 1977-1981. He served two years as an SO3 Intelligence Officer at Headquarters Canadian Forces Europe while based in Lahr, Germany from 1981-1983. In 1983 he transferred to the regular force, first undergoing training and then serving as an instructor at the Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security (CFSIS) in Borden from the fall of 1983 to March 1984.

In March 1984 he became an Attaché trainer and an Intelligence Analyst with DDI-6, (later named the Directorate of Imagery Exploitation in Ottawa), where he covered the Far Eastern Military Districts of the former Soviet Union 1984-1986. He then served three years as the Regimental Intelligence Officer in the Canadian Airborne Regiment (1986-1989) in Petawawa and on United Nations duty in Cyprus (1986-87). During this period he completed additional training at the Toronto Staff School and the Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College (Fox Hole U) in Kingston. He was subsequently posted back to Lahr, Germany, where he served three years as the G2 Operations officer in the HQ and Signals Squadron, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (1989-1992). During his NATO service he participated in Arms Verification Control tasks in Germany and Iceland, and took courses in Advanced Electronic Warfare, Psy Ops, and Interrogation training in England.

In 1992 Captain Skaarup was posted to CFSIS to serve as an Instructor, and on promotion to Major in 1993, became the Officer Commanding the Intelligence Training Company, and later the officer commanding the Distance Learning Company, in Borden. In 1994 Major Skaarup was posted to the Tactics School at the Combat Training Centre, CFB Gagetown, where he is currently the Intelligence Directing Staff officer, as well as the Base G2.