

**The Absence of the Other:
A Macro-Level Application of Goffmanian Frame Analysis
to the End of the Cold War
and its Representation in American Film**

by

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis a unique macro-level application of Erving Goffman's frame analysis perspective is applied to that period of 20th century history known as the Cold War, its sudden and unexpected ending, and its representation in American film. The interpretive tradition in sociology is traced from symbolic interactionism through phenomenology and ethnomethodology to Goffman's work, stressing such themes as the possibility of emergent creativity in social interaction and the probability that such instances of emergence are most likely in "problematic" interaction. Through the use of certain modifications and extensions to Goffman's model its applicability to a social sphere beyond face-to-face interaction is demonstrated and the macro-level Cold War Frame and American Superiority Frame are articulated. The disruption of the former is held to entail emergent consequences for the latter. The medium of American cinema is utilized as the means through which the Cold War Frame and its disruption are followed and the macro-level potential of frame analysis is demonstrated.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| PREFACE..... | vii |
| CHAPTER ONE: THE INTERPRETIVE TRADITION | |
| 1.1 Introduction..... | 01 |
| 1.2 George Herbert Mead and Symbolic Interactionism..... | 02 |
| 1.3 Alfred Schutz and Phenomenology..... | 06 |
| 1.4 Harold Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology..... | 10 |
| 1.5 Summary..... | 13 |
| CHAPTER TWO: ERVING GOFFMAN'S FRAME ANALYSIS | |
| 2.1 Primary Frameworks..... | 15 |
| 2.2 Frames, Keys and Fabrications..... | 21 |
| 2.3 Framing Complications..... | 27 |
| 2.4 Summary..... | 32 |
| CHAPTER THREE: MODIFICATIONS, EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS | |
| 3.1 Cognitive Schemata: Matthew S. Hirshberg..... | 35 |
| 3.2 The Centrality of Frame Breaks: Andrew Travers..... | 48 |
| 3.3 Habitus and Field: Pierre Bourdieu..... | 56 |
| 3.4 Summary..... | 65 |
| CHAPTER FOUR: FRAMES AND IDEOLOGY | |
| 4.1 The Marxist Tradition..... | 68 |
| 4.2 Language and Communications Media..... | 72 |
| 4.3 Summary..... | 85 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: THE INNER AND OUTER FRAMES | |
| 5.1 Outer: The American Superiority Frame..... | 87 |
| 5.2 Inner: The Cold War Frame..... | 93 |
| 5.3 Summary..... | 100 |
| CHAPTER SIX: FRAME DISRUPTIONS | |
| 6.1 A Brief History of the Cold War..... | 101 |
| 6.2 The End of the Cold War as Frame Disruption..... | 116 |
| 6.3 Summary..... | 137 |

CHAPTER SEVEN: ORGANIZING FILM REPRESENTATIONS

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7.1 Temporal Divisions..... | 140 |
| 7.2 The Cold War Film as Genre..... | 144 |
| 7.3 The Relationship of Film to Cold War Frame..... | 152 |
| 7.4 A Microcosm: The Bond Franchise..... | 156 |

CHAPTER EIGHT: FILM ANALYSES

| | |
|--|-----|
| 8.1 Method..... | 164 |
| 8.2 Coding Steps..... | 176 |
| 8.3 Establishment Exemplar: <i>Fail-Safe</i> | 177 |
| 8.4 Dissensus and Détente Exemplar: <i>The Spy Who Loved Me</i> | 179 |
| 8.5 Resurgence Exemplar: <i>Firefox</i> | 181 |
| 8.6 Disruption Exemplar: <i>Company Business</i> | 182 |
| 8.7 Discussion/Conclusions..... | 184 |

APPENDICES

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Cold War Time Line..... | 1.1 |
| 2. Space Race Time Line..... | 2.1 |
| 3. Cold War Film Chronology..... | 3.1 |
| 4. Coding Results..... | 4.1 |
| 5. Establishment Coding and Close Reading..... | 5.1 |
| 6. Dissensus and Détente Coding and Close Reading..... | 6.1 |
| 7. Resurgence Coding and Close Reading..... | 7.1 |
| 8. Disruption Coding and Close Reading..... | 8.1 |
| 9. Response Coding and Close Reading..... | 9.1 |

| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| REFERENCES..... | 302 |
|-----------------|-----|

PREFACE

How might the combination of Hollywood movies and a sociological perspective designed solely for the analysis of face-to-face interaction be able to sort out the confusion and shock of the Cold War's almost instantaneous evaporation at the tail end of the "Reagan-Thatcher" decade? Seldom has a single decade begun and ended in such disparate climates. In the early eighties Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher presided over an era of "evil empires;" of Soviet troop invasions and incursions, war in the South Atlantic, Sandinistas and Contras, frightening Islamic theocracies and such dubious reactions as the "Star Wars" satellite defence system. East and West could not even play nice together in two successive summer Olympics. Popular culture, especially cinema, quickly caught the mood. Soon Rocky was boxing in Moscow, Rambo was killing in Afghanistan and James Bond's career regained its political edge.

By the decade's end the Soviet Union had gone through no fewer than four leaders culminating in the perplexingly earnest Mikhail Gorbachev, demonstrably sincere in his efforts to end the arms race and reform Soviet politics. Suddenly the troops had left Afghanistan, the INF treaty was signed, Solidarity union leaders and poets were coming to the political forefront in Poland and Czechoslovakia, the iron curtain was being parted

along the Austria-Hungary border, and in early November 1989 the Berlin Wall itself was gleefully danced upon and dismantled. Within a few short months every East European Communist government fell, the two Germanies reunified, and on Christmas Day 1991 the Soviet Union itself ceased to exist. And all without one American bullet fired, one embargo imposed or any significant pressure applied from the West. After more than 70 years of Communism in Russia and more than 40 years of East/West Cold War fear and conflict, it was all over in a virtual heartbeat. What were Rambo, Bond, and for that matter George Bush, to do with themselves? Just as importantly, for the purposes of this thesis, what manner of sociology can be applied to understand such radical shifts occurring simultaneously in the realms of popular culture and geopolitics?

At the level of interpersonal interaction a tradition exists which considers in some detail such sudden, radical shifts in shared perceptions. Harold Garfinkel's breaching experiments, for example, demonstrate the range of anomic responses that so often result from the unexpected violation of unquestioned norms. It is Erving Goffman's frame analysis, developed primarily in the 1974 book by the same name, that holds the most promise in this area. As originally intended, frame analysis constitutes a means of conceptualizing face-to-face interaction that is situation-

specific, remarkably versatile, and almost completely unconcerned with such traditional sociological provinces as ideology or power. Here Goffman presents social life as an ongoing negotiation of serial "frames" - shared definitions of presently occurring social reality. Frames are inherently vulnerable but very rarely problematic; negotiations are most often simply a matter of course. However, when a frame "break" occurs and the shared definition of reality is suddenly shattered, interactants may experience an anomic flux that leaves them, momentarily at least, adrift and floundering; what Goffman calls a "negative experience." Typically interactants will struggle to reestablish their lost footing, to return to the baseline of normalcy. But something else may also happen, something unanticipated and unpredictable. In any instance of a true "negative" frame break, that is, the potential for a kind of emergent creativity appears. Moreover, this eventuality is shared by both Goffman and the bulk of interpretive social theorists. Symbolic interactionism, phenomenology and ethnomethodology may all be shown to align with a view that problematic interaction leads to emergent properties, creativity and the micro-sources of social change and vitality.

It is my contention that there is nothing inherent to Goffmanian frame analysis which precludes its employment beyond the realm of face-to-face interaction and that given certain

reasonable modifications and extrapolations from Goffman's principles, the general perspective of frame analysis may indeed be usefully applied in the macro sphere. A stable frame may be rarer here but widely held, highly intersubjective definitions of presently occurring social reality are not impossible to locate. In the United States, from 1948 to 1989, two such macro-level frames may be identified as the Cold War Frame and the American Superiority Frame. The former is held to have been "disrupted" at the end of the above time period and to have rendered certain aspects of the latter suddenly problematic. There may also exist certain manifestations of emergent creativity to be articulated. On the plane of interpersonal interaction these individual instances of emergence are fleeting and ephemeral, melting in the air as they occur. On the macro plane, however, they may be more amenable to observation and scrutiny. The existence of the Cold War Frame seems clearly inscribed, for example, in various media and cultural practices, including Hollywood film. The frame's disruption, then, should also be recorded in cinema, which may even demonstrate certain emergent properties.

Thus, as a lens through which these developments may be understood as well as a medium through which these frames are supported, a number of Cold War films have been scrutinized and related to the Cold War Frame's disruption. At the macro level

the point of frame disruption is held to expand relative to its degree of intersubjectivity. Remaining relatively brief, the disruption phase is nonetheless now possible to document, and for the purposes of this thesis, films corresponding to a "frame date" of 1989-91 will be considered to represent a disruption phase of film making. Although some reciprocal relationship between Cold War events and the representation of the Cold War in film is therefore assumed to exist, this is not a linear, deterministic or cause-and-effect analysis. It is, rather, a means by which, in-keeping with Goffman, the Cold War, its disruption, the Cold War film genre, and its disruption are all rendered more intelligible through their reciprocal relationships.

CHAPTER ONE: THE INTERPRETIVE TRADITION

1.1 - Introduction

The theoretical underpinnings of this project are located primarily in the writings of Erving Goffman, particularly his 1974 work *Frame Analysis*, and certain variations on his model that will be developed herein. Although it may be argued that Goffman's work exhibits significant divergences from his University of Chicago and symbolic interactionist colleagues, the interpretive or "micro" sociology tradition nonetheless informs both Goffman's intellectual development and the early direction of this thesis. A consideration of the continuity between such theorists as George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz, through to Goffman himself, and then to later variations on a frame analysis conception of macro-level social processes, is therefore presented here.

The continuities that I wish to demonstrate are those of a similarity in: a) an active, creative model of human consciousness, not as a self-contained and self-generating entity, but as a socially created human attribute; b) by extension, a model of the individual self as an ongoing process; c) an orientation towards the idea of emergence as a consistent possibility in social interaction; d) a perspective recognizing that emergence is most likely to occur in instances of problematic interaction; and e) an allowance that such instances

of interaction may create an addition to the social stock of knowledge or at least contribute to the micro sources of social change, however difficult such changes may be to quantify.

1.2 - George Herbert Mead and Symbolic Interactionism

In many ways the prototypical micro sociologist, George Herbert Mead was not particularly concerned with the macro structures of social life, except as the necessary context in which the individual self arises. Here the individual is conceptualized as radically social; that is, social by definition. One is not, therefore, born human, but learns to become so through a process of de-centring the inherent egocentric orientation of consciousness. Accomplished primarily through role playing games in early socialization, the young proto-human first learns to appreciate the perspectives of "significant others," then the "generalized other." Thus, "when a self does appear it always involves an experience of another; there could be no experience of a self simply by itself." Mead, 1962:195) More specifically, "all selves are constituted by or in terms of the social process, and are individual reflections of it - or rather of this organized behaviour pattern which it exhibits." (Mead, 1962:201)

Yet each individual reflects this pattern from their own unique perspective, thus manifesting in their own activities and cognitive processes different aspects of the whole pattern. If it is only a function of differing significant others in early socialization that accounts for such variations, there is something unsatisfying about this model in asserting the uniqueness of individual selves. But Mead's model of the self also incorporates a reflexive element generally characteristic of symbolic interactionism, in this case composed of three dimensions:

1. subjective perception - "how I see myself"
2. social perception - "how I believe others see me"
3. social presentation - "how I present myself to others"

Social life, insofar as it involves interaction with other selves, thus resembles an ongoing negotiation and management process very much in line with the perspective Goffman would later develop. However, for the purposes of supporting the view of uniqueness in each perspective of self, it is Mead's dual notion of consciousness that is most useful.

Mead's two basic components, or rather processes, of the self are the "I" and the "me" with the former roughly analogous to the ego, the latter to the generalized other. The "me" constitutes the forces of conformity, the identification with the

organized attitudes of the group, while the "I" represents individual responses to these organized attitudes as they appear in one's own experience. It is the dynamic interplay of these two processes which define individual selves.

The "me" is the part of the self we are most aware of, our habitual "baseline" of behaviour, necessary for day-to-day functioning in society and representative of our internalized norms of conduct. The "I" is elusive and never fully realized, it accounts for the constant unpredictability of human behaviour. It is the cutting edge of human action and cognition, functioning at the exact moment of the realization of novel ideas and unanticipated situations. We may plan our future actions, but their realization is never precisely as we plan. This difference is made possible largely through the effect of the "I," lending us at the least a perception of agency and initiative. Both the "I" and the "me" are necessary for social life. One must belong to a community and generally support its organized attitudes to be accepted, yet one is constantly reacting to these attitudes. Each reaction of each individual "I" changes the group in some way, and the combined effects constitute social change. Some individuals, on rare occasions, may make profound changes, but usually they are minute and virtually impossible to calculate individually.

The existence of novel ideas, then, as brought about by the functioning of the "I" and its interplay with the "me" is an example of Mead's particular conceptualization of "emergence," and although derived socially from the group, this interplay accounts for the individuality or uniqueness of each self and implies the creation of something qualitatively new from the reorganization of elements:

The attitudes involved are gathered from the group, but the individual in whom they are organized has the opportunity of giving them an expression which perhaps has never taken place before. (Mead, 1962:200)

In anticipation of later linkages to Goffman, it is important to note Mead's view that the relative values of the "I" and "me" for the individual are situation-specific, depending in part on whether one wishes to support or challenge one's current perception of the organized attitudes of the group, but more generally simply reflective of the fact that society may be seen as an ongoing series of interactive situations, each demanding slightly different orientations. This is not (at least according to Goffman) the same as asserting that individuals adopt different social roles, which of course they do, but that within or across roles the immediate interactive exigencies exert a certain "framing" influence.

Finally, and again in anticipation of later theoretical relevance, it should be mentioned that Mead did not completely

ignore the micro-macro links implied in his model of self. In terms of impression management, for example, he notes how each self defines itself through comparison to others, especially through notions of superiority and inferiority. Expressions of superiority are deemed socially acceptable here in two related cases: when they are functional for the group and thus become a type of group "property," and when they are part of a shared group expression such as righteousness or nationalism.

1.3 - Alfred Schutz and Phenomenology

Theorists working in the phenomenological tradition, as developed philosophically by Edmund Husserl and sociologically by Alfred Schutz, conceptualize individuals as actors with free will who activity create the social world. It is an idealist model that begins with the certainty of reflexive consciousness for self and its unproven assumption in others (the classic problem of solipsism). Thus our knowledge of the social world is neither complete nor integrated, but this is not a serious hindrance to our ability to function in our social surroundings. We have no direct access to the consciousness of anyone we meet and yet we act in anticipation of their actions and attitudes. We must also anticipate the attitudes and actions of persons we have not or

may never meet, yet in some manner impact upon our lives. The degree of actual or potential impact can be expressed in terms of "zones of relevance." That within our reach is of primary relevance and includes three sectors:

1. world within actual reach (that is, within one's cognitive and manipulative grasp);
2. world formerly within actual reach and thus now within potential future reach;
3. world within the reach of a situated "fellowman" and therefore within actual reach if one were able to trade perspectives.

Common (but not identical) zones of relevance establish social relationships and the various "orientations" to interaction. A "thou" orientation refers to direct face-to-face interaction where one is aware of and confident in the consciousness of the other, while a "they" orientation refers to indirect interaction in which a vague assumption of consciousness or at least predictable activity is made. Here again the perspective exists whereby social interaction is structured by the form of individual settings; it is situation-specific.

For Schutz, however, individual actors are not guided by situations to the degree that Goffman believes. Not only (according to Schutz) is social life becoming increasingly anonymous in character, entailing less control or ability to

define what is and is not relevant to us, but we are grounded in a propensity towards the "taken for granted" character of daily life. The active creation of the social world, then, is a process that operates within a relatively unquestioning orientation toward social life; the "natural attitude" of the "life world."

As Schutz describes it:

"World of daily life" shall mean the intersubjective world which existed long before our birth, experienced and interpreted by others, our predecessors, as an organized world. Now it is given to our experience and interpretation. All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, which in the form of "knowledge at hand" function as a scheme of reference. (1970:72).

While the immediate life world, existing in the zone of relevance within our actual grasp is amenable to appropriation through the natural attitude, the zones of relevance removed from this immediacy are even more susceptible. Anticipating the actions of others leads to the establishment of "typifications" which aid in constructing interactional "recipes." Over time, assuming their utility, these recipes settle into patterns and become entrenched as the natural attitude. According to Schutz typifications and recipes are learned partially in daily lived experience, but as a template are established primarily through early socialization, just as the internalization of the generalized other is learned in the Meadian model of social

interaction. In Schutz's view, then, creativity and emergence are the exceptions to the rule of a baseline banality. Mead may be interpreted as holding a similar position, even with the constant potential for creativity present in the "I" of the self:

Now the "me" may be regarded as giving the form of the "I." The novelty comes in the action of the "I," but the structure, the form of the self is one which is conventional. (1962:209)

If the natural attitude is the baseline, however, it is not one that is inevitable. At points of interaction, typically face-to-face, individuals may often find that their assumptions and typifications are violated and their recipes are inadequate for understanding the situation at hand. Often an actor will withdraw from such a situation, but when this is either impossible or undesirable and the "problematic" interaction must be pursued, the potential for emergence and creativity arises. The reorganization of interactive elements establishes something qualitatively new in a type of micro dialectic and interaction between two actors resembles the functioning of Meadian selves dominated by their respective "I's." As George Ritzer argues:

...in every immediate, intense, and vivid interaction in which there is a reciprocal thou orientation... perceptions of the social world are available for modification, new types are formed, and the social stock of knowledge is enlarged. (1988:223)

In the traditions of both symbolic interactionism and phenomenological sociology, then, a model of social interaction

exists in which daily lived experience is at least partially structured by the situation specific character of interactive patterns. One's immediate interactive context helps determine not only the form of interaction but the qualitative nature of this interaction: mundane and habitual or emergently creative. It may also be argued that both perspectives see the creative occurrences in emergent interaction as the primary micro sources of social change.

1.4 - Harold Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology is the study of the means by which rational, self-conscious individuals make sense of and negotiate their way through the social world on a practical, day-to-day basis. Developed primarily by Harold Garfinkel (a student of Alfred Schutz) in the 1940's, it is an attempt to expose and scientifically explore the assumptions that constitute the phenomenological natural attitude. The basic assumptions of ethnomethodology are well expressed by Mehan and Wood:

[Social reality is] dependent on ceaseless reflexive use of bodies of social knowledge in interaction. As this reflexive interactional work assembles the reality, without it, the reality could not be sustained. Hence, each reality is fragile. In so far as people may experience more than one reality, realities are said to be permeable. (1975:6)

"Realities" in this sense are analogous to phenomenological "zones of relevance," particularly insofar as they are created through "interactional work." Thus, as with symbolic interactionism and phenomenology, the character of daily social life is situation specific. Unlike the preceding perspectives, however, ethnomethodology is not particularly concerned with the sources of interactive normative internalization. Whether occurring in early socialization or accumulated in ongoing lived experience, the point is moot; what matters is the negotiation or in certain instances the discovery¹ of interactive norms, not their creation.

In conducting conversation analyses and "breach experiments," Garfinkel developed many of ethnomethodology's presently employed concepts, such as "accounting," or the ways in which individuals explain and justify their behaviours. In accounting, actors tend to abbreviate much of the mundane or trivial because they assume these to be understood and unnecessary to explicate. Garfinkel calls these un verbalized assumptions "indexical expressions," and this shorthand way of conversing the "et cetera" principle. The degree of indexicality is, of course, dependent on immediate interactive context. When others question our use of indexical expressions, common

¹When, for example, an individual is deposited into an anomic situation such as an alien society with no guidelines for "correct" behaviour.

reactions include confusion, frustration and anger, exposing the "sanctioned properties of common discourse."

A similar anomic scene is initiated in the experimental technique of "breaching" when the researcher purposefully creates problematic interaction by blatantly violating highly intersubjective behavioural norms. These may occur in the most mundane of social situations (elevators, lunch counters) yet still elicit rather intense reactions. Individuals are suddenly thrust into a situation in which they must make sense of an unexpectedly senseless scene. Typically attempts are made to restore the baseline of normalcy; to slip back into the natural attitude. It is the natural attitude itself, however, that such experiments are designed to reveal.

Ethnomethodologists make no apologies for the fact that this perspective is primarily descriptive rather than explanatory, and exhibits no clear theoretical direction for the basis of prediction. Ethnomethodology has little to say - at least directly - regarding the micro sources of social change. It shares the phenomenological orientation that views unproblematic interaction or the natural attitude as an interactional baseline. The ethnomethodological conception of individuals is of rational actors. How and when this rationality is acquired is a question seldom addressed, but it is maintained through interactional

coping strategies and widely assumed when such strategies are not called upon. The preoccupation with breaching or norm violation, however, would seem to indicate that there is something valuable and integral to human interaction in these situations over and above their utility in exposing the existence of the baseline itself. It is not a great leap of logic to assume, then, that this methodological framework can support the thesis that originality, creativity and social change are accelerated at the point of breaching. Moreover, since the situation of sudden strangeness that accompanies the norm violation often leads to confusion and anger, it is not unreasonable to assume that the byproducts, if not always the intended results, of interaction stabilization take on unanticipated and unpredictable, in other words, emergent characteristics.

1.5 - Summary

The tradition of interpretive or micro sociology, as expressed by such theorists as Mead, Schutz, and Garfinkel demonstrates a consistency in the themes of an active, socially-constructed and potentially creative model of the self capable of engaging in emergent interaction either purposefully, or inadvertently as a result of problematic or anomic interactive

situations. In each perspective a great deal of importance is placed on the situation-specific nature of interaction rather than any fixed characteristics of consciousness *per se* or of individuals which might transcend different interactive settings. Social life is thus conceptualized as an ongoing negotiation and performance of a continuing series of interactive imperatives, some habitual and banal, others unexpected and difficult. What this suggests, then, is that a consideration of these settings themselves and their influence on interaction and interactants (as opposed to the study of an individual's influence on interactive structure) should provide significant insight into the form and flow of both habitual and problematic human interaction. It is this perspective that is adopted by Erving Goffman in his general dramaturgical outlook and, in greater detail, in his 1974 study *Frame Analysis*. As will be argued in subsequent chapters, not only does Goffman incorporate the themes of the interpretive tradition mentioned previously, his work provides a point of departure for the macro-level application of many if not all of these principles.

CHAPTER TWO: ERVING GOFFMAN'S FRAME ANALYSIS

2.1 - Primary Frameworks

The application of Erving Goffman's insights into what he eventually termed the "interaction order" of everyday-social life in either a macro context or even as a systematic theoretical guide appears at first counter-intuitive. As Drew and Wootton have pointed out:

...his work is not presented in any conventionalized form: there are, for example, no clear hypotheses, no standard research designs, nor even a theory that could be tested or used to make sense of a variety of research findings. (1988:2)

Moreover, Goffman himself makes no claims to specific relevancies in the macro sphere for his work, content with an explication of interactive forms in such settings as face-to-face interaction or performer-audience situations. What I hope to demonstrate is that both the principles previously recounted in the interpretive or micro sociology tradition and many of those in Goffman's frame analysis are indeed applicable to the macro realm, given certain logical modifications and extrapolations.

One can certainly produce...a reconstruction of what Goffman's theories imply about power, hierarchy and status, but these are not topics which he himself systematically explored. Nonetheless, the fact that he did not, does not mean we cannot. (Strong, 1988:246)

In 1974's *Frame Analysis* Goffman extends the micro sociological theme of situation specific interactional form and

flow to an entire complex schema of social behaviour. He begins in the tradition of social constructionism and phenomenology, citing not only W.I. Thomas' famous dictum², but the 19th century work of William James and the seminal writings of Husserl and Schutz. In James he finds useful the psychologist's "phenomenological twist" on questions of defining reality, asking not what reality is but rather "under what circumstances do we think things are real?" (Goffman, 1974:2) "Circumstances" in this scheme may of course include completely subjective states of consciousness, but also imply the sociological in that events external to the subject impact upon and modify such consciousness. As external conditions change, that is, reality itself (however appropriated or defined) becomes more or less "real." Thus, in James' typology subjective action, in terms of attentiveness, intimacy and appreciation of consistency, influences the degree to which "sub-worlds," such as those of the senses or of supernatural belief are perceived as more or less real. When Schutz takes up this notion he takes a similar position to James in positing a particular reality as privileged (if not paramount). Unsurprisingly this is, in respective terminology, the world of the senses or the world of everyday life, the "subuniverse" (James) or "zone of relevance" (Schutz)

²If men [sic] define situations as real, they become real in their consequences.

in which social interaction is most prevalent and carries the greatest number of consequences.

When Goffman asks the question "what is it that is happening here?" as his organizational point of departure he also leaves open the scope of such a question and admits that the choice of interactive and perceptual parameters is his, not inherently prescribed by frame analysis itself: "To begin with, I must be allowed to proceed by picking my span and level arbitrarily, without special justification." (1974:8) His mission, then, is the same as the phenomenologist's and the ethnomethodologist's: the explication of how individuals make sense of the social world in their daily lives. Goffman seems particularly concerned with how interactants so often arrive at unproblematic intersubjective reality definitions when so many potentially disruptive variables exist in any shared arena of perception. One basic problem for investigation is the seeming contradiction that interactive frames of reference are vulnerable and fleeting constructs, yet so seldom problematic in terms of intersubjective agreement on their characteristics while participation lasts.

Presumably, a "definition of the situation" is almost always to be found, but those who are in the situation ordinarily do not create this definition, even though their society often can be said to do so; ordinarily, all they do is to assess correctly what the situation ought to be for them and then act accordingly. True, we personally negotiate aspects of all the arrangements under which we live, but often once these are

negotiated, we continue on mechanically as though the matter had always been settled. (1974:1-2)

Goffman begins his analysis proper with the concept of "primary frameworks," the frameworks or schemata which organize and render meaningful what would otherwise be chaotic. They are seldom articulated or even understood at a formal level, resembling pre-cognitive organizational propensities employed automatically in daily life. "Natural" primary frameworks exist outside of human agency and are usually shared by all in an attitude of acceptance (the state of the weather, the force of gravity, the linear progression of time, etc.)

Social [primary] frameworks, on the other hand, provide background understanding for events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a live agency, the chief one being the human being. Such an agency is anything but implacable; it can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and threatened. What it does can be described as "guided doings."
(1974:22)

These actions (guided doings) entail an understanding of consequentiality on the part of the actor such that they are subject to consistent self-corrective monitoring according to perceptions of surrounding social standards in such areas as honesty, tactfulness and efficiency.

Most action in the world involves a utilization of both frameworks, with differing weight accorded to each (e.g. long-distance running vs. a game of chess). The means by which these

primary frameworks are integrated, including shared views of "the sum total of forces and agents that these interpretive designs acknowledge to be loose in the world" constitute a group's or culture's "framework of frameworks - its belief system, its 'cosmology.'" (1974:27) The concept of primary frameworks, according to Goffman, allows for the study of five related classes of events:

1. The "astounding complex" - an event occurs which seems to defy explanation through current cosmology, such as seemingly supernatural events. Generally adherents to a cosmology of Western rationality expect to eventually discover explanations for such events which do, after all, fit their frameworks; a return to the baseline is expected or even manufactured. It may be viewed as a collective avoidance of cognitive dissonance.

Certainly individuals exhibit considerable resistance to changing their framework of frameworks. A public stir - or at least a ripple - is caused by any event that apparently cannot be managed within the traditional cosmology. (1974:28-29)

2. The exhibition of stunts - these challenge and therefore help to set the limits of "guided doings" (e.g. magicians, gifted athletes) and the borders between human and animal capacities (e.g. dancing elephants, "counting" horses).
3. "Muffings" - occasions of loss of control help define the parameters of accepted levels of control ("I couldn't help

myself; I had to kiss her/steal it/hit him.")

4. Fortuitousness - significant, (perhaps emergent?) events occurring through an unanticipated combination of mundane events; what we normally refer to as coincidence or luck.

5. Framework segregation - involves issues of the body and its status in defining natural/social framework boundaries (e.g. the special status of doctors in examining a patient's body).

Of the preceding, it is the first and third which are of special interest. Events which "astound" or challenge our cosmological assumptions seem the most likely to elicit unique or emergent behaviours, while "muffings" bear a definite similarity to a class of "frame breaks" to be discussed shortly. The point Goffman wishes to make here, however, relates to the phenomenological concern with behaviour subsumed within the natural attitude or the Meadian assertion that the conservative "me" aspect of the self claims dominance in routine activity. As socially situated individuals, that is, we carry an impressive capacity to render the exceptional mundane to consciousness.

In sum, observers actively project their frames of reference into the world immediately around them, and one fails to see their so doing only because events ordinarily confirm these projections, causing the assumptions to disappear into the smooth flow of activity. (1974:39)

2.2 - Frames, Keys and Fabrications

In the introductory chapter of *Frame Analysis* Goffman provides the following definition for the crucial term "frame:"

I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern events - at least social ones - and our subjective involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I am able to identify. That is my definition of frame. (1974:10-11)

While not an impenetrable definition, it is not particularly revealing and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that at this point Goffman is being purposefully opaque. It is not until several chapters later that the following definition is found:

Organizational premises are...something cognition somehow arrives at, not something cognition creates or generates. Given their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this fitting. These organizational premises - sustained both in the mind and in activity - I call the frame of activity. (1974:247, emphasis added)

A frame, then, refers to the intersubjective agreement among interactants of "what it is that is going on" with regard to any particular "strip of activity." Here, of course, another term requires defining. A strip of activity refers to:

...any arbitrary slice or cut from the stream of ongoing activity, including here sequences of happenings, real or fictive, as seen from the perspective of those subjectively involved in sustaining an interest in them. (1974:10)

It has already been noted that Goffman considers frames both relatively unproblematic regarding the establishment of a shared definition among interactants and "vulnerable." Vulnerable, that is, to particular types of transformations, chief among them what Goffman calls "keyings." A key he defines as the conventions and mechanisms by which "a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else." (1974:43-44) When, for example, two children are engaged in "play fighting" they are participating in a frame which is based on an activity ("real" fighting) recognizable in terms of primary frameworks but transformed, keyed, into something else. Goffman considers five common types of keyings: make-believe (e.g. fantasy play, novels); contests (e.g. sports); ceremonials (e.g. rites of passage); technical redosings (e.g. rehearsals, demonstrations); and regroupings (activities in which special circumstances change our perception of the frame, as when politicians or celebrities perform such "inappropriate" tasks as manual labour for charity or publicity). Of particular interest to Goffman are the keyings associated with make-believe, a class of transformations that includes the products of popular culture. Goffman himself makes extensive use of such keyings as illustrative examples throughout the text.

This corpus of transcriptions is of special interest, not merely because of its social importance in our recreational life, or, as already suggested, because of the availability of so much explicit analysis of these materials, or because the materials themselves are easily accessible for purposes of close study; their deepest significance is that they provide a mock-up of everyday life, a put-together script of unscripted social doings, and thus are a source of broad hints concerning the structure of this domain. (1974:53)

Theoretically, the degree to which any frame may be transformed and retransformed is virtually unlimited. Thus "...keyings represent a basic way in which activity is vulnerable." (1974:83) Goffman refers to multiple rekeyings as additions of "layers" or "laminations." The outermost lamination, the initial keying, he refers to as the frame's "rim" and this provides a convenient descriptive label for the frame itself. For example, the theatrical frame is the label for an initial keying of some manner of activity sensible in terms of primary frameworks. The activity may be rekeyed as a "rehearsal frame," then as a "performance frame," but it is more convenient to refer to the initial transformation as a frame and the others as merely keyings.

The second class of frame vulnerabilities Goffman considers includes benign and exploitive fabrications. While a keying transforms activity in a manner that participants normally understand, a fabrication is a purposeful deception, the intentional effort to produce a false belief regarding what it is

that is happening. Fabrications, as social activities, usually involve "collusive communication," relatively short-lived interactive conspiracies that "contain" particular individuals and that, if and when discovered, radically transform the reality definition for the one contained. Harkening back to Goffman's adopted assumptions regarding the nature of reality, "here 'real,' as James suggested, consists of that understanding of what is going on that drives out, that 'dominates' all other understandings." (1974:85) It should also be noted that a basic difference is evident in the terminations of keyings and fabrications. For the former, even an unexpected, violent ending does not preclude a similar reframing in the future. Fabrications, once exposed, are unlikely to be successfully reconstituted (at least with the same interactants).

Goffman suggests classifying frame fabrications according to the ends they serve. Benign fabrications are those not opposed to the contained one's interests and include such practices as playful deceit, surprise parties, experimental and training hoaxes, vital tests (of loyalty or honesty), and paternal constructions (common tact, medical assurances, etc.) Goffman chooses this point for one of his infrequent references to the macro plane:

When one turns to competition between business organizations or between nation states, the same

analysis can apply but now less surely. [...] Interestingly, as sweeping as these consequences can become, those involved may still exhibit the tendency...to fall into the language of games and to draw upon the distancing and irony which games allow. (1974:103)

A second class of fabrication Goffman terms exploitive:

"...one party containing others in a construction that is clearly inimical to their private interests..." (1974:103) Included here are such practices as discrediting, a retransformation of framed reality that relies at least partially on the number of persons participating: "...one individual member of the audience uninvolved in a stage production need not discredit the show; one participant uninvolved in lovemaking can." (1974:119-120)

Discrediting is perhaps the most easily accomplished form of exploitive fabrication, one that we are particularly vulnerable to since none of us engage in thoroughly consistent behaviour.

Any monitoring of any individual's behavior that he does not know about will then have a discrediting power; all forms of secret surveillance function to undermine later activity, transforming it into a discreditable performance. (1974:169, emphasis in original)

In considering the issue of discrediting, it is noted that only a vaguely plausible defamation of character is necessary in the case of interpersonal fabrications, and in considering the issue of exploitive fabrications in general, Goffman reaches a disturbing conclusion:

The delicate issue, it seems, is that in certain matters, often socially important ones, no very effective check may be available in the society regarding the validity or invalidity of a framework. A specific belief may not be crucial and a specific confrontation of competing frames of reference not possible. Or there may be little interest in pressing such alternative accountings as exist, or little attention paid to such as are presented. (1974:200)

Two final terms are needed at this point before discussing the possibilities of frame breaks or disruptions in depth: "brackets" and "evidential boundaries." These may be thought of as the horizontal counterparts to the vertical form implied in laminations (multiple rekeyings). Spatially, evidential boundaries mark the parameters of the currently existing framed activity, best exemplified by the stage and its props. Evidential boundaries may be cleverly invisible, but need not be so: "it is obviously apparent that a puppet cannot perform on its own, yet in some traditions, puppeteers go to considerable lengths to reduce the visibility of the wires in order, as is said, to heighten the illusion." (1974:217)

Brackets serve a similar function temporally and often serve to mark the edges of keys. Goffman also draws a distinction between "game" and "spectacle" brackets. For example, the raising of a curtain at a play brackets the inner game from the outer spectacle, not the spectacle from wider social reality. Brackets contract within frames like Chinese boxes. An individual

attending a seminar is bracketed from the wider social reality upon entering the auditorium; an emcee introduces a speaker and thus brackets the spectacle; the speaker begins her lecture and thus brackets the game, she provides further "inner brackets" by changing topics, pausing for sips of water, etc. With the basic form and terminology of frame analysis thus established, it remains now to explore the various means by which this form may be disturbed.

2.3 - Framing Complications

According to Goffman, errors in daily life regarding "what it is that is happening" are both rare and short-lived. Frames, that is, are most often "clear:"

To say a frame is clear is not only to say that each participant has a workably correct view of what is going on, but also, usually, a tolerably correct view of the others' views, which includes their view of his view. (1974:338)

Aside from fabrications, however, (which are only misunderstood on one side, and that due to an "artificial" rekeying) errors in framing do occur and entail certain notable consequences.

...it is understandable that the unmanageable might occur, an occurrence which cannot be effectively ignored and to which the frame cannot be applied, with resulting bewilderment and chagrin on the part of the participants. In brief, a break can occur in the applicability of the frame, a break in its governance. (1974:347)

Consider first the occasions of "flubbings" within a theatrical frame. A common example (visible at least in live theatre) is that of an actor forgetting his lines and being prompted from offstage. In such an occurrence, it is not simply the actor's competence that is thrown into question, but the entire dramatic illusion. Similarly:

When an actor literally fails to contain himself [e.g. an unscripted belch] during performance of his part...then embarrassment will be very deep, deeper, perhaps, than can occur on the parade ground or any other place of great formality; for what is embarrassed is an identity, not a role, and beyond this the plane of action in which the other characters have their being, too. (1974:206)

For those participating in the broken or disrupted frame, interactive consequences are immediate and intense, very often including the reaction we call embarrassment. "Flusterings, clumsy movements, and self-consciousness result; in short, behavioral disorganization..." (1974:169) (The issue of embarrassment is a particularly interesting one, to be returned to shortly). A similar form of frame complication occurs when an interactant "floods out," that is, engages in spontaneous activity of an inappropriate sort (uncontrollable laughter at a sedate ceremony, a newscaster using profanity while reading an article). In these instances, however, it is often the individual who has broken from the frame, the latter remaining intact.

"Miskeyings" occur when a frame's levels of lamination are

misinterpreted. These may take the form of an "upkeying" or a "downkeying" where the former implies that participants assumed more laminations than were actually present (e.g. a real robbery is assumed to be a keying of a robbery, a real gun assumed to be a toy) and the latter a miskeying in the opposite direction.

Another inappropriate frame orientation relates to a participant's degree of engrossment:

And whether the individual maintains too little or too much involvement, he will have reason to manage the show of his involvement in order to minimize its disruptive effect on other participants. (1974:346)

Perhaps the most important aspect of a frame misunderstanding is that of ambiguity, particularly the anomic effect of "negative experience." Goffman distinguishes between two types of ambiguity: "one, where there is question as to what could possibly be going on; the other as to which one of two or more clearly possible things is going on. A difference between vagueness and uncertainty." (1974:302-303) It is the former of these that is of interest here, an ambiguity resulting not necessarily from an individual's misinterpretation (although this is often the case) but potentially from the sudden disruption of the frame itself, an eventuality Goffman spends surprisingly little time considering. He does, however, provide a typically compelling description of the sensation:

...the nature of his engrossment and belief suddenly changes. Such reservations as he had about the ongoing activity are suddenly disrupted, and, momentarily at least, he is likely to become intensively involved with his predicament... Expecting to take up a position in a well-framed realm, he finds that no particular frame is immediately applicable... He loses command over the formulation of viable response. He flounders. [...] Reality anomically flutters. He has a "negative experience" - negative in the sense that it takes its character from what it is not, and what it is not is an organized and organizationally affirmed response. (1974:378-379)

Goffman devotes a large portion of *Frame Analysis* to the study of face-to-face interaction and its attendant speech structures, relying heavily on a dramaturgical model developed here, in the earlier *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), and in other briefer works. As Goffman argues, we assume that drama/fiction in its many forms is modelled after "real" life, but this original is itself modelled after a plethora of cultural sources from fiction, moral teachings, early socialization, etc. that are often no more "real" than any other recognized fictions. There is, then, no recognizable origin, no Archimedean Point other than, perhaps, the portion of our cosmology represented by the natural primary framework. (There may, however, be a "Meadian Point" in the "generalized other," although this, too is a mediated subjective appropriation of a particular version of reality). As Goffman asserts, "When we decide that something is unreal, the reality it isn't need not

itself be very real..." (1974:560)

In daily life, however, individuals do not "perform" (at least not always) because they wish constantly to deceive, but because social interaction is, inevitably, an ongoing process of frame management. In the Goffmanian scheme the individual becomes decentred from the privileged position often held in micro sociology, to be replaced by the frames which shape the constant flux of social interaction.

As a singer, an individual wears his heart in his throat; as an everyday interactant he is likely to less expose himself. As one can say that it is only qua singer that he emotes on call, so one can say that it is only qua conversationalist that he doesn't. Neither comment tells us about persons as such; both tell us about figures in frames. (1974:572)

Moreover, the individual, the "self," cannot be seen as "an entity half-concealed behind events, but a changeable formula for managing oneself during them." (1974:573) Goffman thus concurs with the traditions explored earlier in that "subworlds," "zones of relevance" or "realms of being" are taken as critical units of analysis. Where he parts company is in the assertion that any particular zone be held above any other. The phenomenological life world may in fact be far more complex and demanding than the concept of the natural attitude would imply. As a shifting system of frames, each containing the potential for disruption, the Goffmanian vision of social life is uniquely congruent with a

view of social interaction stressing the possibility and even structural inevitability of emergent creativity.

2.4 - Summary

While the self qua self does not exactly disappear in the Goffmanian typology of interpersonal interaction, it in effect can only be fully articulated in terms of its relation to a system of frames. The self is not only intrinsically social (following Mead and virtually all constructionist theorists) but for Goffman is dependant on the vagaries of a frame construction and maintenance that can never be completely subdued by any individual actor. The Goffmanian model of self represents a decided break with that of the self-contained Cartesian ego, but does not evoke the anxiety of an unstructured existentialism. The quasi-structured quality of social life implied by the acceptance of framing as the "meta-narrative" to daily life is relative but not arbitrary. Goffman suggests certain human propensities toward acting and story-telling as surprisingly compelling motivations in patterning the frames of day-to-day interaction. What he explicitly and purposefully omits are the questions of ideology and macro-level power structures that provide much of the moral and political impetus to frame construction, maintenance,

acceptance and in some cases, reification.

In the articulation of a frame analysis that applies beyond the realm of face-to-face interaction, it is in fact possible to transpose certain Goffmanian principles onto the macro sphere without a great deal of modification. Aside from the obvious (shared natural primary frameworks, for example) such notions as the benign or exploitive fabrication may be seen in macro forms from advertising to religious dogma. However, before this articulation of what I will term the "inner" frame of the Cold War and the "outer" frame of perceived American superiority, it is useful to consider certain variations and extensions of the classic Goffman model as a stepping stone to their construction. Three such variations will thus be considered, two which present parallel or complementary positions to the idea of the macro frame and one which focuses on the importance of frame breaks specifically.

Matthew S. Hirshberg, working from primarily a cognitive social psychology perspective, provides a model of cognitive (cultural) schemata in which he considers the relationship between the Cold War and American perceptions of patriotism and self-identity. Andrew Travers considers in some detail the kind of frame breaks I hold to be most important for this study (those of a "negative experience"), demonstrating many of the

anomic consequences of such experiences and challenging certain assumptions in this regard. Pierre Bourdieu, with his development of the concepts of "habitus" and "field," does not address Goffmanian frame analysis directly, but does produce an intriguing complementary framework that may highlight several useful connections between his own approach and those of both Hirshberg and Goffman.

CHAPTER THREE: MODIFICATIONS, EXTENSIONS AND VARIATIONS

3.1 - Cognitive Schemata - Matthew S. Hirshberg

Among the many scholarly treatments of the Cold War's end that have appeared in the 1990s, Matthew S. Hirshberg's 1993 study *Perpetuating Patriotic Perceptions: The Cognitive Function of the Cold War* represents a remarkably similar line of reasoning vis-a-vis an inner/outer frame typology as that to be articulated in this study. Hirshberg's perspective is derived from cognitive psychology as applied to the realm of public opinion and foreign policy studies. The author takes pains, however, to emphasize the social/collective aspects of his approach, placing greater emphasis on "political cognition and culture" and the adoption of a "constructionist" perspective adapted from Gamson's "A Constructionist Approach to Mass Media and Public Opinion" (*Symbolic Interaction*, 11:161-174). According to Gamson: "The concepts employed in this cultural analysis - frames, scenarios, myths, metaphors, images, condensing symbols - parallel the concepts used by constructionists who focus on political thinking." (1988:165) By adopting this perspective, Hirshberg wishes to depart from the traditional public opinion emphasis on precise questionnaires in order to capture the collective nature of opinion formation. As Price asserts:

Individuals, not the public, are the ones "doing" the construction; but they do so cooperatively by taking into account what others are doing and saying... If we are to remain true to a discursive model of public opinion, we want to study individual cognition and opinion formation as forms of social behaviour; that is, as means by which members of the public participate in a collective endeavour. (1988:7)

Here shared definitions of social reality are seen not as the result of atomized individual internalisations of an irresistible master discourse but rather as the result of an interactive endeavour; one which may occur within a context that is not monolithic. Thus, this collective, interactive (if not necessarily goal-directed) orientation regarding opinion formation allows for the sort of modifications and disruptions of shared reality definitions that frame analysis presupposes:

From the constructionist perspective taken in this work, the importance of citizen cognition is not dependent upon the attention paid by policymakers to its manifestations in public opinion. Citizen cognition is important because it is an integral component of a sociocultural system that has foreign policy as its output. (Hirshberg, 1993:25)

Having distanced his study from the shortcomings he perceives in traditional public opinion methodology, Hirshberg links individual cognition to observable social phenomena through the concepts of cognitive and cultural schemata. The former, following a generally orthodox cognitive psychology approach, are defined as "...cognitive frameworks stored in human memory" which "organize information about the stimuli that are processed

through them, specifying how elements of the stimuli fit together." By extension, a cognitive schema may be defined as cultural "...to the extent that it tends to be stored in the memories of a large number of the members of a culture and is repeatedly used by them..." (1993:4)

The specific cultural schemata Hirshberg then articulates are termed the "cold war" and "American patriotic" schemata.

According to Hirshberg:

The cold war schema structured relevant news reports, fictional stories, and educational materials and served as a cognitive framework through which many Americans processed and responded to information about world affairs. The use of the cold war schema in a variety of information-processing tasks - elite decisionmaking, political rhetoric, news reporting, movie making, teaching, public perception, opinion formation, etc. - was mutually reinforcing and formed a dynamic system that resisted (but did not preclude) schematic change. (1993:5)

Hirshberg's concept of the cultural schema bears some resemblance to the Goffmanian frame and his framework of the mutually reinforcing Cold War and American patriotic schemata closely parallels that of an inner (Cold War) and outer (American superiority) frame which will be articulated in chapter five.

Hirshberg also agrees that much of the schemata's "raw material" can be found in the everyday discourse of popular culture and the mass media:

The acts and products (such as the products of the mass media) that have portrayed cold war conceptions to Americans, as well as the cognitive schemata that have

allowed Americans to properly interpret and respond to those symbols, are necessary to the transfer of meaning. The schemata are learned from the symbols, and the symbols are created out of, and are meaningful in terms of, the schemata. (1993:30)

As circular as this reasoning appears, the assertion is not without merit, and the question of origins for both the Cold War as historical era and the resulting/supporting schemata is not unmanageable (again, see chapter five).

Hirshberg's primary theoretical and methodological tool then, is that of the cognitive and/or cultural "balance schema." Balance schemata are based on a triangular model of relationships between individuals, groups, or concepts. Given three entities with either positive or negative relations to each other, one of four possible configurations will be manifested. A balanced schema occurs when all relations are positive or when one relation is positive and two are negative. An unbalanced schema occurs when all relations are negative, or when one is negative and two are positive. In the realm of international relations, the principle is employed - consciously or not - in perceptions of allies and enemies. Hence, the ally of an ally is expected to also be an ally; the enemy of an ally will be an enemy; the ally of an enemy will be an enemy; and the enemy of an enemy will be an ally. All these possibilities are examples of balanced schemata and follow a simple logic. (see figure 1)




Figure 1 - Balanced schemata (from Hirshberg, 1993:36)

Unbalanced schemata are not expected, seem counter-intuitive, and are thus often overlooked or incorrectly interpreted as balanced.

(see figure 2)




Figure 2 - Unbalanced schemata (from Hirshberg, 1993:36)

In the Cold War era, for example, the Communist states of the USSR and PRC were both considered "enemies" of the United States. The principle of schematic balance suggests, then, that they be allies to each other and the tendency to assume balance may in part be responsible for the slow recognition on the part of

American foreign policy officials that the Soviet Union and China were in fact decidedly less than close allies and that this was in fact an unbalanced (triple negative) schema. (1993:35-37)

Hirshberg utilizes this balanced schemata framework to articulate his concepts of the "Cold War" and "American Patriotic" schemata. The American Patriotic Schema (APS) consists of the basic triangulation of "self," "good," and "United States." A positive relationship is assumed to exist between the three concepts in a schema of stability. To the basic triangle are added the further concepts of "democracy" and "freedom" resulting in a pentagon of positive relationships between all five elements (ten in total) and an exceptionally stable cultural schema. (see figure 3)




Figure 3 - The American Patriotic Schema (from Hirshberg, 1993:39)

The concepts of "self" and "good" are then extracted, leaving the triangular schema of the United States/freedom/democracy, and the dyad of self/good as the pivot point for orientation to opposed triangular configurations. Examples employed by Hirshberg include the "American Revolution," "American Civil War" and "Nazi Enemy" configurations as opposing formations that support and perpetuate the APS. The CWS is the continuation of the process, in this case a set of positive relationships between the concepts "Soviet Union," "Communism," and "Oppression" negatively related to "good" and "self," which are in turn positively related to the triangular configuration of the APS. (see figure 4)




Figure 4 - The Cold War Schema (from Hirshberg, 1993:43)
 note: D = Democracy, F = Freedom, C = Communism, O = Oppression

In the years immediately following World War II until the collapse of Soviet Communism in the early 1990s, the CWS dominated American thinking in foreign policy and international relations. Competing schemata, both complementary and contradictory, certainly coexisted with the CWS and its influence was not uniform throughout the era, but as Hirshberg insists, "...for most people, most of the time, most of reality seemed to fit the cold war schema." (1993:45)

There is a compelling logic and simplicity to Hirshberg's framework despite the objections that immediately present themselves: variations in class position, or ethnic differences vis-a-vis one's specific brand of patriotism. Accepting the existence of the CWS (which must also imply acceptance of the APS) evokes images of a mythical "average American" who may in fact exist only in the abstract. One should not overlook, however, the power inherent in the need to maintain a positive self-image. To be an American citizen (for the vast majority) implies either that one is born and raised in the United States, has made a conscious decision to immigrate, or has fled undesirable conditions elsewhere. In any case the acceptance of at least the APS seems an easy, expected, even required means of avoiding cognitive dissonance. Still, it is one thing to posit a logical and coherent model, it is another to provide evidence for

its existence.

Hirshberg's evidence is presented in a two-part strategy. The first consists primarily of a painstaking review of public opinion towards Communism (foreign and domestic), the Soviet Union, American and Soviet leadership, and American foreign policy. At certain points the CWS seems particularly vehement, at others more relaxed, yet the basic components seem to remain intact. From 1947 to 1953, for example, between 76% and 79% of Americans surveyed believed that "the Soviets were building up to rule the world." In October 1961 a Gallup poll found that 81% of Americans preferred an all-out nuclear war to living under Communism (only 6% chose the alternative). A comparison of British responses to the same question yields only a 21% willingness to engage in the conflict, underlining the distinctiveness of the schemata to the American context.

(Hirshberg, 1993:65) Surveys are reviewed from several sources regarding such issues as the fluctuations in opinions toward the Soviet Union and Communism as a form of government from 1953 to 1991. The overall impression offered is that while opinions varied as to which tactics and strategies might best be employed, the fundamental animosity between the USA and USSR; between freedom and oppression, could not be safely ignored.

Hirshberg's second strategy is experimental. In early 1987,

40-45 political science undergraduate students were asked to list the concepts they associated with certain words. With "the United States," for example, the top five responses included: "freedom" (65%), "flag" (53%), "proud" (40%), "democracy" (38%), and "powerful" (35%). When given the words "freedom" or "democracy" the most popular association in both cases was "the United States." (Hirshberg, 1993:132-135) A strikingly similar nexus of associations was found to support the other half of the CWS, with the words/concepts "Soviet Union," "Communism," and "oppression" consistently grouped together. (1993:136-138)

Further, in January of 1988 and 1990 Hirshberg presented specific word-pairings to students in a test of the strength of specific conceptual associations. The words "good," "you" (the subject), "democracy," and "freedom" were paired in combinations with "United States," "freedom," and "democracy." In 1988 all nine associations were rated exceptionally high. Subjects reported a positive association between "democracy" and "United States" at a 100% level in 1988, and at 96% in 1990. Similar minute declines were evident over the two year period in the other associative combinations. More interesting was the distinction subjects made between "Communism" and the five concepts compared to "the Soviet Union" and these same concepts over the same time period. While attitudes toward Communism

shifted hardly at all (e.g. a 12% "positive" association between "Communism" and "good" in 1988; 14% in 1990) feelings toward the Soviet Union apparently shifted a great deal in the interim. In 1988 only 2% of subjects expressed a positive association between "Soviet Union" and "freedom," while in 1990 the figure jumped to 17%. Similar shifts occurred between the other combinations.

(1993:148-150)

To directly test the validity of cognitive balance theory in his experiment, Hirshberg provided subjects with word-pairs in sets of three (e.g. "you," "democracy," and "Communism" contains the three word-pairs "you-democracy," "you-Communism" and "democracy-Communism"). In this case it is expected that one pair will elicit positive associations (the first) and two will elicit negative responses. Multiplying the three responses should yield a positive or negative (or potentially neutral) result which can be matched to the triangular models of cognitive balance schemata. In this example the result should be positive and thus balanced (positive x negative x negative = positive). In fact Hirshberg's results showed a relatively small number of unbalanced triads, indicating, he believes, that "human minds seek to maintain balanced cognitions when possible and to regain balance once it has been lost." (1993:159) Specifically, with regards to the CWS:

It appears that increasingly positive perceptions of the Soviet Union led to unbalanced cognitions. Changing political realities resulted in a shock to the belief system, knocking beliefs, at least temporarily, off balance. (1993:147-148)

Hirshberg's basic conclusions regarding the socio-political consequences of the patriotic and Cold War schemata's functions are not surprising. The schemata, that is, "serve a system maintenance function at the domestic political level" (1993:210) such that international military interventions are interpreted in a positive light, which "enables American rulers, if they wish, to stage antidemocratic or otherwise destructive interventions with relative ease." (1993:211) The ability of American citizens to monitor and critically understand their government's foreign policy is, according to Hirshberg, fundamentally impaired.

The evidence Hirshberg provides, both statistical and experimental, is certainly compelling. Taken as a whole, support is evident for a somewhat stereotypical view of American cognition as representing an unquestioning jingoism. Hirshberg points to the difficulty his subjects experienced in processing information that contradicted a view of America as the international champion of freedom and democracy, and refers to the patriotic schema as "a long-standing, stable, and pervasive fundamental belief system in American culture." (1993:6, 209-210)

Hirshberg's findings, however, should not necessarily be

read as indicative of an American patriotic straightjacket. In terms of a frame analysis perspective they provide support for at least two important components of the model. First, responses (particularly in the experimental cases) to problematic or "incongruent" information reflect many of the same reactions Goffman demonstrates in cases of "frame breaks." That is, subjects manifested confusion and "unbalanced cognitions" at points where the stability of either the Cold War or American patriotic schemata were placed in jeopardy. Second, support for the idea of the "baseline retreat" (see following section on Travers) was clearly evident in subjects' efforts to re-align their cognitions in order to avoid the consequences of frame disruption. This occurred even to the point where subjects displayed a tendency "...to ignore, forget, or be confused by information inconsistent with the cold war schema, or to recall it incorrectly as if it were consistent with the schema."

(1993:210)

Where Hirshberg's work concludes is the point at which these tendencies would be most interestingly explored - the post Cold War era. The statistical evidence included from the very early 1990s suggests, as noted previously, that opinions of the USSR/Russia and its leaders had "softened" somewhat. Hirshberg's research suggests that the absence of the Cold War schema leaves

unaffected the core of the American patriotic schema and that alternative means of geo-political support for the latter still abound:

...minor villains have provided quick enemy fixes, and it may be that a succession of Irans, Nicaraguas, Lybias, and Iraqs will suffice to fill the enemy role. [...] Although the jury is still out, the recent conflict with Iraq suggests that the powerful, threatening enemy superpower may be adequately replaced by a series of pesky, deranged, and deluded minor conquerors. (1993:48-49)

This assertion is, of course, far from certain, and the contention that the American patriotic schema is relatively unaffected by the Cold War's end is not precisely the same as positing a similar relationship between what I will later term the Cold War Frame and the American Superiority Frame.

3.2 - The Centrality of Frame Breaks - Andrew Travers

In "Strangers to Themselves: How Interactants are Other than They Are" (1992), Andrew Travers utilizes a "Mead-Goffman-Garfinkel" model of self to explore the consequences of radical frame shifts. Travers' modifications and extensions on Goffman's terminology provide the following categorizations. The unproblematic frame exhibits "normal appearances" in the behaviour of its interactants, producing "routine reality" or "routine grounds." The instances of problematic interaction which

Goffman refers to as "frame breaks" or "negative experience" Travers terms "rituality" or "unreal frames," produced by sensations of "strangeness" and creating "ritual reality." Travers also makes occasional reference to the term "anomie" as a descriptive prefix in explicating aspects of rituality. It must be stressed here that Travers' use of the term "rituality" bears little resemblance to either its generic or anthropological definition:

Ritual reality is a reality that is more engrossing than routine reality. It can be described as "alarmed," and it can also be described as containing emergent anomie. An alternative term, "existential reality," captures the meaning that I want to convey of interactional reality raised to a fateful and intensely uncertain pitch but yet the more real for that. (1992:608)

One of Travers' more interesting contributions to frame analysis is one that seems initially counter-intuitive. Rather than conceptualizing rituality as destructive to a frame's stability, Travers attempts to reformulate the entrenched perspective within interaction sociology that considers normal appearances as the baseline and strangeness as anomalous. What Travers wishes to foreground is ritual reality:

...the Goffmanian frame (like Garfinkel's routine grounds) is at all times a temporary resolution of strangeness rather than a pre-existing order that strangeness destroys. The examples show that a frame is actually more tightly defined by the emergence of strangeness, the definition of frame deepening to the degree that perception and engrossment is heightened by the coherent dialectic of routine and ritual, of reality and unreality. (1992:611)

According to Travers, normal appearances/frames are not the baseline from which interactants occasionally depart and to which they strive to return; rather they are constituted in and begin to take form only through their opposite - strangeness. "Normal appearances only begin to feel real enough for interactants to take them seriously when they are experienced as potentially abnormal, that is, existentially real" and "a frame becomes a frame only when the frame is in question..." (1992:609) In this view, the "life" of society is in abnormal, strange interaction. Normal appearances are simply the result of the many instances of failure in producing healthy strangeness. The principle is well established in sociological theory and can be found in the basic assertion regarding the power of normative behaviour. It is akin, that is, to the idea of the invisibility of norms while they are observed; that only the violation of norms renders them salient through subsequent social sanctions.

... "culture" or "society" (as a system of frames) may not be churned out principally by repetitive conduct that can only know background expectancies but may be given an evolutionary momentum through interactants' engrossment in strangeness rather than in familiarity. (1992:619)

At many points in his analysis Travers seems to agree that strangeness gives rise to emergent, creative social consequences. The melding of emergence and evolution, however, is a problematic mix and it is unclear exactly what Travers means by "evolutionary

momentum." There is likely little if any linear force to a progression of strangeness and emergence itself is inherently non-linear. However, the implication that instances of strangeness (interactive points of anomic hyper-alertness) and emergence contribute to social change remains.

What, then, happens to interactants and frames during an occasion of strangeness? Assuming that interactants continue the exchange rather than fleeing the problematic situation, several possibilities exist. According to Goffman or Garfinkel, there should be a conscious struggle by one or more participant to return to normal appearances. Even without this struggle, the very manifest strangeness itself should serve as a signal to return to normalcy such that the unreal frame moves "of itself" toward homeostasis. In other words, the unreal frame is fragile and tenuous, the normal frame is stable and magnetic, drawing interactants naturally back to its baseline. There is another possibility, however, according to Travers. Rather than retreating to normal appearances, the unreal frame may act upon interactants such that they become "strangers to themselves." This does not deny instances in which interactants resist their emerging strangeness and cling to normal appearances, but suggests that it is possible for a type of unintended mutation to occur in which the unreal frame is strengthened as such while the

interactants themselves are re-aligned in its image. In some cases:

The originality (abnormality, rituality, strangeness), far from plunging the frame into interactive disorder, affirms a frame whose routine reality fades into a background that certainly supports the rituality but does not provide the regulative morality which now depends on ritual reality alone, as I would say - and as Goffman should, to be consistent - morality always does. (1992:624)

So interactants may operate between the two poles of normalization: a) acceptance of strangeness (which is often actually its denial through redefinition) and b) conscious denial of strangeness through its rejection. "We ought then to expect strangeness to set interactants adrift between the two outer possibilities of acceptance and rejection." (1992:627) It is the movement between these poles that constitutes frame definition and therefore the shape of face-to-face interaction. Rather than an aberration, it is the very constitutive matter of social life. Ambiguity in this case is not only tolerated but necessary and often nurtured.

The notion of an "evolutionary momentum" remains problematic, but the assertion that "regulative morality" depends on ritual not routine reality (or rather, the movement between the two) is an intriguing one. If true, it suggests a refocusing on what are elusive, ephemeral points of interaction, extremely difficult to capture, at least at the micro level. If the

principle can be extrapolated to the macro plane, implications include the idea that groups, cultures, or societies can only understand the character of their shared perceptions of morality at points of crisis and that these points are when such groups are the most "selflike." Interactants, that is, "are most selflike just when they are at their least definable" (1992:603), when they become "strangers to themselves:"

A self is a stranger to itself when its frame, departing from routine reality, becomes unreal and anomic and yet the more engrossing for being anomic and unreal. [...] The enhanced rituality of the stranger to its self makes it feel, moreover, as if it was a truer self than the one it was before. Therefore I would say that strangers to themselves are interactionally the 'real' selves that people seek in psychotherapy, drugs, risk-taking, art-consumption, and other real-time experiments with their real selves. Further, unless selves have the continuous capacity to become strangers to themselves...they would be absolutely controlled by society even within themselves and interaction would not need to be the moral order that it is. (1992:632)

The methodological difficulties inherent in capturing occasions of rituality are readily apparent, including not only the problem of recognizing such occurrences and establishing anything other than a loose "face validity" regarding their criteria, but also the difficulty of even approaching agreed-upon standards of reliability. "Caught up and carried away by a ritual frame, the sociologist is not a sociologist any more, while, if resolutely detached, he or she simply misses the rituality." (1992:633) Moreover, it is difficult to anticipate the

researcher's ability to reproduce the sensations of strangeness/rituality (Travers utilizes examples from literature) so that its assumed occurrence remains convincing on the printed page. Travers summarizes these problems as including the following:

(a) the necessity of a focus on disorder such that ordering it involves (b) the dissolution of he or she who would so focus sociology, (c) the collapse of an available style or form of sociological representation, and (d) the requirement, textually, of *de novo* constructions that before they are accomplished cannot know their own persuasiveness. (1992:634)

If, however, a similar process can be said to occur at the macro level, its intensity may be attenuated, but a simultaneous temporal expansion renders such occurrences far more amenable to appropriation.

In assessing the tradition of interaction and phenomenological sociology, including the contributions from Andrew Travers as well as Matthew Hirshberg's brand of (constructionist) cognitive psychology, certain variations on the themes of "selfhood" and problematic/emergent interaction become apparent. It may be that the Meadian model of self as a dualistic and dialectic process between "I" and "me" is the most useful in this context. Such a self is not torn by ambiguity as the classic Cartesian ego would certainly be. The unpredictable, free-floating edge of the "I" allows for the flexibility and tolerance

necessary to engage in strangeness, appreciate anomic uncertainty and integrate the original thought thus produced into the more stable "me." And, as Travers insists, it is this ability that contributes to both social and personal awareness since "The selves of normal appearances ('Median mes') tend to have a security that militates against seeing themselves as interactional products." (1992:607)

The self as interactional product is the overriding concern of Goffman, but is also another point where he diverges from the orientation of much interaction sociology. For Goffman, the constitution of the self as such is of little concern relative to the process of that constitution. He not only side-steps the issue of what the self is in order to focus on what the self does, but further, is only interested in what the self does in relation to a presently occurring definition of reality. Selves are merely "figures in frames" and these are his units of analyses.

In reviewing the rather crowded lexicon of terminology employed thus far, the following may be considered as roughly analogous terms and concepts:

- 1a. Mead's "me" in terms of unproblematic interaction;
- 2a. Schutz's interaction conducted within the "natural attitude;"
- 3a. Garfinkel's unbreached "routine grounds;"
- 4a. Goffman's unproblematic "frame;"
- 5a. Travers' "normal appearances" or "routine reality."

- 1b. Mead's "I;"
- 2b. Schutz's interaction conducted outside the "natural attitude;"
- 3b. Garfinkel's anomic reactions to breaching experiments;
- 4b. Goffman's "frame breaks," particularly "negative experience;"
- 5b. Travers' "ritual reality" or "strangeness."

The language of frame analysis adopted from Goffman and including such modifications as its application to the macro plane demands will be utilized in subsequent chapters.

3.3 - Habitus and Field - Pierre Bourdieu

Bourdieu's analytical tool of the "habitus" is employed in the service of incorporating the influences of subjectivism and objectivism - agency and structure - in the typical, that is, habitual attitudes and comportments of actors as inscribed in their minds, bodies, and practice. Habitus is generated through interaction and only makes sense by reference to this context. Habitus is inscribed in, carried by, the bodies of actors; embodied as "the mediating link between individuals' subjective worlds and the cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others." (Jenkins, 1992:75) Bourdieu defines the habitus as:

...an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others. (1977:95)

The habitus is far more stable and resistant to disruption than the Goffmanian frame. It is acquired in early socialization, entrenched and modified throughout the life cycle and operates in a largely unreflexive manner. It seems at first glance quite similar to the Meadian "me" or the phenomenological "natural attitude."

Habitus is realized in 'le sens pratique' (feel for the game) a pre-reflexive level of practical mastery. It is a mode of knowledge that does not necessarily contain knowledge of its own principles ('docta ignoratia') and is constitutive of reasonable but not rational behaviour... (Bourdieu, 1990:52; McNay, 1999:100-101)

The habitus also includes, however, the type of social practice that would be characteristic of the Meadian "I" or the problematic reactions that engender a break from the natural attitude.

Bourdieu, however, would take issue with aspects of both competing models, believing Mead assigned too much novelty to the "I" and that phenomenological models overemphasize the use of typifications and recipes in the operation of the natural attitude. As McNay asserts:

In Bourdieu's model, although the habitus accords a disproportionate weight to primary social experiences, the resulting closure is never absolute because the habitus is an historical structure that is only ever realized in reference to specific situations. Thus

while an agent might be predisposed to act in certain ways, the potentiality for innovative or creative action is never foreclosed... (McNay, 1999:103)

Closely related to the concept of habitus, in fact inseparable from it, is the idea of "field."

The field is defined as a network or configuration of objective relations between positions. The configuration receives its form from the relation between each position and the distribution of a certain type of capital. Capital - economic, social, cultural and symbolic - denotes the different goods, resources and values around which power relations in a particular field crystallize. (Bourdieu, 1993:72-77; McNay, 1999:106)

Thus the habitus is not a set of rules and guidelines but a generative disposition towards patterns of social practice, and "...belonging to a field means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it." (Bourdieu, 1992:80) It follows from Bourdieu's logic that one's habitus is primarily cultural in origin (rather than physiological or cognitive) and if accepted the concept goes far in fleshing out a source for Hirshberg's somewhat vague idea of the genesis of cultural schemata.

Important distinctions exist between the idea of the habitus and that of either cultural schemata or macro-level Goffmanian frames. In both of the latter formulations there is at least a limited assumption that schemata or frames may transcend gender, age, ethnic and class divisions. In Hirshberg's case this idea only retains validity through the very general terms in which he

formulates and general context into which he places these cultural schemata, such that the author can speak of "most people, most of the time." In the case of a macro-level frame the degree to which class, gender or any other demographic variable is applicable to its maintenance is relative to each individual frame manifestation. At the micro level, a frame either "works" or does not, and interactants for the most part recognize this. What is remarkable is how seldom frame definition and maintenance are problematic in daily life. At the macro level an intersubjective definition of presently occurring social reality can certainly operate along demographic lines such that perceptions of reality will exhibit certain distinctions from one group to another. This principle is hardly novel; it approaches the status of a sociological axiom. What is important to remember is the distinction between a definition of reality and an attitude towards it. At the level of primary natural frameworks this is simple enough. Two persons agree that it is night; one is frightened, the other exhilarated. At every other (social) level agreement will be less than perfect. Bourdieu's concept of habitus could conceivably provide a means of predicting the attitudes towards, and even the frame definitions that groups are likely to produce in a far more comprehensive manner than a mere amalgamation of demographic data, if a sophisticated enough

method were developed to catalogue and quantify habitus itself. Unfortunately (at least for the purposes of this project) the very nature of habitus as a dialectical, constantly adjusting process makes this virtually impossible. It is, as Bourdieu asserts, "history turned into [human] nature" (1977:78), and history does not end.

Frames involve no particular judgements of or concerns regarding the biographies of interactants other than their relationship to any presently occurring frame. A "pure" frame analysis considers such extra-frame influences secondary at best. Since social life may in fact be defined as a an ongoing system of frames, there is no particular behavioural nexus, subject position or unified identity that constitutes a stable core or set of propensities that must always be privileged. Each successive frame is considered in turn and on its own terms. This is not to suggest that interactants are only constituted in frames as disembodied "infinitely malleable" subjects; but that in the context of the frame the "feel for the game" exerts as much or more influence on the character of interaction as the habitus of the interactants.

Thus, habitus renders a stability to the interactants' subject positions, while field implies a degree of stability and objectivity beyond the scope of the frame per se, since the field

always denotes some struggle over resources/capital, whether or not that struggle directly involves or implicates the interactants themselves. Frames may indeed involve such struggles (most often over symbolic capital) but by their nature this is not necessarily so. Moreover, the connection between habitus and field demonstrates both a compelling similarity to interactants in frames and at least one other significant divergence. Just as the self outside the frame is a virtual contradiction in terms for frame analysis, "the embodied potentialities of the habitus are only ever realized in the context of a specific field..." (McNay, 1999:109) However, while habitus is generated, reproduced and modified in particular ways related to particular fields, always in the context of capital, the selves in frames are not. Any future frame may be wholly unanticipated and virtually unique with little relation to previous frames, an eventuality unlikely in the relation of habitus to field. Most significantly, then, we return to the question of identity and its relation to structures, flows, or fields of power. Selves interacting in any frame will certainly vary in terms of gender, class, ethnicity and the plethora of other demographic variables by which sociologists and most others differentiate humans. But while these disparate ascriptions and achievements condition habitus, place individuals in definite relations to fields and in fact

circumscribe which fields are open and closed to which individuals, it is quite possible that (at least within most Western capitalist nation states) the dissemination of mass mediated information and popular culture renders a great abundance of macro-level frames accessible across virtually all demographic categories. In short, the military officer manning a DEW Line station in Alaska, the male African-American teenager in Chicago and the female university student in Berkeley may all have had different relationships to and levels of engrossment with the Cold War Frame in 1969, but all three would almost certainly recognize the fact of its existence.

I retain the concept of frames not because they are inherently more "representative" of reality but because their flexibility, in the particular manifestations I have chosen, allows for the kind of acceptable application across demographic lines that few if any similar tools are capable of accomplishing. The American Superiority Frame and the Cold War Frame are/were not universals even within the United States, but their existence as frames (as opposed to one's judgements of them) approach(ed) this status to as great an extent as any non-primary framework.

This is not to say, however, that Bourdieu's habitus is not at all applicable to the idea of a macro-level frame analysis. There is a certain affinity, for example, between Goffman's

dramaturgical orientation and Bourdieu's emphasis on the improvisational aspect of social practice.

The depiction of practice as an improvisatory performance brings us back in time: improvisation is the exploitation of pause, interval and indecision. Although time is objectively irreversible, delay - or, indeed, its opposite, the swift execution of the surprise move - is manipulable as a strategic resource. It is not, however, that actors choose to improvise their way through life; no other approach could possibly work... (Jenkins, 1992:71)

Bourdieu does not imply here that "improvised" social practice is random. It is, rather, a "regulated improvisation" (Bourdieu, 1977:78) representing a "strategical vagueness" (Jenkins, 1992:51) that, predictably, straddles the camps of agency and structure:

Because the habitus is an endless capacity to engender products - thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions - whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it secures is as remote from a creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial conditionings. (Bourdieu, 1977:95)

Here again Bourdieu parts company from the idea of the Median "I" and the phenomenological insistence that qualitatively new ideas can be created and added to the social stock of knowledge at such improvisational moments.

What does this imply, then, for the idea that emergent creativity can accompany frame disruptions? For Bourdieu, it seems, there are restraints placed upon the possibility. It depends,

of course, on the definitions adopted for terms such as "new" or "unique." Bourdieu's desire to construct a theoretical tool merging the objective and subjective pulls him back not only from such determinism of, for example, Althusserian structuralism but from a conception of social practice some might see as romantic and idealist. Whether or not it is possible to unambiguously demonstrate the creation of truly novel social practice, I believe it is not inconsistent with the idea of habitus to retain the idea that certain modes of problematic interaction and frame disruptions accelerate the improvisational aspects of social practice, at least in the short term. Subsequent responses are more strategic and goal-oriented. And as Wacquant points out, this, too is consistent with the typology developed here:

Times of crisis, in which the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures is brutally disrupted, constitute a class of circumstances when indeed 'rational choice' often appears to take over. But, and this is a crucial proviso, it is habitus itself that commands this option. We can always say that individuals make choices, as long as we do not forget that they do not choose the principals of these choices. (Wacquant, 1989:45)

Thus do men make their own history, but only obliquely under circumstances of their own choosing. If social life can be defined as "a process of adjustment between subjectivity (habitus) and objective reality" (Jenkins, 1992:80) and if habitus does indeed define human subjectivity to the degree

Bourdieu proposes, the most significant result for the present study would lay in its influence on reactions to frame disruptions. Following (modified) Goffman, the disruption of the Cold War Frame should engender the two-fold responses of initial confusion/disclosure/emergent properties and subsequent strategies vis-a-vis the baseline of normalcy. Following Bourdieu, the state of habitus should blunt or attenuate both these sets of responses.

3.4 - Summary

Matthew S. Hirshberg, Andrew Travers and Pierre Bourdieu all contribute, in quite disparate manners, crucial parallels, complementary perspectives, variations or extensions to a macro-level frame analysis. Hirshberg's perspective of cultural schemata (Cold War and American Patriotic) demonstrates a parallel analysis based in cognitive psychology and provides some evidence for the idea of a frame disruption occurring at the beginning of the 1990s. This research also foregrounds the degree to which the baseline of normalcy attracts perception and cognition, particularly evident in the experimental findings where subjects often imposed a balance that did not exist or were incapable of processing contradictory information.

Andrew Travers draws attention to the critical function of frame breaks in not only their potential for emergent creativity but in their connection to identity formation. In focussing on instances of anomic "strangeness" Travers highlights the points where interactants are most "selflike" when least definable, and posits these points as the necessary sources for frame definition, perceptions of morality and touchstones for self-identity. In this perspective, frame disruptions are the crucial sources of both creativity and stability.

Bourdieu's concepts of habitus and field further the interpretive tradition of self-as-process, provide a potential cultural framework to the Median model of consciousness, and a more intelligible grounding for the sources of Hirshberg's cultural schemata. All three perspectives admit either the possibility or the necessity of emergence in situations analogous to frame disruptions, while none exhibit significant contradictions to the tradition established in this study beginning with George Herbert Mead and culminating in a macro application of Erving Goffman.

Before proceeding to the development of the two macro-level frames to be employed in this study, it remains to situate such a development in a relationship to the macro-level concern of ideology. In the following chapter the Marxist critique of

ideology will be considered, along with the turn in ideological critique towards language, culture and communications media. The connections between frames and such ideas as the Habermasian "ideal speech situation" and Bakhtinian "secondary speech genres" is presented, and certain distinctions are drawn between the concept of ideology and the macro-level frame.

CHAPTER FOUR: FRAMES AND IDEOLOGY

4.1 - The Marxist Tradition

If one proceeds from the assumption that some force known as "ideology" exists in the social world, then Goffmanian frames must inhabit and interact with an "ideological context." Yet the currency of the concept of ideology as it has been presented historically in sociological research is not without its problems. The advantages of the concept of the frame vis-a-vis the encapsulation of face-to-face interaction may in fact be translated to the macro scale and provide, at least for the purposes of this study, a serviceable alternative to the concept of ideology. In its familiar micro setting frame analysis includes "...a ritual interaction order maintained by the selves it constitutes." (Travers, 1992:169) This order may be seen as reacting to and generating its own ideological influences, but carries with it no conventional ideological precepts itself. It is an order that is situationally and interactionally bound, and thus open to the kinds of rapid shifts and radical re-definitions that ideologies as such find so awkward and problematic. If the same can be said of the macro level frame, then a means of conceptualizing dynamic social reality definitions may exist with a wider range of applications.

Inherent in virtually all sociological critiques of

capitalist ideology is the idea of dominance; the imposition of one group's will upon that of another. At the heart of this critique is an overt yet seldom questioned moral stance, that domination is inequitable and must be challenged. The tradition here is predominantly Marxist, guided by the principle of praxis, and if academic sociologists often have little connection with political action, there are at least frequent calls to remember the moral implications of dominance. Thompson, for example, complains that "the concept of ideology has lost its critical edge" and insists that the connection between "the concept of ideology" and "the critique of domination" must be preserved. (1984:76)

To insist on the retention of the critique of domination in a theory of ideology is to make a number of assumptions: a) that power is pleasurable or desirable to possess and to wield; b) conversely, that to be subject to the will of others is not desirable; c) that domination implies something of a zero-sum orientation where benefits to one result in losses to another; d) that generally those who dominate are aware of their privileged status and are thus - to varying degrees - either immoral or amoral; and e) that domination involves not only the imposition of will on will or actions on actions, but a differential allocation of the material conditions of existence (where more is

assumed preferable to less).

The "strong" version of the "Dominant Ideology Thesis," where Marx's ideas have been interpreted to imply a monolithic, near-irresistible power for a specific ruling class, is seldom maintained in contemporary sociology. (Abercrombie et al., 1980) The identification of a ruling class in Marxian terms, i.e. "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal" (Marx, 1846/1960:39), may have been relatively simple in the first century of the Industrial Revolution, but the case is not so clear in post-Fordist or "late" capitalism.

...Bourdieu claims that when power is no longer incarnated in persons or specific institutions but becomes coextensive with a complex set of relations between different fields, social control becomes more insidious and hence more effective. At the same time, this increase in the efficacy of symbolic domination is counterbalanced by an increase in 'the potential for subversive misappropriation' arising from movement and conflict between fields of action (Bourdieu, 1989:554-57; McNay, 1999:106)

This presents an interesting problem for the Marxist critique of ideology. If there is no distinct ruling class to identify as oppressor, much of the moral force of the critique is dissipated. The focus shifts to more ambiguous targets and such general orientations and propensities as patriarchy, racism, or Eurocentrism. The "other," in a socio-economic sense, becomes less and less tangible.

The thread that consistently binds the various permutations

of Marxist theory is not a dogmatic fidelity to original Marxian specifics, but a retention of the centrality afforded the economic sphere. Wallace and Wolf insist that virtually all "conflict" theorists, from Marx to Mills "are inclined to use a 'unicausal' theory of social structure, and to see people's circumstances as primarily determined by one set of institutions, most often property." (1986:73) The debate regarding the degree to which Marx postulated a unilinear casual relationship between economic base and cultural/ideological superstructure is one that has persisted perhaps longer than is useful, producing almost as many convincing economist arguments as attempts to "rescue" historical materialism from its representation as economic determinism. When theorists of the Frankfurt School allow for the relative autonomy of the cultural sphere from that of the economic, the departure from original Marxian formulations is not an enormous one. Nor is Gramsci's purposeful departure from a reductionist orientation when assessing the degree to which the working classes are capable of resisting false consciousness. Even Althusser's formulation of interlocking state apparatuses retains a privileged position for the economic as a determining force "in the last instance." (Althusser and Balibar, 1970) Althusser also illustrates another Marxist preoccupation in the critique of ideology, that of the structural metaphor. Certainly

this structure is conceived of as less resistant to reorganization than the classic functionalist organismic analogy, but whether expressed as the simplistic base/superstructure pyramid of "vulgar Marxism," the more convincing materialism that incorporates the dialectic principle, or the overdetermining function of various ideological state apparatuses, the idea of a social "structure" remains.

The Marxist critique of ideology, then, may be characterized as increasingly problematic in contemporary capitalism by many of the same propensities which afforded it much of its initial power: a preoccupation with questions of domination that has at its heart a clear moral stance demanding an "other" to be challenged; a consistent recourse to the economic sphere as the criterion for defining class, power and dominance; and a reliance on the concept of structure, either metaphorically to describe the social "system" or as the primary object of study in political economy.

4.2 - Language and Communications Media

As an alternative to either the primacy or the fragmentation of the economic sphere's centrality, a re-focussing on the role of language and communications media has proved particularly

useful. The first distinction to be made in this area is that between language as a generally neutral medium and language as an ideologically-charged resource. Few might now argue the former position, but if not a pure instrument of communication, just how "ideological" is language, and what language forms are more and less likely to be saturated in whatever flow of ideology exists, directed or undirected?

Frankfurt School theorists (with the arguable exception of Walter Benjamin), experiencing first-hand powerful, centralized state propaganda and ideological manipulation in the continental Europe of the 1930s, envisioned mass culture as a potentially dangerous tool of the ruling class, atomizing audiences into "mere" consumers and attenuating the development of revolutionary consciousness. The concern here, however, was primarily with the use to which the "normally neutral" media of communications were themselves employed. As a contrasting view, Alvin Gouldner sees the supplanting of mass literacy by mass media as placing a large proportion of a population (primarily the working class) "beyond the reach" of ideology. Ideology functions best through the written word, Gouldner asserts, and less formal language forms do not invoke the same authority. "A Socratic preference for the spoken word, and a corresponding rejection of writing, is inherently nonideological." (Gouldner, 1976:80, emphasis in

original) In such a scheme, cinema, radio and television are held to represent a "consciousness industry" as distinct from the ideological "cultural apparatus" centred primarily in universities. While this position may seem counter-intuitive on first reading and even naïve in accepting the possibility of a non-ideological mass media, Gouldner's position is based on historical developments in capitalist societies that are now so well entrenched that they are most often overlooked. Borrowing from Habermas, Gouldner points out that a divergence in the domination practices of the ruling class has occurred such that the economic elite must rely more heavily than ever before on the functioning of ideology as it is employed by non-economic sectors. A strong link is forged between cultural elites, institutions of the state and the bourgeoisie. The masses, however, theoretically "controlled" by the mass media, are exposed to an apparatus itself mediated by the practices of more than a single ruling group. The various media, that is, can no longer be harnessed to the interests of a single ruling class. The position stands in stark contrast to that of Althusser for whom the media may be considered only a portion of the "interlocking and overdetermining" ideological state apparatuses, and where the apparent diffusion of a ruling class results in greater, not lesser ideological dominance, even if this dominance

is less specifically goal-directed than in pre-WW II society.

In his synopsis of Gouldner's position, Thompson rejects the consignment of ideology to the realm of the written word and the idea of the masses as beyond its influence. "I think that one must leave open the possibility that the language of everyday life is the very locus of ideology and the very site of the meaning which sustains relations of domination." (1984:89-90, emphasis in original) In one of Gouldner's many definitions for the concept of ideology something of this insight is revealed:

Ideology is that speech that seeks to reduce the dissonance between mutual dependence and differential allocation; it seeks to reduce the dissonance between the fact that nothing can be accomplished without others, while at the same time allowing differential rewards despite this radical, mutual dependency. (1976:277, emphasis in original)

If this definition (ideology as the promotion of the meritocracy myth, not too far afield from a classic Marxist conception of false consciousness) is to be reconciled with the idea that the spoken word is nonideological, then it is to the word "Socratic" in Gouldner's statement that one should turn. What Gouldner seems to be implying is that it is a dialectic discussion between uncoerced individuals that is "inherently nonideological." The assertion remains unsatisfying until a better understanding of an uncoerced or "free" dialogue is engendered.

How then is a recognition of the preeminence of language

incorporated into the general perspective of the Marxist critique of ideology? One method is supplied by Habermas through his reformulation of historical materialism. While it is true that Marx seemed to recognize some importance in language for the development of consciousness;

Language is as old as consciousness, language is practical consciousness...language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men. Consciousness is therefore from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. (Marx, 1846/1960:19)

subsequent discussion of language's importance by Marx is virtually non-existent. By contrast, Habermas seizes upon language and communication as a fundamental framework in which to analyse capitalist society:

...Habermas apparently believes that society can be comprehended from the communicative perspective since it is literally produced by language. [...] It follows that social systems can be regarded as a series of communicative actions... (Rockmore, 1989:76).

Habermas has engaged in a purposeful reformulation of historical materialism, rejecting its particular emphasis on material production but retaining its most basic epistemological foundation. In a sense, Habermas has transformed the content of historical materialism so that material production is replaced with "communicative action," and it is the latter which is fundamental in the determination of consciousness.

Habermas asserts the intersubjective assumption of an "ideal

speech situation" in which communicative validity is tied to a form of consensus based on certain quasi-empirical criteria.

(Habermas, 1979) There seems a movement towards intersubjective agreement or "face validity" as the ultimate criterion of rational, valid communication:

...in the model of communicative action, speech acts are the medium in which actors who are oriented toward a cooperative coordination of their different plans of action "mobilize the potential for rationality" inherent in ordinary language. [...] The communicative model...can fully illuminate the "rational internal structure" of the process of coming to an intersubjectively valid agreement. And it is only such an agreement that can, in turn, constitute the basis for a form of cooperation... (White, 1988:40)

This hopeful possibility of an ideal speech situation echoes the earlier concerns of M.M. Bakhtin and his conception of dialogics. Bakhtin was aware of the power accompanying the mastery of language and of particular language modes or speech genres, especially those perceived as privileged or dominant. The mastery of official discourse often implies power, and as Buton and Carlen assert in their analysis of the relationship between law, ideology, and the state, a degree of oppression as well:

We view Official Discourse as the realisation of power in the creation of a distinct object that is fashioned from the discourses of law, epistemology, social science and common sense. This object functions via its attempts (successful and unsuccessful, and always unfinished) to repair the fractured image of the self-acclaimed essentially just characterisation of the state's repressive and ideological apparatuses. (1979:34)

While recognizing the power of official discourse, Bakhtin was actually more interested in the functions of informal discourse and saw an emancipatory potential in its employment. In the literary form of the novel, Bakhtin recognized a freedom of expression not found in other literary forms; an openness of discourse reflecting the inherent heteroglossia of all but the most isolationist and xenophobic cultures. Since, for Bakhtin, language does not reflect or transmit ideology but is the terrain where ideology is formed and contested, informal discourse or "secondary speech genres" are important forces in the resistance of ideological domination. The existence of a multiplicity of social speech genres is considered in this view the essential engine of societal growth and change:

These languages enter into struggle, invest and animate human consciousness with specific patterns of motivation and action, co-exist and interrelate dialogically... the act of understanding and interpreting the alien word requires a kind of hermeneutics of the quotidian micro-world of the word. (Gardiner, 1992:37,38)

It may be argued that Bakhtin's writings suffer from a certain romanticism of folk culture and a rather unfashionable optimism regarding the liberating potential of free and open dialogism. As Michael Gardiner points out:

He felt that we required a dialogical interaction with others before we could develop a coherent image of self and engage in morally and aesthetically productive tasks. Such a co-endeavour is ideally conducted in a

spirit of mutual recognition and trust, even love.
(1992:3)

Moreover, the logic behind this optimism is not particularly evident. According to Bakhtin, the self is also formed in and through discourse in the world - the self being a process that resists closure rather than the self-contained, rational ego of Cartesian or Kantian formulations. Since signifying systems exist logically prior to the individual as part of the world (s)he is born into, and since individuals learn to conceptualize the world through these signifying systems, which are inherently ideological, heteroglot and changing, then all consciousness is ideologically grounded and the self is a socio-historical process, not a pure vessel of reason and rationality. Thus, Bakhtin's optimism regarding the utility of everyday dialogism must entail the eventuality of emergence. True dialogic intercourse must be "free" - at least in a Bakhtinian or Habermassian sense - but more importantly it must exhibit unpredictable, emergent properties. Not only are such exchanges the result of social heteroglossia, they continue to produce that state, and in so doing manifest the instances of an often unintended ideological resistance. If so, then the importance of an examination of everyday discourse, or "secondary speech genres" becomes apparent.

Discourse analysis, however, in its varying forms, exhibits

an understandable tendency to focus on structure and the rules of discursive organization, often at the expense of content. A large part of this tendency is the result of simple logistics, that is, the problem of transcribing. The written representation of a naturally occurring discursive situation often seems stilted, awkward and inelegant. Aesthetic considerations notwithstanding, fidelity to an original form is an unreasonable expectation across different communications media. The reproduction of informal conversation on the written page will never capture the essence or flavour of the original by simply striving for accuracy.

Verbal communication, however, varies significantly in its amenability to analyses of a structural orientation. Many social situations evoke highly structured interaction with clear power dynamics and well understood expectations of all concerned (certain employer/employee, teacher/student or parent/child interactions, for example). In these situations, a method such as Harold Garfinkel's conversation analysis may be quite appropriate. Even in highly structured situations, however, a striking distinction between manifest and latent content may be observed in the results of the method's application. In carrying out such exercises, with an ethnomethodologist's sensitivity to subjective meaning, Garfinkel's students invariably found the

latent to heavily outweigh the manifest content in their written reproductions of conversations. (Garfinkel, 1967)

The tendency towards privileging structural analysis is also the result of the rules of language itself. Language is a formalized, highly-structured, internally-coherent system. That methods designed to analyse such a system share many of these characteristics should not be surprising. It may be preferable, for certain modes of inquiry, to accentuate the enabling rather than constraining function of language, the free-flow of casual conversation and the evocative nature of such quasi-linguistic practices as singing and visual art.

To analyse the flow of informal discourse, an emphasis is often placed on the tacit rules of turn-taking in conversation and the relations of power that may be thus illuminated. The number of influences on the negotiation of this turn-taking are potentially immense and exist beyond their visible/audible manifestations in the event itself. Finally, perhaps the greatest structural influence on the analysis of language and discourse is the pervasive Enlightenment/modernist propensity for classification. Where structure is not immediately evident it is often imposed; where such impositions are exceptionally difficult positivistic science, the Western touchstone of valid knowledge, becomes equally difficult.

Naturally occurring discourse - casual conversations - are replete with emergent characteristics. If discourse is the site of ideology in the everyday and everyday discourse has a fundamental unpredictability, does it follow that ideology is also "unpredictable" or largely unstructured? What is the extent of ideology's emergent properties? How might "non-structure" be quantified or categorized? These questions are easily avoided in the majority of discursive situations by an artificial structural veneer, but become salient in particular situations of anomic "strangeness" elaborated in the previous chapter.

As noted, the frame as essentially a shared definition of presently occurring social reality, cannot exist wholly independent of ideological underpinnings or the force of hegemonic modes of discourse. Frames, however, are not ideologies in themselves, nor are they perfect reflections of any particular ideology. The macro-level frame, while inherently more stable than its micro-level counterpart, is more time-dependent and more fragile than ideology. While certain macro-level frames may appear stable, as a definition of what is currently occurring, a frame is vulnerable to disruption from a wider variety of sources than an entrenched ideology.

Nor may frame analysis be reduced to the model of paradigm shifts. Following Thomas Kuhn (*The Structure of Scientific*

Revolutions, 1970), paradigm shifts occur after enough anomalies accumulate during a period of "normal science" to overthrow an existing model or theory and establish a new paradigm. Thus begins another cycle of normal science until anomalous findings again build to the theoretical breaking point. The moment of the actual paradigm shift may indeed be sudden, even shocking, thus resembling a frame break. However, Kuhn's model deals with scientific research or at least the organized production of knowledge, not social interaction as such. Moreover, there is a certain linear, progressive element to the model of paradigm shifts where each successive theory is considered stronger, more inclusive than the previous. It is essentially an evolutionary model of "revolutions." The concept of the frame break or disruption, however, makes no assumptions regarding direction or progress. Frame disruptions may possibly occur from the accumulation of contradictory ideas or evidence (anomalies) but are as likely to derive from singular events and may have little or no connection to scientific research.

Unlike frames, ideologies often orient themselves toward large scale strategies of persuasion and claims to universality. There is a strong movement towards codification, doctrine and in extreme cases, state-supported dogma. Much of an ideology's strength is derived from normative claims to correctness and

suspicion and/or sanction of dissenters. By contrast, those who do not share a particular definition of presently occurring reality suggested by a frame may be considered outsiders, strange, or at worst mentally imbalanced, but rarely criminal or treasonous. The strength of macro frames is dependent upon each individual manifestation, not upon a set of prescriptive guidelines or overarching philosophy.

Finally, it must be noted that in certain cases it is possible that a stable macro frame may become so entrenched that it is all but indistinguishable from established ideological precepts. At such a point it may become reified and permanently incorporated into the culture's surrounding ideology and thus cease to exist as a frame at all. Such an occurrence, however, is exceedingly rare, since the stable frame itself is so rare. It is possible, however, that the "outer frame" of American superiority to be discussed shortly is in fact such a pseudo-frame, as evidenced in part by its unusually strong historical resistance to disruption. Ideologies exhibit a limited trans-historical power that frames, by their very temporal nature, can only imitate.

4.3 - Summary

We thus return to the theoretical orientation derived from the micro sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology and Goffmanian frame analysis; the stream of thought that will incorporate the micro concerns of emergent creativity into a perspective recognizing the problems inherent in many traditional conceptions of ideology. At this point we again note the following: first, humans are capable of originality and the creation of unique ideas; secondly, that capacity is inherent in the conception of human consciousness, but only as the result of socialization and social interaction; thirdly, the capacity for creativity is actuated most acutely in reciprocal face-to-face interaction; and finally, it is only when interaction is habitual, routine, mundane, that this creativity is stifled.

In the process of incorporating an understanding of ideology and the macro plane to the above insights it is argued that:

1. Much of the Marxist tradition shares with its object of critique - capitalist ideology - a normative need for a tangible "enemy" or "other," particularly in the economic sphere. The fragmentation of an identifiable ruling class makes this orientation problematic.
2. The Marxist critique of ideology has undergone a necessary

transformation in its recent turn from a faith in the centrality of the economic sphere to a recognition of the crucial role played by language, culture and mass communication. While the theoretical possibility of discourse forms resistant to or even "free" of ideological influence is on occasion argued, ideology exists in language and is spoken both in public political discourse, private casual conversation, and in signifying systems beyond the spoken or written word.

3. The preoccupation with structure and structural metaphors in Marxism, critical theory, and discourse analysis might benefit from a reorientation toward process and a metaphor of flow.

4. Ideology as discourse is "unbound," flowing like liquid with the heteroglossia of everyday life and saturating the content of mass media with undirected energy in complementary and contradictory directions.

5. The Goffmanian concept of frame, informed by the work of Andrew Travers and further modified to function at the macro sociological level is capable of incorporating the vagaries of ideological influence in late capitalism.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INNER AND OUTER FRAMES

5.1 - Outer: The American Superiority Frame

In the introduction to his study, Matthew S. Hirshberg offers the following description of the Cold War:

The cold war was, in many ways, a psychological phenomenon. It persisted to the extent that policymakers perceived a "cold war" and discussed policy in those terms, to the extent that supporters and critics joined in accepting a cold war interpretation of policy and using cold war jargon to discuss it. It lasted to the extent that people agreed that the cold war was the proper framework for interpreting foreign affairs. The cold war was not an event: It was a period of history during which a particular paradigm dominated perceptions of international reality. (1993:2)

As noted, Hirshberg conceptualizes this "psychological phenomenon/paradigm" as the "cold war schema" and his description often approximates the idea of a macro-level frame for the Cold War. It is worth noting, however, that even psychological phenomena often entail tangible consequences. After all, the crucial component of the Thomas dictum is in the phrase's final four words. The Cold War, that is, was also "real in its consequences." Policies were enacted, borders changed, economic systems adapted, governments were overthrown, regional conflicts emerged, and real people died very real deaths.

All these consequences were rendered more, if not perfectly, acceptable to the American citizenry by the mutually reinforcing

perception of the inner frame of the Cold War (its existence and its necessity to exist) and the outer frame of American superiority among nation states. Hirshberg's patriotic schema, in the context of his study, is coherent only in terms of the Cold War schema. The patriotic schema is "an expanded articulation" of the Cold War schema, with the latter containing within it the components of the former. (1993:4-5, 6) The concepts of inner and outer frames which I intend to utilize also reinforce each other, but they do not depend on each other for their existence as frames. The corollary to Hirshberg's patriotic schema, the outer frame, thus includes a somewhat broader set of assumptions.

The outer frame of American superiority among nation states includes the components of political, social, moral, technological and cultural ascendancy. The political component is articulated in American advancement of particular party politics (democracy and equal political opportunity) where competing systems (monarchies, constitutional or otherwise; various so-called autocracies; and all variations on socialism or Communism) are seen as only varying degrees of totalitarianism and self-evidently both inferior and undesirable.

The social aspect is manifested in part through idealized concepts of capitalism (free enterprise and equal economic opportunity) which promote "healthy" competition designed to

actualize a potential for greatness and prosperity limited only by one's desire for success. If the "American Dream" was once most often expressed in terms of the justice and freedom of the "New World," it had by the early post-war period been reduced in popular discourse to an image of comfortable, conservative, suburban domesticity where the crucial concern was that each generation enjoy a higher "standard of living" than the previous.

Self-identification with a moral superiority, at least partially an outgrowth of the social/political nexus, is promoted in the ideals of freedom (speech, assembly, worship, the press), an avowed avoidance of imperialism, and a collective sense of responsibility to protect and promote such ideals on an international scale. The official separation of church and state as well as the proliferation of such mythologies as the classless meritocracy and equality of opportunity along race/gender lines supports this assumption even for many whose lives seem an overt contradiction to its acceptance.

Technological and scientific ascendancy ("good old American know-how"), though occasionally problematic, has been articulated historically in the efficient exploitation of America's exceptional wealth of natural resources and the rise of a powerful industrial infrastructure, perhaps best exemplified by the assembly line production of automobiles; tangible symbols of

ingenuity, industrial leadership and mobility, both spatial and social. If certain Asian (and to a lesser degree European) challenges to this assumption have arisen in the last quarter century, such endeavours as the aerospace program and military advancements remain American strong suits and carry much symbolic power.

The cultural component is the most recent and problematic element, derived from the preceding components but less coherent and less entrenched. In the realm of popular culture America's ascendancy is truly impressive. In terms of commercial success and social reach, Hollywood films and American popular music tower above any competition. American television programs may be viewed on any continent, while the United States remains one of the few capitalist nations that imports virtually no foreign programming. In terms of what has been traditionally categorized as "high culture;" classical music, legitimate theatre, literature, architecture, etc., America's relatively short history precludes the depth and breadth of accumulation evident in the Eastern hemisphere. The accomplishments of native cultures have been generally dismissed and a certain dismissive attitude toward the "suspiciously snobbish" nature of European culture also remains. It may be said, nevertheless, that some appreciation for at least the tangible aspects of other cultures

(fashion, cuisine, art) exists and may provide a small degree of collective uncertainty regarding this component of the American Superiority Frame.

In a recent (1996) collection of articles titled *Bonds of Affection: Americans Define Their Patriotism*, editor John Bodnar gathers more than a dozen writers' essays on the subject. Virtually all concentrate heavily upon, or make frequent reference to, the military component of patriotism. Indeed it is not surprising that periods of armed conflict invoke and evoke the many strategies that promote nationalism, often to a rather extreme degree. In the arena of competing nation states, however, relatively few can credibly advance pretensions to ascendancy. In the 19th century Europe in general and Great Britain in particular could make such a claim and it may be argued this helped impel the sense of moral correctness in a mission to "make the world British." During the first half of the 20th century America's position had of course risen, but only to that of a number of great powers including several European nations, a few Asian, and Russia/USSR. Following WW II the number had shrunk to the two familiar "superpowers." Following this logic, the post Cold War era should further entrench this aspect of the ASF as the United States finds itself the preeminent military power on the planet.

Although individuals encounter the ASF as a pre-existing but continually renewed intersubjective reality definition, the frame cannot exist *ex nihilo*; it must derive from a coherent and acceptable source. Nor is it tenable to base such a self-definition on ascriptive characteristics. While the United States is dominated economically and politically by white, Protestant males, a national self-image of superiority based on race or religion cannot, at present, function in official or widely-disseminated popular public discourse. In short, Americans can see their society as superior to others not because they are "born to greatness" but because they and their ancestors have made it so. Superiority based on achievement rather than ascription is at the heart of the American myth.

The ASF is not impervious to attack and challenges to this nexus of assumptions do appear in both political discourse and popular culture. However, even these relatively few instances proceed from the initial assumption of the frame's existence. It is the baseline frame. Temporally this outer frame has gathered an historical inertia that has proceeded from the late 18th century with its few significant interruptions (the Civil War, the Great Depression) eventually assimilated back into the baseline definition. It is the most enduring and stable of American frames and may in fact be undergoing the reification

process which will incorporate it permanently into the ideological context from which it is derived. It will continue to exist as a frame *per se* to the extent that it is vulnerable to a relatively sudden disruption - at present an unproven assertion.

5.2 - Inner: The Cold War Frame

It is very difficult to place the Cold War Frame (CWF) in any one particular realm of being as defined by Goffman. Certainly a degree of unkeyed and non-deceptive activity in the "real" occurs. There is also resemblance to theatre, games, ritual/ceremony, and even dance. All this without considering the degrees of lamination present at any point, the spatial and temporal brackets employed or the various forms of benign and strategic fabrication which abound. Of course this difficulty is to be expected and the potential for extreme (if not always problematic) complexity is in fact one of Goffman's main points.

We may treat the concept of primary frameworks, it seems, as an unproblematic "given" unless an argument can be made, for example, that Americans and Russians perceive time in qualitatively distinct manners. It seems reasonable as well to adopt Goffman's practice of referring to a frame's initial keying or "rim" as a label for the frame itself. It may be assumed, that

is, that a "cold" war is indeed based on some other form of conflict or warfare. Potential difficulties only arise when additional laminations are admitted. Conceivably, one could argue that the CWF represented a Goffmanian "fabrication" on the part of political leaders or powerful groups within the military-industrial complex and that the majority of Americans (not to mention Russians, NATO, Warsaw Pact and global citizens in general) were "contained" within this definition. The idea, however, seems untenable to all but the most dedicated of conspiracy theorists. Certainly an almost inexhaustible list of fabrications conducted in the service of the CWF could be compiled, from propaganda statements subtle and gross to a plethora of espionage methods, but these practices are all contained within the frame itself and typically support the perception of its existence.

Goffman's fascination with a dramaturgical model of social interaction does seem applicable to the CWF. His belief was that one of the crucial elements of face-to-face interaction, and by extension virtually all framed activity was of "structured suspense;" the sensation, whether actual or "artificially" entered into, that a story is unfolding. As Goffman asserts: "Indeed, it seems that we spend most of our time not engaged in giving information but in giving shows." (1974:508) In very few

arenas of social life outside of drama *per se* are there as many motivations to put on such shows as in geopolitics.

Goffman's distinction between two types of anomic confusion regarding frame definition - "uncertainty" (confusion between one of several distinct possibilities) and "vagueness" (confusion as to what could possibly be occurring) is also instructive and applicable. The former condition represents an ambiguity contained within recognizable if uncomfortable parameters and may be applied to the Soviet/American relationship within the CWF.

It is understandable, then, that two quite intimately related individuals can each spend a considerable amount of time in private thought trying to piece out what the other really "meant" by doing a particular thing and what the implications of this meaning are for the state of the relationship. (1974:459)

The latter condition, however, represents what Goffman called a true "negative experience" (as described in chapter two) and is a far more acute, intense sensation. This, I would argue, is the form of frame ambiguity that may be associated with the historical period immediately following the acknowledgement of the CWF's collapse. Put simply, the ambiguity of "what are the Soviets really up to?" is less anomic than the vagueness of "what do we do now?"

In a reversal of the temporal direction derived in Hirshberg's relationship between the patriotic and Cold War schemata, the inner frame may be conceptualized as a specific

outgrowth of the outer. It existed in embryonic form in the first half of the 20th century and emerged fully developed in the aftermath of the second World War. Its major keying occurred at the end of the 1940s (most visibly in the containment and rollback doctrine) and remained fundamentally intact until the late 1980s.

With the United States the only Western nation-state of significant military strength to emerge from World War II with its economic system and infrastructure intact, and the subsequent entrenchment of what became known as the military-industrial complex, the Cold War could proceed. As Eugene Burdick unwittingly demonstrates in *The Strategy of Persuasion*, the ideological impetus of the Cold War was almost completely masked at this time. The outer frame was a self-evident state of affairs requiring no domestic justification:

At the end of World War II it was difficult to believe that America's world position could possibly deteriorate. We alone possessed the atomic bomb. We alone had surplus food with which we fed both friend and former foe. We alone had the technical knowledge and the surplus capital with which the ravaged industrial countries could be rebuilt. We alone had no history of colonialism. We alone had an unblemished prestige. We were, in honest fact, a sort of innocent colossus. We knew we were not imperialist nor expansionist; we assumed everyone would know that also. (1968:7, emphasis in original)

In attempting to unravel the sources of a wide intersubjective agreement regarding the necessity of the Cold War

as it took its familiar structure, Barnet argues that "the glue of the new consensus was anti-communism" and that:

Every major institution in American life was now [1950] engaged in the effort to influence popular opinion in the direction of the new orthodoxy. The rapidity with which Americans changed their minds about fundamental national security concerns - the Russians, the United Nations, maintaining a large military, massive foreign aid, military involvement - was attributable in large part to the extraordinary coincidence of imagery, rhetoric and prescription employed by a wide variety of American opinion leaders. (1990:292)

While such a concentrated and concerted effort may not have been completely necessary, its occurrence in the absence of centralized state media control suggests much regarding the latent American anxiety over Soviet Communism, as does the tenacity of this keying throughout the Cold War era. In summarizing survey data collected by the American Public Agenda Foundation, English and Halperin reported that "most Americans" shared the views that: a) "Soviets are obsessed with their own military security; b) Expansion of communism abroad threatens our religious and moral values; c) Soviets treat accommodation as a sign of weakness; d) Soviets can't be trusted to abide by international agreements; and e) The only language the Soviets understand is strength." (1987:98) Similarly, as Ralph Levering asserts:

Although some people did not accept this viewpoint, Americans generally agreed with statements like these: Russia broke its wartime agreements with the West, and

therefore is responsible for starting the Cold War. Because Russia is seeking to spread communism throughout the world, America has no choice but to take firm anti-Soviet measures. There is a monolithic international communist movement, centered in Moscow and including Communist China. It is dangerous and a waste of time to try to negotiate with the Russians; the only thing they understand is military strength. Democratic, prosperous America is the generous and wise leader of the free World; communist rule, in contrast, is always unpopular and dictatorial. (1982:7-8)

As noted earlier, Hirshberg's 1993 investigation utilizes a wide variety of public opinion research regarding American attitudes of the Soviet Union. A particularly demonstrative table indicated virtually no change in opinion regarding "communism as a form of government" from 1973 to 1988. Those responding that Communism was "good" ranged from a low of 1% to a high of 3%, while those rating it "bad or worst" fluctuated from a low of 70% (1973) to a high of 85% (1984, 1985) with no clear trend evident. (Niemi, Mueller and Smith, 1989:69) With regard to the Soviet Union specifically:

Attitudes fluctuated as various events and developments affected the Soviet image. Unfavourable attitudes toward the Soviet Union increased to 72% in 1976 and dropped back down to 60% in 1979. By 1980, the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had pushed unfavourable attitudes toward the Soviet Union over 80%... (Hirshberg, 1993:83)

Public opinion fluctuations, then, represent shifts in the normative tone of the Cold War Frame, but leave unscathed the fact of its existence; the shared definition of socio-political

reality that it represents. It may indeed be true, as American diplomat George Kennan stated in 1956, that "the image of a Stalinist Russia poised and yearning to attack the West, and deterred only by our possession of atomic weapons was largely a creation of the Western imagination." (Levering, 1982:24) It is this very "Western imagination," however, that is at issue: the perceptions and attitudes that nurtured and perpetuated the Cold War Frame.

These, then will be taken as the basic components of the Cold War Frame as it existed from the years 1948 to 1988:

a) The Cold War exists; b) The USA and USSR represent two diametrically opposed systems of social and political organization; c) If left unchallenged, Soviet Communism will expand on a global scale; d) American involvement in international affairs is primarily an ongoing response to actual or potential Soviet Communist aggression; e) American responses to this aggression are generally well justified, therefore f) the Cold War is necessary as long as Soviet Communism exists, and thus g) the Cold War will continue to exist into the foreseeable future.

5.3 - Summary

The most stable of American macro-level frames, the American Superiority Frame, contains the interrelated components of a perceived social, political, cultural, technological and moral ascendancy. For approximately 40 years, contained within the American Superiority "outer" Frame was a supporting form, the Cold War "inner" Frame. The two are not dependent on each other for their existence, but operated often in a mutually reinforcing capacity. Thus, the disruption of the inner frame (the Cold War's sudden and unexpected end), should produce certain macro-level equivalents to the consequences of micro-level frame breaks as proposed by Goffman and/or Travers, and may entail problematic and thus emergent consequences to the outer frame as well. The following chapter considers the Cold War's end as a frame disruption in some detail, preceded by a brief history of the Cold War Frame itself.

CHAPTER SIX: FRAME DISRUPTIONS

6.1 - A Brief History of the Cold War

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had, since the end of World War I, come to represent the two preeminent political, economic and social philosophies of the 20th century: capitalism and socialism respectively. While a certain enmity has existed between the two nation states since the 1917 revolution (with the short-lived and incomplete exception of World War II alliance) the Cold War as an accepted and widely understood frame did not exist prior to the closing of the second World War. The Cold War did not take shape until the USA and USSR could see themselves as the global exemplars of their respective socio-economic formations without significant rivals; as the world's two great "superpowers." Following the war, the European continent was economically ruined, physically crushed and emotionally exhausted. The nations of Africa, almost completely subjected to European imperialism would not gain independence until the 1960s and 70s. Portions of Asia were still subject to European control or devastated by the war, and those portions of Latin America free from European colonial rule were either subject to a great deal of American economic and political influence or lacking the political will to engage in global power struggles.

America in particular enjoyed the sensation of having finally, completely "come into its own." American public opinion supported the idea that the United States had saved the world on the side of right, and although great loss of life had been suffered it was on nowhere near the scale of losses in Europe, Russia or Japan. The war had effectively brushed away the end of the 1930s depression, spurred industrial development, accelerated technological advances, and entrenched the military-industrial complex. The United States emerged from the 20th century's most destructive conflict stronger and more confident than it had ever been, and had every intention of solidifying this position in the years to come. It seemed quite obvious that America's only obstacle in insuring the self-evident values of global democracy and free enterprise was the Communist USSR.

It was thus at the point where the American Superiority Frame was at its strongest that the Cold War Frame was born. The end of the war also saw the introduction of perhaps the most crucial single development shaping the latter's future form and flow: the atomic bomb. When "fat man" and "little boy" were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, American president Harry Truman may indeed have hoped to impress the Soviet Union with this unprecedented weapon of war, but it is doubtful this was the primary catalyst for its deployment. Regardless of

specific motivations, the presence of nuclear weapons, the atomic and hydrogen bombs coupled with the means of delivering them to their targets in the United States or Soviet Union, became the single unifying danger that underscored the unique nature of the Cold War Frame. Regardless of the degree of perceived tension between the two main antagonists, the potential for nothing less than global catastrophe was always believed possible with one bad decision or one mistake, one "push of a button."

The advantage of the frame perspective is that it allows us to remain on what appears to be the "surface" of history rather than forcing the excavation of hidden motives, obscure documents, or revisionist reappraisals. Frames derive their influence and very existence from shared perception. If subsequent analyses of, for example, the second term of Ronald Reagan's presidency reveal a more measured and conciliatory stance than that reflected in popular opinion in 1986, the frame is not affected in any way. Thus, though the antecedents to the Cold War are doubtless of a wide variety that can be traced at least back to the 1920s, the inception of the Cold War Frame may be derived from more visible, public events drawing their power from their very conspicuousness.

The context, of course, concerned the future of Europe in the post-war world and the extent of American and Soviet

influence on the continent. There are perhaps three leading candidates for the label of Cold War catalyst: Joseph Stalin's refusal in March of 1946 to remove Soviet troops from Iran without securing oil concessions equal to those awarded Britain; the 1948 forced imposition of a Soviet-controlled Communist government in Czechoslovakia; and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin forcing American relief airlifts. If these events constituted the first crucial public manifestations of the Cold War, the first indication of how quickly the stakes of the pseudo-conflict could be raised came on August 29, 1949 when the Soviet Union successfully test-detonated its first atomic bomb. It was the first indication to the United States and the world that Soviet science, at least in military matters, was operating at an elite level. It was a shocking revelation and it would not be the last such surprise. I have divided my history of the Cold War into six rather wide temporal categories, each corresponding (with the exception of category A) to the time frames established in organizing film representations in chapter seven. A more detailed Cold War time line is provided in appendix 1.

A. Prelude: 1917-46. This refers to the span of history following the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of Communism in Russia to the end and very early aftermath of World War II. It is the era, in Russia, of civil war, of Lenin's

victory, of his death in 1924 and the beginning of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" that soon became a dictatorship of Joseph Stalin. Through famines, purges and disastrous agricultural restructuring the United States remained generally unconcerned with a Soviet military threat, remaining preoccupied with engendering the "good life" sans alcohol in the 1920s and attempts to reclaim it following the 1929 stock market collapse. Although as many as 10,000 suspected Communists and "subversives" were arrested in the United States through the efforts of the General Intelligence Division in 1919-20 (under the leadership of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and a young J. Edgar Hoover), it was not until the Great Depression that any general perception of Communism's appeal to the American working class entered the public consciousness. The House Un-American Activities Committee was formed in 1938, but would exert no significant influence until the late 1940s.

B. Establishment: 1947-64. The era considered the most intense and dangerous of the Cold War, prior to the Vietnam War and the era of détente, when Mutual Assured Destruction is eventually established. This period is filled with the Cold War's most dramatic events and colourful leaders: Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev in the Soviet Union; Harry S. Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy in the United States. The years

seem crammed with seminal Cold War moments: the establishment of Communism in mainland China; the invasion of South Korea and the subsequent war; the arrest and execution of the Rosenbergs; Joseph McCarthy and the HUAC investigations/blacklistings; the founding of the CIA and its first overseas interventions; the Hungarian revolt of 1956; Sputnik, Yuri Gagarin and the early space race; Gary Powers and the U-2 spy planes; the erection of the Berlin Wall; Fidel Castro, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis; the development and testing of increasingly powerful nuclear weapons and the expansion of the nuclear community to include five nation-states. The era comes to a close with the assassination of Kennedy, the deposition of Khrushchev, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the catalyst for direct American involvement in the Vietnamese civil war.

C. Dissensus and Détente: 1965-78. This era is dominated in the United States by the Vietnam War and the first significant progress in nuclear arms control. It is the era of the greatest political stability for the Soviet Union (Leonid Brezhnev) and the least for the United States (Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter). American preoccupation with domestic subversion, "duck and cover" drills in public schools, and space race insecurity gave way to an obsession with Vietnam that, with its definite antecedents in the Korean conflict, became increasingly unpopular

and problematic. It eventually brought down the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, became the focal point of inter-generational conflict, and despite Richard Nixon's protestations of "peace with honor" constituted America's most humiliating 20th century military failure.

Under Brezhnev the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal was dramatically expanded and posed a far greater threat to American territory than it did in the suburban bomb shelter era. Missile technology progressed rapidly in both countries in conjunction with the rocket science of the space race. To counter American ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles) the Soviet Union developed its ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system. In response the United States developed the MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) missile system, allowing each ICBM to carry up to ten separate warheads. At the end of the 1960s the first Soviet/American "summits" on nuclear weapons control began. The SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) meetings were not particularly effective in actually limiting weapons research and development but at least provided a public indication that Soviet and American leaders both recognized the dangers of the arms race.

In the space race, despite continued Soviet superiority through the 1960s, the last and most symbolically significant

accomplishment was achieved by the United States when *Apollo XI* landed two Americans on the moon in July of 1969. Only six years later *Apollo* and *Soyuz* spacecrafts would link in space for a cooperative mission. The event was symbolic of the era of détente, an easing of tensions manifested not simply in arms talks but in trade, sport and cultural exchanges, and the American sale of wheat to the USSR to offset harvest failures.

Internationally, several newly-independent African nations turned toward Communism or their own variations of socialism, while the CIA continued its anti-Communist interventions including the ousting of the popularly-elected Marxist president in Chile, Salvador Allende, in 1973. Vietnam notwithstanding, the Cold War as a military venture became largely invisible, the province of covert operatives, secret weapons bases and arms-length support of perceived interests in the Third World and Middle East. Strategically, the détente era is generally believed to have favoured the Soviet Union. Despite the Sino-Soviet split, the USSR was afforded the opportunity to vastly increase its weapons supply and technology, while Communism and socialism gained popularity not only with a newly cynical and disillusioned Western youth, but in real political movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The mid-to-late 1970s constituted the most significant

challenge to the American Superiority Frame since the revelation of Soviet leadership in the early space race. The three central factors in this challenge were the humiliation and dissensus of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal of Richard Nixon's presidency, and the so-called "malaise" of the Carter administration. The war in Vietnam cost the United States approximately \$150-200 billion, 58,000 lives, a great deal of international respect (particularly over the intense bombing campaigns of 1969-72) and a significant degree of national self-esteem. Following Nixon's resignation, Gerald Ford was considered a caretaker president and the 1976 election was won by Jimmy Carter and the Democrats virtually by acclamation. Unjustly or not, Carter's presidency is remembered chiefly for the economic recession and increasing oil/gasoline prices resulting from OPEC organization, and the seeming helplessness of his office in the Iran hostage crisis.

D. Resurgence: 1979-88. By the decade's end the American public seemed eager to accept a revitalized Republican party under the leadership of noted conservative Ronald Reagan and his revival of certain "classic" Cold War themes. Several events at the turn of the decade prepare the way for the popularity of Reagan's policies. In Nicaragua the socialist Sandinistas end the 40-year dictatorship of the Somoza family and appear to be

exerting influence in neighboring Honduras and El Salvador. In El Salvador Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, is murdered in his cathedral sparking the 10-year Salvadoran civil war. In Britain Margaret Thatcher becomes the country's first woman prime minister, leading the Conservative party and the nation in a decided turn to the right. The alliance between Reagan's America and Thatcher's Britain would soon become more concerted internationally than at any time since World War II. In Afghanistan Soviet troops invade in an attempt to reinstate and support the short-lived Communist government of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It is the USSR's first direct military intervention outside of Europe in the post-war era. And perhaps most significantly, the Iranian revolution ousting the Shah and installing Ayatollah Khomeini sparks fierce anti-American demonstrations in that country. The taking of American hostages in the Tehran Embassy (with demands for the Shah's extradition) and the complete failure of an American rescue operation results in the perception of a weak and incompetent presidency and "a nation held hostage." Although arrangements for the hostages' release had already been completed by the end of 1980, in a final gesture of contempt for the Carter administration they were not released until immediately following Reagan's inauguration.

Although only one additional nation-state (India in 1974) had been confirmed as a new nuclear power in the preceding era, by the end of the 1970s it is assumed that Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea and Libya are at the threshold of nuclear weapons production. Worldwide weapons spending is estimated at \$600 billion per year in the early 1980s with the United States and the Soviet Union accounting for approximately 60% of the total. The number of American and Soviet nuclear weapons approaches 10,000 each, equaling approximately 500,000 megatons of explosive power or 100,000 times the total used in all of World War II. Weapons production would continue to increase throughout the 1980s.

In this context Ronald Reagan is elected on a platform stressing a new hardline approach to the expansion of international Communism, particularly in Latin America. The United States immediately begins to actively assist the Salvadoran government in resisting leftist (FMLN) guerrillas. In El Salvador approximately 30,000 civilians are killed by right-wing death squads 1979-81, although the extent of CIA involvement in this is uncertain. Economic aid to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is frozen but is afforded to the Contra rebels and CIA destabilization operations are approved. In 1982 Britain demonstrates a new boldness in the Falkland Islands War with

Argentina. In a March, 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, Reagan refers to the USSR as an "evil empire" and "the focus of evil in the modern world." That same month he announces the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Spending on the dubious concept would exceed \$16 billion before the decade's end. In October 1983 American troops and a token force from Jamaica and Barbados invade Grenada and quickly overthrow its pro-Cuban military government.

This renewed sense of international authority, of "dealing from a position of strength" (judged necessary by implicit reference to the CWF component that the Soviets respect only such strength) indicated the strategic efforts of the Reagan government to overcome the ASF challenge of the dissensus era, particularly the Watergate/Vietnam/Carter nexus of the 1970s, and reestablish the stable ASF baseline. As Susan Jeffords has argued, the 1980s saw a similar process occur in popular culture representations in film and television as America began finally to assimilate (rather than forget or ignore) the experience of the Vietnam War:

...the Vietnam War and its veterans became the springboard for a general remasculinization of American culture that is evidenced in the popularity of figures like Ronald Reagan, Oliver North, and J. R. Ewing, men who...favor images of strength and firmness with an independence that smacks of Rambo and confirms their faith in a separate culture based on a mythos of masculinity (1989:169)

However, while the hardness of attitude and demonstration of military strength proved generally popular (Reagan's reelection in 1984 was a landslide victory) the refusal of the administration to revitalize the SALT process with either Brezhnev or his successor Yuri Andropov also allowed many of the fears that lay almost dormant in the détente era to resurface:

President Reagan and his advisers had gained a reputation for irresponsibility, even recklessness, on nuclear issues. The administration's obvious preference for rearmament over arms control contributed to this... By the end of 1982 there had developed, as a consequence, the strongest upsurge in public concern over the danger of nuclear war since the Cuban missile crisis... (Gaddis, 1992:122)

The first START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) meeting held in Geneva in 1983 accomplished little and Andropov's successor Konstantin Chernenko's attempts at a new détente with the United States were rejected by the Reagan administration. Early in the administration's second term the SDI project and the policies of a new-style "containment" and "rollback" in Central America continued unabated with the American congress approving \$100 million in military aid to the Contra rebels. In the Soviet Union, however, the mid-point of the decade saw the most significant change in leadership since Lenin entered the Kremlin.

Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Chernenko following the latter's death in March of 1985, and almost immediately launched his programs of *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika*

(restructuring). Within a matter of months a unilateral ban on nuclear test detonations in the Soviet Union was announced, and the Gorbachev government began overtures toward the United States regarding a renewal of arms reduction talks. In the light of continued American SDI research (regardless of differing opinions on its feasibility) Gorbachev appeared particularly anxious to prevent "the militarization of space." In November the first summit meeting between American and Soviet leaders in more than six years was held in Geneva. At a press conference at the summit's conclusion Gorbachev characterized his several private meetings with Reagan in decidedly guarded terms: "Our discussions were straightforward, lengthy, sharp and at times very sharp. Nevertheless, I think we were productive to some extent."

(Gorbachev, 1985/1987:143)

During the next three years a gradual shift in perceptions of leadership occurred in the United States that was undoubtedly rather uncomfortable for the Reagan administration. The apparent sincerity and earnestness of Gorbachev's positions regarding domestic liberalization and international peace proposals seemed increasingly uncharacteristic for the leader of an "evil empire." While the Soviet Union continued its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing, the United States continued test detonations in the Nevada desert. The nuclear reactor disaster in Chernobyl,

Ukraine, though not a result of weapons testing, seemed to underscore the dangers in America's policy and the wisdom of the Soviet Union's. Gorbachev consistently reached out to the American president, initiating the Reykjavik summit and taking the lead in arms reduction proposals. Meanwhile congressional hearings were held on the Reagan administration's sale of arms to Iran through Israel, the trading of arms for hostages held in Lebanon, and the secret funneling of international monetary donations to the Contra guerillas in Nicaragua. Although Reagan was not found culpable in these dealings, a certain tarnish now existed on his presidency, while Gorbachev enjoyed the most positive image in the Western media of any Soviet leader since the short-lived period of World War II alliance when glowing articles on "Uncle Joe" Stalin and the Soviet Union appeared in *Look* and *Life* magazines respectively.

Despite fears that Gorbachev's policies might provoke a backlash from more conservative Soviet party members, and the nagging suspicion that it might all be a clever ruse, this time period and Reagan's presidency end with guarded optimism. A significant treaty (on Intermediate Nuclear Forces) had been signed and the announcement had even been made that Soviet troops would withdraw from Afghanistan by February of 1989. As promising as these developments appeared, however, they were far from

adequate foreshadowing of the complete upheaval and disruption of the Cold War Frame that would immediately follow. The specific political events of the 1989-91 disruption phase are catalogued in appendix 1, while a consideration of frame disruptions in general as well as the disruption of the Cold War Frame in particular are presented in the following section.

6.2 - The End of the Cold War as Frame Disruption

Sudden shifts in shared definitions of a social situation's reality, what will be termed "frame disruptions," entail both immediate, largely unguarded reactions and subsequent strategic responses. For Travers, the former are expressed as instances of "strangeness" or "rituality," resulting in "anomic reality." For Hirshberg, a macro-level parallel is found in what he terms "schemata challenges." Antecedents for these can be found in the tradition of interaction sociology in such concepts as Garfinkel's normative "breaching" and of course the Goffmanian "frame break." In discussing the latter Goffman often utilizes the more structured frames of public performances as examples. A frame break in such a case occurs when the intersubjective understanding between performer and audience of the frame's interactive rules is violated. Inappropriate performer

recognition of the audience's existence (e.g. reactions to applause) or intrusions by the audience into the realm of the performer (e.g. heckling) result in at least momentary confusion and render the existence of the performance frame suddenly "visible" and absurd. The consequences of more mundane frame breaks in daily interaction include embarrassment, unexpected emotional expressions and unintended self-disclosures.

A frame disruption may be defined as any event or series of events, whether initiated by an interactant, perceived within the existing frame or derived from "external" reality which suddenly and significantly alters the interactants' shared understanding of the frame's reality. What a particular frame has been defined as, that is, becomes suddenly something qualitatively different or non-existent. Micro-level examples include a serious interaction suddenly exposed as a joke or hoax (or the reverse) or, to employ another of Goffman's examples, an exercise in "play fighting" suddenly escalating to real violence.³

There are several events of the Cold War era that might be taken as relatively minor disruptions of or challenges to the outer (American Superiority) frame. It is important to note that the relationship between the inner and outer frames at these

³These examples are more accurately categorized as "fabrications" and "miskeyings" respectively, but demonstrate well the subjective sensation of involvement in a frame break.

points is not always a positive linear one. While the two frames are mutually reinforcing, disruptions to one are not necessarily congruent challenges to the other. In so far as they relate to events of the Cold War, disruptions in the outer frame in fact often strengthen the inner. The point is perhaps best illustrated through a consideration of the early years of the "space race."

The unexpected success in Soviet aerospace with the launch of the Sputnik satellite demonstrated a level of Russian scientific advancement that constituted a clear challenge to the ASF component of technological and scientific superiority. When the USSR successfully test-detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949 Americans could reasonably argue the probability that this was only accomplished through the efforts of spies and security leaks. The device was, after all, very similar in design to early American bombs. This theory also suited the turn of the decade mood regarding the "red menace in our own backyard" and helped provide justification for the HUAC hearings, the Truman and Eisenhower loyalty programs and the death sentence imposed on the Rosenbergs. In 1957, however, an application of this discourse to the Sputnik launch held far less currency. The Soviets had, after all, accomplished the feat first. Predictably, then, reactions to this ASF challenge included the kind of unintended emotional disclosures Goffman and others catalogue in face-to-face

interactive parallels. Perhaps the most common initial reactions were those of confusion, anger, denial, and above all surprise.

In 1957, to the astonishment of Americans, the backward empire of unfreedom launched the first satellite, Sputnik, into orbit. [...] The grapefruit-sized satellite exposed America as technologically backward and aroused fears that its undisciplined next generation, evidently deficient in science, reading, and computational skills, would be no match for Russian youth. (Engelhardt, 1995:107)

Similarly, Levering describes the launch as "stunning" Western opinion:

Russia might have a larger army, Europeans and Americans had believed; but surely the United States, which had first developed atomic weapons and numerous other scientific marvels, was years ahead in technology. Not necessarily, the Russians demonstrated in one stroke, and Khrushchev predictably boasted about it. (1982:78)

Levering goes on to describe the deep concern expressed in the *New York Times* regarding the military, political and finally psychological implications of the Sputnik launch. The thought that Soviet Communists possessed atomic weapons was disturbing enough (though Americans had had nearly a decade to get used to the idea) but that the ultimate "high ground" of outer space could be controlled by such a nation was profoundly unsettling. Americans could now tune their ham radios to a certain frequency and hear the simple, ominous "beeping" of the satellite as it passed, unseen but undeniable, above their heads. To make matters worse, Sputnik II, this time carrying the canine passenger

"Laika" was successfully launched the very next month. Initial American attempts at duplicating the Soviet achievement resulted in embarrassing public failures and seemed to indicate a certain uncharacteristic desperation. Even the first notable success, the Explorer I satellite powered by the new Jupiter-C rocket, did not completely measure up (a successful launch but not a true orbit).

Between 1958 and 1961 six more Sputniks were launched, the Soviet Luna 3 satellite orbited and photographed the Moon, cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space (Alan Shepard's subsequent flight was a mere 15 minute sub-orbital venture), cosmonaut Gherman Titov spent an entire day in orbit (John Glenn's subsequent flight was cut short due to an autopilot malfunction), and in the years immediately following cosmonauts Valentina Tereshkova and Aleksei Leonov became the first woman in space and the first person to complete a spacewalk respectively. It was not until the decade's end with the Apollo XI flight that this challenge to the ASF was finally and decidedly overcome. (A more detailed account of the events of the "space race" is provided in appendix 2).

It is worth considering this period, then, in terms of a particular application of frame disruption principles. One of the most common reactions to a sudden frame break, as argued by both Goffman and Travers, is that of embarrassment. Goffman in fact

dedicated an entire early (1956) article to the subject.⁴ In a 1988 study Christian Heath takes up the topic as well, focussing on the identity disclosure aspect of the sensation.

"Embarrassment thrives on one person seeing another see them, and so on; the reflexive recognition kindling further the fires of discomfort." (Heath, 1988:146) This seems quite congruent with Goffman's view that:

In all these [embarrassing] settings the same fundamental thing occurs: the expressive facts at hand threaten or discredit the assumptions a participant finds he has projected about his identity. Thereafter those present find they can neither do without the assumptions nor base their own responses upon them. The inhabitable reality shrinks until everyone feels "small" or out of place. (Goffman, 1956:269)

There is an unspoken "moral" obligation between interactive participants to support each other's identity claims, according to Goffman. When circumstances arise that violate these claims, individuals lose their interactive grounding and are reduced to "blushing, fumbling and vacillating movement." Moreover, the fragility of the present frame increases and if a disruption has not yet occurred, its potential rises significantly. Certainly in the context of the early space race, with two interactive antagonists, the "moral obligation" to avoid engendering the other's discomfort is hardly a priority.

⁴"Embarrassment and Social Organization," *American Journal of Sociology* 62:264-274.

Much of Goffman's original formulation retains currency at the macro, nation state level. While any embarrassment at the individual level among, for example, American aerospace directors upon hearing of the Soviet Sputnik launch is irretrievably lost to history as useful data, and while one cannot anthropomorphize the United States as an embarrassed entity *per se*, the principle of contradictions regarding a projected identity (a technologically superior nation) and certain visible manifestations of embarrassment (temporary inability to participate in the ongoing activity, vacillation of activity) do apply. The hurried efforts of official government spokespersons to assuage the fears of the American public are the nation-state equivalents of individual blushes and stammerings. The rapid 1958 introduction of the National Defense Education Act, designed to stream more young Americans into the physical sciences and engineering, was a direct result of this perceived ASF challenge. The more organized and measured efforts of the space program to correct the situation in the mid-1960s represent the strategic management strategies designed to reestablish the ASF baseline. Although NASA did not operate without more very public failures (the most spectacular being the Apollo I disaster) the impetus had shifted from desperate catch-up to competitive race, and as much pressure was placed on NASA by president Kennedy's famous

challenge as the fear of Soviet "victory." Still later with the Tom Wolfe novel and Phil Kaufman film *The Right Stuff* the entire series of events is brought into the comforting realm of "history" as though it had all unfolded as it should. The film, of course, foregrounds the heroic efforts of figures like Shepard and Glenn while virtually ignoring those of Gagarin or Titov.

Again, in the preceding example, a challenge to one of the outer (ASF) frame's components actually strengthens or intensifies the inner CWF. When the disruptive direction is reversed, however, the inner/outer frame relationship does take on a greater sense of parallel progression. That is, a disruption of the inner frame is often a simultaneous challenge to the outer. A serious disruption to the CWF carries with it the possibility of exposing the less palatable aspects of the ASF's underpinnings, of rendering them visible and vulnerable, open to challenge. Although employing his schemata concepts rather than frames, Hirshberg articulates this "danger" well:

The American patriotic schema is a stable belief system, deeply ingrained in the American psyche. The cultural predominance of the patriotic schema is a crucial component of political stability in America. Significant skepticism concerning any of the schema's components would threaten to replace mass complacency with discontent. (1993:5)

Yet a significant degree of "discontent" had already entered the American consciousness in various manners and on more than

one occasion during the Cold War era, particularly in the post-Kennedy/Khrushchev era. In *The End of Victory Culture*, Tom Engelhardt recounts an adolescent experience in which he fashions a war map representing the triumph of a Chinese Communist army, featuring a mushroom cloud drawn in the expanse of the Pacific Ocean. He refers to it as a "half-conscious oppositional act" and notes that he found "secret pleasure and entertainment then in playing with the worst nightmare the anti-Communist mind could produce." (1995:8-9) The experience, I believe, was not an uncommon one for children and teenagers in the Cold War era. The strange, compelling beauty of the mushroom cloud was noted even by the crew of the *Enola Gay*. Young men in particular are offered few impediments to cultivating an appreciation of destructive machines. The feel of a gun in the hand, whether water or machine pistol, the sleek lines of an F-14 jet fighter (or for Canadians the Avro Arrow), the sheer power of a modern tank are all the stuff of adolescent power fantasies. The mushroom cloud, however, was something different, and so was the contemplation of war from the 1950s onward. Now an ambivalent enjoyment in nuclear fatalism could be cultivated; an existential angst with a tangible source and an apocalyptic excuse for excess ("let's make love, not war for tomorrow they might drop the big one"). For those born in the post-war period the Cold War was always already an

institutionalized, abstracted, vaguely unreal formation. It impacted baby-boomers directly in two forms: as children or teens in the short-lived but intense anxiety engendered by the Cuban missile crisis; and in the more tangible consequences of the Vietnam War, though its connection to Cold War principles was always somewhat murky. As Engelhardt argues, children of the 1950s and 60s intuitively grasped what their parents would not; that the Cold War, while apparently "real" somewhere "out there" and apparently threatening somehow, was also tinged with a certain ridiculous quality:

Before novelist John Le Carré's spies began to tell grown-ups in a world-weary fashion, "We're all the same, you know, that's the joke," children reading Prohias's "Spy vs. Spy" in MAD magazine's "Joke and Dagger Department" experienced the Cold War as a series of ludicrous acts between two arbitrarily distinguishable quasi-warriors who had everything in common with each other, and nothing with anyone else. (1995:131)

One of Engelhardt's main points is the contention that American "victory culture" was eroded in part due to the "disappearance" of the enemy long before the Cold War itself ended. While Communism was most certainly the foe, its spatial orientation was frustratingly unpredictable. With the rise of Communist China, the appearance of Communist or socialist governments elsewhere in Asia and in Africa, and the spectre of domestic subversion, there seemed no particular body to pierce or

head to sever. Moreover, war as it had been understood by the American public no longer existed. In the nuclear age total war was, for the first time, a profoundly unsettling and morally ambivalent idea. The more meaningful battles of the Cold War were fought by CIA operatives in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba or Chile. For Americans, actual conventional warfare in Korea and Vietnam had no resonance in "victory culture." Traditional warfare in the shadow of nuclear weapons was trivialized and exceedingly frustrating; conventional fighting often proved inadequate while nuclear attack seemed far too dangerous.

While Engelhardt's ideas do merit consideration here, I believe they represent what may be called "tonal shifts" or Goffmanian "keyings/laminations" in the nature of the Cold War and American Superiority Frame respectively. The abstracted nature of Cold War perception for those born after the mid-1950s does not eliminate the frame's existence. Rather, it places the frame in its institutionalized, stabilized context. It actually helps to entrench the frame as an almost reified aspect of American existence, a "fact of life" on the order of baseball or rock 'n' roll. The "disappearance" of the enemy associated with Communism's elusiveness is, I believe, something of a generational phenomenon; problematic primarily for those accustomed to the easy geopolitical identifications of Nazi

Germany or Imperial Japan. For post-war generations the possibility of domestic Communist subversives may be a disturbing idea, and the appeal of Communist and socialist principles to the people of China, Chile or Cuba may be difficult to understand, but regardless of the frustration, the enemy remains identifiable in something more than the abstract; it remains Communism and for most remains centred in the Soviet Union. The problem for the ASF during the dissensus/détente era was less the "disappearance" of the enemy, but the changing perception of the enemy's characteristics in the judgement of American youth. Still, campus protests regarding American policy in South-East Asia and Che Guevara dormitory posters were not the hallmarks of revolution some believed them to be, and again these events only occurred as a function of the Cold War Frame's existence. Whether perceptions of the Cold War were abstracted or immediate the Cold War Frame existed and formed the consistent backdrop of both foreign policy decisions and the American public's understanding of their place in global geopolitics. Whether the American Superiority Frame was in a period of relative strength or weakness, it continued to exist, and moreover, virtually all its various challenges from 1948 to 1988 are comprehensible only in the context of the Cold War Frame.

One of the more important political functions of the Cold

War Frame's existence was its deflection of domestic criticism. As long as the frame existed, enormous expenditures of time, energy and economic resources were deemed necessary, and a certain other-directed orientation was maintained. With the frame's collapse and the other's absence as Other, it was critical to emphasize this series of events as an implicit endorsement of American socio-political organization. Without a specific and significant other-directed impetus, governmental policy must at least partially re-orient itself to domestic concerns. Without the Soviet Union as convenient opposite mirror, the reflection is that of self-image. The problem can be seen in microcosmic form with the events of the Gulf War and its aftermath. George Bush's republican presidency segued smoothly and skilfully from the Cold War to the "new world order" largely because an excellent opportunity for international consensus based on economic self-interest presented itself. The war's antecedents were methodical and precise, and despite nagging questions of "mission creep" very little was left to chance. Another Vietnam experience was to be avoided at all costs. If managed correctly, the Gulf War could go much further than the relatively trivial Grenada invasion in exorcising the spirit of defeat that had never fully been purged in the Reagan years. In the heady days of the first joint Soviet-American military

venture since World War II, Cold War discourse was most assuredly an inappropriate means of rallying public support. Since the American public knew virtually nothing about Iraq (and even less about Kuwait) the predictable recourse was to fall back on the imagery of World War II, as demonstrated by president Bush's repeated comparisons of Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler. At the beginning of the war in January 1990, with public attention galvanized in this other-directed orientation, the president's approval rating stood at an astonishingly high 80%. By July of 1992, with the war concluded and an election mere months away, the figure had dropped to an equally surprising low of 29%.

(Mueller, 1994:179-180)

With the benefit of historical perspective, certain antecedents to the disruption of the CWF can now be identified in the *glasnost* and *perestroika* reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev's government. Up until the end of 1991, however, any or all of the Soviet domestic reforms and American-Soviet arms reduction agreements might have been reversed. With the consolidation of Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, the rise of non-Communist governments in Poland and Hungary (soon to be followed by virtually all of Eastern Europe) and perhaps most significantly the opening of East Germany's borders, the entire system of Cold War strategy was thrown into a state of flux. With

the fall of the Berlin Wall November 9, 1989, the most potent symbol of Western-Soviet antagonism collapsed. The speed of these and subsequent events up to the failed hardline coup and the final collapse of Communism in December 1991 created a sudden vacuum in foreign policy orientation seldom before encountered. (Again, for a more detailed account of the political events of 1989-91, see appendix 1). Engelhardt argues that:

Between 1945 and 1975, victory culture ended in America... It was a bare two decades from the beaches of Normandy to the beachfronts of Danang... The shortness of the span seemed surrealistic. (1995:10)

If the "suddenness" of what I maintain is still at least an arguable shift requiring 20 years is "surrealistic," how much more startling is one that may be measured in months or at the most two and a half years? The speed of this upheaval, this intense frame disruption, engenders the same sense of confusion, even denial that any micro-level frame break may cause:

The Cold War is over but not really, not yet. America is experiencing a deep confusion of purpose at this moment in history, holding onto a past that is defunct but unable to imagine a different future. (Greider, 1997:62)

It is possible of course to interpret the transformations of Russia and her former satellite states as evidence that the Western democratic/capitalist form of social organization has been vindicated. Much official political public discourse in the early 1990s expressed the idea that the United States had "won"

the Cold War. But just how was it that America achieved this victory? No final war had been fought, none of the many popular revolts relied on American arms, supplies, or other overt aid, no boycotts or embargoes were implemented and little if any diplomatic pressure was required or applied. After more than 70 years of anticipation, the moment of Soviet Communism's collapse was not only sudden but, at least to most American observers, decidedly anti-climactic:

What was so surprising about the fall of the Soviet Union was not only that it was so rapid, but also that it went so gently into the night. [...] The conventional wisdom for years had been that the Soviet system, with its centralized totalitarian wings, the Communist Party, the K.G.B., the enormous military, and the controlled media would never topple from within, and that any attempts from the outside to bring about the collapse of the empire would lead to nuclear war. The common wisdom proved to be utterly wrong.
(Gwertzman, 1992:xi)

Following the almost instantaneous rise of democratic governments in Eastern Europe and the final dissolution of Soviet Communism, no new international crisis has been capable of demonstrating the unexpected level of cooperation and success as the Gulf War. Both the United States and United Nations often appeared incapable of devising a strategy to deal with events in the Balkans, and American troops in Somalia found their mission far more difficult and ambiguous than the "liberation" of Kuwait. The Gulf War consensus has not been duplicated and the "new world order" has

not yet suggested its probable form. As John Lewis Gaddis argues:

...the forces of integration may not be as deeply rooted as we like to think. It comes as something of a shock to remember that the most important of them - the global market, collective security, the "long peace" itself - were products of the Cold War. Their survival is by no means guaranteed into the post-Cold War era. Fragmentationist forces have been around much longer than integrationist forces have been, and now that the Cold War is over, they may grow stronger than they have been at any point in the last half-century. (1992:215)

Tom Engelhardt identifies the problem as existing in the realm of entrenched popular discourse or mythology:

Experts in "Communist studies" used to say that Communist states could not exist without external enemies. Ironically, this very issue has proved central to American national identity. Is there an imaginable "America" without enemies and without the story of their slaughter and our triumph? Can there be a new story Americans will tell about and to themselves, no less to the world, that might sustain them as citizens and selves? So far only warring fragments of race, gender, religion, and ethnicity have risen to fill the space emptied of victory culture. Whether those fragments of "identity" presage some longer-term collapse or something new remains unknown. (1995:15)

What, then, must America tell itself about this new, undefined frame? According to *New York Times* correspondent Bernard

Gwertzman:

...the underlying reasons for the USSR's collapse are many - a broken-down economy, a political system based largely on fear, and the bankruptcy of the Communist ideology which for a time in this century had attracted millions to its banners. (1992:x)

In this statement some of the difficulty of constructing a Cold War victory discourse is evident. Certainly the economic

situation in the Soviet Union in the 1980s was not ideal, but the Soviet Union had known economic hardship and even widespread famine at several points in its history. Regarding the remainder of the statement, it might be pointed out that hundreds of millions still live in the Communist nations of mainland China, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba. By contrast, it is assumed that the American political system is free of the politics of fear and that the "ideology" of democracy is in fine fiscal health.

As early as 1913 Rosa Luxemburg suggested that capitalism must "always and everywhere fight a battle of annihilation against every historical form of natural economy it encounters..." (Abdo, 1995:368). While modern Communism does not strictly fit the criteria for a natural economy, it is not difficult to perceive a similar process occurring on a global scale at present, with the Soviet Union as its most recent and dramatic manifestation. The borders of the Soviet Union may have been effectively closed to most overt American capitalist incursions, but the logic of capital renders most political borders at least semi-permeable, and a black market economy for Western consumer goods had existed for most of the USSR's history. It is also reasonable to assume that the United States' significant increase in military spending during the Reagan administrations forced the allocation of funds in the Soviet

Union to military expenditures rather than consumer goods (this was, in fact, initiated primarily under Brezhnev and something of a reversal was attempted under Gorbachev). If the Cold War represents any type of victory - and this remains arguable - then it is in no small part a victory of capital, and this is a far less dramatic rallying point for the American outer frame. If the "bankruptcy" of Communist ideology were such a factor, why then the suddenness of 1989's events? How did hundreds of millions of citizens decide almost instantaneously that their socio-political life was now wrong? For the continued stability of the ASF, however, such ideas must be presented.

Even if the problematic assertion of Cold War victory were to be widely accepted, the sudden absence of the Other still carries the inevitable problem of alternative identification strategies. As the only remaining "superpower" the United States might consider itself capable of imposing its will in any particular international "trouble spot." Should the United States take full advantage of the situation militarily, instituting a *Pax Americana*? As of 1997 the American armed forces included approximately 1.5 million persons in active service (with reserves the figure is above three million), more than 11,000 aircraft (including 13 B-2 stealth bombers at a cost of approximately \$2 billion each), 7,680 helicopters, over 10,000

battle tanks, and 988 nuclear missiles. (Greider, 1997:62-70). This is, of course, only a very partial list. Should the United States take advantage of the situation economically by diverting military spending to domestic programs? Where is the "peace dividend" to be found? Perhaps most importantly, how might the United States take advantage ideologically and morally? Without the consistent need to oppose Soviet interventions in the Third World, how is America to deal with various international crises unrelated to the now-obsolete bipolar balance? These are the questions that correspond to the initial period of inner frame disruption "strangeness" and their resolutions will tell much about the consequences of this disruption for the stability of the outer frame.

In the case of a micro-level frame, the point of initial strangeness accompanying its disruption is a fleeting and ephemeral moment difficult to capture or reproduce. Goffman provides several illuminating examples from "ideal type" daily interactions while Travers uses excerpts from literary fiction. In the translation of micro to macro level frame disruption analysis, the temporal expansion of the point of strangeness allows for the capture of certain cultural practices as manifestations of these "ephemeral" moments. Accordingly, the 1989-91 period will be considered the initial period of

confusion, embarrassment and self-disclosure, while the period initiated with Mikhail Gorbachev's resignation and dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party to the present date constitutes the era of adjustment; either frame redefinition, strategic attempts to restore the baseline of normal appearances or, as Travers suggests, a re-alignment of interactants in the "image" of the new frame. In any instance of frame disruption, then, there exist at least four general orientations for such responses:

1. What appeared to be a disruption was in actuality merely a quantitative shift requiring only a slight modification to the frame; interactants assimilate events into the pre-existing reality definition.
2. A disruption evokes responses designed to return the frame to its pre-existing state of normal appearances. Interactants reject the new reality and strive for the re-establishment of their shared baseline. At a macro level this process may be the result of directed political/social action or of a plethora of micro-responses such that the return resembles a "natural" movement to the baseline. In such a situation, the frame in question may exhibit qualities resembling those of an organism striving to maintain homeostasis.
3. A disruption is sufficiently problematic to preclude an easy baseline return. The resulting anomic ambiguity leads either to

an obvious frame redefinition or (at the macro level) to such obvious strategies for baseline retreat that the frame's ideological underpinnings (if, indeed, any are to be found) are thrown into bold relief.

4. Following Travers, a frame disruption may in fact exert a greater influence on interactants themselves than upon the frame's stability such that interaction is re-aligned in the image of the re-defined frame. The frame itself, though briefly disrupted, is actually rendered more stable as frame.

6.3 - Summary

The Cold War Frame had operated as a reliable barometer for American foreign policy decisions and American perceptions of their place in geopolitics for 40 years. It also provided a powerful if imperfect support for the "outer" frame of American superiority among nation-states. The Cold War ended, quite unexpectedly, in a matter of months. At the macro level of social interaction, this may be taken as an example of a frame disruption.

Evidence for this disruption is manifested in media as diverse as news reports, popular music, political rhetoric, public opinion polls, economic indicators, travel brochures and,

of course, popular film. Aspects of these media thus aid in constructing the previously presented temporal divisions within the history of the Cold War and in drawing the parameters of the initial "disruption" phase: 1989-91. As a suggestive example, such an indicator as international patterns in military spending and arms trade lend support to this temporal framing. The American share of world arms exports through most of the 1980s was relatively stable at approximately 20%, while the Soviet Union's varied only slightly between 35% and 40%. Between 1989 and 1993 the American share rose from 20% to 47%, while the USSR/CIS/Russia accounted for only 12% by the end of the same period. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1995:15)

Historians, journalists and social theorists have spent much of the 1990s commenting on the absence of the Other for America and the presence of a concomitant crisis of identity and direction. Beyond a statement of the problem, however, there seems little available in either theory or historical precedent that may provide guidelines for what can be expected in 21st century American geopolitics. As Gaddis admits, "international relations theory...suggests surprisingly little about the post-Cold War world." (1992:169) However, as a cultural practice that has mapped the vagaries of the Cold War for the American public in a highly visible manner during its entire history, the medium

of narrative cinema seems uniquely qualified as a site of disruption analysis. Such an analysis is not expected to, and indeed most probably cannot, yield a deterministic model. Film is not the cultural superstructure built on the Cold War political base in a modified vulgar Marxism. Yet a relationship between the two most certainly exists, and an appreciation of one lends an increased intelligibility to the other. This relationship will now be considered in some detail. Moreover, in an interesting (and convenient) "parallel crisis," an entire lucrative and popular film genre based on the Cold War Frame's existence has been rendered suddenly and profoundly problematic with the frame's collapse. Thus again, an understanding of one disruption illuminates the other.

The following chapter thus lays out the temporal periods (following those expressed in this chapter) into which filmic representations of the Cold War may be placed. A consideration of a "Cold War film" genre follows, as well as an articulation of the relationship between this genre and the changing state of the Cold War Frame. Finally, in anticipation of the more detailed analyses offered in chapter eight, a filmic microcosm of the Cold War is presented in an examination of the enduring James Bond movie franchise.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ORGANIZING FILM REPRESENTATIONS

7.1 - Temporal Divisions

The initial categorization of time periods begins with the selection of 1989 as a watershed year in the historical evolution of what will be termed the Cold War film genre. Films prior to this point will be considered part of a general "classic" Cold War genre, corresponding to the pre-disruption inner frame context. Cold War films are then further divided into four temporal categories corresponding with the divisions laid out in chapter 6.1: Establishment (1948-64), Dissensus and Détente (1965-78), Resurgence (1979-88), Disruption (1989-91), and Response (1992-96).

In order to properly situate each film in one of these five time periods, the facile practice of choosing the film's theatrical release date must be tempered with information regarding the film's screenplay source and production lag time. Film industry trade journals provide some of this information (particularly if a given film runs overly long in its production budget and scheduling). Smaller budget films are typically produced and released quicker than "blockbusters" and different studios, producers and directors tend to operate at different paces. Hence, a 1991 release date may represent a film with a screenplay written, actors cast and film produced that same year,

one that required as much as five years to create, or one that - for varying reasons - was produced but not released for a certain period of time. Films utilizing original screenplays introduce an extra element of temporal uncertainty, but are generally written not long before a film's initial production work. It is not uncommon for a screenplay to be "shopped around" in search of financial resources, but in the case of such topical material as the Cold War, such time lags cannot be so great that significant logical inconsistencies or anachronisms appear in the script. Moreover, the production process itself functions (albeit imperfectly) to select what is considered current and relevant material vis-a-vis a film's release date.

Screenplays culled directly or adapted from other sources (often popular novels) require a consideration of the original material's production time. Temporal categorization of the film adaptation of, for example, a Tom Clancy novel must include a consideration of the novel's publication date and the time lag between the author's writing and that publication date, tempered by as much information as possible regarding the degree of modification between novel and screenplay texts.

It should be noted at this point that these various time lag considerations need not be interpreted as representative of a "real time" delay. That is, with the (arguable) exception of the

case in which a film is produced and then significantly delayed in its release, the production time of a film or the temporal difference between finished screenplay and its source should not result in temporal re-classification based on a one-to-one ratio. Film studios and producers themselves consider the effect of this temporal lag. Screenplays can be and often are modified during the production process and regardless of such a lag, the viewers of any particular text do indeed receive their exposure to the film after its release date. If then, a novel is written in 1980, published in 1981, purchased as screenplay material in 1982, produced as a film in 1983, and released to theatres in 1984, it does not necessarily follow that 1980 is a more appropriate temporal placement than 1984. In the absence of clear information that would suggest an unambiguous date, a 1:2 ratio regarding lag time may be the best compromise. In the above example the film would be considered representative of the state of the inner frame associated with the year 1982. This, then, will be considered the more socially and politically accurate date - the "frame date" - and will constitute the date of reference for temporal classification.

Temporal classification issues also point to another significant set of considerations regarding the best textual exemplars of the critical 1989-91 time period. Put simply, the

quicker a film is produced, the more likely it is to reflect emergent creativity and to reflect the type of disruptive manifestations that support the thesis. An "ideal type" film, then, would most probably be produced on a moderate budget and utilize an original screenplay. Films produced for television often meet these criteria, but in themselves do not constitute a large enough or representative sample.

Once films have been originally selected as part of the Cold War genre (see following chapter) and chronologically sorted, those which exhibit evidence of reasonable production speed may be identified as potential exemplars. Subsequent judgements are then arrived at through a largely inductive process. Representative or typical films from each year may be selected by reference to three general considerations: material, thematic, and social. Material criteria include typicalities in production budgets, producer, director, studio and screenplay sources, box office receipts, and lengths of theatre runs. Thematic typicalities are derived from initial viewings or "surface readings" and include sub-genre categories, subject matter groupings and overall tone or attitude toward the bipolar power balance (or sudden lack thereof). The third category, social considerations, allows for the factoring in of special circumstances. Certain films, for example, have with time become

recognized as particularly influential in directing the course of subsequent films on the same subject matter. Others may be "atypical" by reference to many of the preceding criteria but through exceptional popularity or less overt means have exerted a particular influence on popular culture and movie audiences and thus merit inclusion.

7.2 - The Cold War Film as Genre

The identification of a film genre through the listing of particular criteria or specific components is a more difficult exercise than might be expected; it may also be unnecessary. While identifiable film genres do exist, few individual films fit neatly into categorization schemata, and many exhibit at least one problematic characteristic. The identification of genres must often be conducted inductively, working from the films themselves and their structural/thematic similarities and differences with other films. While the commercial practice of labelling film themes in order to better identify product for sales to distributors (or more recently, to establish spacial coherence in video rental outlets) may have influenced the development of contemporary film genres to some degree, the most telling criterion for genre identification has simply been audience

recognition. Films need not be labelled at theatres, we as viewers are quite capable of recognizing a genre with the aid of very few cues. As Buscombe points out, "...a genre film depends on a combination of novelty and familiarity. The conventions of the genre are known and recognized by the audience, and such recognition is in itself a pleasure." (1986:21)

Film genres, however, do not simply exist in relation to each other, but depend on the social context in which they are produced and consumed. As a somewhat extreme example, a film such as *Rambo III* may be classified as "action/adventure" in North America, a blatant propaganda piece in Cold War USSR, or as a patriotic call to arms in Afghanistan. As Tudor argues:

...genre terms seem best employed in the analysis of the relation between groups of films, the cultures in which they are made, and the cultures in which they are exhibited. That is, it is a term that can be usefully employed in relation to a body of knowledge and theory about the social and psychological context of film.
(1986:10)

The identification of a genre termed Cold War, then, is less an exercise in categorization than an elaboration on the relationship between American film-making and the socio-political Cold War context, i.e. the state of the inner frame. It is not an absurd extension to claim that any American film created during the influence of the Cold War Frame is in fact a Cold War film. Yet some parameters must be established. In "New Cold War Sequels

and Remakes" Christine Anne Homlund considers a "New Cold War ideology" through the analysis of three films, two of which seem quite outside the scope of Cold War concerns. *Down and Out in Beverley Hills*, for example, is considered a Cold War film by the author because it reflects and encapsulates a Reagan era drive to obscure domestic social concerns and overcome the anxieties of Cold War uncertainty. The family depicted in the film:

...acts both progressively and traditionally, capable under strong paternal leadership of absorbing any and all subcultures, from punks to gays to blacks to Mexicans and a host of others. In much the same way, the political rhetoric of the Carter and Reagan administrations appealed nostalgically to the security the nuclear family supposedly offered. (1988:86)

In *Aliens*, a film clearly in the science fiction genre (with some horror and action/adventure overtones) the protagonists, with the crucial exception of the central character Ellen Ripley, are almost all interplanetary American marines. Their enemies are alien monsters, and there is no apparent attempt to present the creatures as symbolic of a Communist menace (as in, for example, *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*). The film's climax occurs when Ripley braves the creatures to rescue an orphaned girl.

Motherhood, in fact, is the film's dominant theme from the vaginal opening of the "I" in the *Aliens* title to Ripley's showdown with the alien queen to the orphaned girl's cry of "mommy!" at the film's end. Thus, as Holmlund suggests:

Aliens' conclusion, like that of countless other New Cold War films, evades facing societal and political problems by apparently returning to traditional values. [...] To depict Ripley as nurturer justifies and masks the film's violence and promotes a New Cold War characterization of U. S. foreign policy as defensive, not aggressive. (1988:94)

It hardly seems crucial then that a film present an actual depiction of Cold War events or make direct reference to Soviet-American relations to at least be interpreted as commenting on a Cold War "ideology." However, while I do not wish to dispute the validity or usefulness of Holmlund's readings of *Aliens* or *Down and Out in Beverley Hills*, her analysis does draw attention to a point of demarcation I wish to establish. Although it is possible that the writers, directors and producers of these films had in mind some of what Holmlund describes as a commentary on the state of the inner frame, I judge this to be unlikely. Thus, self-consciousness of the inner frame manifested in the film itself will serve to identify what will be considered a "Cold War film" for my purposes. A film such as *Aliens* would then not be considered, while other science fiction films such as the aforementioned *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, widely regarded as a purposeful commentary on the insidious threat of Communist incursion, would be considered appropriate. Similarly, *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country*, another film of the science fiction genre, seems an obvious, intentional allegory of the Cold War's

end and may thus be considered a Cold War film.

Such genre bridging seems quite necessary and appropriate as there are in fact very few films that may be nestled into the category of Cold War (e.g. *Fail-Safe* or *Firefox*) without impinging on other genre categories. The Cold War and its concerns may also serve as the dramatic backdrop for films of other genres. To continue with the science fiction example, *2001: A Space Odyssey* makes brief reference to the presence of Russian scientists but is in essence a "pure" science fiction film. By contrast, its sequel *2010: The Year We Make Contact* is very much concerned with the state of Soviet-American relations and the potential for nuclear war. Although the bulk of the narrative occurs in space, the Soviet and American scientists are in constant contact with their mutually antagonistic governments and represent a microcosm of the problem of mutual trust. Films which simply take the occurrence of nuclear war as narrative point of departure without elaborating on its causes (much of the post-apocalyptic science fiction sub-genre, for example) will not be considered.

Few would argue that the Vietnam War was not intimately related to the Cold War theme of the struggle between capitalism and Communism or, as more often expressed in political discourse, between freedom and oppression. Yet the great majority of Vietnam

War films are surprisingly empty of such rhetoric. In Hollywood at least, the Vietnam conflict seems to inhabit its own peculiar narrative universe severed from the Soviet-American power struggle. The tendency is to focus on the psychological state of the soldiers themselves, either in their loss of innocence (*Platoon*), their ambivalence and irreverence (*Apocalypse Now*) or in their difficulties adjusting to post-war civilian life (*First Blood*). When politics and Communism are mentioned at all it is almost always in the context of Vietnam itself, not the wider Cold War frame. The Vietnam War film is a fascinating genre in itself; quintessentially American, self-reflexive in an oddly limited manner, and worthy of detailed separate treatment.

Other exclusions I wish to establish are those of comedies and documentaries. Doubtless both formats impart a great deal of information relevant to this study, but they do so while operating under differing sets of dramatic and structural conventions. Neither engender the same suspension of disbelief that realist narrative cinema is capable of accomplishing. While this certainly does not render them less effective formats, it seems to me sensible to restrict analyses to a narrative style that retains a relatively consistent psychological engagement. As Clifford Geertz points out:

Thinking, conceptualization, formulation,
comprehension, understanding, or what-have-you consists

not of ghostly happenings in the head but of a matching of the states and processes of symbolic models against the states and processes of the wider world. (1964:61)

This, Geertz asserts, serves as a model for human consciousness (at least in the cognitive psychology tradition) and points to such processes as genre identification where a particular text is recognized as belonging to a particular genre by contrast and complementarity to other texts, and even the apprehension of frames themselves. The symbolic model of the Cold War film mediates, renders comprehensible, the "state and processes" of the Cold War in the "wider world" just as powerfully (if not more) as newspaper reports or political speeches. Here the mediation employs a special power; the symbolic model of the realist narrative film exists both as an obviously "real" artifact and "unreal" event which is nonetheless "surrendered" to (to varying degrees) during the course of its viewing/reading. One need not accept any of the images or ideas of a film as "realistic," but the entire point of the realist narrative film is to convince the audience to do just that. Appropriate location shooting, special effects, quality acting, skilled directing, cinematography, editing, sound, and everything that can be subsumed under the heading of "high production values" is employed in the service of convincing the viewer/reader intellectually and especially emotionally that "something like

this" happened, is happening or could happen.

Comedies are manifestly "unreal." There are frequent reminders of this fact and the narrative and characters are often exposed as absurd. Documentaries are (ostensibly) completely "real." There are frequent reminders of this fact and the audience is less likely to be engaged in narration as they are narrative. Between these poles stands realist narrative cinema; a format understood to be unreal even while it sustains the sensation of reality for at least as long as the cinematic event.

For the purposes of this project, the basic Cold War film genre will be taken to include realist narrative films dealing with such themes as international espionage and political "intrigue," to the extent that such films include reference to the bipolar Cold War power balance. Also included are films exploring the social, political and cultural differences between Soviet Communism and Western capitalism/democracy. Equal treatment will be afforded those films which at first seem to be of a separate genre (science fiction, horror, war, sports, drama, action/adventure, etc.) but which either allegorize the Cold War or which contain significant Cold War concerns within their narrative structure.

7.3 - The Relationship of Film to Cold War Frame

In *Movie-Made America: A Social History of American Movies*, Robert Sklar names film "the most popular and influential medium of culture in the United States." (1975:1) Certainly instances have occurred throughout the 20th century in which various groups in American society, government and otherwise, have reacted as though this were true. As early as 1947 the House UnAmerican Activities Committee was effectively blacklisting film producers and directors suspected of having Communist or even vaguely left wing affiliations. During WWII Hollywood seemed perfectly aligned with the perceived "need" to represent an unquestioning patriotism:

Although the issues - such as freeing conquered nations - were nebulous, there was never any doubt of our innate goodness or that we deserved to triumph... In our movies, morality lost all complexity, especially among nations: virtue was American, evil was German, torture was Japanese, bravery was British. Jews were understood to suffer (overseas), although the history of persecution wasn't really acknowledged, and suffering usually took place offscreen. (Sayre, 1982:8)

But in the aftermath of the war, with the realization of Soviet Russia's military and (potential) ideological power, it was deemed necessary (by enough in the American government) to enact strategies ensuring the "loyalty" of Hollywood. With the benefit of historical distance it hardly seems likely that the efforts of Senator Joseph McCarthy and others vis-a-vis American filmmakers

were necessary. When considering the events of 1948-50, however, a certain trepidation regarding the insidious "red menace" may be viewed with some sympathy. In the space of less than three years the USSR seized Czechoslovakia, blockaded West Berlin and detonated its first atomic device. The same period also saw Mao Tse-Tung's Communists defeat the nationalists of Chiang Kai-Shek who fled to the island of Formosa, dividing China into the Communist mainland and capitalist Taiwan. Less than a year later North Korea's Kim Il Sung (after receiving Joseph Stalin's approval) launched the invasion of South Korea. As if validating the rise to prominence of Senator McCarthy, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are arrested for espionage regarding America's nuclear secrets (they would be executed in 1953). Both the Catholic and (somewhat later) Protestant Churches officially endorsed the loyalty investigations of Americans suspected of Communist sympathies. And as Nora Sayre points out in *Running Time: Films of the Cold War*:

Albert Canwell, the chairman of the Washington State Legislative Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, declared, "If someone insists that there is discrimination against Negroes in this country, or that there is inequality of wealth, there is every reason to believe that person is a Communist." (1982:11)

In what seems an almost desperate attempt to demonstrate its patriotism, Hollywood released a spate of polemic Cold War films in this period with such telling titles as *The Iron Curtain*, *The*

Red Menace, Conspirator, I Married a Communist, I Was a Communist for the FBI, and Invasion USA, to mention but a few. Whether seen as a "moral panic," a form of social hysteria, mild paranoia, or prudent and justified caution, the period of the late 1940s and early 1950s was a time in which a consensus regarding the necessity of the inner frame existed at an unusually high level, perhaps intensified by the unknown scope of Communist influence:

One theme that does emerge from some of the movies of the Fifties is the uncertainty about the nature or the location of our enemies: the Communist who operates behind the scenes... In the years when we had little communication with our perceived enemy, the Soviet Union, the movies also stressed a dread of the unknown... (Sayre, 1982:25-26)

Some other limited attempts to trace a correspondence between Cold War events and their filmic representations have been made. Michael Barson (1992) presents a satirical history of the Cold War through the changing Hollywood attitudes toward the "Red Menace" in his study *Better Dead than Red*. As entertaining as the study is, however, it mainly constitutes a collection of specific, selected films to illustrate particular points, and little consideration is given to texts that contradict the convenient time periods circumscribed in the study.

A more comprehensive attempt is undertaken by Norman Denzin in his study *Hollywood Shot by Shot* regarding filmic representations of alcoholism. "Films such as those analyzed in

this work serve as distorted mirrors or fractured reflections of the American concern for its 'alcoholism' problem" and this is so, according to Denzin, because such films create "...a very specific type of discourse" (1991:xiii)

Specific types of discourses have also been created regarding the Cold War and for much of its history one might posit a certain parallel endeavour undertaken in regard to Hollywood's depictions. One of Denzin's main concerns is the damage and distortions created by a discourse of alcoholism that may on occasion present "realistic" depictions within a film's narrative but remains "distorted" regarding such issues as the means of recovery or influence on family life. Denzin divides his study into three main time periods: 1932-1962; 1962-1980; 1980-1989 and thematically examines such depictions as the "happy" alcoholic and the "new 'diseased' alcoholic family." Denzin begins with those films produced as prohibition was repealed in the United States and follows historical shifts in social attitudes towards alcohol and alcoholism. Thus, although these shifts are real and significant, they do not include a specific, widely intersubjective crisis point or frame disruption on the order of the Cold War's end.

Denizen makes the reasonable assumption that an interaction, or rather complex of interactions, occurs between the so-called

"external" reality of social life and its representation on the movie screen. He notes the influence of such developments as the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous (1935) and the National Committee for the Education on Alcoholism (1944). He also notes the unavoidable influence of Hollywood's development of a film production code regarding the depiction of alcohol consumption in American cinema. Du Gay et al agree that cultural artefacts cannot be adequately understood in isolation, and posit a "circuit of culture" model that includes a consideration of "representation, identity, production, consumption, and regulation." (1997:3) There is no set point of departure in the circuit and all components interact with each other. It is too simplistic to believe only that "films are mirrors of our lives and times," (Flaum, 1978:xi) yet the interactions do exist and some consideration of these reflections, as distorted or fractured as they may be, should be undertaken.

7.4 A Microcosm: The Bond Franchise

The James Bond film franchise now includes 19 films over a period of 35 years (1962-97) and is an obvious choice for a kind of "longitudinal" study of the reflections of Cold War events in film; a microcosm of the fluctuations in the inner frame's filmic

representation. Bond's basic *raison d'être*, after all is that of a Western "secret agent" in both the novels of Ian Fleming, their translation to the cinema, and later adventures from original screenplays. The novels, of course, pre-date the films and it is there that Bond is most closely tied to a "classic" depiction of the Cold War. According to Bennett and Woollacott, in their study *Bond and Beyond: The Political Career of a Popular Hero*:

Bond effects an ideologically loaded imaginary resolution of the real historical contradictions of the period, a resolution in which all the values associated with Bond and, thereby, the West - notably, freedom and individualism - gain ascendancy over those associated with the villain and, thereby, communist Russia, such as totalitarianism and bureaucratic rigidity. [...] Again, it is no accident that Bond's fame began to spread, to any significant degree, in 1957. In the aftermath of the national [British] humiliation of the Suez fiasco, Bond constituted a figure around which, imaginarily, the real trials and vicissitudes of history could be halted and put into reverse. (1987: 25, 28)

In the move from print to screen, however, Bond's close identification with the Cold War was eased somewhat, "...the figure of Bond was detached from the ideological co-ordinates of the Cold War period and adjusted to the prevailing climate of détente." (1987:33) To say that Bond was "detached" from the Cold War is misleading, however, when employing the concept of the Cold War Frame. Détente may have been a "prevailing climate" for much of Bond's film "career" but the Cold War's existence is still the necessary backdrop for virtually all of his 19

adventures. It should also be noted that shifts in Bond's political positioning are also affected by financial considerations: "...the primary impetus for this ideological readjustment came from the requirements of the film industry... That is, the Bond of film was - relative to the Bond of print - de-politicized in aid of international appeal and thus greater ticket revenues. (1987:33, 34)

The majority of the Bond films (including all prior to 1981) have been produced in Britain, but in anticipation of their appeal to the lucrative American market. Bennett and Woollacott argue that "in effect, the maintenance of pax Americana is leased to Britain, in the person of Bond, but only in the context of close American supervision and background control." (1987:156) While it is true that the Cold War interests of Britain and America are closely linked, and that virtually all Bond films feature a connection to the CIA (usually in the person of Bond's friend and agency contact Felix Leiter), part of Bond's appeal is that he is manifestly British. Bond's character is certainly an "action hero" but not in the typical American mode. The British stereotypes employed are those that render his character distinctive: a reserved "cool" and cultured sophistication, a relatively upper-class accent and an unapologetic appreciation for the "finer things." The American action hero wears jeans and

drinks beer in his local bar; James Bond sips vodka martinis (shaken, not stirred) in a perfectly tailed tuxedo at the gaming tables in Monte Carlo. These are the traits that both the British and American audience expects and appreciates; part of the Bond formula that reassures viewers as much as the predictable narrative and plot structures.

Bond films provide the quintessential example of what Buscombe refers to as the pleasure found in the combination of novelty and familiarity in the genre film. With a handful of notable exceptions each Bond film attempts novel variations on the following themes: each film begins with a brief (five to 20 minute) adventure in which Bond completes whatever mission Her Majesty's government had assigned him. There is then an abrupt shift to the opening credits displayed over purposefully "tacky" images of silhouetted naked women and guns while a dramatic theme song is sung by a currently popular pop/rock artist. In the next 30 minutes Bond is summoned to the presence of "M" where he receives his mission briefing and flirts with the attractive but somewhat plain secretary Moneypenny. After collecting his latest secret gadgets from "Q" he leaves for a series of exotic locations filled with beautiful women and would-be assassins. There are of course car chases, guns, bombs, escapes from certain death and ample time for recreational sex. There are typically at

least two main "Bond girls," one good and one evil. Both make love with Bond; one is almost certain to die. Bond's typical adversary is a demented millionaire industrialist or the organization known as SPECTRE (SPecial Executive for Counter-intelligence, Terror, Revenge and Extortion) that exploits the fragility of East-West relations. The villain attempts to arrange a situation in which either the USA or USSR is duped into believing the other has initiated a military first strike. The resulting retaliation will escalate into WW III unless an astronomical ransom is paid. Thus, both détente and the Cold War background are utilized without direct East-West confrontation. Bond of course foils the plan and ends up in the arms of the "good" woman rather than reporting back to the ministry.

The novelty is sometimes provided by the relative state of the inner frame. It is noted that:

He was given a "law and order" inflection in a number of the 1970s films (*Diamonds are Forever, Live and Let Die*), pushed into an increasingly comic mode and then reactivated in relation to the re-emerging Cold War of the 1980s and the flickering reawakening of British post-imperialist ambitions. (1987:280-281)

It is in the first seven (Sean Connery) films, to the year 1971, where the above formula is most consistent. The James Bond of the 1970s, at the high point of détente, seemed increasingly superfluous as a Cold War operative. The CWF remained, but with its urgency dissipated the dramatic "slack" was taken up by such

devices as goofy American "sidekicks" and pieces of formula derived from American television. It was not until the early 1980s with *For Your Eyes Only* and *Octopussy* that the classic Cold War formula was successfully re-integrated.

The increasing centrality of Cold War rhetoric in the discourse of Reaganism and Thatcherism; the return, in the wake of the Falkland's Crisis, of "the nation", in its most atavistic forms, to the centre of political life; the attempt to roll back feminism and, with it, women to their "proper place", in the home: these developments have combined to lend to the Bond films a much harder and sharper political edge than they had in the 1970s. (1987:42)

The 1983 releases (*Octopussy* and *Never Say Never Again*) as well as 1987's *The Living Daylights* were actually the last installments of the classic Cold War Bond film. In between these was Roger Moore's last depiction of Bond in *A View to a Kill*, where certain twists on the formula began. Here Bond is far less cavalier in his attitude toward the film's women, and the threat to be overcome has little to do with the possibility of war. It involves instead a plot to trigger the San Andreas fault and destroy Silicon Valley.

In thus constricting the scope of the villain's conspiracy so that it is directed solely against the interests of American capital, *A View to a Kill* realises the trans-Atlantic passage of the Bond plot more thoroughly than any of the earlier films. (1987:290)

At the film's close a Soviet official actually informs the British ministry that Bond is to be awarded the Order of Lenin for

saving Silicon Valley, since Soviet science would be lost without American technological secrets to steal.

Following *A View to a Kill*, Bennett and Woollacott predict that "...as the conditions of production of Bond become more clearly and unequivocally American, Bond is likely to become increasingly Americanised." (1987:283) This was not the case with *The Living Daylights*, where the device of the Soviet "maverick" (last seen in *Octopussy*) is used to manipulate the British, American and Soviet intelligence agencies into the possibility of WW III. Bond's adventures take him to Czechoslovakia and Austria to aid in a defection and to Afghanistan where he befriends an Oxford-educated rebel leader. This would be the last Bond film to utilize or even acknowledge the CWF for eight years. Between 1987 and 1995 the only Bond film released was 1989's *Licence to Kill*, one which strayed from the established formula to an extent not seen before.

Not surprisingly, *Licence* was produced and released at a point where Cold War themes had perhaps the least resonance, at least in the traditional mould. The Bond franchise side-steps the problem of how to treat the Cold War in the era of *perestroika* and *glasnost* by ignoring the issue completely and fulfilling Bennett and Woollacott's "Americanisation" prediction. *Licence to Kill* is the only Bond film to be set entirely in the Western

hemisphere (Florida, Bahamas and Central America). In fact, Bond spends a total of exactly two minutes and five seconds of screen time on "British" soil: in the British Embassy in Miami. The villain is simply a very powerful and ambitious drug dealer envisioning a cocaine-based "manifest destiny" from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. In the film's first act Bond attends the wedding of his CIA friend Felix Leiter. Soon Felix is crippled and his wife killed by the villain's henchman and Bond most uncharacteristically resigns from the service in order to seek personal revenge. The entire film resembles more than anything such American fare as *Miami Vice*, and Bond's distinctiveness is all but gone.

The Bond franchise then took its longest hiatus since its 1962 inception (six years), remaining on the sidelines as its most important source of dramatic material dissolved. When the franchise finally reappeared with *Goldeneye* in 1995, it was in a form filled with new characters, contradictions, ambiguities, anachronisms, formula violations, and relentless reflexive self-examination. Surprisingly it was also, in many ways, the highest quality Bond film yet produced (see appendix 9: Response Coding and Close Reading).

CHAPTER EIGHT: FILM ANALYSES

8.1 - Method

The Cold War film genre, as defined in chapter 7.2 consists of those English-language films produced primarily in the United States and Great Britain in a realist narrative style (that is, excluding documentaries and all but the most influential of comedies and avant-garde examples) which exhibit a clear self-consciousness regarding the Cold War Frame and/or directly comment on the social, political or cultural differences between the United States and Soviet Union in the Cold War context. Normally these are films which might be judged as "political thrillers," "international espionage" or "military adventures." However, the criterion of Cold War self-consciousness renders such films as *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country* appropriate even though the film is set in the 23rd century, since the narrative is an obvious allegory for the Cold War's end. Similarly, films depicting the Vietnam War, a 20th century conflict most definitely connected to Cold War politics, are most often not appropriate since this same consciousness is rarely manifested. Of a potential pool of more than 200 films judged to belong to the Cold War genre, then, a significant proportion are no longer available to the video-renting North American consumer, or have become rather obscure and scarce artefacts. Much produced

in this genre before the late 1970s has never been released on videocassette and thus may not be subjected to the same level of scrutiny as latter-day films. The availability of films is also something of a self-selecting methodological tool for the purposes of this study, since frames are built from common perceptions, the scarce and obscure are by definition less applicable to the construction or reflection of these perceptions (see appendix 3 for a chronological list of Cold War films accompanied by brief plot synopses).

Each accessible film to be considered has been subjected to at least one and as many as three coding steps, while several have been selected for particular close scrutiny as specific exemplars of their time periods. The methods of analysis, then, may be generally defined as both content analysis and close readings. The former is undertaken partially in aid of providing evidence for the temporal categories employed as they parallel the shifts in the Cold War Frame. It should again be noted, however, that the "classic" content analysis emphasis on strict objectivity cannot be sustained regarding all filmic elements to be coded. Nor is this coding undertaken in order to establish any particular linear cause-and-effect relationship between political events and their filmed representations. Rather, these codings provide a framework or initial backdrop for intelligibility and

understanding that is articulated in more detail in close readings. The latter is also necessary for a greater appreciation of each film's tone and essence:

...the classification system of general formal codes in the cinema, while necessary, must not retard the far more pressing task of describing the peculiar way meaning is experienced in cinema and the unique quality of the experience of major films. (Andrew, 1985:627-628)

The first coding step, to which the majority of available films have been subjected, includes the following 17 elements:

| STEP 1 | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 01. FILM TITLE: | 13. MAJOR CHARACTERS: |
| 02. SUB-GENRE: | 13A: etc. |
| 03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: | |
| 04. RELEASE DATE: | 14. MINOR CHARACTERS: |
| 05. FRAME DATE: | 14A: etc. |
| 06. CHROMATICS: | |
| 07. MEDIUM: | 15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS |
| 08. STUDIO: | 15A: etc. |
| 09. PRODUCER: | |
| 10. DIRECTOR: | 16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS: |
| 11. SCREENPLAY: | 16A: etc. |
| 12. SOURCE: | |
| | 17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: |

01. FILM TITLE. 02. SUB-GENRE: Although all films are selected as appropriate to a Cold War genre, most are also associated with one or more other established film genres (war, science fiction, espionage, etc.) which for the purposes of the study will be considered secondary or "sub-genres." 03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: Normally the United States, although a significant proportion of Cold War films have been produced in Great Britain.

Those produced in any foreign language are excluded. 04. **RELEASE DATE:** Year in which the film was originally released in theatres and/or (less often) directly to the video market. 05. **FRAME DATE:** As outlined in the discussion of temporal classification in chapter 7.1, an hypothesized "frame date" is established from available information to better represent the actual state of the Cold War Frame. This may or may not correspond to the film's theatrical release date, but is most commonly one to three years prior. Due to inconsistent and incomplete information on many films prior to the late 1970s, only those films in the final three categories (resurgence, disruption, and response) as assigned frame dates. 06. **CHROMATICS:** Generally either colour film or black and white; remarkable chiefly when the latter is used for dramatic effect. 07. **MEDIUM:** Theatrical release, theatrical and subsequent video release, made-for television with subsequent video release, and direct to the video market release. 08. **STUDIO:** Film studio of production. 09. **PRODUCER:** Individual(s) and/or organization(s) listed as producer(s) in film credits. 10. **DIRECTOR:** Individual(s) listed as director(s) in film credits. 11. **SCREENPLAY:** Individual(s) listed as responsible for writing the film's story and/or script in film credits. 12. **SOURCE:** The source from which a film's screenplay is derived. Normally adapted from a novel or other fictional work, a

dramatization of actual events, or an original screenplay. 13.

MAJOR CHARACTERS: Major characters (whether considered protagonist or antagonists) are categorized according to their nationality (normally either American/Western or Russian/Communist), their general depiction (sympathetic, unsympathetic, or ambiguous), the character's name, and in the case of films subjected to close readings, a two-letter abbreviation for use in the text of such readings). 14. **MINOR CHARACTERS:** Minor characters are subjected to the same categorizations as major characters. 15. **AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:** A categorization of recognizable symbols, whether obvious or subtle, that denote America, the West, democracy, etc. Examples include national flags, military uniforms, and particular landmarks (e.g. the Pentagon or Statue of Liberty). 16. **RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS:** A parallel coding to the above. 17. **EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE:** The tacit judgements contained within the film's tone as well as the overt narrative statements that cue the viewer regarding the moral, cultural and social status of the United States/West/ capitalism and the USSR/East/Communism (e.g. "Mildly pro-American; strongly anti-Soviet").

The second coding step is conducted on accessible films judged reasonably representative, according to the criteria

established in chapter 7.1, of the time periods resurgence (1979-88) and disruption (1989-91), a total of 42 (30 and 12 respectively) films. These codings include the following 12 elements:

STEP 2

01. THREAT TYPE:

- a) WW III
- b) limited war
- c) national security compromise/strategic disadvantage
- d) Communist/foreign incursions
- e) defection to the East
- f) terrorism
- g) other _____

02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION:

- a) high
- b) moderate
- c) low
- d) ambiguous

03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:

- a) uniform
- b) wealth/consumerism
- c) attitude towards communism
- d) conspicuous freedom (voting, travel, free press, etc.)
- e) cultural knowledge
- f) other _____

04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:
as above

05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:

- a) uniform
- b) poverty/lack of consumer goods
- c) attitude towards capitalism
- d) conspicuous oppression (closed borders, fear of expression)
- e) speech patterns (accent, grammar, etc.)
- f) stereotypical food/drink (vodka, caviar, etc.)
- g) cultural ignorance
- h) emotional extremes (emotionless, sadistic, etc.)
- i) other _____

06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:
as above

STEP 2 (continued)

07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN:

- a) politician/bureaucrat
- b) soldier/military officer
- c) scientist
- d) spy/agent
- e) criminal
- f) private citizen
- g) defector
- h) other _____

08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST

as above

09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY:

- a) extremely positive
- b) generally positive
- c) ambiguous
- d) generally negative
- e) extremely negative

10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY:

as above

11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES: (examples)

- a) America is inherently more moral/virtuous than USSR
- b) Communists are "not like us" and/or not fully human
- c) The Communists cannot be trusted
- d) Communist citizens live in fear, ignorance and suspicion
- e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control
- f) Communism is an insidious force within America
- g) Russia will not stop until world Communism is established
- h) America has allowed itself to become weak
- i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not common people
- j) Soviet Union is actively racist/intolerant

01. THREAT TYPE: Virtually all films in these two categories entail particular wide-ranging threats, normally what is at stake should the American/Western protagonist fail in his or her mission. These include: a) World War III, the most dramatic and catastrophic of threats, one that normally pits the United States and the Soviet Union as adversaries (though often unwittingly)

and is generally specific to the Cold War genre; b) limited war, less common than the preceding, but occasionally involving the possibility of nuclear exchange or the unspoken potential for further escalation; c) various types of national security compromises for the West and a resulting strategic disadvantage in the continuing Cold War, usually understood as a dangerous "sign of weakness" that the Communists can not resist exploiting; d) Communist incursions into the West either in the form of "duping" innocent Americans/Westerners into believing Communist propaganda or some variation on the "domino theory" where Communism insidiously moves closer to America's borders; e) defection to the East, a less common film occurrence, it nonetheless is occasionally exploited as a dramatic device, the most common formula sees a scientist or other person of sensitive technical knowledge, disillusioned with the West, hoping to effect some change through providing the other side with information they desperately want; f) terrorism, a specific variation on the security compromise theme, the individuals in question are occasionally given their assignments by their governments but are as likely to be acting on their own for personal revenge or due to some personality disorder; g) other, as evidenced in each individual film. 02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION: a) high, b) moderate, c) low, or d) ambiguous.

03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS: Film characters are identified as exemplifying a nationality and its respective values in their dress, possessions, speech and general comportment. Examples include: a) uniform (military or otherwise signifying America); b) wealth and consumerism, including proud or joyful possession of the latest American "toys;" c) attitude towards Communism (generally negative, but including a fairly wide range of reactions); d) conspicuous freedoms (e.g. voting, travel, speech, worship); e) cultural knowledge (including references to recent popular culture); and f) other (as evidenced in each individual film).

04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS: Minor characters are subjected to the same categorizations as major characters.

05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS: A parallel categorization to the above, including: a) uniform; b) poverty/lack of consumer goods; c) attitude towards capitalism; d) conspicuous oppression (e.g. closed borders, fear of expression); e) speech patterns (exaggerated accents, grammatical errors); f) stereotypical food and drink (e.g. vodka, caviar); g) cultural ignorance; h) emotional extremes (usually either a lack of expressed emotion or sadism/cruelty); i) other (as evidenced in each individual film).

06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS: Minor characters are subjected to the same categorizations as major

characters. 07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN: American or Western main characters generally fall into one of the following categories: a) politician, bureaucrat or other government official; b) soldier or military officer; c) scientist or technician; d) spy, CIA agent or other operative, usually covert; e) criminal; f) private citizen (generally an "everyman" caught up in unexpected events and required to rise to the challenge; g) defector; or h) other (as evidenced in each individual film). 08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST: Russian or Communist main characters generally fall into one of the same categories as above. 09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY: a) extremely positive; b) generally positive; c) ambiguous; d) generally negative; e) extremely negative. 10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY: a) extremely positive; b) generally positive; c) ambiguous; d) generally negative; e) extremely negative. 11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES: Working inductively from film viewings, the following consistent themes and depictions recur: a) America is inherently more moral or virtuous than the Soviet Union or any Communist nation; b) Communists are "not like us" and/or are not fully human; c) the Communists cannot be trusted; d) Communist citizens live in fear, ignorance and suspicion; e) the military and/or the arms race is out of control; f) Communism is an insidious force within

America; g) the Soviet Union will not stop until world Communism is established; h) America has allowed itself to become weak; i) politicians and/or governments are the real enemies, not the common people of either country; j) the Soviet Union is actively racist and intolerant.

The third phase of film scrutiny is conducted only for films of the disruption phase (1989-1991). The categories that follow contain examples of a few of the reflections expected in terms of uncertainties and an "oscillation of selves" manifested in instances of frame disruption. In practice, these will be integrated into the "close readings" of each film thus considered. These categories are examples only and do not exhaust the possible range of filmic disruption evidence.

STEP 3

01. ANOMALIES:
02. NARRATIVE ANACHRONISMS:
03. THEMATIC ANACHRONISMS:
04. AMBIGUITIES:
05. CONSPICUOUS ABSENCES/LACUNAE:

01. ANOMALIES: Example: CIA and KGB agents work together in defiance of both their governments and in aid of exposing their equal levels of corruption and amorality (*Company Business*).

02. NARRATIVE ANACHRONISMS: Example: A Russian character's business card bears the heading "Commonwealth of Independent States," an entity which technically still exists but was only commonly made reference to as a replacement political formation to the USSR for a short time (*Sneakers*). 03. THEMATIC ANACHRONISMS: Example: Vitriolic anti-Communist and anti-American attitudes in main characters, conspicuous by their extremism in a film concerned with East/West co-operation and the emergence of the new world order (*Comrades in Arms*). 04. AMBIGUITIES: Example: The two main characters (American and Russian) are impossible to characterize definitively as either positive/sympathetic or negative/unsympathetic and no satisfactory conclusion to their struggle is reached (*The Fourth War*). 05. CONSPICUOUS ABSENCES/LACUNAE: Example: The power and ominous threat of the Soviet military and the KGB (*Back in the USSR*).

The information gathered through the first two coding steps is presented in detail in appendix 4, including selected comparative (resurgence vs disruption) graphic representations of 10 elements.

8.2 - Coding Steps

A total of 42 films were taken through coding stages beyond step one for comparative purposes; 30 from the resurgence era and 12 from the disruption period. Although not all "results" support the 1989-91 disruption "hypothesis" (and in fact are not expected to) a number of intriguing and suggestive findings are evident. The proportion of American/Western and Russian/Communist film characters that are depicted as sympathetic, unsympathetic or ambiguous differ considerably in the two periods, including a marked increase in unsympathetic Americans, sympathetic Russians and ambiguous characters of both types in the latter time frame. As expected, the implied state of East/West political tension manifested in the films was far lower in the disruption phase, and the depiction of Russian/Communist society was decidedly more positive. Most telling, perhaps, is the dramatic decline in the occurrences of the 10 Cold War "thematic consistencies" from an average of 2.40 in the resurgence phase to 1.42 in the disruption period. While other coding elements are more difficult to interpret (e.g. signs of American nationality or culture declined significantly among main characters but increased slightly among minor characters) both the coding in general and the close readings in particular do support the contention that some form of disruption did occur in the genre at the selected frame date

of 1989. Again, a complete representation of these coding elements may be found in appendix 4. It is perhaps most instructive at this point to consider exemplars of each time period in turn.

8.3 - Establishment Exemplar: *Fail-Safe*

As previously noted, many Cold War films prior to 1980 are now very scarce or simply have never been judged financially viable for transference to videocassette. One of the exceptions to this rule is the 1964 Cold War classic *Fail-Safe*. Appearing at the end of the establishment era, *Fail-Safe* in fact reflects this time period extremely well. In the wake of the recent Cuban missile crisis it seems reasonable to assume the film's theme had a good deal of resonance for the American public (and renders the appearance of *Dr. Strangelove* all the more remarkable).

Fail-Safe is primarily a cautionary tale on the dangers of military automation, the need for international cooperation and trust, and the futility of nuclear war. It is intense and earnest, verging at times on accidental self-parody. This judgement might even have been fairly common at the time of the film's original theatrical run due to the influence of another film released only eight months earlier: *Dr. Strangelove Or: How*

I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, an influential Stanley Kubrick black comedy. In the latter film, almost exactly the same set of scenarios presented in *Fail-Safe* are brilliantly and ruthlessly satirized. It is difficult to surrender one's self to the gravity of a cultural product that has already and so recently been undercut, in effect sabotaged, through insightful comic parody.

Both *Dr. Strangelove* and *Fail-Safe* appear to be based on the same 1958 novel titled *Red Alert*, yet *Fail-Safe* itself began as a best-selling 1962 novel. The authors of the latter were in fact sued for plagiarism (settled out of court) while *Dr. Strangelove* acknowledges *Red Alert* as its source material.

Although the idea of a mechanical failure in nuclear safeguards is not (at least for filmic purposes) a great leap for the viewer, *Fail-Safe* repeatedly makes the case that, given the sophistication of equipment and the "independent" logic of computers, such a failure is inevitable. Variations on this theme have become very common in the Cold War genre, from the erratic behaviour of the "WOPR" computer in 1983's *Wargames* to the "Skynet" computer's decision to purposefully eradicate humans by initiating nuclear war in the *Terminator* films. The theme of computers following their own logic to the ruin of humanity appears in film, television, novels, comic books and popular

music (see, for example, David Bowie's *Saviour Machine*, 1971).

The USSR is radically "other" in that it is invisible. The only representation of Soviet people is a brief telephone statement from a Soviet officer and the words of the Soviet Premier as reported by the president's translator. Though certainly not the of the same ilk as a few of the insultingly polemic early 1950s films, *Fail-Safe* is perhaps the quintessential pre-détente American Cold War film. For a full representation of coding elements and a close reading, see appendix 5.

8.4 - Dissensus and Détente Exemplar: *The Spy Who Loved Me*

The Spy Who Loved Me (1977) represents installment number 10 in the ongoing James Bond saga and is the film most clearly reflective of the "spirit of détente." While the presence of a beautiful female agent from the other side is hardly a new development, the humanization of the film's Russian characters is. The head of the KGB is shown to sincerely care about the emotional well-being of his people and other than the obligatory thick accent he displays none of the Russian stereotypes so common in the Cold War genre. Only two of a possible 10 identified Cold War thematic consistencies are manifested (the

danger of the arms race and the idea that only the East/West politicians are enemies rather than the common people, or in this case, the common spies) and these are hardly inflammatory. In the film's opening acts consistent parallels are shown between the concerns and actions of the two agents, suggesting that Bond and his counterpart are equally honourable, competent and human. The two enter an alliance that is at first uncertain but soon progresses to mutual respect, affection and intimacy, (if not actual love), while "M" and his KGB counterpart fairly trip over each other in their politeness. Indeed, it is this sense of détente that is the only distinctive feature of the film, which follows to the letter the standard Bond formula: a rich but demented industrialist covertly acquires nuclear weapons and plans to dupe the United States and Soviet Union into launching World War III. The only (slight) twist is the villain's desire to begin an underwater utopia at the war's conclusion rather than holding the superpowers ransom. Just as this era (1965-78) was nearing its close, détente in the Bond would also be short-lived:

During the making of *The Spy [Who Loved Me]*, the production team actively sought to cultivate an ethos of détente in all stages of film production and presentation. [...] It is worth noting, however, that the desired imagery of détente...is quite specific to *The Spy*. Later films in the series resume a much more anti-Soviet stance. *For Your Eyes Only*, for example, is firmly installed in Thatcher's Britain... (Bennett and Woollacott, 1987:192, 193)

For a full representation of coding elements and a close reading, see appendix 6.

8.5 - Resurgence Exemplar: *Firefox*

Following a significant downturn in the number of Cold War films produced in the previous time period (particularly in the mid-to-late 1970s), the turn of the decade and beginning of the resurgence phase saw a veritable explosion of films employing well-known Cold War themes. Generally the first half of the resurgence phase contains a greater number and more polemic films than the waning years of the decade, a development in-keeping with a dawning reassessment of Soviet leadership and society accompanying Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* programs.

The 1982 film *Firefox* (frame date 1981) represents the early portion of this period exceptionally well. It trades on the themes of a mysterious, dangerous Russia and the supposed recent "weakness" of the West. In fact nine of a possible 10 Cold War thematic consistencies are evident, including the depiction of Soviet society as actively racist. There are a number of common American war/espionage film tropes: the lone American misfit anti-hero; ruthless, somewhat dull Russians; a good-hearted but

quirky, absent-minded British administrator; and nobly suffering but ultimately unappealing Jewish underdogs. The threat is no less than Soviet world domination, the depiction of Soviet society is relentlessly bleak and oppressive, the Russian characters are virtual caricatures of Soviet depravity, and the American protagonist is played by no less an icon than Clint Eastwood, perhaps second only to John Wayne as a symbol of traditional American manhood. In the Reagan-era resurgence climate the film was a great success. For a full representation of coding elements and a close reading, see appendix 7.

8.6 - Disruption Exemplar: *Company Business*

Although several films of the 1989-91 frame dates are representative of the disruption phase (*Sneakers*, *Back in the USSR*, *The Fourth War*) the 1991 release *Company Business* (frame date 1990) is perhaps the best exemplar of a film displaying "disruption qualities." The plot is meandering and rather uninvolving, concerning the exchange of American and Russian ex-agents in Berlin, and the adventures of a pair of former operatives (one ex-CIA, one ex-KGB) as they elude their respective organizations and attempt to expose illegalities on both sides.

There are narrative and thematic anachronisms (a "Gorbyman" Mikhail Gorbachev tee shirt, the need to disparage Eastern Bloc technology, the jaded mystery and romance of "East" Berlin, the "novelty" of cooperation between Russian and American agencies, and the very presence of the KGB) and a marked sense of confusion or lack of direction. The overriding sensation one is likely to experience in this convoluted and only mildly interesting "thriller" is that of a certain desperation. The film seems far too eager to present itself as completely up to date on the state of the inner frame and thus is quickly obsolete. A kind of "scattergun" approach is employed by which every possible reference to recent global politics is included in hopes that at least a few will resonate beyond the initial theatrical run. The list is astounding: the fall of the Berlin Wall; the anomie of the current situation ("At least in prison I knew the rules"); Manuel Noreiga; Nicaragua; Oliver North and "arms for hostages;" Cuba and Fidel Castro; ex-Nazis from WW II on the American payroll; the Contras; Afghanistan; Angola; Lithuania; the PLO; prostitution as the result of democracy (not capitalism); Iraqi hit squads; Columbian drug cartels; the threat of Japanese economic imperialism, and more. Although other candidates exist, the confusion and oscillation of this film marks it as a top contender for the quintessential disruption Cold War film. For a

full representation of coding elements and a close reading, see appendix 8.

8.7 - Discussion/Conclusions

If films of the 1989-91 time period exhibit immediate disruption reactions, those produced in the years following (1992-97) should manifest the more strategic responses extrapolated from macro-level frame analysis. First it should be noted that although a small minority may still believe otherwise, quite clearly, the Cold War Frame no longer operates as a widely intersubjective definition of presently-occurring reality, and that this is indeed reflected in the breakdown of the Cold War film genre. Thus, the first possibility of an apparent frame disruption (that the frame has only been altered quantitatively or given a new tonal variation) may be safely discarded. It is equally evident that the Cold War's end, to employ Goffman's terminology, is not a fabrication (a clever deception on the part of the Russians/Soviets) or a miskeying (a misinterpretation of what is only a new phase in the Cold War as its actual end).

The second possibility is the strategic baseline retreat; the denial of the frame disruption and the conscious attempt to restore previous "normal appearances." In film this is manifested

in attempts to "save the genre" through the slightest possible variation. Thus far, two basic strategies appear evident. The first involves the use of Russian "mavericks," either right-wing ultra-nationalists or overly-nostalgic former Soviets longing for the "good old days." An excellent example of this strategy is found in 1995's *Crimson Tide*, where a Russian general seizes a missile base near Russia's Pacific coast and threatens a first strike against the United States (and Japan). The elements of the specific bipolar power balance and the threat of nuclear war are restored, but without the dark "mystique" of inscrutable or monstrous Communist motivation. As long as Russia or the former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Kazakhstan) possess a nuclear arsenal and until Russian politics stabilize to Western satisfaction, such scenarios will retain dramatic currency. As a baseline retreat, however, it is less than complete.

The second strategy in reestablishing "normal appearances" involves the substitution of Communist China for Communist Russia. This was utilized to some effect in 1997's *Red Corner* where an American businessman is framed for murder and must endure physical abuse, attempted murder and the alien Chinese legal system. It was most effectively used, however, in the second post-Cold War Bond film *Tomorrow Never Dies* released the same year. In Bond's 19th adventure the standard formula is again

employed: a rich and powerful businessman (mass media mogul) manipulates Britain and Communist China to the brink of nuclear war. It is a far closer baseline retreat in most respects; a mere substitution of one powerful Communist country with nuclear weapons for another, but somehow still lacks the resonance of the original formation. For most Westerners the People's Republic remains something of an enigma. The status of Sino-American trade policy is still in question, and filmmakers may be more reluctant to play this "race card" than they are with the distressingly common "Arab = terrorist" theme. Future attempts to substitute the PRC for the USSR, if they occur with any regularity, should prove particularly revealing. Variations on the problematic state of "the new Russia" also abound (*The Saint*, *The Jackal*, *Air Force One*, all from 1997), but are less closely tied to the baseline elements of nuclear war or the geopolitical bipolar power balance. For a full presentation of coding elements and a close reading of a strategic response film, see appendix 9.

Generic Arab terrorism and Latin American drug cartels remain the most common candidates for alternative enemies (the theme of Japanese economic imperialism lost its "currency" in the last half of the 1990s). Examples here include *Clear and Present Danger* and *True Lies* from 1994 and 1996's *Executive Decision*, among many others. While it is difficult to claim either as a

true substitute for the Cold War Frame, it may indeed be the case that such alternatives fulfil a similar function, albeit less ably. Both posit the idea that the world remains a dangerous place for America and Americans, justifying the existence and deployment of military action in the service of self-defence. With the Gulf War fading from the collective American memory (only two major films, 1996's *Courage Under Fire* and 1999's *Three Kings* have employed the setting) only the unlikely emergence of an aggressive and overtly anti-American Arab or South American "superpower" could possibly take up all the political slack left in the absence of the Soviet Other.

The final strategic response following a frame disruption to be considered is Travers' contention that interactants are subjected to a transformation of sorts that aligns them in the image of the new anomic frame. Applying Travers' reasoning might suggest that the American Superiority Frame is actually strengthened and made more salient through the Cold War Frame's disruption. Moreover, Travers believes that in instances of anomic disruption selves are actually the most "self-like" through the heightened engrossment that disruption interaction demands. America, that is, should be "truer" to itself at the point where self-definition is most problematic. Relative to the previous strategies, however, capturing this eventuality seems to

demand a level of anthropomorphization, either of the United States (or the film industry) that cannot be reasonably sustained, and the degree to which individual American citizens (or film producers) have become "strangers to themselves" remains a subjective, ephemeral state of being.

Presumably, the confusion and oscillation accompanying a frame disruption simultaneously engenders some degree of emergence and hopefully, emergent creativity. It is difficult, however, to establish this judgement unambiguously when assessing the filmic output of Hollywood in the early 1990s. Such assertions, on one side or the other, are difficult to distinguish from questions of simple aesthetic taste. Certainly a proliferation of interesting "alternative threats" (as opposed to alternative enemies) seemed to appear in many 1995 and 1996 films, ranging from technophobia (*Johnny Mnemonic*, *Strange Days*) to disease or AIDS metaphors (*Outbreak*, *12 Monkeys*) to environmental/natural "revenge" (*Congo*, *The Arrival*). It is virtually impossible to know, however, if these films were indeed inspired by the breakdown of the Cold War film genre. Moreover, the appearance of these alternatives at this time seems rather late vis-a-vis the emergent properties of a disruption occurring four to five years earlier.

There seems some indication that the nuclear fatalism of the

Cold War may be replaced with an environmental equivalent. Mass media statistics regarding the number of animal species or rainforest square acreage disappearing daily resemble the extremes of nuclear "overkill" figures and engender similar sensations of helplessness. An out-of-control arms race is replaced with an out-of-control global capitalist order, one that is less specified and thus more subject to reification, yet also much more immediate and potentially alterable in particular manners. The juxtaposition, then, of apocalyptic environmental predictions with the common failure to "think globally, act locally" riddles Western capitalism with a form of social cognitive dissonance. At present there seems little indication that the Cold War's end has had any significant effect in allowing for a refocusing on environmental, or indeed any of the other traditional social concerns of liberal humanism.

So while the Cold War's end has generally been greeted with an unquestioning enthusiasm and optimism, its benefits are exceptionally difficult to recount. Since the mid 1960s various groups have consistently drawn attention to the enormous wealth "squandered" in the arms race and the more positive purposes to which it may be applied. Yet where now is the long anticipated "peace dividend?" The familiar bipolar power balance is seemingly erased and the threat of global nuclear war is seemingly eased.

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remain, however, and their future elimination is by no means assured.

Following Goffman, a true frame disruption is characterized first and foremost by what he terms "negative experience." A frame disruption, that is, takes its character not from what it is, but from what it is not, i.e. a recognizable set of interactive prescriptions or normative guidelines. Such a description may be applied now to post-Cold War American foreign policy. There has been no "Clinton Doctrine" and America's role as "the world's only superpower" remains ill-defined. Following the first heady rush of the Gulf War consensus, there has been no structured, definable "new world order." America seems to have no particular agenda in the arena of global politics aside from economic "growth." Like the traditional critique of ideology within the sociological tradition, American ideology has lost its defining mirror; its perhaps quite necessary other. Every new American military venture is still judged by its potential to become "another Vietnam" where ambiguous goals preclude consensus-building and the establishment of the high patriotic fervour required in times of armed conflict. Without the imperative to investigate and resist Soviet political and military movements, each potential geopolitical crisis must be addressed on its own merits and presented to the American public

as immediately "vital" to crucial national interests or as a moral imperative. For the United States, military-political life has become a serial negotiation and performance of situation-specific global interactions. The future of American geopolitics, that is, is a continuing system of macro-level frames.

In such circumstances, when structure gives way to flow and geopolitical meta-narratives grow increasingly nebulous, only a perspective that retains a situation-specific model of interaction (micro or macro) and does not rely on structural metaphors is capable of encapsulating or even adequately tracking the non-linear movement of unbound, increasingly disembodied geopolitical machinations. The further development of a frame analysis perspective that understands macro-level "interaction" as an ongoing series of performative negotiations may in fact be an exceptionally useful model for 21st century social science in the realms of cultural expression and political practice.

APPENDIX 1 - COLD WAR TIME LINE

LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA

| | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1912-20: Woodrow Wilson | |
| | 1917-24: V. I. Lenin |
| 1920-23: Warren G. Harding | |
| | 1924-27: interim struggle |
| 1923-28: Calvin Coolidge | |
| | 1927-53: Joseph Stalin |
| 1928-32: Herbert Hoover | |
| 1932-45: Franklin D. Roosevelt | |
| ----- | |
| 1945-52: Harry S. Truman | |
| | 1953-55: interim struggle |
| 1952-60: Dwight D. Eisenhower | |
| | 1955-64: Nikita Khrushchev |
| 1960-63: John F. Kennedy | |
| | 1964-82: Leonid Brezhnev |
| 1963-68: Lyndon Johnson | |
| 1968-74: Richard Nixon | |
| 1974-76: Gerald Ford | |
| 1976-80: Jimmy Carter | |
| | 1982-84: Yuri Andropov |
| 1980-88: Ronald Reagan | |
| | 1984-85: Konstantin Chernenko |
| | 1985-91: Mikhail Gorbachev |
| 1988-92: George Bush | |
| ----- | |
| 1992-00: Bill Clinton | |
| | 1991-99: Boris Yeltsin |

A: PRELUDE: 1917-47

1917 - Bolshevik Revolution begins, V.I. Lenin in Kremlin.

1918 - Tsar Nicholas II and family executed.

1924 - Lenin dies and is succeeded by Joseph Stalin who initiates industrial and agricultural restructuring.

1924 - Communist government established in Mongolia under Soviet influence (Mongolian independence recognized by China 1946).

1929 - Stock market crash and worldwide depression of the 1930s results in some disillusionment with capitalist economies in much of Europe, popular support for socialist principles in the West at its highest point.

1931-32 - Revolts in Mongolia suppressed by Soviet troops.

1936 - Stalin initiates the first of many purges to eliminate "Enemies of the Motherland." These, along with the forced collectivization of agriculture in early 1930s result in the deaths of approximately 20 million.

1938 - The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) established.

1939 - USSR and Nazi Germany sign a mutual non-aggression pact in August, a new concern with domestic infiltration of Communism in United States emerges.

1939 - Following German invasion of Poland September 1, Britain and France declare war on Germany September 3. World War II begins.

1941 - Nazi Germany invades USSR. Soviet Union transformed into a "valiant ally" of the West.

1941 - Following Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, United States enters WW II in December, forming the triple alliance of major allied powers along with Britain and Soviet Union.

1945 - "Big Three" (Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt) conference at Yalta fails to secure Polish self-determination or a clear direction for post-war European political alignments.

1945 - Nazi Germany is defeated and partitioned. Berlin is divided into zones of control (USA/UK/France and USSR).

1945 - United States completes Manhattan Project, drops atomic bombs on Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ending the war in the Pacific and eliminating the need for an invasion of Japan but eventually killing at least 200,000 civilians.

1945 - As per Yalta Conference agreement, Korea divided at 38th parallel, indicating zones of Soviet (north) and American (south) influence.

1946 - First major Cold War crisis occurs in March when Stalin refuses to withdraw Soviet troops from northern Iran without securing the same oil concessions awarded Britain. Truman implies that United States could use the atomic bomb in support of their British allies.

1946 - Winston Churchill delivers his "iron curtain" speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. The metaphor would remain a part of Western consciousness for four decades.

1947 - American Congress passes the National Security Act, creating the position of National Security Advisor to the president and establishing the National Security Council. The Act also establishes the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the wartime Office of Strategic Services. The Agency is to conduct overt and covert operations under the supervision of the executive branch of government (presidency) to promote American political and financial interests, particularly in the context of the Cold War.

1947 - Truman Doctrine announced in March, economic aid packages approved to protect right-wing monarchy in Greece and conservative government in Turkey from Soviet influence.

1947 - European Recovery Program ("The Marshall Plan") announced by American Secretary of State George Marshall in June.

1947 - The concept of "containment" is first enunciated in an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in *Foreign Affairs*, written by George Kennan, head of the Policy Planning Group in the US State Department.

B. ESTABLISHMENT: 1948-64

1948 - Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February is considered a crucial event in initiating the Cold War.

1948 - Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Communist North Korea) declared.

1948-49 - Soviet blockade of West Berlin and American relief airlifts. Official partition of Germany and openly-acknowledged beginning of the Cold War.

1949 - Formation of NATO in April and the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a western response to the Berlin blockade.

1949 - Creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October.

1949 - Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) formed. Membership eventually includes USSR, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, GDR, Poland, Romania, Cuba and Vietnam.

1949 - US Congress exempts CIA from publically revealing its size, budget or scope of operations.

1949 - USSR detonates its first atomic bomb August 29.

1949 - Communist government established in Hungary.

1949 - Mao Tse-Tung's Communists defeat the nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek, who flee to the island of Formosa. China is divided into the mainland People's Republic of China (PRC) and capitalist Taiwan.

1949 - Mao and Stalin sign the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.

1949-52 - Office of Policy Coordination, the branch of CIA responsible for Cold War covert operations, expands in personnel from 302 to over 6,000 and in budget from \$4.7 million to \$82 million.

1950 - First American spy plane shot down over Soviet airspace.

1950 - Senator Joseph McCarthy rises in public prominence by seizing on anti-Communism as his main theme for a re-election bid in 1952. In HUAC investigations of Hollywood movie production, all of the "Hollywood Ten" are sentenced to prison.

1950 - After receiving Stalin's approval, North Korea's Kim Il Sung launches the invasion of South Korea June 25.

1950 - Truman administration endorses NSC document 68 which calls for massive American rearmament, both conventional and atomic. Initially greeted with scepticism by Truman and some senior advisors, it is endorsed following the invasion of South Korea.

1950 - Julius and Ethel Rosenberg arrested for stealing atomic secrets; executed in the electric chair 1953.

1951 - Jacobo Arbenz Guzman becomes president of Guatemala; begins program of land reforms and pseudo-Marxist restructuring.

1951-52 - Most intense period of HUAC investigations/hearings of the film industry. Blacklisting was not declared illegal by the Supreme Court and many in the industry were unable to work until the mid-1960s.

1952 - UK detonates its first atomic bomb.

1952 - United States detonates hydrogen bomb November 1. World's first thermonuclear explosion contains 1,000 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.

1953 - Joseph Stalin dies March 5, brief power struggle ensues.

1953 - CIA-supported coup deposes Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh who had nationalized American and British petroleum interests in Iran. Shah is reinstated.

1953 - Eisenhower's loyalty program, a continuation of Truman's, is launched and results in the firing of 2,200 federal employees in its first year. None are ever proved to be Communists.

1953 - Korean War ends; nation remains divided between Communist north and capitalist right-wing south at 38th parallel. War deaths estimated at 54,000 Americans, one million Chinese, and four million Koreans.

1954 - Following the end of the Korean conflict the Geneva Conference fails to resolve the "Korean question" leaving the nation divided. The conference also sees the establishment of the US-supported SEATO to ensure stability in Southeast Asia, calls for the withdrawal of French troops from Indochina, the creation of two Vietnams and a commitment for a plebiscite within two years that would provide for unification.

1954 - Vietnamese rebels defeat French forces at Dien Bien Phu; end of French colonial rule in Indochina. Vietnam divided between Communist-controlled North and American-supported, autocratic South at 17th parallel. USA begins sending military advisors.

1954 - Japanese fishing boat contaminated with radiation from American hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Island. All 23 crew members suffer radiation poisoning, one dies.

1954 - Eisenhower introduces his domino theory to American public regarding the fall of East Asian nations to Communism.

1954 - Nationalization of Boston-based United Fruit Company's banana plantations in Guatemala by president Arbenz results in CIA-sponsored military coup, perhaps the CIA's most efficient and successful intervention.

1955 - USSR detonates world's first airborne hydrogen bomb.

1955 - West Germany enters NATO primarily as a means devised by Britain and USA to allow for its rearmament.

1955 - Warsaw Pact formed in May as a direct response to West German rearmament.

1955 - Allied and Soviet troops from WW II leave Austria with the understanding that it will establish permanent neutrality.

1955 - "Open Skies" policy proposed by Eisenhower at Geneva Summit to combat rising spy plane fatalities and provide mutual knowledge of military activities. Proposal is rejected by Soviet delegation.

1955 - Nikita Khrushchev emerges as new Soviet leader, initiates a slightly more amiable relationship with West, frees millions of political prisoners, and denounces Stalin's terror tactics.

1955 - Americans are shown Soviet long-range bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons; first understanding that American territory could be thus reached from the USSR. Eisenhower orders increased production of American B-52s.

1956 - Khrushchev delivers his "de-Stalinisation" speech in February at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

1956 - CIA-controlled flights of U-2 reconnaissance planes begin.

1956 - Soviet army crushes Hungarian revolt in Budapest.

1956 - Suez Canal Crisis.

1956 - USA, and South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem, refuse to allow unification plebiscite in South Vietnam as outlined in 1954 Geneva agreement.

1957 - Soviets develop first Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile at secret Baykonur rocket base in Kazakhstan.

1957 - Following its independence, policy of non-aligned "African socialism" pursued in Ghana (ties with USSR/Warsaw Pact developed after 1964).

1957 - Great Britain detonates its first hydrogen bomb.

1957 - Soviets launch Sputnik October 4, the world's first artificial satellite. A month later, Sputnik II is launched, this time carrying the canine passenger "Laika."

1957 - First American attempt at satellite launch in December results in explosion of Vanguard rocket on launching pad.

1958 - Beginning of widespread independence from European colonialism in Africa. Several newly-independent nations adopt Marxist principles in the 1960s and 70s with widely-varying degrees of commitment and success.

1958 - Under direction of German expatriate rocket scientist Werner Von Braun, United States successfully launches Explorer satellite using new Redstone rocket.

1958 - Khrushchev completes consolidation of power, combines positions of prime minister and party first secretary.

1958 - In order to correct perceived lag in scientific development, United States passes National Defense Education Act, streaming more students into physical science and engineering programs.

1958 - NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) established in October.

1958-60 - PRC's "Great Leap Forward" proves impossible to coordinate. At least 20 and as many as 30 million die in floods and famine; limited privatization restored in early 1960s.

1959 - After meeting with vice-president Richard Nixon at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, Khrushchev becomes the first Soviet leader invited to tour the United States.

1959 - France detonates its first hydrogen bomb in the Sahara Desert.

1959 - Fidel Castro's guerilla forces defeat army of Batista; Castro takes over Cuban government.

1960 - U-2 spy plane shot down over Sverdlovsk, pilot Gary Powers convicted in USSR of espionage.

1960 - First American spy satellite launched in August.

1960 - Sino-Soviet split, PRC accusing USSR of betraying ideals of Communism. Degree of the differences between the two nations not fully understood by USA for another decade.

1960 - Successful testing of American ICBMs.

1960-62 - Era of intense Soviet and American test-detonations of increasingly powerful nuclear bombs.

1961 - In his inaugural speech newly-elected American president Kennedy declares that the USA will "bear any burden, pay any price" to oppose Communist aggression.

1961 - Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin becomes first man in space aboard Vostok 1, April 12.

1961 - Failed "Bay of Pigs" invasion of Cuba. Most of the 1,500 CIA-trained Cuban exiles are killed or captured April 17-20. Castro subsequently announces Cuba a Communist state, the first in the Western hemisphere, and seeks out closer ties with USSR. Cuban prisoners ransomed to USA the following year in exchange for over \$50 million in food and medicine.

1961 - Alan Shepard becomes first American in space, completing a 15 minute sub-orbital flight May 5.

1961 - Soviet cosmonaut Gherman Titov spends an entire day in orbit aboard Vostok 2 in August.

1961 - Berlin Wall erected in August.

1961 - Autocratic government of Sekou Toure in Guinea, west Africa attempts rigid Communist economic reforms (returns to mixed economy and private enterprise 1979).

1962 - First Soviet spy satellite launched in April.

1962 - Khrushchev sends bombers, nuclear missiles and 40,000 troops to Cuba in October. Following American naval blockade and ultimatum from Kennedy, USSR withdraws and Khrushchev begins to fall out of favour in Moscow.

1962 - Following Cuban missile crisis, a "hot line" is established between Moscow and Washington; USA, USSR and UK sign treaty limiting nuclear testing to underground (PRC and France refuse to sign).

1962 - USSR increases its production of nuclear missiles. Beginning of the era of Mutual Assured Destruction between USA and USSR.

1962-65 - After winning its independence from France, Algeria adopts a degree of socialist principles before a right-wing military government is established.

1963 - South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem killed in military coup.

1963 - Speeches in June by Khrushchev and Kennedy regarding the end of the so-called Berlin Crisis hint at the beginning of the détente era.

1963 - Khrushchev's insistence on the planting of vast crops of corn rather than wheat leads to disastrous crop failures and the humiliating need to import wheat and bread from Western Europe.

1963 - President Kennedy assassinated in November. Lyndon Johnson takes over as president and soon escalates American involvement in Vietnam.

1964 - PRC detonates its first atomic bomb. It is assumed that the number of nation-states possessing nuclear weapons will stabilize at five: USA, USSR, PRC, UK and France.

1964 - United States enters Vietnamese civil war following Gulf of Tonkin incident. Begins longest military campaign in American history.

1964 - Khrushchev deposed in October, replaced by Leonid Brezhnev who initiates increased military spending.

C. DISSENSUS AND DÉTENTE: 1965-78

1965 - United States escalates troop strength in Vietnam from approximately 20,000 at beginning of year to 184,000 at year's end.

1966 - Accidental crash of American B-52s off the coast of Spain results in the loss of four hydrogen bombs; three contaminate the coastline with plutonium, one is recovered intact in the Mediterranean Sea. It is the 14th American "broken arrow" (lost nuclear weapon) in 16 years; more would follow.

1966 - USSR and Mongolia sign 20-year "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" pact.

1966 - Soviets develop first ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) system, temporarily destabilizing the MAD balance.

1966-69 - PRC's "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" unleashes uncontrollable waves of violence; Chinese society pushed to the brink of anarchy.

1966-69 - Increasing guerilla activity in Cambodia led by Communist Khmer Rouge.

1967 - Launch pad fire aboard Apollo I kills all three American astronauts in January.

1967 - "Six Day War" between American-supported Israel and Soviet-supported Egypt, Syria and Jordan. USSR and USA would continue to support opposing sides in future Arab-Israeli conflicts.

1967 - USA develops the MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) missile system, allowing each ICBM to carry up to ten separate warheads and effectively rendering the Soviet ABM system obsolete.

1967 - PRC detonates its first hydrogen bomb.

1967 - Widespread protests in the USA against American involvement in Vietnam.

1967 - In the "Arusha Declaration" Tanzanian president Nyerere pledges to build a socialist state. No clear alliance with USSR or USA; experiment is perhaps the most successful in Africa for more than a decade.

1968 - North Vietnamese Tet Offensive fails to inspire nationwide uprising but shocks American forces in its scale and audacity, including penetration of American embassy in Saigon. American Secretary of Defense McNamara resigns. Lyndon Johnson calls for peace talks and declines to run for a second term as American president.

1968-70 - Communist government established in Congo.

1968 - "Prague Spring." Czechoslovakian liberalization movement of "socialism with a human face" crushed by USSR/Warsaw Pact forces in August.

1968 - American troop strength in Vietnam reaches its height of 540,000 by year's end.

1968 - After assassination of Robert Kennedy, Richard Nixon elected American president. Henry Kissinger becomes National Security Advisor to the President.

1969 - Combined USA and USSR spending on nuclear armaments reaches level of \$50 million per day; amounts would increase significantly through the 1970s and 80s.

1969 - "Nixon Doctrine" announced as policy of providing only indirect support to Asian nations in resisting Communism. Indicates USA would no longer "bear any burden, pay any price" and that America's allies must do more for their own defense. The doctrine also argues that the Sino-Soviet split had caused divisions in the Communist world that the west might now exploit.

1969 - Three weeks after a second N-1 moon rocket failure in USSR, Apollo XI successfully lands two American astronauts on the moon "in peace for all mankind."

1969 - First SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) meeting in Helsinki. Talks would continue until the Afghan invasion (1979) and would be replaced by START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in 1983.

1969-70 - American bombing of Cambodia; massive student protests across the United States (student demonstrators killed at Jackson State and Kent State Universities).

1970 - In Chile, Dr. Salvador Allende becomes world's first democratically elected Marxist president; begins nationalizing private industries including American interests.

1970-72 - American bombing of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos escalates further; widely condemned in international community. In accord with the "Nixon Doctrine," the president and Kissinger pursued a policy of "Vietnamisation," i.e. that South Vietnamese forces would progressively take on more of the burden of resisting the North because of eventual American withdrawal.

1971 - PRC admitted to United Nations.

1972 - In-keeping with the "Nixon Doctrine," the American president visits the People's Republic of China in February. Despite continued differences on status of Taiwan, it marks the beginning of normalizing relations between USA and PRC.

1972 - Communist government established in Dahomey (western Africa); name changed to Benin.

1972 - After three years of negotiations the first SALT treaty is signed. Extent of agreement: limitations on the development of the already obsolete ABMs and a temporary freeze on missile launchers.

1972 - Faced with harvest failure, USSR negotiates first of several grain purchases from USA.

1973 - Paris Peace Treaty signed in January; United States withdraws virtually all its troops from Vietnam. Nixon secretly assures South Vietnamese president Thieu that American troops will return if needed.

1973 - Chilean president Allende killed in CIA-backed military coup. General Augusto Pinochet rules an economically successful but repressive dictatorship until 1990.

1973 - Henry Kissinger becomes US Secretary of State in September. He remains the chief architect of American foreign policy until the advent of the Carter administration.

1974 - Under threat of impeachment over Watergate and related scandals, Nixon becomes first American president to resign the office.

1974 - India performs underground test of atomic bomb, becomes sixth nuclear power.

1974 - Portuguese Empire in Africa collapses; Communist government established in former colony of Mozambique.

1974 - New American president Gerald Ford meets with Brezhnev in Vladivostok; some progress made in limiting strategic weapons.

1975 - After a frantic airlift of remaining Americans, Saigon falls to North Vietnamese troops April 30. Hanoi's plan to capture South Vietnam in two years requires only eight weeks. Nixon-Kissinger policy of Vietnamisation fails.

1975 - Apollo-Soyuz link-up in space in July.

1975 - Communist Khmer Rouge overthrow American-backed government of Cambodia (Khmer Republic); country renamed Kampuchea.

1975 - Helsinki Conference marks the formal end of WW II; produces the "Helsinki Accords" regarding the respect for human rights. Despite paying lip-service, Soviet Union refuses to honour the Accords.

1975-76 - Quasi-Communist governments established in Angola and Ethiopia. Cuban troops intervene in both countries but are most active in Angola. Due to the earlier passing of the War Making Powers Act, intended to curtail presidential war-making power and thus prevent other Vietnams, Ford and Kissinger cannot provide American support for anti-Marxist forces.

1975-76 - Developments in Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, as well as the Soviet response to the Helsinki Accords, mark the beginning of the movement away from détente and the Cold War's resurgence.

1975-80 - Madagascar's five-year "experiment" in Marxism.

1976 - North and South Vietnam officially unified as Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City). Total war deaths estimated at 58,000 Americans, 200,000 South Vietnamese, one million North Vietnamese and 500,000 civilians. The war costs USA as much as \$200 billion.

1976 - Death of Mao Tse-tung, September 6.

1976-78 - Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge government introduces extreme reforms in Kampuchea; approximately 2.5 million die from famine, disease and executions.

1977-79 - "Red Terror" in Ethiopia; thousands killed in purges and forced collectivization of farming.

1978 - Communist government established in South Yemen.

1978-79 - Vietnam and PRC sever diplomatic relations and fight a brief but intense border war. Vietnam invades Kampuchea in opposition to Pol Pot's government (700,000 refugees flee as "boat people").

D. RESURGENCE: 1979-88

1978-79 - Nicaraguan revolution; Sandinistas end 40-year dictatorship of Somoza family.

1979 - Full diplomatic relations restored between USA and PRC.

1979 - Margaret Thatcher becomes UK's first woman prime minister.

1979 - Shah of Iran flees country, Ayatollah Khomeini returns and establishes Islamic theocracy.

1979 - American hostages taken in Tehran embassy and held for 444 days. American rescue attempt fails and Carter administration perceived as ineffectual.

1979 - Soviet troops invade Afghanistan in December.

1980 - Creation of Solidarity union in Poland.

1980 - Beginning of Iran-Iraq war (to 1988).

1980 - Maoist Sendero Luminoso ("Shining Path") guerrilla activity begins in Peru.

1980 - USA and several other Western nations boycott summer Olympic Games in Moscow in protest over Afghan invasion. (In winter Olympics at Lake Placid the American hockey team defeats USSR in the "miracle on ice.")

1980 - Oscar Romero, Archbishop of San Salvador, is murdered in his cathedral; sparks 10-year civil war in El Salvador claiming approximately 70,000 lives.

1980 - Ronald Reagan elected president running on a platform featuring a hardline stance towards Soviet expansionism (particularly in Latin America) and a commitment to rearmament after the cutbacks of the Carter administration.

1981 - Iranian captors release their American hostages immediately following Reagan's inauguration.

1981 - USA actively assists Salvadoran government in resisting leftist (FMLN) guerrillas.

1981 - Despite his regime's recent violent suppression of student pro-democracy demonstrations (approximately 2,000 civilians killed), South Korea's military ruler General Chun Doo Hwan is the first foreign head of state to visit USA during Reagan administration. Serious anti-American sentiment grows among young South Koreans.

1981-84 - Reagan administration aids Contra rebels in Nicaragua, freezes economic aid and approves CIA destabilization operations.

- 1982 - Brezhnev dies in November, succeeded by Yuri Andropov.
- 1982 - Falkland Islands War between UK and Argentina.
- 1983 - Ronald Reagan's "evil empire" speech, March 8.
- 1983 - Reagan administration announces the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March.
- 1983 - USSR shoots down Korean Airlines 747 in Soviet airspace.
- 1983 - First START meeting between USA and USSR in Geneva.
- 1983 - American invasion of Grenada and overthrow of its pro-Cuban military government.
- 1984 - Yuri Andropov dies in February and is succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko.
- 1984 - USSR and Warsaw Pact nations boycott summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
- 1985 - Reagan publically announces his intention to remove Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua.
- 1985 - Konstantin Chernenko dies in March and is succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev.
- 1985 - Reagan/Gorbachev summit in Geneva, November 19-21. First such meeting in over six years.
- 1986 - US Congress approves \$100 million in military aid to Contra rebels.
- 1986 - Nuclear reactor disaster in Chernobyl, Ukraine in April. Approximately 250 killed and thousands of square miles contaminated; radioactive clouds spread as far as Scandinavia.
- 1986 - Gorbachev/Reagan summit in Reykjavik, Iceland.
- 1986-87 - Congressional hearings on Reagan administration's sale of arms to Iran through Israel, the trading of arms for hostages held in Lebanon, and the secret funneling of international monetary donations to the Contra guerillas in Nicaragua.

1986-88 - Progress in arms reduction, both nuclear and conventional with Gorbachev most often taking the initiative. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty signed in 1987.

1987-89 - Vietnamese troops withdraw from Kampuchea. Country returns to name Cambodia, Buddhism re-established as state religion (political situation remains unstable through the 1990s)

1987-90 - Reduction of Soviet troops in Mongolia from 80,000 to 15,000.

1988 - USSR announces it will withdraw its troops from Afghanistan between May 1988 and February 1989.

E. DISRUPTION: 1989-91

1989

February - Soviet troops complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan. The 10-year war results in the death of 15,000 Soviet troops, 70,000 Afghan soldiers and more than one million Afghan civilians (over five million flee as refugees to Pakistan and Iran).

April 17 - Ban on Polish Solidarity Party lifted.

April-May - Pro-democracy demonstrations in Beijing.

May - Hungary begins to dismantle the fences along its Austrian border.

June 4 - Solidarity Party wins in Polish parliamentary elections.

June 4 - Chinese troops crush student democracy demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square killing over 2,000 unarmed civilians.

Aug-Sept - Approximately 30,000 East Germans leave GDR; most emigrate to West Germany through Hungary.

September - Democracy and civil rights demonstrations violently dispersed by police in GDR.

Oct. 7 - On 40th anniversary of the founding of GDR massive protests disrupt Gorbachev's visit and official celebrations.

Oct. 18 - In GDR, General Secretary of the ruling SED (Socialist Union Party) Erich Honecker resigns. He is replaced by Egon Krenz who attempts to introduce reforms within the socialist system.

Nov. 4 - Largest demonstration in GDR history draws over one million people in East Berlin.

Nov. 9 - East German borders and Berlin Wall opened. More than 200,000 cross from East to West in first two days, and over 11 million GDR travel visas are issued in first two weeks.

Nov. 10 - Bulgarian president Todor Zhivkov deposed; opposition parties tolerated.

Nov. 17-24 - Czechoslovakian Communist party removed from power, inspired by leadership of Vaclav Havel's Civic Forum.

Nov. 28 - FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl presents a ten-point plan for German reunification.

Dec. 6 - SED General Secretary Egon Krenz resigns and is replaced by Gregor Gysi.

Dec. 7 - Open talks between GDR government and opposition parties; elections announced.

December - At summit meeting in Malta Gorbachev and Bush publically declare an end to the Cold War.

Dec. 22 - Brandenburg Gate officially opened in the presence of both GDR and FRG heads of state.

Dec. 20-25 - Democratic "revolution" in Romania. President Ceausescu executed December 26.

Dec. 29 - Vaclav Havel elected Czechoslovakian president.

1990

March - Soviet Parliament authorizes private ownership of the means of production. Subsequent constitutional amendments allow for the succession of Soviet republics, but independence of the Baltic states not recognized by Moscow.

March 18 - Elections in GDR result in a coalition government advocating reunification.

March 25-April 8 - Hungarian elections result in victory for United Democratic Front. Josef Antall takes office May 24.

April 12 - Coalition government takes power in GDR with Lothar de Maiziere as prime minister.

April 24 - Formal German reunification talks begin; Kohl and Maiziere agree on July 1 as date for economic merger.

May 17 - During his visit to the United States Chancellor Kohl is assured of unconditional support for German reunification by president Bush.

May-June - Gorbachev tours Canada and United States.

July 1 - West German mark becomes official currency in both Germanies.

Aug. 31 - German reunification treaty signed. Ratified in FRG's Bundestag by a 442-47 vote and in GDR's Volkskammer 229-101.

- Multiparty elections in Yugoslavian republics result in non-communist governments in Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia.

- Multiparty elections and economic privatization in Mongolia.

Sept. 12 - Treaty signed by the foreign ministers of GDR, FRG, USA, UK, USSR and France officially terminating WW II allies' responsibilities in both Germanies.

Sept. 24 - GDR withdraws from Warsaw Pact.

Sept. 28 - Hungary and USSR agree on withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungarian territory.

Oct. 3 - Official reunification of Germany.

1990-91 - Economic disorganization leads to food shortages and rising crime in USSR; emergency international airlift of food required during winter.

- Gorbachev awarded 1990 Nobel Prize for Peace.

1991 - Gorbachev granted emergency presidential powers to deal with increasing economic, political and ethnic fragmentation; decided swing to authoritarian rule in Soviet politics during late winter and early spring.

1991 - Boris Yeltsin elected president of Russian Federated Soviet Republic.

1991 - Attempted military coup August 19-22 fails to win widespread popular support. Gorbachev re-instated in Moscow, but through his public defiance during the coup Yeltsin emerges as a powerful and charismatic politician.

1991 - On August 24 Gorbachev resigns as general secretary (remains president) and orders the dissolution of the Central Committee.

1991 - Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Ukraine and all three Baltic republics declare independence. New union treaty drafted to secure a "Union of Sovereign States." All but Moldova and the Baltic states express willingness to sign.

1991 - Commonwealth of Independent States formed beginning with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine December 8 and including all former republics but Georgia (due to civil war) by December 21.

1991 - Formal dissolution of the USSR and resignation of Gorbachev as its president December 25.

APPENDIX 2 - THE "SPACE RACE" TIME LINE

- Oct. 1957.....Sputnik I launched (first artificial satellite).
- Nov. 1957.....Sputnik II launched (carries "passenger" Laika).
- Dec. 6, 1957....Vanguard rocket failure.
- Dec. 17, 1957...First American ICBM.
- Jan. 1958.....American Explorer I satellite powered by the
Jupiter-C rocket successfully launched and
recovered (no orbit).
- Oct. 1958.....NASA (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration) established.
- 1958-1961.....Six more Sputnik satellites launched.
- 1959.....After two failures the Luna 3 orbits the Moon and
sends back photographs to USSR.
- Aug. 1960.....First American spy satellite (Corona) is code-
named "Discoverer" and is publically announced as
a research project. After several failed attempts
the "Discoverer 14" provides photographs from 100
miles above USSR.
- April 1961.....Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin becomes first man
in space.
- May 5, 1961.....Alan Shepard becomes first American in space,
completing a 15 minute sub-orbital flight.
- May 25, 1961....JFK: "I believe that this nation should commit
itself to achieving the goal, before the decade
is out, of landing a man on the moon and
returning him safely to the Earth."
- Aug. 1961.....Soviet cosmonaut Gherman Titov spends an entire
day in orbit aboard Vostok 2.
- Feb. 1962.....American astronaut John Glenn completes three
Earth orbits but must control the final two
manually when the craft's autopilot fails.

- April 1962.....First Soviet spy satellite (Zenit) is launched, code-named "Kosmos."
- June 1963.....Soviet cosmonaut Valentina Tereshkova becomes first woman in space.
- March 1965.....Soviet cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov achieves first EVA (spacewalk).
- June 1965.....Edward White aboard Gemini IV achieves first American spacewalk.
- Jan. 1967.....Launch pad fire aboard Apollo I kills all three American astronauts.
- April 1967.....First Soviet Soyuz ("union") spacecraft launched. Modified versions would eventually carry over 100 cosmonauts into space.
- Nov. 1967.....Development of the American Saturn V rocket.
- Sept. 1968.....Soviet craft Zond 5 orbits moon and returns; several more are launched through to 1970.
- Oct. 1968.....Successful test of Apollo VII; first American manned flight since Apollo I disaster.
- Dec. 1968.....Apollo VIII orbits moon.
- Feb. 1969.....Soviet N-1 moon rocket crashes.
- July 1969.....Second N-1 rocket failure.
- July 1969.....Three weeks after the second N-1 failure, Apollo XI successfully lands two American astronauts on the moon. Six more Apollo flights would follow with only XIII failing its mission.
- 1970.....USSR lands robotic rovers on moon; again in 1973.
- April 1971.....USSR launches Salyut, world's first space station. Six more would follow.
- May 1973.....USA launches Skylab space station.
- July 1975.....Apollo-Soyuz link-up for cooperative mission.

APPENDIX 3 - COLD WAR FILM CHRONOLOGY

note: films in categories A and B are listed according to their actual dates of production, those in categories C and D are listed by their frame dates. If frame dates and production dates differ, the latter is provided in parentheses immediately following the film's title.

* = not generally available on videocassette
 ** = virtually impossible to obtain on videocassette
 UK = British production (otherwise American, unless indicated)
 JB = Film of the James Bond series.

A. ESTABLISHMENT: 1948-64

1948 ** *The Iron Curtain* - First true Cold War film concerns the Gouzenko incident, a Russian cipher clerk's defection from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa.

1949 * *Conspirator* - American woman discovers her British army officer husband is a Communist spy. (UK)

1949 * *Guilty of Treason* - A Hungarian cardinal becomes a martyr when convicted of treason.

1949 ** *The Red Danube* - Ballerina on the run from monstrous Communist pursuers.

1949 ** *The Red Menace* - American citizen "menaced" by American Communist sympathizers.

1950 ** *I Married a Communist* (aka *The Woman on Pier 13*) - Man with an unknown past is blackmailed by Communists.

1950 * *The Big Lift* - Experiences of an American pilot during the Western air lift of supplies to West Berlin.

1951 *The Day the Earth Stood Still* - Alien attempts to warn humanity about the dangers of nuclear war.

1951 ** *Five* - Five survivors of nuclear war turn on each other.

1951 ** *Highly Dangerous* - Male American journalist teams up with female British scientist for a spy mission behind the iron curtain. (UK)

1951 ** *I Was a Communist for the FBI* - self-explanatory

1951 ** *The Whip Hand* -

1952 * *Big Jim McLain* - A heroic HUAC investigator goes after Communists lurking in Hawaii.

1952 ** *Invasion USA* - Communists invade the USA, of course.

1952 * *My Son John* - Fear experienced by parents when they suspect their son is a Communist; polemic.

1952 * *Walk East on Beacon* - FBI saves Boston from Communist incursions.

1953 ** *China Venture* - American commandos are sent on a rescue mission in China on the verge of revolution.

1953 ** *The 49th Man* - Atomic bomb smugglers and American spies.

1953 ** *The Man Between* - Black marketeer in Berlin must choose between East and West; choice becomes easier when the woman he loves is kidnapped by the Communists. (UK)

1953 * *Never Let Me Go* - American man marries a Russian ballerina, then attempts to arrange her defection.

1953 ** *Pickup on South Street* - A small-time New York crook discovers his patriotism when he stumbles across a Communist spy ring.

1954 ** *The Bamboo Prison* - American POW in North Korea works as double agent.

1954 ** *Hell and High Water* - Submarine crew travels to Arctic to thwart Communist plot to start World War III.

1954 ** *Tobor the Great* - Evil Communists attempt to steal Tobor, a young boy's robot.

1955 ** *Blood Alley* - Man and woman team smuggle refugees out of Communist China.

1956 * *Flight From Vienna* - Defection from Communist Hungary.

1956 *Invasion of the Body Snatchers* - Residents of a small town are taken over by aliens in their sleep. Widely regarded as a metaphor for the insinuation of domestic Communism.

1956 ** *The Iron Petticoat* - Female Russian officer is romanced by Western bodyguard; remake of 1939's *Ninotchka*. (UK)

1957 ** *Jet Pilot* - American Cold War pilot reforms a female Russian pilot.

1957 * *The Girl in the Kremlin* - American agent in Russia suspects Stalin's death to be a ruse.

1957 ** *The Man Who Wouldn't Talk* - Courtroom drama about a man accused of killing a female spy.

1957 * *Red Nightmare* - Narrated in docu-drama style; polemic cautionary tale of Russia invading USA (re-released in 1984 as *The Commies are Coming, the Commies are Coming*).

1958 * *The Cosmic Man* - Another alien tries to warn us about nuclear war.

1959 ** *The Journey* - Dramatization of 1956 Hungary.

1959 * *On the Beach* - WW III survivors in Australia wait for the inevitable arrival of deadly radioactive fallout.

1960 ** *I Aim at the Stars* - Story of Werner von Braun's life and work for the United States in the space race.

1960 ** *Man on a String* - Communist spy works as a double agent for Americans after being caught by the CIA.

1961

1962 JB01: *Dr. No* (UK)

1962 *The Manchurian Candidate* - Former North Korean POW is conditioned to carry out a political assassination in the United States.

1962 ** *Escape from East Berlin* - East Berliners cross over by tunnelling under the wall. (US/FRG)

1962 * *We'll Bury You* -

1963 JB02: *From Russia with Love* (UK)

1963 * *The Ugly American* - American diplomat in SE Asian country attempts to balance his duties with his friendship for a revolutionary leader.

1964 JB03: *Goldfinger* (UK)

1964 *Dr. Strangelove* - Black comedy on the accidental triggering of World War III. (UK)

1964 *Fail-Safe* - Drama on the accidental triggering of WW III.

1964 *Seven Days in May* - American general plans a military coup to prevent the president from signing a peace treaty with the Soviets.

B. DISSENSUS AND DÉTENTE: 1965-78

1965 JB04: *Thunderball* (UK)

1965 *The Bedford Incident* - Obsessed American destroyer captain tracks Soviet submarines off the coast of Greenland.

1965 *The Ipcress File* - Thief is recruited as CIA agent to investigate the kidnapping and relocation of Western scientists by Communists. First in a series of three films with recurring characters including *Funeral in Berlin* and *Billion Dollar Brain*).

1965 *The Spy Who Came in From the Cold* - A bitter Cold War spy's career comes to an end.

1966 ** *The Liquidator* - MI6 trains a former war hero for an espionage mission. (UK)

1966 * *Funeral in Berlin* - CIA agent travels to East Berlin to assist in defection of high-ranking Soviet official.

1966 * *Our Man Flint* - James Bond wannabe film involving agent's battle against organization attempting to control weather. More dated than the Bond films of the era.

1967 JB05: *You Only Live Twice* (UK)

1967 ** *Billion Dollar Brain* - Former CIA agent must thwart Communist plot for world domination in Finland.

1967 * *Battle Beneath the Earth* - Chinese Communists attempt to invade the United States by tunnelling through the Earth. (UK)

1967 ** *The Double Man* - CIA agent investigates his son's death in East Germany. (UK)

1967 * *In Like Flint* - Sequel to *Our Man Flint*; agent must rescue kidnapped American president from a spy ring composed of beautiful women.

1968 ** *Assignment K* - Secret agent becomes disillusioned by the proliferation of double agents. (UK)

1968 * *The Bamboo Saucer* - American and Soviet officials compete against each other to investigate a possible UFO crash in Communist China.

1968 * *A Dandy in Aspic* - British double agent in Berlin is ordered to kill another spy who happens to be himself. (UK)

1968 ** *Hammerhead* - American agent pursues Communist arch villain. (UK)

1968 * *Ice Station Zebra* - American agent chases Soviet spy while American and Soviet submarines compete to retrieve sensitive military information in the Arctic.

1969 JB06: *On Her Majesty's Secret Service* (UK)

1969 ** *The Girl Who Knew Too Much* - Man is hired by the CIA to investigate an organized crime murder and discovers Communists are trying to take over the mafia.

1969 * *The Looking Glass War* - An AWOL Polish seaman is recruited by two British agents to photograph East German missiles. (UK)

1970 * *The Kremlin Letter* - A false Soviet-American treaty could actually cause World War III.

1971 JB07: *Diamonds are Forever* (UK)

1972 * *Embassy* - American agent eludes Russian counterparts while attempting to smuggle KGB defector out of Middle East. (UK)
 1972 * *Madame Sin* - Female Asian villain kidnaps American agent and plans world domination by stealing nuclear submarines.

1973 JB08: *Live and Let Die* (UK)

1973 * *Innocent Bystanders* - British agent tries to boost his career by rescuing a Russian scientist in Siberia. (UK)
 1973 * *The Mackintosh Man* - American agent attempts to expose Communist spy in prison. (UK)

1974 JB09: *The Man with the Golden Gun* (UK)

1974 *The Black Windmill* - British spy rescues his son from Euro-spy kidnappers. (UK)
 1974 * *The Girl from Petrovka* - Problematic romance between American man and Russian woman.

1975 *The Eiger Sanction* - Former American agent is pressed back into service to hunt down the assassins of another agent.

1976 * *The Front* - McCarthyism in Hollywood black comedy.

1977 JB10: *The Spy Who Loved Me* (UK)

1978

C. RESURGENCE: 1979-88

1979 JB11: *Moonraker* (UK)

1979 *Reds* (1981) - Based on biography of John Reed, journalist who covered the Russian Revolution.

1979 * *Avalanche Express* - CIA agent aids in the defection of a KGB agent by smuggling him out on a train.

1979 ** *The Human Factor* - A disillusioned secret agent hunts down a traitor.

1979 * *Last Embrace* - A CIA agent suffers a mental breakdown and can't tell whether agents are after him or he is just paranoid.

1980 * *Final Assignment* - A Canadian news reporter must escape Russia and the KGB to report on inhumane scientific experiments performed on children. (CAN)

1980 * *Kill Castro* - Fisherman befriends a CIA agent attempting to assassinate Fidel Castro.

1980 * *Berlin Tunnel 21* - (1981) Man attempts escape from East Berlin by burrowing under the wall.

- 1981 JB12: *For Your Eyes Only*
- 1981 * *Condorman* - A cartoonist adopts his comic book superhero persona to aid a beautiful defecting Russian spy. (UK)
- 1981 * *Night Crossing* - East German family attempts to defect to the West in a hot air balloon. (UK)
- 1981 *Firefox* (1982) - Disturbed Vietnam veteran is recruited by joint American-British agencies to infiltrate Soviet Union and steal a new super-plane.
- 1981 *The Right Stuff* (1983) - Fact-based dramatization of the space race focussing on the Mercury astronauts.
- 1982 *2010: The Year We Make Contact* (1984) - Science fiction adventure in the context of pre-WW III tension. Soviet-American cooperation in outer space helps avoid the unthinkable.
- 1982 * *Coming Out of the Ice* - American athlete is finally released from Siberian prison camp after a 38-year stay for not renouncing his American citizenship.
- 1982 * *The Final Option* - American agent must foil takeover of American embassy by radical no-nukes protestors. (UK)
- 1982 *Enigma* (1983) - CIA agents must thwart five KGB agents attempting to assassinate five Soviet dissidents. (UK)
- 1983 JB13: *Octopussy*
- 1983 JB14: *Never Say Never Again*
- 1983 * *Daniel* - Rosenberg trial dramatization.
- 1983 *The Day After* - Depiction of nuclear war aftermath.
- 1983 *Gorky Park* - Moscow policeman fights Kremlin corruption while investigating a murder involving an American businessman.
- 1983 *Wargames* - Eighties spin on Fail-Safe theme; teen accidentally taps into master defence computer and begins the countdown to "global thermonuclear war."
- 1984 * *Another Country* - Young gay man defects to USSR in hopes of better treatment/understanding. (UK)
- 1984 *Cloak and Dagger* - Father and son must save the world from evil spies.
- 1984 * *The Jigsaw Man* - British double agent defects to Russia, undergoes plastic surgery and returns to spy on Britain. (UK)
- 1984 * *Massive Retaliation* - Panic in a small town at the outbreak of World War III.
- 1984 *Red Dawn* - Russian invasion of United States is resisted by a band of Colorado high school students.
- 1984 ** *Thoughts are Free* - Tale of a husband separated from his wife and family by erection of Berlin Wall and their attempts to communicate through the years.

- 1985 **JB15: A View to a Kill**
- 1985 **White Knights** - White Russian ballet dancer/defector meets black American tap dancer/defector. Together they escape the artistically repressive regime.
- 1985 **The Falcon and the Snowman** - Two childhood friends pass American secrets to the Soviet Union; one for his ideals, the other for money.
- 1985 **Gotcha** - American college student studying in Europe becomes involved with German spies.
- 1985 **Invasion, USA** - Soviet-backed terrorists invade Florida forcing a retired CIA agent back into action.
- 1985 **Rocky IV** - After his friend is killed in the ring by a Soviet super-athlete, Rocky agrees to fight him in the USSR.
- 1986 **Born American** - Three young Americans cross into the USSR as a prank and end up prisoners.
- 1986 * **Deadly Recruits** - KGB's recruitment techniques at Oxford University. (UK)
- 1986 **Iron Eagle** - A young pilot rescues his father from behind the Iron Curtain.
- 1986 * **Latino** - Chicano American soldier experiences a crisis of conscience when sent to Nicaragua to aid Contras.
- 1986 **Salvador** - American journalist witnesses the beginning of the Salvadoran civil war and criticizes American "post-Vietnam experience" policy.
- 1987 **JB16: The Living Daylights** (UK)
- 1987 * **Escape from the KGB** - CIA agent infiltrates Russian spaceport.
- 1987 **The Fourth Protocol** - Russian agent assembles an atomic bomb in Britain next to an American air base. (UK)
- 1987 * **Her Secret Life** - Retired female agent quits her job as a schoolteacher to join an undercover mission in Cuba.
- 1987 * **Tailspin (1989)** - Dramatization of American government's reaction to Soviet destruction of Korean Airlines 747.
- 1988 * **The Beast** - Soviet soldier defects from his extremist tank commander and joins the Afghan rebels.
- 1988 * **Bulletproof** - Retired L.A. policeman battles multinational Communist terrorists in Latin America.
- 1988 * **Codename: Kyril** - KGB agent reevaluates his position when he discovers his superiors plan to use him as a scapegoat. (UK)
- 1988 **Iron Eagle II** - American and Soviet pilots team up to raid a Middle Eastern missile base. (CAN)
- 1988 * **Judgement in Berlin** - American judge must decide the fate of East Germans who hijack a Polish plane.

- 1988 *Little Nikita* - American teenager is befriended by CIA agent who informs him his parents are Soviet "sleeper" agents.
- 1988 *Rambo III* - Rambo must rescue his friend and former commander held captive by Soviet helicopter pilot in Afghanistan.
- 1988 *Red Heat* - American and Soviet police officers team up to catch a Russian drug dealer on the loose in Chicago.

D. DISRUPTION: 1989-91

- 1989 *JB17: Licence to Kill* (UK)
- 1989 *The Abyss* - Underwater oil rig workers team up with American Navy Seals to retrieve sunken nuclear weapons before the Soviets.
- 1989 * *Fellow Traveler* - Hollywood blacklisting drama. (US/UK)
- 1989 *The Inner Circle* - (1991) A projectionist shows films for Stalin and slowly becomes disillusioned.
- 1990 *By Dawn's Early Light* - United States and Soviet Union teeter on brink of nuclear war after an accidental missile launch into the USSR.
- 1990 * *The Endless Game* - British agent discovers conspiracy while investigating the death of his lover and fellow agent. (UK)
- 1990 * *Family of Spies* - Dramatization of true story regarding American naval officer who spied for Soviets over two decades.
- 1990 *The Fourth War* - American commander of a base on the Czech border begins his own private war with his Soviet counterpart.
- 1990 *Full Fathom Five* - Central Americans capture an American nuclear submarine and threaten to nuke Texas in retaliation for the Panama invasion.
- 1990 *The Hunt for Red October* - Former American CIA agent must aid a Soviet submarine captain defect and hand over a new super-submarine before it is destroyed by Russian pursuers.
- 1990 *The Russia House* - British book publisher reluctantly works for American and British agencies to establish the validity of secret documents passed to him by a Russian dissident.
- 1990 * *China Cry* - based on autobiography of Nora Lamm and her experiences of the Japanese invasion of China in WW II and the aftermath of the 1949 revolution.
- 1990 *Sneakers* (1992) - Team of misfit American business-spies-for-hire stumble across the ultimate decoder. Neither the Americans nor Russians can be trusted.
- 1990 *Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country* - (1991) The Federation and Klingon Empire tentatively overcome mutual suspicion to establish a new galactic order; obvious allegory of the Cold War's end.

1990 *Company Business* (1991) - CIA agent and ex-KGB agent team up in Berlin to elude both their agencies and uncover shady dealings by both governments.


1991 * *Eminent Domain* - Polish Communist official's attempts to discover why he was fired from his post. Kafkaesque puzzler based on life of the film's scriptwriter Androej Krakowski.

1991 *Guilty By Suspicion* - Hollywood blacklist drama.


1991 *Comrades in Arms* - American and Russian soldiers reluctantly team up to topple the "new world power" of a Columbian drug cartel.

1991 *Back in the USSR* (1992) - Young American visiting Moscow becomes entangled in Russian organized crime ring.


APPENDIX 4 - CODING RESULTS
1. Selected Graphic Representations




01. Number of Main American/Western and Russian/Communist Characters per Film, 1979-88 and 1989-91.




02. Proportion of American/Western Main Characters Judged Sympathetic, Unsympathetic and Ambiguous, 1979-88 and 1989-91.




03. Proportion of Russian/ Communist Main Characters Judged Sympathetic, Unsympathetic and Ambiguous, 1979-88 and 1989-91.




04. Number of American/Western and Russian/Communist Symbols per Film, 1979-88 and 1989-91.




05. Proportion of Threat Types Manifested in Films, 1979-88 and 1989-91.




06. Implied State of East/West Tension in Films (proportional), 1979-88 and 1989-91.




07. Proportion of American/ Western Main Character Types, 1979-88 and 1989-91.



08. Proportion of Russian/ Communist Main Character Types, 1979-88 and 1989-91.



09. Proportional Depiction of American/Western Society, 1979-88 and 1989-91.



10. Proportional Depiction of Russian/Communist Society, 1979-88 and 1989-91.

2. Full Results

01A. NUMBER OF MAIN AMERICAN/WESTERN CHARACTERS PER FILM

1979-88: 2.7

1989-91: 1.4

01B. PROPORTION SYMPATHETIC/UNSYMPATHETIC/AMBIGUOUS

1979-88: 0.76/0.20/0.05

1989-91: 0.53/0.35/0.12

02A. NUMBER OF MAIN RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST CHARACTERS PER FILM

1979-88: 1.2

1989-91: 0.9

02B. PROPORTION SYMPATHETIC/UNSYMPATHETIC/AMBIGUOUS

1979-88: 0.24/0.65/0.11

1989-91: 0.64/0.18/0.18

03A. NUMBER OF MINOR AMERICAN/WESTERN CHARACTERS PER FILM

1979-88: 4.8

1989-91: 4.6

03B. PROPORTION SYMPATHETIC/UNSYMPATHETIC/AMBIGUOUS

1979-88: 0.79/0.16/0.05

1989-91: 0.40/0.45/0.15

04A. NUMBER OF MINOR RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST CHARACTERS PER FILM

1979-88: 1.0

1989-91: 2.2

04B. PROPORTION SYMPATHETIC/UNSYMPATHETIC/AMBIGUOUS

1979-88: 0.33/0.63/0.03

1989-91: 0.46/0.35/0.19

05A. NUMBER OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS PER FILM

1979-88: 5.2

1989-91: 3.1

05B. NUMBER OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS PER FILM

1979-88: 4.4

1989-91: 3.8

06A. THREAT TYPE 1979-88

| | | |
|---|----|-------|
| a) World War III..... | 18 | (.42) |
| b) limited war..... | 5 | (.12) |
| c) national security compromise/strategic disadvantage...10 | | (.23) |
| d) Communist/foreign incursions..... | 3 | (.07) |
| e) defection to the East..... | 2 | (.05) |
| f) terrorism..... | 3 | (.07) |
| g) other..... | 2 | (.05) |

06B. THREAT TYPE 1989-91

| | | |
|--|---|-------|
| a) World War III..... | 4 | (.25) |
| b) limited war..... | 1 | (.06) |
| c) national security compromise/strategic disadvantage...5 | | (.31) |
| d) Communist/foreign incursions..... | 0 | (.00) |
| e) defection to the East..... | 0 | (.00) |
| f) terrorism..... | 2 | (.13) |
| g) other..... | 4 | (.25) |

07A. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION 1979-88

| | | |
|-------------------|----|-------|
| a) high..... | 18 | (.60) |
| b) moderate..... | 07 | (.23) |
| c) low..... | 02 | (.07) |
| d) ambiguous..... | 03 | (.10) |

07B. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION 1989-91

| | | |
|-------------------|----|-------|
| a) high..... | 01 | (.09) |
| b) moderate..... | 02 | (.18) |
| c) low..... | 04 | (.36) |
| d) ambiguous..... | 04 | (.36) |

08A. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS 1979-88

| | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| a) uniform..... | 47 |
| b) wealth/consumerism..... | 40 |
| c) attitude towards communism..... | 28 |
| d) conspicuous "freedom"..... | 53 |
| e) cultural knowledge..... | 32 |
| f) other..... | 05 |
| signs per character..... | 205/82 = 2.50 |

08B. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS 1989-91

| | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 03 |
| b) wealth/consumerism..... | 08 |
| c) attitude towards communism..... | 03 |
| d) conspicuous "freedom"..... | 07 |
| e) cultural knowledge..... | 06 |
| f) other..... | 01 |
| signs per character..... | 28/17 = 1.65 |

09A. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS 1979-88

| | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|
| a) uniform..... | 51 |
| b) wealth/consumerism..... | 25 |
| c) attitude towards communism..... | 37 |
| d) conspicuous "freedom"..... | 24 |
| e) cultural knowledge..... | 09 |
| f) other..... | 02 |
| signs per character..... | 148/144 = 1.03 |

09B. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS 1989-91

| | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 06 |
| b) wealth/consumerism..... | 03 |
| c) attitude towards communism..... | 05 |
| d) conspicuous "freedom"..... | 04 |
| e) cultural knowledge..... | 01 |
| f) other..... | 02 |
| signs per character..... | 21/17 = 1.24 |

10A. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS 1979-88

| | |
|--|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 08 |
| b) poverty/lack of consumer goods..... | 12 |
| c) attitude towards capitalism..... | 11 |
| d) conspicuous oppression..... | 08 |
| e) speech patterns..... | 28 |
| f) stereotypical food/drink..... | 10 |
| g) cultural ignorance..... | 09 |
| h) emotional extremes..... | 11 |
| i) other..... | 02 |
| signs per character..... | 99/37 = 2.68 |

10B. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS 1989-91

| | |
|--|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 05 |
| b) poverty/lack of consumer goods..... | 04 |
| c) attitude towards capitalism..... | 01 |
| d) conspicuous oppression..... | 03 |
| e) speech patterns..... | 08 |
| f) stereotypical food/drink..... | 05 |
| g) cultural ignorance..... | 04 |
| h) emotional extremes..... | 01 |
| i) other..... | 00 |
| signs per character..... | 31/11 = 2.82 |

11A. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS 1979-88

| | |
|--|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 06 |
| b) poverty/lack of consumer goods..... | 09 |
| c) attitude towards capitalism..... | 04 |
| d) conspicuous oppression..... | 06 |
| e) speech patterns..... | 22 |
| f) stereotypical food/drink..... | 06 |
| g) cultural ignorance..... | 05 |
| h) emotional extremes..... | 07 |
| i) other..... | 02 |
| signs per character..... | 67/30 = 2.23 |

11B. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS 1989-91

| | |
|--|--------------|
| a) uniform..... | 11 |
| b) poverty/lack of consumer goods..... | 07 |
| c) attitude towards capitalism..... | 03 |
| d) conspicuous oppression..... | 05 |
| e) speech patterns..... | 20 |
| f) stereotypical food/drink..... | 07 |
| g) cultural ignorance..... | 04 |
| h) emotional extremes..... | 04 |
| i) other..... | 00 |
| signs per character..... | 61/26 = 2.35 |

12A. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN 1979-88 (n = 82)

| | |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| a) politician/bureaucrat..... | 16 (.20) |
| b) soldier/military officer..... | 23 (.28) |
| c) scientist..... | 10 (.12) |
| d) spy/agent..... | 17 (.21) |
| e) criminal..... | 02 (.02) |
| f) private citizen..... | 13 (.16) |
| g) defector..... | 01 (.01) |

12B. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN 1989-91 (n = 17)

| | |
|----------------------------------|----------|
| a) politician/bureaucrat..... | 01 (.06) |
| b) soldier/military officer..... | 07 (.41) |
| c) scientist..... | 00 (.00) |
| d) spy/agent..... | 02 (.12) |
| e) criminal..... | 00 (.00) |
| f) private citizen..... | 07 (.41) |
| g) defector..... | 00 (.00) |

13A. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST 1979-88 (n = 37)

| | | |
|----------------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) politician/bureaucrat..... | .08 | (.22) |
| b) soldier/military officer..... | .09 | (.24) |
| c) scientist..... | .03 | (.08) |
| d) spy/agent..... | .07 | (.19) |
| e) criminal..... | .02 | (.05) |
| f) private citizen..... | .05 | (.14) |
| g) defector..... | .03 | (.08) |

13B. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST 1989-91 (n = 11)

| | | |
|----------------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) politician/bureaucrat..... | .02 | (.18) |
| b) soldier/military officer..... | .04 | (.36) |
| c) scientist..... | .01 | (.09) |
| d) spy/agent..... | .01 | (.09) |
| e) criminal..... | .01 | (.09) |
| f) private citizen..... | .02 | (.18) |
| g) defector..... | .00 | (.00) |

14A. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY 1979-88 (n = 26)

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) extremely positive..... | .07 | (.27) |
| b) generally positive..... | .10 | (.38) |
| c) ambiguous..... | .06 | (.23) |
| d) generally negative..... | .03 | (.12) |
| e) extremely negative..... | .00 | (.00) |

14B. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY 1989-91 (n = 12)

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) extremely positive..... | .00 | (.00) |
| b) generally positive..... | .03 | (.25) |
| c) ambiguous..... | .06 | (.50) |
| d) generally negative..... | .03 | (.25) |
| e) extremely negative..... | .00 | (.00) |

15A. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY 1979-88 (n = 22)

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) extremely positive..... | .00 | (.00) |
| b) generally positive..... | .02 | (.09) |
| c) ambiguous..... | .04 | (.18) |
| d) generally negative..... | .10 | (.45) |
| e) extremely negative..... | .06 | (.27) |

15B. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY 1989-91 (n = 11)

| | | |
|----------------------------|-----|-------|
| a) extremely positive..... | .00 | (.00) |
| b) generally positive..... | .00 | (.00) |
| c) ambiguous..... | .07 | (.64) |
| d) generally negative..... | .04 | (.36) |
| e) extremely negative..... | .00 | (.00) |

16A. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES 1979-88

| | |
|--|----|
| a) America is inherently more moral/virtuous than Russia.... | 06 |
| b) Russians are not like "us" and/or not fully human..... | 11 |
| c) The Russians cannot be trusted..... | 10 |
| d) Communist citizens live in fear and ignorance..... | 09 |
| e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control..... | 07 |
| f) Communism is an insidious force within America..... | 03 |
| g) Russia will not stop before world communism..... | 06 |
| h) America has allowed itself to become weak..... | 08 |
| i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not the people..... | 10 |
| j) Soviet Union is actively racist/intolerant..... | 02 |

consistencies per film.....72/30 = 2.40

16B. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES 1989-91

| | |
|--|----|
| a) America is inherently more moral/virtuous than Russia.... | 00 |
| b) Russians are not like "us" and/or not fully human..... | 02 |
| c) The Russians cannot be trusted..... | 03 |
| d) Russian citizens live in fear and ignorance..... | 01 |
| e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control..... | 03 |
| f) Communism is an insidious force within America..... | 00 |
| g) Russia will not stop before world communism..... | 01 |
| h) America has allowed itself to become weak..... | 01 |
| i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not the people..... | 05 |
| j) Russian state is actively racist/intolerant..... | 01 |

consistencies per film.....17/12 = 1.42

APPENDIX 5 - ESTABLISHMENT CODING AND CLOSE READING

STEP 1

01. FILM TITLE: *Fail-Safe*
02. SUB-GENRE: international intrigue/political thriller
03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: United States
04. RELEASE DATE: 1964
05. FRAME DATE: 1962
06. CHROMATICS: black and white film
07. MEDIUM: theatrical release, later video release
08. STUDIO: Columbia
09. PRODUCER: Max E. Youngstein
10. DIRECTOR: Sidney Lumet
11. SCREENPLAY: Walter Bernstein
12. SOURCE: novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler

13. MAJOR CHARACTERS:
 - 13A: American, sympathetic (American President = PR)
 - 13B: American, sympathetic (General Black = BL)
 - 13C: American, somewhat unsympathetic (Prof. Groeteschele = GO)

14. MINOR CHARACTERS:
 - 14A: American, sympathetic (General Bogan = BG)
 - 14B: American, sympathetic (translator Buck = BU)
 - 14C: American, sympathetic (Defense Secretary Swenson = SW)
 - 14D: American, sympathetic (bomber pilot Colonel Grady = GA)
 - 14E: American, unsympathetic (Colonel Cascio = CA)
 - 14F: American, neutral (electronics specialist Mr. Knapp = KN)
 - 14G: American, unsympathetic (Mr. Foster = FS)
 - 14H: American, sympathetic (Congressman Raskoh)

15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:
 - 15A: military uniforms
 - 15B: military equipment
 - 15C: military organization
 - 15D: New York City skyline and street scenes

16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS: none

17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: pro-American, mildly anti-Soviet

STEP 2

00. FILM TITLE/FRAME DATE: *Fail-Safe*, 1962
01. THREAT TYPE: a) WW III
02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION: a) high
03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:
- 03.1 American President
e) cultural knowledge
- 03.2 General Black
a) uniform
d) conspicuous freedoms
e) cultural knowledge
- 03.3 Prof. Groeteschele
b) wealth/consumerism
c) attitude towards Communism
d) conspicuous freedoms
e) cultural knowledge
04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:
- 04.1 General Bogan
a) uniform
c) attitude towards Communism
- 04.2 Buck
d) conspicuous freedoms
e) cultural knowledge
- 04.3 Secretary Swenson
c) attitude towards Communism
d) conspicuous freedoms
- 04.4 Colonel Grady
a) uniform
c) attitude towards Communism
d) conspicuous freedoms

04.5 Colonel Cascio

- a) uniform
- c) attitude towards Communism

04.6 Mr. Knapp

- d) conspicuous freedoms

05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTER: none

06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTER: none

07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN:

07.1 American President: a) politician/bureaucrat

07.2 General Black: b) soldier/military officer

07.3 Prof. Groeteschele: c) scientist

08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST: none

09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY: b) generally positive

10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY: d) generally negative

11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES:

- a) America is inherently more moral/virtuous than Russia
- b) Russians are "not like us" and/or not fully human
- c) The Russians cannot be trusted
- e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control
- g) Russia will not stop until world Communism is established
- i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not common people

CLOSE READING - Fail-Safe

The first image/information seen is white on black text:

"New York City, 5:30 a.m." Immediately we cut to a large open air sporting arena where a bullfight is in progress. Obviously this is not New York City at 5:30 a.m., a certain spatial-temporal and thus psychological discontinuity is established immediately. The matador is finishing off the bull, a man watches in distraught fascination in the stands, his figure brighter and distinctive; he is in the audience but not of the audience. An urgent high-pitched noise is heard in the background. As the bull dies we discover it is a dream. The dreamer awakes, and as the opening credits are superimposed he leaves his bed, checks on his children, and tells his wife the dream is recurring. He believes the dream will leave him if he resigns from his (unknown to us at present) job. We are in New York City at 5:30 a.m. after all.

"Washington, D.C., 5:30 a.m." Cut to a cocktail party where political science professor Groeteschele (GO) debates the hard realities of nuclear war. He speaks of "acceptable losses" in the tens of millions and the survival of an American rather than Russian culture. He is something of a dashing, cynical figure of obvious intellectual prowess and his exposition entertains the guests. He seems to win an argument with a less appealing character:

GO: I say every war, including thermonuclear war must have a winner and a loser. Which would you rather be?

FS: In nuclear war everybody loses. War isn't what it used to be.

GO: It's still the resolution of economic and political conflict. [...] I'm not a poet, I'm a political scientist, one who would rather have an American culture survive than a Russian one.

"Omaha, Neb., 5:30 a.m." Cut to CA receiving phone call, has to go into town, off the military base he is on. GB calls after he leaves, gets address and goes to intercept CA. Finds CA in a bitter dispute with his alcoholic parents. They leave for the base in a socially awkward silence, covered up with shop talk.

"Anchorage, Alaska, 5:30 a.m." Cut to Alaska base with pilots relaxing, discussing increasing automation in air force, including the "new breed" of young pilots.

P1: Look at those kids. Remember the crews you had on the 24s? Jews, Italians, all kinds, you could tell them apart, they were people. These kids, you open 'em up you find they run on transistors.

Cut to scene of jets taking off in the early dawn light. Cut to Omaha war room nerve centre, where tracking methods of plane and sub movements on both sides are being demonstrated for a visiting official. He is concerned with the dangers of automation: "The only thing that everyone can agree on is that no one's responsible." The control centre is sterile, precise and impressive looking. An alarm sounds to indicate a UFO near Hudson Bay. There is an explanation of plane routes to fail-safe

positions.

Meanwhile GO is giving a lecture on limited nuclear war to officers at the Pentagon. Now-familiar Cold War arguments on whether a nuclear war can be controlled or won. The concept of disarmament is shrugged aside as ridiculous. GO's comments become more hawkish. He is still a persuasive and eloquent speaker, but his position is beginning to sound reckless. His opposing voice at the lecture is BL who feels events are spinning out of control.

There is still no identification on the UFO over northern Quebec. Concern is increasing, but not panic. The American bombers reach their fail-safe positions as the war room goes to the next stage of readiness. The bombers hold position. The UFO is moving south into Ontario. The next stage of readiness is proclaimed (here coded by colour: blue-yellow-green-red, as precursors to the Def-Con number system). It is confirmed as non-hostile just north of Toronto. There is no mention of the concept of Canadian air space. There is an unknown and presumably minor malfunction in the control room.

Cut to pilots in bomber receiving coded transmission, interference prevents communication with Omaha. They verify the code's authenticity and open their sealed orders which contain one word: Moscow.

In Omaha they notice the bomber group moving towards Russian air space and realize it is a mistake. They contact the president (PR), who calls in an interpreter Buck (BU). PR is calm and efficient, very presidential. He goes through procedures with Omaha over the phone, calls Secretary of Defense Swenson at the Pentagon, and asks for opinions on shooting down the bombers. BL favours it, GO is opposed. PR calls BO in Omaha and gives the order. The American fighters have little chance of catching up with the bombers and if they do they will not have enough fuel to return. Colonel Cassio (CA) reluctantly speaks to the fighter pilots and they take up the pursuit. PR sets up a conference line to discuss other options if the fighters can't shoot down the bombers.

Mr. Knapp of Amalgamated Electronics (KN): The more complex an electronic system gets, the more accident prone it is. Sooner or later it breaks down.

SW: What breaks down?

KN: A transistor blows, a condenser burns out, sometimes they just get tired, like people.

GO: Mr. Knapp overlooks one factor, the machines are supervised by humans. Even if the machine fails, a human being can always correct the mistake.

KN: I wish you were right. The fact is, the machines work so fast, they are so intricate, the mistakes they make are so subtle, that very often a human being just can't know whether a machine is lying or telling the truth.

[...]

GO: I think if our bombers get through, the Russians will surrender. The Russian aim is to dominate the world. They think that Communism must succeed eventually if the Soviet Union is left reasonably intact. They know that a war would leave the Soviet Union utterly destroyed therefore they would surrender.

CA: But suppose they feel they could knock us off first?

GO: They know we might have a doomsday system, missiles that would go into action days, even weeks after a war is over and destroy an enemy even after that enemy has already destroyed us.

BL: Maybe they think that even capitalists aren't that insane to want to kill after they themselves have been killed.

GO: These are Marxist fanatics, not normal people. They do not reason the way you reason General Black. They are not motivated by human emotions such as rage and pity. They are calculating machines. They will look at the balance sheet and they will see they cannot win.

SW: Then you suggest doing what?

GO: Nothing. The Russians will surrender and the threat of Communism will be over, forever.

CA: That's a lot of hogwash. Don't kid yourself, there'll be Russian generals who'll react just as I would. The best defense is a good offence. They see trouble coming up take my word for it they'll attack and they won't give a damn what Marx said.

GO: Mr. Secretary I am convinced that the moment the Russians know bombs will fall on Moscow they will surrender. They know that whatever they do then they cannot escape destruction. Don't you see sir, this is our chance. We would never have made the first move deliberately but Group Six has made it for us by accident. We must take advantage of it, history demands it. We must advise the president not to recall those planes.

The fighters fail to reach the bombers and crash into the Arctic Ocean. PR is told the odds are good one or two bombers will get through to Moscow. He decides to call the Soviet Premier (PE), and asks BU to pay attention to voice inflections,

emotional tones, etc. PR informs PE of the accident. He is not initially convinced, but seems reasonable. They have the beginning of a bond when PE realizes PR personally gave the order for the fighters to chase down the bombers:

PE through BU: We saw your planes fall into the sea. I wanted only to hear your explanation, and whether it was done at your own order. It is a hard thing to order men to their deaths, is it not?

PE calls back later, reports only one confirmed kill. BU notes he is more subdued. There are tight close-up shots on the PR's eyes and mouth, heightening the sense of urgency and the importance of each word. PE relays his generals' suspicions. Much discussion on the need for trust, PE admits they jammed radio signals. PR asks why they jammed it this time:

PE: We have computers like yours. They computed that this time your alert might be real.

PR: On what grounds?

PE: Probability, the law of averages. They have their own logic. It is not human, but it is positive, so we listen.

PR convinces PE to lift jamming to he can speak to Group Six commander Colonel Grady (GA) and orders BO to find GA's wife. PR orders a return but Grady refuses. PR advises PE to leave Moscow in case it's bombed. In the control centre GO advises a first strike:

SW: We don't go in for sneak attacks. We had that done to us at Pearl Harbor.

GO: And the Japanese were right to do it. From their point of view we were their mortal enemy, as long as we existed we were a deadly threat to them. Their only mistake was that they failed to finish us at the start and they paid for that mistake at Hiroshima.

SW: You're talking about a different kind of war.

GO: Exactly. This time we can finish what we start. And if we act now, right now, our casualties will be minimal.

BL: Do you know what you're saying?

GO: Do you believe that Communism is not our mortal enemy?

BL: You're justifying murder.

GO: Yes, to keep from being murdered.

BL: In the name of what? To preserve what? Even if we do survive what are we? Better than what we say they are? What gives us the right to live then? What makes us worth surviving, Groeteschele? That we are ruthless enough to strike first?

GO: Yes! Those who can survive are the only ones worth surviving.

BL: Fighting for your life isn't the same as murder.

GO: Where do you draw the line once you know what the enemy is? How long would the Nazis have kept it up General if every Jew they came after had met them with a gun in his hand? But I learned from them General Black, oh, I learned.

BL: You learned too well, professor. You learned so well that now there's no difference between you and what you want to kill.

PR contacts BL, reminds him of the story of Abraham's sacrifice in the Old Testament, tells him to keep it in mind, and orders him to Andrews Air Force base. PR activates the touch phone between BO and Soviet command. PR goes on public address for both Americans and Russians to hear. He cautions that his

orders must be obeyed without question. He orders Americans to cooperate in any way in helping to shoot down the planes, and that they must share information with the Russians. CA can't bring himself to share information; a Sergeant must do it, but reluctantly. They all feel dirty sharing secrets on how to destroy missiles and planes. CA still thinks it's a trap and tries to convince BO. He becomes more agitated and demands a first strike. BO tells him he is talking treason. CA tries to take command of the base, saying BO is unbalanced. MPs take him away as he raves about betrayal and his alcoholic parents. BO apologizes for the delay to Soviet Marshall Yevsky (MY).

MY: I was aware of your difficulty Gen Bogan. We have had such problems ourselves.

PE calls PR, both ambassadors are on the line as well. PR informs PE of his plan. As soon as Moscow is hit, so will New York; bombed by BL. There is stunned silence from the Americans, acceptance from PE, who sees it as the only possibility.

Cut to GA. There are only two planes remaining, 14 minutes from Moscow. MY orders his planes to chase after a decoy despite BO's warning. MY collapses after knowing he allowed a bomber to get through. They bring in GA's wife to talk to him. She fails, on the verge of hysteria. In the control centre, all know it's a matter of time now. GO is more subdued and turns his efforts to planning a salvage operation of important corporate documents

from the coming New York wreckage. PE calls PR, tells him the offensive missiles have stood down and only the Moscow defensive systems are active. The odds are very slim that the bomber will be shot down.

PE: And yet, this was nobody's fault.

PR: I don't agree.

PE: No human being did wrong. No one is to be blamed.

PR: We're to blame, both of us. We let our machines get out of hand.

PE: Still, it was an accident.

PR: Two great cities may be destroyed, millions of innocent people killed. What do we say to them, Mr. Chairman, "accidents will happen?" I won't accept that.

PE: All I know is that as long as we have weapons...

PR: [interrupting] All I know is that men are responsible, we're responsible for what happens to us. Today we had a taste of the future. Do we learn from it or do we go on the way we have? What do we do, Mr. Chairman? What do we say to the dead?

PE: I think if we are men we must say this will not happen again. But do you think it possible, with all that stands between us?

PR: We put it there, Mr. Chairman and we're not helpless. What we put between us we can remove.

The American Ambassador in Moscow reports in, then we hear the shrill sound of the telephone melting. Moscow is destroyed. PR contacts BL, tells him to drop the bombs on New York. BL tells others in the plane he will do the bombing personally. Cut to scenes of New Yorkers going about their daily life. BL flips the

switch, removes something from his uniform, perhaps a cyanide capsule? He mutters about his bullfight dream: "the matador, the matador, me, me" and dies. The last moments are of the different New York scenes with the camera zooming in then freezing on each scene in succession. The film ends with a statement on screen:

The producers of this film wish to stress that it is the stated position of the Department of Defense and the United States air force that a rigidly enforced system of safeguards and controls insure that occurrences such as those depicted in this story cannot happen.

APPENDIX 6 - DISSENSUS AND DÉTENTE CODING AND CLOSE READING

STEP 1

01. FILM TITLE: *The Spy Who Loved Me*
02. SUB-GENRE: action/adventure
03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: UK
04. RELEASE DATE: 1977
05. FRAME DATE: 1977
06. CHROMATICS: colour film
07. MEDIUM: theatrical release, later video release
08. STUDIO: United Artists
09. PRODUCER: Albert R. Broccoli
10. DIRECTOR: Lewis Gilbert
11. SCREENPLAY: Christopher Wood and Richard Maibaum
12. SOURCE: Adapted from Ian Fleming's original 1967 novel

13. MAJOR CHARACTERS:
 - 13A: James Bond: British, sympathetic
 - 13B: Agent XXX: Russian, sympathetic

14. MINOR CHARACTERS:
 - 14A: Stromberg: unknown nationality, unsympathetic
 - 14B: General Gogol: Russian, sympathetic
 - 14C: Jaws: unknown nationality, unsympathetic
 - 14D: Sandor: unknown nationality, unsympathetic
 - 14E: M: British, sympathetic
 - 14F: Naomi: unknown nationality, generally unsympathetic
 - 14G: Commander Carter: American, sympathetic

15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:
 - 15A: military equipment
 - 15B: military uniforms
 - 15C: British flag

16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS:
 - 16A: Moscow skyline
 - 16B: military uniforms
 - 16C: military equipment
 - 16D: red star

17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: decidedly détente

STEP 2

00. **FILM TITLE/FRAME DATE: *The Spy Who Loved Me*/1977**
01. **THREAT TYPE:**
- a) WW III
 - c) national security compromise/strategic disadvantage
02. **IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION: c) low**
03. **SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:**
- n/a: British main character
04. **SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:**
- 04.1: Commander Carter
- a) uniform
05. **SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:**
- 05.1: Agent XXX
- a) uniform
 - c) attitude towards capitalism
 - e) speech patterns
06. **SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:**
- 06.1: General Gogol
- e) speech patterns
07. **MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN: d) spy/agent**
08. **MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST: d) spy/agent**
09. **DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY: b) generally positive**
10. **DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY: b) generally positive**
11. **THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES:**
- e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control
 - i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not common people

CLOSE READING - *The Spy Who Loved Me*

The film's first shot is of the British nuclear submarine *Ranger* in routine setting. Suddenly vibrations are felt, alarms go off and systems begin to fluctuate. Cut to a British admiral on a red phone who receives the news that "we've lost one of our nuclear submarines." Cut to Moscow, with brief glimpse of skyline. General Gogol (GG) is receiving similar news on his own red phone about the submarine *Potemkin*. He calls for his "best agent" code-named "triple X," in the best tradition of Bond film female names (*Pussy Galore*, *Dr. Goodhead*, etc.) She is on leave with her lover, another agent, who must soon leave for his assignment in Austria. The signal to call her in is initiated by a music box playing "Lara's Theme" from *Dr. Zhivago*, a Western movie about the Russian revolution. Cut to the British secret service ministry calling in their "best agent" code-named 007. Bond, like *XXX*, is in the arms of his lover (though his relationship is undoubtedly more casual) during a break in his assignment in Austria. At this point the film is less than five minutes old and no less than four specific, obvious Anglo-Soviet parallels have been presented. The "ethos of détente" has already fairly saturated the proceedings.

JB is called away and leaves his lover and lodge, leisurely skiing away. He is soon pursued by four skiers with guns, one of

whom we recognize as XXX's lover. He is killed by JB who eludes his remaining pursuers with style and daring, skiing off a cliff before popping a parachute sporting a Union Jack design. The scene blends into the standard opening credits presentation of naked silhouettes accompanied by the film's theme song "Nobody Does it Better" performed by Carly Simon (one of the more popular Bond songs).

XXX reports to GG looking beautiful but dutiful in her tight military uniform. He sends her to Cairo to investigate the missing submarine and expresses sincere regret at reporting the death of her lover, exposing the human, compassionate side of the KGB. XXX vows to avenge her lover's death.

Cut to JB meeting with Q, the Minister of Defence and high ranking naval officers. They speculate that the Russians have found a way to track their submarines which would "totally undermine our Western defence strategy" and that someone in Cairo is attempting to sell the tracking system. It is confirmed that the *Ranger* carried 16 *Polaris* nuclear missiles that must be retrieved.

Cut to an opulent dining room where Stromberg (ST) and his female assistant are bidding farewell to the two scientists who developed the tracking system for them. ST confirms that they have been paid \$10 million each, then informs them there is a

traitor in their midst. He dismisses his assistant ostensibly so that she need not hear the details. However, the elevator she steps into deposits her in a pool with a hungry shark. As Mozart plays in the background she is devoured in front of ST and the two scientists. They leave in a helicopter that explodes, saving ST \$20 million. We see his impressive underwater home and laboratory rise from the ocean floor. ST brings out two of his henchmen, Sandor (SA) and Jaws (JA), and instructs them to retrieve a missing microfilm of the tracking system. JA is the senior partner of the two; he is very large and possesses metal teeth.

Cut to JB dressed in bedouin clothing riding a camel across the desert to meet his contact. In a splendid tent filled with food, wine and beautiful women he is informed that he must meet a man named Fekkesh (who will eventually lead him to Max Kalba), and is persuaded to accept the "hospitality" of a suitably subservient harem woman. Cut to JB the following day in his tailored Western suit wandering the streets of Cairo. We see minarets and hear a call to prayer in Arabic, heightening the contrast between JB and his surroundings. JB enters the home of Fekkesh and is greeted by a beautiful woman whom JB suspects is purposefully delaying him. They embrace and kiss, and she notices SA at an adjacent window about to shoot JB. Apparently one kiss

is enough to convert her as she shouts "no!" and spins around in order to take the bullet herself. JB chases SA, a brief fight ensues, SA tells JB that Fekkesh is at the pyramids. JB arrives at the pyramids just before dawn where hundreds of tourists are waiting patiently for the sunrise. Fekkesh is speaking with XXX. He excuses himself for a moment and is chased and killed by JA who finds an address for Max Kalba (MK). JB follows JA (and is followed in turn by XXX) but is too late to save the life of Fekkesh. It seems his only purpose in the film is to demonstrate that JA prefers to kill his victims by biting their necks.

Cut to JB in his tuxedo, XXX in her low-cut evening gown at an Egyptian nightclub. JB approaches her and reveals that he knows her identity. XXX reveals that she also knows all about JB, down to the "shaken not stirred" vodka martinis. JB leaves her to find MK who owns the club. XXX follows. They both assume MK can sell them the tracking system microfilm and compete to bid for it. MK shows them the microfilm then leaves to take an urgent phone call. It is a trap and JA takes the device before killing MK in the telephone cubicle. JB discovers MK's body and callously tosses an "out of order" sign on it. JA leaves in a telephone service van with JB and XXX stowing away in the back. JA knows they are there and listens to their conversation as he drives into the desert. They stop in an ancient abandoned village and

follow JA through the ruins but lose track of him. JA attacks JB and demonstrates his superior strength before XXX pulls out her gun and grabs the microfilm. XXX tries to abandon JB but he had earlier lifted the van keys. As the two of them attempt to flee JA systematically tears the van apart. They finally escape although their vehicle eventually breaks down. As they prepare to trek through the desert the theme from Lawrence of Arabia is heard. On board a merchant's skiff that floats them down the Nile to Cairo, JB uses his handy microfilm reader to authenticate their prize. XXX, who had been very professional and rather cold towards JB previously, finally succumbs to his charms as the sunset sets the Nile sparkling. It is, alas, short-lived. After a few kisses she drugs JB with the knock-out gas from her cigarette.

JB awakens in a Cairo marketplace without XXX or the microfilm. He makes his way to another set of spectacular, silent ruins that happen to contain a secret service office within. He casually greets Money Penny, proceeds to the inner office and is alarmed to find GG waiting there. Soon M and XXX enter:

M: Our respective governments have agreed to pool our resources to find out what happened to our submarines.

GG: We have entered a new era of Anglo-Soviet cooperation and as a sign of Russian good faith I am prepared to make available to you the microfilm recovered by agent XXX.

JB reveals that the microfilm is missing the vital technical

information they need. They decide to see if Q can help them examine it for clues. As M and GG walk the halls they are painfully civil to each other:

Q: After you, Alexis.

GG: Oh no, no, no. After you, Miles.

Q: Oh, thank you.

They find Q hard at work with his latest gadgets, all being tested on figures dressed in traditional Arab clothing. They examine the microfilm and find a partial symbol of ST's company. JB and XXX compete to look the most knowledgeable for their superiors:

GG: "oratory" - what is that?

JB: It's another word for chapel.

Q: Looks a bit like a Bishop's miter.

XXX: It is a fish. That is the symbol of the Stromberg shipping line.

Q: Karl Stromberg? Why he's one of the richest men in the world.

XXX: One of the principal capitalist exploiters of the West.

JB: Sir, it's not "oratory" it's "laboratory." Stromberg has a marine research laboratory. On Corsica, I believe.

M: Well done, James.

XXX: Actually, sir, it is in Sardinia.

GG: [laughs] That's brilliant. I am certain two such perceptive talents will enjoy working together in Sardinia. It will help to make Anglo-Soviet cooperation a reality.

Cut to JB and XXX on a train, finding their sleeper cars. JB suggests a drink but XXX refuses. They begin changing into their bedclothes in adjoining cars, both keenly aware of the other's presence through the wall, but neither willing to make the first move. As XXX opens her closet she discovers JA and screams. JB runs in and once again JA demonstrates his strength, tossing JB about effortlessly. JB smashes a table lamp and touches the exposed wires to JA's metal teeth allowing him the opportunity to kick JA out the train window. Finally JB and XXX get around to the inevitability sexual Anglo-Soviet cooperation.

On their arrival Q delivers JB's car (a white Lotus). Naomi (NA), a beautiful young woman, arrives at their hotel to bring them to ST. JB and XXX are travelling as a marine biologist and his wife/assistant, Mr. and Mrs. Sterling. They boat out to his laboratory and JB meets with ST alone. ST shows JB his model for a vast underwater city, but their meeting is a brief one.

Downstairs JB finds NA and XXX:

XXX: Darling, you should look at this model, it's beautiful.

NA: This is the *Liparus*, the latest edition to the Stromberg fleet. Launched nine months ago, at over a millions tons it's the largest tanker in the world.

XXX: After the *Karl Marx*, of course.

JB: Really, darling? It's amazing the items of information you store away.

ST meets with JA (looking quite recovered from falling off the

train), reveals that he knows they are agents and instructs JA to kill them once they are on shore. In their Lotus JB and XXX elude attempts from an unknown assassin on a motorcycle, JA in a car, NA in a helicopter, and more anonymous killers once they dive into the ocean and convert the Lotus to a sleek mini-sub. Back in their hotel XXX finally discovers that JB was the one who killed her lover. She vows to will JB once their mission is completed.

Cut to JB and XXX boarding an American submarine where they meet the commanding officer Commander Carter (CC). They plan to destroy ST's laboratory but soon meet the same fate as the other submarines: they are captured by ST's supertanker as it opens up its bow and "swallows" the craft whole. The crew is taken prisoner while JB and XXX are brought before ST. In a standard Bond film scene ST reveals his typical plan for world domination. The captured submarines will be programmed to fire their nuclear missiles and begin World War III:

ST: At 12 noon they will have reached firing positions. Within minutes New York and Moscow will cease to exist. Global destruction will follow. The new era will begin.

JB: All right, Stromberg, you've made your point. How much do you want?

ST: How much? Whatever do you mean, Mr. Bond?

JB: The price for not firing those nuclear missiles.

ST: You're deluded, Mr. Bond. I'm not interested in extortion. I intend to change the face of history.

XXX: By destroying the world?

ST: By creating a world. A new and beautiful world beneath the sea. Today civilization as we know it is corrupt and decadent. Inevitably it will destroy itself. I'm merely...accelerating the process.

ST and XXX depart the tanker in a speedboat heading for the laboratory, leaving JB behind as a prisoner. He soon escapes his captors, of course, and frees the three captured submarine crews. They then battle it out with ST's army of henchmen. We witness the heroism of the British and especially American seamen, but the Russians are virtually invisible. JB reprograms the submarines to launch their missiles at each other, thus once again saving the world. The three crews escape the damaged tanker in the American submarine and torpedo the tanker. CC is ordered to destroy ST's laboratory, but JB convinces him to hold off for an hour while he rescues XXX. ST tries the elevator shark trick, but JB clings to the sides, makes it to ST's dining room and demands to see XXX.

ST: Well, well, well. A British agent in love with a Russian agent. Détente, indeed.

JB guns down ST in cold blood then begins his search for XXX.

Unfortunately he meets JA once again. JB lifts JA with an electromagnet and drops him into the shark tank. Unknown to JB, JA bites the shark and will live to menace him in future films. JB finds XXX in her third low-cut outfit of the film and they

escape the laboratory just as American torpedoes begin to explode. In ST's private escape pod JB offers XXX a drink. XXX pulls out her gun to make good on her vow:

JB: In my country, major, the condemned man is usually granted a last request.

XXX: Granted.

JB: Let's get out of these wet things.

XXX hesitates, smiles, and they embrace. They are later discovered by a British ship containing M, Q, etc. and brought aboard. In another standard Bond film scene they are "caught in the act."

M: 007!

GG: XXX!

M: Bond, what do you think you're doing?

JB: Keeping the British end up, sir.

Before Carly Simon's version reappears over the closing credits a brief "showtune" style rendering of "Nobody Does it Better" is heard as if to accentuate the playful sexuality of the scene.

APPENDIX 7 - RESURGENCE CODING AND CLOSE READING

STEP 1

01. FILM TITLE: *Firefox*
02. SUB-GENRE: *Spy/intrigue*
03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: *United States*
04. RELEASE DATE: *1982*
05. FRAME DATE: *1981*
06. CHROMATICS: *Colour film*
07. MEDIUM: *theatrical release, later video release*
08. STUDIO: *Warner Brothers*
09. PRODUCER: *Clint Eastwood*
10. DIRECTOR: *Clint Eastwood*
11. SCREENPLAY: *Alex Lasker and Wendell Wellman*
12. SOURCE: *novel by Craig Thomas*

13. MAJOR CHARACTERS:
 - 13A: *American, sympathetic (retired pilot Mitchell Gant = MG)*

14. MINOR CHARACTERS:
 - 14A: *American, sympathetic (air force Capt. Arthur Buckholz = AB)*
 - 14B: *British, sympathetic (intel coordinator Kenneth Aubrey = KA)*
 - 14C: *Russian, sympathetic (NATO spy Pavel Upenskoy = PU)*
 - 14D: *Russian, neutral (Colonel Dmitri Priabin = CP)*
 - 14E: *Russian, unsympathetic (Colonel Kontarsky = CK)*
 - 14F: *Russian, sympathetic (dissident Jew Dr. Semelovsky = DS)*
 - 14G: *Russian, sympathetic (dissident Jew Dr. Baranovich = DB)*
 - 14H: *Russian, sympathetic (dissident Jew Natalia Baranovich = NB)*
 - 14I: *Russian, unsympathetic (unnamed Soviet First Secretary = FS)*
 - 14J: *Russian, unsympathetic (Air Marshal Kutuzov = MK)*
 - 14K: *Russian, neutral (General Vladimirov = GV)*
 - 14L: *American, sympathetic (unnamed submarine captain)*
 - 14M: *Russian, ambiguous (MiG pilot Colonel Voskov = CV)*

15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:
 - 15A: *American military uniforms*
 - 15B: *American and British military organization, training*
 - 15C: *American military equipment*
 - 15D: *London skyline*
 - 15E: *American flag*

16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS:
 - 16A: *military uniforms*
 - 16B: *Red Square, St. Basil's*
 - 16C: *vodka in hotel room*

16D: military organization
16E: red banners
16F: hammer and sickle, red star
16G: military equipment

17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: strongly pro-American, anti-Soviet

STEP 2

00. FILM TITLE/FRAME DATE: *Firefox*, 1981

01. THREAT TYPE:

a) WW III
c) national security compromise/strategic disadvantage

02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION: b) moderate to high

03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:

03.1 Mitchell Gant

a) uniform
c) attitude towards Communism
d) conspicuous freedoms

04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:

04.1 Capt. Arthur Buckholz

a) uniform

04.2 Kenneth Aubrey

c) attitude towards Communism

05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTER: n/a

06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTER:

06.1 Pavel Upenskoy

b) poverty/lack of consumer goods
d) conspicuous oppression
e) speech patterns

06.2 Colonel Dmitri Priabin

- a) uniform
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns

06.3 Colonel Kontarsky

- a) uniform
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns
- h) emotional extremes

06.4 Dr. Semelovsky

- b) poverty/lack of consumer goods
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns

06.5 Dr. Baranovich

- b) poverty/lack of consumer goods
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns

06.6 Soviet First Secretary

- a) uniform
- c) attitude towards capitalism
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns
- h) emotional extremes

06.7 Air Marshal Kutuzov

- a) uniform
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns
- h) emotional extremes

06.8 General Vladimirov

- a) uniform
- d) conspicuous oppression
- e) speech patterns

07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN:**07.1 Mitchell Gant**

- b) soldier/military officer
- d) spy/agent

08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST: n/a

09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY: b) generally positive
10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY: e) extremely negative
11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES:
- a) America is inherently more moral/virtuous than Russia
 - b) Russians are "not like us" and/or not fully human
 - c) The Russians cannot be trusted
 - d) Communist citizens live in fear, ignorance and suspicion
 - e) The military and/or the arms race is out of control
 - g) Russia will not stop until world communism is established
 - h) America has allowed itself to become weak
 - i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not common people
 - j) Soviet Union is actively racist/intolerant

CLOSE READING- Firefox

The narrative centres around the discovery by British Intelligence that the Soviets have developed a new war plane (the *Firefox*) capable of mach five speed, undetectable by radar and equipped with thought-controlled weapons. In the words of one character, "if the Soviets can mass-produce it, it would change the structure of our world." Since NATO has nothing to compare, the only solution is to send fighter pilot and Vietnam veteran Mitchell Gant (MG) into the Soviet Union to steal it. We first meet MG jogging near his cabin retreat in Alaska. The sound of the helicopters dispatched to retrieve him triggers an episode of his post-traumatic stress disorder and we see the source of his trauma in flashback: shot down in Vietnam, he is placed in a bamboo cage and mistreated by his captors. He is rescued by an American helicopter attack and a napalm drop. He is haunted by the image of a young, innocent girl burned to death by the napalm strike.

After reluctantly accepting the assignment, MG travels to London for his briefing and training. He learns he must impersonate Leo Sprague, an "independent businessman" from Nevada who has been "defiling Soviet youth with high-grade heroin." The KGB have been led to believe he is "an enemy of the Soviet people." On his arrival in Moscow an airport security officer

inspects his baggage, checks his transistor radio (homing device) and asks: "And what is this? Perhaps you are hoping to pick up your stock market reports in Moscow?" The Moscow street scenes are very grey, drab, and depressing. The only colours seem to be in the occasional splash of red on Communist banners. Soldiers march outside MG's hotel window. A shot of MG walking in front of Red Square/St. Basil's is a superimposed composite, marking the film as produced before Western film makers had free access to the streets of Moscow.

Meanwhile, Soviet security officers discuss their final preparations for the first demonstration of the Firefox. One officer calls the Russian Jewish dissidents working on the craft "scientists," the other calls them "traitors."

In Moscow MG is repeatedly approached by sinister looking KGB agents and other officials demanding to see his "papers." They are consistently calm, cool, deliberate, bureaucratic, and habitually making veiled threats. He is earlier warned that "Because of its size the KGB is sometimes slow to awaken. It is like a monster, if you can walk by carefully enough it may just sniff at you. But if you awaken it..."

MG meets his first two contacts, who kill the real Leo Sprague. A confused MG follows them into the metro station, receives a new identity and almost blows his cover by killing one

KGB agent and performing poorly when questioned by another. His contact Pavel Upensky (PU) calls him a "stupid American." The greyness of Moscow and Russia is oppressive. The people are quiet, the metro station echoes to the sound of footsteps, the entire film seems like it is shot through a fine mist. There are constant suggestions that the USSR is a totalitarian police state and a consistent sensation of fear, paranoia and psychological claustrophobia exists.

A member of the spy network, Boris Glasinov, whom MG is supposed to impersonate, is arrested, but they go forward with the plan regardless. PU and MG leave the city in PU's van; they are followed by KGB agents wondering who MG might be.

Throughout his mission MG encounters several members of NATO's spy network and Russian dissidents willing to help him. All express their complete devotion to the Western cause and revulsion of the Soviet system:

MG: What is it with you Jews anyway? Don't you ever get tired of fighting city hall?

PU: Fighting city hall, as you say Mr. Gant, is a freedom we don't enjoy. Dr. Baranovich and Semelovsky are amongst the most brilliant minds in Soviet science. They were born here. This is their country, too. But when the Firefox project is to be completed, they will be sent somewhere, just because of their religious heritage.

MG: And you? What happens to you?

PU: I don't know. I'm not a Jew, Mr. Gant. [...] I have a wife. Did I tell you that, Gant?

MG: No, you didn't mention it.

PU: She is a Jew. She's educated. And still she married me. She's been in prison for 12 years for demonstrating against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. They do not treat her well in prison. I've spent the last 12 years trying to be worthy of her.

MG jumps out of the van to meet his next set of contacts. UP drives on, is forced off the road and eventually tracked down by dogs. He shoots himself to avoid capture. Meanwhile Boris Glasinov is interrogated, beaten and killed. The KGB decide to stop the van, but MG is already gone, hidden in Dr. Semivoski's (DS) car trunk. He meets Dr. Boranavich (DB) and his wife, Natalya (NB). They go through some final preparations and have a few quiet hours together. MG is to be disguised as a Soviet officer in order to infiltrate the base where the Firefox is being prepared. DB tells MG to smoke foreign cigarettes to help confirm his identity as an officer.

MG: Supposing I get to lift-off and everything works well, what happens to you?

DB: It doesn't matter.

MG: What do you mean, it doesn't matter? I don't understand why you're all so willing to die.

DB: I don't expect you to understand.

MG: Don't you resent those people in London who are ordering your death like this?

DB: Mr. Gant, you're an American. You're a free man. I'm not. There is the difference. If I resent the men in London who are ordering me to die, then it is a small thing when compared to my resentment of the KGB.

A Soviet officer with Colonel Dmitri Priabin (CP) works on finding MG's identity. Perhaps he is not a spy but an astronaut since "the NASA astronauts are the most highly-trained people in the world." They work through their intelligence files. MG infiltrates the Firefox installation in his Soviet uniform. As he hides in the shower he experiences another Vietnam flashback. MG knocks out the real pilot, is about to kill him, then relents, muttering "you didn't do anything." The Soviets security officers realize MG is somewhere in the building but can't find him. Finally it is discovered that MG is a pilot and might be there to actually steal the plane - unthinkable but apparently true. At this point the three dissident scientists set off an explosion as a diversion while MG steals the plane. They are shot down ruthlessly, but MG gets to the plane and takes off just as the First Secretary arrives.

In London, radar reports confirm the lift-off and re-fueling plans are initiated. MG buzzes a Soviet airliner then changes course to throw his pursuers off the scent. FS talks to MG on the cockpit radio. MG speaks to him with respect. They establish their positions and are at first quite civil to each other, then FS turns nasty and makes his threat.

FS: Mr. Gant, as you will be aware, I am not interested in the life of one rogue pilot with a poor health record. I was merely hoping to save the billions of rubles poured into the development of this project. I see you won't allow that to happen. Very well.

You will not, of course, make it to wherever you are going.
Goodbye Mr. Gant.

FS and other high ranking officers attempt to predict MG's plan for re-fueling and escaping Soviet airspace.

MK: You have considered, First Secretary, that this might be some kind of supreme bluff by the Americans to distract us from looking to the north, while this single aircraft attempts to escape to the south?

FS: No, Marshall Kutentov, they're simply paying the price for too many years of softness. Paying with an act of desperation such as this one.

MK: Are you absolutely certain?

FS: I am certain. They know the potential of this plane, they know what it means. I would imagine if the roles had been reversed, that we would have acted similarly.

FS is rather dim-witted, but General Vladimirov (GV) does a good job anticipating MG. MG is impressed with the plane. The Soviet officials immediately begin blaming each other for the lapse in security. GV takes control of the situation.

GV: Sir, we need to know only one thing from you. What do you wish done when the plane is sighted?

FS: Obliterate it. Completely.

FS, MK, and GV continue to trade insults and blame, sniping at each other. GV compliments MG's abilities and tactics at several points ("He is a fine pilot, perhaps even their best...He is a better pilot than we first assumed...Quite clever of him, really...This man is a very clever pilot", etc.) They are willing to sacrifice a Soviet pilot in an initial attempt to shoot down

MG, deciding quickly with only a small thought of the pilot's life. FS and KU think they have succeeded, GV does not. FS screams at GV when this first failure is confirmed.

MG is running low on fuel as he flies over the Arctic Ocean and passes above a Soviet warship. He destroys two of the ship's helicopters and evades its missiles by simply flying faster than they can ("Boy, is this a machine!") Meanwhile FS sends up Colonel Voskov (CV), the original pilot, in the second Firefox.

FS: You do not need to be reminded of the absolute crisis that we face here. The price of failure, Colonel Voskov, for you, for many in this room, would be great.

CV: The American is a dead man, First Secretary.

MG finds his submarine re-fueling ship in the Arctic Ocean as it bursts through the permanent ice pack. FS is not convinced such a ship exists and orders forces elsewhere, where the Americans have deployed decoys. GV is not convinced.

FS: Come, come Vladimirov, is it so difficult to accept? You were simply matched against inferior minds, and you have won.

The sub re-fuels MG, replaces his missiles "from a MiG-25 borrowed from Syria," and sends him on his way. Macho camaraderie is displayed between MG and the sub commander. The refueling team disguise themselves as weather researchers ("Operation Harmless") when Soviet helicopters arrive. Soon the Soviets realize a submarine might be there to meet MG. FS doesn't want to send the second MiG there, GV does and challenges FS's "stupidity!" FS

relents rather contritely.

MG thinks he's home-free but the second MiG finds him. They duel in the sky, MG's plane goes into a flat spin and he suffers another Vietnam flashback, contradicting an earlier statement that such attacks "manifest themselves in civilian life, not combat situations." CV has MG at his mercy but instead of finishing him off he allows him to regain his composure and control of the aircraft. Flying alongside MG he actually waves to him from his cockpit, then rejoins the fight. This is the second of three strange inconsistencies in the film's final few minutes. Presumably there is a mutual respect being displayed here between two pilots, or perhaps CV is repaying the "debt" he owes MG for his earlier decision to only knock him out rather than kill him. In either case it is an anomalous gesture vis-a-vis the film's general tone. As soon as CV breaks off MG again turns his attention to shooting down the second MiG. Here occurs the third inconsistency. MG was chosen for the mission in part because he is fluent in Russian and can operate the thought-controlled weapons by "thinking in Russian." He has done so without trouble since the moment he climbed in the plane. Suddenly he has forgotten how as he mutters in English "fire rear missiles." Finally he remembers, fires a single missile, destroys the second MiG with one shot, and mutters "I'm coming home."

APPENDIX 8 - DISRUPTION CODING AND CLOSE READING

STEP 1

01. FILM TITLE: *Company Business*
02. SUB-GENRE: spy/intrigue (post-Cold War intrigue?)
03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: United States
04. RELEASE DATE: 1991
05. FRAME DATE: 1990
06. CHROMATICS: colour film
07. MEDIUM: theatrical release, subsequent video release
08. STUDIO: MGM
09. PRODUCER: Steven-Charles Jaffe
10. DIRECTOR: Nicholas Meyer
11. SCREENPLAY: Nicholas Meyer
12. SOURCE: original screenplay by Nicholas Meyer

13. MAJOR CHARACTERS:
 - 13A: American, sympathetic (ex-CIA agent Sam Boyd = SB)
 - 13B: Russian, sympathetic (ex-spy Pyotr Grushenko = PG)

14. MINOR CHARACTERS:
 - 14A: American, unsympathetic (CIA director Elliot Jaffe = EL)
 - 14B: American, unsympathetic (Colonel Grissom = GR)
 - 14C: American, somewhat unsympathetic (CIA agent Bruce = BR)
 - 14D: American, unsympathetic (CIA agent Mike Finn = MK)
 - 14E: Saudi, neutral (ex-arms dealer Faisal = FA)
 - 14F: Russian, unsympathetic (KGB director Grigori = GG)
 - 14G: French, sympathetic (Grushenko's daughter Natasha = NA)

15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:
 - 15A: CIA headquarters
 - 15B: The Capital building
 - 15C: military uniforms

16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS:
 - 16A: Russian vodka
 - 16B: Checkpoint Charlie sign
 - 16C: balalaika
 - 16D: image of Gorbachev
 - 16E: East European automobile

17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: ambiguous

STEP 2

00. FILM TITLE/FRAME DATE: *Company Business, 1990*

01. THREAT TYPE:

g) other: exposure of CIA illegalities

02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION: d) ambiguous

03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTERS:

03.1 Sam Boyd

b) wealth/consumerism

c) attitude towards communism

d) conspicuous freedoms

e) cultural knowledge

04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTERS:

04.1 Elliot Jaffe

none

04.2 Colonel Grissom

a) uniform

c) attitude towards communism

04.3 Bruce

none

04.4 Mike Finn

none

05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTER:

05.1 Pyotr Grushenko

e) speech patterns

f) stereotypical food/drink (vodka, caviar, etc.)

06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTER:

06.1 Grigori

e) speech patterns

h) emotional extremes (emotionless, sadistic, etc.)

07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN:**07.1 Sam Boyd****h) other: ex-spy/agent****08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST****08.1 Pyotr Grushenko****h) other: ex-spy/agent****09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY: c) ambiguous****10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY: c) ambiguous****11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES:****i) Politicians/governments are enemies, not common people**

CLOSE READING - *Company Business*

The film opens with dramatic if somewhat generic music suggesting tension and speed, then quickly slows. A sub-title informs us we are in Fort Worth, Texas. The first shot is of a large, darkened building with a dim light burning in one window. Outside a security guard notices the light and informs his colleague over the radio. A number of security guards are seen running through the complex. We see the surface of a desk in the lit room; someone dressed in typical Hollywood all-black "spy gear" is photographing important documents. Security forces move in. A complex-wide alarm is sounded and the man in black runs off. (At this point the film's initial credits are being displayed in precise yet colourful lettering. It is apparent early that the film is not low-budget.) The man in black eludes the guards by rappelling down the outside of the building in best spy tradition. He climbs the perimeter fence to complete his escape but falls in the process, injuring his ankle. The illusion of a James Bond-like character is punctured by the awkwardness of the moment and by the revelation that the spy is older than expected; seemingly in his 50s. With the removal of his mask we also recognize the actor, Gene Hackman. He is a very recognizable actor, of course, but his roles have been so plentiful and varied that he carries no particular baggage of type-casting with him.

The scene segues to the bright, austere, ultra-modern reception area of cosmetics company. The spy (Sam Boyd = SB) is sitting uncomfortably and somewhat inelegantly on a bright red sofa, reading a newspaper article regarding the disappearance of a Texas A&M professor. A young, somewhat "nerdy"-looking and unkempt man sits beside him and opens a file folder. He seems to have the same information SB photographed the night before. On enquiring, the young man explains that he hacked into the company's computer and "gave them a virus for good measure." SB asks the kid to get him a coffee, "holds" his notes for him and goes into the inner office unannounced. In a meeting within he takes credit for the kid's work. It is revealed SB has been working at corporate counter-espionage. The end of the preceding and virtually all of this scene are designed to present SB as rather old and out of touch (he parrots the young man's computer terminology without understanding it) but still capable of a few "old tricks," including seducing one of the (slightly older) secretaries from the cosmetics company since the next scene takes place with the two of them in post-coital relaxation. We see none of the seduction itself, however. There is no depiction of romance, joy or even eroticism; the effect is to further the perception of a certain pathetic sadness to SB's life without the glamour or intrigue of, say, a Humphrey Bogart character. SB

receives a phone call in bed containing a code message: "Who do you like in the fifth?"

Abrupt cut to the underside of a passenger jet touching down as a female voice announces the welcome to Dulles airport in Washington. SB is met by two typically-dressed "company" men in dark trench coats and sunglasses. SB wears a dull, unfashionable suit. As they pick up two tickets to Berlin at the Air France counter SB notices a man in a nearby queue rolling his neck around, apparently working out the kinks. For no reason he consciously realizes, it seems suspicious. He and his escorts move on. In the back of a car SB opens a briefcase to find a large amount of money and a pair of binoculars. "Why me?" he mutters, "Why take the battleship Missouri out of mothballs?" The car takes an exit marked with a small simple road sign identifying the route to CIA headquarters and we realize that the "company" referred to in the film's title is indeed the American agency, not a reference to corporate espionage.

SB walks into a CIA conference room (double doors part before him in either a straight-up impressive manner or in the rather ridiculous style of *Get Smart's* closing credits, depending on one's reading). It is large, low-ceilinged and somewhat imposing, but nearly empty, quiet, and somewhat dark, lending an impression of disuse; the first indication of the sense of

"obsolescence" to the "spy game."

CIA director Elliot Jaffe (EL) greets SB ("the company has missed you") and introduces a "special friend of the company," Mr. Paco Gonzales who is into "Columbian pharmaceuticals." Gonzales looks very much the stereotype of the Columbian drug lord: moustached and dark-haired, overweight, and wearing the obligatory white suit. "I would very much like to help your country, uh-huh" he states twice in a matter of minutes. EL obviously has a job in mind for SB.

EL: Governments come and go, bureaucracies stay the same. Just look at us. We've been approached by Colonel Grigori Golilsin with a proposition that we find interesting.

SB: The KGB's making propositions to you?

(As SB speaks we briefly see the scene from behind a window where the conversation is being recorded, indicating something is not "on the level" already.)

EL: We do a lot of business with the KGB these days. They're cutting deals. You remember Ernest Sobel?

SB: Ernest Simpson Sobel, U-2 pilot shot down over Taskent, 1969. Convicted of espionage, life imprisonment.

EL: For two million we can have him.

SB: Don't tell me they're that broke.

EL: Well, we'll throw in one of theirs, that way it'll look like a swap. That's not illegal. Looks better for Grigori, too.

BR: If this works it could be a whole new program for us.

SB: Why don't you just wait a couple of months and Gorbachev will

send them all back for National Brotherhood Week?

EL: Gorbachev may not be around that long, and then we'll have lost the chance.

BR: The President loves this guy. You get him back, he'll give us the medal of honour.

Abruptly a forceful voice is heard from a desk at the back of the room. It is a general (General Grissom = GR) in full uniform, looking very much like G. Gordon Liddy.

GR: We don't want the medal of honour. What we would like is to get Congress off the company's back so it can resume full effectiveness in defending this nation from its enemies.

EL: Thank you, Colonel Grissom. You see Sam, they're pissed because we didn't tell them about the Wall coming down, and then we goofed on the Noreiga thing.

EL informs SB of the Russian prisoner they will trade for Sobel.

SB thinks something is not quite right.

SB: Nobody gives a shit about this guy.

EL: C'mon Sam. This is not arms for hostages. It's perfectly straight forward.

SB: If it's so straight forward what are we doing here in the bubble room with Senor Gonzales?

SG: I would very much like to help your country, uh-huh.

EL: Mr. Gonzales' associates have very kindly offered to put up the two million dollars necessary for this operation. There's no way we can ask the taxpayers to help us out on this one, Sam.

SB is told it's all very simple, even if it's "not exactly kosher" - just take PG and the \$2 million to Berlin and bring Sobel back. On leaving he is told to keep accurate records of his

expenses since "they're all over us about that sort of thing now." SB is seen driving through the heartland of America somewhere as the scene's voice-over is from his car radio informing the public about North Dakota's sugar beet crop. There is a second incidental mention (on the radio) of the disappearance of Texas A&M professor Norbert Kelly.

SB picks up Pyotr Grushenko (PG) from his prison in Fargo. PG is played by Mikhail Baryshnikov, the well-known Russian defector, ballet dancer and actor who does bring a certain set of cognitive associations for the viewer to his part. They are, of course, perfectly in-keeping with his role (he has even played a similar part in 1985's *White Nights*). He speaks with only a slight Russian accent, but like most Russians in American films has trouble with the grammatical concept of articles. SB couches the news of PG's freedom in American culture: "Do you like baseball? That's your new uniform. You've been traded." In the airport PG briefly gives SB the slip in a scene that seems to serve no purpose but to add a measure of "excitement" to the narrative at this point. Once on the plane SB is drinking Russian vodka.

SB: Betcha thought about Stoli more than once in the last seven years, huh?

PG: Ever try Starka?

SB: Can't be as good as Stoli.

PG: It's not. I just prefer it.

SB: Starkle, huh?

SB purposefully mis-pronounces the name on several occasions in a good-natured ribbing of PG whom he is quickly warming up to.

SB: I can understand why you're nervous about what Moscow might be thinking. This whole deal, you know, it's weird.

PG: So you don't know what you're doing either.

SB: Hey, tovarisch, I'm just like you, except you're going home.

PG: What makes you think I'm so crazy to go home? At least in prison I knew the rules.

They land in Berlin and find their Budget rental car complete with gun in glove compartment. PG shaves as they drive.

PG: Why Berlin?

SB: Are you kidding? We always go to Berlin.

PG: I still can't believe it - no more Wall.

SB: They're going to set it up around London Bridge, Lake Havasu. You want to buy a piece?

PG: Can't you buy me a coat instead? I'm freezing.

SB: I've got a better idea. What's the name of that stuff?

They go to a bar and order a selection of various vodkas. PG picks out the Starka glass on sight. Balalaika music is playing in the background. SB tries it and likes it; they order a bottle. Later the bar is almost empty. SB is eating borscht, PG is playing the balalaika.

PG: I don't belong here, I don't belong there. You tell me where

is home.

SB: Search me.

PG: Couldn't you just let me go? You could come with me.

SB: Why would I want to do that?

PG: Admit it, your life sucks.

SB: Hey, leave my life out of it, okay?

PG: You're used up, like me, come on.

SB: Why would I want to go anywhere with you?

PG: Why not? We are not bad guys any more. "The Russians are coming, the Russians are coming," eh? Japanese are here. They own your whole fucking country.

SB: What does that mean, I'm supposed to go to off and elope with you?

PG: Hey - you and me, we're servants for a few assholes.
[salutes] Same bullshit.

SB: Hey don't go all Russian on me now, okay?

PG: Who's ass you Americans going to kick now, eh?

SB: We've always got Fidel.

PG: We've always got him, too.

SB: True. (they laugh)

Cut to the next evening, they are driving to the exchange site.

They get out at a closed-down U-Bahn station, meet a contact, an agent (Mike) that SB knows from Central America. They go through the exchange plan, the agent notes that the KGB will be watching.

SB: Is that legal?

AG: They call it confederated, united, amalgamated. There's 200,000 jumpy Russians still stationed in East Germany.

They pass into "East" Berlin, to the meeting place. The station signs are dingy, the stair steps are rotten. SB sends PG through. They exchange a friendly good-bye. SB watches PG's progress through his binoculars. He sees the contact walking towards PG and notices that he is lolling his head about in the same manner as the "suspicious" man at the airport. His mind (through several camera images displayed as SB's consciousness) goes back to the newspaper photograph of the missing professor. He connects all three images, though all have somewhat different appearances, as the same person and realizes something is amiss. He shouts to PG and runs after him. Suddenly several men appear from an old subway car shouting in Russian and shooting at him. He shoots back, grabs PG and the money, they run for it and make it to the subway car. Once there SB hands PG his gone and tells him to "cover me" while he tries to start the subway car. This, presumably, is a demonstration of the trust that is somehow established between Russians and Americans after a night of vodka and borscht. SB gets Mike the agent on the phone, tells him they have to abort. Mike protests, then contacts the authorities to seal off the subway. PG asks SB what went wrong at the exchange. SB replies, "I like you better than I like him." They travel back through the populated section of the subway line, past bewildered

commuters and finally to a quite, abandoned station. They hurry off the train and SB smashes the window of a display case in order to obtain some new clothes. SB is not concerned about PG escaping at this point and simply mentions in passing, "By the way, I want my gun back." Outside it is raining heavily and we are given the impression that Berlin, East or West is a dark, slightly drab, but especially a shadowy and vaguely threatening place. Agent Mike calls Washington.

Meanwhile, SB and PG find a Berlin cabaret club which appears to be populated with transvestites and/or transsexuals dressed in old-style "cabaret" stereotype clothing. We see that they now have matching jackets bearing a picture of Superman's body with Gorbachev's head and the caption "Gorbyman" underneath.

SB: Act natural, and don't try anything funny.

PG: If I was trying to do anything, why did I give back the pistol?

SB: Yeah, why did you?

PG: Stupid of me.

Thus we re-establish the problem of mutual trust, a tension that must be maintained for the sake of a narrative that has already become rather winding and confusing. SB finds an outside line and contacts EL in Washington. (We do not know if Agent Mike has already spoken to the CIA or if had called someone else).

EL: You screwed up!

SB: No, they screwed up.

EL: What are you talking about? You opened fire in East Berlin; two guys are shot. What are you trying to do, re-start the Cold War?

SB tells EL that the man at the exchange was not Sobel, but a man he saw at Dulles airport. He is not sure if he is actually an A&M prof and suspects the Russians are running a scam to get back PG and the money without giving up Sobel. The first indication that SB is either a bit paranoid or simply doesn't trust EL comes as he initially gives EL a false location, then admits he's still in Berlin, knowing they can trace his call anyway. EL directs him to a safe house where he'll be picked up. After hanging up, EL is very upset.

EL: Shit!

AGENT 1: Elliot, you didn't ask him about the money.

AGENT 2: Forget the money, Gonzales ain't gonna open his yap. You better get on the Z phone, Elliot.

(At present we do not know what the "Z phone" is). SB and PG steal an East German car (a Trabant) which they disparage.

SB: Is it alarmed?

PG: Only if you frighten it.

(SB fishes through his pocket for his knife in order to jimmy the lock)

SB: You notice the only thing you ever hear about the Swiss Army is their knives?

(PG deftly stikes the door handle on the passenger side and it

pops open)

PG: The only thing you hear about Trabants is they're plastic.

They drive off as the Trabant spews exhaust, backfires and sounds very much like a sewing machine. Back in Washington, EL informs GR about the situation who reacts badly. He apparently knows more than EL and wants him to hush up the situation: "It is no longer fashionable to ransom hostages with Columbian drug money." The scene seems to indicate that EL is still basically on SB's side, believes him, and is "just trying to do his job." GR is now the leading candidate for the character of corrupt/misguided American official. In what seems like an incidental, throwaway scene, GR pops a candy into his mouth after hanging up the phone. Back in Berlin, PG refuses to go to the safe house. He doesn't trust the CIA. He pulls out a gun and tells SB to leave.

SB: I thought we were friends.

PG: My friends aren't stupid.

He keeps the money and sends SB on his way. The Trabant again sounds terrible as he drives away. In Washington EL is waiting to meet someone. He walks past a plaque depicting the CIA Credo and is surrounded by American symbols (flag, CIA seal, presidential photos). SB walks to the safe house through the dark, wet streets of Berlin. Streetlights cast his shadow across the dull buildings. In Washington agents (without EL) are watching a

computerized map of the safe house on a TV monitor. SB arrives at the safe house. A bottle, dropped by a drunk in a passageway, rolls across his path. A car speeds out from a narrow side-street, just missing him. Someone peeks out from behind the curtains of their window. The sound of raucous laughter is heard far in the distance. The street is otherwise quiet and seemingly deserted. Supposedly all these rather contrived and cliched occurrences are employed to heighten the tension of the scene. They are not particularly effective. SB hesitates at the front door and looks at the doorbell. PG is watching SB from across the street and calls SB over to him. SB hands him a silencer for the gun and PG tries to shoot the doorbell from across the street.

SB: Aren't you being a bit theatrical?

PG: Someone's got to take care of you.

On his third shot he hits the doorbell and the building explodes. The safe house was obviously a set-up. SB instantly assumes EL is behind it.

SB: I didn't realize Russians were so sentimental.

PG: Yeah, yeah, we are. Can you go higher up? Is there someone else to bring us in?

SB: Hey, you don't get it, do you tovarisch? There's no place to bring us in to. If I go back, assuming I get there alive, I'm the next Oliver North, without a chest full of medals. With an Israeli passport, yet.

PG: We've still got the money.

SB: The money is all numbered. It'd be like signing our names. In Washington EL believes SB and PG were the ones to blow up the safe house. He gives orders to "close up Berlin" and the police are mobilized to find them. We have a few brief scenes of the German police conducting their search. The depiction of German police, the language, helicopters, searchlights, boats, dogs, various equipment, etc. has disturbing connotations even if a connection to Nazi-era tactics is not overt.

EL: How long is this going to take?

BR: This is the new, improved big Berlin, Eliot. These people don't jump for us like they used to. It's gonna cost.

EL: What are we telling the German cops?

BR: Either it's Ahmed Gibril the Pan-Am bomber or an Iraqi hit squad.

SB and PG go to see a man, Horst, who can make them new passports and credit cards. At CIA, EL's aide suggests they may be visiting Horst.

EL: Not Horst. Christ, is that old Nazi still on our payroll?

AIDE: We got him back from the Russians in '86.

EL phones Horst while he's working on the papers. They are forced to hide quickly as police close in, accompanied by Agent Mike. EL decides to head for Berlin himself. An agent asks EL "What do we tell the old man?" (presumably meaning the president) EL responds, "You don't tell him a thing! This is a company

problem." This is the keynote of the film, and one suspects the line might have been misspoken (perhaps was meant to be "This is company business.") The implication is that regardless of the state of international politics; pre or post Cold War, the CIA feels it must act autonomously in order to be effective. This is, of course, meant to cause us concern, at least in principle. But the rather bungling and confused actions of the agency undermine any sense of dread we may feel at the prospect. In Washington GR meets agent BR in a public park. He tells him that EL will end up taking the blame and that he wants the Sobel trade back on. Again, he is seen eating candy (Life Savers). SB and PG wander through the red light district where PG complains that it's been seven years since he's had the pleasure of female company: "She's pretty, eh? Fruits of democracy." They steal bicycles, ride to the house of Faisal (FA), a Saudi arms dealer that SB knows. SB boasts of his wealth. They find him, however, in less than opulent splendour. His mansion is virtually empty, even of furniture.

FA: Mint tea all around?

SB: Faisal could we just drop the Arabic amenities and get right to cases? I have two million dollars here.

FA: Did I hear you correctly? Two million? My friend, you could not have come at a more opportune time.

SB: It looks like you're about a billion short here. Actually all we really need is a room for the night.

FA: My house is yours, but I think I can help with laundering the money. Look, we form a limited partnership, huh? I have all the papers here. It is so simple. First we exchange your dollars for Brazilian cruzeiros. They are impossible to trace. With the Brazilian cruzeiros we ship out rocket launchers to the Contras.

SB: The Contras have disbanded.

FA: Right. Right. All right. How about this? We trade your dollars for German deutschmarks. The rates are excellent this week. We form a Panamanian corporation and sell mortars to the Cubans in Angola. Brilliant, Sam.

SB: The Cubans are out of Angola. The Russians are out of Afghanistan.

FA: You're going to love this. We trade for escudos and sell exocet missiles to Lithuania, eh? Ah, who am I kidding? They're stone broke. Ah! The PLO! Ah, don't tell me; they recognized Israel. God damn it. And nowadays you can't give away anything to the Columbian drug cartels. Sam you gotta help me, please, please. I just need to prime the pump.

PG suggests they meet a woman in Paris who could help them with the money. In the morning, looking out the window, they realize they are surrounded. Mike and cronies come to the door. SB & PG push aside unopened crates of Stinger missile parts and jump out the window into the river to escape. Walking along the railway tracks, SB & PG work out the mystery. The Texas A&M prof really is Sobel. He was a Russian double agent. GR, we realize, knows all the details right back to 1969 and has been Sobel's control. PG knew him only by his code name "Donald." He also had a phone number and knows that "donald" has a sweet tooth. The whole explanation of the plot is complicated and uninvolving, very likely to completely lose most viewers. They hop a train and SB

casually demonstrates his trust of PG by handing him the case of money while he jumps on.

EL lands in Berlin and sets up operations. Agent Mike tacitly admits to killing Faisal. EL does not seem surprised or concerned. Obviously, these things happen in the spy business. Soon the KGB director Grigori (GG) enters. EL is unsure how to react; this is an odd and perhaps unprecedented occurrence.

GG: Forgive my intrusion, Eliot but I believe we share a common embarrassment. I hope you will allow us to sit in. As you know I am missing an important grey attache case. Let us combine our resources in the name of progress.

EL: Well it's a brave new world, isn't it boys?

GG tells EL that they are probably headed for Paris. EL already knows this and tries to throw GG off. Apparently EL is not yet ready for a brave new world. Nonetheless, a joint operation is begun. GG speaks in Russian to one of his aides, revealing that they know about PG's female contact in Paris but are not telling the Americans about it quite yet. A parallel is thus established in the question of mutual trust. The two individuals have accomplished it, the two agencies have not. SB and PG make it to Paris where they meet a woman named Natasha (NA).

SB: Natasha. She doesn't look Russian to me.

PG: She's French. Her mother was crazy for War and Peace so they named her Natasha.

SB: She seems pretty keen on you.

PG: Yeah.

SB: She in the orchestra?

PG: In the KGB? No. She works for one of those big Japanese firms. She's biggest capitalist you ever met.

NA thinks she can launder the money through her company's Swiss bank accounts. PG heads off to Zurich, leaving SB with NA. One last moment of problematic trust occurs here. SB does not know whether it's better to hand over two million dollars to "a capitalist" or "a communist." Their movements are being watched. Later SB meets NA for dinner at the Eiffel Tower. Skeletons of dinosaurs are suspended from the restaurant ceiling. They discuss the situation.

NA: You and Pyiotr Ivanovich, the pair of you, do you know what you are? Dinosaurs. With your spy games you are extinct today. Russia, America, who cares? You will kill each other and it will be for nothing. In two years all of Europe, including Germany, will be one big corporation. What's good for Toshiba is good for the world.

Later, GG captures NA. EL intercepts them. It is revealed that NA is PG's daughter. They call SB, tell him they have her and demand an exchange: GG gets money and PG, EL gets Sobel, NA and SB go home. SB agrees to the deal, leaves his hotel and loses his tail. He pages every flight back from Zurich until he contacts PG, tells him to meet him and NA atop the Eiffel Tower and that everything is okay. He contacts EL and tells him the

same thing, letting the agencies know that PG will be there for the taking as long as NA is safe. SB sets a trap, they get away temporarily but PG is shot in the stomach.

SB: You asked me before what I believe in? I believe in you, pal. They go into the restaurant halfway up the tower. PG makes a call, leaves a message in Russian for "Donald" (GR) in Washington saying that Sobel has gone back to working for the Americans. The machine is by GR's hat, but since he had been eating candy earlier and PG mentioned he had a sweet tooth, observant viewers already should know that "Donald" is GR. This way he can't be recycled again. They are confident NA is safe, SB shows airline tickets to the Seychelles where they and their two million can't be extradited. They order Starka and toast their fortune. Closing camera shot freezes on the glasses clinking and credits roll to the sound of balalaika music.

APPENDIX 9 - RESPONSE CODING AND CLOSE READING

STEP 1

01. FILM TITLE: *Goldeneye*
02. SUB-GENRE: action-adventure (post-Cold War intrigue?)
03. PLACE OF PRODUCTION: United States
04. RELEASE DATE: 1995
05. FRAME DATE: 1995
06. CHROMATICS: colour film
07. MEDIUM: theatrical release, subsequent video release
08. STUDIO: United Artists
09. PRODUCER: Michael G. Wilson and Barbara Broccoli
10. DIRECTOR: Martin Campbell
11. SCREENPLAY: Jeffrey Caine and Bruce Feirstein
12. SOURCE: original story by Michael France

13. MAJOR CHARACTERS:

- 13A: British, sympathetic (James Bond = JB)
- 13B: British/Russian, unsympathetic (Alec Trevelyan = AT)
- 13C: Russian, sympathetic (Natalya = NA)

14. MINOR CHARACTERS:

- 14A: British, somewhat sympathetic (M = M)
- 14B: American, sympathetic (CIA agent Jack Ward = JW)
- 14C: Russian, somewhat unsympathetic (Xenia Onatopp = XO)
- 14D: Russian, very unsympathetic (General Urumov = GU)
- 14E: Russian, somewhat unsympathetic (Valantine = VA)
- 14F: Russian, unsympathetic (Boris = BO)
- 14G: Russian, somewhat sympathetic (Mishkin = MS)

15. AMERICAN/WESTERN SYMBOLS:

- 15A: military equipment
- 15B: military uniforms

16. RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SYMBOLS:

- 16A: hammer and sickle
- 16B: flags
- 16C: statues
- 16D: military equipment
- 16E: military uniforms
- 16F: red stars

17. EAST/WEST NORMATIVE TONE: Moderately pro-Western

STEP 2

00. FILM TITLE/FRAME DATE: Goldeneye, 1995
01. THREAT TYPE:
- g) other: destruction of British financial system
02. IMPLIED STATE OF EAST/WEST TENSION:
- c) low
03. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTER:
- 03.1 James Bond
- b) wealth/consumerism
- d) conspicuous freedoms
04. SIGNS OF AMERICAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTER:
- 04.1 Jack Ward
- e) other: pronounced American accent
- e) other: relaxed American attitude
05. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MAIN CHARACTER:
- 05.1 Natalya
- e) speech patterns
06. SIGNS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALITY/CULTURE, MINOR CHARACTER:
- 06.1 General Urumov
- a) uniform
- e) speech patterns
- f) stereotypical food/drink
- h) emotional extremes
- 06.2 Xenia Onatopp
- a) uniform
- e) speech patterns
- h) emotional extremes
- 06.3 Valantine
- b) poverty/lack of consumer goods
- e) speech patterns
- f) stereotypical food/frink

06.4 Boris**e) speech patterns****06.5 Mishkin****a) uniform****e) speech patterns****h) emotional extremes****07. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, AMERICAN/WESTERN:****07.1 James Bond****d) spy/agent****08. MAIN CHARACTER TYPES, RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST****08.1 Natalya****c) scientist****f) private citizen****09. DEPICTION OF AMERICAN/WESTERN SOCIETY:****c) ambiguous****10. DEPICTION OF RUSSIAN/COMMUNIST SOCIETY:****d) generally negative****11. THEMATIC CONSISTENCIES:****none**

CLOSE READING - Goldeneye

Standard opening shot into camera, then cut to initial adventure preceding opening credits. Bond is breaking into "Arkangel Chemical Weapons Facility - USSR" immediately dating the events as pre-1991, probably pre-1989. The first Soviet soldier we see is in the undignified position of sitting on the toilet, reading a newspaper. JB meets agent 006 (AT) who speaks Russian to him, possibly foreshadowing his later turn to the "other side." They spring into action, according to both, "for England." AT is captured and apparently killed. JB escapes, outwitting an entire platoon of Soviet soldiers. Soviet sadism and disregard for the value of human life are expressed when commanding officer shoots his own overly-anxious soldier.

Opening credits: title song "Goldeneye" by Tina Turner. Standard silhouettes of scantily or un-clad women against a backdrop of falling Soviet symbols: red stars, hammers and sickles, statues of Lenin and others in heroic/revolutionary poses, two-faced "Janus" woman, Soviet symbols intertwined with obvious sexual play, esp. phallic symbols. Women climb the statues, hammer falls through opening of sickle, women climb through mouth of statues, Soviet flags blow away, gun in woman's mouth (coming out rather than going in), women swinging hammers in mock-proletarian worker style, but using hammers to smash

statues (echo of Berlin Wall smashing) .

JB charms young female psychiatrist sent to evaluate his mental stability, sees "the next girl" on the road, stops car and breaks out champagne rather than be out-driven by Russian (Georgian) woman. Standard lame sexual double entendres. JB finds the driver in a casino (Monte Carlo?), she is Russian, smokes Cuban cigars, gambles well (not quite as well as JB), seems sexually aggressive, but leaves JB for a Canadian admiral. Her name, in the continuing "tradition" is Xenia Onatopp.

XO: [Russia] is very different now, a land of opportunity.

JB: With a Ferrari in every garage?

XO: Not exactly.

Probable reference to a) presence of capitalism; b) cutthroat nature of Russian capitalism; c) presence of organized crime.

XO is an ex-Soviet fighter pilot, now suspected of ties to Russian Janus crime syndicate, St. Petersburg. St.P. better symbolizes new Russia than Moscow, reminds us of change simply by different name, suggests economic/mafia rather than political/military power. XO kills Canadian admiral in S&M fashion, steals his credentials. Killing is an orgasmic experience for her. She and partner steal new anti-radar French helicopter ("Europe's answer to the electronic battlefield")

Cut to "Space Weapons Control Centre - Severnaya, Russia" where many of the young people manning the centre are 90s computer nerds or at least well-versed in computer systems. Boris is an "invincible" sexist hacker who breaks into classified systems and mentions the internet. "The Americans are slugheads," he boasts and dreams of "a million bucks hard currency." Still some older, emotionless workers. BO has to go outside for a cigarette. The centre is destroyed by XO and the general who apparently killed AT years ago, now head of Space Division. Russian uniforms still similar to Soviet style. Before destroying Centre they sadistically kill their fellow Russian workers, XO still orgasmic in her killing, even when using a gun - she is completely over the top throughout the film. Space-based satellite still bears "CCCP" markings.

Cut to London for JB's standard meeting with Money Penny, M, and Q. All but the latter are new actors, M is a new character: a woman. Money Penny holds her own with JB's sexual innuendos, perhaps actually getting the better of him, not the usual pining for the unattainable Bond. Mention of sexual harassment.

M: Unlike the American governmentt, we prefer not to get our bad news from CNN.

M and Bond watch via satellite as the Centre is destroyed by the Goldeneye E-M pulse. Goldeneye was developed "by the Americans

and the Soviets during the Cold War." Implies the Cold War is definitely over. New dangers exist - the Janus crime syndicate is mentioned, but JB immediately suspects military insider compliance. After the E-M pulse, official Russian explanation is an accident during routine training.

JB: Governments change, the lies stay the same.

M: What else do we know about the Janus syndicate?

JB: Top flight arms dealers headquartered in St. Petersburg. First outfit to re-stock the Iraqis during the Gulf War.

While discussing General Urumov (GU), M notes that "He sees himself as the next Iron Man of Russia." M and JB discuss differing strategies in post-CW climate.

M: You don't like me Bond. You don't like my methods. You think I'm an accountant, a bean-counter more interested in my numbers than your instincts.

JB: The thought had occurred to me.

M: Good. Because I think you're a sexist, misogynist dinosaur. A relic of the Cold War whose boyish charms, though wasted on me obviously appealed to that young woman I sent out to evaluate you.

JB: Point taken.

M: Not quite, 007. If you think for one moment I don't have the balls to send a man out to die your instincts are dead wrong. I've no compunction about sending you to your death. But I won't do it on a whim, even with your cavalier attitude towards life. [...] Bond? Come back alive.

GU meets with Defence Minister Mishkin (MS) and a panel of faceless Russian male suits. He delivers his report that the

Centre was destroyed by Siberian separatists. MS seems suspicious, calls for further investigation. Seems to be old vs new guard, but MS not much different. Very emotionally controlled, but not without some depth.

JB visits Q. Gets a BMW to replace the British Austin-Martin, then leaves for St. Petersburg. Meets his American contact (Jack Wade) who calls him a "stiff-assed Brit." He is distressingly informal, JB not amused. Tries to discuss gardening, calls him Jimmy, Jimbo, makes him help repair his car. Directs JB to Janus' competition Valentine in order to get close to Janus. VA is ex-KGB, remembers JB from good old Cold War days.

Meanwhile, NA has escaped the Centre and makes her way to a run-down IBM computer store. Shelves are poorly stocked. Salesman overjoyed, groveling at the prospect of sales to Swedish school, American, etc. Thrilled at the idea that NA will pay in dollars. NA contacts BO, the only other survivor, is betrayed by him and captured.

JB finds VA in nightclub, finally persuades him to go along. In background women singers mangle "Stand By Your Man." VA mocks JB: "James Bond. Charming sophisticated secret agent. Emph. Shaken, not stirred." All is quite tacky. "Still working for MI6 or have you decided to join the 21st century? I hear the new M is a lady." His flunkies are idiots. He needs money. JB appeals to

his patriotism while VA drinks straight vodka.

JB: These are not just criminals, Valentine, they're traitors. They used the chopper to steal a nuclear weapon, killed a lot of innocent Russians doing it.

VAL: What do you expect from a Cossack?

JB: Who?

VA: This Janus, I never met the man but I know he's a Liens Cossack.

JB: The group that worked for the Nazis against the Russians, second World War.

VA: You know your history, Mr. Bond. At the end of the war the Liens Cossacks surrendered to the British in Austria, believing they would join your government and wage war against the Communists. But the British betrayed them, sent them back to Stalin, who promptly had them all shot; women, children, families.

JB: Not exactly our finest hour.

VAL: Still, ruthless people, they got what they deserved.

JB survives an XO attack, mentioning safe sex. Makes her take him to Janus headquarters. Janus himself is AT, still alive. He and JB meet in what appears to be the graveyard of Communism, a collection of forgotten statues. They face each other across the ruins of the Cold War. Repetition of the visual motif from the opening credits.

JB: Why?

AT: Hilarious question, particularly from you. Did you ever ask why? Why we toppled all those dictators, undermined all those regimes, only to come home: "Well done, good job, but sorry old boy everything you risked your life and limb for has changed?"

JB: It was the job we were chosen for.

AT: Of course you'd say that. James Bond, her majesty's loyal terrier, defender of the so-called faith. [...]

AT: MI6 figured I was too young to remember and in one of life's little ironies the son went to work for the government whose betrayal caused the father to kill himself and his wife.

JB: Hence Janus, the two-faced Roman god come to life.

JB is knocked out, wakes up trapped in helicopter with NA. They escape but are captured by MS who doesn't "take the time to do a really sinister interrogation." A reflexive comment on the Bond formula. NA calls them "boys with toys." MS notes that "Russia may have changed but the penalty for terrorism is still death." GU bursts in and kills MS, tries to kill JB and NA. They escape, killing several Russian soldiers along the way. This apparently does not trouble NA. She is captured by GU, JB pursues in a tank, destroy a beautiful statue in the streets of St.Petersburg, GU nips at mickey bottle while being chased. GU and XO take NA into old Soviet train fortress, meet AT. JB derails the train, gets trapped inside with NA, they escape. UR seems concerned about whether AT is really a Liens Cossack, but we don't learn how concerned. NA's computer trace program represents graphically the polycentric new world order, but it still points to communist Cuba. They set out for Cuba, but of course take time out for nookie in the grass. Cut to Florida in BMW, they meet JW from CIA. Lends them plane

and unofficial aid for insertion into Cuba.

JW: So you're looking for a dish the size of a football field, huh? Doesn't exist. You can't light a cigar in Cuba without us seeing it.

NA: I know it's there. It's a duplicate of Severnaya, like your secret transmitters in New Zealand.

JW: I've never been in New Zealand. (aside to JB: How does she know about that?)

JB: What if I need back-up?

JW: Get on the radio, I'll send in the marines.

They are shot down and crash-land in the jungle. JB and XO fight it out. XO is killed (the bad woman always dies). They find hidden radar dish and control centre. AT and BO prepare to target London. Targeting map still shows USSR in red, USA in blue. JB and NA sneak in, JB sets explosive timer, surrenders. AT deactivates explosive.

AT plans to use the E-M pulse to destroy British bank, stock, property records. He wants revenge on Britain, foresees a complete financial meltdown. NA changes computer codes, but they still need to destroy the transmitter. JB physically jams antenna, has showdown with AT. Goldeneye satellite burns up in atmosphere. England is safe, Cuban Centre is destroyed, BO is dead. JB and NA escape, find themselves surrounded by US Marines and JW. They fly off to Guantanamo Bay.

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