"From the Friendly City to the Seaway City:"

The Impacts of Deindustrialization and the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project on the Seaway Valley

by

Stephanie Ann Kirkey

A thesis submitted to the Department of History
in conformity with the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario, Canada

September 1997

Abstract

Of the many factors that helped to shape the character and development of Cornwall, Ontario and its environs in the first half of the twentieth century, two of the most important forces in the history of the area were the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project and the textile industry. But both had their greatest impacts on the people of Cornwall and the Seaway Valley in the 1950s, the former in its "glorious" realization, and the latter in its not-so-glorious decline and demise. Indeed, Cornwall's 1950s are a study in state and capital formation, as the expanding welfare state supported the Seaway mega-project in its turn toward staples-led economic growth, and away from support for traditional manufacturing sectors such as textiles. The completion of the Seaway development and the deindustrialization caused by the closure of the local cotton mills irrevocably changed Cornwall's history and identity. The experiences of three "groups" of people are of particular interest.

The Seaway Project "required" the expropriation and flooding of a great deal of land, translating into the destruction of eight communities in the Seaway Valley, and the relocation of 6 500 residents to form "new" towns. Most of the people who were displaced cooperated with rather than objected to, the Project because they believed that the Seaway would bring, to themselves and to Canada as a whole, the benefits of modernization: economic and population growth. Much to their disappointment, the promised "boom" never seemed to have occurred, and most people discerned few

substantial long-term benefits accruing to the residents of the Seaway Valley. We will never know what might have happened had the Seaway "improvements" not been undertaken, but the rhetorical promise of the 1950s was considerable, and in its aftermath certainly appeared to many in Cornwall to be overstated.

Some Native land was also expropriated for the purposes of the Seaway. Although unable to stop this appropriation, the Mohawks did their best to protect their interests and to cope with the environmental degradation that was caused by the "modernization" associated with the Project.

In order to save their jobs, the workers in the local Canadian Cottons mills also had to contend with modernization. But even though they worked alongside their employers in joint efforts to "rationalize" the production process, they objected vehemently when "modernization" led to an erosion of their wages and working conditions.

The experiences of these groups highlight modern capitalist hegemony, as the imperatives of capitalist development and expansion, or "modernization," were largely accepted. Moreover, the ways in which the people negotiated their encounters with either the Seaway Project or the struggles of the local cotton mills for survival, also show how they interpreted "modernization" in terms of their own material interests, and acted accordingly.

Acknowledgments

Where do I begin, and where do I end?

First of all, I wish to thank my supervisor, Bryan Palmer, for his patience with this very unlearned student, and his guidance in letting me "wander" where I had to go in order to learn what I needed to know. Ian McKay was a source of encouragement, with his many ideas and his interest in our common hometown. I am also grateful to past instructors who inspired me to learn more and to carry on with my studies. Hats off to the office staff in the Departmental offices, especially Yvonne Place, for tips on how to navigate the administrative maze. The staff at Stauffer Library, the Cornwall Public Library and the National Archives of Canada were a great help. And to those who granted me interviews, I am in your debt. The experiences you shared with me were invaluable to my research, as well as to my ongoing education in this thing called life.

I am grateful too for friends and family. You are appreciated more than you know. My Aunt Ginette and Uncle Wayne made research trips to Ottawa easier and more pleasant by letting me stay with them. Finally, I am so fortunate to have the enduring love and support of my Mom, Dad and brother, Shawn. And to my father, who instilled in me his love of history: thank you.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

Chapter One: Introduction

Community-based histories are numerous, and studies by Bettina Bradbury, Bryan Palmer, Suzanne Morton and others illustrate the utility of this approach in examining material processes such as industrialization and urbanization, and social phenomena such as gender identity or ideas about progress and development.[1] Cornwall, Ontario in the 1950s was in many ways a typical "mill town," but the experiences of the residents of the area in these years make this region, during this period, especially interesting. The construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, and the decline and demise of the local cotton mills of the Canadian Cottons Company, had a huge impact on the immediate Cornwall area. The Seaway Project, begun in 1954 and completed in 1959, was a two-pronged "mega-project" which involved dredging the St. Lawrence river from Montreal to the Great Lakes to allow deep-sea vessels passage to inland ports, and the damming of the upper rapids of the international section of the river to provide hydro-electric power. While any layoffs or closures of the cotton mills were of concern to local residents, the plight of the Canadian textile industry struck Cornwall dramatically in 1953 with the closure of the Stormont mill, and concern

---

[1] See Bettina Bradbury, Working Families: Age, Gender and Daily Survival in Industrializing Montreal. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993; Bryan D. Palmer, Capitalism Comes to the Backcountry: The Goodyear Invasion of Napanee. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1994; Suzanne Morton, Ideal Surroundings: Domestic Life in a Working-Class Suburb in the 1920s. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.

over the future of the local mills continued until Canadian Cottons ended operations in the city in 1959.[2] These otherwise unrelated events or processes share some common elements, as both show the power of capital and the state[3] to reshape and redefine the history and identity of a small community. In addition, both were constructed by the state and capital, and understood by a number of people, to be necessary aspects of modernization, a seemingly desirable process which would result, generally, in a better, more prosperous existence. Modernization as an historical process and modernity as an aesthetics of development are complex features of the last three centuries, congruent with the rise of advanced capitalist societies. They have been accompanied by varied ideological and cultural forms and an immense analytic literature. In this thesis, I use "modernization" less theoretically than this writing would suggest, and more descriptively, drawing on the common-sensical way in which different individuals or groups used the term in a casual manner. Precisely how the Seaway Project and the struggles of the local cotton mills were understood by local residents was

---

2

Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, pp.223-223; Elinor Kyte Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983, pp.446-449.

3

For the purposes of this thesis, "the state," when not identified in a specific way, refers to both the governments of Canada and Ontario, and the agencies and corporations created and controlled by them. Alternatively, "the state" refers to any institution, group or person with the power to inflict "legitimate violence" (symbolic or otherwise).

determined less by the dominant ideology of modernization, and more by fundamental material realities and experiences. In this regard, the experiences and responses of those who had to be relocated because of the Seaway Project, the Mohawks of Akwesasne, and the workers in the mills of Canadian Cottons are of interest, and will be the focus of this study.

The role of the state in these simultaneous processes is of particular note. An analysis of the state's role in the Seaway Project suggests a continuation of the gradual shift from Canada as a "laissez-faire" liberal colony, to an interventionist, democratic nation-state. Governments, both federal and provincial, attempted, through their words and actions (more words, less actions, as one would expect) to create a concept of Canada as an independent, modern country, dedicated to the welfare of its citizens. Conversely, the state's expropriation of land for the Project, and the refusal to extend any aid to the Canadian textile industry, contradict such a view of a democratic welfare state, and highlight Canada's dependence on capital investment and trade -- especially foreign capital -- for survival.

The relationship between the state and society in Canada changed dramatically with the rise of the "welfare state" after World War II. As a result of the implementation of Keynesian economic policies, the state had an explicit obligation to sustain high levels of employment and economic growth and, in the form of social welfare programs, provide for the basic needs of those who could

not adequately sustain themselves within a modern capitalist economy.[4] Thus, views of the role of the state also started to change from a more "laissez-faire" liberal position, which perceived state involvement in economic and social life as anathema, to a more "new democratic" liberal position, which held the state responsible in many ways for the well-being of all Canadians.[5]

In essence, the provision of a social safety net was part of a larger tacit "social contract" between the state, labour and capital. In exchange for state regulation of the economy and the provision of the "social wage," capital was expected to provide employment and to ensure increased growth, productivity and living standards. Similarly, labour, or more specifically unions, were given a voice in national decision-making and the right to bargain collectively, but on the condition that union leaders governed workers, maintaining the "status quo" and ensuring labour cooperation for the sake of capitalist expansion.[6] Unfortunately, this

---

4

David A. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982," in Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey, eds., Modern Canada: 1930-1980's. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984, pp.46-47; James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State 1914-1941. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983, pp.212-213; Miriam Carol Wright, "'The Smile of Modernity': The state and the modernization of the Atlantic cod fishery, 1945-1970." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, May 1990, p.32.

5

Leo Panitch, Working-Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State. London: Verso, 1986, p.5.

6

Ibid., pp.132-134,198; Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992, pp.268-269; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An

"postwar settlement" worked best under the "boom" conditions experienced by many, but not everyone, in the postwar years. For as the experiences of Canadian textile labourers demonstrate, any import penetration of domestic markets, tariff deregulation or reduction in mass consumption led to the destabilization of labour-management relations and to attacks on workers' wages and working conditions.[7] And as we are seeing today, economic decline points the way not only to employers putting the "squeeze" on labour, but also to government cuts to social programs and spending.

While the state is not directly controlled by capital interests, the main purpose of the state in modern capitalist society is to ensure and to promote the smooth and profitable functioning of the capitalist system. The state, then, must balance the demands of, and organize compromises between, competing sectors of capital, labour and other groups in society in such a way as to ultimately support an "unequal but largely positive sum relationship" whereby certain sectors of capital dominate.[8] But it is vital that the efforts of working people, through years of struggle, to win rights and protections from the state not be underestimated. While attention to the roles of corporate and political actors in the

---

Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1989, pp.134-135; Mike Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class. New York: Verso, 1986, pp.112-113.

[7] Davis, Prisoners, pp.118,122.

[8] Claus Offe, Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984, pp.51-61; Rianne Mahon, The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: Canadian Textiles. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, pp.9-11; Leo Panitch, "The role and nature of the Canadian state," in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian state: political economy and political power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977, pp.7-8.

creation of social policy is important, one cannot deny the crucial pushing that came from workers, farmers, women and other "ordinary" people for workers' rights and welfare programs.[9] At the same time, though, the fact that industrial legality did undermine the willingness and ability of working people to resist capitalist exploitation, even as this exploitation became more sophisticated, masked by the "necessity" of "modernization" and "scientific management," is quite clear.[10] From this perspective, then, state social programs and industrial legality are useful tools in obtaining consent to this arrangement, or in Gramscian terms, in the construction of hegemony.[11] The Seaway Project, therefore, points to a broader struggle for hegemony between different sectors of capital -- natural resources versus manufacturing -- in which post-war federal fiscal policy favoured the former.[12] More importantly, the Project was the result of the efforts

---

9 Wayne Bullen and John Roberts, "A Heritage of Hope and Struggle: Workers, Unions and Politics in Canada, 1930-1982," in Cross and Kealey eds., Modern Canada, p.105; James Struthers, The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, pp.11-13.

10 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, pp.282-284; Rianne Mahon, "Canadian public policy: the unequal structure of representation," in Panitch, ed., Canadian state, p.194; Blair Laidlaw and Bruce Curtis, "Inside Postal Workers: The Labour Process, State Policy, and the Workers' Response," in David J. Bercuson and David Bright, eds., Canadian Labour History: Selected Readings. Mississauga: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994, pp.354-355.

11 Palmer, Working-Class Experience, p.277.

12 Wolfe, "Keynesian Era," pp.54-55; Paul Phillips and Stephen Watson, "From Mobilization to Continentalism: The Canadian Economy in the Post-Depression Period," in Cross and Kealey, eds., Modern Canada, pp.30,38; Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.15.

of the primary beneficiaries and supporters of the Project (the iron ore and steel industry, grain interests, and inland ports, among others) to unite other sectors of capital which would not benefit directly or who might be hurt by the Project (for example, railways, Eastern ports, and the Canadian shipbuilding industry). The general public also often rallied behind the Project because of the "progress" the Project would encourage, supposedly ultimately benefitting everyone.[13] But the state must also respond to a broader political and economic context, and in the post-World War II "boom" period, both the United States and Canada faced increasing demand for natural resources, cheap power and better transportation routes.[14] And given the tense atmosphere of the Cold War, cooperating with and accommodating our most important trading partner, ally and "protector's" needs was certainly perceived within the state to be in Canada's best interests.

Still, while the state and capital have an advantage in that they have a "monopoly of the means of production," hegemony is not simply a "top-down given," but is rather a process of struggle and is continually being reconstructed and challenged.[15] Gramsci's

---

13

William R. Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics and Diplomacy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, pp.22,158,259,278; George Washington Stephens, The St. Lawrence Waterway Project. Montreal: Louis Carrier and Co., 1930, pp.185,225,384.

14

Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.218,221; Phillips and Watson, "From Mobilization," pp.31-33; Lionel Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway. Toronto: Macmillan, 1959, p.7.

15

Antonio Gramsci, Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Ed. and trans. by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Novell Smith. New York: International Publishers,

concept of hegemony is useful as an analytical framework because although he recognizes that ideologies and identities are grounded in material conditions, "hegemony" emphasizes that the mixed, contradictory and overlapping experiences and consciousness of people cannot be explained by economics alone. And in this respect, the work of Foucault on discourse analysis is also helpful, as Foucault sees all language as multi-referential, and suggests that theory, material relations and the "common sense" beliefs of people do not often correspond.[16] But even though post-structuralist attention to language, discontinuities and specificity is important, those who hold strictly to this theory tend to overemphasize discourse to the point of disconnecting the study of power from any material basis.[17] This thesis, then, employs a neo-Marxist theoretical framework, stressing Gramsci's concept of hegemony and the importance of state and capital formation in framing social relations, but with the incorporation of some important insights from post-structuralist/linguistic theory.

Politicians at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, capital interests supporting the Project, as well as others, presented the Project as a source of, and catalyst for,

---

1971, pp.245-246; Palmer, Capitalism Comes to the Backcountry, pp.16-18; Ian McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in 20th Century Nova Scotia. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994, p.303; Stuart Hall, "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists," in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988, pp.53-55.

[16] McKay, Quest of the Folk, pp.300,306; Hall, "Toad in the Garden," p.59.

[17] Bryan D. Palmer, " The Poverty of Theory Revisited: Or, Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, And the Ostensible End of Marxism," in left history, 1 (Spring 1993), p.94.

industrial expansion, population growth, and an easier, more prosperous way of life. In the context of a widespread sense of optimism, a belief in a great future for Canada, and unquestioning faith in anything "scientific" or "modern," Project promoters repeatedly used words such as "progress" and "modern" in association with the development of the Seaway. Similarly, the necessity of "modernization" to salvage and improve the Canadian textile industry was used as a reason for workers to cooperate with efforts of textile employers to modernize the plants and to rationalize production. This view of the Seaway Project and of the forced modernization of Canadian textile production as inevitable, necessary and good was largely accepted; the "hegemonic" authority of the agendas of capital and the state is an unambiguous ideological "fact" of Cornwall's 1950s. Still, in both contexts, people expressed doubts, fears and opposition, their ambivalence related directly to the ways in which these processes affected the daily lives of the different individuals involved.

Much of the literature written about the St. Lawrence Seaway Project was written prior to, during, or immediately after the completion of the Project. This body of thought, dating from the late 1920s to the early 1960s, consists mainly of academic and engineering studies or publications of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (SLSA) and Ontario Hydro (OH). The vast majority of these works are laudatory in tone, arguing strongly for the Project because of the growth and prosperity that would occur "inevitably" with its fulfillment, and pointing to the greatness of such an historic achievement with praises for the "great men" (I use "men" explicitly here) who made the "dream" into a reality. In addition, the boosterism and enthusiasm for the Project

whipped up in the pages of the local newspaper, the Cornwall Standard-Freeholder, after World War II and especially during the construction years, easily places the Standard-Freeholder within this promotional framework. These sources are useful both as primary and secondary sources, providing insights and evidence about the Seaway Project, but also revealing some of the attitudes, values and motivations of contemporary people. A number of these works mention, in varying detail, the flooding of eight communities and the relocation of 6 500 residents of the area, or the "Seaway Valley," that was required by the Project. This massive dislocation is typically portrayed as a difficult, but necessary disruption, with some salute to the forbearance of those relocated and a great deal of praise for the scientific way the move was carried out by OH.

Carleton Mabee, however, in his 1961 The Seaway Story, is much more critical of OH's treatment of local residents. Composed with a wry sense of humour, The Seaway Story , while maintaining that the completion of the Seaway Project was a "great achievement," presents a wide scope of perspectives on the Project and on the Seaway Valley relocations. And although he also notes the positive aspects of the move and of the Project, Mabee is much more sympathetic to the feelings of those forced to move, both Native and non-Native, because of the development. Unlike his contemporaries, he is not afraid to discuss the negative impacts of the Project, such as traffic jams and housing shortages, and the corresponding shortcomings in the actions of state agencies on both sides of the border.[18]

Sources about the Canadian textile industry are also numerous, ranging from primary

---

[18] Carleton Mabee, The Seaway Story. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

sources like Royal Commission and Tariff Board reports, to theses by Ellen Scheinberg and Ralph Ellis, which focus specifically on Cornwall's textile mills, but in an earlier period. Most useful for this study has been Rianne Mahon's The Politics of Industrial Restructuring, as she discusses the decline of the Canadian textile industry in the context of state and capital formation. The Ralph McIntee and Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board Collections at the National Archives, and the Standard-Freeholder, contain valuable information about local textile labour and the concern of many local residents about the plight of the domestic textile industry.

On Cornwall specifically, two local histories -- Elinor Kyte Senior's From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984, and Clive Marin's and Frances Marin's Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978, have been especially helpful. Both works discuss the troubles of the local textile mills and offer a more critical look at the impacts of the Seaway Project on the Seaway Valley. They do, of necessity, touch upon the role of the state, but they do not explicitly link local events to state and capital formation. Works by Mahon, David Wolfe, and Stephen Watson and Paul Phillips will be used to tie Cornwall's changing economy to federal fiscal policies and global economic trends. The Marins deal extensively with the Seaway Valley relocations, and they do mention the power of the belief that "progress much prevail," but I would like to examine how this widespread belief in modernization as the prerequisite for capitalist expansion was understood, both positively and negatively, in the three contexts outlined above.

The fact that both OH and the SLSA expropriated land for the Seaway Project from the people of Akwesasne (at the time known as the St. Regis Indian Reserve), a Mohawk territory across the river from Cornwall, is virtually ignored in the literature on the Project. The Mohawks of Kahnawake (Caughnawaga) near Lake St. Louis, Quebec also lost land because of the Project. Only because the people of Kahnawake vocally opposed the expropriation, and because of concerns expressed about the location of the bridge from Akwesasne to Cornwall, are Native concerns discussed at all. The exception to this void is a 1961 book by Omar Ghobashy, in which the author focuses on the legal implications of the expropriations at Kahnawake, and the Mohawk dislocations and their subsequent legal proceedings.[19] Even in Senior's book, the community of Akwesasne is recognized, as it is so close to Cornwall, but not in relation to the Seaway Project. Bruce Johansen, in a recent book on the gambling war in Akwesasne and the Oka crisis of 1990, does link some of the social and economic difficulties that exist today to the environmental destruction caused, both directly and indirectly, by the Seaway Project. In fact, the lack of material on Akwesasne and the Seaway Project is somewhat surprising, given the amount of work produced in recent years about the impacts of hydro mega-projects on Native peoples in Canada, especially in

---

19

See Omar Ghobashy, The Caughnawaga Indians and the St. Lawrence Seaway. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1961.

discussion of how the people of Akwesasne were involved in and affected by the Seaway Project, I rely mostly on oral testimonies, Band Council Minutes from the period, and legal documents.

Cornwall, like many other towns along the St. Lawrence river, was founded by United Empire Loyalists. Sir John Johnson chose the site in 1783-1784 largely because of its location on the river, the major transportation route for fur traders and military personnel travelling from Montreal to the interior.[21] The completion of the Cornwall section of the St. Lawrence canal system in 1842 and of a local route of the Grand Trunk Railway gave Cornwall better commercial ties with Montreal, but Montreal industrialists were not attracted to Cornwall until 1868, when George Stephen built a woolen mill, the Canada Manufacturing Company.[22] In 1870, the Gault brothers, also from Montreal, built the Stormont Cotton mill on the west bank of the canal, and in 1872 a group of businessmen constructed the rival Canada Cotton Company on the east bank.[23] The textile industry, then, quickly became a dominant force in Cornwall's economy and identity. From 1871-1881, the town's population jumped from 2 033 to 4 468, much of this demographic expansion related to French-Canadians who relocated to Cornwall to work in the cotton

---

2(1995):231-254; James B. Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run: Hydroelectric Development and Native Communities in Western Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988.

[21] Senior, From Royal, p.21.

[22] Ellen Carrie Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers in Cornwall, Ontario, 1936-1946." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, March 1990, pp.23-24.

[23] Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.24; Senior, From Royal, pp.225-226.

mills. By the late nineteenth century, Toronto's Globe dubbed Cornwall "The Factory Town," undoubtedly because of the three textile mills and the Toronto Paper Company, established in 1883.[24] The decision of Courtaulds to locate a viscose rayon plant in Cornwall in 1924 reinforced the centrality of textiles to the town's economy. By 1934, 75% of all of Cornwall's industrial employment was in this sector.[25]

Industrialists were drawn to Cornwall because of a ready supply of labour, cheap water, location to markets, and support from town council in the form of tax exemptions, bonuses, and loans.[26] Indeed, Cornwall's financial and political leaders always seemed eager to promote this town as a manufacturing centre, and revived the defunct Board of Trade in 1906 when some local businessmen expressed concerns that Cornwall was not "developing" as quickly as it should have been. Of the seven industries attracted to Cornwall from 1902-1920, five received financial assistance from the town council. Local "boosters" also promoted the city through civic festivities, such as a 1906 Old Boys' Reunion and a 1946 Old Home Week.[27] But the potential for cheap power was the motive force attracting industry to the area. Interest in improving the St. Lawrence river for the purposes of transportation and the production of electricity trace back to the

---

[24] Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.25; Senior, From Royal, pp.234-235.

[25] Senior, From Royal, p.387; Ralph Ellis, "Textile Workers and Textile Strikes in Cornwall, Sherbrooke, and St. Gregoire de Montmorency, 1936-1939." MA Thesis. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1985, p.6.

[26] Senior, From Royal, pp.226,233.

[27] Ibid., pp.347,350,435.

nineteenth century, and this interest intensified after World War I because of the growing need in Canada and the United States for better shipping and cheap hydro energy.[28] In 1921, the International Joint Commission (IJC), the United States-Canada body which coordinated the management of the international section of the river, approved a recommendation by its Joint Board of Engineers for a joint seaway and power development, but continued delays and squabbles prevented any immediate action from taking place.[29] The Depression and World War II also put off any hopes for immediate Seaway construction.

Cornwall emerged from World War II with a healthy economy, and with much impatient and optimistic talk about the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. With a population of approximately 17 000 in the early 1950s, about evenly divided between French-speaking and English-speaking residents (although the city was predominantly Catholic), Cornwall was still a mill town.[30] (See Figure 1.) But by the 1950s, the Canadian textile industry began to falter due to the "dumping" of cheap foreign imports, encouraged by the federal government through reduced tariffs, and this had a traumatic impact on the textile workers in Cornwall. In February 1954, with mills running at reduced capacity or closing, the National Employment Service (NES) reported 3 610

---

28 Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.12-13; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.72-73,84-85.

29 Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.95.

30 The Making of a New Cornwall, 1963-1983 (Revised Ed.) - An Urban Renewal Study Toronto: E.G. Faludi and Associates Town Planning Consultants, 1983, pp.14,29.

people registered as unemployed, the highest number since the Cornwall office opened in 1941.[31] No wonder, then, that the Seaway and Power Project, which finally received American approval in May-June 1954, with its promise of jobs and economic growth, was so wanted and so welcomed by local residents.[32] Even though the local residents benefitted in the short-term due to the construction work on the Seaway, they also suffered greatly from the federal government's deregulation of tariffs and slow withdrawal of protection for the Canadian textile industry, the closure of local mills of Canadian Cottons in 1953 and 1959 hitting the community hard.[33]

The other settlements, smaller than Cornwall, that will be discussed in this study have different histories, but all are linked, inevitably, by their location on the St. Lawrence river. The eight communities flooded because of the Seaway Project -- Mille Roches, Moulinette, Aultsville, Farran's Point, Dickinson's Landing, Wales, Iroquois, and one-third of Morrisburg (not to mention the hamlets of Maple Grove and Woodlands) -- were also largely founded by United Empire Loyalists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. (See Figure 2.) As future events would confirm, any development of the river had implications for the development of these communities. Morrisburg, for example, outgrew its larger "parent," Mariatown, as a result of the completion of the

---

31 Cornwall Standard-Freeholder, 5 February 1954, p.3; Barbara J. Austin, "Life Cycles and Strategy of a Canadian Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1983." PhD Thesis. Montreal: Concordia University, 1985, pp.539,545-552.

32 Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.254,258.

33 Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.223-224; Senior, From Royal, pp.446-450.

Morrisburg canal in 1847. In contrast, Dickinson's Landing saw a drastic drop in population, as the construction of the canal to bypass the Long Sault Rapids meant that the village lost its importance as a "landing" where those travelling by road heading west could stop and board a boat, and where those traveling by boat headed east would, out of necessity, stop and take a stagecoach or walk. By the 1950s, the populations of the "Lost Villages," as they are now known, had not increased dramatically, although these mostly agricultural communities had grown to include more industrial and commercial activity.[34]

The Iroquois, or Six Nations, originate generally from the St. Lawrence Valley, and the Mohawks of Akwesasne for a time lived mostly in the Mohawk Valley in New York State.[35] The present site became a more permanent occupation in about 1755, so that people could be closer to a nearby Jesuit mission.[36] In fact, Sir John Johnson had to negotiate with the "St. Regis Indians" for the area which became Cornwall. As the son of Sir William Johnson and Molly Brant, he himself was of mixed blood, but he apparently possessed neither as much respect from the Mohawks, nor as much sympathy for them as

---

34

St. Lawrence Parks Commission, "Down the Front: The Story of the Mighty St. Lawrence River." Morrisburg, Ont: St. Lawrence Parks Commission, n.d.

35

Ghobashy, Caughnawaga Indians, p.5; Interview, Darren Bonaparte, Akwesasne artist and historian, 1 April 1997.

36

Bruce E. Johansen, Life and Death in Mohawk Country. Golden, Colorado: North American Press, 1993, p.1.

his father, as he had to rely upon Chief Joseph Brant to finalize a settlement.[37] The people of St. Regis were valuable allies of the British in the War of 1812, and the residents of Cornwall and St. Regis mixed frequently, usually on friendly terms.[38] For instance, some church records, as well as Akwesasne oral history, indicate that a number of non-Native unwed mothers, in order to avoid bringing shame on themselves and their families, sent their newborn babies across the river in baskets, Moses-like, to the reserve, because they knew their children would be adopted and cared for by the Mohawks.[39] Still, the two communities were distinct, and tensions existed (and still exist) between the two groups -- not surprising when one group believes it is "better" or "superior" to the other, and when this belief is reinforced with institutionalized political and economic inequality. On the "eve" of the Seaway Project, even though most people were quite familiar with non-Native society and culture, as many attended school or shopped in Cornwall or Massena, New York, a large number of Akwesasne residents still engaged in traditional economic activities such as trapping, hunting, fishing and farming, and the reserve itself was rural in character.[40] (See Figure 3.)

Deindustrialization and Seaway construction would thus have particular ramifications

---

[37] Senior, From Royal, pp.18-21.

[38] Ibid., pp.104-105.

[39] Interview, Mike McDonald, historical curator for the North American Indian Travelling College, 4 March 1997.

[40] Interview, McDonald; Phone interview, Brian David, employee of Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 2 April 1997.

for the people of the "Lost Villages," the people of Akwesasne and the workers in the local mills of Canadian Cottons. How they understood these processes of "modernization," and how they responded to them, will be the core of this thesis.

The people of the Lost Villages had a mixed reaction to the announcement that the Seaway Project had finally received full approval. Although they, like most other local residents, looked forward to the prosperity the Project promised, they would have to see their homes and communities destroyed. But even though most residents resigned themselves to the relocation, feeling that the "progress" of the region and indeed, the country, depended upon the Project's successful completion, they were not simply passive participants. They were vocal in defending and protecting their interests, and used the Ontario government's promises to be "fair" and "democratic" in their efforts to try to secure protections.

The people of Akwesasne also lost land because of the Seaway Project. Given that Native peoples in Canada were (and still are) under the "guardianship" of the federal government, their unequal legal, political and socioeconomic status provided them little power to stop the expropriations. Some Mohawks did likely see the Project as a source of jobs, but most opposed the dislocations and the Band Council Resolutions indicate that the Band Council, as much as possible, tried to preserve and protect the community's land base and environment.

The workers in the four local Canadian Cottons mills, in a losing battle to save their jobs, found themselves forced to cooperate with management in the modernization of the plants and the rationalization of production. But the extent of their efforts to encourage

support for the Canadian textile industry from both consumers and the federal government indicates that the workers were driven not only by economic need, but also by a pride in their identity as textile workers. This interpretation is reinforced by the frequent strikes and walkouts, many of them "illegal," engaged in by the workers when they felt that "modernization" threatened their wages or working conditions, or appeared to denigrate their dignity as cotton mill labour.

The next three chapters will be devoted to examining the experiences of these three "groups" and the end results of their encounters with "modernization," either in the form of the Seaway Project or deindustrialization. If anything, the way in which "modern" capitalist development and expansion was first presented and "sold," felt, and subsequently reinterpreted by these people is summed up by Marshall Berman: "To be modern is to find ourselves in an environment that promises us adventure, power, joy, growth, transformation of ourselves and the world, and at the same time, threatens to destroy everything we have, everything we know, everything we are."[41] The final chapter will highlight the more important themes of the thesis and some of the broader, more long-term implications of the changes that occurred in the Cornwall area in the 1950s.

41

Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York: Penguin Books, 1988, p.15.

Chapter Two:
The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: The Lost Villages

After a winter of high unemployment and several plant closures, the Seaway Project's "official" start in August 1954 must have seemed like a "gift from above" to the people of Cornwall, especially those who were under or unemployed. But the Project had a long history. Demands for the improvement of the St. Lawrence river for navigation began in the 1820s, most vocally from the St. Lawrence Association of Upper Canada and Lower Canada Merchants. They did manage to get the Welland and Rideau canal systems built, but these canals proved to be disappointments, as they did not increase traffic as much as expected, and still could not meet the transportation needs of Upper Canada. As a result, merchants continued to push for St. Lawrence channel improvements.[1] The idea of the Seaway Project gained momentum in the late nineteenth century, and was discussed at the September 1895 meeting of the International Deep Waterways Association.[2]

In fact, the role of capitalist interests, both in driving the Project forward and in holding it back, is remarkable, although not surprising. The interest in the hydroelectric development of the St. Lawrence highlights the sometimes uneasy relationship between

---

1

William Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics and Diplomacy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, pp.14-15,20.

2

Sister Mary Jane Howard, Some Economic Aspects of the St. Lawrence Project. PhD Thesis. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949, p.10; Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.12.

capital and the state, and the way this relationship affects state policy and development. In the United States, the St. Lawrence Power Company in New York, incorporated in 1896, failed in their plans to profit from the Long Sault Rapids, so the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa), located at Massena, New York, bought the company. With the perfect geographic location to exploit the river for power secured, Alcoa began a legislative campaign to win the rights to harness the Rapids, and used its Canadian subsidiary, the St. Lawrence Power Company, to argue its case on the Canadian side. A simultaneous push by government officials and the general public to make state power publicly-owned and controlled, however, led to the 1916 repeal of Alcoa's legal right to develop hydroelectricity.[3] Even in 1920, the IJC received a proposal for Alcoa, General Electric and DuPont to develop the Upper St. Lawrence from Lake Erie to Montreal, but again, private development of the power of the river was rejected.[4] Although the "public versus private" debate concerning the production and distribution of electricity seemed settled in Ontario by 1906, with the creation of the Hydroelectric Power Commission of Ontario, or Ontario Hydro, the successful drive for public power was hardly a foil to corporations; rather, public power was more a result of their wishes and their influence. According to N.V. Nelles, the public power crusade in Canada was essentially a businessmen's movement. Manufacturers wanted cheap electricity, and turned to public ownership because the private companies at Niagara refused to guarantee them an

---

3 Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, p.12; Howard, Economic Aspects, p.28.

4 Howard, Economic Aspects, p.30.

inexpensive supply. Convinced that their future prosperity depended upon a cheap and virtually limitless supply of power, manufacturers also assumed that society would benefit as well. Such notions secured the support of many corporate elites for the development of public power. These last points are of interest, for the Seaway Project illustrates the extent to which the priorities of capitalism -- profit and prosperity -- have permeated popular consciousness, and the way in which business and political leaders presented and promoted the Project as a benefit to everyone. In addition, Nelles notes that OH, in spite of being a government agency, has historically been run by and for big business.[5]

In 1913, the United States Senate passed a resolution to enter into negotiations with Great Britain or Canada to improve navigation in "joint" waters.[6] After World War I, interest increased in a joint Seaway and power project, and OH expressed a desire to be responsible for the power development of the province.[7] Moreover, the drive for capitalist expansion led a growing number of financial and political leaders to see the Seaway Project as the answer to their needs, as the words of the Chairperson of the 1919 Great Waterways Conference indicated: "The world's markets are being realigned; and if we are to have prosperity we must reach out for foreign trade both in our natural and

---

5

N.V. Nelles, The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941. Toronto: Macmillan, 1974, pp.245,248-249,490.

6

Howard, Economic Aspects, p.13; George Washington Stephens, St. Lawrence Waterway Project. Montreal: Louis Carrier and Co., 1930, p.156.

7 Stephens, Waterway Project, p.158.

manufactured products. And, if we are to compete with other countries for world trade, we must keep down the costs of production and delivery."[8] In 1921 the IJC accepted the Joint Board of Engineers' recommendation for a joint project, but the engineers disagreed on how the development was to be carried out. The American engineers wanted a "single-stage" plan, which was more cost- and power-efficient, while the Canadian engineers preferred a "two-stage" proposal, which allowed for the completion of the development in two parts, better control over the flow of the river, and a reduction in the flowage of land. They also disagreed on the location of the dam, powerhouses and locks.[9] The federal governments of the two countries quarreled over the division of costs and the issue of jurisdiction.[10] But by 1932, some really began to think the Seaway Project might become a reality: the Joint Board of Engineers finally agreed on a two-stage plan, and the two countries signed a treaty which settled the issues of cost and ownership. To their chagrin, the United States Senate rejected the treaty.[11]

Perpetual wrangling between government bodies and corporate entrepreneurs thus characterized the negotiations and development of the Seaway Project. When one country was ready, the other was not; when both agreed, their efforts were blocked by

---

[8] Ibid., p.162.

[9] St. Lawrence Waterway Project: Report of the Joint Board of Engineers. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, November 16, 1926, p.32.

[10] Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.116,125.

[11] St. Lawrence Waterway Project: Report of the Joint Board of Engineers (Reconvened) on the International Section. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, April 9, 1932, p.4; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.145-148.

provincial or state governments, or by capitalist interests, through the Senate or the courts. The Project did have much support from the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce from cities on both sides of the border, farmers' groups, the Great Lakes ports, the province of Ontario, and the Midwest states.[12] Most important, however, were the natural resources industries of iron ore and grain. "Big Steel" in the American Midwest needed Labrador ore, especially with the push from the United States military for arms production.[13] Similarly, grain was an important product, and the possibility of carrying grain downstream and returning with iron ore was an attractive and potentially profitable possibility.[14] The Seaway Project, then, reflects the resource/staples focus of Canadian fiscal policy in the post-World War II years. The channel improvements would allow the movement of grain to the east, iron ore to the west, oil and coal to Quebec, and newsprint and pulpwood to the Great Lakes ports.[15] Yet quite a few people opposed the Project because it threatened their stability and profits. In the United States, railways, the coal industry, and utility companies all

---

12

Stephens, Waterway Project, pp.166,196-197; Howard, Economic Aspects, p.43; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.221,259.

13 Carleton Mabee, The Seaway Story. Toronto: Macmillan, 1961, p.168.

14

The Toronto Star Weekly- Salute to the Seaway. 27 June 1959, p.11; Paul Phillips and Stephen Watson, "From Mobilization to Continentalism: The Canadian Economy in the Post-Depression Period," in Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey eds., Modern Canada: 1930-1980s. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984, p.43.

15

Phillips and Watson, "From Mobilization," in Cross and Kealey eds., Modern Canada, pp.42-43.

resisted the development and the cities of Montreal, New York and Buffalo fought to protect their ports.[16] In 1928, the Canadian Navigators' Federation complained that the Project would lead to the destruction of the Canadian shipbuilding industry, but Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Transportation until 1954 when he became SLSA President, assured those concerned that the number of foreign carriers would be restricted by legislation.[17] Canadian railways were less oppositional, as they chose to see the benefits of "modernizing" and coordinating water and rail traffic.[18]

By 1950, after more studies and debates, Canada was getting impatient with American delays, and OH and the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) had agreed upon a method of developing power in the International Rapids section. In December 1951, the Canadian Parliament passed the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act, which created the Authority as an agency of the federal government with the power to construct and operate an all-Canadian Seaway. Parliament also approved the agreement between OH and PASNY to develop hydro energy.[19] Finally, on May 6, 1954, the Wiley-Dondero Act passed the United States Congress, enabling the Project to proceed, and the last

---

16 Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.158; Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.13; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.159; Howard, Economic Aspects, p.79.

17 Stephens, Waterway Project, p.225; Cornwall Standard-Freeholder. 28 June 1955, p.4.

18 Stephens, Waterway Project, p.384.

19 Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.234; St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, The St. Lawrence Seaway -- Under Construction. Ottawa: St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, 1957, p.7.

hurdle was overcome on June 7, when the United States Supreme Court upheld PASNY's license to develop power for New York state.[20]

The residents of the Seaway Valley, and especially Cornwall, had been eagerly awaiting a decision as to whether or not the Project would go ahead. Numerous articles appeared in the Cornwall Standard-Freeholder, before and during its construction, about the Seaway Project, and at every opportunity the Project's proponents, including politicians at all levels of government, the newspaper's editor, J.B. McKay, business leaders, and others presented the Project as beneficial and necessary to the Cornwall area and to Canada as a whole. The Project promised economic expansion and population growth, which would in turn lead to a more modern, prosperous society. In their rhetoric, supporters constantly used words like "progress" and "modern" in association with the Project, and emphasized the absolute necessity of the Project to a future of growth and prosperity, expressing and promoting the widespread conception of "progress" as further capitalist development and expansion, including the increased reliance upon science and technology in a more rational, efficient society. For instance, an editorial in the March 12, 1952 edition of the Standard-Freeholder, assessing Cornwall's rate of industrial growth amidst excited talk of plans for the Seaway being passed by the United States Senate, married industrialization and progress: "Without the solid foundation of a healthily growing industrial capacity, many of our fondest hopes for the future would

---

20

Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.254-258; St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, Under Construction, p.8.

have no chance of realization."[21] Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Transportation and one of the biggest proponents of the Project (he was later dubbed "Mr. Seaway") predicted that Cornwall, within a few years of the Seaway's completion, would have a population of 100 000, quite a jump from a population of approximately 40 000 after the annexation of 19 200 acres and 22 604 people from the Township in 1957.[22] And the new communities of Morrisburg, Iroquois, Ingleside and Long Sault, while built for the immediate number of those to be relocated to the towns, were also built in the expectation of expansion. Morrisburg, which only had a population of 1 800, anticipated a future population of 12 000, and Iroquois, with just over 1 000 residents, looked forward to a population of 10 000 after the "industrial boom" which would "naturally" follow the completion of the Project.[23] Continuities existed, then, with notions of "progress" shared by turn-of-the-century Canadian imperialists studied by Carl Berger, in their emphasis on industrialization and population growth as indicative of "progress."[24]

More important, perhaps, was the belief that modern capitalist development (in this context, in the form of the Seaway Project) was inevitable, a process with a momentum

---

[21] Cornwall Standard-Freeholder. 12 March 1952, pp.4,20.

[22] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, p.3; The Making of a New Cornwall, 1963-1983 (Revised Ed.) - An Urban Renewal Study. Toronto: E.G. Faludi and Associates Town Planning Consultants, 1983, p.14.

[23] Ibid., 28 June 1958, p.8; Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.27.

[24] Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970, pp.109-114.

of its own which could not be stopped.[25] The announcement of the approval of the joint United States-Canada application to develop power in the International Rapids section of the river (from Cornwall to Prescott, roughly) by the IJC at the end of October 1952 was welcomed with enthusiasm by Cornwall Mayor Aaron Horovitz, who stated

> Nothing can stop Cornwall now...When the great project is launched, it will create unprecedented prosperity for our community. Our city will double or triple in size within a very short time, literally overnight. There will be unbelievable residential, commercial and industrial expansion. Cornwall is the key city in the entire development. The boundaries, industrialization and general prosperity of our city of the future are beyond belief and immediate conception.[26]

Horovitz again insisted that "our city is bound to experience tremendous expansion" less than two years later, when news that construction on the Project would begin in earnest in the summer of 1954: "Just think of the immensity of the project. Our city cannot escape expansion and prosperity, the full extent of which at the moment is beyond the most vivid imagination."[27] This view of capitalist expansion as preordained was echoed, predictably enough, by business leaders as well (Horovitz was, incidentally, a leading businessman). Cornwall businesses, especially, linked the Seaway Project, Cornwall, and their businesses in the advertisements. Bringloe Furniture, for instance, in one entitled "Progress," posited that "Progress by its very nature -- is an ever-forward development,

---

25 Miriam Carol Wright, "'The Smile of Modernity': The state and the modernization of the Atlantic cod fishery, 1945-1970." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, May 1990, p.12; Berger, Sense of Power, pp.109-114.

26 Freeholder, 30 October 1952, p.3.

27 Ibid., 26 June 1958, p.2.

constantly fed and sustained by individuals, corporate and community energy and initiative. Bringloe Furniture Co. is dedicated to the mainspring of Cornwall's greatness...PROGRESS."[28]

Now that the "fondest hope" of the Seaway Valley was finally going to come true, economic growth would certainly be the result. Chevrier predicted an increase in Seaway traffic from ten million tons, to thirty to thirty-five annually, and by July 1956, argued that the hopes of Seaway backers were justified by the already evident economic impact of the Project.[29] Indeed, the modernization and growth promised by the Project seemed to have been fulfilled at Massena, New York, just across the river from Cornwall, where a hotel, department store, two new supermarkets and many new homes were under construction soon after the news of the Project's approval, and several months before work on the Project began "officially."[30] And Cornwall was, in time, also to some degree "modernized" because of the Project. Due to the added pressure from an influx of workers into Cornwall, for instance, the city had to build a new water tank, but more impressive was the new water filtration and purification plant. With a capacity for ten million gallons of water, and at a cost of $1 730 000, Cornwall residents could also boast that the "sparkling new" plant was "the most modern plant of its type in North America."[31] Still, even this "modern" advance in technology could not rival the "Seaway

---

[28] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.2.

[29] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.4; 10 July 1956, p.2.

[30] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.3.

[31] Ibid., 10 July 1956; 26 June 1958, p.21.

Skyscraper," or the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Building. As Cornwall's tallest building on Cornwall's busiest corner, many perceived the new SLSA headquarters as a symbol of the Project's success.[32] And its modernist architectural form definitely made the structure stand out from the smaller, older buildings in the vicinity.

Also notable was the apparent obsession people had with the "scientific technology" used on the Project. Innumerable pictures of dredges, bridges, dump trucks, dam headworks, cofferdams and other signs of "modernity" appeared in the Standard-Freeholder, often accompanied by captions or full-length articles describing what the object/machine was, how much it weighed, what it had to do within the scheme of the Project, and to which agency/company it belonged. The "General Brock," a suction dredge, received a "tribute" of sorts upon the completion of an excavation of 500 000 cubic yards of sand and gravel in the form of an article and two pictures.[33] Many engineering and technological "feats" occurred over the course of the Project, and the newspaper staff eagerly reported a number of these, such as OH's success in building the tallest steel transmission towers in the agency's history in a record time of two weeks.[34] The eight Project models, however, were an even greater wonder. The five structural and three topographical scale models were of considerable importance because they allowed engineers and contractors to "test" plans; moreover, it was expected that they would, like

---

[32] Ibid., 10 July 1956, pp.31-32.

[33] Ibid., 31 July 1956, p.9.

[34] Ibid., 25 June 1955, p.2.

the models used in the Niagara Project, save millions of dollars in construction costs.[35] Faith in science and technology was remarkably strong in the 1950s in Canada, and was rarely questioned.[36] But this belief in scientific knowledge and the fascination with the Project work also stemmed from and perpetuated a view of nature that was to be used and dominated by humans for the purposes of capitalist development.

Of greatest significance in this faith in the merits of modern capitalism, and especially science and technology, is the source of much of the scientific planning and technology: the state, especially OH and the SLSA, played pivotal roles. Ontario Premier Leslie Frost, in a letter addressing the forthcoming "Inundation Day" on July 1, 1958, called the Project the result "of the work of science, engineers and skilled workmen."[37] And Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, before construction began, pointed to the Project as "a splendid example of what may be achieved when the latest in technological advances are applied to the development of our country."[38] Although engineering and other "scientific" studies had been commissioned or done earlier -- for example, the reports of the Joint Board of Engineers and the Canadian Conference of Engineers in the 1920s -- in the years just prior to and during the Project, the state or one of its agencies increasingly used arguments about efficiency, scientific accuracy and rational planning to

---

[35] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.16.

[36] Frank James Tester and Peter Tulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994, p.120.

[37] Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.2.

[38] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.3.

convince opponents that the Project was feasible and desirable. Predictions about increases in trade and about the amount of materials, workers and time needed for the Project were determined by "scientific" analysis, and increasingly these studies and other important work done on the Project were carried out by "experts." The removal of thousands of fish from the dewatered dam area, performed by two commercial fishermen, was supervised by a biologist from the Department of Lands and Forests. Similarly, an expert on "mega-projects" from New York advised both American and Canadian officials on the number of people who would arrive at certain locales; on approximately how many of these would buy or rent homes or rooms; of the necessity of community planning (such as zoning bylaws); and other potential problems the Project might bring, like damage to roads and increased crime.[39] As a result, then, OH, or the state agency involved, could respond to concerns with "scientific" authority or justification. Miriam Wright, in her work on the modernization of the Newfoundland cod fishery by the federal and provincial governments, where a similar use of scientific discourse by the state occurred, draws upon Claus Offe and Michel Foucault in her observation that the use of science tends to "depoliticize" decision-making and gives the state a source of "superior" knowledge which enhances the legitimacy of decisions.[40] And certainly, judging by the coverage given anything "modern" or "scientific" in the newspaper, and the frequency with which these words were used, a widespread belief existed that scientific knowledge was beyond challenge.

---

[39] Ibid., 29 June 1954, p.3.

[40] Wright, "'The Smile of Modernity,'" pp.16-17.

Of course, considering the sheer magnitude of this development, one can hardly imagine anyone – even a consortium of companies – leading the Project to its successful completion without using "rational" planning and definitely not without possessing the extensive power and legitimacy of the state. The Project required the cooperation and coordination of many levels of government, and required the growth of the state itself because of its central involvement, in the form of an expansion of OH's size and power, and in the creation of the SLSA in December 1951.[41] The central role of the state and its "experts" could hardly be ignored, as references to and pictures of this or that OH official, and as the opinions of politicians at all levels, appeared in the Standard-Freeholder on a continual basis. For instance, upon hearing of the International Joint Commission's approval of the power development, the paper printed comments by virtually every politician in the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry.[42]

The state, in one way or another, seemed involved in almost every aspect of the Project. In short, the state in the 1950s was directly "taking care of business," and not merely looking out for the common interest of the capitalist class. Moreover, the state and its agencies placed the monitoring and regulation of people at the centre of their project, taking responsibility not only for the political and economic aspects of the Seaway development, but for more "social" aspects as well, from ensuring enough spaces for children of incoming workers in area schools, to working alongside health workers to monitor the consequences of the influx of population by taking X-rays of employees

---

[41] Lionel Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway. Toronto: Macmillan, 1959, p.47.

[42] Freeholder, 30 October 1952, pp.2-4.

before they began work.[43]

Also marking this "kinder, gentler" approach of the state was the "handling" of workers on the Project. Reflecting the era of industrial legality, in January 1954 OH signed a labour pact with the Allied Construction Council, an amalgamation of the seventeen unions working on the Project, which covered wages, working conditions and benefits.[44] Paying better wages overall than most other employers -- skilled labour received three dollars or more an hour -- Cornwall employers often blamed the Seaway for "draining" the city of workers, especially construction labour. But OH defended their wage rates, arguing that they were set according to existing collective agreements in the region, as well as by the agreement signed with the Allied Construction Council.[45] In fact, a number of Cornwall workers left their jobs to work on the Project. Henry Bellmore, for example, left his place as a welder at Bingley Steel to work as an unskilled labourer because the wages were better (he received $1.85 an hour). When he was laid off by OH, he was hired by Mannix-Raymond (later part of Iroquois Constructors) as a welder to work on the powerhouses. When asked about working conditions, Mr. Bellmore admitted that although the work was hard, and at the start of the Project the work sites were rather unorganized, OH soon built its workers a cafeteria and thirty-bed hospital on-site, and that the supervisory staff, ("experts" because of their experience on the Niagara Project) "did not push too hard." While these efforts to "take care" of its

---

[43] Ibid., 28 June 1958, pp.8,24; 29 June 1954, p.3; Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.239,242.

[44] Ibid., 28 June 1955, p.17.

[45] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.20.

workers indicate an acceptance by the state of an obligation to its workers, these measures can also be seen as a means of conciliation and containment. Of interest in this regard is the "no strike" clause in contracts, and the apparent dearth of strikes or work stoppages. Of the many issues of the Standard-Freeholder examined for this thesis, only one strike by truckers in February and March 1955 is mentioned, and only briefly. Bellmore himself could only recollect a couple of brief work stoppages during his time spent working on the Project, one of which was by carpenters who threw down their tools to demand drinking water. Significantly, the dispute ended within a few hours, and the time spent off work was docked from the carpenters' pay.[46]

Instances of labour strife on the Project seem to confirm that attempts were made at the "containment" of work disputes by government and agency officials, employers and union leaders, either through conciliatory negotiations, or through more coercive means. A strike by thirty-eight employees of Canada Dredge and Dock in June-July 1957, for example, was settled quite firmly in the workers' favour. The strike was called by the union (the Seamen's International Union) for recognition and a collective agreement, which may have helped to tip the scales in workers' favour.[47] Similarly, when eight operating engineers walked off the job because their new placement with J. Entwhistle did not pay the "Seaway rates" they received through their collective agreement with

---

46

Phone interview. Henry Bellmore, 20 February 1997; Freeholder, 28 June 1955, p.14; 28 June 1958, p.5.

47

National Archives of Canada (NAC). RG27-- Department of Labour. Strikes and Lockouts,Vol. 521, T4137, #128.

Coleman-Munro, the union supported the walkout. The workers were subsequently transferred back to Coleman-Munro.[48]

In other work stoppages, however, the outcomes for workers were not as fortunate, in part, at least, because the stoppages were not sanctioned by the union. In August 1956, seventeen concrete labourers and two foremen quit work to protest the dismissal of a foreman for misconduct. Although the International Hod Carriers and Common Labourers Union was part of the Allied Construction Council, the men were chastised for their actions with a discharge from the company, Iroquois Constructors. The labourers could be rehired by another Seaway employer as jobs became available, but the foremen did not retain this right.[49]

A larger strike in February 1957, though, drew a great deal of media attention because of its size -- the official report indicated a total of 698 on strike, while newspaper reports offered a range of 800-1 000. More importantly, such a large stoppage, as one correspondent in the Toronto Telegram stated bluntly, threatened to spread to other Seaway work sites all along the river. Originally, 113 engineers from Iroquois Constructors stopped work because they received less money than other workers on the Project, and were in the process of negotiating a new contract, but not under the Allied Council. Over several days, hundreds of other Iroquois Constructor workers, not all from the same union or even working for the same agency, joined the strike. The unions were quick to disown this "unauthorized wildcat," and to order their members back to work

---

[48] NAC. RG27 Vol.521, T4137, #18.

[49] NAC. RG27 Vol.518, T4136, #155.

after settling with OH and the SLSA.[50] The huge media hype over the four-day walkout clearly put pressure on union leaders to distance themselves from the workers' actions, but the feeling that the Seaway Project had to be completed as quickly as possible because it was so necessary to the nation's future growth and prosperity, also likely contributed to both the hype, and union leaders' eagerness to cooperate with Project employers. As well, in their efforts to prove themselves "legitimate" partners in planning and implementing fiscal and social policies, union leaders would have been in an awkward position condoning their members' actions, especially in light of the ideological climate of the Cold War and the "war within the unions."[51]

Another extension of these attempts by the state to meet the needs of the people demonstrated by the Project was the promise of "open" relations with the public. Judging by the coverage in the Standard-Freeholder, which reported every scrap of news concerning the Seaway, the federal and provincial governments, and OH and the SLSA, were generally forthright with their plans. Certainly, the residents of the Lost Villages were relieved to discover that Premier Frost would "take care of the Seaway refugees," and that they would be invited to participate in the planning of their new communities.[52] Likewise, when the plan for a parks system similar to the one at Niagara was announced,

---

[50] NAC. RG27 Vol.521, T4137, #21.

[51] Leo Panitch, Working-Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State. London: Verso, 1986, pp.132,134; Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class-Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992, pp.284,290-292.

[52] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, p.1.

Frost spoke of the plan as "a partnership deal...Niagara is managed by the people of the community and we want to do the same thing here."[53] This "democratic" rhetoric, emphasizing openness and increased public participation in political decision-making, suggests a continuing shift from a wider acceptance of a conception of society as comprised of individuals, to a view of society as a collectivity. Frost was also interested in safeguarding the high esteem held by the Ontario public for OH, and this kind of rhetoric was good for public relations.[54] As the Standard-Freeholder's editor, J.B. McKay argued on October 31, 1957, Cornwall's efforts at industrial expansion were good and necessary because "industry gives more than it takes" by increasing industrial assessments, which in turn would allow for the expansion of civic services to benefit everyone.[55] Thus, the Seaway Project was necessary and justifiable on the basis of the progress and modernity the Project would bring to society as a whole. Even OH's motto, "The Gifts of Nature are for the People," expressed a belief that the benefits of modernization and industrialization should be shared by all, even if the Commission did not always abide by its motto.[56]

A growing Canadian nationalism, then, could be interpreted, in part, as an extension of this view of society as a collectivity. Issues of control over the International Rapids

---

[53] Ibid., p.3.

[54] Roger Graham, Old Man Ontario: Leslie M. Frost. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, p.374.

[55] Freeholder, 31 October 1957, p.4.

[56] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.10.

section of the river should the Seaway development occur, the division of costs and the ownership of the power produced, and the proper way to implement the Project were constant hindrances in negotiations between the United States and Canada.[57] The Canadian section of the Joint Board was told by O.D. Skelton in 1929 to try to reconcile the divergent views of the American and Canadian engineers, and was asked "specifically to report respecting the most effective and economical method of developing the International Rapids section, while at the same time fully safeguarding Canadian interests in the purely national -- that is to say, Canadian -- section of the river."[58] But as opposed to being simply a defensive nationalism based upon efforts to protect our territorial sovereignty (although this feeling continued to exist), in the post-World-War II period, Canadians expressed a growing self-confidence and pride in their Canadian identity, as well as a desire for Canadian expansion, which encouraged a general endorsement of the Seaway Project.[59] Proponents often argued that the Seaway Project was "vital" to Canadian economic development. They also highlighted the fact that those who had once objected, such as the city of Montreal and the Canadian National Railway, had come to accept the Project because they saw that it would benefit Canada

---

57 Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway, pp.68, 145-148; See also the 1921 and 1926 reports of the Joint Board of Engineers.

58 Report of the Conference of Canadian Engineers on the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, December 30, 1929, p.3.

59 Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway, p.219; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.156.

as a whole, and therefore themselves as well.[60] More significant was the state's new interest and efforts in constructing and perpetuating nationalism, and the Seaway Project is a case in point. The Prime Minister stated that "every Canadian is looking forward with pride" to the opening of the Seaway, noting that "Hydro-electric power is a major foundation of Canada's industrial strength."[61] And before construction began, St. Laurent was even more explicit in describing Canada's future prosperity as contingent upon the Seaway Project. A new and much-needed source of hydroelectric power would "mean more employment, more wealth and better conditions of life for many more Canadians," and the greater accessibility to inland ports would stimulate international trade, "upon which the welfare of every Canadian depends to a very large degree." He closed his address with praises for the benefits of belonging to the Canadian nation, saying that the Project would "illustrate the great accomplishments that are possible when the citizens of a nation are prepared to work together for the benefit of all."[62]

In the context of the Seaway Project, the drive for an "all-Canadian" Seaway is the clearest example of the state's manipulation and encouragement of popular nationalism. Raising an idea that reached back to the 1920s, St. Laurent, in a discussion with Chevrier about the delay by the United States in approving the Seaway Project, suggested to Chevrier that Canada should build the "Seaway" part of the Project on its own. According to Chevrier himself, St, Laurent made him responsible for spreading the idea

---

[60] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, p.15.

[61] Ibid., 28 June 1958, p.3.

[62] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.3.

of an all-Canadian Seaway and of gaining public support. Thus, on September 14, 1950, at the Warden's Banquet in Cornwall, Chevrier stated publicly his belief that Canada should "explore the possibility of an all-Canadian deep waterway." The statement received a great deal of attention, although the press and American diplomats felt the statement was made to get headlines and did not take the proposal too seriously.[63] In later statements, Chevrier admitted that Canada would naturally prefer a joint Project and cooperation with the United States, but would "go it alone" if necessary.[64] In his account of the "Seaway story," Chevrier admitted that the key reason for the "tough talk" of the federal government was to goad the United States into action.[65] Still, other prominent politicians publicly supported an all-Canadian Seaway, including Louis St. Laurent and C.D. Howe. External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson said in 1951 that "The biggest and longest dragging of feet I have known in my entire career is that of the Americans on the St. Lawrence."[66] And Leslie Frost, a strong supporter of the all-Canadian Seaway, declared to an audience in Kingston that "the seaway is as certain as the rising of the sun."[67] Even though the passage of legislation authorizing OH to negotiate power development with PASNY, and creating the SLSA to construct an all-Canadian deep

---

63 Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, pp.42-44; Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.155-156; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.224.

64 Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.225; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.157.

65 Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, pp.43-44.

66 Ibid.; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.161.

67 Graham, Leslie M. Frost, p.216.

waterway in December 1951, convinced some Americans that they should join the Project, the delays continued.[68] Chevrier, asking "Will there be no end to these delays?", pointed out that every day of delay (supposedly) hampered Canada's growth.[69]

Clearly, the members of the federal government supported an all-Canadian Seaway, and Chevrier continued to promote the idea, but did this idea take hold among "ordinary" Canadians? Senior and Mabee indicate that many Canadians, tired of American excuses and looking forward to the industrial expansion and modernization the Seaway promised, welcomed the development, especially those communities that bordered the river. W.J. Henderson, a Kingston MP, appealed to Americans on March 12, 1952 to "make up their minds" about the Seaway, "as soon as possible, one way or another, so we can get on with the job."[70] And an editorial reprinted in the Freeholder from Toronto's Globe and Mail echoed this nationalism and independence when the editor insisted that Canada be clear that it was fed up, urging the state to just go ahead. He called the court actions of American interests trying to block the Project a product of "malice and vindictiveness," but the editor reminded readers, in a tone of smug satisfaction, that the court case could not stop the all-Canadian Seaway.[71] Even after the United States passed a Seaway bill, many Canadians, especially Canadian labour and "Seaway" communities, preferred that

---

[68] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.158.

[69] Ibid., p.161.

[70] Freeholder, 12 March 1952, p.2.

[71] Ibid., 9 November 1953, p.4.

Canada build the Seaway alone.[72] After the announcement that the Project was a "go" in the United States, but before the extent of American involvement had been negotiated, editor J.B. McKay summed up what appears to have been the feelings of many local residents: "The St. Lawrence Project can, in fact, be taken as a model of the new Canada; a country confident of its strength and ability and eager to get on with the job of expansion." Looking back in history, he noted, Canada once felt this Project was too huge an undertaking, but "today we know we can do it ourselves, and as a matter of fact would prefer it that way." As a final retort, he reminded readers that after all, Canada had been the "driving force" behind the Project since World War II.[73] This editorial, then, suggests that at least some people in Cornwall spoke proudly of Canada and identified themselves with an independent, growing country.

Still, self-interest also had a part in this proud nationalism and in the desire, especially of Seaway communities, to have the Project proceed on Canadian terms. Cornwall was a particularly vocal supporter of the Seaway Project because residents expected that two of the locks would be located in or near the city; thus, when rumours began to circulate that the locks would be placed on the American side, near Massena, local people became concerned.[74] When news began to emerge that, indeed, "Cornwall's" locks would be built in Massena, on August 10, 1954 -- the day of the official "sod-turning" for the

---

[72] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.169.

[73] Freeholder, 30 June 1954, p.6.

[74] Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.6; Elinor Kyte Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983, p.450.

Project -- Cornwall residents formed a Citizens' Joint Action Committee to prepare a petition demanding an all-Canadian Seaway.[75] The Committee even got support from the United Electrical Workers. The Hamilton and District locals sent a telegram to Chevrier, by then President of the SLSA, demanding an all-Canadian Seaway be built using "Canadian Labor and Materials" for the sake of "our national independence and future."[76] Their conviction that the future growth and prosperity of Canada, and especially Cornwall, depended on the locks being in Cornwall, attests not only to the power of the desire for the modernization and industrialization promised by the Seaway, but also to the primacy of material realities. Some people in Cornwall, a number of Canadian workers, and others, then, appropriated nationalism to guard their own interests.

Chevrier did manage to get dredging and land excavations done in the Cornwall area in anticipation of a future all-Canadian Seaway. In 1955, for instance, many predicted that in ten years, increased Seaway traffic would require an additional channel and set of locks.[77] Even as late as 1963, a Toronto company preparing an urban renewal study for the city said it was a "known fact" that duplicate locks would be built in Cornwall.[78] Cornwall also received the SLSA Building as "compensation" for the locks not being located in Cornwall, making the building a symbol not only of the Seaway's promises,

---

[75] Senior, From Royal, p.450.

[76] UE Canadian News, Vol.XI No.528, Friday 27 August 1954, p.4.

[77] Freeholder, 28 June 1955, p.26; Senior, From Royal, pp.450-451.

[78] Making of a New Cornwall, p.34.

but of its "missed opportunities" as well.[79] The irony of all this fuss about "Cornwall's locks" is that as early as 1929 plans for the Seaway had the locks located near Massena, with even the Conference of Canadian Engineers conceding that they could be built more economically on the American side. [80] To this day, the myth of "Chevrier the hero" who fought valiantly against American interests to "keep" the locks in Cornwall, but was overpowered, persists.[81] While this irony is better explored in another paper, one cannot help but wonder where the idea that the locks were "supposed" to be on the Canadian side originated, and why Canadian politicians never informed the people of Cornwall of the "original" plans.

Another irony which refocusses attention on the role of the state in perpetuating and manipulating nationalist sentiment was the sudden "about-face" Canadian politicians made as soon as the United States decided to join the Project. The sod-turning ceremony at Maple Grove, just west of Cornwall, for instance, demonstrates quite a change from complaining about the Americans to praising American cooperation with Canada. In particular, the symbols displayed at the ceremony are telling. In the centre of the platform mural was a painting of Uncle Sam and a Mountie, each holding one side of a

---

[79] Senior, From Royal, p.451.

[80] Report of Canadian Conference of Engineers, pp.6-7.

[81] Senior, From Royal, p.451; Mabel Tinkess Good, Chevrier: Politician, Statesman, Diplomat and Entrepreneur of the St. Lawrence Seaway. Canada: Stanke, 1987, pp.140-141.

"fountain of progress."[82] An illustrated guide of the Seaway and Hydro Project published by the Long Sault Boat Line in 1963 notes that the history of the Project is one of cooperation, "amity and peace," and that Canadians and Americans would continue to work together in "unity and friendship."[83] And on the plaque which marks the international boundary between the powerhouses is the following: "This stone bears witness to the common purpose of two nations, whose frontiers are the frontiers of friendship, whose ways are the ways of freedom, and whose works are the works of peace."[84] The Seaway Project, then, illustrates definite efforts by the state to construct an understanding of Canada as an independent nation, looking forward to a future of further modernization and industrialization, as well as the ability of the state to use nationalism selectively in the pursuit of capitalist expansion. Of course, as mentioned earlier, in the context of the Cold War, having such a "harmonious" relationship with the United States clearly had its advantages.

The above evidence strongly suggests that a view of modernization and industrialization as desirable and good was hegemonic. But what about counter-hegemonies, or notions that may have questioned or challenged "commonsense" ideas about progress, industrialization and modernization? What about the dangers of modern capitalist society? Based upon the evidence collected for this paper, although some

---

[82] Freeholder, 28 June 1955, p.14.

[83] Seaway and Hydro Project - Illustrated Guide. Long Sault: Long Sault Boat Line Ltd., 1963, p.4.

[84] Robert F. Legget, The Seaway. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1979, p.88.

people did voice cynicism, or regret for what had to be sacrificed, these concerns were more than counterbalanced by the far more numerous and much louder voices of those who hailed the modernization the Project embodied. For instance, Bob Eadie, a local artist and musician whose cartoons appeared weekly in the Standard-Freeholder from 1947 to 1963, often presented comical criticisms of the Project. In one cartoon entitled "Bob Eadie's Seaway Questionnaire," dated December 18, 1954, he asked, "Are tents comfortable in the wintertime?" in reference to the housing shortage in the area due to the influx of Project workers, and "Do you want underwater locks for submarines?" in reference to the "loss" of the "Cornwall" locks and to Chevrier's "victory" in the dredging of a deep-sea channel on the Canadian side.[85] In another, with the caption reading, "May Build Canadian Seaway Sooner Than Expected," Eadie drew a man up to his neck in water, shouting "Please -- No more 'seaways' for at least 100 years!" In the water, he lists some of the inconveniences of the Project, such as business dislocation and general upheaval.[86] And in relation to the displacement of people and the loss of homes and cottages, one Freeholder correspondent expressed sympathy with "those in the path of progress" and lamented that "Cottagers who once enjoyed the restful solitude of the [Iroquois] Point are now moving elsewhere as their haven will be cut off by the excavation."[87]

---

[85] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.76; Bob Eadie, Seaway Valley Cartoons. Cornwall: Vesta Publications, 1975, p.126.

[86] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.76.

[87] Freeholder, 28 June 1955, p.10.

But more often, these reservations and concerns were mixed with faith in, and a general enthusiasm for, the Project. Perhaps the best illustration of the overlapping and confused feelings and identities of Cornwall residents is Loretta and Morris Burgess's "The Seaway Song." Copyrighted on February 11, 1956, the song, their son remembers, was composed at their cottage along the "East Front" of the river.[88] The tone of the song is one of boosterism and pride in the Project, and especially in Cornwall's central place in the Project. The song's lyrics reflect the tension between nationalism and pride in Canada-United States cooperation in their simultaneous praise for Chevrier, who "comes from dear Cornwall a Canadian land," and for "our Uncle Sam/ For doing their share of this big Seaway plan." Even though they express regret about the "beautiful scenery, never no more to see" of Sheek's Island, or the fact that "The thundering old rapids will soon disappear," these nostalgic sentiments are more than counterbalanced by images of all the "activity going around," such as "digging big ditches/ And pulling up ground." Of particular significance here is the metaphor of the Project as an epic battle between humans and nature, which naturally, humans are winning. That "many a ship would not dare to go near" the Rapids emphasizes the awesome power of the Rapids, and of the river, "a mighty big stream," which underlines the greatness of harnessing the power of the Rapids. In a similar vein, the workers work "a twenty-four hour a day" to finish "this mighty Seaway," but no doubt is expressed that soon, "the men from Hydro [will] have

---

[88] Phone interview. Jim Brownell, 5 April 1997.

won their race."[89] And appropriately, Premier Frost echoed this perception of "nature for use and profit" when he noted that the St. Lawrence river had always contributed to the development of North America, but that the river was "now to embark upon a new sphere of usefulness -- that of contributing to modern transportation and to the power requirements" of Ontario and New York State.[90]

Mabel Tinkess Good also romanticized the river in a story about its history and its "mystery," but in a way that implied that the history of "greatness" of the river and of the early settlers ensured that the Seaway Project would eventually come to a successful conclusion.[91] Interestingly, the proponents of the Project also employed nostalgia, or "history," in order to present the river and the Project as part of a larger and inevitable "narrative of progress" of capitalist expansion. Mayor Horovitz pointed out the "steady impact" of the river upon Cornwall's development, and hinted again at the inevitability of modern capitalism when he argued that the United Empire Loyalists chose to settle in the area because "of a vision and faith in the future of this area...for trade, commerce and industry."[92] George Challies, the Vice-Chairman of OH and MP for Grenville-Dundas recalled that

> The history of eastern Ontario shows clearly that we have not lacked

---

89 Lorretta Burgess and Morris Burgess, "The Seaway Song." Cornwall. Copyright 11 February 1956.

90 Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.2.

91 Ibid., 28 June 1955, pp.19,21.

92 Ibid., 26 June 1954, p.2.

> the basic ingredients that make for a strong and constructive community spirit. With such traditions behind us we cannot fail to meet the new challenge exhibiting all the qualities of vision and courage bequeathed by our forefathers.[93]

Also playing upon "tradition," the Devitt Fuel Company featured an advertisement, which stated that "Deeply rooted in the old fashioned virtues of the past" Cornwall had "come a long way in the march of progress" by taking "her place" in the Seaway Project. The images used in the advertisement enhance the contrast between history and modernity at the same time as the language of the advertisement links them. On the top is a picture of two cowboys on horseback, greeting a group of Natives, who respond in kind; on the bottom is a picture of the "Seaway City of the future," a city of blocks and blocks of skyscrapers.[94]

Perhaps nothing best illustrates the central role of the state in the Seaway Project, nor the power of the belief in modernization as the greatest good, than the experiences of the people of the Lost Villages. For them, the ambivalences of modern capitalism -- both the possibilities and the dangers -- were striking. But the attractions of modernization, in addition to the "new democratic" offerings of the state, convinced the vast majority to cooperate with those implementing the Project. At the same time, their experiences also demonstrate a struggle over meanings of concepts like "democracy," reflective of a struggle over power between the people, the state, and to a lesser extent, capital.

When the people of the Lost Villages learned on June 7, 1954 that the Seaway Project

---

[93] Ibid., p.4.

[94] Ibid., p.15.

finally had American approval, the news was bittersweet. Naturally, a number of people were saddened and angry, and although a green light was turned on in the Morrisburg Municipal Building to symbolize the "go-ahead," most of the residents were not in the mood to partake in parades, as the people of Cornwall did.[95] As one letter to the Freeholder by some residents of one of these villages made clear, the fact that "the cold water of the St. Lawrence River" would soon flow over "everything we have worked for as a community," including homes they had lived in for many years, and gardens they had spent so much time tending, meant "we do not feel like celebrating and being joyful with clowns and bands."[96] But still, how could they object to a development that would bring growth not only to the Seaway Valley, but to the nation, even the whole continent? Lloyd Davis, Reeve of Iroquois and Warden of the United Counties, expressed the residents' resignation to their removal by saying that they "would not stand in the way of progress."[97] And generally, even though many of these people were deeply attached to their land because it was handed down to them by their United Empire Loyalist ancestors, these people, to a large extent, believed that the benefits of modernization and industrialization outweighed the costs of the Project. The fact that plans for the Project had been circulating for so long likely reinforced a sense of inevitability, although some were doubtful that "they would really do it" because the Project had been shelved so many times. Overall, evidence suggests that while the relocation was a difficult process,

---

[95] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.169.

[96] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.19.

[97] Ibid.

many looked forward to the economic growth and modernization the Project would bring. A sign posted in Iroquois on Highway Two summed up the feelings of the majority of residents: "We have to go, but watch us grow!"[98]

On the whole, many looked forward to the future, for, as Davis and the people of the area to be flooded argued, the "threat" of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project had "held them back" from economic development and population growth. Even the Ministry of Education had been reluctant to build schools in the region because they would eventually be flooded.[99] Residents welcomed Premier Frosts's promise that they would be "looked after," and his spoken desire for a "partnership approach," expecting that they would be involved in the planning process. Lloyd Davis's demands on behalf of his constituents "to be right in the centre of the picture in our discussions and negotiations with the government and its instruments. We want to have the chief say in our destiny..." indicates that the people of the Lost Villages saw Canada as a democracy and expected to be participants in the plans for their new communities, although Davis's insistence hints that they feared they would be "shut out" of negotiations.[100] In fact, to the provincial government's credit, and further demonstrating that "new democratic" ideas about public participation pre-dated the Project, OH had consulted the planning boards set up by municipal and township councils in drafting their plans for the four new communities: a new Iroquois, a partially replanned Morrisburg, "New Town No. 1" (later Ingleside), and

---

[98] Ibid., pp.14,16,25.

[99] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, pp.2,16.

[100] Ibid., p.2.

"New Town No. 2" (later Long Sault).

When the plans were unveiled over the summer of 1954, the divergence between how residents defined "open" and "progress," and how OH defined these terms, became clear. The people of Iroquois and Morrisburg, especially, were critical of the plans for their towns, and had no qualms about taking Frost up on his "open approach" and exercising their "democratic" right to organize Citizens' Commissions in defense of their wishes and their interests. One doubts that, if Frost had foreseen such a vocal critical response, he would have invited participation; on November 29, for example, two thousand Morrisburg and area residents came out to a mass meeting to heckle George Challies, and appropriately enough, one of the residents' complaints was lack of public consultation.[101] The town council even went so far as to hire their own "experts," King-Coons Ltd., to analyze the OH plans and to draw up a new plan which would incorporate the changes the residents wanted.[102]

As well, both Morrisburg and Iroquois residents disagreed with OH's vision of their "modern" communities. The plans, which included, according to Hydro planners "the most progressive basic features" such as loop streets, were not to the residents' liking, and they found the lot sizes too small. They also had different views about where to best locate schools and churches, and what type of businesses -- local, not chain stores -- should go in their malls. But people were also concerned about the "progress" of their towns in terms of future economic development. The people of Morrisburg complained

---

[101] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.27-28.

[102] Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.9.

because with only four acres designated for industry, they would likely lose tax revenue as many industries would have to build in the township instead.[103] The case of Iroquois emphasizes the importance of industrialization and economic growth in the definition of "progress" ultimately shared by OH, the town council and capital. Iroquois residents were most upset that OH plans situated the new town north of the old village, as opposed to by the river. In the end, the needs of industry decided the issue. OH signed a deal with Caldwell Linen Mills, Iroquois' main employer, in which a "most modern" and larger mill would be built north of the village. Seeing the benefits of receiving the tax revenue and more jobs from the mill, Iroquois consequently agreed to the OH plan.[104] Again, material realities proved to be a powerful influence on people's decisions. The Lost Village residents' eagerness to acquire new industry through the Project, however, is rather ironic, and stands in contrast to the pre-World War I protests by the township councils against the potential flooding of their land by a "commercial proposal, promoted by individuals for profit."[105]

The biggest issue, however, was compensation. The residents demanded full replacement value, rather than the market value plus ten to fifteen per cent offered by OH, because real estate in the area was "depressed" due to the "threat" of the Seaway. They also wanted a collective, across-the-board settlement. But OH refused both of these demands, and their insistence on dealing with people "on an individual basis" is a

---

[103] Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.214-217; Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.9.

[104] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.30-31.

[105] Ibid., p.13.

reminder that although the state was beginning to recognize the demands of social groups, they returned to the liberal notion of the importance of the individual when the issue was property rights. But the decision by most residents to have their own houses moved to the new town sites largely quelled this debate. Altogether, 531 homes were moved.[106] The over 200 people who owned cottages on Sheek Island also demanded that either their cottages be moved or that they receive compensation. And although they had no legal rights in this regard, their moral appeals to Members of Parliament and others finally forced the Ministry of Transportation to agree to their demands.[107]

Hydro assumed responsibility for the move, informing residents of the date, providing them with "stopover" homes for a few hours or days, as was needed, and if necessary, repairing any damages. In addition, OH would provide other "modern" conveniences in these scientifically-planned communities, which many residents did not have before, such as water, sewage and electrical systems; paved roads and sidewalks; street lighting; surface drainage ditches; and most exciting of all, shopping centres! These state offerings of "progress" would have helped to convince some people that perhaps moving was not so bad after all.[108]

And the innumerable articles and pictures associated with these "new democratic" provisions clearly indicates that they were the focus of a great deal of attention by locals and even by tourists because they were so "modern." The Hartshorne house movers, used

---

[106] Ibid., pp.29-34.

[107] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.209.

[108] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.33-37.

to lift the houses off their foundations to their new sites, were a "prime drawing card" for tourists, and one person who was relocated to Ingleside recalls, "It was better than a movie to see that house-moving machine go into action."[109] In an article about the new schools built in the new towns, one wonders if the author tried to see how many times he/she could use the word "modern." Entitled "Eight Modern Schools Built in 'Valley,'" the author describes in detail the "modern fluorescent lighting...modern cafeteria...modern brightly-lit library" at Iroquois High School (now Seaway District High School), as well as the gymnasium and oil and hot water heat the school possessed.[110] The caption below a picture of "one of the most pleasant curving boulevards" in the new Iroquois also reminds readers of the state's responsibility for all this modernization, as OH laid the sod and repainted the homes.[111] A significant sign of a shift to the modern welfare state was the provision of "Modern Low Rent Housing" in Morrisburg for those who rented in the old village or who were "eligible" for a space according to their income. Arguing that this "beautiful housing" should be called "paradise acres" rather than the "sophisticated name of Victoria Park," the author's attitude implies that at this time, public housing had not yet acquired the stigma it carries today.[112]

---

[109] Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.23; Jean C. Jeacle, To Make a House a Home: The Story of Ingleside, Ontario. Ingleside: Township of Osnabruck, September 1975, p.3.

[110] Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.9.

[111] Ibid., 29 June 1957, p.14.

[112] Ibid., 28 June 1958, p.10.

But of all these signs of material progress and modernization, the new shopping centres undoubtedly received the most attention, with articles and pictures in the newspaper each time one opened, conveying details about the number and kind of businesses and the cost of the structure. These "keys to the commercial life of the new towns," according to the Freeholder, were quickly "one of the most popular features of the Ontario Hydro rehabilitation enterprise."[113] Of course, people today looking at these one-level, sterile strip malls, containing space for anywhere from fifteen to forty-two stores, often appear surprised or laugh at the use of the term "shopping centre" for these structures.[114] Most intriguing is the way in which the openings of the malls are described as having transformed the attitudes of the residents towards their respective new communities. In Morrisburg, for instance, the opening of the shopping centre was a "memorable occasion" which changed the "tone" of the protests of 1954 into "applause."[115] The opening of the "modern," "sprawling new building" at Iroquois, the "village which refused to die in the face of complete relocation" was described as "symbolizing a remarkable change in the thinking of the public. From that time on, most people have identified themselves with the new town rather than the old."[116] The verity of such drastic alterations in feelings and attitudes at such specific moments in time is questionable, and the mere suggestion that people construct a sense of community

---

[113] Ibid., 29 June 1957, pp.14,26.

[114] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.41.

[115] Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.11.

[116] Ibid., 29 June 1957, pp.14,26; 28 June 1958, p.8.

identity or belonging around a concrete building is rather a sad comment on our consumerist society that is also of dubious accuracy. But the perception of the shopping centres and of their "power" definitely speaks to the attractions of modern capitalism.

Many differences exist between the relocation of the people of the Seaway Valley and other relocation projects occurring during the 1950s and 1960s, such as the resettlement of the Inuit in the Eastern Arctic in the 1950s and the displacement of fishers and their families in Newfoundland in the late 1960s, in terms of their size, scope and nature ("voluntary" or "involuntary"). At the same time, however, they were similar because they were all state-sponsored and state-controlled, with politicians promising some material support or incentive, and claiming the "offers" to be "democratic" (although the "democratic" element in all three cases can be called into question). All were also undertaken, either implicitly or explicitly, for the purposes of capitalist development.[117] Another interesting similarity between the Inuit relocations and the relocation of the residents of the Lost Villages was the use of the term "pioneers" to describe those being displaced.[118] While not used extensively in the case of the Seaway Valley relocations, Lloyd Davis, in an effort to demand respect for the residents who were losing so much and to ensure that they would be centrally involved in the plans for the move, asked, "is it not true that we who are about to be displaced, to be turned away from the lands and

---

[117] See Tester and Tulchyski, Tammarniit, and Noel Iverson and Ralph D. Matthews, Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland. St. John's: Memorial University, 1968.

[118] Tester and Tulchyski, Tammarniit, p.120.

homes of our forefathers, are in a true sense pioneers once more?" This time, though, they would be laying the foundation for a "Twentieth Century" way of life.[119]

Indeed, there was a sense that those being displaced were doing something great for the future growth and development of the Seaway Valley and Canada, and the recognition they received for their contribution probably helped to ease the pain of moving, and to bolster a sense of pride in the people of the Lost Villages for their actions. In the "Inundation Day" edition of the Freeholder, the editor's words echo Berman's words about capitalist modernity: "Progress exacts a price, and in this case it has been paid by the people whose lives have been changed."[120] And Premier Frost also thanked the people "of an area which is old in history and tradition giving the lead in the most modern of improvements and ideas."[121]

Did the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project bring the anticipated economic development, population growth and modern conveniences to Cornwall and the Seaway Valley? Certainly, the city itself experienced an expansion of "modern" services, such as the new water tower and the filtration plant, as well as of schools and hospitals, largely due to the pressures of dealing with the influx of workers who came to the area with their families to count themselves as one of the over 12 000 people who worked on the Project. Between 1951 and 1958, the population of the city and the township increased

---

[119] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, p.2.

[120] Ibid., 28 June 1958, p.6.

[121] Ibid., p.2.

by twenty-one per cent.[122] Local business, as a result, prospered, and a few construction companies either had their start or expanded during these years. Locating the SLSA headquarters in Cornwall also meant an additional one hundred fifty jobs for the city.[123] Another long-term impact of the Project was the establishment of the St. Lawrence Parks Commission, to create and maintain parks and an historic site on the new shoreline. A response to a burgeoning tourist industry and to "antimodernists" who insisted that at least some of the area's history and recreational areas should be protected from the "path of progress," the Parks Commission was also a sign of the welfare state, as these provincially-owned parks and historic sites were, essentially, a new public service. During the first full summer of operation in 1962, a quarter of a million people visited Upper Canada Village and another quarter million used the beach and camping facilities.[124]

In fact, the Project itself became a tourist attraction, and approximately one and a half million tourists visited OH's construction and rehabilitation sites. In response to this interest in the Project, OH operated bus tours and created three lookout points. At the one located nearest the Long Sault Rapids, OH erected a fifteen foot map of the Project with lights; installed two loudspeakers for the tour guides and telescopes for the visitors; and offered some kind of recognition to tourists who happened to be the 100 000th or some other landmark number. The Project as a symbol of the greatness of modernization also

---

[122] Senior, From Royal, p.451; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.239.

[123] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.223.

[124] Ibid., pp.50-54.

attracted many domestic and foreign politicians, business leaders and dignitaries, from the Prime Ministers of Ghana and Rhodesia to Governor-General Vincent Massey.[125] The greatest famous visitor, of course, was Queen Elizabeth II, who came to Canada to "officially" open the Seaway, and who was greeted with crowds and gifts during her brief stop in Cornwall.[126] The choice of the Queen as Canada's representative is rather ironic, given Canada's efforts to establish itself as an independent, modern nation-state, and demonstrates that Canada still had (and has) deep attachments to Great Britain.

But as was hinted at earlier, the Seaway Project also brought some more unpleasant realities. The influx of people led to housing shortages and high rents; from January 1955 to March 1956, rents rose thirty per cent in the city.[127] Henry Bellmore remembers that among the tricks some workers used to avoid high rents were doubling and tripling up in homes, or making a down payment on a home to avoid monthly rents, and then leaving town at the end of the Project without paying any more.[128] On July 6, 1955, a twenty person delegation from the Cornwall Joint AFL-CIO Coordinating Committee, headed by Wilfred Oliver, Ralph Carrara and Alex Mullin, demanded a freeze order on rents from the city and township councils. That this request came from a coalition of the two largest labour bodies in Cornwall -- the Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board (GCTJB) and the Cornwall and District Trades and Labour Council -- reflects the unequal distribution of

---

[125] Ibid., p.19; Freeholder, 28 June 1958, p.5.

[126] Senior, From Royal, p.452.

[127] Ibid., p.451; Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.239-240.

[128] Interview, Henry Bellmore.

the costs and benefits of the Seaway Project. Oliver stated this fact bluntly to the councils: "You have declared the people would not suffer from the St. Lawrence Power Project...If that is so then you are slow in acting because they are already suffering." A reeve responded that the councils were negotiating with the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation regarding low rental housing and rent controls, but argued that the minimum rental of fifty dollars a month would push up all rents. Dissatisfied with this answer, the delegation pointed out that their request had been made a year before, and that the freeze should therefore be retroactive to January.[129] Local workers' demands were reiterated by the Family Welfare Bureau, ministers and even some merchants.[130] Thus, while well-paid workers could perhaps afford the rents, many others could not. As a consequence, many women were forced into the workforce, which contributed, according to local social workers, to increased "family breakdown" and juvenile delinquency. The city, however, did nothing until after the shortage crisis had passed, unlike OH, who built some barracks (still inadequate) for workers, as well as low rental housing for ex-apartment dwellers in Morrisburg.[131] Traffic increased, leading to more accidents, higher insurance rates and damage to roads.[132] In the long term, no real industrial "boom" occurred, and in 1969, one hundred fifty jobs related to the old canal

---

[129] NAC. MG28 I 219 – Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board Collection. Vol.93, File 3 - 1955 Press Clippings, Freeholder, 6 July 1955.

[130] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.242.

[131] Ibid., pp.240,242; Senior, From Royal, pp.451-452.

[132] Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.240-241.

moved to St. Lambert.[133] The area did not get any "preferred rates" on the power harnessed at the R.H. Saunders Generating Station, and ironically, the city still buys its power from Hydro-Quebec, because the rates are lower.[134] Also significant were the environmental impacts of the Project, as the "taming of the Rapids" changed the river's flow and level, affecting every aspect of the ecosystem.[135] But then again, perhaps the negative environmental effects were not surprising, given that the "necessity" of modernization emphasized the "usefulness" of nature for the purposes of industry. The environmental degradation caused by the Project, and its subsequent socioeconomic and psychological impacts will receive greater attention in the next chapter.

As prior examples illustrate, the residents of the Lost Villages also received their share of "modern" conveniences and services, but some of these services were poorly installed; both Morrisburg and Iroquois experienced problems with their water and sewage systems.[136] And like Cornwall, the expected flood of industrial development never materialized. But because the negotiations for property compensation were carried out on an individual basis, residents' feelings about OH and about the relocation varied widely. The recollections contained in Jean Jeacle's history of Ingleside, for instance,

---

[133] Senior, From Royal, p.451; Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.222-223.

[134] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.222; Interview. Brian Carrara, Property Manager, St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (Cornwall), 5 March 1997.

[135] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.57-58.

[136] Ibid., p.33.

range through expressions of satisfaction, anger, sadness and resentment.[137] This variation in opinions and feelings supports a materialist interpretation of the Seaway Project's impacts, because the ultimate arbiter of opinions seemed to be whether or not individuals felt they had received a "fair shake" on their property from OH. Some received more than what their homes were worth. One farmer was given three times the offer of six thousand dollars he had received before the Project started.[138] In Jeacle's book, a few people said that OH had "treated me fair," and thus had no real complaints. One family was quite happy because they were able to build their new home further back on their own farm.[139] Others, however, resented the fact that "you had to fight for every dollar you got," and that "done deals" were sometimes retracted by OH arbitrarily. Henry Laflamme, for example, ended up settling for much less than he had originally agreed to after the first contract was rejected by OH's Toronto head office.[140] One resident's warning to the Hydro agent reflected his anger at being "short-changed:" "I told the Hydro man... 'If you ever come back, WATCH OUT. We won't be so easy next time. We've been taught by the real horse traders...YOU.'"[141] The St. Lawrence Board of Review, composed of local, OH and provincial representatives, was established as the first level of appeal for those unable to settle with OH, and in a February 1955 report, one

---

[137] Ibid., pp.37-43; Jeacle, To Make a House, pp.2-4.

[138] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.37.

[139] Jeacle, To Make a House, pp.2,4.

[140] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.37-38.

[141] Jeacle, To Make a House, p.2.

of its members noted that OH had been pushed into offering almost the replacement value demanded by residents.[142] The Ontario Municipal Board, the next level of complaint, heard less than twenty cases, but A.W. Lamport, OH Project Property Officer, doubted that people won very much from the OMB, as they had to pay their own legal expenses.[143] The fact that the residents of the Lost Villages complained loudly enough to make the creation of a special Board of Review necessary, and the fact that they did, to some small degree, increase the amount of compensation they received, are testimony to their efforts to defend their material well-being. At the same time, though, the limited gains they made and the relatively few cases brought forward also illustrate the ability of the state and capital to integrate those relocated into the Project through the rhetoric of modernization, and to intimidate and coerce, even indirectly. As one reeve admitted, "they're [OH] a big outfit. I am afraid of reprisal...."[144] These new communities also took considerable time to truly "take root," or for people to identify themselves with their new communities, as being uprooted and reestablished in artificially-created towns was for many a difficult process.[145]

While the debate over the costs and benefits of the Project is still open, the Project did contribute to a conception of Canada as a democratic welfare state. The state at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, to varying degrees, involved themselves in

---

[142] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.44; Mabee, Seaway Story, p.210.

[143] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.44; Mabee, Seaway Story, pp.207,291.

[144] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.207.

[145] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.45-48.

almost every aspect of the Project. Although the notion of an interventionist state existed, the Seaway Project is remarkable not only because of the amount of state intervention in social and economic life, but also because of the increasing emphasis on the state's central role in society by politicians themselves, and by people in general. In short, people more and more often looked to and expected the state to provide for their needs. The labour delegation that asked for rent controls, for instance, admitted that the Seaway Project was the major reason for the housing shortage, but maintained that the municipal government was responsible for the welfare of its citizens.[146] And when those relocated encountered problems related to their move, they held OH responsible and turned to them to resolve their difficulties or to rectify any wrongs. As one person recalled, "The Hydro Rehabilitation Office on Wales Drive was the busiest place in Ingleside in 1957. You had to line up with your complaints."[147] Elinor Kyte Senior, writing about the "depressed" economic conditions in Cornwall in the early 1960s, notes (in a rather disdainful tone) that people increasingly looked to politicians, and especially City Hall, to solve the city's problems.[148] While this situation has no direct relation to the Seaway Project, the Project likely contributed to the view of Canada as a modern state which looked after its citizens, not in any haphazard way, but in a scientific, rational, efficient manner. In addition, the use of scientific discourse, rational planning and "experts" on the Project served to legitimize not only state decisions and plans, but "science" itself,

---

[146] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 3, Freeholder, 6 July 1955.

[147] Jeacle, To Make a House, p.4.

[148] Senior, From Royal, p.487.

because the state, as an object of authority, also lends authority and legitimacy to the discourses and practices it uses.

Certainly, the whole issue of the all-Canadian Seaway exhibits the state's efforts to construct a nationalism based upon an independent, modern, democratic Canada, as well as its ability to manipulate popular nationalism. And in an attempt to protect and to promote Canadian jobs and economic growth, a number of local people and Canadian workers appropriated this nationalism. Similarly, the "open" approach promised by OH was perceived differently by the people of the Lost Villages and the agency. OH had consulted people in the planning process, but evidently not enough. But this trend toward public consultation and participation was undoubtedly encouraged and more accepted as a result of the experiences of both state officials and local people in the Project.

From the evidence presented here, the belief in, and desire for, modernization and capitalist expansion was largely hegemonic, and worked along with the words and actions of the state to frame the Seaway Project in favourable terms, constructing the Project as desirable and necessary to the growth and prosperity of the Seaway Valley and to Canada as a whole. The way in which the uncertainties and dangers of modernization were downplayed or were overwhelmed by promises of progress and growth also speaks to the power of ideology. But one cannot ignore the importance of material conditions in shaping discourses and ideologies. The actual material benefits, for instance, provided by the state were crucial elements in convincing the residents of the Lost Villages of the benefits of the Project. And when the anticipated material and social benefits of the Project failed to appear, people became more critical of the Project and of its impacts, as

the local histories consulted for this paper illustrate.

The Seaway Project did benefit Canada as a whole. Seaway traffic increased, especially in grain and ore; more than fifty-five per cent of the tonnage carried on the Seaway in the first years after its completion consisted of these products.[149] The costs of imports and transportation costs for Western farmers also decreased.[150] But Jack Owens, writing about the blowing up of the cofferdams and the disappointment at how slow the flooding was, best expresses the economic impact of the Project on the Seaway Valley: "It was a spectacular 'whisper.'"[151] The Project raised hopes and during the construction years, the area did experience some modernization in the form of economic and population growth. But in the long run, the Project left little positive impact on the Valley, although certainly, the unalterable changes to the area are still being felt and assessed.

Other Seaway Valley residents are also still weighing the full impacts of the Project. The people of Akwesasne, like the people of the Lost Villages, lost land for the purposes of the Project. Because of the particularities of their geographic location, their culture and their legal status, the people of Akwesasne have experienced, and continue to experience, the environmental degradation linked to the Project most accutely. Native peoples, like all affected by the Seaway Project, responded with a range of reactions to change. They were neither uniformly opposed to, nor homogenously in favour of, the

---

[149] Phillips and Watson, "From Mobilization," p.43.

[150] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.255; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.278.

[151] Freeholder, 2 July 1958, p.13.

Seaway. In subsequent years, the losses occasioned by the Seaway Project registered with the locale's aboriginal community in environmental terms in ways that related to the increasing concern with Native sovereignty. At the time, the state did not make detailed and explicit efforts to meet the needs of Natives who lost land, as they did for non-Natives, but the minutes of the Band Council meetings during the construction years indicate that the Band Council did try to guard the interests of the Akwesasne community in their negotiations with various state agencies, with some success. The ways in which the Band Council attempted to promote the well-being of the people of the community, and the negative effects of the Project on the environment will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Chapter Three:
The St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project: Akwesasne

In 1929, the Canadian Conference of Engineers made a number of recommendations regarding the flooding of the Seaway Valley, and suggested that "various works designed to protect the interests of the towns and villages affected by the proposed improvement" be initiated. They also hoped, especially in the cases of Morrisburg and Iroquois, that the flooding and relocation "should be brought about by a cooperative plan in which the citizens of the area to be affected and the town as a whole would be inconvenienced as little as possible."[1] And from the information presented in the previous chapter, those responsible for implementing the Project -- specifically OH -- took some of these recommendations into consideration and tried to meet the needs of the people of the Lost Villages. But in the case of the flooding of some Native land, such proposals that specific needs be determined and that the Project be carried out with as much fairness and local participation as possible, are markedly absent. Nor did OH or the SLSA, both of whom expropriated aboriginal land for the Project, make similar efforts to inform Native peoples about the Seaway plans, the potential impact on their communities, and the compensation, if any, they would receive for their losses -- that is, until Natives objected

---

1 Report of Canadian Conference of Engineers on the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, December 30 1929, p.5.

loudly to the expropriations, the Project or to aspects of the Project, and especially if they were able to capture media attention. Even in the Standard-Freeholder, which reported virtually anything related to the Seaway, I found no mention of the loss of territory of the residents of Akwesasne. And as mentioned in the introductory chapter, the lack of written material, historical or otherwise, about this issue is troublesome, and speaks to the subordinate status accorded aboriginal peoples in Canada, both then and now. Thus, while these pages most emphatically do not represent "the" story, this chapter is an attempt to shed more light on how the people of Akwesasne negotiated their encounter with "modernization" in the form of the Seaway Project, as well as the impacts of the Project on the aboriginal community.

Tester and Tulchyski stress the dangers of condemning past actions without taking into account the attitudes and values of the historical context. In their work on Inuit relocations in the 1950s, they point to pervasive feelings of optimism about Canada's future and its development, the notion of "nation-building," faith in progress and modernization, and assimilationism and paternalism as factors shaping the relocations and how they were carried out by the state.[2] Much the same could be said about the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, as the vast majority of local residents welcomed the modernization and industrialization promised by the Project, and as the two conflicting views of Natives that co-existed at the time greatly influenced the treatment of Native peoples by the state. The words and actions of federal politicians, and SLSA

2

Frank James Tester and Peter Tulchyski, Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-1963. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994, pp.115-119.

President Lionel Chevrier in particular, illustrate the tension between paternalist and assimilationist views of Natives, but also show how, ultimately, both of these perceptions deemed Natives "inferior," and that the imperatives of modernization and industry were far more important than aboriginal concerns.

The Mohawk reservations of Kahnawake, in Quebec, and Akwesasne, which straddles the borders of Quebec, Ontario and New York, sat literally "in the middle" of the Project and, as a result, the SLSA or OH, or both, needed to expropriate some of this land for the purposes of the mega-project. By Order-in-Coucil PC 1955-1416, the SLSA was authorized to take possession of twelve hundred sixty acres of the Kahnawake reserve.[3] And although some residents were willing to accept some form of compensation, others, as well as the Band Council, distrusted the Canadian government and refused to surrender their land.[4] To protest the land expropriations and their treatment by the SLSA, a number of Kahnawake residents engaged in war-dances against the Authority. Prompted by all the media attention devoted to these protests, Lionel Chevrier announced that the Mohawks would be treated like other landowners, and would be paid market value plus ten percent for "inconvenience" for the land they occupied.[5] MP William Hamilton suggested in Parliament that the Natives should be treated with special care, because they could not easily defend themselves. But those in Parliament clearly felt that

---

[3] Omer Ghobashy, The Caughnawaga Indians and the St. Lawrence Seaway. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1961, p.77.

[4] Ibid., pp.65,88.

[5] Carleton Mabee, The Seaway Story. New York: Macmillan, 1961, p.208.

they were acting in the "best interests" of these "wards of the Crown" when they broke treaties in order for the Project to be completed.[6] Chevrier, however, was forced to give more than cursory treatment to Native demands. Louis Diabo, a Kahnawake resident, attracted even more media attention by refusing to move when the contractors digging the canal through the reserve reached his home; he abandoned his site only after Chevrier paid him over $70 000 for his property.[7] Even though Chevrier emphasized that he was "invited" onto the reserve, he really had little choice, given the publicity surrounding Native concerns about the Project, but to meet with the Kahnawake community personally to negotiate the terms of land transfer. Largely because of the actions of opposition of the people of Kahnawake, the SLSA promised to fill in low-lying areas; to build a beach; to provide a water and sewage system; to preserve some historic buildings, including the Jesuit church; and to pay the Band Council a percentage of the money paid to individuals as a form of collective compensation.[8] In spite of his insistence that aboriginal peoples be given "equal treatment," Chevrier conveys, in his account of the Project, a condescension towards the Mohawks and their concerns. Noting that initially the residents were "satisfied with what we were doing," he hinted that they became obdurate because they were "prompted" by outsiders, which echoes anti-Communist rhetoric about "foreign agitators," as well as a paternalistic view of Natives as gullible and essentially passive. Thus, Native concerns were only considered when they forcefully

---

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.; Lionel Chevrier, The St. Lawrence Seaway. Toronto: Macmillan, 1959, p.106.

broke the stereotype of the "passive, happy Indian" to draw public attention to the actions of the state. But in the end, Chevrier's summation that he "sometimes...felt that the Indians were just having fun at the expense of the Seaway" reflects his assimilationist views, dismissing Native concerns as unimportant in the grand scheme of modernization.[9]

Native peoples, of course, were not uninfluenced by modern capitalist society and the rhetoric and promises of the Seaway's promoters. Indeed, the experiences of the people of Kahnawake and Akwesasne with the Seaway Project mirror those of other aboriginal communities in Canada with hydroelectric developments. James Waldram, for example, notes that the governments involved often "sold" these megaprojects as guaranteed prosperity and industrial growth; predictably, then, varying numbers of Natives supported these developments.[10] As for the community of Akwesasne, Mike McDonald, historical curator at the North American Indian Travelling College, admitted that some Mohawks likely saw the Project as a source of jobs and economic growth. He remembered that the Army Corps of Engineers toured around the American towns and villages to persuade people of the benefits of the Project. He also noted that cultural rejuvenation or "rediscovery" is a fairly recent trend, and that the belief that First Nations peoples should be integrated into "mainstream" society would have further encouraged support from

---

[9] Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, pp.104-105.

[10] James B. Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run: Hydroelectric Development and Native Communities in Western Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988, pp.7,59-60.

Native peoples.[11] Similarly, Darren Bonaparte, a Mohawk artist and historian, highlighted the fact that several Akwesasne residents were employed on the construction of the megaproject, and a large number now work on maintenance for the Seaway Bridge Authority, a management company jointly "owned" and operated by the SLSA and its American counterpart, the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. A few Mohawks were also hired at the new General Motors (GE) and Reynolds Aluminum plants that moved into the area in response to the Seaway Project's completion.[12]

Even acknowledging the support of some Natives for the Project, however, appreciating that a few did benefit from jobs related to the Project, the more widespread Native response was one of a reflection on the blunt material losses in land and many intangibles, that were felt (and are still being felt) in the Akwesasne community. There is little evidence of dramatic actions of opposition at Akwesasne; most of the residents, along with the Band Council, restricted their discontent to verbal statements against the expropriation or against the Seaway plans as they stood.[13] In fact, the only mention the Mohawks of Akwesasne receive in most accounts about the Project is in reference to their opposition to the original plans for the new bridge between the reserve and the

---

11

Interview, Mike McDonald, historical curator for the North American Indian Travelling College, 4 March 1997.

12

Interviews, Darren Bonaparte, Akwesasne artist and historian, 1 April 1997; Brian Carrara, Property Manager, St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (Cornwall), 5 March 1997.

13

Interviews, Mike McDonald; Darren Bonaparte; Phone interview, Brian David, employee of Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 2 April 1997.

Canadian mainland. The plans proposed that the Ottawa branch of the New York Central Railroad and the portion of Roosevelt Highway from Rooseveltown to Cornwall Island (part of the reserve) should be relocated and replaced, with a fixed bridge running from Polley's Gut (at the northwest point of Cornwall Island) to Cornwall. But this location would have forced those living in the St. Regis, Quebec portion of the reserve to travel an extra five miles to get to Cornwall, where many residents attended school and did their shopping.[14] When the New York Central decided to abandon its line between Cornwall and Rooseveltown, allowing for other possible locations for the bridge, the SLSA and the Seaway Development Corporation decided instead on a high-level suspension bridge. While this bridge would provide a more direct route, a more important factor in this change of plans was likely the fact that the high-level bridge would cost anywhere from two to four million dollars less than the previous plan.[15] In this instance, then, although the Native residents' desire for a direct route to Cornwall contributed to the change of plans, one suspects that economy and efficiency may have had a greater role in this decision.

Orders-in-Council PC 1955-748, PC 1956-1730, PC 1956-1761, and PC 1958-1034 enabled the SLSA to expropriate approximately one hundred forty-seven acres of the Akwesasne Mohawk territory, including Second Crab Island, Stanley Island, and parts of

---

[14] Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, p.77; William R. Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics and Diplomacy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, p.269.

[15] Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, p.78; Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.269.

Cornwall Island, for the purposes of digging the deep-sea channel, regulating the flow of the North and South channels of the river, creating the Cornwall harbour, and building a fixed light tower to aid in Seaway navigation.[16] Each individual "locatee" was given "full compensation" for the land taken and, as in the case of Kahnawake, ten percent of the amount paid to each individual Native was paid to the Band.[17] The SLSA claims, during the years 1957-1959, to have paid a total of $221 500 to both individuals and the Band for land "transferred" to the Authority. In addition, from November 1957 to June 1969, the SLSA apparently paid to individuals and the Band "at least $233 370" as compensation for such things as damages, soil rehabilitation, cash payments in lieu of performance, the relocation of the school and other matters.[18] As Brian Carrara, Property Manager for the Cornwall SLSA office noted, in many cases people lost only parts of the land they occupied, as much of the expropriation occurred along the shores or "corners" of Cornwall Island, in contrast to the larger disruption at Kahnawake, where a shipping canal cut right through the reserve.[19]

Similarly, PC 1955-1709, PC 1956-742, and PC 1956-1416 empowered OH to expropriate part of Sheek Island, as well as Toussaint, Adams, Steen, Grassy, Wagner, Indian and Doran Islands, a total of eleven hundred ninety-seven acres, because they

---

16 The Mohawks of Akwesasne v. The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and Ontario Hydro. Court File No. T2210-76. Defence, pp.7-8.

17 Ibid. pp.8-9; Interview, Brian Carrara.

18 Defence, pp.10-11.

19 Ghobashy, Caughnawaga Indians, p.87; Interview, Brian Carrara.

would be flooded due to the construction of the power dam and control dams. In this instance, also, individuals were compensated, with ten percent of each settlement again going to the Band. This led to payments of $172 200 to the Band and the residents of Akwesasne.[20]

The land expropriations undertaken in these years by both state agencies are presently "in litigation," the Mohawks of Akwesasne suing both agencies over the Seaway expropriations. The people of Akwesasne admit in their claim that payments were made by both the SLSA and OH to the Band and to individuals, but in lower amounts: from the SLSA, they claim to have received $147 000, and from OH, $130 170. Moreover, they note that no final agreement or settlement was reached and that any previous payments represent only part of the compensation and damages to which they are entitled.[21] Indeed, the list of damages is considerable, but these concerns will be dealt with in greater detail later in the chapter. This legal situation makes accessing information somewhat awkward, as the different parties involved in the lawsuit are constrained in their disclosure of information. Fortunately, I have been able to access legal documents stating the position of each party, and have tried to buttress this information with interviews, material from other secondary sources, as well as archival material. The information provided from these different sources conflicts, but not to any large degree (except, naturally, in relation to the lawsuit). The only really disconcerting "gaps"

---

[20] Defence, pp.10-12.

[21] The Mohawks of Akwesasne v. The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and Ontario Hydro. Court File No. T2210-76. Declaration of Plaintiffs, pp.11,13.

concern the amount of land taken. The legal documents present a total for OH of eleven hundred ninety-seven, but in a phone interview, Paul Newell of OH Corporate Communications said that the Commission expropriated a total of twelve hundred twenty-four acres.[22] Also, in a very brief discussion, Donna Roundpoint, an employee of the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne who works in their Land Claims department, listed two more islands that had been flooded by the damming of the river: Presqu'ile and Canada Islands.[23] No mention is made of either of these islands in the legal documents, and Paul Newell did not list these islands either. But both islands are listed in the minutes of Band Council meetings during the early stages of negotiations with OH.[24] Thus, because these islands were not covered by Orders-in-Council but were flooded, the Mohawks have received no compensation for their loss.

One interpretation of the events surrounding the expropriations at Akwesasne presents the whole affair as one of manipulation and "selling out." As Mike McDonald explained, many of the residents, then as now, believe that having the elective system of government in place made the expropriations easier.[25] Both traditional and federal, or elective,

---

22 Phone interview. Paul Newell, Ontario Hydro Corporate Communications, 19 March 1997.

23 Phone interview. Donna Roundpoint, employee, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 3 March 1997.

24 NAC. RG10 -- Department of Indian Affairs. Vol.7133, File 481/3 Part 1 - Minutes of Council, St. Regis Agency, 1943-1960. See April 25, 1955 and February 24, 1956.

25 Interview, Mike McDonald.

systems of government have existed at Akwesasne since 1884, when, in an attempt to train "more advanced bands of Indians...for the exercise of municipal powers," the elective system was imposed upon Mohawks at Caughnawaga, Tyendinega, Oka, Bay of Quinte and St. Regis.[26] The people resisted, expressing their desire to maintain their own method of selecting life chiefs at first through petitions, and then, at St. Regis, through forcibly preventing the elections from taking place; in 1899, two hundred people rioted, and the federal government responded by arresting the hereditary chiefs and killing one, Jake Ice.[27] In spite of the threat of "stern measures" if they persisted with "tribal custom," Mohawks to this day continue to select leaders according to their own view of democracy, and at the time of the Seaway, as now, the traditional system of selecting chiefs engaged far more participants than did the elective system. The elective system is widely regarded by Native peoples as a poor way of choosing leaders. And especially given the amount of control held by the Indian Affairs Branch (IAB) in the 1950s (and to a lesser extent by the Department of Indian Affairs today) over approval of electoral candidates and over Band affairs generally, many Natives would have seen this Council as easily manipulated or, conversely, "bought off," by the state.[28] In fact, McDonald pointed out that distrust of the elective system increased as people saw and felt the negative impacts of the Seaway Project on their community and their environment; out of

---

[26] Interview, Darren Bonaparte; Rarihokwats, "How Democracy Came to St. Regis." Rooseveltown, New York: Akwesasne Notes, n.d., pp.2-3,5.

[27] Rarihokwats, "How Democracy," pp.2-10.

[28] Ibid., p.2; Interview, Mike McDonald.

a population of roughly five thousand on the "Canadian" portion of the reserve, he estimates an average of fifty people cast votes in elections.[29] This lack of support for the elective system, then, also raises questions about how much the Band Council Resolutions acceding to the expropriations reflected the "will" or wishes of the Akwesasne community as a whole.

Still, evidence exists suggesting that the expropriation of land from Natives, as from non-Natives, was more complex. Rather than concluding that the expropriations were simply a "top down" process, with the state acting as oppressor and the Mohawks as victims, the expropriation of Akwesasne land for the Seaway Project can be viewed as a process of struggle and negotiation. The Mohawks did occupy a subordinate position in their relationship with the state, but the recognition and compensation they received as a collectivity, and the "conditions" attached to some of the Orders-in-Council, indicate that the Band Council was not merely co-opted by the state, but made real efforts to defend the interests of the community. An examination of some of the Band Council minutes from 1952-1960, in fact, demonstrates how the Mohawks were able to manoevre within the constraints placed upon them to force the state to make some concessions.

The actions of the people of Kahnawake forced the state to be more forthright in its dealings with Native peoples and to recognize and address their concerns about the Project. Of significance here is the recognition of the loss of land as a loss to the Band as a whole, and the subsequent payment of ten percent of the amount paid to each individual to the Band as "collective compensation." Although the state in the post-

---

[29] Interview, Mike McDonald.

World War II era was moving slowly towards a greater recognition of the reality of "groups" in society, as opposed to a view of society as comprised of individuals, when the people of the Lost Villages demanded a collective settlement, OH refused and insisted on dealing with each landowner individually.[30] The SLSA and OH did pay compensation to individual Natives, but were forced also to negotiate with the Band, which had to agree to the price offered. Of course, the fact that Natives did not actually "own" the land as individuals aided in the argument that they be treated as a collectivity.

But the ability of the Mohawks to act and to receive recognition as a group also enabled them to guarantee themselves compensation that many "lost" as individuals. Quite often, the people displaced from the Lost Villages never saw the ten to fifteen percent "extra" promised them for "forcible taking." OH sometimes argued that the money was included in the final offer, or was given in lieu of cash for painting, plumbing installation or landscaping.[31] And while Native "locatees" as individuals were likely subject to the same arguments or excuses, because they were able to negotiate collectively through the Band Council, they were at least guaranteed collective compensation. Indeed, Brian Carrara was baffled by this ten percent collective compensation, and added that, to his knowledge, no municipal government ever received payments of this nature.[32]

---

30 Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, pp.28-29.

31 Ibid., p.38.

32 Interview, Brian Carrara.

Also important are the conditions contained in the Orders-in-Council, which originated in the Band Council Resolutions covering the expropriations. Closely related to the advantage of collective recognition was the stipulation that the Band as a whole had to agree to the amount paid to individuals.[33] The Band Council, then, could ensure that people were given decent settlements, as they would have the knowledge of what was paid to each "locatee." And the Band Council members were not afraid to step in to defend someone's material well-being. On December 8, 1956, for example, the Council revoked the deal between Peter White and the SLSA, because the compensation offered would have been inadequate to deal with extra costs, as he was forced to sell some cattle.[34] The Council was also actively involved in regulating the contracts and agreements between individual Mohawks and state agencies or contractors, as these also had to be approved by the Band Council. The Band Council granted permission to Peter White to rent ten acres of "his" property to be used as a right-of-way by McNamara Construction, but only if he received payments of one thousand dollars a year, the first of which was to be made two weeks from the date of the resolution.[35] The Council also insisted upon receiving a royalty, usually ten percent, over and above the amount paid by contractors to individuals for any sales or leases. One of the stipulations attached to the permission given to Mr. and Mrs. Hopps to sell gravel from Spencer Island to Cardinal Construction was a Band "royalty" of ten percent, underlining the fact that such contracts

---

[33] NAC. RG10 Vol.7133, File 481/3 Part 1. December 8, 1956.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., January 21, 1957.

were not regarded simply as methods of obtaining private profit, but as a use of the community's land and resources.[36]

Linked to this "collective consciousness" were the efforts of the Band Council, as much as possible, to protect the local environment. In their approval of "individual" agreements, as well as agreements on behalf of the entire Band, the councillors made numerous conditions that reflect an intimate knowledge of their environment and of the need to preserve it, both for survival in the present and for the benefit of future generations. For instance, in allowing Mr. and Mrs. Hopps to sell gravel, the Council required the contractor to leave the pit at an angle of fifteen degrees, and that the island could not be any lower than five feet above water level. In fact, one of the Council members was to check the level of the pit once digging "reached" one hundred thousand yards.[37] A Band Council resolution concerning the disposal of materials from the dredging of the channel in some of the bays around Cornwall Island gave even more detailed instructions about the way in which the disposal was to be carried out. In the southeast section of Cornwall Island, the Council asked that special care be taken to stop erosion conditions; in the north corner, Council expressed concern about sufficient drainage, and asked that here, and wherever needed, the fill should be spread in areas that had to be raised to the surrounding ground level; in general it ordered that "at least two layers of top soil suitable for farming purposes" be spread over the fill, and that

---

[36] Ibid., November 5, 1956.

[37] Ibid.

laneways be built so that farmers could water their cattle along the fill areas.[38]

In addition, a number of the expropriated islands were "subject to reversion." In other words, whatever was not "used" or flooded was supposed to be returned to the people of Akwesasne -- more specifically, the islands taken by OH, except for Adams Island, which (if any land was left unflooded) was to be returned to the previous Mohawk occupier.[39] At present, the "return" of what is left of Sheek, Toussaint and Adams Islands is "under discussion."[40] Through the courts, the Mohawks are also demanding the return or abandon of some one hundred twenty-eight acres of Cornwall Island.[41] Thus, the Band Council tried to retain as much of the Band's allotted territory as possible.

Other stipulations made in the Band Council resolutions relating to the Seaway Project communicate a certain level of cynicism. The request that any power and phone lines installed by contractors be left to serve the Akwesasne community, and the recommendation that local Native labour be used in any work by SLSA contractors, may be interpreted as an embrace of the modernization and economic opportunities of the Project.[42] At the same time, though, these resolutions were practical: if one is losing a great deal, why not make the most of a bad situation? Also, the demand that no billboards or advertising be put up on the bridge right-of-way property seems an attempt

---

[38] Ibid., December 8, 1956.

[39] Ibid., February 24, 1956; Plaintiffs, p.14.

[40] Interviews, Paul Newell and Mike McDonald.

[41] Plaintiffs, p.11.

[42] NAC. RG10 Vol.7133, File 481/3 Part 1. December 8, 1956; April 1, 1957.

to escape the commercialism of modern capitalist society.[43]

Over time, the conditions attached to the expropriations increased, hinting at a growing distrust and "wisdom" in the methods of negotiation of the state and business owners. On April 25, 1955, the Council was willing to accept $150 000 as payment in full for all the islands to be expropriated by OH, including (at that point) Presqu'ile and Canada Islands.[44] But on February 24, 1956, the Council demanded a total of $166 700 for all islands except Canada Island, with a Band equity of ten percent over and above this amount. The Council also made things more difficult by leaving OH to haggle with all the cottagers on Sheek Island. (OH ended up being forced to relocate the cottages or to pay the owners compensation.)[45] And a Band Council resolution covering the Cornwall Island Order of 1958, in which the SLSA expropriated another sixteen acres, required the payment of $1100 per acre, including $100 per acre for "forcible taking."[46] The Council asserted the Band's rights to the timber on the lands to be taken, either stating that the timber belonged to the occupier of the land, or, in the case of Sheek Island, taking levels to ascertain the areas to be flooded in order to claim the timber.[47] And in spite of ongoing negotiations with OH about the sale of Mohawk lands, for some

---

[43] Ibid., September 10, 1956; December 8, 1956.

[44] Ibid., April 25, 1955.

[45] Ibid., February 24, 1956.

[46] Defence, p.8.

[47] NAC. RG10 Vol.7133, File 481/3 Part 1. June 4, 1956; December 8, 1956; March 4, 1957.

time the Band Council strongly objected to the sale of lands to the SLSA and authorized only leasing the land.[48] This objection was revoked, however, after a meeting where four members of the SLSA, a representative from the Department of Justice, and a representative of the IAB provided information which was "most satisfactory and informative."[49] One suspects that these state officials were compelled to come, in order to quell the fears of Akwesasne residents and to persuade them to agree to the Project on friendlier terms.

The idea of the Band Council as a "weakened" bargainer because it was closely monitored by and linked to the federal government, likely contains an element of truth; the potential for co-optation clearly existed, as it still does. But again, the Akwesasne Band Council minutes from these years suggest that the Council did, to some extent, at least, listen to the demands of those in the community and did not simply act on the whims of the councillors or on the orders of the IAB. The special requests of individuals concerning the Seaway Project and its impact on them were taken into account, and voiced through the Council's resolutions. The Council did "not favour" the dumping of dredge materials on Stanley Island, but rather preferred the use of the west end of Hog Island, in fulfillment of the wishes of the locatee, Mike Mitchell.[50] Likewise, on behalf of John Sparrow, the Council requested that no part of his riverfront lot be filled with any

---

[48] Ibid., September 10, 1956; October 1, 1956.

[49] Ibid., December 8, 1956.

[50] Ibid., June 6, 1955.

dredgings or fill from the Project.[51] Initially, the Council accepted the annexation of Cornwall Island by the city of Cornwall "unanimously," but later stood against the annexation because most of the Mohawk population opposed it.[52] The Council also conceded "in protest" with the desire of the people of Akwesasne to have Mohawk school children bussed to Cornwall to attend school.[53] Evidently, the Band Council was not simply a "puppet" of the government.

As further evidence of this interpretation, the Council, in several instances, expressed a willingness to defend the rights and dignity of Native peoples and voice resentment of the paternalistic regulations of Indian Affairs. On May 5, 1952, the Council agreed to spend $2 000 on legal costs to push the Canadian government to respect the right of Mohawks under Jay's Treaty to freely cross the international border, and to "further assure that the Canadian government and its departments won't continue to infringe on the rights of the Indians under the above [treaty]." Accordance with the treaty was, after all, "favourable to friendship and good neighbourhood."[54] In the spring of 1954, the IAB introduced a new Band Council resolution form, the "IA5-7," which required that each resolution be typed and signed by every Council member, and that the copy of the minutes sent to the IAB be accompanied by a cover letter from the agency

---

[51] Ibid., January 7, 1957.

[52] Ibid., March 13, 1956; October 1, 1956.

[53] Ibid., December 31, 1956.

[54] Ibid., May 5, 1952.

Superintendent recommending the certification of land transfers.[55] But the St. Regis Council flatly refused to use the new form, which they felt was time-consuming and a clear sign of distrust. The councillors pointed out that previous Councils had never denied the resolutions passed; a copy of the minutes was given to the chief; all the councillors signed the minute book; and the need to type and sign each resolution would "slow up business considerably." These objections were passed on to the IAB by T.L. Bonnah, the St. Regis Agency Superintendent, who agreed that the large number of resolutions concerning land titles made the form impractical, and noted that the Council did not oppose the use of the form for expenditures. Bonnah's letter is telling, though, as he explains his major reason for supporting the Council:

> As it has taken some considerable time to develop an interest in the Council concerning their various responsibilities, it is my belief that we should do nothing at this time to impede the good work that the Council is doing and I trust that you will agree with us on this point and permit the resolution to stand as passed by Council.[56]

Thus, paternalism was at the root of his "leniency," and given the insistent rejection by the people of Akwesasne of the elective system, the "newness" of the interest in the Council which he mentions is not surprising. In a memorandum, the Superintendent of Reserves and Trusts, L.L. Brown, offered a compromise, but only to be made in cases of difficulty in getting resolutions passed, or where the Council "refuses bitterly to comply

---

[55] Ibid. Memorandum from L.L. Brown, Superintendent, Reserves and Trusts Division.

[56] Ibid. Letter from T.L. Bonnah, St. Regis Agency Superintendent, to the Indian Affairs Branch, April 20, 1954.

with Department policy."[57] It appears, then, that the Mohawks of St. Regis were judged to have been sufficiently "bitter," or at least to have won their practical point.

Brian David's interpretation of the Council's logic at the time also supports the tentative hypothesis presented here. David, an employee with the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, pointed out that Orders-in-Council are usually "absolute-type decisions," which makes the conditions written into them rather remarkable. Members of the Band Council probably recognized that they did not possess the power to stop the expropriations, so they figured they would do what they could to protect the future of the community by ensuring that a decent price was paid for land, compensation for damages and losses was provided, and as much land as possible was retained by the Band through the stipulations contained in Band Council resolutions. David also noted the limitations placed upon any well-organized collective resistance by the people of Akwesasne. At that time, most of the people on the reserve had no electricity, and most engaged in a land-based economy of farming, fishing, hunting or trapping. With Council meetings occurring every one to two weeks, and with little means of disseminating information as quickly as decisions were being made, the possibility for protests like the ones at Kahnawake was restricted. One must also remember that in the 1950s, most Natives did not have the educational opportunities they have today, so they were unable to function with the same "expert" knowledge of "legalese" as state representatives and lawyers.[58]

---

[57] Ibid. Memorandum to Administration 2 from L.L. Brown, Superintendent, Reserves and Trusts, May 5, 1954.

[58] Interview, Brian David.

Nor, in the 1950s, did any real venues exist for them to defend their interests either within the state or in society, other than the Band Councils. Thus, the evidence above suggests that the Mohawks of Akwesasne were able to use a "white" system or structure that had been imposed on them, to subvert it, and to use it against the state. And even though their results may seem disappointing, the agency exhibited by the people of Akwesasne through the Band Council is important and should not be dismissed.

In addition to these more subtle examples of agency, the Mohawks of Akwesasne and Kahnawake made other arguments against the expropriation and against the Project. The Mohawks challenged the very legitimacy of the Canadian government and its claims to be an independent nation-state. The people of Kahnawake were backed by the people of Akwesasne in their complaint that the Canadian government had no jurisdiction over their land, and therefore had no right to take it, because the treaty they had made which promised them eternal sovereignty was entered into with Great Britain.[59] This refusal to recognize the authority of the Canadian state contrasts with the image of a modern, independent Canada constructed simultaneously by the government itself and by Canadians, as well as through the state's role in the Project. Predictably, Chevrier, upon hearing this argument, was not convinced, as he felt certain there was not the "faintest chance" of a court upholding the Mohawk claim.[60] But this denial of the sovereignty of Native peoples seems to contradict the recognition the Mohawks received from the Canadian and United States governments, and even the United Nations, in petitions and

---

[59] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.208; Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, p.106.

[60] Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, p.106.

letters written in defence of their interests.[61] In the present day, the federal government maintains that once the British withdrew from Canada, the Canadian government inherited all responsibility for and jurisdiction over Native peoples, a position with which Natives disagree.[62] Additionally, the people of Akwesasne now claim as their traditional territory land from Riviere Beaudette, Quebec to the Thousand Islands, near Gananoque, Ontario, while the government points to the legally-defined Reserves No.15 and No.59 as the only land to which the Mohawks of Akwesasne are entitled.[63]

The people of Kahnawake also argued that to support a growing population, they needed all of the reserve land and could not afford to lose any.[64] And the population pressures today at Akwesasne, at least, attest to the truth in this statement: many Mohawks live in Massena and Cornwall not by choice, but because of the waiting lists of Natives wanting to live with their communities on the reserve. The problems of space inadequacy and difficulties with physical planning on the reserve are listed as complaints in the lawsuit.[65] But this increased demand to actually live on the reserve also stems from recent trends in cultural and spiritual renewal among aboriginal peoples in

---

[61] Ghobashy, Caughnawaga Indians, pp.50-56.

[62] Interviews, Mike McDonald; Darren Bonaparte; Brian David.

[63] Defence, p.2; Interviews, Brian Carrara; Donna Roundpoint; Mike McDonald; Brian David.

[64] Mabee, Seaway Story, p.208.

[65] Interview, Mike McDonald; Plaintiffs, p.13.

Canada.[66] More importantly, the negative environmental impacts of the Seaway Project amplified the initial loss of land by removing the ability of many Akwesasne residents to support themselves on the land remaining. The desire of many residents to preserve a balanced and harmonious relationship with their environment and to continue as trappers, hunters, fishers and farmers certainly clashed with the faith in modernization and industrialization which drove the Seaway to completion, and with more "mainstream" views of the environment as something to be used and dominated for the purposes of industry and "progress." Clearly, for a community and a way of life sensitive to and dependent upon the natural world, environmental degradation was not seen as part of some inevitable narrative of capitalist expansion., although a few may have felt that the benefits they would receive in terms of economic development merited the extensive alteration of the ecosystem which was "required" for the Project.[67] Again, one must take into account the influence of modern capitalist society on Native peoples, even though then, as now, the people of Akwesasne had an acute awareness of, and need to, respect the environment.

Linked to these conflicting views of the environment were the different perceptions of the "usefulness" of the islands expropriated. To the Native residents, islands were more valuable than mainland areas, because of their lifestyle, which for many consisted of

---

[66] Interview, Mike McDonald.

[67] Bruce E. Johansen, Life and Death in Mohawk Country. Golden, Colorado: North American Press, 1993, p.12.

travelling to various islands or sections of the river for harvesting.[68] As Waldram emphasizes, water, or access to water, is the true backbone of the economy for many aboriginal groups.[69] The dominant view of "nature for profit," however, likely made taking the islands easier for the state and more justifiable to the public, as the islands would have been seen as "useless" because permanent residents did not live on some of them, and none were "developed" in any industrial or "modern" sense.

Obviously, the people of Akwesasne at the time of the Project did not make elaborate arguments about the precise extent of the increase in pollution that would occur, or about the virtual disappearance of some species of animals that could result from the Project, as they, like most other people, were unable to have such exact knowledge of future events. They did, however, unlike most people, recognize that the damming of the Rapids and the dredging of a deep-sea channel would drastically affect every aspect of the ecosystem. As early as 1834, when the Colonial government first built the St. Lawrence canal system, the Mohawks of Akwesasne warned government officials that the control structures near Barnhart Island were destroying important fish spawning grounds.[70] To be fair, not all of the environmental changes caused by the Project were bad. For instance, the shallows created by flooding in the spring and the fall are good for game birds, and the parks created by the St. Lawrence Parks Commission provide

---

[68] Interview, Brian David.

[69] Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, p.5.

[70] Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.2.

habitats for many plant and animal species, especially Canada geese.[71] But because of their close relationship with their environment, as well as their geographical and political location, the Akwesasne community has borne the brunt of the negative environmental impacts of the Seaway Project. The "taming of the Rapids" changed the St. Lawrence from a "fast-flowing, well-aerated waterway into a shallow-shored lake."[72] In order to speed the melting of the ice in spring, the water levels, monitored by the International Joint Commission, are raised and dropped rapidly so the air pockets caught in the water will pulverize the ice. But this process also floods muskrat and beaver hutches, drowning huge numbers of these animals and, as a consequence, has destroyed the trapping industry in the area.[73] Stagnant waters, especially where the flow was decreased by dredging, results in accumulated undergrowth, which hinders boating, fishing and swimming and presents the potential for problems with taste and colour in drinking water.[74] The problem is compounded by sediments getting caught in the shallow water vegetation, which in turn encourages more weeds to grow.[75] Ironically, though, while the Mohawks list the stagnation of the water as one of their complaints, in their response to the Akwesasne lawsuit, OH and the SLSA highlight the positive aspects of "the

---

[71] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.57.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.; Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.12.

[74] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.58; St. Lawrence Remedial Action Plan Team and the St. Lawrence (Cornwall) Public Advisory Committee. Choices for Cleanup: Deciding the Future of a Great River. Cornwall: Ministry of Natural Resources, August 1994, p.35.

[75] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.58.

consequent ability to control the flow of water below these dams," pointing to greater regulation of the "velocity and volume of water" in the channels, a reduction in cyclic fluctuations in water elevations and an elimination of ice jams.[76] Of course, the people of these agencies and at the IJC do not seem to realize that in fact, a number of people relied upon "cyclic fluctuations" and "velocity and volume" as conditions which shaped and contributed to their livelihood. The artificial controls on water cycles have also devastated area wetlands and have increased erosion in inland tributaries, in particular the shorelines of shipping channels; the shoreline of Pointe Mouillee; and the shorelines of the Cornwall Island-St. Regis section of the north channel.[77] The types of fish in the Cornwall-Akwesasne part of the river also altered because of the Project. In addition to the effects of the dams, the dredging eliminated many of the in-river reefs and shoals which were a good habitat for fish.[78] In the years following the Project's completion, local fishers noted the disappearance of sturgeon and the dramatic drop in the number of pickerel, the latter change being subject to a study in 1961. And to the dismay of many fishers, the stillness of the river below the dam also contributed to an explosion of the carp population.[79] All of these negative effects are listed, quite rightly, as reasons why the people of Akwesasne deserve compensation from the SLSA and OH.[80]

---

[76] Plaintiffs, p.13; Defence, p.12.

[77] Remedial Action Plan, Choices for Cleanup, pp.40-41.

[78] Ibid., p.40.

[79] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.57.

[80] Plaintiffs, p.13.

By far the clearest and most documented evidence relating to the negative impacts of the Seaway Project on the Akwesasne community is the increase in pollution resulting from the industries that moved into the area because they sought cheap power and access to water transportation. The problem of pollution predates the Seaway, but the decision of Reynolds Aluminum and General Motors to locate themselves at Akwesasne (the plants are in fact on Native land), and the decision of Alcoa to expand its operations at its Massena plant, are connected to the "benefits" of the Project to industry.[81] And even though this "mini-boom" occurred on the American side of the St. Lawrence, pollution created in one sector affects a wide area, including the entire Seaway Valley. Moreover, numerous studies by environmental scientists and others can trace the recent destruction of the Akwesasne environment back to GM, Reynolds and Alcoa among others, with the large corporations being the biggest culprits.[82]

In 1978, a Cornell University study linked the death of cattle to fluoride emissions from Reynolds, and in December 1981, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation reported that preliminary tests showed that Akwesasne was the worst PCB-contaminated site in Franklin County, and that even the groundwater was polluted.[83] The degree of environmental contamination at Akwesasne ranks highly both in Canada and

---

81

Willoughby, St. Lawrence Waterway, p.278; Interview, Mike McDonald; Remedial Action Plan, Choices for Cleanup, p.40; Peter Moon, "Eagle Returns, A Sign of Hope for Mohawks," in Akwesasne Notes. Vol. 1, No. 1(Spring 1995), p.93.

82

Johansen, Mohawk Country, pp.2-7; Remedial Action Plan, Choices for Cleanup, pp.9-24.

83 Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.4.

the United States: recently, Akwesasne was declared the "most polluted reserve in Canada," and was found to be the largest non-military contaminated site in the United States.[84] In October 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) charged GM with seventeen counts of illegal PCB disposal. Because of the contamination of drinking water, with GM mainly responsible for the contamination, the company began supplying the people living near the plant with bottled water.[85] In addition to PCBs and fluoride, alarming levels of other toxins and metals, such as mercury, have been found not only in drinking water, but in animals and fish. In the case of mercury, the sources are mainly on the Canadian side, with companies like Courtaulds and ICI (both now closed) and Domtar being largely responsible.[86] By 1990, people were warned by New York State officials (and were also warned by Canadian officials) not to eat fish from the river. The Mohawk governments of Akwesasne had been doing so since 1978.[87] According to Henry Lickers, Director of the Department of the Environment for the Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, it was not unusual for people to get 60-70% of their protein from the river, through fish, so such warnings had severe repercussions.[88] Mothers were also asked not to breast-feed their babies, as their breast milk was laced with toxins. The

---

[84] F. Henry Lickers, "The Message Returns," in Akwesasne Notes. Vol.1, No.1(Spring 1995), p.10.

[85] Johansen, Mohawk Country, pp.7,13.

[86] Remedial Action Plan, Choices for Cleanup, p.12.

[87] Ibid.; Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.13.

[88] Moon, "Eagle Returns," p.94.

erosion of the ability of Akwesasne residents to "live off the land" is clear. In the 1950s, Akwesasne had more than one hundred commercial fishers and about one hundred twenty farmers; by 1990, less than ten commercial fishers and twenty farmers remained.[89] Even though the economic difficulties of the people of Akwesasne are not solely attributable to the impacts of the Project, the fact that by 1990 eighty percent of adults were underemployed or unemployed, and seventy percent were on public assistance, is definitely connected to the elimination of the traditional sources of income of many people. The loss of sources of diet and income has also led to health complications, such as a rise in the number of cases of diabetes, because many could only afford to supplement their diets with cheap, unhealthy, processed food.[90]

Linked indirectly to environmental degradation at Akwesasne is the dumping of dredge materials on fertile farmland by the contractors hired by the SLSA during the digging of the deep-sea channel. While the SLSA denies this in their legal defence, Mike McDonald confirmed this allegation, as did Brian Carrara, himself an employee of the SLSA.[91] SLSA records on claims by contractors against the Authority confirm that "improper" dumping took place. The SLSA faced numerous claims by contractors, asserting that they were underpaid for the work done.[92] The details of the claim are unclear, but it appears that Canadian Dredge and Dock, and McNamara Construction,

---

[89] Johansen, Mohawk Country, pp.12-13.

[90] Ibid., p.13; Moon, "Eagle Returns," p.94.

[91] Defence, p.9; Plaintiffs, p.13; Interviews, Mike McDonald; Brian Carrara.

[92] Chevrier, St. Lawrence Seaway, p.82.

hired by the SLSA to dig the channel in the Cornwall-Akwesasne area, complained that they were not paid in full, with the SLSA countering that the work was not completed satisfactorily. In a letter explaining the decision on the claim, the Treasury-Board Assistant-Secretary stated that both parties were at fault. The SLSA was at fault for not providing an additional disposal area for dredgings, even though such space was available, and the contractors were also to blame for "dumping on the run."[93] In August 1968, the "Judy LaMarsh Show" filmed a television program on the efforts of Akwesasne farmers to have their farmland restored by the SLSA, and included interviews with farmers, Band officials and Dr. Cook, a soil expert, who described how the soil had been rendered useless for farming.[94] Brian Carrara highlighted the efforts of the SLSA to "replace" land taken with fill materials "added to" the shorelines or other areas, which he says was done in recognition that to Native peoples "land was more important than money."[95] Still, one wonders about how fertile this fill material was, or how valuable this new "reclaimed" land was in terms of agricultural productivity.

Recent studies of the impacts of hydro development on Native communities point to the similarities to the situation at Akwesasne in striking ways. In general, findings

---

93

NAC. RG52 –St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Records. Vol.31, File C966 - Contracts - Policy, Claims, Claims by Contractors - General.

94

Cited in National Archives of Canada, Archivea, Vol.2. as AV 1987-0480, acc#CAVA/AVCA:1987-0480. Judy LaMarsh Show: out-takes - Indian Farmers Seek Redress from St. Lawrence Seaway Authority. CTV, August 1968. Unfortunately, inaccessible because of the move of NAC storage facilities to Gatineau.

95 Interview, Brian Carrara.

document "the decimation of fisheries, flooding of hunting territories, declines in natural resources requiring increased harvesting efforts and higher out-of-pocket expenses, more individual and community stress, health impacts and other social and cultural effects."[96] Environmental degradation is now recognized to have significant social, economic and cultural effects that far outweigh the short-term benefits of jobs on the mega-projects. The residents of Akwesasne do not even benefit from lower electricity rates. Although the hydro energy is produced on their land, the Mohawks on the American side of the reserve pay some of the highest rates in the state, but apparently, this irony is also shared by other Native communities that have experience with hydro mega-projects.[97] Harvesting, in addition to its importance as a means of subsistence, also has spiritual meaning that is difficult to quantify. As awareness of the degree of environmental contamination grows, so do people's concerns about the safety of their surroundings, as well as a distrust of their environment.[98] Loran Thompson hoped to start a farm at Akwesasne: "I had two beautiful gardens. I was raising pigs; [I] was going to get horses and cows...I got rid of the pigs. I got rid of the gardens. People are afraid to start anything here."[99] The combination of all these factors often leads to increased alcohol and drug

---

[96] N. Knight et al., cited in Martin Loney, "Social Problems, Community Trauma and Hydro Project Impacts," in Canadian Journal of Native Studies. XV,2(1995), p.236.

[97] Waldram, As Long as the Rivers Run, p.8.

[98] Loney, "Community Trauma," pp.236-240.

[99] Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.18.

abuse, violent deaths, petty crime, assaults, child neglect and family breakdown.[100] This kind of social disintegration, felt in other communities that have lost their economic base, has also been experienced at Akwesasne at the political level, where factions and internal disputes have increased since 1985.[101] Martin Loney's use of the concept of "community trauma" to summarize how the "cumulative effects of hydro regulation strike at the very core of a community's sense of self-confidence and well-being," then, is also borne out by the experiences of the Akwesasne community.[102]

Two concrete examples of the long-term ramifications of the Project on the people of Akwesasne are gambling and smuggling. In what is now referred to as the "Civil War," J.R. "Junior" Edwards and Matthew Pyke were killed in the summer of 1990 when Akwesasne turned into a war zone, with gunfire being exchanged between the Warriors, a pro-gambling faction, and those who opposed commercial gambling on the reserve.[103] Smuggling, while not as electrifying an issue, has created divisions in the community, and has also brought violence and negative media attention. In order to understand the roots of these conflicts, one must examine the historical context from which they arose, and the Seaway Project is a significant contributing factor. Chief Ernie Benedict, for instance, described the environmental damage wrought by the Project as having "the rug...pulled from under you. Then we're expected to survive. But we don't have the tools

---

[100] Loney, "Community Trauma," p.237.

[101] Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.xxiv; Moon, "Eagle Returns," p.94.

[102] Loney, "Community Trauma," p.248.

[103] Interview, Darren Bonaparte; Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.160.

to survive in this contemporary time."[104] Thus, the people of Akwesasne turned to gambling and smuggling for material support.

Once again, the Seaway Project, which promoters vowed would bring economic expansion and a better life to all, fell far short of expectations, and was, in short, destructive to the community of Akwesasne. The sheer amount of evidence linking the severe disruptions of the ecosystem to the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project is indictment enough. True, some industrialization and modernization occurred, but at a very high cost. From the evidence presented in these pages, interpretations that pose the Mohawks as passive victims or eager modernizers, or conclude that the people of Akwesasne were "sold up river" by a government-controlled Band Council are clearly simplistic, and deny the efforts of the Council on behalf of the community to defend the interests of the Band as a whole. Although some may see their successes as unimportant, the fact that the Mohawks were able to force the state to comply with some of their demands in the context of tight governmental regulation deserves attention, especially when they also had to contend with a widespread acceptance of modernization and industrialization as necessary and the "greatest good," and perceptions of aboriginal peoples that deemed them "inferior." Like the residents of the Lost Villages, they had to fight to protect their material well-being. And from their experiences with the Seaway Project, they too learned an especially bitter lesson about power relations in capitalist society. Doug George, editor of Akwesasne Notes and Indian Time, commenting on the "invasion" of capitalism, or non-traditional economic and value systems into Mohawk

---

[104] Cited in Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.12.

society, warns that people cannot trust the promises of business owners, even if they provide jobs to local people, because "the power of greed will eclipse even the best of intentions."[105]

The cotton workers in Cornwall's Canadian Cottons mills also learned the hard way not to trust in the words of business owners or politicians. They too had to contend with modernization, as the Canadian textile industry struggled to survive in an increasingly competitive global economy. But the workers supported these efforts only insofar as they were to their economic benefit. The next chapter will explore how the labourers of Canadian Cottons understood "modernization" and acted according to these perceptions.

105

Doug George - Kanentiio, "No Evading Natural Law," in Akwesasne Notes. Vol.1, No.2(Summer 1995), p.67.

Chapter Four
Canadian Cottons Limited: Capital and Labour

The textile industry was one of the earliest large-scale factory employers in Canada.[1] In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Canadian textile industry grew quickly, largely in response to the high tariff on manufactured cotton goods enforced in the National Policy, but stimulated as well by the growth of the domestic market and the availability of financing.[2] In the 1890s, however, many companies were forced to close or merge, and the industry, through consolidation, came under the control of a few Montreal businessmen.[3] In 1890 and 1892, A.F. Gault and David Morrice merged fifteen cotton mills to form two companies: the Dominion Cotton Mills Company, and the Canadian Coloured Cotton Mills Company.[4] Corporate concentration continued and

---

1 A.B. McCullough, The Primary Textile Industry in Canada: History and Heritage. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1992, p.155.

2 McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.69; Gregory S. Kealey and Bryan D. Palmer, Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1900. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p.43; Peter DeLottinville, "The St. Croix Cotton Manufacturing Company and its Influence on the St. Croix Community, 1880-1892." MA Thesis. Montreal: Dalhousie University, 1970, p.xiv.

3 Elinor Kyte Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983, p.233; DeLottinville, "St. Croix Cotton," p.2; Ellen Carrie Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers in Cornwall, Ontario, 1936-1946." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, March 1990, p.26.

4 McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.59.

increased in the years preceding World War II, and the maintenance of high tariffs ensured protection and some prosperity to textile interests.[5] Canadian textile companies fared better than many other businesses during the Great Depression, because with tariff revisions in 1930 and 1932 blocking lower-priced imports, demand continued for cheaper lines of Canadian clothing and other textile products.[6] By 1933, for example, the primary textile industry had lost only 8% of employees, while other manufacturing industries lost an average of 30% of their workforces.[7]

Still, the federal government focused its attention on the industry at least twice in the 1930s, with different findings each time. The 1933 Royal Commission on Price Spreads decided that "the cotton group has a fairly good record in the matter of employment. While not paying high wages, it appears to adopt a fair attitude in its employment policies, and there are no cases of unscrupulous tactics."[8] In contrast, Justice W.F.A. Turgeon, Commissioner of the 1938 Royal Commission on the Textile Industry,

---

[5] Ibid., p.75.

[6] Barbara J. Austin, "Life Cycles and Strategy of a Canadian Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1983." PhD Thesis. Montreal: Concordia University, 1985, p.399; Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.32.

[7] Austin, "Life Cycles," p.395. The definition of "primary textiles" varies in the literature on the topic. In The Primary Textile Industry, the term includes the woolen, cotton, knit goods/hosiery and silk/synthetics sectors, but in the 1956 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, knit goods and synthetics are excluded. Similarly, in the 1938 Royal Commission on the Textile Industry, Justice Turgeon includes all sectors, but in theses, the term is used broadly. I will try, whenever possible, to indicate which textile sectors I am including when referring to "primary textiles."

[8] Cited in Austin, "Life Cycles," p.421.

chastised textile leaders for their treatment of workers, considering the relative prosperity of the industry, and concluded that textile employers had an obligation to provide for their employees in return for tariff protection. Also critical of practices such as overcapitalization, secret inventory reserves and improper charges to operations which hid profits, Turgeon suggested that it might not be a bad idea to threaten textile companies with the loss of tariff protection if they acted unfairly in fixing prices or failed in "any other material respect" in the discharge of their "duties."[9]

Of course, the fact that the 1938 Royal Commission was called partially in response to growing labour unrest in the industry may account for such sympathy for workers; in 1936-1937, the industry lost over 400 000 working days to strikes. The major demands were wage increases, better working conditions and union recognition, and strikes to achieve these goals -- especially union recognition -- continued well into the 1940s.[10] World War II proved to be a boost to Canadian textile companies, with great civilian and military demand for textile products. Heavy demand continued in the immediate postwar years.[11]

The textile industry was of course central to Cornwall's economic, political and

---

9 Royal Commission on the Textile Industry. Justice W.F.A Turgeon, Commissioner. Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 1938, pp.146-147,205-206; McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.93. See also Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men and Change in Two Industrial Towns 1880-1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, "The Politics of Protection," for an examination of gender and tariff protection for Canadian textiles.

10 McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, pp.110-113.

11 Ibid., p.145; Austin, "Life Cycles," p.463.

social life by the late nineteenth century, due to its largest employer, Canadian Cottons. In 1881, the three main textile factories -- the Canada and Stormont cotton mills, and the Canada Manufacturing Company, a woollen mill -- employed 786 workers, and 47% of all cotton mill workers in Ontario worked in Cornwall.[12] With so many industrial workers, the town was a prime locale for both labour organization and labour strife. The Knights of Labor began organizing at the cotton mills in 1886, led several strikes in 1887, 1888 and 1889, and had four local assemblies in Cornwall by 1891.[13] In 1903, the Canada Manufacturing Company came under the control of Canadian Coloured Cottons, and became the Dundas cotton mill somewhere between 1904-1906.[14] Operating a low-paying industry offering only semi-skilled and unskilled employment, Canadian textile owners relied heavily upon women and children for labour power, and Cornwall's mills were no exception.[15] Although women were only 40% of the workforce at Courtaulds and 25% of the workforce at the Canadian Cottons mills in 1937, throughout the 1920s the percentage of women employed in the local mills ranged from 50-60%.[16] (Canadian Coloured Cottons Mills Limited changed its name to Canadian Cottons Limited in

---

[12] Kealey and Palmer, Knights of Labor, pp.42-44.

[13] Ibid., p.62; Senior, From Royal, p.237.

[14] McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.195; Senior, From Royal, p.233; Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.26.

[15] McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.185.

[16] Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.27.

1910.)[17] Again the importance of this sector to Cornwall's economy cannot be overstated, especially when compared to national averages. While, as aforementioned, approximately three-quarters of all industrial work in the town was in textiles in the early 1930s, the national average was a mere 1.4%.[18]

Cornwall's textile labourers were the first in the industry to win union recognition.[19] Workers at Courtaulds led the way in 1936 by organizing an independent union, the Rayon Textile Workers Industrial Union. They won a decisive victory, but not outright union recognition until 1938, only after cotton workers had won the closed shop through strikes in 1937-1938.[20] By this time, though, the economic slump had taken its toll on the local textile mills, and encouraged union and management officials to institute a "no married women" hiring policy.[21] Such employment restrictions weakened as demand created by Canada's participation in the war reached the Cornwall mills by 1942; war contracts comprised anywhere from 33-35% of total production at the Canadian Cottons

---

17 John Sherman Porter, ed., Moody's Manual of Investments, American and Foreign: Industrial Securities 1945. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1945, p.2775.

18 Royal Commission on the Textile Industry, p.31.

19 Senior, From Royal, p.387.

20 Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," pp.39,49; Ralph Ellis, "Textile Strikes and Textile Strikes in Cornwall, Sherbrooke, and St. Gregoire de Montmorency, 1936-1939." MA Thesis. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1985, p.5; McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.111.

21 Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," p.62.

mills.[22]

At war's end, however, the globalizing trend of capital, and federal fiscal policies which reinforced this trend, spelled trouble for the domestic textile industry. In 1947, Canada signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and subsequently lowered its tariffs, which resulted in a 3.6% reduction on cotton goods over the next three years.[23] As a result, imports of textiles rose, especially with the extension of "most favoured nation" status, once only granted to Britain, to countries like the United States, India and Japan.[24] The removal of Wartime Price Controls amplified the threat of an influx of cheaper imports, mostly from the United States.[25] The federal government returned to an emphasis on staples-led growth, indicated by subsidies to oil, mining and gas interests, and by funding for mega-projects like the Trans-Canada Pipeline and the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project.[26] Through such deregulation and incentives, the creators of Canadian fiscal policy aimed at attracting American capital to exploit Canada's natural resources for the purposes of export. But at the same time, this strategy

---

[22] Ibid., pp.67-69.

[23] McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.146.

[24] Ibid., p.146; Rianne Mahon, The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: Canadian Textiles. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984, pp.19-21; The Canadian Cotton Textile Industry in Perspective: A Study of Recent Trends and Future Prospects. Prepared by W.A. Beckett Associated, 1963, pp.5.10-5.11.

[25] Austin, "Life Cycles," pp.488-489.

[26] Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.15.

allowed other domestic markets, like textiles, to be overtaken by imports.[27]

Canadian textile interests did not immediately succumb to competition from Asia and the United States, where low-wage, mass production was the norm. In fact, employment in the cotton yarn and cloth industry peaked in 1951 at 27 632 workers, and in 1952, 57 textile manufacturing establishments and 35 companies were in operation.[28] Similarly, Cornwall's textile mills continued to do quite well in the immediate post-World War II years. In 1946, the three Canadian Cottons mills employed 1 500 people, who produced $6 000 000 in goods.[29] In 1948, the company took over Powdrell and Alexander, a curtain manufacturing company, and renamed it Glengarry Cottons. When the market for curtain material collapsed in 1955, the plant joined the Dundas mill in the production of blankets.[30]

But by 1952, the combined effects of weak sales organization, rising competition from synthetics, high costs for labour and materials, and dropping tariffs began to have an impact on the Canadian textile industry, particularly the "natural" sectors of cottons

---

27

Ibid., p.24; Paul Phillips, "New Staples and Mega-Projects: Reaching the Limits to Sustainable Development," in Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, eds., The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, p.229; Stephen Clarkson, "Disjunctions: Free Trade and the Paradox of Canadian Development," in Drache and Gertler, eds., The New Era, p.105.

28 Textile Industry in Perspective, p.1.6.

29 Senior, From Royal, p.437.

30

Ibid., p.437; Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, p.223.

and woolens.[31] Other factors exacerbating these problems were the low rates of exchange of some countries (in particular, the United States), quality improvements which lengthened the life of textile products, and the inability of Canadian producers to meet the variety of demand because of a limited domestic market.[32] By the mid 1950s, the protective tariff had fallen 36% since 1939, and was the lowest rate of any other manufacturing country, including Japan.[33] By 1953, the Canadian share of the domestic market had dropped to under 50%, forcing the federal government to admit that textiles could no longer realistically be considered a "protected" industry.[34]

In response to federal policies and to the predominance of a global economy, managers and owners of Canadian textile firms relied upon two main strategies: lobbying the federal government for better protection from foreign competition, and more importantly, "modernizing" their plants, their products and the production process. New equipment, new man-made fibres, new finishes, dyes and printing techniques for natural fibres, new methods of production and supervision, and corresponding changes in wage

---

31 McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.147; Austin, "Life Cycles," pp.538-539; Textile Industry in Perspective, pp.1.3,1.15; Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects: The Canadian Primary Textile Industry. Ottawa: National Industrial Conference Board, July 1956, p.224.

32 Austin, "Life Cycles," p.539; Textile Industry in Perspective, pp.1.15-1.16; Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, p.12.

33 Austin, "Life Cycles," p.539; Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, p.30.

34 Austin, "Life Cycles," p.553.

rates were all undertaken, to varying degrees, by Canadian companies in order to become more efficient and competitive.[35] And these measures did increase productivity. Output for cotton goods rose 53.5% from 1949-1962, and in relation to output, labour costs decreased.[36]

But what did state policies and the practices of employers mean to those working in this sector? The ultimate consequences of "modernization" for textile workers included plant shutdowns, wage cuts, layoffs and short work weeks.[37] More "traditional" sectors, such as cotton, experienced major job losses in favour of synthetics.[38] In 1946, the primary textile industry (all sectors) provided 5.7% of all manufacturing jobs, but by 1954, the comparable figure had declined to only 4%, and from 1951-1956 employment in cotton yarn and broad woven fabrics decreased 23.5%.[39] Unions representing textile workers, then, as well as the workers themselves, were in a quandary. On the one hand, they were compelled to cooperate with the modernization efforts of the industry's employers, as well as join in with textile interests in their calls to the government for greater tariff protection, in order to save the domestic industry and members' jobs. Union

---

35 McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, pp.147-148; Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.51; Textile Industry in Perspective, p.3.1; Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, pp.58,62.

36 Textile Industry in Perspective, pp.3.33,3.45.

37 Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.69.

38 Textile Industry in Perspective, p.148.

39 Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, p.73.

leaders, especially, would have felt pressured to cooperate with textile employers in implementing new technologies, work processes and wage rates, as they, within the "postwar settlement," were expected to ensure labour stability in exchange for certain rights.[40] On the other hand, though, the modernization of textile production also hurt textile labour by chipping away at jobs, wages and working conditions, which pushed workers to defend their material interests and their dignity as workers through strike action. Much has been written about the "two roles" of the union in the post-World War II era of industrial legality, as an institution to contain class struggle and as an instrument to forward workers' interests in this struggle, as well as about how the institutionalization of labour relations undercut shopfloor militancy.[41] Still, as Blair Laidlaw and Bruce Curtis note, unions could -- and can -- provide a place where workers come together to voice their discontents and defend their interests.[42] The fact that unions continued to grow and win some of their demands (as they do today) lends credence to

---

40

Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992, p.282; Leo Panitch, Working-Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State. London: Verso, 1986, p.5.

41

Palmer, Working-Class Experience, pp.282-284; Rianne Mahon, "Canadian public policy: the unequal structure of representation," in Leo Panitch, ed., The Canadian state: political economy and political power. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1977, p.184; Blair Laidlaw and Bruce Curtis, "Inside Postal Workers: The Labour Process, State Policy, and the Workers' Response," in David J. Bercuson and David Bright, eds., Canadian Labour History: Selected Readings. Mississauga: Copp Clark Longman Ltd., 1994, pp.354-355.

42

Laidlaw and Curtis, "Inside Postal Workers," in Laidlaw and Curtis eds., Canadian Labour History, p.355.

this interpretation.[43] And a closer examination of the uneasy relationships between the state, Canadian Cottons management, Textile Workers' Union of America (TWUA) officials, and workers in the Cornwall cotton mills illustrate these contradictions.

Like other Canadian textile interests, the owners and managers at Canadian Cottons (CC) attempted to modernize their mills and their production processes, and asked for the cooperation of their workers in these efforts in order to rescue the company from its dangerous plight. The actions of textile union leaders and textile labour in Cornwall in the 1950s point to both the containment and "vocal" oppositional aspects of unions. But the actions of local cotton workers, in particular, highlight the weaknesses of industrial legality and the ultimate inability of union leaders, through a conciliatory relationship with CC management, to protect their members or to solve their on-the-job problems. Also of interest are the views of other "Cornwallites" about the situation facing the national industry and the local cotton mills. Although the editorials written by long-time Standard-Freeholder editor J.B. McKay cannot be taken as representative of every person's opinion, his moderate pro-business stance may hint at a wider current of opinion with which CC workers would have had to contend. In the end, though, the different responses of managers, union leaders and cotton mill workers reflect how they defined and interpreted the "necessary modernization" of the Canadian textile industry largely in relation to their own material interests.

From the earliest days of the local textile mills, Cornwall's textile workers exhibited a resolve to defend their rights as workers. Even before being organized by the Knights of

---

[43] Palmer, Working-Class Experience, pp.285,298-299.

Labor, employees in the Stormont and Dundas mills struck several times in 1882 and 1883.[44] Likewise, before being organized by the United Textile Workers in the 1930s, CC workers formed their own "union" in 1921.[45] At the same time, however, evidence suggests that Cornwall's workers – or more specifically, local labour leaders – were rather conservative and preferred a conciliatory approach to negotiations with employers. Ralph Ellis and Ellen Scheinberg have each written about the certification strikes at the town's textile mills in the 1930s, and both note the contrast between the initial strike at Courtaulds and the strikes at CC. The Courtaulds strike originated with the workers, and women workers were central players in the strike, but the CC strike and subsequent strikes were tightly controlled by union leaders, who refused to allow women on the picket line.[46] Ellis also points out that the leadership tried its best to end wildcats, prevent sitdown strikes and present a "moderate" image to CC management.[47] Relations between CC managers and the union (by 1938, the TWUA) remained friendly for some time, and Cornwall labour leaders led the way in "purging" their locals of the "Communist menace."[48] Thus, the "restraining" influence of union leadership did not simply come about in the postwar period, but predated the 1950s.

---

[44] Senior, From Royal, pp.236-237.

[45] Ibid., p.398.

[46] Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," pp.39-43,49; Ellis, "Textile Strikes in Cornwall," pp.21,32.

[47] Ellis, "Textile Strikes in Cornwall," pp.39-40.

[48] Senior, From Royal, pp.401,438.

Local textile workers, through their unions, were in any case active members of the community and made important contributions to Cornwall socially, politically, and economically. TWUA locals and other CCL-affiliated locals formed the Cornwall and District Labour Council in January 1947, a counterpart to the Cornwall Trades and Labour Council (TLC). In April of the same year, textile workers founded the Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board (GCTJB) to more specifically meet the needs of Locals 779 (Courtaulds), 805 (Glengarry Cottons), 806 (Canadian Cottons), and 1332 (TCF).[49] The Joint Board promoted educational seminars for workers; organized social events such as picnics and Labour Day parades; and ensured that its members contributed to local charities and service clubs, like the United Welfare Fund.[50] Ralph McIntee, a vocal member of the GCTJB and for a time its President, also ran as a CCF candidate in the 1948 election, but lost.[51] The textile mills were central to the lives and identities of many people, especially as most workers began at the mills at a very young age, and often had several family members who worked for either Courtaulds or CC.[52] Like other workplaces, the mills had their own traditions and camaraderie. Jeannine Kirkey, who worked at Courtaulds in the early 1940s and at the Dundas mill in the mid-1950s, recalls

---

[49] Ibid., pp.438-439; NAC. MG30 A87 - Ralph McIntee Collection. File 3 - Clippings, 1938-1974.

[50] Senior, From Royal, p.439.

[51] NAC. MG30 A87, File 1 - Correspondence, Flyers, Agreements, etc., 1938-1957, 1973-1975.

[52] Scheinberg, "Female Textile Workers," pp.28-29.

the numerous practical jokes she and her co-workers used to play on each other, and how they used to help each other out with their work.[53] In December of 1956, the GCTJB held a "Stewards' Training School" for 130 local textile stewards, teaching them how to hold proper meetings and how to deal with grievances.[54] As discussed in the first chapter, the GCTJB was part of a larger coalition calling for rent controls and low-rental housing during the construction of the Seaway, and textile union leaders stood up for workers in other ways. Gordon Jarett, a union representative from Courtaulds, wrote a letter to the editor in April 1953 defending the right of organized workers to take a second job.[55] When city workers struck for union recognition and a collective agreement, William Wilkinson expressed the support of Cornwall's textile workers for the strike in an open letter to city council printed in the Standard-Freeholder.[56] And textile workers expressed pride in their identity as textile labour, a pride that carried over into both their cooperation with management, in an attempt to save their jobs, as well as in their resistance to wages and terms of employment which they considered to be unacceptable. Ralph McIntee, in presenting reasons why the state should help Canadian

---

53

Interview. Jeannine Kirkey, former textile worker, Courtaulds and Canadian Cottons, 21 February 1997.

54

NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol. 93, File 4 - 1956 Press Clippings, Canadian Labour, December 1956, p.45.

55

NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 1 - 1953 Press Clippings, Cornwall Standard-Freeholder, 8 April 1953.

56

NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122 - GCTJB Press Clippings, 1948-1968, Freeholder, 8 July 1957.

textiles, noted that the industry was the largest employer of labour in Canada, and had been vital to "our wartime security," as it would be to "our peacetime economy."[57] In response to the merger of the CCL and the TLC, Ralph Carrara, then President of the GCTJB, was optimistic that the textile "situation" would improve, and was certain that textile unions would be important participants in the making of a better society.[58] Thus, in spite of some evidence of the union as an instrument to quell workers' anger, local heads of textile unions did work for their members in various ways.

Peter DeLottinville, in a study of a "cotton mill town" at the end of the nineteenth century, argues that the National Policy failed to encourage enough diversification or new industry to counterbalance the costs of high tariffs, and as a result, instead of becoming a "mature," competitive industry, the "infant" cotton industry "grew into a short-sighted, greedy, water-logged adolescent monopoly."[59] But even in his 1938 report, Justice Turgeon pointed out that the whole notion of the "infant principle" was problematic, and that the federal government had to accept that Canadian textiles would always need government help for survival.[60] In any case, the TWUA, and certainly Cornwall's textile labourers, followed their employers' lead in asking the federal government to save the domestic industry from the influx of cheap foreign goods. Indeed,

---

57 NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 1- 1953 Press Clippings, Freeholder 19 October 1953.

58 NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 3- 1955 Press Clippings, Textile Labour (October 1955): 3A.

59 Peter DeLottinville, "St. Croix Cotton," pp.viii-ix.

60 Royal Commission on the Textile Industry, p.192.

between the lobbying of the textile elite and the sector's workforce, these repeated cries for increased tariff protection in the 1950s must have made the Canadian textile industry sound like a complaining child.

On March 12, 1952, nine local TWUA delegates joined eleven other TWUA officials in presenting a brief to Finance Minister Abbott, Labour Minister Gregg, Production Minister Howe, and Transportation Minister Chevrier. The delegation informed the ministers that employment in the primary industry had dropped by 10 000 since April 1951, and asked that the government take steps to help the industry and to end the "waste of manpower and resources" caused by unemployment in this "largest single Canadian manufacturing employer."[61] TWUA Local 806's Resolutions sent forward to the Canadian TWUA Conference of May 1953 were, in order of priority: Canadian government action on imports, the labeling of goods by country of origin, and the insistence on buying Canadian goods. And at the national level, the TWUA considered the need for government action to help the textile industry one of the union's top priorities.[62] Mahon notes that the TWUA argued for corporatist planning in the modernization and restructuring of the textile industry, which would partly explain its backing of industry leaders in search of government protection.[63]

As an example, in a newspaper letter to the editor based upon decisions made at the May Conference, Ralph McIntee stated that textile unions wanted a tripartite conference,

---

[61] Cornwall Standard-Freeholder. 12 March 1952, p.3.

[62] NAC. MG30 A87 File 1- Correspondence, etc., 1938-1957, 1973-1975.

[63] Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.64.

with unions, the state and employers represented. McIntee reminded Standard-Freeholder readers that approximately 3 500 Cornwall workers and their families relied upon the local mills for survival, and at that very moment, only the Dundas mill was running at full capacity. Courtaulds had laid off three hundred; the Canada and Stormont mills had shut down one week, and many of their crews were on three-day weeks; and the Glengarry weave room had closed down.[64] Again, in November 1953, a group of local TWUA representatives joined 200 other textile workers from Eastern Canada to discuss with members of Cabinet how to best help the domestic industry. This time, however, they were accompanied by a civic delegation from Cornwall which included Mayor Horovitz, Township Reeve Emard, aldermen, and representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, the Retail Merchants' Association, and the Board of Trade.[65]

In response to this growing crisis, Revenue Minister McCann announced an amendment to the Customs Bill designed to curb the dumping of cheap imports, which he felt was in keeping with the federal government's policy of lowering trade barriers in order to, according to C.D. Howe, "enjoy the broader benefits of free international trade."[66] Even so, economic conditions in Cornwall continued to decline. The blocking of the Customs Bill "loophole" came too late for Canadian Cottons, which was forced to close the Stormont mill in December 1953, putting 385 people out of work. Because of its age and architecture, the Stormont was the hardest mill to modernize, and was thus

---

[64] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol 93, File 1, Freeholder, 19 October 1953.

[65] NAC. MG30 A87 File 3- Clippings, 1938-1974, Freeholder 14 November 1953.

[66] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 1, Freeholder 8 December 1953; 1 December 1953.

selected for closure. J. Irving Roy, President of CC, assured city residents that the decision to close the mil was "dictated solely by the extremely grave situation," and that only temporary shutdowns were planned at the Canada and Dundas mills.[67] The local reaction to this news, expressed by McKay in an editorial, reinforced how important the textile industry was to Cornwall's history and identity. Remarking how closely associated Canadian Cottons was to the welfare of the city, McKay wrote that "the passing of the Stormont Mill is like the loss of an old and familiar friend."[68]

Predictably, editorials in the Standard-Freeholder were supportive of the efforts of textile interests and employees to save the industry. For instance, the editor pointed out that Canadian textile companies had spent $120 000 000 on modernization since World War II, and therefore could not be blamed for their plight. Moreover, he argued that unless someone stopped the "glutting" of the market with American goods "no amount of modernization" would help. After all, "the need to protect every industry important to the well-being of the country" outweighed arguments for free trade. Echoing the words of textile owners and workers, McKay reminded readers that textiles had "grown up with Canada, and in its present troubles should get the help and attention which a long-established business that has proved its value to the country deserves."[69] Nonetheless,

---

[67] Freeholder, 12 December 1953, pp.1,3; Senior, From Royal, p.446.

[68] Freeholder, 12 December 1953, p.4.

[69] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 1- Freeholder, 30 December 1953; 29 October 1953; 1 December 1953.

the government granted "most favoured nation" (MFN) status to Japan in March 1954.[70]

The efforts of textile labour to save their jobs went beyond joining with their employers to demand government aid for the industry. Workers also ran union label campaigns to promote the purchase of Canadian textile products, as well as to express their own pride in what they had made and in their identity as organized labour. Cornwall's textile workers were especially active in these campaigns. Theresa Ingram, a shop steward at a CC mill, was named "Miss Union Label" for a drive which began in October 1956 because of her active participation in union affairs. The union label drive originated with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, and was taking place all over Eastern Ontario and Quebec. In Cornwall, workers put on a parade to publicize the campaign, followed by information demonstrations in front of retail stores, where they handed out pamphlets to shoppers. And their hard work seemed to pay off, for after a month, about 90% of local merchants, it was estimated, carried the union label. Local labourers were determined that the drive would continue until "every consumer in Cornwall becomes label-conscious...and we will leave no stone unturned until we have reached that success."[71]

The TWUA's call for a "tripartite conference" to plan the reorganization of the Canadian textile industry indicates that the union was not against modernization as such; rather, union leaders simply wanted a voice in how this restructuring would be carried

---

[70] Freeholder, 31 March 1954, p.1.

[71] Freeholder, 8 November 1956; NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 15 November 1956, p.9.

out. Indeed, Ralph McIntee even urged the Canadian industry to modernize their products, saying that they lacked the "styling, color, texture and over-all quality" of American imports.[72] Canadian Cottons did initiate a modernization program in the Cornwall mills, including new equipment, time and quality control studies, and new "incentive" programs and wage rates.[73] The company even built a new converting plant, and proudly boasted of its "King Cot-Quality Products Finished the Modern Way." In a full-page newspaper advertisement that included several pictures of "men at work," the company noted that the plant, "one of the most modern in North America...was designed to meet the needs and tastes of the Canadian market [and] is equipped with the latest machinery and produces all types of dyed and finished cotton fabrics."[74]

Naturally, tensions did increase because of these endeavours at making production more "rational" and "efficient;" the many work stoppages in 1957 reflect these tensions, and will be dealt with later. But even in the early 1950s, years of relative labour peace at the Cornwall cotton mills, when workers cooperated with their employers in "modernizing" the plants and in lobbying the government, CC officials and the editor of the Standard-Freeholder suggested, at times very strongly, that cotton mill workers were not "doing enough" to save the industry. In short, in spite of other factors, in their view

---

[72] Freeholder, 6 November 1953, p.3.

[73] Senior, From Royal, p.446; Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.224; MG28 I 219 Vol.110, File 33- Incentive Applications: Card Tender, Carding Department, Canada Mill, 1947-1958.

[74] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 4- 1956 Press Clippings, Freeholder, 11 February 1956, p.7.

the sad situation in Canadian textiles was largely the fault of textile workers.

For example, in a letter to shareholders printed in the Freeholder, CC President J. Irving Roy cited both foreign competition and high expenditures on modernization as the reasons for the company's failure to pay its last share of dividends. Roy briefly offered three solutions to the plight of the industry: first of all, the continuation of restructuring by companies themselves; secondly, the necessity that organized labour work with management to reduce the cost of production through increased efficiency and higher output; and finally, the need for fair market value in the Customs Act. But since CC had already spent $12.5 million on modernization, and the government was reluctant to act, the answer, ultimately, lay with workers making concessions.[75]

The following day, J.B. McKay put forward the view that "a thorough-going program of labour-management cooperation appears to be the only answer to the threat of textiles from Japan and other low-wage countries" in decidedly clear terms. Although Canadian companies had "narrowed the gap" through modernization, McKay contended, "if the Canadian worker, with the better equipment available to him, does not operate more efficiently the scales can easily shift in the direction of the low-wage country." And given that the government did not seem willing to meet the reasonable demand of an end to dumping, the "salvation" of the industry rested with labour and management realizing that they faced "a common problem," one that necessitated them working together.[76] Less than a year later, in a second editorial which contrasted greatly with the first one

---

[75] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 1, Freeholder, 20 November 1953.

[76] Ibid., Freeholder, 21 November 1953.

which celebrated the go-ahead of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, McKay again discussed the problems facing the Canadian textile industry. After outlining the problem of federal trade policy, though, he turned to a comparison of textile wages in various countries, emphasizing that only the United States had higher wages than Canada, while wage rates in other countries were much lower. In addition to "reconsidering" their "high" wages, McKay argued that textile employees had to contribute to saving the industry by increasing their productivity.[77] This notion that workers had to sacrifice for the "greater good" of the Canadian textile industry, and for the nation as a whole, sounds suspiciously like the way in which the Seaway Project was presented to both the residents of the Lost Villages and the people of Akwesasne. They were all compelled to give up, under the rubric of modernization, a certain degree of their material well-being for the purposes of capitalist development and expansion.

Cornwall's cotton mill workers would accept the bitter pill of restructuring to save their jobs but, if the words of Ralph McIntee are any indication, they greatly resented their cooperation with the company being taken for granted, even thrown in their faces. On November 27, 1953, McIntee, then President of the GCTJB, wrote a letter responding to McKay's and Roy's comments of the previous week. (One should be aware that no "Letters to the Editor" section existed in the newspaper at this time, and the publication of such letters was very unusual.) Conceding that CC had spent money on the modernization of the plants, McIntee voiced his concern with their words on the "issue of labour-management relations for increased efficiency and output," stating that he thought

---

[77] Freeholder, 26 June 1954, p.6.

the editor, management and the general public "should know the score." The Joint Board President noted that in 1945-1946, CC acquired the services of American Associated Consultants to introduce greater measures of scientific rationalization, such as new standardized work assignments. In spite of their knowledge that this company was renowned for establishing heavy work loads and high tasks, McIntee pointed out that the union and workers had "accommodated" to the tasks introduced, as unpleasant or difficult as they often were. He even cited an MP from Beauharnois who defended textile workers, saying they had done their part to help the industry. In a more conciliatory tone, McIntee wrote that workers agreed with the need for fair market value for imports, and highlighted the efforts of the local delegation of textile labour to convince the government to act. Still, in their contract negotiations with CC, cotton workers would "refuse to lower our standards" and in fact, hoped to raise them with their moderate demands. Finally, in defense of the TWUA, McIntee informed Roy that the union wanted to bring stability to the industry, and sought only "economic and industrial democracy."[78] And in his assessment of the anti-dumping provision announced in December 1953, McIntee emphasized that labourers had done their part in increasing productivity, and that prices and marketing were matters for management.[79]

Nor did McIntee let the June 1954 editorial pass without comment. Focussing on McKay's statement that "employees must share in working out the solution too" through increased workloads, McIntee reminded readers that he had outlined the union's position

---

[78] NAC. MG30 A87 File 1, Freeholder, 27 November 1953.

[79] NAC. MG28 I 219 File 1, Freeholder, 8 December 1953.

on previous occasions, and thus would not go on at length. He admitted that productivity was an issue in contract negotiations, but that CC's workers would not grant a "blank cheque" to the company and would stand by the existing safeguards in their contract. McIntee warned that union leaders would defend their members from "speed-ups and stretch-outs," and refused to "turn back the clock."[80]

Although the union and workers had made concessions, then, regarding wages and working conditions -- concessions which, according to McIntee, hurt workers -- TWUA leaders, on behalf of local textile labour, would only accept losses that seemed reasonable to them. The fact that McIntee had to be a voice for workers in the form of letters to the newspaper shows the unequal power relations between capital and labour. After all, why were local textile workers or union leaders not asked to comment on the accuracy of Roy's letter, or about their experiences with the modernization of the mills? By initially presenting only a pro-business perspective, the newspaper suggested that the opinions of CC management were the only "truth," which would also be a hint as to why McIntee so urgently wanted people to "know the score." McIntee's admission that the union had accepted, and would consider for the future, restructuring methods that affected or would affect its members negatively is reflective of the "corporatist" strategy of the TWUA. McIntee's indignation at the claim that workers were not doing their "share" also points to a pride in being a textile worker and a union member, a sense of dignity illustrated in his refusal to see textile labour and unions presented in a poor light, and in his insistence that workers would "hold their ground." But if cotton mill workers

---

[80] NAC. MG30 A87 File 1, Freeholder, 27 June 1954.

exhibited a determination to defend their "standards," local union officials, as will be illustrated in the next few pages, were not nearly as willing to defend their members as McIntee claimed in his letters.

The increase in labour strife at the CC mills in Cornwall is indicative of rising tensions, often related to modernization in the mills. In 1951, only 2 000 man-hours were lost at the city's CC mills, while 7 200 man-hours were lost in 1954 to protests against the dismissal and suspension of workers. By 1956-1957, Cornwall's cotton workers, through numerous work stoppages, appear to have been communicating a message: enough is enough. In 1956, the 5 330 man-hours lost at local textile mills were due to disputes over the wages of loom fixers, revisions of the incentive bonus, the dismissal of an employee, and at Courtaulds, an increase in the supervision of workers which forced them to stay at work when ill.[81] Reportedly, company officials in the Montreal head office used to joke, "I wonder which mill in Cornwall will strike today?"[82] The workers, though, through their actions, were simply defending their material interests as well as their dignity as textile labour. Incentive bonuses were difficult to achieve, and base wage rates were reduced when the bonus programs were implemented. "Streamlining" meant higher workloads, "stretch-outs" and "speed-ups."[83] In addition, incentive bonuses and work assignment specifications seemed in constant flux, with many "revisions."[84]

---

[81] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 6- Strikes 1957-1958.

[82] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.224.

[83] Ibid.

[84] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.110.

Ironically, though, (bringing us back to the strategy of conciliation and cooperation adopted by the TWUA and local union leaders), many of these methods of modernization were agreed to by the union and, in fact, some of the time studies were carried out by union representatives.[85] A more detailed look at some of the 1957 disputes at the CC mills – Ralph McIntee recalled as many as thirty-two stoppages at the Dundas mill alone, while the Standard-Freeholder reported seventeen at all of the cotton mills – are of particular interest.[86] Not only do they demonstrate the refusal of workers to see their wages and working conditions eroded for the sake of "efficiency," but they also offer clear examples of the union's "containment" function in the post-World War II period. While union leaders joined with management to quell these disturbances, the words of both CC management and Freeholder editorials hint at a hardening attitude toward cotton mill workers, with an implicit message that they should just "put up and shut up."

According to GCTJB files, strikes and stoppages at the cotton mills contributed a loss of 22 315 man-hours for the company in 1957, based upon four strikes over incentive pay, the discharge of some workers, work assignments, and wage rates for certain job classifications.[87] No dates are recorded in the Board's records; the first two one-day strikes correspond with Department of Labour records of two one-day strikes in March, although some discrepancies regarding numbers exist. On March 18, 400 spinners left their places to protest heavy workloads, which were an issue in negotiations then taking

---

[85] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.252.

[86] Ibid.; Senior, From Royal, p.447.

[87] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 6.

place between the company and the union. The union advised those involved to go back to work and to follow their regular work routine. But later that day, 800 spinners, spooler tenders and warper tenders walked out in rejection of the incentive application which was in their contract. Again, the union executive and the company ordered the workers back, but were ignored. The dispute ended March 19 at one in the afternoon, but by 11:00 pm, 1 265 workers refused to work because of the disciplinary action taken against those responsible for the "unauthorized walkout" the day before. They returned to work by seven in the evening on March 20.[88]

The details in the Standard-Freeholder account of these disputes differ, but not greatly. The first strike, according to the newspaper, originated with workers in the filling plant of the Canada mill, which may explain why GCTJB files indicate that only 55 workers struck.[89] Because the filling department was central to production, the illegal stoppage resulted in a shutdown of the 900 employee plant. After resuming work and hearing about the actions to be taken against their fellow workers, the mill's employees walked off the job again, but this time numbers swelled to 1 500 with the support of employees in the Dundas mill, the Dundas annex (formally Glengarry Cottons), and the converting plant. Neither the union nor the company would discuss the terms of the agreement, but company officials gave credit to union leaders for their efforts to end the "wildcats."[90]

---

[88] NAC. RG27 Vol.522, T4138, #46, #51.

[89] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 21 March 1957; Vol.93, File 6.

[90] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 21 March 1957; 19 March 1957.

A "coalition" of union and management officials termed another work stoppage "illegal" in early May 1957. But to further underscore the contradictory nature of the union, and to add some bitter irony, the walkout was initiated by a female shop steward who refused a work assignment. Her co-workers in the weave room followed her out, and the closure of this department led to the shutdown of the spinning and carding rooms. The union offered no support. One can only imagine the steward's surprise or displeasure at the union executive's hostile indifference to her complaint. In the newspaper coverage of the wildcat, a total of 1 504 workers were listed as being "out." The dispute ended May 15, with the mills resuming production on May 22.[91] In these instances, then, workers rejected a definition of "modernization" that contributed to the degradation of the gains they had made as organized labour. In direct defiance of union officials, CC employees left their places to protest infringements upon their wages and working conditions. Their actions speak to a frustration with the "corporatist" tactics of the union, and to a belief that the union was either incapable of or unwilling to defend the material well-being of its members. The decisions of the Local 806 executive to side with the company in both the March and May disputes, condemning the workers' "illegal" actions and ordering them back to work, likely reinforced and contributed to disillusionment with the union. Conversely, the support given by the cotton mill workers to each other, through sympathy strikes, walkouts to protest the punishment or dismissal of co-workers, and refusals to cross picket lines, expressed a pride in their identity as textile workers and a firm sense of the justness of their actions.

---

[91] Ibid., Freeholder, 9 May 1957; 22 May 1957.

In response to the May walkout, CC placed a full-page advertisement, or "message to the public," in the May 11 edition of the Freeholder, offering the company's interpretation of events and "the facts." The advertisement provides an example of employers' tactics in strike situations, and the way in which, because of their power and resources, companies had and have a "public relations" advantage. More important, though, is the "hard ball" approach taken by CC, mirroring the tense relations between the company and its workforce. According to the advertisement, the steward "breached the contract" by refusing a "routine change in assignment," but attempted to justify her "misconduct" as the job change was only scheduled for the following Monday. She then ignored the "advice" of union representatives to obey the supervisor, and as a result, out of a "mistaken sense of loyalty," fellow employees supported this "irresponsible action" rather than listening to their union representatives, and walked out. Their "unauthorized picket lines" subsequently denied entry to the "responsible employees who wished to work." CC management cited the management rights and no strike clauses, as well as grievance procedures, contained in the collective agreement, as proof that they were the innocent party in the dispute, and highlighted the fact that the tasks required in the job change were "similar" to those performed by competitors' workers. The authors also offered a list of "injuries" caused by the wildcat, including the unemployment of 1 800 workers in Cornwall and 140 employees of a feeder plant in Saint John, New Brunswick, and the endangerment "of the livelihood of countless others who serve the company and its employees." As a "responsible enterprise," company officials noted the suffering of the 3 000 employees and their families due to the loss of wages, and invited an "impartial

enquiry from a citizen committee" to resolve the dispute. In spite of taking on the persona of the innocent victim in the message, though, the company took the offensive in concluding with a barely-veiled threat to close the Cornwall mills "if forced into further shut-downs" which further aggravated the "difficult task of running a textile concern." Pointing out the 1 800 jobs, five million dollars in annual payroll and tax revenue the city would lose, CC underlined the importance of the cotton mills to Cornwall. In advising workers of a union meeting to discuss the strike, the company asked that "proper conduct and procedure" be on the top of the agenda," and "that all citizens are entitled to this pledge in future."[92] Thus, the company hinted that union leaders should do a better job of controlling their members. In posing as the beneficent employer looking out for the best interests of the community, the company staked the moral, as well as economic, "high ground." Also, informing readers that the union concurred with the company reinforced the claim that the workers were irresponsible and selfish.

This message to CC workers to "behave" themselves also came from J.B. McKay. In an editorial concerning the "serious side effects of labor disputes," he warned that this dispute, along with "numerous other ones" that had taken place in past years "do have effects on the economy of the community, which we think should be considered." First, he noted the financial loss to workers, the company and merchants in the community. In particular, he felt that the cotton workers should have pity on the company "at a time when it is fighting for every order and waging a battle for survival." But more important were the implications for attracting new industry. Even though "generally" labour-

---

[92] Freeholder, 11 May 1957.

management relations were good in the city, strikes made a bad and lasting impression. Of course, McKay conceded, workers had the right to strike for "legitimate grievances," but work actions had to be

> carefully considered by those who have the interests of Cornwall at heart, and who are tempted to take part in, or to condone a 'wildcat' walkout. We feel that it places upon union leadership a further responsibility, and that they should shoulder it as diligently as they have shouldered other community responsibilities in the past.

These "responsibilities" would be even greater in the coming years, as Cornwall had to attract new industry to counterbalance the loss of jobs that would accompany the completion of the Seaway. Cornwall's many advantages would be greatly advanced if city spokesmen could say "that the era of the 'wildcat' or unauthorized walkout is passed."[93] Evidently, the editor had greater sympathy for CC than for its workers, and took much of what was contained in the company's message as "the truth." Like company officials, the editor singled out the union's leadership and held them responsible for the behaviour of union members, but he blunted his reprimand with praise for the past "community responsibility" cotton labourers had shown. McKay echoed the company's rhetoric to lay a "guilt trip" on those who participated in the wildcat by calling for consideration of the "welfare" of Cornwall. Clearly, cotton workers risked criticism if they acted to protect their living and working standards, and although the words of CC officials and the newspaper editor cannot be assumed to represent widespread public opinion, one cannot help but to suspect that a number of local residents, receiving most of their information about the strikes from these

---

[93] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.93, File 6, Freeholder, 23 May 1957.

"authorities," may have felt that cotton workers were behaving like spoiled brats.

The next major dispute to be examined here erupted October 23, 1957, when seven men in the converting plant walked off to protest a wage cut of twenty-five cents an hour over a five month period, resulting from the "red circle" quota clause in their contract.[94] These wage cutbacks had been a source of annoyance to those affected by these "special" rates and quotas, and were responsible for labour troubles in June as well.[95] The next morning, fellow workers refused to cross the picket lines that had been set up, bringing the total number of workers out to 1 200. This work stoppage was similar to those in March and May, in that cotton workers left their jobs to protest one of the various "modernization" schemes or techniques adopted by their employer. But while the union disclaimed responsibility for the strike, it decided to, in the words of Local 806 President Bernard Branchaud, remain "open to negotiations" with the company, siding with the men who claimed they were fired after asking to discuss the cuts with a higher authority. Management, on the other hand, argued that the pay cut to the seven workers was not unfair, but rather was due to the non-attainment of quotas set up in engineering surveys and in effect throughout the industry. Furthermore, said company spokesmen, the men had quit. Company officials also refused to talk to the union, as the union had disclaimed responsibility for the stoppage.[96]

---

[94] Freeholder, 25 October 1957, p.13; NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 11 November 1957.

[95] Senior, From Royal, p.447.

[96] Freeholder, 25 October 1957, p.13.

Within a few days, 1 300 workers were still off the job, and local politicians were involved in the dispute. A union-management meeting set up by Mayor Archie Lavigne, who "deplored the harm caused the city by such work stoppages," ended without a solution.[97] While the Mayor did not make any statements of blame, Stormont MP Albert Lavigne called the action a strike. Minister of Labour Michael Starr called the stoppage a layoff, but the union said it was neither a strike nor a layoff.[98] This confusion over what to label the walkout is in some ways a reflection on the more negative aspects of industrial legality, as no one really knew how to proceed with negotiations until they could "fit" the dispute into a legally-defined category.

The desire of politicians at all levels, but especially the municipal level, to end the strike as soon as possible was likely spurred by news that 400 would be released from their jobs on the Seaway Project; Cornwall Pants would be on a two week shutdown; and several workers would be laid off at Bingley Steel.[99] To add to the pressure, on November 7, the National Employment Service announced that 1 969 people were registered as unemployed, up from 1 083 the previous year.[100] Indeed, by November 4 -- the twelfth day of the dispute -- top officials on both sides, including CC Vice-President Jack B. Paddon, the TWUA's Canadian director Paul Swaitz, and Assistant to TWUA

---

[97] Ibid., 28 October 1957, p.9.

[98] Ibid., 31 October 1957, p.13.

[99] Ibid., 4 November 1957, p.9.

[100] Ibid., 7 November 1957, p.13.

President Harold D'aoust, were called upon to negotiate a settlement.[101] Workers finally agreed to return to the mills on November 11, on the conditions that no one be penalized, and that negotiations over the red circle rates continue.[102]

In this dispute, company officials used similar tactics as in the May strike, but focussed less attention on the general public and more on its workers. In the hopes of convincing those who perhaps were not strongly supportive of the walkout to come back to work, the company issued periodic radio bulletins telling workers that the gates were open, and that they were free to return to work.[103] They also addressed an "open letter to employees" in the Standard-Freeholder, in which, again, they gave "the facts." The most significant of these "facts" were that out of the seventy workers affected by the "red circle" rates only four of the seven men had their wages cut; the "red circle" rates were acknowledged to be badly out of line with the wages paid to other workers, but had been agreed to by the union. Appealing to workers' pocketbooks, the company offered its regrets to the majority who were losing money because of the "irresponsible actions of a few."[104] So even though the company stood firm on its version of the "facts," rather than using threats of closing down, officials tried to lure workers back by waving amnesty and money (in the form of wages) in their faces.

The tone of McKay's November 7 editorial, however, was less forgiving and perhaps

---

[101] Ibid., 6 November 1957, p.13; Senior, From Royal, p.448.

[102] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 11 November 1957, p.9.

[103] Freeholder, 25 October 1957, p.13.

[104] Ibid., 28 October 1957, p.18.

expressed a more widespread local exasperation with the frequent walkouts occurring at the cotton mills. Even though confusion continued over the "status" of the walkout, he singled out employees for not following the arbitration process. As in his May editorial, McKay lamented the long-term impacts of labour disputes, as they proved to be a "stumbling block to the industrial program" of the city. After all, what new industry would want to locate itself in Cornwall given the evidence of bad labour relations? He chastened both company and union officials, but more so union representatives, by saying that the community had a right to expect "responsibility of action; adherence to rules; and sincere and continued discussions" from both parties.[105] It appears, then, that workers were being assailed on all sides -- by politicians, the local media, and CC management -- to suffer the consequences of modernization for the "greater good" of all. More likely, though, they defined "greatest good" according to the economic costs and benefits to themselves. Cornwall officials could not have been enamoured with cotton workers who willingly walked off the job and added to the growing numbers of unemployed in the city, and politicians at the provincial and federal levels probably did not relish the prospect of having to offer more financial assistance to support more people. McKay voiced similar concerns from his position as editor of the community newspaper. CC management, of course, sought to protect the company's profits, however small they were. (For the first time in a number of years, in 1957 CC netted a profit of

---

[105] Ibid., 7 November 1957, p.4.

$275 330.)[106] They therefore needed not only to keep production running smoothly, but also to get employees to bear the costs of restructuring.

This dispute became a major concern largely because of its 18-day length, which contrasted with more common shorter stoppages. Although the inability to peg precisely the legal nature of the walkout contributed to its length, another significant reason lay in the union's decision to defend its members rather than siding with the company. In opposition to management claims that only seventy workers were subject to the "red circle" quotas and that no more wage roll-backs were planned, union leaders countered that in fact 126 workers were affected by these rates, and that the company did have more wage cuts in store. And a meeting with 1 100 of 1 300 cotton mill workers present resulted in the unanimous rejection of a company proposal to rehire the seven men, but with a three-day suspension.[107] Even though union leaders agreed that the stoppage was "illegal," they refused to take responsibility for the actions of cotton mill workers so long as the company continued to cut wages under the "red circle" clause, which they claimed only applied to jobs vacated by a transferred worker or by a new employee.[108] The union executive, then, despite its support for its members, distanced itself by disclaiming responsibility, and did not oppose the wage cuts entirely, but only the company's "misuse" of the clause. Still, the fact that the union finally chose to act on workers'

---

106 John Sherman Porter, ed., Moody's Industrial Manual, American and Foreign, 1958. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1958, p.1918.

107 Freeholder, 29 October 1957, p.9.

108 NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 11 November 1957, p.9.

behalf might suggest a cognizance, on the part of local TWUA leaders, that in continuing with their "corporatist" strategy, they were failing to adequately protect the interests of their members, and in the process were losing the support of the rank-and-file.

For the next year and a half, labour-management relations improved, even if tensions over restructuring continued, as did local efforts to draw attention to the failures of Canadian trade policy. A month after the end of the "red circle" dispute, Stormont MP Albert Lavigne argued to the government that rather than sending buying missions abroad for textile goods, the state should be encouraging the establishment of new plants in Canada.[109] And at a Rotary Club meeting, the manager of CC's Cornwall mills, V.H. Bruneau, highlighted the damage done the industry by imports when he demanded to know why people could no longer find blankets produced at the Dundas mill in Cornwall stores.[110] Fortunately for textile interests, the victory of the Conservatives in the 1957 election led to some, albeit limited, relief for the domestic industry. In 1958, for example, Canada negotiated its first "voluntary export restraint" agreement (VER) with Japan, followed by others on other products.[111] Even so, the federal government maintained, in Tariff Board Reference 125, that as a "mature" industry, textiles should not expect any state incentives for further growth.[112] Most of Cornwall's CC employees

---

[109] Ibid., Freeholder, 11 December 1957, p.9; Senior, From Royal, p.448.

[110] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 21 April 1959, p.9.

[111] Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, pp.59-60; McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.148.

[112] Austin, "Life Cycles," p.545.

were laid off when the mills shut down "temporarily" in the summer of 1959.[113] News that CC had sold some machinery from the converting plant and the Dundas mill to Dominion Textiles set off alarm bells in the city, with Mayor Lavigne doing his best to convince Dominion Textiles to set up operations in Cornwall, but failing.[114] Local residents received more foreshadowing of near-future events when they heard that a company called Canadian Corporate Management had bought controlling shares of CC, and the President of both companies (not coincidental, as will be explained later), L.C. Bonnycastle, talked of possible "diversification" at the local mills.[115] Finally, on December 7, 1959, came the announcement of the shutdown of the CC mills in Cornwall, with the details of hundreds of layoffs to come on December 12 and 19. One hundred to one hundred twenty-five workers would be kept on until after Christmas, at which point staff would be reduced to 35 people in shipping until after March. The author of the Freeholder article about the closure regretted the losses in wages and taxes to the city, and stated that CC might demolish the mill buildings if no one made the company a quick offer. But a Committee comprised of members of city council was already inquiring into purchasing the property. Bernard Branchaud, President and Business Agent of Local 806, confirmed that 422 workers remained at the Dundas mill and annex on blanket production and maintenance, while the other mills were closed down. Branchaud also reported that the union had contacted textile mills in Toronto,

---

[113] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.224,468.

[114] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 13 August 1959, p.9.

[115] Freeholder, 1 December 1959, p.1.

Brantford, Trois Rivières and Quebec City to find employment for the 1 300 cotton mill workers who would eventually be left without jobs.[116]

One of the driving forces behind the negotiations to buy the CC properties for the city was Cornwall Industrial Developments Limited (CIDL), a group of local businessmen led by E.D. May which was formed in September 1959.[117] Indeed, May admitted that the CIDL was founded in response to the "reliable" news that CC would end its operations in Cornwall. And even though the company was preparing to deal a horrible economic blow to the community, CC management still attempted to portray the company as the benevolent employer who cared about the people of Cornwall. This "benevolence" was exhibited when CC Vice-President Jack Paddon "generously" offered to several Cornwall businessmen and politicians a paid trip to Manchester, New Hampshire. This textile town had also lost its main industry, but a citizens' committee bought the old buildings and successfully drew new business to the area. The lesson, of course, was for the people of Cornwall to do the same; thus, city council and the CIDL worked hard to sell the idea (as well as shares in the CIDL) to local residents.[118] In selling the 900 000 square foot space for $675 000, CC "handed the city a lifeline," according to some local figures. (The city bought the Canada and Dundas mill properties; Glengarry Cottons was

---

[116] Ibid., 7 December 1957, p.9.

[117] Senior, From Royal, p.449.

[118] Freeholder, 9 December 1959, p.13; NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 5 February 1960, pp.1,9.

sold separately to National Grocers for $200 000.)[119] While one wonders how the closing of one of the city's main sources of employment could be interpreted as a "lifeline," this statement certainly echoes the gushing thanks given to CC from city officials for its "help" and its "concern" for the welfare of the community. J.R. Whitehead, for instance, upon the announcement of the acquisition of the CC properties by the city, wanted to thank CC officials "most of all" for having shown "time and again that they have the best interests of the city of Cornwall at heart." The CIDL President pointed out that he had been informed by CC management that the factors which prompted the closure were not due to any lack of cooperation from either city officials or the company's workers. The company was even "good enough" to recommend Cornwall as a great location for industry, and to credit their employees' "skill and cooperation," a far cry from prior claims that CC's local workers were not doing enough to improve efficiency and productivity. According to Whitehead, city residents could not be more grateful to CC officials for going "far out of their way to ease the blow to the community." In return, the company was equally civil, praising the "enthusiasm and integrity" of the CIDL directors and expressing regret at cutting their ties with Cornwall.[120]

Such words of gratitude, however, did not come from CC's laid off employees. Many had lost their jobs due to cutbacks in the summer of 1959, and found work in textile mills in Trois Rivières and Brantford. Three former employees went to the Dominican

---

[119] Senior, From Royal, p.449; Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.225.

[120] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 5 February 1960, pp.1,9.

Republic, and a plant in Lewiston, Maine recruited 125 local cotton mill workers.[121] In November 1960, the Freeholder reported that a group of seven former CC employees had signed six month contracts with Texfin, a new textile firm in Venezuela. The Cornwall workers were chosen for their "knowledge, skill and ability" to train new workers in the plant. The fact that some of the plant's machinery came from some of Cornwall's cotton mills made their jobs as trainers easier, if not ironic. Still, they wished to return to Cornwall when economic conditions improved, which they believed would happen in time.[122] And in spite of the blow dealt to its members, the GCTJB continued to protest the flooding of domestic markets by foreign textile imports. In March 1960, the Board sent letters to a number of political leaders rejecting a proposal to allow a 10% increase in the volume of Japanese imports. GCTJB President Rheal Dupuis emphasized the hardship brought upon Canadian textile workers with "the spectre of mill closures and unemployment across our land," and urged a halt to "the reckless sacrifice of this great and essential primary industry of our country."[123]

Cornwall's financial and political elite, CC management and cotton mill workers responded to the closure of the mills according to how the shutdown affected their material security. Many workers moved elsewhere to find jobs, as they had to have some source of income. Local TWUA leaders kept on lobbying the government for better

---

[121] Freeholder, 5 August 1997, p.4; NAC. MG30 A87 File 1, "Brief History of CUPW Retired Member With Over 30 Years in Labour Movement."

[122] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 12 November 1960, p.9.

[123] Ibid., Freeholder, 21 March 1960, p.9.

protection for the industry, as they had little choice but to continue the struggle to defend industry jobs and hence, their positions, as textile labour figureheads. The deferential attitude of municipal politicians and businessmen towards CC is not so strange, considering that they were hoping to get a good price in the properties they wanted to purchase. Nor was their eagerness to attract new industry to the area unpredictable, as high local unemployment threatened either their electoral chances or the prosperity of their own businesses. And although CC officials did not greatly benefit from their so-called "caring," they may have had other reasons for trying to present themselves as fellow victims of federal fiscal policy and global competition, and as "old friends" of the city. More specifically, the owners of CC began shifting out of textiles as early as 1952, but under an agreement which stipulated that the company would remain in business until after the completion of the investigation of the cotton industry by the Tariff Board. The heads of the company then sold their remaining textile interests and equipment to Dominion Textiles in 1959.[124] Essentially, those at the upper echelons of the company decided to liquidate the remaining assets and to use them in other ventures by transferring the funds first to Canadian Corporate Management, a holding company, and then to Canman Industries.[125] If Cornwall residents and the company's laid off workers had known immediately that CC was neither as "victimized" nor as "caring" as it made

---

[124] Mahon, Industrial Restructuring, p.52.

[125] Ibid, p.52; Senior, From Royal, p.449; McCullough, Primary Textile Industry, p.193; John Sherman Porter, ed., Moody's Industrial Manual, American and Foreign, 1961. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1961, p.cxxxiii.

itself out to be, perhaps their reactions would have been more hostile.

In a collection of essays on the decline of unions and communities over the last thirty years, editors Charles Craypo and Bruce Nissen conclude that the various case studies presented seem to support the "community dependency thesis." This interpretation posits that power structures under modern industrial capitalism give private corporations ultimate power over a community's economy, and hence a great deal of influence over the community's political and social spheres as well. For even though the residents of communities are not completely controlled by big business, unions, municipal governments and residents are often caught in the position of reacting to the actions of private interests, which limits their capacities as agents and decision-makers. Typically, in the case studies, the imperatives of capital were accepted as the only imperatives. Thus, when anyone questioned or opposed the demands or the hegemony of companies operating in these cities, this opposition was characterized as endangering the "common good." In a similar vein, if economic conditions declined, local residents as well as industry leaders tended to blame the state for not giving the firm enough, and workers for demanding too much. And even in instances of plant closures, city councils usually adjusted to the needs and actions of private corporations. Although some local community leaders were active in adjusting to the decisions of business owners, they were still, in the end, merely reacting to the actions of capital.[126]

126

Charles Craypo and Bruce Nissen, eds., Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions and Communities. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1993, pp.242-243. Another excellent recent example is Napanee, evident in Bryan D. Palmer, Capitalism Comes to the Backcountry: The Goodyear Invasion of Napanee. Toronto:

These conclusions about "community dependency" in industrial communities in the 1970s and 1980s resonate strikingly with the situation in Cornwall in the 1950s. The people of Cornwall were left to respond to the policies of not only capital, but the state. Fortunately, CC was not the only firm in the city, but the cotton mills had a central place in the economic, political and social life of Cornwall residents. When the federal government enacted fiscal policies of tariff deregulation that favoured staples-led growth, Cornwall's elite and local textile labour, recognizing the threat to one of the community's main employers, scrambled to lobby the government to protect the Canadian textile industry. Textile workers and unions were compelled to accept the modernization efforts of textile interests, even if restructuring meant increased supervision, wage cuts, speed-ups and stretch-outs. When CC workers walked out in protest against the erosion of their living and working conditions, they were chastised in the local press and by company leaders for not "giving enough" to the company and for expecting too much. Local TWUA leaders, as a result of both the "postwar settlement" and the plight of the local textile mills, adopted a more conciliatory approach to labour relations, and often cooperated with management in implementing modernization schemes and in disciplining "irresponsible" workers who struck "illegally." When CC announced that it would end its operations in Cornwall, municipal leaders took the initiative to buy some of the company's properties to lease to new industry, but the decision to sell, and at what price, lay ultimately with management, which meant that the city's financial and political leaders still had to cater to the company. Also, the very fact

---

Between the Lines, 1994.

that the city was so desperate to obtain the properties in order to draw industry to Cornwall demonstrates how reliant communities are on capitalist development.

Cornwall's cotton mill workers, then, like the people of the Lost Villages and the residents of Akwesasne, were asked to bear the brunt of the costs of "modernization" for the "greater good" of the community and of the nation as a whole. Out of economic self-interest, CC workers did cooperate with management attempts to rationalize production and to gain better tariff protection for the industry, but in the end, workers defined "modernization," not in the grander terms of capitalist development and expansion, or in the ability of Canadian textile firms to compete globally, but in terms of its direct impacts on their material well-being. Consequently, they often resisted elements of corporate restructuring that attacked their economic security in defiance of union leaders, who vacillated between their jobs as defenders of workers' interests and their "duties" within a system of industrial legality as glorified babysitters. Nor can the psychological or emotional impacts of the closure of the mills on workers be underestimated. Cornwall's CC employees, with their long history and important place in the community, exhibited a longstanding pride in their identity as textile workers and as organized labour. The loss of their jobs meant far more than a loss of earnings.

By the end of the 1950s, the Seaway Valley had changed dramatically as a result of both the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project and deindustrialization through the loss of the CC mills. The longer-term implications of these changes on the people of the area, as well as the impacts of other developments over the last thirty-five to forty years, will be dealt with in the next, and final, chapter.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

In spite of the hard times facing the city at the end of the 1950s, Cornwall's civic leaders seemed unable to let go of the belief that the good times promised by the Seaway Project would soon come to Cornwall and the surrounding area. As though it were planned as a "buffer" of good news, an article appearing on the same page as the closure of the cotton mills announced that unemployment levels in Cornwall were lower than at the same time in 1958. Of course, the 10% overall reduction of those who chose to register as unemployed was based upon November statistics, and even they had jumped to 2 261 from 1 611. A further, and rather significant, qualifier was the increase in the number of people on "relief."[1] Still, local politicians and businessmen continued with their boosterism, regarding the closure of the cotton mills a "minor setback" to a prosperous future, and expended a great deal of energy from the end of 1959 into 1960 proclaiming how well Cornwall was doing, given current economic blows. And in editorials, J.B. McKay added his voice to those trying to downplay the economic hardship a number of local people were facing with talk of a "brighter dawn." This future, however, was contingent upon local support for the CIDL's efforts to buy the old CC mill properties, as was argued forcefully at a December 8 city council meeting. The company threatened to tear down the buildings if a buyer was not found immediately, which would, according to Alderman Murray, "be a catastrophe of the first order for the

---

[1] Cornwall Standard-Freeholder. 7 December 1959, p.9.

industrial future of the city and would affect in one way or another every person within the city." Murray, who had visited Manchester, New Hampshire, raved about the "instant" success of the citizens in attracting new industry, and stated that the CIDL would have "no difficulty" filling the mills with new businesses. In fact, Murray used the welfare statistics given at the meeting to emphasize the "grim side" which could occur if residents were not "interested enough in wanting to divert possible catastrophe." According to the Chairman of the Health, Sanitation and Welfare Committee, welfare for the year had, up to that point, cost $549 264, and was expected to total $569 262 by the end of the year. In comparison, the total bill for 1958 was $318 500. Expenditures for September-October-November 1959 had risen to $144 251 for 4 897 residents, over $101 102 for the same period in 1958. Cornwall citizens, the alderman pointed out, had to realize that the "onus of responsibility for economic recovery" rested squarely with each of them. City council's unanimous approval of the CIDL's plan to purchase the cotton mills was declared "the vision of a brighter future on Cornwall's industrial horizon." Mayor Lavigne also expressed confidence that "if we all get out and help out we can beat this thing working together."[2]

To convince local residents to buy shares in the CIDL, then, municipal leaders rallied citizens to "help themselves," in spite of the fact that growing numbers of citizens, through no fault of their own, were unable to afford this "self help." And to underline the necessity of the city's acquisition of the mills, they juxtaposed a dark future of enduring local unemployment with a future of industrial expansion. This rhetoric, reminiscent of

---

[2] Ibid., 8 December 1959, pp.9-10.

the promises of the growth and modernization the Seaway Project would bring, was echoed in an editorial the following day. Calling the "unwelcome and unenviable economic situation" in Cornwall "a unique challenge," McKay asked citizens to support the CIDL because the Committee's proposal "might lead to large-scale employment."[3]

Although the city was successful in acquiring the mill properties, the reality of the economic difficulties facing many people in the area would not go away, as much as Cornwall's elite tried to tell people that they were not "in trouble." Moreover, their repeated, vociferous speeches that Cornwall was doing just fine, thank you, suggests that they were having some difficulty convincing people of it. They were particularly upset at an article that appeared in an Ottawa newspaper soon after the announcement of the CC closures, entitled "Warns Seaway City Faces Economic Ruin."[4] The article, which seems to have portrayed Cornwall as on the brink of disaster, was supposedly based upon a conversation with Mayor Lavigne, but the Mayor claimed that he was misinterpreted and argued that the city's economic problems would be overcome.[5] McKay bemoaned the fact that the story was so negative. But while he admitted that the financial situation locally was not great, "naturally" a readjustment to the loss of a major industry had to occur, which, he noted, was already happening with the work of the CIDL. As proof of Cornwall's "bright economic future," the editor cited the recent $12 million expansion at the paper mill; the fact that Courtaulds was running at full capacity; the establishment of

---

[3] Ibid., 9 December 1959, p.4.

[4] Ibid., 10 December 1959, p.4.

[5] Ibid., 9 December 1959, p.13.

three new industries in town; and the smooth running of several other local businesses. In closing, he highlighted the senselessness of a "defeatist attitude" and the need for a "positive approach."[6] A couple of days later, more responses to the Ottawa newspaper story were printed in the Standard-Freeholder. In one article, the author boasted of how many industries were either doing well, or had moved to the city, in that year, and pointed out that local officials felt that the city's future was bright.[7] Board of Trade manager Alex Gilbert called the recent "gloom and doom" reports about the city "very strange...Any one strolling through the shopping section of Cornwall would find such a statement extremely difficult to accept, in fact, gentlemen, impossible is the more appropriate word." Just to be sure this message was getting across, the Board of Trade sent denials of the Ottawa article's "allegations" to four major daily newspapers.[8]

Although their attempts to rally community spirit deserve credit, the boasts of local leading figures about Cornwall's economic health became harder and harder for people to believe. Clearly, Cornwall's "Seaway boom" had ended. The "sense of forward motion" had continued even after the completion of construction and the blowing of the cofferdam on Inundation Day, aided by the expansion and modernization of the city and its services. More important, though, was the anticipation of the "official" opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project by Queen Elizabeth II, and much time and effort

---

[6] Ibid., 10 December 1959, p.4.

[7] Ibid., 11 December 1959, pp.9-10.

[8] Ibid., p.9.

went into plans for the monarch's visit.[9] But after this "icing on the cake" of the Seaway, followed by summer layoffs at CC and news of the company's end of operations in Cornwall, the economic downturn must have been a bit of a shock for many local residents.

Even so, civic boosterism continued into 1960. Ross Denton, Vice-President of the CIDL, informed The Toronto Star that people did not have the right frame of mind about Cornwall, and that municipal leaders wanted to convince local people that the CIDL was "for their own good."[10] But the persistence of poor economic conditions made belief in a golden future a stretch of the imagination. For instance, in November 1960, 2 868 area residents relied upon unemployment insurance, a 32.7% increase over the previous year, although the count excluded registrations of those who already had jobs and included all of the United Counties.[11] Advocates of the city chose instead to emphasize that more than 5 000 city residents had jobs, stating their displeasure that many "seem to be concentrating on the difficulties we have" and even comparing numbers and wages with Kingston to prove that the situation in Cornwall was not as bad as people perceived it to be. Still, marking the impact of material realities on even their buoyant hopes,

---

9

Elinor Kyte Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983, p.452.

10

Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, pp.224-225.

11

National Archives of Canada (NAC). MG28 I 219 - Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board Collection. Vol.122, Freeholder, 12 November 1960, p.9.

Cornwall's boosters had to agree with the Department of Labour's assessment of local conditions as a "slight recession."[12] Reflective of this more realistic consideration of Cornwall's economy, then Mayor-elect Nick Kaneb asked for the help of both local and national labour organizations with "the unemployment problem" in the city, which he described as "serious." His admission that the Ontario government had contacted him promising aid to draw industry to the area hints at the severity of economic conditions, as local people, including politicians and businessmen, increasingly turned to the state for help, and as the state, recognizing the need for intervention, offered the community more assistance.[13]

In December 1960, 3 260 people were on "direct relief;" by the end of 1961, the federal government declared the Cornwall area "depressed," with 4 100 people registered as unemployed and another 1 000 unemployed but unregistered.[14] The city was therefore entitled to more government subsidies and tax incentives to offer to new businesses wanting to locate in the region. And as promised, the provincial government did provide some assistance by setting up a trade school in one of the CC buildings and paying the CIDL $18 000 a year for rent.[15] But Cornwall's designation as a "depressed" area was also based upon employment and unemployment statistics from the 1950s. In order to be

---

[12] Freeholder, 14 November 1960, p.9.

[13] NAC. MG28 I 219 Vol.122, Freeholder, 17 December 1960, p.9; Senior, From Royal, p.487.

[14] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.224.

[15] Ibid., p.226; Senior, From Royal, pp.487-488.

considered a "persistent heavy unemployment area" of Canada, the average ratio of unemployment for the summer months had to be 2% above average for all other major industrial areas, and the average ratio for the winter and the year overall had to be consistently above average. According to NES registrations, unemployment averages for Cornwall, from 1953-1959 were, for the summer, 8.6%; for the winter, 15.8%; and for the annual average, 12.2%. Consequently, Cornwall was labelled a "persistent heavy unemployment" area of Canada, along with communities such as Corner Brook, Newfoundland, and Lac St. Jean and Shawinigan, Quebec. Predictably, in examining the occupational distribution of those unemployed, the authors of the report noted that large numbers of registrants worked in textiles and construction.[16]

Despite the work of local boosters to counter negative feelings about poor economic conditions, then, material realities outweighed their "anti-gloom and doom" rhetoric. The post-Seaway Cornwall clearly illustrates the limitations of rhetoric -- "discourse," if you wish -- and how, once a particular set of beliefs, ideologies or "commonsenses" is so far removed from existing material conditions as to be unbelievable, people lose faith. Thus, all the talk of the benefits of the modernization that would accompany the Seaway was increasingly met with uncertainty, cynicism, or outright hostility. The claims that Cornwall was not "depressed" in late 1959 must have met with a similar reception, judging from the way in which the repeated, insistent cries that Cornwall was

---

16

NAC. RG27 - Department of Labour Records. Vol.601, File 6641-4 -- Selected Employment and Unemployment Statistics, August 11, 1960. Ottawa: Prepared by the Working Committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Employment and Unemployment, pp.65-66,69.

economically secure changed into a more moderate boosterism, including the admission that Cornwall was indeed "depressed."[17]

But that is not to suggest that Cornwall area residents gave up hope, or stopped trying to bring jobs to the city. Even though 2 333 people still relied on welfare in April 1962, by 1965 the CIDL and the city's own Industrial Commission had attracted approximately 1 500 jobs to the area, allowing the federal government to take Cornwall off the list of "depressed" economic regions. These new industries, with the loss of the cotton mills, contributed to a reconfiguration of the city's labour force. By the mid-1960s, for every one worker employed in manufacturing, four worked in service industries.[18]

But diversification does not necessarily guarantee better levels of employment. In 1991, for instance, out of a total of 22 280 industrial workers, manufacturing employed 5 090 Cornwall residents, making this sector the most important source of local jobs. But this number was counterbalanced by the 4 105 people working in government, health and social services.[19] Unemployment levels remained quite high in the Cornwall area. The overall unemployment rate was 10.8%, or 11.1% for men and 10.5% for women fifteen years of age or older.[20] The city witnessed a number of plant closures beginning in 1989 which continued into the 1990s, so these figures illustrate the impacts of capitalism's

---

[17] Marin and Marin, Stormont, p.224; Senior, From Royal, p.487.

[18] Marin and Marin, Stormont, pp.224,226.

[19] Census of Canada 1991: Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario, Part B. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994, p.660.

[20] Census, p.658.

"ups and downs" on a community. In short, these statistics serve as a reminder that despite the initiatives of local people to "help themselves," the economic welfare of individual towns and cities is very much dependent upon the decisions of politicians and corporate leaders. Indeed, a number of local firms left Cornwall in order to move their operations to the United States, in response to the Free Trade Agreement.

The events that unravelled in the 1950s in Cornwall highlight the power of capital and the state to reshape and redefine an entire region. That Cornwall is "a physical, social and economic reality created in the restless, impatient atmosphere of the implementation of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Projects" was stated bluntly in an urban renewal study commissioned in 1963. The authors of the report wished to emphasize "that many of the deficiencies in Cornwall today resulted mainly from the impact of the implementation of gigantic national and international projects, and therefore the municipality needs exceptional financial consideration by Federal and Provincial levels of government." The study not only presented a report sympathetic to the city that asked that the state assist the area, but underlined the responsibility of the state and big business to help Cornwall out of its precarious financial position: "Unfortunately, these immense projects of national and international importance were never conceived and co-ordinated within a long-range regional plan, encompassing the future development of the new city and its region."[21] This commissioned report, in short, blamed the decisions of governments and capitalist interests for the city's "deficiencies." Although one must

---

21

The Making of a New Cornwall, 1963-1983 (Revised Ed.). Toronto: E.G.Faludi and Associates Town Planning Consultants, 1983, pp.6,14-15.

keep in mind the added effects of annexation and deindustrialization on the city, these criticisms were, by and large, accurate, and reflected contemporary disappointment that the promises of the Seaway never materialized. This more negative interpretation of the Seaway's impacts on Cornwall and the Seaway Valley remains in local public memory, demonstrating how important material outcomes and experiences are to the reconstruction of history. Elinor Kyte Senior, for example, concludes that at the end of the 1950s, the "tightly-knit prosperous city of the war years had given way to a more impersonal one. The Friendly City had evolved into the Seaway City."[22] While many people remember the relative wealth and optimism of the "construction years," they also recognize the history of greatness that never was, with a sigh for what could have been, or bitter words about what should have been.

The residents of the new towns created after the destruction of the Lost Villages also sought to reconstruct their history, once settled and secure in their new identities and communities. In 1977, the Lost Villages Historical Society (LVHS) was formed, with its aim "to collect, preserve and display our local heritage."[23] The efforts of LVHS members to educate people about the "real" history of the area can be found in the Lost Villages display in the Long Sault Parkway, as well as in the Lost Villages Museum in Ault Park, close to what used to be Moulinette. The fact that the Marins' text was written and published at about this time is reflective of this attempt to revive public memory of

---

[22] Senior, From Royal, p.453.

[23] Lost Villages Historical Society, "Lost Villages Historical Society." Box 306, Ingleside, Ont.: Lost Villages Historical Society, n.d.

the Seaway Valley (no longer the "St. Lawrence Valley") relocations. If the pamphlet produced about itself by the LVHS is any indication, twenty years of mulling over the events of the 1950s resulted in a more critical "revisionist" history, a history which had its roots in the very real fear, regret and opposition of some of those relocated. For instance, the Society notes that the Lost Villages "were not lost through carelessness," but were "casualties of progress...disposed of with government approval 'for the common good.'" Two decades after moving into their new communities (namely Long Sault and Ingleside -- the communities of Morrisburg and Iroquois were rebuilt, but their composition remained pretty much the same) "the desire of newcomers to know about the background of these seemingly-traditionless towns sparked the desire of pioneers to show and tell the proud heritage to which the new towns were heirs."[24] The LVHS, then, emphasizes the pivotal roles of both the state and "progress," or in other words, the quest for industrial expansion, in the destruction of their communities. Even though many residents acknowledge the steps taken by OH to "cushion the blow," as well as the fact that most people, at the time, cooperated with the move, they still feel that they were compelled to move for a development which had little positive economic impact on the Seaway Valley.

The expropriation of Mohawk land for the Project led to greater losses than just physical space. The dredging and flooding, in addition to the industrialization of the Akwesasne area, severely affected the ecosystem through artificial controls and pollution, respectively. The subsequent environmental disruptions eliminated sources of

---

[24] Lost Villages Historical Society, "Lost Villages Historical Society."

diet and income for many Akwesasne residents. Amplifying the direct economic losses were the psychological and spiritual impacts, due to the close relationship aboriginals have with the natural world. Recognizing the negative impacts on the people of Kahnawake and Akwesasne, some residents believe that the dislocations caused by the Seaway had a positive side, in that they sparked a greater political consciousness and desire to fight back. Political activism related to the Seaway did not end after the so-called "settlements" between the Mohawks and the state. As an example, Darren Bonaparte pointed to the occupation of a park in Fort Hunter, New York, in "Mohawk Valley," in June 1957. A small group of Mohawk labourers, mostly ironworkers from Kahnawake and Akwesasne, working on a project in the area had already set up a "squatters' camp" in the park, and apparently decided to stay to protest the treatment of their people and the loss of land resulting from the Seaway development. The protest was coordinated with others from the two communities, who converged on the park with their families.[25] In a letter to the President of the United States regarding Six Nations treaty rights, three Kahnawake and two Akwesasne residents argued that, in addition to simple justice, the American government should make the necessary treaty payments because "our tribe is in desperate need of funds particularly due to the hardship, and the taking of certain parcels of our property by the Canadian government without just compensation in

---

25

Interview, Darren Bonaparte, Akwesasne artist and historian, 1 April 1997; Schenectady Union Star, 22 June 1957, p.1.

connection with the opening of the St. Lawrence Seaway."[26] Using the media to publicize their claims against the SLSA for "improper dumping," the people of Akwesasne also pursued legal channels, launching their suit against OH and the SLSA in 1974. In another vein, Akwesasne Notes, the official news journal of the Mohawk Nation of Akwesasne, was born in December 1968. This publication came about after a peaceful blockade of the International Bridge to protest the failure of the Canadian government to respect the right of aboriginals to freely cross the border under Jay's Treaty, as well as the effects of the Seaway, "which had expropriated and destroyed Mohawk lands and otherwise invaded this community."[27]

Ken Coates, in his work on Native-White relations in the Yukon, discusses the "political awakening" also taking place in the 1960s and 1970s among aboriginals in the North. But he emphasizes that counter to the contemporary belief that they were "stirred up" by non-Native radicals, the Native community, although influenced by outside events and people, initiated land claims on their own out of their own concern for their future welfare.[28] The Mohawks of Akwesasne, too, witnessed and gained inspiration from the explosion of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, including "Red Power" and the

---

26 Omar Ghobashy, The Caughnawaga Indians and the St. Lawrence Seaway. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1961, pp.53-54.

27 Akwesasne Notes, Vol.1, No.1(Spring 1995), p.4.

28 Ken S. Coates, Best Left as Indians: Native-While Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840-1973. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, pp.231-232.

American Indian Movement.[29] Ultimately, though, the grievances they had were real, long-standing and very much their own. After hundreds of years of mistreatment, the accumulating anger and resentment had to be released in some form, and the wide-ranging impacts of the Seaway development already outlined would certainly have added "fuel to the fire." As Brian David concluded, people do what they must to survive, and as the Seaway removed the ability of many in the community to sustain themselves, Akwesasne residents fought back. And this taking action in order to protect the well-being of the community is important, even necessary. More specifically, studies of various aboriginal communities which have experienced hydro mega-projects illustrate that greater aboriginal involvement in both implementing and responding to the developments can help to counter the feelings of loss of control and betrayal engendered by the projects' impacts.[30] This sort of initiative has been demonstrated at Akwesasne in, for instance, the active role of Mohawk women in environmental studies, like the First Environment Projects (FEP). These studies of body contamination had their beginnings in the mid-1980s, when midwife Katsi Cook began collecting breast milk samples in response to the alarming number of local babies she saw born with birth defects, such as cleft palates or deafness. Akwesasne mothers were horrified that they were, in effect,

---

29

Interviews, Darren Bonaparte; Mike McDonald, historical curator for the North American Indian Travelling College, 4 March 1997; Brian David, employee, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 2 April 1997.

30

Martin Loney, "Social Problems, Community Trauma and Hydro Project Impacts," in Canadian Journal of Native Studies. XV,2(1995), pp.245-246.

poisoning their own children.[31] In response, Mohawk women cut down or eliminated their consumption of fish from the river, and became active in, even leading, contamination studies and other community work, assisting a midwifery program, training health givers about environmental concerns, and helping other communities cope with environmental degradation by sharing their knowledge and experiences. Phase I of the breast milk study found that Akwesasne mothers had successfully reduced the PCB levels in their bodies, and that overall, the benefits of breast milk outweighed the costs of small amounts of toxins. But as relieved as they were at this news, Mohawk women, in a public statement, expressed their justifiable anger that they were the ones forced to cope with the consequences of environmental contamination, while the corporations responsible did almost nothing.[32] The other actions taken by the Akwesasne community to seek redress for losses caused by the Seaway, or for other grievances, also speak to a determination to resolve their problems.

This agency has been made easier in recent years with the opening up of political, economic, educational and legal opportunities and channels for aboriginal peoples and others, as women, youth, ethnic groups and francophones are encouraged to involve themselves in "citizen participation" in Canada.[33] Consequently, Natives can acquire the

---

31

Johansen, Mohawk Country, p.14; Priscilla Warswick, "First Environment Project," Akwesasne Notes, Vol.1, No.2(Summer 1995), p.16.

32 Warswick, "First Environment Project," pp.16-18.

33

Leslie A. Pal, Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992, p.8; Martin Loney, "A political economy of citizen participation," in Panitch, ed., The

knowledge they need to better defend their interests within the state and society. And even though the impetus for collective action came from the community itself, funding from federal, provincial and state governments has enabled the people of Akwesasne to carry on with their efforts. The FEP testing, for instance, is being conducted with the help of the New York State Department of Health.[34] Brian David is now working on what is basically an oral environmental history project. The project involves videotaping the recollections of elder Mohawks who experienced the Seaway as farmers, fishers, hunters and trappers, with a focus on how they witnessed and felt the damage to the environment wrought by the Seaway. Ironically, some of the funding for this endeavour comes from OH.[35]

State funding for "minority" or "interest groups," however, raises the question of co-optation. More conservative critics of funding for advocacy groups feel that these groups only exist and survive because of the support they receive from the state.[36] Those on the left, though, argue that the state will only fund "moderate" groups in order to project a facade of true "democracy" or "pluralism" and to maintain the status quo. This interpretation of government subsidies as a form of "social control" also posits that financial and institutional assistance serves to defuse radicalism and "grease the wheels"

Canadian state, p.446; Coates, Best Left as Indians, p.264.

[34] Warswick, "First Environment Project," p.16.

[35] Interviews, Darren Bonaparte; Brian David.

[36] Pal, Interests of State, p.12.

in the context of negotiations.[37] And in support of the latter interpretation, the extension of "democracy" to aboriginals seems like an extension of the "public participation" pledged to residents of the Lost Villages in order to gain both legitimacy and consent for their dislocation. Brian David, commenting on OH's recent "partnership approach" to relations with the people of Akwesasne, did not consider the money given for the oral history project "co-optation." In fact, he welcomed this friendlier relationship, through which resolutions to conflicts and much-needed research are more likely to be accomplished, in place of an adversarial relationship in which the state agency is less accessible. He also pointed out, in opposition to the "social control" thesis, that in some ways, OH, like other government, corporate and social bodies, have been forced into adopting more "open and honest" relations with aboriginal peoples. With more and more Native lawyers, scientists and other "professionals," and a generally more educated Native population, political and business leaders can no longer use paternalistic or assimilationist arguments about "cultural inferiority" or "looking out for their best interests" to exploit them or to sidestep their concerns.[38] In a discussion about OH funding for the study, though, another source immediately remarked on the irony and joked about using the study's findings to in turn sue the agency. Thus, interpretations of state support for collective action at Akwesasne vary, and as with the view that the Band Council "sold out" to Seaway promoters in the 1950s, relations between the state, aboriginals, and capital are more complex than they appear. Even so, the fine line

---

[37] Ibid., p.11; Loney, "Citizen Participation," pp.446,453-454.

[38] Interview, Brian David.

between co-optation and subversion is often unclear. I was informed of a "rumour" that OH officials offered money to the Mohawks of Akwesasne for the construction of their new arena, but were refused because the offer was seen as a bribe related to the Seaway Project lawsuit. When asked about this "rumour," however, Paul Newell confirmed that OH had made a contribution to the Turtle Arena and Community Centre as part of "past grievance negotiations" between the Akwesasne Band Council and OH, which had been ongoing "in earnest" since 1993.[39]

It is interesting to note that, within the "modernization" represented by the Seaway development and the closure of the cotton mills, our present era of global capitalism is visible. The Seaway Project was undertaken to increase traffic and trade with foreign countries, as those who backed the Project sought larger markets. These same political and corporate leaders supported deregulation to increase capital mobility. At the same time, Canadian fiscal policy reflected the decision, on the part of the state, to focus on making Canada a "specialist" in the export of natural resources and to seriously cut down on support for more traditional manufacturing sectors.[40] In response to growing global competition from previously "unindustrialized" areas, as well as to the loss of tariff protection, CC pushed for greater "flexibility" in its labour processes, expecting workers

---

39

Phone interview. Paul Newell, Ontario Hydro Corporate Communications, 19 March 1997.

40

Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, "Preface," in Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, eds., The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991, pp.xi-xii.

to exhibit most of the "flexibility." The increasing mobility of capital is also illustrated by both the decision of CC owners to end operations and to invest in a more profitable sector, and by the existence of Texfin in a low-wage, non-union country.[41] Thus, while most who write about the end of the Keynesian or "Fordist" era refer to the 1970s, the roots of the "global era" are evident in Cornwall as early as the 1950s.[42]

Still, as much as "community dependency" rings true for the Cornwall area in the 1950s, the amount of control of capitalist interests and the state must be qualified. The residents of the Lost Villages, the people of Akwesasne, and the workers in the CC mills all understood "modernization" in relation to the contexts of their own daily lives. When these efforts at capitalist expansion menaced their material security, they resisted or acted to protect their interests as best they could, given the circumstances. Though their demonstrations of agency may seem insignificant, their experiences represent some of the lesser known "histories" of Canada in the 1950s; that, in itself, is justification enough.

41

Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler, "The World Economy and the Nation-State: The New International Order," in Drache and Gertler eds., The New Era, p.9; David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, Mass; Blackwell, 1989, pp.147,185.

42

Bryan D. Palmer, Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992, pp.337-339, 342-347; Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, pp.134-135,147,185; David A. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982 ," in Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey, eds., Modern Canada: 1930-1980's. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984, pp.48-49.



Fig. 1. City of Cornwall, 1950. The Canadian Cottons mills are: (5) Canada Mill; (6) Dundas Mill; (7) Glengarry Cottons/Dundas Annex; (8) Stormont Mill. Source: Elinor Kyte Senior, From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983, insert.



Physical impact of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, showing the old and new waterlines and communities and main seaway and power structures.

Fig. 2. Locations of the Lost Villages of Mille Roches, Moulinette, Wales, Dickinson's Landing, Farran's Point, Aultsville, Morrisburg and Iroquois.
Source: Clive Marin and Frances Marin, Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982, p.74.



Fig. 3. Akwesasne (St. Regis Reserve) today, excluding several islands.
Source: Bruce E. Johansen, Life and Death in Mohawk Country. Golden, Colorado: North American Press, 1993, p.29.

Bibliography

I. Primary Sources

A. Manuscripts

Department of Indian Affairs. National Archives of Canada. RG10 Vol. 7133.

Department of Labour. National Archives of Canada. RG27 Vols. 521, 522, 524, 601, 602.

St. Lawrence Seaway Authority. National Archives of Canada. RG52 Vols. 31, 34.

Greater Cornwall Textile Joint Board Collection. National Archives of Canada. MG28 I 219 Vols. 93, 110, 122.

Ralph McIntee Collection. National Archives of Canada. MG30 A87.

B. Interviews

Bellmore, Henry. Former Seaway Project worker, 20 February 1997.

Bonaparte, Darren. Akwesasne artist and historian, 1 April 1997.

Brownell, Jim. Member of the Lost Villages Historical Society, 5 April 1997.

Carrara, Brian. Property Manager, St. Lawrence Seaway Authority (Cornwall), 5 March 1997.

David, Brian. Employee, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 2 April 1997.

Kirkey, Jeannine. Former textile worker, Courtaulds and Canadian Cottons (Cornwall), 21 February, 1997.

McDonald, Mike. Historical curator for the North American Indian Travelling College, 4 March 1997.

Newell, Paul. Ontario Hydro Corporate Communications, 19 March 1997.

Roundpoint, Donna. Employee, Mohawk Council of Akwesasne, 3 March 1997.

C. Government Documents and Publications

Canada. Census of Canada, 1991: Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario, Part B. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1994.

Royal Commission of Canada's Economic Prospects: The Canadian Primary Textile Industry. Ottawa: National Industrial Conference Board, July 1956.

Royal Commission on the Textile Industry. Justice W.F.A. Turgeon, Commissioner. Ottawa: J.O. Patenaude, 1938.

D. Newspapers and Newsletters

Various Issues Unless Otherwise Noted

Standard-Freeholder. (Cornwall).

The Star Weekly. (Toronto). 27 June 1959.

Union Star. (Schenectady). 22 June 1957.

UE Canadian News. Vol. XI No. 528, 27 August 1954.

E. Other Reports and Studies

The Canadian Cotton Textile Industry in Perspective: A Study of Recent Trends and Future Prospects. Prepared by W.A. Beckett Associated, 1963.

The Making of a New Cornwall, 1963-1983 (Revised Ed.): An Urban Renewal Study. Toronto: E.G. Faludi and Associates Town Planning Consultants, 1983.

Report of the Conference of Canadian Engineers on the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, December 30, 1929.

St. Lawrence Remedial Action Plan Team and the St. Lawrence (Cornwall) Public

Advisory Committee. Choices for Cleanup: Deciding the Future of a Great River. Cornwall: Ministry of Natural Resources, August 1994.

St. Lawrence Seaway Authority. St. Lawrence Seaway -- Under Construction. Ottawa: St. Lawrence Seaway Authority, 1957.

St. Lawrence Waterway Project: Report of the Joint Board of Engineers. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, November 16, 1926.

St. Lawrence Waterway Project: Report of the Joint Board of Engineers (Reconvened) on the International Section. Ottawa: F.A. Ackland, April 9, 1932.

F. Other Primary Sources

Burgess, Loretta and Burgess, Morris. "The Seaway Song." Cornwall. Copyright 11 February 1956.

Eadie, Bob. Seaway Valley Cartoons. Cornwall: Vesta Publications, 1975.

McKay, Don. Long Sault. London, Ont.: Applegarth Follies, 1975.

The Mohawks of Akwesasne v. The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and Ontario Hydro. Court File No. T2210-76. Declaration of Plaintiffs.

The Mohawks of Akwesasne v. The St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and Ontario Hydro. Court File No. T2210-76. Defence.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Articles and Pamphlets

Clarkson, Stephen. "Disjunctions: Free Trade and the Paradox of Canadian Development." In The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, pp.103-126. Edited by Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

Craypo, Charles and Nissen, Bruce. "Introduction." and "Conclusion." In Grand Designs: The Impact of Corporate Strategies on Workers, Unions and Communities, pp.3-17, 224-250. Edited by Charles Craypo and Bruce Nissen. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1993.

Cuthbert Brandt, Gail. "The Transformation of Women's Work in the Quebec Cotton

Industry, 1920-1950." In The Character of Class Struggle, pp.115-137. Edited by Bryan D. Palmer. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986.

Drache, Daniel and Gertler, Meric S. "Preface." In The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, pp.xi-xx. Edited by Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

-------. "The New World Economy and the Nation-State: The New International Order." In The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, pp.3-25. Edited by Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

Hall, Stuart. "The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism Among the Theorists." In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, pp.35-73. Edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988.

Kanentiio, Doug George. "No Evading Natural Law." Akwesasne Notes. Vol. 1, No.2 (Summer 1995):16-18.

Laidlaw, Blair and Curtis, Bruce. "Inside Postal Workers: The Labour Process, State Policy, and The Workers' Response." In Canadian Labour History: Selected Readings, pp.354-376. 2nd ed. Edited by David J. Bercuson and David Bright. Mississauga: Copp Clark Longman, 1994.

Lickers, F. Henry. "The Message Returns." Akwesasne Notes. Vol. 1, No. 1(Spring 1995):10-11.

Loney, Martin. "A political economy of citizen participation." In The Canadian state: political economy and political power, pp.446-472. Edited by Leo Panitch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

-------. "Social Problems, Community Trauma and Hydro Project Impacts." The Canadian Journal of Native Studies. XV,2(1995):231-254.

Lost Villages Historical Society. "Lost Villages Historical Society." Box 306, Ingleside, Ont.: Lost Villages Historical Society, n.d.

Mahon, Rianne. "Canadian public policy: the unequal structure of representation." In The Canadian state: political economy and political power, pp.165-198. Edited by Leo Panitch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

Moon, Peter. "Eagle Returns, A Sign of Hope For Mohawks." Akwesasne Notes. Vol. 1, No. 1(Spring 1995):93-95.

Naylor, R.T. "The rise and fall of the third commercial empire of the St. Lawrence." In Capitalism and the national question in Canada, pp.1-41. Edited by Gary Teeple. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Page, J. Bryan. "The Use of Reminiscences and Oral Tradition in the Study of Ethnohistory." In Ethnohistory: A Researcher's Guide, pp.275-296. Edited by Dennis Wiedman. Williamsburg, Va.: College of William and Mary, 1986.

Palmer, Bryan D. "The Poverty of Theory Revisited: Or, Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, And the Ostensible End of Marxism." left history. 1(Spring 1993):67-101.

Panitch, Leo. "The role and nature of the Canadian state." In The Canadian state: political economy and political power, pp.3-37. Edited by Leo Panitch. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977.

Phillips, Paul and Watson, Stephen. "From Mobilization to Continentalism: The Canadian Economy in the Post-Depression Period." In Modern Canada: 1930-1980's, pp.20-45. Edited by Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

Phillips, Paul. "New Staples and Mega-Projects: Reaching the Limits to Sustainable Development." In The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, pp.229-246. Edited by Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

Rarihokwats. "How Democracy Came to St. Regis." Rooseveltown, NY: Akwesasne Notes, n.d.

Roberts, Wayne and Bullen, John. "A Heritage of Hope and Struggle: Workers, Unions, and Politics in Canada, 1930-1982." In Modern Canada: 1930-1980's, pp.105-140. Edited by Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

St. Lawrence Parks Commission. "Down the Front: The Story of the Mighty St. Lawrence River." Morrisburg, Ont.: St. Lawrence Parks Commission, n.d.

Warswick, Priscilla. "First Environment Project." Akwesasne Notes. Vol. 1, No.2(Summer 1995):16-18.

Wolfe, David A. "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982." In Modern Canada: 1930-1980's, pp.46-78. Edited by Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984.

B. Books

Berger, Carl. The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970.

Berman, Marshall. All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.

Bradbury, Bettina. Working Families: Age, Gender and Survival in Industrializing Montreal. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993.

Brior, John H. Taming of the Sault. Watertown, NY: Hungerford-Holbrook Co., 1960.

Chevrier, Lionel. The St. Lawrence Seaway. Toronto: Macmillan, 1959.

Coates, Ken S. Best Left as Indians: Native-White Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840-1973. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991.

Davis, Mike. Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class. New York: Verso, 1986.

Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge. London: Tavistock Publications, 1972.

Frobel, Folker, Heinrichs, Jurgen and Kreye, Otto, eds. The New International Division of Labour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Ghobashy, Omar. The Caughnawaga Indians and the St. Lawrence Seaway. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1961.

Good, Mabel Tinkess. Chevrier: Politician, Statesman, Diplomat and Entrepreneur of the St. Lawrence Seaway. Canada: Stanke, 1987.

Graham, Roger. Old Man Ontario: Leslie M. Frost. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Gramsci, Antonio. Selections From the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Edited and Translated by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Novell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.

Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989.

Howard, Sister Mary Jane. Some Economic Aspects of the St. Lawrence Project. PhD Thesis. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949.

Iverson, Noel and Matthews, Ralph D. Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland. St. John's: Memorial University, 1968.

Jeacle, Jean C. To Make a House a Home: The Story of Ingleside, Ontario. Ingleside: Township of Osnabruck, September 1975.

Johansen, Bruce E. Life and Death in Mohawk Country. Golden, Colorado: North Amercian Press, 1993.

Kealey, Gregory S. and Palmer, Bryan D. Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1900. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Legget, Robert F. The Seaway. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Co., 1979.

Mabee, Carleton. The Seaway Story. New York: Macmillan, 1961.

Mahon, Rianne. The Politics of Industrial Restructuring: Canadian Textiles. Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1984.

Marin, Clive and Marin, Frances. Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 1945-1978. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1982.

McCullough, A.B. The Primary Textile Industry in Canada: History and Heritage. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, Canada, 1992.

McCullum, Hugh and McCullum, Karmel. This Land is Not For Sale. Toronto: Anglican Book Centre, 1975.

McKay, Ian. The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in 20th Century Nova Scotia. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994.

Morrison, Beryl. Two Centuries of Life in Osnabruck Township. Ingleside: Township of Osnabruck, 1984.

Morton, Suzanne. Ideal Surroundings: Domestic Life in a Working-Class Suburb in the 1920s. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995.

Nelles, N.V. The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974.

O'Dette, Leonard A. Glimpses, Glances, Sideswipes of Dickinson's Landing. Ottawa: T&H Printers, 1982.

Offe, Claus. Contradictions of the Welfare State. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.

Pal, Leslie A. Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992.

Palmer, Bryan D. Capitalism Comes to the Backcountry: The Goodyear Invasion of Napanee. Toronto: Between the Lines, 1994.

———. Working-Class Experience: Rethinking the History of Canadian Labour, 1800-1991. 2nd ed. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992.

Panitch, Leo. Working-Class Politics in Crisis: Essays on Labour and the State. London: Verso, 1986.

Parr, Joy. The Gender of Breadwinners: Women, Men, and Change in Two Industrial Towns 1880-1950. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.

Porter, John Sherman, ed. Moody's Industrial Manual, American and Foreign, 1958. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1958.

———. Moody's Industrial Manual, American and Foreign, 1961. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1961.

———. Moody's Manual of Investments, American and Foreign: Industrial Securities, 1945. New York: Moody's Investors Service, 1945.

Seaway and Hydro Project -- Illustrated Guide. Long Sault: Long Sault Boat Line Ltd., 1963.

Senior, Elinor Kyte. From Royal Township to Industrial City: Cornwall 1784-1984. Belleville: Mika Publishing, 1983.

Stephens, George Washington. The St. Lawrence Waterway Project. Montreal: Louis Carrier and Co., 1930.

Struthers, James. The Limits of Affluence: Welfare in Ontario, 1920-1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994.

———. No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State 1914-1941. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983.

Tester, Frank James and Tulchyski, Peter. Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic, 1939-63. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1994.

Waldram, James B. As Long as the Rivers Run: Hydroelectric Development and Native Communities in Western Canada. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1988.

Willoughby, William R. The St. Lawrence Waterway: A Study of Politics and Diplomacy. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.

C. Theses

Austin, Barbara J. "Life Cycles and Strategy of a Canadian Company: Dominion Textile, 1873-1983." PhD Thesis. Montreal: Concordia University, 1985.

DeLottinville, Peter. "The St. Croix Cotton Manufacturing Company and Its Influence on the St. Croix Community, 1880-1892." MA Thesis. Montreal: Dalhousie University, 1970.

Ellis, Ralph. "Textile Workers and Textile Strikes in Cornwall, Sherbrooke, and St. Gregoire de Montmorency, 1936-1939." MA Thesis. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 1985.

Scheinberg, Ellen Carrie. "Female Textile Workers in Cornwall, Ontario, 1936-1946." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, March 1990.

Wright, Miriam Carol. "'The Smile of Modernity': The state and modernization of the Atlantic cod fishery, 1945-1970." MA Thesis. Kingston: Queen's University, May 1990.