UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

The Internal Dynamics of Strategic Change in
Canadian National Sport Organizations

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Physical Education and Recreation

Edmonton, Alberta
Fall, 1998

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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to investigate the way in which various internal dynamics affected the strategic change process in a set of 36 Canadian national sport organizations (NSOs). Specifically, the intent was to provide insight into why some organizations were able to complete a program of radical change to become more professional and business-like in their operations, while others were not. Structural and values data collected between 1984 and 1996 comprised the primary data for the three studies reported on here.

In the first study it was discovered that fast-paced change in and of itself was not sufficient to bring about radical change. However, rapid change to an NSO's decision-making systems was found to be critical in completing the transition process. In the second study, attention shifted to the impact that the values held by NSO members had on the outcome of the transition. The key finding here centred on the fact that although coercive pressures could be used to initiate the change process, completing the transformation depended upon members of an organization holding values that were supportive of the transition. In the final study, it was discovered that those NSOs that completed the transformation catered for the interests of influential sub-units, while those that failed took little account of them. Further, it was learned that those NSOs that made the change were typified by a structure that saw power dispersed to include professional staff. Those organizations that failed to complete the change had concentrated power structures dominated by an elite that opposed the transition. Finally, those NSOs that

completed the change had leaders who were able to articulate a future state to which the organization needed to move and convince others of their ability to effectively lead the organization through the transition process. Those NSOs that failed to complete the transformation instead had leaders who were either in favour of retaining the *status quo*, or who lacked the ability to bring about change of this nature.

Acknowledgements

There are numerous people who need acknowledging here, people who have influenced me and hence this project. To list them all individually would make this section longer than the thesis, but there are a few who need to be singled out. First, my committee members Royston Greenwood, Tim Burton, Michael Mauws and Ann Hall (a committee member until the final days of my thesis work) all shared with me their expertise in a friendly, collegial manner that enriched my learning experience considerably. Bob Hinings spent many hours patiently explaining things to me, suggesting ideas and directions for the research, and outlining why Nottingham Forest are a team worth watching. In fact, the conversations with Bob and Royston (a committed Leeds fan) over football were always entertaining, and showed me that internationally renowned scholars will sometimes argue passionately about something without a shred of supporting evidence – a valuable lesson! Finally, my supervisor, Trevor Slack. The debt I owe Trevor for educating me over the past 5 years is unlikely to be repaid. He epitomized to me what a supervisor should be, and then went far beyond it. His guidance, insight and friendship went a long way to making my doctoral experience such a rewarding and pleasurable one. Laura Cousens and Tim Berrett, both sport management doctoral students, also contributed much to my education. Tim became my biggest critic when it came to proof reading papers – a job he seemed to relish! Laura was always available to discuss problems and issues, and her work ethic continually made me demand more of myself. As well, Tim and Laura's friendship and support have always stood me in good stead.

I was fortunate to also gain from membership of three select groups of people while I lived in Edmonton. The graduate student body in the Faculty of PE and Recreation led to several firm friendships: Chase, Tony Webster, Michael Heine and Silky are amongst those who taught me a thing or two over the last few years. Hamish Black and all the players at Edmonton Scottish certainly added a new dimension to my life here, as did Len Vickery and the Golden Bears soccer team. Andy, Dougy, Nick and the rest of both teams greatly enhanced my stay in Edmonton.

My final thanks are also personal in nature. Burge has been as good a friend as I could ever have hoped to have. He has consistently stuffed me at pool, run my legs off along the river valley, had me crawling out of the gym, and argued a point with me until I completely contradicted myself – and yet always made me feel as though I gained from the experience. Catherine has enriched my life immeasurably. She has always been there for me, providing stability, insight, friendship, support and love, even when we have been thousands of miles apart. Finally, my family. Mum, dad, Sally and Gary have always loved and supported me in everything I do. Without them, I would never have completed this.

Thanks to you all.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Canadian amateur sport system recently experienced what has almost certainly been the most tumultuous twelve years in its history. The first year of this period, 1984, marked the start of an era during which Canada's National Sport Organizations (NSOs) were put under intense pressure to alter their structures, systems, and values. The final year, 1996, has been described as the "end of the line for Canada's [amateur] sport system . . . the last product of Canada's golden age of sport spending" (Christie, 1997, p. A1). Over this twelve-year period, NSOs were exposed to a variety of frequently conflicting internal and external pressures. The federal government, through its agent Sport Canada, wanted these informal, volunteer organizations to become much more professional and business-like in their operations. However, these changes were anachronistic to many of the values and beliefs that had traditionally underpinned Canadian NSOs. Consequently, although some NSOs satisfied the government's requirements and became much more professional and bureaucratic, others experienced little significant change.

The origins of this turbulent twelve-year period can be traced back to the federal government's first notable involvement in Canadian amateur sport in 1961 and the passage through Parliament of Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport*. From this point on, the government became increasingly involved in the provision of amateur sport. At first government involvement was limited to the provision of small grants to national governing bodies and various joint initiatives with provincial governments aimed at increasing participation (Macintosh, Bedecki & Franks, 1987). However, through the 1960s "as sport assumed an increasingly popular role in Canadian popular culture, the government's attitude changed" (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990, p. 4). In 1968, an electioneering Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau argued that sport could serve as a powerful source of national unity, and promised to establish a Task Force on Sport. The resultant *Report of the Task Force on Sport for Canadians* (Canada, 1969) criticized Canada's NSOs for their "kitchen table"-like operations that placed a reliance on volunteer officers, had national executives that were frequently drawn from only one or two regions of the

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country, and were, overall, inefficient. The report also placed an emphasis on the role that the federal government should play in promoting high performance sport.

The *Proposed Sports Policy for Canadians* (Munro, 1970) that followed the Task Force report went even further. It laid the foundations for the creation of a sport bureaucracy by providing guidelines for, amongst other things, direct funding for NSOs and the creation of Sport Canada. It also touted the importance in developing programs for mass participation and the production of elite level athletes. However, it quickly became apparent that "the sport governing bodies, for the most part, did not have the organizational skills nor the leadership necessary for the development of elite athletes. It was evident that funds would have to be expended to hire full-time professional staff and to streamline administrative and organizational capacities" (Macintosh et al., 1987, p. 66). Consequently, through the 1970s a gradual increase in the professionalization and bureaucratization of Canada's NSOs took place (Harvey & Proulx, 1988; Macintosh, 1988; Macintosh et al., 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990).

The changes that were made to the amateur sport system over this period were carried out in a gradual and incremental manner. However, in 1983, the federal government's Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, through Sport Canada, introduced its "Best Ever" program. Embarrassed by Canadian performances at the 1976 Montreal Olympics, the original objective behind the Best Ever program was to assist national team athletes in their preparation for the 1988 Winter Olympics to be held in Calgary. Following the successes that were achieved at the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, it was decided to expand the program to also include all of those NSOs that were preparing competitors for the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul.

The Best Ever program indicated a pronounced alteration in the government's approach to amateur sport. Rather than promoting an incremental move towards professionalization which had been ongoing since 1970, the government instead decided to introduce a scheme that was designed to bring about radical, frame-breaking change. The federal government determined that elite level athletic performances would be dramatically improved if the informal, volunteer run NSOs became controlled and operated by full-time professional staff, and produced detailed four-year plans of proposed activities and

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objectives. The government promised a great increase in resources for those organizations that agreed to move to a more professional, formal design. Office space was provided at the Canadian Sport and Fitness Administration Centre in Ottawa, together with funding assistance to fill certain professional staff positions, administrative and marketing support, and operational assistance from Sport Canada consultants. Those NSOs that refused to accede to the government's wishes were correspondingly threatened with the withdrawal of resources. The governments increased commitment to achieving Olympic success was reflected by the fact that by the final year of the first Best Ever quadrennial, 1988, federal funding for amateur sport in Canada had reached an all-time high CDN$86m (Jollimore, 1996).

At the 1988 Olympics, however, Ben Johnson recorded a positive drug test after "winning" the men's 100 metres gold medal. A Royal Commission headed by The Honorable Charles Dubin, which was subsequently charged with conducting a public enquiry into the scandal, found that drug taking was prevalent in many parts of the Canadian amateur sporting system. The Commission's report questioned the wisdom of placing such great emphasis on high-performance amateur sport at the expense of mass participation. Consequently, with Canada also entering a period of severe financial depression, many in the government questioned the amount of public money that was being provided to amateur athletics in the country. As a result, the 1988-1992 and 1992-1996 quadrennials each witnessed increasingly severe cutbacks in both the money and infrastructure with which the federal government was willing to support the amateur sport system. In fact, by 1996 seven of the original 36 NSOs that had been involved in the Best Ever program in 1984 had their federal support totally eliminated. The highs that were enjoyed before the Seoul Olympics were virtually forgotten as total federal spending on amateur sport decreased in 1996 to CDN$48.6m (Jollimore, 1996). The message to NSOs was clear: they were expected to largely support themselves with money gained from sponsorship, membership fees and philanthropic donations. A timeline illustrating some of the key events that have shaped the development of the Olympic sport system within Canada is provided in table 1.

The effects of government involvement in Canada's amateur sport system have been the focus of several research programs (e.g., Kikulis, Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Macintosh et al., 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1987, 1992, 1994). While these studies have increased our understanding of the nature of change in NSOs, this work has been, on the whole, highly deterministic. Their varying analyses have concentrated on the way in which external pressures, primarily the federal government but also the sports community and to a lesser extent the physical education profession, have impacted the amateur sports system. These pressures are largely described as acting in a uniform manner and *causing* NSOs in particular to change in a certain prescribed way. However, the pressures that these NSOs were exposed to between 1984 and 1996 resulted in what were ostensibly very similar organizations often changing in very different manners. Furthermore, as previously noted the pressures that were designed to transform these NSOs were diametrically opposed to many of the long-held values and beliefs that had traditionally underpinned the amateur sport system. It is therefore suggested here that much of the variation in organizational response to these pressures can be attributed to the different internal dynamics that shaped and constrained the change process. This, however, is an area, that has yet to be systematically investigated. Consequently, the purpose of this research is to try and uncover the effects that different internal dynamics have on the propensity of an organization to enter into and complete a program of change. The insights provided by such research should go a long way to determining why it is that some organizations are able to make radical transitions, while others are not.

Thus far, the changes that the federal government was trying to impose have been discussed in quite general terms. In order to more accurately determine the changes made by these organizations, we employed Hinings and Greenwood's (1988) notion of archetypes. An archetype is defined as a set of structures, processes and systems that are

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underpinned by a collection of ideas, beliefs and values (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). Within this Most changes that take place are relatively small-scale attempts by managers to improve the coherence among different organizational elements (Miller & Friesen, 1984). As such, they take place within the parameters of the existing archetypal design. By contrast, radical change involves moving from one archetype to another (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a). This type of change is frequently disruptive and viewed as threatening by organization members. Consequently, it can be extremely difficult to accomplish.

Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995a), in their investigation into the way in which Canadian NSOs changed between 1984 and 1988, uncovered the existence of three different archetypal designs. The *Kitchen Table* archetype represents the way in which Canadian NSOs have been traditionally designed. Volunteers are all-powerful in this type of organization, with appointments to different positions based not on individual expertise, but more on loyalty, desire and commitment to the organization. The organization is operated very informally, with little emphasis given to formal planning, policies or procedures. The ultimate goal of the NSO is ensuring the satisfaction of its membership.

In the *Boardroom* archetype, greater emphasis is placed on nurturing elite-level athletes, providing high quality competitions, developing technical expertise among professional staff, and increasing administrative efficiency. Opportunities for recreational-level activities and mass participation are still valued, but not as highly as they are in the Kitchen Table archetype. The organization is still dominated by a volunteer controlled hierarchy that is supported by professional staff who conduct day-to-day operations.

Finally, the *Executive Office* archetype appeared as a direct result of the Best Ever program. Technical expertise is required in all professionals and volunteers who hold formal positions in the organization. The development and operation of the NSO is placed in the hands of the theoretically more expert professional staff. The volunteer board, which meets much more infrequently in this type of design, is intended to merely set long-term policy and sanction the decisions of the professional staff. The overriding objective in this type of organization is the winning of medals at major championships such as the Olympics, Commonwealth Games, World Championships, and Pan-Am Games.

These archetypes gave us an heuristic with which to determine how each of the NSOs involved in this research altered over time. The purpose of the changes introduced by Sport Canada was to move what were predominantly Kitchen Table-type organizations to an Executive Office design. By gathering data at specific intervals, we could determine the change in archetypal design of each NSO between 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992 and 1996. We could then go on to examine the effects of different internal dynamics on the transition process.

The first study, outlined in Chapter 2, consists of an investigation into the effects of the speed at which change takes place and the order in which different parts of the organization are changed. The pace and sequence of organizational change has lacked any great examination, and yet has been noted as an important area requiring future research (Nadler & Tushman, 1989; Pettigrew et al., 1992). Some theorists have suggested that radical changes need to be introduced quickly in order to overcome the inertia that builds up over time as members develop familiarity and comfort with current operating practices (e.g., Hackman, 1984; Warren, 1984). Others, however, have argued that fast-paced change is too disruptive to the organization's operation and, therefore, should be introduced more gradually (e.g., Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Hedberg, Nystrom & Starbuck, 1976). There has been similar disagreement over the order in which different parts of the organization should change. Some have argued that the most important parts of the organization, termed high-impact elements, should be changed first in order to send a clear message to the entire organization as to the nature and importance of the changes that are taking place (Kanter, 1984; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). The opposite argument has also been expressed by those who hold that it is too difficult to change these central parts of the organization, and that momentum should be built up by altering more peripheral elements first (e.g., Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990; Peters & Waterman, 1982). The lack of unity on pace and sequence is perhaps a result of the lack of any formal investigation into how these dynamics affect change. The purpose of this first paper, therefore, is to examine whether the pace and sequence of radical change in any way affects the outcome of the transition process.

In Chapter 3, the impact of values on the change process is explored. Institutional and transformational theory literatures are drawn upon to construct a theoretical framework. From this, various questions are addressed concerning the way in which values held by members of an organization affect change. This again is an area that has received virtually no explicit attention in either the management or sport literatures.

In Chapter 4, the effects of three more internal dynamics involved in the change process are assessed. The first of these is the way in which the desire to enhance or protect sub-unit interests can serve to either promote or block any attempted program of radical change. The second is the effect that the power structure of an organization can have on its propensity to change. The third is the way in which the organization's capacity for change, most notably the effect of leadership, impacts on the transition. The predominantly quantitative approach employed in chapters two and three is somewhat balanced here by the construction and analysis of case studies, some depicting NSOs that made the radical transformation, and others describing organizations that did not. In this way we are able to follow a comparative case study design, seen as particularly useful when trying to examine the impact of internal dynamics on the change process (Pettigrew et al., 1992).

Chapters two, three and four are linked together by a concluding chapter. Here, the implications of the findings outlined in the three previous chapters are analyzed as to the impact that they may have on our understanding of the change process. As is pointed out in the conclusion, the study of change is becoming increasingly important as economic, political and technological environments change more quickly. With this in mind, possible directions for future research are discussed.

The data that were used for the three studies were collected in a variety of ways and by various researchers. Professor Trevor Slack, Professor Bob Hinings and graduate student Lisa Kikulis collected the structural and interview data pertaining to 1984, 1986 and 1988. They were used by Kikulis in her doctoral work at the University of Alberta (Kikulis, 1992a), and formed the basis of a collection of papers by Kikulis, Slack and Hinings (1992b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). The data from 1992 were collected by Slack and Hinings, and have never been published. The author of this dissertation collected the 1996

structural and interview data. The values data were collected in 1986, primarily by Lucie Thibault as part of her Master's work at the University of Alberta (Thibault, 1987). Hinings, Thibault, Slack and Kikulis (1996) also used these data. All of the raw data were analyzed by the author, irrespective of if or how they had previously been used. Therefore, although concepts such as the three archetypes had been used before, the actual raw data were totally reanalyzed for this project. Finally, every article on amateur sport that appeared in the *Globe & Mail*, *Maclean's Magazine*, *Calgary Herald*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Toronto Star*, *The Gazette* (from Montreal) and *The Chronicle-Herald* (from Halifax) between 1982 and 1996 was collected. These, together with every federal government publication on amateur sport that was produced over the same period, were then assessed by the author of this dissertation to provide additional context to the changes that took place.

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Table 1.1. Key events in the development of the Olympic sport system in Canada.

Date	Event
1959	Speech of Prince Philip in which he laments the state of Canadian fitness.
1961	Unanimous passage of Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport*. Seeks to improve athletic performances through increase in physical fitness of population.
1960s	Greater money increases participation in national and international competitions. Lack of organizational skills in National Sport Governing Bodies (NSGBs); few coaching clinics; poor officiating; lack of sports medicine; need for athletes to spend more time training – all seen as barriers to progress.
1966	First administrative grants given to NSGBs.
1969	Report of *Task Force on Sport for Canadians* suggests sport inextricably linked with matters of national pride and prestige at home and abroad. Therefore suggested important federal government become more fully involved in Canadian amateur sport. Also urged that national championships and NSOs become a priority, that professionalism on field should be reflected in administration (criticized volunteer driven "kitchen table" organizations as inefficient); recommended enlargement of sport bureaucracy, raising of its profile in the government, and creation of Sport Canada (SC) to oversee NSO operations.
1970	Establishment of National Sport and Recreation Centre in Ottawa – 33 sports housed there; 36 non-resident sports funded.
1971	Sport Canada established to run amateur sport. Government policy statement released aimed at improving elite level performances and mass participation opportunities.
1975	Canada Olympic Association (COA) and Olympic Trust create Athletes Assistance Program (AAP) to support elite level athletes.
1976	Montreal Olympics – Canada first host to fail to win a gold medal. Sport Canada takes on AAP – government now has direct access to athletes. Sport Minister's portfolio created.
1978	Canada finishes top of medal table at Commonwealth Games. Sport Minister Iona Campagnolo carried around track by athletes – political capital to be gained from elite sport acknowledged.
1979	*Partners in Pursuit of Excellence: A National Policy on Amateur Sport* released – focus on elite level sport; no mention of recreation. Focus on role of government in production of world class athletes, coaches and official. Noted need for private funding and confining assistance to sports with a national identity and strong base.
1981	White paper *A Challenge to the Nation: Fitness and Amateur Sport in the '80s* released. Focus on elite sport, improvement of NSO administration, and development of high performance centres, hosting policy and AAP.
March 1983	Sport Minister Ray Perrault announces that in addition to current $5.5 million per year spent on winter sports, a further $18.7 million per year will be devoted to winter NSOs over next five years rising to $25 million by 1988, as part of "Best Ever" program. Perrault promised that there would not be a repeat of 1976 when Canada hosted and failed to win a gold medal.
Aug. 1984	Sport Minister Jean Lapierre announced Ottawa will increase spending on amateur sport by about 50% (@$9 million per year) following performances at LA Games. Summer sports now part of "Best Ever" program.
May 1985	Otto Jelinik (Sports Minister) wants to bring more private money into amateur sport.
Jan. 1986	Sport Marketing Council established to increase corporate sponsorship of amateur sport.
March 1988	5 year extension to Best Ever program worth $32 million.

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Table 1.1 (continued).

1988	Federal funding for sport at all-time high $86 million. Ben Johnson fails drug test after "winning" 100 metres in Seoul Olympics.
Oct. 1988	Sport Canada budget cut from $55 million to $50 million.
Dec. 1988	Winter sports have budgets cut 13% to 49%. Sponsors also pull out following Johnson scandal. Sport Minister Jean Charest calls for greater emphasis on ethics and a redefinition of cultural values of sport.
March 1989	Dubin Report: need to change AAP system that provides incentives to use drugs by basing funding on international rankings; winning too important.
April 1989	4% drop in government funding for amateur sport to $55.6 million.
Nov. 1991	Athletes form Canadian Athletes Association because they feel that sport system undervalues them.
March 1992	NSOs continue with budgets frozen since 1987-88.
May 1992	*Sport: The Way Ahead* released by federally appointed Task Force. 117 recommendations including deemphasis on win at all costs mentality, focus on athletes not sport organizations, increase financial support for athletes, develop professional coaching system, host more international events, develop list of core sports to be funded.
1992	Canada finishes 15th in medal table: 7 golds, 4 silvers, 7 bronzes
June 1993	Sport Minister's portfolio eliminated – moved to Canadian Heritage.
May 1994	Core Sports report released – recommends that 19 sports (including 1994 Olympic medal winning biathlon and freestyle, and national sport lacrosse) have federal funding terminated in 3 years. Minister Dupuy says biathlon and freestyle safe.
Dec. 1994	Sport Canada Funding Framework proposed to replace Core Sports report. Similar concept – funding reduced number of sports. Elite performances again influence funding.
March 1995	1994/95 NSO funding $41.675 million (overall $50 million on amateur sport) 1995/96 set at $31.28 million (75%) – 12% cut; 5% reallocated to "Major Games"; 1% to AAP. Intended cut 12% in each of next two years – i.e. 50% cut in 3 years. Overall spending on amateur sport in 1995/96 set at $38.8 million.
April 1995	22 NSOs (inc. 7 Olympic) to be eliminated from federal funding by 1996/97.
April 1996	COA announces $4 million increased funding of athletes and NSOs to $16 million over 4 years. Money from marketing and management of endowment fund from 1988 Olympics.
Aug. 1996	Canada finishes 11th in medal table: 3 gold, 11 silver, 8 bronze

Sources: Macintosh, Bedecki & Franks, 1987; Macintosh, 1988; Harvey & Proulx, 1988; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; and articles from the *Globe & Mail, Maclean's Magazine, Toronto Star, Calgary Herald, Chronicle-Herald* (Halifax), *Winnipeg Free Press, The Gazette* (Montreal).

Chapter 2
The Pace and Sequence of Strategic Change

The implementation of programs of large-scale change has become an increasingly prevalent feature of organizational life in recent years, particularly following the political and economic fluctuations of the 1980s and early 1990s. As Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee (1992, p. 1) noted, during this time, "the pace of [organizational] change seemed to accelerate . . . as restructuring became a common experience." Consequently, the study of organizational change has also become increasingly popular in recent years. These studies have taken a variety of forms. There have been detailed case studies typified by the Pettigrew's (1985, 1987) study of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) and Child and Smith's (1987) analysis of Cadbury Limited. Highly quantitative studies have also appeared, such as Miller and Friesen's (1984) investigation of small Quebec businesses, and Hannan and Freeman's (1989) population-level analyses of change. There have also been studies which have combined qualitative and quantitative approaches, including Hinings and Greenwood's (1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993) work on the transformation of local government in the UK and Romanelli and Tushman's (1994) analysis of the US mini-computer industry.

As the number and variety of empirical studies on change have increased, so too has the evidence that organizations do not follow the type of linear progression that early change theorists described (Chin & Benne, 1961; Greiner, 1967, 1972) and to which many prescriptive writers still subscribe (cf. Kotter, 1994). For early theorists, the idea of organizational change carried with it "the notion of a single revolutionary event, of an organization moving from one state to another in a short period of time" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p. 106). However, more recent theoretical and empirical work has suggested that organizations go through long periods of evolutionary or incremental change interspersed with short, sharp revolutionary, quantum, or frame breaking, transitions (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Miller, 1982; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Mintzberg, 1978; Pettigrew, 1985; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).

Evolutionary change involves fine-tuning the organization to improve consistencies between the organization's structure, strategy, processes, and people. It requires a series of small adjustments, often made in response to minor environmental shifts. Within this scenario, uncertainties remain well within tolerable limits as the system is adapted rather than transformed. Revolutionary change, by contrast, involves momentous alterations to the entire organization. Most research has suggested that revolutionary change occurs in response to, or preferably but less often in anticipation of, major environmental changes (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Nadler & Tushman, 1989; Pettigrew, 1985; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). This type of transition involves rapid, wholesale changes to the organization, and may include reformations to the corporate mission and core values; alterations to the power and status of internal groups; modifications to the organizational structure, systems, and procedures; and, frequently, the hiring of new executives with a commitment to the new mission and freedom from prior obligations within the organization (Tushman, Newman & Romanelli, 1986). In short, the "deep structure" that provides the organization with its stability is dismantled, and a new configuration constructed (Gersick, 1991).

This notion of internal configurations stems from the idea that there are only a limited number of possible combinations of elements that will permit the organization to function effectively (Mintzberg, 1979; Miller and Friesen, 1980a, 1980b, 1984). Logically, then, in any transition many different organizational components "will have to change rapidly and simultaneously if [dysfunctional] structural hybrids or mutations" are to be avoided (Miller, 1982, p. 142). Gersick (1991, p. 34) agreed, suggesting that "fundamental change cannot be accomplished piecemeal, slowly, gradually, or comfortably." In other words, the successful implementation of large-scale change seems to require rapid adjustment to all parts of the organization. However, some writers have suggested that it is more important to change some parts of an organization before others. Kanter (1984) and Hinings and Greenwood (1988) have both argued that successful transitions depend on early change in those structures and systems that are central to the function of the organization. Change to these "high-impact" elements, it is suggested,

sends a clear, and necessary, message to the entire organization as to the importance and permanency of the changes being introduced.

Much of this theorizing about configurations, evolutionary and revolutionary change, and high-impact elements, raises important issues regarding the speed, or *pace*, at which change takes place, and the order, or *sequence*, in which different parts of the organization are altered. Recently, several writers have, at least implicitly, suggested that this neglected area requires further investigation (Gersick, 1994; Monge, 1995; Nadler & Tushman, 1989; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). It is this gap in the literature that we wish to begin to fill with an empirical investigation into the effects that the pace and sequence of change have on the outcome of organizational transitions. To this end, the remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. In the next part, a theoretical framework is developed with which to underpin the study. This is followed by a description of the research site and an outline of the methods used to collect and analyze the data. The results that were found are then detailed, and the ways in which they improve our understanding of the pace and sequence of organizational change discussed. The paper finishes with some brief concluding remarks.

Theoretical Framework

In any study that seeks to examine strategic change, it is of course necessary to first define the nature of the change that is being investigated. We do this by drawing on the notion of archetypes (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993; Hinings and Greenwood, 1988; Kikulis, Slack & Hinings, 1995a; Miller & Friesen, 1980a, 1984). The type of change of interest in this study is what Greenwood and Hinings (1993) termed "radical", Miller and Friesen (1984) "quantum", Tushman and Romanelli (1985) "revolutionary", and Nadler and Tushman (1989) "frame breaking". We define it as the move from one archetypal form to another, or from a form that has no clear archetypal status to one that does.

The use of archetypes in the study of organizational change emanates from Miller and Friesen's (1980a, 1984) suggestion that, rather than examining an organization by looking at its individual component parts, greater insight is gained from considering the overall patterning of these components. It then becomes possible to examine the manner

in which different parts of the organization interact. Employing this form of holistic study, Miller and Friesen came to the conclusion that, despite the theoretically enormous number of ways in which it is possible for them to be combined, organizational elements are in fact arranged in only a relatively small number of different patterns. In short, organizations tend to evolve towards specific coherent combinations of elements, generally termed archetypes, configurations or gestalts, as the most effective form of organizing. The patterning of these elements is held in place by the underlying set of beliefs and values which are held by individuals within the organization and known as interpretive schemes (Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980). The unique way in which beliefs and values are shaped by the inner and outer organizational context render archetypes institutionally specific (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). In other words, although certain ideas might be generalizable to other organization sectors, the archetypes, *per se*, are not transferable.

Greenwood and Hinings (1988) built on Miller and Friesen's work by placing a greater emphasis on the importance of values and beliefs in underpinning the archetype. They defined an archetype as,

> "a set of ideas, beliefs and values that shape prevailing conceptions of what an organization should be doing, of how it should be doing it, and how it should be judged, *combined with* structures and processes that serve to implement and reinforce those ideas" (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, p. 295) (emphasis in the original).

With the desired state of organizational coherence constantly being strived for, most change will occur within an archetype. This involves the organization making a series of relatively minor changes in an attempt to better conform to a particular design. Revolutionary, or radical, change, by contrast, involves moving from one archetype to another. It involves decoupling the organization's structures and systems from the prevailing interpretive scheme, and recoupling them to another (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). The inevitable disruption to organization routines, and the resistance from groups which perceive that the move will place them in a disadvantaged position, not to mention the actual difficulty in permanently adjusting peoples' values, mark this type of transition as being very difficult to accomplish. In this sense, an archetype can be compared to a

paradigm with its notions of longevity, stability, and intractability (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

Archetypes, then, are a useful heuristic with which to determine the design-status of an organization at a particular point in time. However, as Hinings and Greenwood (1988, p. 24) suggested, "the identification of design archetypes is an interesting and illuminating but essentially *preparatory* step for the explanation and mapping of change" (emphasis in original). Hinings and Greenwood (1988) used this notion of archetypes to uncover different change *tracks*. Quite simply, tracks allow the researcher to draw a conceptual map, plotting the process that the organization makes in attempting a transition from one archetypal form to another. A fundamental tenet of the tracks notion is "the rate at which design arrangements become decoupled from the prevailing interpretive scheme and become attached to suffusing ideas and values (Greenwood and Hinings, 1988, p. 303). As such, although they do not provide any direct indication of the pace and sequence of a transition, the very existence of different tracks raises questions regarding the speed and sequence of change.

The most common organization track is "inertia". If the proposed changes are inconsistent with the prevailing meanings held by the dominant group within the organization, the change may not be recognized, or, if it is, it may be suppressed. Any adjustment that is carried out remains consistent with the logic of the prevailing interpretive scheme as the organization retains its original archetypal form. A second possible track which organizations may follow is an "aborted excursion" or "reversal". Here, selective parts of the organization become decoupled from the prevailing interpretive scheme. This may be accidental, occurring as a result of organizational slack, it may be politically motivated, or it may be the consequence of genuine experimentation. Whatever the reason, the accompanying decline in performance causes management to reinstate the previous design arrangement.

Third, an organization may actually be successful and carry out its archetypal transformation. This will occur when the prevailing interpretive scheme has lost its legitimacy. In its place an alternative emerges, with support provided to a different pattern of structural elements. This transformation may occur in a smooth linear manner,

but more often changes in direction - oscillations - and delays mark the transition process. Fourth, there may be what Hinings and Greenwood (1988) term an "unresolved excursion". Although the organization starts to change, it becomes locked between the gravitational pulls of competing interpretive schemes, and ends up residing in a "schizoid" form, a hybrid of the two archetypes. If one accepts the logic of archetypal coherence, then this track may just be a function of the amount of time the organization in question has been observed. It may be that it is on its way to attaining archetypal coherence, or is about to start reversing back towards its original form, but just has not yet resolved its final form. Indeed, Kikulis et al. (1995a, p. 92), in their study of Canadian National Sport Organizations (NSOs) found that one third of the organizations in their study followed what they called a delayed track. They concluded that "these organizations were not delayed because of a lag in their change; rather, four years [the length of their study] was not enough time for them to reach the design archetype." In other words, the delayed and unresolved excursion tracks are likely to be more a reflection of the pace at which change occurs rather than of any singular set of circumstances.

Finally, organizations which are close to a particular archetype in an "embryonic" form may have to make only incremental changes to their structures and systems in order to attain full archetypal status. These organizations use current structural and systemic arrangements as a guide as they follow a convergent track towards a coherent design. The concept of tracks offers implicit support for the importance of pace and sequence in the change process. For instance, how is it that some organizations are able to overcome inertia while others are not? Why do some follow a linear reorientation track and others a reversal? It seems inevitable that the pace at which change takes place and the sequence in which different elements are altered will play an important role in deciding which track the organization will follow. We now examine the pace and then the sequence of change more specifically as we build towards some testable propositions.

Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Miller and Friesen (1980a, 1980b, 1984) have suggested that organizations which successfully negotiate revolutionary changes do so over a relatively short period of time. They each proposed that rapid change is positive because it creates synergy whereby all parts of the organization are pulling together in a

common direction. This prevents pockets of resistance building up from groups that feel that their power, both formal and informal, is threatened by the reorientation. It also allows other changes which are necessary, but which have been put off during convergent periods of relative stability, to be carried out. Finally, it overcomes the disruptive period of risk and uncertainty associated with any major change as quickly as possible. In short, rapid change allows those instigating the transformation to overcome the inevitable inertia that is usually the biggest obstacle to achieving organization change.

In fact, the need to overcome inertia provides the most compelling argument for fast-paced organizational change. Convergence, theoretically, brings about better and better performance as iterative alterations improve the congruence among organizational goals, structure, systems, values and the environment. However, as the organization becomes more successful, internal forces develop which promote stability: habits and patterned behaviors become value laden, employees develop a sense of competence which they are reluctant to forsake, and structures and systems are developed that allow for only compatible changes (Wilson, 1992). Self-reinforcing patterns of behavior, norms, and values all conspire to develop complacency and a history of standard operating practices which can anchor the organization in the past and reduce flexibility. As a result, when faced with an environmental threat, complacency and stunted vigilance may prevent the threat registering; or, if it is recognized, the response is frequently to conform to the *status quo* as managers subscribe to the comforting "let's-stick-to-what-we-do-best" maxim (Peters & Waterman, 1982). "Productive attention to detail, for instance, turns into an obsession with minutia; rewarding innovation escalates into gratuitous invention; and measured growth becomes unbridled expansion" (Miller, 1990, p. 3). As a consequence of this, any changes that are attempted are likely to be incremental and implemented relatively slowly. Factors such as sunk costs, dominant coalitions wishing to retain their bases of power, and barriers to entry and exit in an industry, can also prevent organizations from being able to undertake rapid change (Scott, 1995).

Although the innate logic behind the need for fast-paced change is convincing, and theoretically widely supported, the very small amount of empirical evidence available is largely anecdotal and somewhat equivocal. Burns and Stalker's (1961) organic

organizations, Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) plastic companies, Stinchcombe's (1959) craft firms, and Mintzberg's (1979) adhocracies are all praised for their abilities to respond rapidly to changes in their environments. In fact, it is a characteristic seen as vital for their survival. Warren's (1984) study of Antioch College and Hackman's (1984) investigation of People Express airline similarly suggested that for transformations to be successful, they have to implemented quickly. Hinings and Greenwood (1988) and Miller and Friesen (1980a, 1980b, 1984) have also proposed that internal structures, systems, and values have to be changed relatively quickly in order for a transition to be successful. Conversely, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), Lindblom (1959), Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1976) and Vickers (1959) have all cautioned against organizations following courses of dramatic and pervasive change in favor of more gradual and incremental evolution. Despite these latter dissenting voices, in our first proposition we suggest that:

> **P1:** Organizations that are able to complete an archetypal transition are characterized by rapid change to all parts of the organization early on in the change process.

Organizations, it has been theorized, go through long periods of stability during which the only changes that occur take place within the parameters of the design archetype. Every so often, however, revolutionary or radical change takes place in which the organization shifts from one archetype to another. Mintzberg (1978, p. 978) articulated this as a tendency for change "to take place in spurts, each followed by a period of continuity." More recently, this thesis has found general acceptance as the theory of punctuated-equilibrium (Gersick, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). The underlying premise of this notion, with its roots in the life-cycle literature (Kimberley, Miles & associates, 1980), is that any large-scale change is disruptive as people within an organization require time to adjust to new roles, operating practices, and decision-making mechanisms. Thus, after any period of radical change, an organization requires a time of stability if it is to regain operating efficiency. Pettigrew (1985, p. 442), in his study of British chemicals giant ICI, found support for this premise when he observed "periods of revolutionary change . . . interspersed with eras of learning and adjustment." Although it makes intuitive sense, and is widely subscribed to by writers in the field, there are those

who argue that revolutionary change, even when interjected into longer periods of stability is inherently dangerous to the organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1989). Peters and Waterman (1982) suggested that those organizations that are excellent undergo continuous evolutionary adaptations rather than any large-scale periodic transitions. Similarly, Hedberg et al. (1976, pp. 60-61) called for organizations to avoid,

> "drastic revolutions . . . . Costs such as hostilities, demotivation, wasted energies, ill-founded rationalities and foolish risks can be lowered by nurturing small disruptions and incremental reorientations by substituting evolution for revolution."

However, we side with the logic of punctuated-equilibrium, and postulate that:

P2: The observed transition period will be marked by long periods of incremental change interspersed with short bursts of large-scale change.

Whether slow- or fast-paced change is better, what is clear is that the speed at which change occurs appears to have a significant impact on the transition. A related and equally significant dynamic that also requires investigation is the sequence in which organizational changes take place.

Sequencing describes the process of selective change in certain organizational elements. Although there is often an implicit assumption that all elements of an organization change at the same pace, pressures for change "may operate with varying effect on different organizational attributes" (Oliver, 1988, p. 558). It is our contention that this differential rate of change may be important in determining the overall outcome of the transition process.

As noted earlier, structural and systemic elements of organizations are not neutral and value free. On the contrary, members create provinces of meaning which incorporate interpretive schemes, intermittently articulated as values and interests, that form the basis of their orientation and strategic purpose within the organization (Ranson et al., 1980). Consequently, organizational change is not just a matter of altering structures, systems and processes, but also of changing the values and beliefs which underpin them.

The attachment of values to organization elements has significant consequences for the sequence of change, and has resulted in much discussion as to the order in which changes should be implemented within an organization. Values and beliefs are more likely

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to be enshrined in some organizational elements than others. These are what are often referred to as high-impact elements or systems (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Kanter, 1984). Those that subscribe to the notion of high-impact systems argue that successful change requires early change to these elements because of the powerful signal that will be sent to the rest of the organization. In his study of ICI, Pettigrew (1985, p. 378) identified the move of the company's decision-making headquarters from Millbank as "a signal that the changes in ICI were for real." As one ICI director put it, "I see the Millbank change as being the outward and visible sign . . . that signals to the outside world and the [internal] units that we are going to do something very different" (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 378).

However, because of their very centrality, it is also the high impact systems that are tied to the core values and beliefs of the organization that are likely to be the most resistant to change. Slack and Hinings (1994, p. 821), in their study of Canadian NSOs, observed that "change in a number of organizational characteristics was relatively easily achieved, while those which we identify as high-impact elements [decision-making systems] in that they reflect values central to these organizations, show little change." The results reported by Kikulis et al. (1995a) supported this finding. Consequently, there are those who argue that it is the more peripheral structural and systemic elements that are not tied to core values and beliefs are likely to be first in the sequence of elements to be changed (Beer, Eisenstat & Spector, 1990). Peters and Waterman (1982, p. 148), for example, argue that the most effective way to achieve the crucial momentum necessary for organizational change is to "start with the easy stuff, the things that are easy to change." Despite this, we contend that for radical organizational change to be successful, managers must target high-impact elements early on in the change process. Only in this way will it be possible to transmit to the entire organization the importance of the transition process, and thus generate the momentum necessary to break free from the all-enveloping organization inertia. This leads to our third proposition:

P3: Organizations that are able to complete an archetypal transition are characterized by early change to their high-impact elements.

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Our final point of investigation is to challenge the often, at least implicitly, held belief that organizational change occurs in an ordered, linear fashion. This is directly connected to our notions of value infused elements, and the effects that they have on the change process. Although as with our earlier theorizing there has been no direct examination of this facet of change, there have been a number of case studies from which it is possible to draw some insight into the linearity of the change process. In their study of National Steel, Barratt and Camman (1984) reported that managers introduced, then withdrew, and finally reintroduced various changes that they wished to see implemented. Peters and Waterman (1982) suggested that changing organizations inevitably end up oscillating back and forth as various options are tried and then replaced as they end up not producing the desired results. Pettigrew (1985), in his study of ICI, also uncovered a non-linear process of transition. The experimentation reported by Peters and Waterman undoubtedly explains some of the changes in direction observed in the case studies reported above. A second, and potentially more powerful explanation emerges when the language of tracks is reexamined. "A key aspect of tracks . . . is the rate at which design arrangements become decoupled from the prevailing interpretive scheme and become attached to suffusing ideas and values" (Greenwood & Hinings, 1988). This involves altering the dominant values and beliefs held by members of the organization, which can result in varying degrees of resistance across different parts of the organization. It is therefore not surprising that changes in direction and delays characterize the transition process. Indeed, Greenwood and Hinings (1988) and Kikulis et al. (1995a) found far more examples of organizations which followed reversal, oscillatory or delayed tracks than those that followed a straightforward linear transformation. However, these studies determined the linearity of the transformation process by examining "the extent to which the change process is marked by movements that are consistently towards a new archetype or punctuated by . . . reversals of direction" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p. 114). Having outlined the potential importance of high-impact systems to the change process, it seems that focussing on the linearity of change among different elements will provide greater insight into the change process than would another investigation into the organization as a whole. Thus, our final proposition suggests that:

P4: The final combination of elements in an organization design-type will be the result of a non-linear transition process.

Research Design

Our purpose within the framework of this study was to compare organizations that were able to complete a reorientation, or radical change, with those which were unable to do so. Our logic behind this is prompted by Hinings and Greenwood's (1997) suggestion that "if failed attempts can be identified and analyzed and shown to be different from attempted and successful reorientations, the resultant theories of organizational change and reorientation would be significantly strengthened" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1997, p. 10). We support this notion, and have used it to shape our research design.

Research Site

The organizations that we studied comprised a set of 36 Canadian Olympic NSOs. This group of organizations provided an excellent milieu in which to test our propositions for two reasons. First, it allowed us to study the effects of change forces on an entire population of organizations. Second, we were able to study the organizations during a distinct 12 year period which was quite probably the most turbulent in the history of Canadian amateur sport. The first year of our study, 1984, was the start of an era during which Canada's NSOs were placed under intense pressures to change their operating structures, their systems, and indeed, their values. The last year, 1996, has been described as the "end of the line for Canada's [amateur] sport system . . . the last product of Canada's golden age of sport spending" (Christie, 1997, p. A1). In this respect, we were granted an opportunity available to few who research outside the laboratory in that we were able to collect data over a distinct epoch marked by discernable beginning and end points. Throughout this period, these organizations were exposed to a variety of pressures to change the way in which they were structured and operated. In order to gain a full understanding of the impact of these pressures, it is first necessary to understand the context in which the changes were taking place. We therefore begin this section with a brief overview of the backdrop to the recent changes that have taken place in Canada's amateur sport system.

Since the passage in 1961 of Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport*, Canadian amateur sport organizations have been subject to a series of changes. These were initiated primarily as a result of the federal government's desire to drastically improve elite athletic performances at major international competitions (Harvey & Proulx, 1988; Macintosh, 1988; Macintosh, Bedecki & Franks, 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990). Up until the early 1980s, these changes, although seemingly endless, were principally, if not entirely, incremental in nature.

Much more dramatic change was instigated in 1983 when the federal government's Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, through its agent Sport Canada, introduced its "Best Ever" program. Originally designed to assist winter Olympic sport organizations to optimally perform at the 1988 Calgary Olympics, the program was expanded in 1984 to include all summer Olympic sports. Rather than just furthering the incremental shift toward professionalization and bureaucratization that had been on going since 1970, the Best Ever program was designed to bring about frame-breaking change within Canada's NSOs. Instead of the traditional design of an informal organization operated by volunteers receiving professional assistance, it was intended that NSOs should become highly bureaucratic operations, controlled by professional staff with volunteers reduced to a supporting role (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a; Slack & Hinings, 1987). More recently, the reduction or elimination of federal funding has resulted in these organizations being pressured to adopt market mechanisms in their management, and to seek corporate dollars through sponsorship or other agreements (cf. Canada, 1988; Harvey, Thibault & Rail, 1995). Consequently, the study of change in Canadian NSOs has become a fertile area of study (Hinings, Thibault, Slack & Kikulis, 1996; Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Macintosh et al., 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1987, 1992, 1994).

The work of Kikulis, Slack and Hinings is particularly germane to explaining the context of our research, not least because they studied the same set of 36 NSOs. Of particular use here is their 1992 article in which they outlined three archetypal designs associated with NSOs: *Kitchen Table*, *Boardroom*, and *Executive Office*. The process that they used for constructing the archetypes was that laid down by McKinney (1966),

and is detailed in Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995a). In short, it involved conducting an extensive review of published material, such as journals, books, official government documents, research reports, newspapers, and magazine articles. Themes were then identified which provided the foundation for the archetypes, namely the growth of amateur sport in Canada, the development of bureaucratic structures, the introduction of professional staff, and the emphasis on effectiveness. The next step was to identify the key underlying values that define the variety in the organizational design of these organizations. The number of viable archetypes was defined by reviewing the data according to the structural attributes of standardization, specialization and centralization, and the value attributes of orientation, domain, principles of organizing, and criteria of effectiveness. The final part involved identifying each individual archetype's characteristics, selected because of their criticality in defining that design (see Table 2.1).

Insert Table 2.1 about here

The Kitchen Table archetype was the institutionally approved mode of operation for NSOs until the early 1970s (Kikulis et al., 1995a). In this form, volunteer control is emphasized. In fact, the authority of volunteers becomes institutionalized at the cognitive level in such a way that it becomes taken-for-granted by organization members (Jepperson, 1991; Zucker, 1977). Roles in this type of NSO are not awarded on the basis of expertise or specialization, but more as a result of loyalty, desire, and commitment to the organization. Little emphasis is accorded to formal planning, rules, or policies; the organization is run on an almost *ad hoc* basis, aimed at satisfying its members.

With the increase of federal funding for sport in the 1970s, the Boardroom archetype became the legitimized form (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Here, although the provision of development opportunities and participation are still valued, there is a greater emphasis placed on the development of elite athletes, opportunities for competition, and technical expertise. Administrative efficiency and effectiveness are also highly valued. The method of organizing still revolves around a volunteer-controlled hierarchy supported by professionals who make day-to-day operational decisions.

Finally, the Executive Office archetype was a direct result of the Best Ever program and the federal government's focus on high performance athletics. In this design, the measure of success is simply the number of medals won at major championships such as Olympics, Commonwealth Games, and World Championships. Technical expertise is valued, indeed required, in professionals and volunteers. Policy development and the operation of the organization is devolved to the "more expert" professional staff, with the volunteer board intended to merely set organization policy and sanction professionals' decisions. The purpose of the government prescribed change program, therefore, was to get NSOs to change from predominantly Kitchen Table, or similar, designs to the Executive Office archetype. It is this program of change that we focus upon here.

Data Collection

Data collection began in 1984 (T_1), and was repeated in 1986 (T_2), 1988 (T_3), 1992 (T_4), and 1996 (T_5). The longitudinal nature of the study was seen as essential to capture the variety of organizational designs and patterns of change exhibited over time (Miller, 1982; Monge, 1995; Pettigrew, 1990, 1985). The qualitative and quantitative data used in the study were collected in a number of different ways. The first source comprised the high performance report that each NSO was required to complete as part of the initial quadrennial planning process (QPP) in 1984. Each NSO's volunteer board of directors, sometimes with input from professional staff, and two planning consultants who were hired by the federal government to provide technical assistance prepared this highly detailed report. These reports provided details of the programs operated, board and committee structures, professional staff roles, extent to which operations were standardized, and decision-making structures. Policies and procedures manuals, organization charts, and job descriptions were also included. To confirm these data, and obtain any missing information, interviews were conducted with either the NSO's senior professional, volunteer president, or its Sport Canada consultant. These data were used to determine the archetypal design of each NSO at T_1.

In order to ascertain the pace and sequence of the various changes that took place over the next twelve years, a series of repeated interviews were carried out with key

professional staff in each of the 36 NSOs involved in the QPP. We tried to keep the same informant across this time period but, of course, this was not always possible. This was not viewed as a major detriment to the study as each interview was conducted with the senior person most directly involved in the planning process. In total, approximately 200 interviews were conducted across the twelve years of the study. In order to maintain the consistency of the quantitative data being collected, a structured *pro forma* comprising a set of standard questions was used to guide the first half of the interview. The second half of each interview consisted of a more free ranging discussion of the changes that had occurred in each NSO individually, and in the Canadian amateur sport system as a whole. These allowed us to gain greater insight into why particular changes were occurring over time. Each interview lasted between 90 minutes and two hours.

We also carried out two documentary analyses in order to add further detail to our data, and to build up a picture of the context in which the changes were occurring. First, all federal documents produced on sport between 1961 and 1996 were examined. Second, all media reports on amateur sport printed between January 1982 and December 1996 in the *Globe and Mail*, *Maclean's Magazine*, *Toronto Star*, *Calgary Herald*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Chronicle-Herald* (from Halifax, Nova Scotia), and *The Gazette* (from Montreal) were collected. In this way we sought to provide a depth and richness to our data that would otherwise have been lacking. We also used this data to provide a check on the design archetypes that had been outlined by Kikulis et al. (1992). Although these archetypes appeared conceptually and empirically sound, and had been used in several published studies (e.g., Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Slack & Hinings, 1994) they had been created towards the end of the 1980s. The organizations in the study had subsequently been exposed to a variety of pressures that might have resulted in a new archetype becoming institutionally prescribed. In fact, all of the documentary evidence that we collected, and the interviews that were carried out in 1992 and 1996, supported the existence of the three archetypes previously described, and only those three.

Construction of the Archetypes

The quantitative data were used to determine the structural configurations of each organization at each of the data collection points T_1 to T_5. The structural dimensions used

for this purpose were specialization, standardization, and centralization. These dimensions have been theoretically and empirically established in both the organizational (Miller & Dröge, 1986; Pugh, Hickson & Hinings, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner 1968) and sport (Frisby, 1986; Hinings & Slack, 1987; Kikulis et al., 1989, 1995a; Slack & Hinings, 1987, 1992, 1994) literatures. Specialization here refers to the degree to which the organization was differentiated in terms of administrative, technical, and support roles in both the professional and volunteer domains. For example, specialization of volunteers (spvol) was measured by counting the number of different roles held by different individuals in each NSO. These might include the president, past president, various vice-presidents, secretary, treasurer, and so on. Specialization of professional staff (proper) was similarly calculated by counting roles such as managing director, marketing director, technical director, head coach, and the like. Specialization of support staff (supper) covered the existence of positions that included assistant coaches, marketing assistants, technicians and medical staff. Technical specialization (tecspec) was determined by examining the number of teams NSOs operated, the number of coaches used, the breakdown of the coaching staff by technical expertise and gender, and the existence of national teams' committees. Finally, a single item measure was created to account for the total number of committees (numco) present within the organization. In this way, we were able to operationalize specialization with the creation of five separate scales.

Standardization was also measured using five scales, each consisting of between four and ten items. These covered administrative operations (stadmin), athlete services (stath), evaluation procedures (steval), support operations (stsupp), and decision-making (stdec). This dimension was used to measure how consistent operations were kept across the organization, and the extent to which use was made of formal plans, policies and procedures. Each item was given a score that varied from "0", indicating that no formal procedures existed pertaining to that item, to "4", noting that extensive formal procedures were used.

The degree of centralization in each NSO was measured using four scales, each of which consisted of six decision-making items covering topics that were deemed central to the operation of the organization. These included questions regarding how decisions were

made on the selection of national team athletes, the selection of coaches, the development of officials, and which athletes should receive direct federal funding from the Athletes Assistance Program. Specifically, the scales were used to determine the locus of final decision-making responsibility (cent), the number of hierarchical levels involved in each decision (level), which final decisions were made by professional staff (prodec), and which decisions volunteer members had no input into (profinv). Each of the 11 multi-item scales was tested for reliability using Cronbach's alpha[1], reported in table 2.2; the others, numco, profdec and profinv were simple summed scales.

Insert Table 2.2 about here

Of course, archetypes represent ideal forms and are not, in fact, likely to be found in their purest forms (Miller & Friesen, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979). Following the lead of Kikulis et al. (1995a), we allocated archetypal status to a NSO which displayed appropriate scores on between 11 and 14 scales (see table 2.3). Those organizations that displayed 9 or 10 appropriate scores were deemed to have achieved embryonic archetypal status. Those that displayed 8 or less were labeled schizoid indicating that they bore several characteristics of two or more archetypes. These breakdowns seemed appropriate because, on the one hand, they allowed for the fact that empirically it is rare to find an organization with all the elements of an archetype (see Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Kikulis et al., 1995a). On the other hand, however, enough characteristics were demanded to ensure conceptually that each NSO could be deemed as existing in a particular state. Other combinations of elements were considered, such as requiring 12 to 14 appropriate measures for archetypal status, but the breakdown above was deemed to be both conceptually and empirically the most satisfactory.

Insert table 2.3 about here

It is now necessary to explain exactly how we determined which scores were to be designated high, medium, or low. Greenwood and Hinings (1993), in ascertaining which

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organizations corresponded to their two archetypal configurations, computed standardized scores for each variable using a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 15. They then decided that scores less than two-thirds below the mean (i.e., less than 40) would be a "low" score; scores two-thirds above the mean (i.e., greater than 60) would be "high" scores. They selected two-thirds of a standard deviation as the most appropriate cut-off point because "a greater standard deviation would have resulted in a large middle range including most scores, and a lower standard deviation would have created a narrow middle range with most scores falling in the high and low extremes" (p. 1068). Kikulis et al. (1995a) used a similar rationale, although because they, like us, had three archetypes, they had to determine low, medium, and high scores. They also standardized the raw scores to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 15, but selected one-half of a standard deviation above or below the mean as their cut-off points. In other words, those scores less than 42.5 on any dimension were labeled low, those greater than 57.5 were labeled high, and those between the two medium. Again, the decision on the cut-off points was to try to create a distribution with a middle range that neither contained too many or too few scores. What resulted was an apparently arbitrary distribution with a middle-range containing approximately 38% of the scores and the upper and lower ends approximately 31%, assuming that the scores were approximately normally distributed.

We felt that there were two problems with this approach. First, it made the unlikely assumption that for each scale, across the 36 organizations in the first year of the study, approximately 31% of all scores would be low, 38% medium, and 31% high. Second, and related to this, it assumed that all the scores were normally distributed, again highly unlikely. These assumptions are made still more questionable when one considers the pressures that these NSOs were under between 1984 and 1988. Over this time, institutional pressures were pushing all the organizations towards becoming more professional and bureaucratic. It is therefore highly probable that at the start of the study there would be many more low scores than high scores, with the number of medium scores falling between the two extremes but probably closer to the number of low scores. This rendered the existence of an even distribution of the sort assumed by Kikulis et al. (1995a) extremely unlikely.

Having dismissed the method used by Kikulis et al. (1995a), we tried several different ways of organizing the data. We basically had two alternatives. The first was to split the range for each scale into thirds, and designate the bottom third low, the middle third medium, and the top third high. The problem with this was the way in which outliers skewed the size of each subsection. Even when some of the outliers were discarded, we were still left with a set of results that, although methodologically sound, did not make conceptual sense. In other words, they gave us results which all the other evidence, such as interviews and other published material, suggested were incorrect. The second alternative, and the one that we employed here, was to split the entire distribution of scores across T_1 to T_5 for each scale into three. The bottom third we called low, the middle third medium, and the upper third high. The details of this breakdown of the 180 scores for each scale is provided in table 2.4. While recognizing that this distribution is still not perfect, it is our contention that the changing pressures to which the different organizations were exposed over the 12 years of the study render this distribution far more likely than the one advocated by Kikulis et al. (1995a). As such, there was no need to standardize the scale scores; we simply used the raw scores to create the archetypes, and to measure the pace and sequence of the changes that took place.

Insert table 2.4 about here

The purpose of uncovering the archetypes at each point in time is that it allowed us to construct a picture of how each organization had changed over the twelve-year period. As Hinings and Greenwood (1988, p. 23) pointed out, "understanding change requires examining how far any particular organization is moving from one design archetype to another and how far its current situation shows design coherence." In this sense, the identification of archetypes is an illuminating but essentially preparatory step for the explanation and mapping of change (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Kikulis et al., 1995a). However, having uncovered the archetypes for T_1 to T_5, the process of defining the tracks and measuring the pace and sequence of the changes that took place became relatively simple.

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Before we go on to discuss our findings, it is worth reiterating that a major principle underlying the study was to compare organizations that were able to complete a radical transition with those that were not. Hinings and Greenwood (1997) have suggested four necessary preconditions for following such a research design. First, the organizations must be attempting the same change. This is important because different innovations may have different change dynamics (Kimberley, 1987). Clearly, in our study, this condition is satisfied because each organization was making the transition towards an Executive Office archetype.

Second, the high-impact elements relevant to the changes being attempted must be identified at the start of the change process. Here, we follow Kikulis et al.'s (1995a, 1995c) lead in citing decision-making structures as being the high-impact elements in NSOs. Decision-making structures influence the goals, priorities, relationships and communication processes among organization members. "In essence, decision-making or authority structures establish standards of behavior and interactions that unify, link and satisfy organizational members forming the core of the organization" (Kikulis et al., 1995a, p. 72). Pettigrew (1990) and Mintzberg and Waters (1990) pointed out that decision-making is central to gaining an understanding of organizational change. This is supported by Kimberly (1987) who suggested that it is decision-making structures that are hardest to change because of their strong link to the strategic direction of the organization. Similarly, Pettigrew (1985) found that the shift in location of ICI's decision-making headquarters sent a clear message to the entire organization as to the importance of the changes being implemented. This is exacerbated in our study in that the prescribed changes which NSOs were pressured to make had as a central focus a shift in the locus of decision-making from volunteers to professionals. This change has caused more conflict within these organizations than any other (Amis et al., 1995; Goldfarb Consultants, 1986; Slack, Berrett & Mistry, 1994) and was thus most openly resisted in the transition process (Kikulis et al., 1995a; 1995c; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1992, 1994). Consequently, any attempt to change decision-making structures will likely have "explosive potential" (Quinn & McGrath, 1985), or a "high-impact"(Greenwood and Hinings, 1988) on organizational design.

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Third, there must be some determinant of what constitutes a successful reorientation. This, in our study, simply required a NSO to achieve, and maintain until 1996, Executive Office status. Finally, the organizations must begin their transitions from approximately the same position so that any observable differences could not be attributed to changes in starting point. In our study, unsurprisingly, organizations did begin their transition paths from different starting designs, five to be precise. However, organizations from each different starting point either reoriented to an Executive Office archetype, or achieved embryonic Executive Office status during the 12 years of the study. Also the duration of the study provided, we believe, ample time for any of the organizations from any starting point to reorient. We are therefore confident that starting from any of the initial designs recorded in the study would not have prevented any individual organization from reorienting. We acknowledge, however, that those organizations that had to undergo the greatest amount of change in order to reorient may have differing dynamics to those that had less distance to travel. We therefore do disaggregate our results somewhat.

Results & Discussion

As explained earlier, the concept of tracks was introduced by Hinings and Greenwood (1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988) in order to map the way in which an organization changed as it moved between, or within, archetypes. In our study, we identified five different tracks along which NSOs had traveled between 1984 and 1996. Eight organizations followed a reorientation track over the twelve years. That is, they had all started outside the Executive Office archetype or embryonic Executive Office in 1984, and by 1996 (or before) had managed to achieve and retain full Executive Office archetypal status. Nine NSOs underwent a reversal. Although each of these organizations started changing in the institutionally prescribed direction, something happened along the way that caused them to reverse the direction of their transition, in other words, they started moving back towards the Kitchen Table archetype. Seven organizations followed an unresolved track. Although they were continuing to become more professional and bureaucratic right up until 1996, they had still not managed to achieve full Executive Office status. Nine NSOs underwent a delayed track whereby they started to move in the

prescribed direction, but ended up stuck in a design outside of the Executive Office archetype. Three organizations followed an oscillatory track whereby they continually fluctuated back and forth between becoming more and then less professional and bureaucratic. The track followed by each NSO is detailed in table 2.5.

Insert table 2.5 about here

For the immediate purposes of our study, therefore, eight NSOs reoriented, whereas 28 NSOs did not. For the purposes of analysis and discussion, we split the population into three groups. Group 1 contains all 8 organizations which reoriented; group 2 consists of the three NSOs which reoriented from an initial embryonic Boardroom design, and is thus a sub-group of group 1; and group 3 comprises the 28 NSOs which failed to reorient. As we noted earlier, Hinings and Greenwood (1997) suggested that organizations that are being compared should start their transitions from approximately the same starting point. Although, as we have already stated, the starting points among different NSOs appear to be similar enough as to not affect the outcome of the transition process, we have allowed for that possibility by creating group 2. In this way, we were able to provide separate information for those organizations that had to make the greatest changes to complete the transformation to an Executive Office.

Interesting as it is to construct archetypes and tracks, all of this was essentially a preliminary step in our investigation of the effects of pace and sequence of change on the transition process. The next part of this process was to calculate the change that had occurred in each NSO between 1984 and 1986 (change period 1), 1986 and 1988 (cp2), 1988 and 1992 (cp3), and 1992 and 1996 (cp4) for each of the 14 scales. Because of the small numbers in each of the three groups, statistical analyses were carried out at a relatively simple level. The small group sizes also suggested that our chances of finding results that were statistically significant would be small. This was not a major concern. What we were most interested in were the relative directions and magnitudes of the observed changes, and it is these that we focus upon in the discussion of our results. We first discuss propositions one and three, then move onto proposition two, and finish with proposition four.

Pace & Sequence

In proposition 1 we suggested that those organizations able to complete programs of radical change would be characterized by rapid change to all parts of the organization early on in the change process. There is no support provided for this premise here. In order to uncover whether more early change took place in those NSOs that reoriented, we combined the scores for the different scales. This necessitated standardizing the changes that took place in each scale to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. At this stage, we were interested only in the amounts of change activity over time so we calculated these standardized scores from absolute values of change. In other words, we disregarded the direction and recorded only the magnitude of each change. From these standardized scores, a mean was generated indicating the relative amount of change that took place in each group of NSOs over each change period. These results are reported in table 2.6.

Insert table 2.6 about here

A positive score indicates that an above average amount of change took place over that time period; a negative score denotes a lower that average amount of change activity. It is clear that although more change took place over the first two years than the following six in groups 1 and 2, a similar scenario also unfolded in group 3, the non-reorienters. There is therefore no significant difference, or indeed directional difference, between the amount of early change that took place in those NSOs that reoriented and those that did not. This finding contradicts Miller and Friesen (1984), Burns and Stalker (1961), Warren (1984), and Hackman (1984) who all suggested that large-scale adjustments need to be made throughout the organization early on in the change process if a radical transformation is to be completed. However, there is no supporting evidence for those scholars such as Vickers (1959) or Hedberg and his colleagues (1976) who have suggested that more on going, incremental change is required for successful reorientations.

Insert tables 2.7a, 2.7b, 2.7c & 2.7d about here

More specific insight into the way in which change took place across different scales is provided in tables 2.7a, 2.7b, 2.7c and 2.7d. Here the mean amount of change for each scale and each group across each time period is provided. The significance of the differences between the groups of reorienters and non-reorienters, carried out using a one-way ANOVA, is also given. Table 2.7a indicates that across all three groups, five of the 14 scales - technical specialization, specialization of support staff, professional specialization, specialization of volunteers, and standardization of decision-making - show the largest change between 1984 and 1986 in group 3, the non-reorienters. In fact, when all of the reorienters (group 1) are compared to all of the non-reorienters, eight of the scales which show the most change over this period are in group 3, while only 6 of the biggest changes occurred in group 1. Similarly, if we compare those organizations that had to make the biggest changes to reorient (group 2) with those that failed to reorient, there is little difference: seven scales show the greatest change in group 2, seven in group 3. This provides further evidence that proposition one is unsupportable and that reorientation does not depend upon rapid early change across the entire organization.

Table 2.7a, however, does begin to tell an interesting story. In proposition 3, we suggested that those organizations that reoriented would change their high-impact elements earlier than those NSOs that failed. The high-impact system that we identified was decision-making. Decision-making structures within these organizations are imbued with the values and beliefs that have been formed over the lifetime of the organization. Thus, changes within these high-impact elements will send powerful messages to the remainder of the organization regarding the importance and long-term nature of the transition into which the organization is entering. Indeed, Kanter (1984) and Hinings and Greenwood (1988) have stressed that early change to high-impact elements is vital if radical change is to be sustainable and ultimately successful.

Our results provide strong support for this argument, and consequently support proposition three. In table 2.7a, the score for the scale "cent" indicating the locus of decisions within the organization declines quite markedly in group one, and even more pronouncedly in group 2. In other words, these organizations became more decentralized early on in the change process as decision-making authority was shifted from volunteer

directors to professional staff. In group three, the score actually increases indicating that the organizations, overall, became more centralized. This suggests that in those NSOs which were able to reorient, a clear message was sent throughout the organization at the start of the change process by devolving decision-making power in some important areas (we only collected data on decisions which were intrinsic to the operation of the organization). This message was not relayed in the 28 organizations that were unable to reorient; in fact there was a slight rise in the locus of decision-making. In these group 3 organizations, volunteers actually assumed greater amounts of authority almost in a retrenchment against what they saw as a move by the federal government to remove the decision-making authority that they had traditionally held.

The scale indicating the number of levels involved with decision-making (level) also supports the importance of making early change to high-impact elements. Here, the scale indicates that in groups one and two, the number of hierarchical levels involved in making decisions in the NSOs that reoriented dropped quite significantly, while those in group three increased. In fact, the differences between groups one and three were statistically significant at the .1 level[2], and between groups two and three, the differences were highly significant at the .05 level. Again, this is important in terms of the messages that were relayed throughout the organization. It is worth reiterating that a central thrust of the proposed transformation of these organizations was to get professional staff making decisions rather than volunteers. When combined with the results of the changes to the "cent" scale reported above, the "level" scale indicates that professional staff were being accorded greater decision-making autonomy in the organization as a whole in those NSOs which reoriented. As well as becoming more decentralized, it appears from these results that staff making the decisions had to consult less with senior board members about them. This was particularly noticeable in group 2, those NSOs that had to make the greatest amount of changes in order to reorient. The increase in the number of hierarchical levels involved in decision-making in group 3 NSOs indicates that the volunteers in these organizations were keen to resist some of the changes which were being exerted from outside the organization by retaining or even extending their involvement in the decision-making process.

The "prodec" scale in table 2.7a indicates the change in the number of final decisions made by professional staff. It indicates that between 1984 and 1986 there was an overall increase in the number of decisions that were made by professional staff in those NSOs that reoriented. In line with the arguments presented above, this is not surprising. It also supports our surmising about the importance of changing the high-impact element of decision-making early on in the change process if a reorientation is to be achieved. The result from group two, a relative decrease in number of decisions made by professional staff is unexpected. In light of the earlier results, we would have expected more final decision-making authority to be decentralized to professional staff in these NSOs. However, there is a plausible explanation for this. The three NSOs in group two had to reorient from a starting position of an embryonic Boardroom design. In other words they were coming from an organization in which volunteers had traditionally made all decisions of importance. What appears to have happened is that although decisions did get substantially decentralized in these organizations, as indicated by the "cent" and "level" scales, some of these decisions may have been made by committees comprising volunteers and professionals rather than just professionals. Rather than completely giving up their decision-making authority, the volunteers could thus retain some input into the process. In organizations making such a monumental change to a high-impact system, as was clearly the case from the other results, this may have been seen as an acceptable compromise position to adopt early on in the change process. The fact that the score for group three increased marginally is explained by the fact that all of the 36 NSOs in the study took on more professional staff in 1984. It is therefore natural in these circumstances that these new staff members be given at least a small amount of decision-making authority.

"Profinv" indicates the number of decisions made in NSOs in which volunteers were not involved. Following on for the arguments for "prodec", it is not surprising that the scores decreased for all three groups, indicating that over the first two years, volunteers increased their involvement in the decision-making process. The fact that the largest increases of the three occurred in the two groups which contained the organizations which reoriented suggests that although these NSOs were undoubtedly

changing in the prescribed direction, volunteer board members were still keen to retain some participative role in making key decisions. This is most clearly portrayed in group 1, which showed a large increase in "prodec", the number of decisions made by professionals, but also a large decrease in "profinv". In other words, although professional staff were being given more decision-making responsibility, volunteer board members were insistent on retaining input into the decisions being made. Frequently this involved little more than a "rubber stamping" by the executive, board, or a committee, of a professional's decision, although sometimes a more active role was taken. The general consensus from the volunteers in the reorienting organizations, though, was to let the professional staff get on with the jobs for which they had been hired.

Although not a high-impact scale *per se*, specialization of volunteers - spvol - also supports the notion of high-impact elements. One of the important characteristics of moving to an Executive Office archetype is that the volunteer board of directors and executive move from making decisions regarding the day-to-day running of the organization to a role of setting policy; responsibility for the everyday operation is devolved to the professional staff. In this respect, members of the board become less specialized; that is, rather than having specific areas of responsibility, they provide general input into more global decisions pertaining to the overall direction of the organization. This is reflected in the "spvol" scores. In those organizations which reoriented, the volunteers became less specialized, while in the group of non-reorienters, they became noticeably more specialized. This suggests that in those NSOs which reoriented, the volunteer board was indeed decentralizing day-to-day decision-making authority, while in those that failed to reorient, the volunteers were, if anything, increasing their operational stranglehold on the organization. Our findings, therefore, strongly support proposition three. That is, if an organization is to reorient, it must make early large-scale changes to its high-impact elements.

Punctuated-Equilibrium

Our second proposition predicted that, in line with Tushman and Romanelli's (1985) theory of punctuated-equilibrium, the NSOs in the study would experience long periods of

relative inactivity interjected with short periods of radical change. Consequently, because of the intense change pressures that these organizations were put under at the start of the transition period, we expected to find greater levels of change activity at the start and end of the change period, with a time of relative quiet in the middle.

The results reported in table 2.6 provide very strong support for proposition two. All NSOs showed an initial flurry of activity over the first two years of the study, which then quietened significantly over the next six years before picking up in the final four. Although this cycle of activity was repeated for each group, and the reported changes were frequently significantly different, it is most clearly shown by the final column of table 2.6 indicating the average amount of change across all three groups that took place over time. Here there are highly significant differences between the amounts of change activity that took place in change periods 1 and 2, 1 and 3, 2 and 4, and 3 and 4.

Over the first two years, all of the 36 NSOs in the study were pressured to become more professional and bureaucratic. Such changes were anathema to many within what had traditionally been volunteer controlled, informally operated organizations. Thus the transitions which were prescribed were in direct opposition to the culture which had built up over many years. For example, the three NSOs in group two, as has already been discussed, had an embryonic Boardroom design in 1984. The early and dramatic changes to the high-impact elements in these organizations was undoubtedly traumatic. It would thus take time for members to comprehend just exactly what these changes meant for the future of their organizations, and for the changes to be properly implemented. Pettigrew (1985, p. 443) cast light on the reasons for this, suggesting that "strategic change is likely to be a challenge to the dominating ideology, culture, and systems of meaning and interpretation, as well as the structures, priorities, and power relationships of the organization." Consequently, an organization which has been exposed to such violent upheaval needs to undergo a time of learning and incremental adjustment in which "to elaborate structure, systems, controls, and resources toward increased coalignment" (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985, p. 173).

The final quadrennial in the study, 1992 to 1996, showed increased change activity in all three groups. It appears, therefore, to have taken about six years for the NSOs to

regain the stability required for further dramatic change. As Pettigrew (1985, p. 447) suggested, as well as absorbing the impact of revolutionary action, it also takes time for an organization to "come to terms with the fact that further changes are eventually necessary." This can be a hard pill to swallow for an organization which has undergone large-scale changes relatively recently, but it is also inevitable if the organization is to retain structural and systemic arrangements which are consistent with internal and external demands (Gersick, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Thus, we can conclude that proposition two is well supported, and that organizations do indeed undergo relatively long periods of incremental change punctuated by intense periods of more pronounced transformation.

Linearity of Change

The final analysis involved comparing the amounts of change that took place early on in the transition period with that which occurred later, within each scale and within each group. These results are presented in tables 2.8a, 2.8b and 2.8c.

Insert tables 2.8a, 2.8b & 2.8c about here

In table 2.5, we reported that three NSOs followed an oscillatory track and nine a reversal while the other 24 organizations that we studied appeared to move in a linear manner with no pronounced changes of direction. However, when the tracks are broken down to the scale-level of analysis, it becomes apparent that there is much more forward and backward movement over the duration of the transition than these figures would suggest. In table 2.8a, illustrating all of those NSOs that reoriented, only 5 of the 14 scales increased over each successive change period, indicating a linear track. Nine scales had negative scores or zeros at some point indicating a reversal of direction over that time period or a delay. In table 2.8b, providing results for group two NSOs, only three scales changed linearly over time; and in the 28 group three NSOs shown in table 2.8c, six scales changed in a linear manner. Interestingly, of the 14 occurrences of linear change, 12 of them were scales describing the levels of standardization in the organizations. In other words, smooth, linear transformations occurred predominantly in areas that were uncontroversial,

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easy to implement, and had relatively little impact on the traditional operating methods of the organization. Furthermore, organizations are less likely to reduce the level of standardization than they are other dimensions of the organization. Elements of specialization, such as the number of teams, committees, and professional or volunteer roles were frequently altered throughout the duration of the study to reflect changes in resource level or policy. Even some of the centralization scales, despite being high-impact elements, also showed some degree of fluctuation in some of the NSOs. Many organizations, by contrast, kept items such as policy and procedures manuals or job descriptions, even if they spent most of the time gathering dust on a shelf and were only rarely consulted. Similarly, many organizations simply kept adding to these documents over time as new policies and procedures were developed while very few NSOs actually deleted such guidelines even when they became obsolete. Thus the standardization scales tended to follow a more linear increase than those of the other structural dimensions, which were inclined to be more sensitive to changes in the internal and external contexts of the organizations.

There are several reasons for these findings. First, as we have stressed throughout, the changes that were being implemented were diametrically opposed to the traditional culture of the organization. Consequently, opposition built up in many NSOs resulting in some of the introduced changes having to be withdrawn and then reintroduced in either a slightly different form, or at a time when the organization was more receptive of the proposed change. This was a similar scenario to that discovered by Barrett and Cammann (1984) in their investigation of changes at National Steel Corporation.

Second, the NSOs were being pressured into making changes of which nobody, not even the Sport Canada consultants who assisted with the implementation of the transition, was sure of the outcome. Amateur sport organizations in Canada, as elsewhere around the world, had traditionally been operated in an informal manner, primarily by volunteers. How would these organizations react to the change in decision-making emphasis from volunteer to professional? How would they cope with the required large-scale increases in strategic planning? How would the massive increases in federal funding be handled? How would members react to a pronounced shift in orientation from

participation and satisfaction of member interests to high-performance and international results? Such issues create an uncertainty that results in experimentation as changes are tried, found to be unsuitable, and withdrawn to be replaced with something different (Peters & Waterman, 1982). In fact, the quadrennial planning process itself, which drove the initial changes, was withdrawn in 1992 in favor of a less bureaucratic system that was easier to manage and implement.

Finally, there have been substantial changes over the duration of the study in the pressures to which NSOs have been exposed. For example, following Ben Johnson's failure of a drug's test at the 1988 Olympics, a federally appointed Royal Commission, headed by The Honorable Charles Dubin, conducted an investigation into drug abuse in Canadian amateur sport. One of the recommendations of a report which found evidence of wide scale drug abuse among Canadian athletes was a deemphasis of high performance sport. For a short while, high-performance sport became almost a dirty word in Canadian NSOs as more grass roots participation was emphasized.

In addition, NSOs have also had to cope with substantial increases, and then decreases in federal funding. Funding from the federal government peaked in 1988 at CDN$86m but by 1996 this had been cut to CDN$48.6m (Jollimore, 1996). In fact, seven of the organizations which we gathered data on, rhythmic gymnastics, ski jumping, Nordic combined, archery, weightlifting, handball and luge had their federal funding totally eliminated in 1996. Even those organizations that did still receive money from the Canadian government at this time had to cope with drastic reductions. This led to all of the NSOs in our study actively seeking alternative sources of income, with varying degrees of success, ranging from corporate sponsorship, to membership fees, to private donations.

A third example of the variation in pressures to which these organizations have been exposed is the recently announced shift to a more "athlete centered" system based on a series of high performance centers (Christie, 1997). Rather than the central emphasis on bureaucracy with all of the national organizations housed in a single building in Ottawa, money is starting to be directed towards the creation of a network of high-performance centers across the country which, it is hoped, will more directly benefit Canadian athletes.

There are currently centers in Victoria, Calgary and Montreal, with others scheduled to open in Winnipeg, Toronto, Vancouver and Halifax. Such wide scale changes in external pressures render a linear transformation process extremely unlikely (Pettigrew, 1985). Consequently we are able to offer strong support for proposition four and report a non-linear approach to the unfolding changes which took place.

Conclusion

This study was conceived with the intention of furthering the discussion of organizational change dynamics by uncovering the effects of pace and sequence on the transition process. Although issues of pace and sequence have been creeping into the organizational change literature, these have predominantly been *post hoc* rationalizations of various case study analyses. Our four propositions were constructed with the intent of more explicitly examining these under-researched change elements.

The first major finding to come out of this research is that pace of change is important, but only when considered in conjunction with sequence. This is important because there has been an almost taken-for-granted feeling in much of the literature that radical organizational transitions depend upon rapid change throughout the entire organization. Even those researchers who have identified high-impact elements have still emphasized the importance of rapid change across the entire organization. Our findings suggest that, in fact, radical change depends upon early, rapid adjustment to high-impact elements. Without this, fast-paced change elsewhere in the organization is rendered much less effective.

The second point worth highlighting is that organizations do seem to follow the punctuated-equilibrium model of organizational change. Even those organizations unable to reorient still followed this cyclical model of change. Organizations need time to recover from major surgery, just as people do, before the next invasive procedure is attempted. In showing this, we also provide insight into a methodological issue that has plagued those who research strategic change: how long is it necessary to study organizations in order to uncover the full-extent of the transition process? Kikulis et al. (1995a) found that four years was insufficient to uncover the full extent of the changes that were taking place in

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the NSOs that they studied. Greenwood and Hinings (1993, p. 1075) suggested that "although the [8 year] research period reported upon [in their study] was considerably longer than that usually found in organization theory research, we have concluded that the period was too short" to gain full insight into the change process. We suggest that 12 years is a minimum period necessary to study the cyclical effects of organizational change, for it took that long for the second wave of large-scale change to become evident (see table 2.6). That said, the necessity of studying organizations in their context (Pettigrew, 1987) and taking into account the institutionally specific nature of archetypes and change dynamics (Child, 1988; Child & Smith, 1987; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988) means that care is needed in generalizing findings such as these to organizations in other sectors.

Finally, we were also able to offer support from a wider empirical base for those researchers who have suggested that the traditional view of change as a linear process is at odds with reality. Organizations which are able to reorient, and even those which try to change but are unable, have to be flexible enough to accept that changes that are initially implemented may have to be modified or withdrawn or reintroduced before they become established within the organization. Uncovering such oscillations, as with the other dynamics of strategic change which we have discussed, is demanding in terms of time and resources, but the quality of insight that such studies can reveal make them well worth the effort.

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Table 2.1. Institutionally specific design archetypes for NSOs.

Institutional Values	Kitchen Table	Boardroom	Executive Office
Orientation	Private, volunteer nonprofit (member-ship & fundraising)	Private, volunteer nonprofit (public & private funds)	Private, volunteer nonprofit (govt. & corporate funds)
Domain	Broad: mass-high performance sport	Competitive sport opportunities	Narrow: high performance sport
Principles of organizing	Minimal coordina-tion; decisions made by volunteers	Volunteer hierarchy assisted by profess-ionals	Formal planning; professionally led & volunteer assisted
Criteria of effectiveness	Membership prefer-ences; quality of service	Administrative efficiency & effectiveness	International success
Organizational Structure			
Specialization	Roles based on interest & loyalty	Specialized roles & committees	Professional technical & administrative expertise
Standardization	Few rules; little planning	Formal roles, rules and planning	Formal roles, rules and planning
Centralization	Decisions made by a few volunteers	Decisions made by the volunteer board	Decisions decentralized to the professional staff

(From Kikulis et al., 1995a)

Table 2.2. Reliability coefficients for scales used in the construction of the archetypes.

	Alpha	Standardized alpha
tecspec	.6106	.5556
supper	.7659	.7796
proper	.6997	.7048
spvol	.4305	.4176
numco	n/a	n/a
stadmin	.6711	.6662
stath	.6764	.6933
stsupp	.7497	.7554
stdec	.7457	.7475
steval	.6348	.6313
cent	.7996	.7966
level	.6382	.6554
profdec	n/a	n/a
profinv	n/a	n/a

Note: As some items making up the scales have different response categories, standardized alpha scores are provided.

Table 2.3. Profiles of structural design attributes for design archetypes.

	Kitchen Table	Boardroom	Executive Office
SPECIALIZATION			
Technical (tecspec)	Low	Medium/High	High
Support Staff (supper)	Low	Low/Medium	High
Professional Staff (proper)	Low	Medium/High	High
Volunteer Roles (spvol)	Low/Medium	Medium/High	Low/Medium
Number of Committees (numco)	Low/Medium	High	Low/Medium
STANDARDIZATION			
Administration (stadmin)	Low	Medium/High	High
Athlete Services (stath)	Low	Medium/High	High
Athlete Support Systems (stsupp)	Low	Medium/High	High
Decision-Making (stdec)	Low	Medium/High	High
Evaluations (steval)	Low	Medium/High	High
CENTRALIZATION			
Locus of Decisions (cent)	High	High	Low/Medium
Levels of Involvement (level)	Low	Medium/High	Low
Number of decisions made by professionals (prodec)	Low	Low/Medium	High
Number of decisions in which volunteers have no involvement (profinv)	Low	Low/Medium	High

Table 2.4. Parameters for low, medium and high structural scale scores.

	low	medium	high	Mean (s.d.)
tecspec	4.57-10	11-13	14-21	12.2 (2.8)
supper	0-1	2-3	4-10	3.2 (2.2)
proper	0-4	5-6	7-16	5.8 (3)
spvol	2-6	7-9	10-16	7.8 (2.6)
numco	1-6	7-11	12-30	9.9 (5.7)
stadmin	1.2-7	8-10	11-17	8.6 (2.9)
stath	4-12	13-16	17-31	14.8 (4.6)
stsupp	1-7	8-10	11-19	9.3 (3.4)
stdec	6-13	14-15	16-28	14.8 (3.5)
steval	0-3	4	5-10	4.2 (1.9)
cent	13-22.8	23-24	25-36	23.5 (3)
level	6-9	10-11	12-18	10.5 (2.6)
prodec	0	1-2	3-6	1.9 (1.8)
profinv	0	1	2-5	.92 (1.2)

Table 2.5. Archetypes and tracks of change.

NSO	1984	1986	1988	1992	1996	Track
1	schiz. EO/BR	Emb. EO	EO archetype	EO archetype	EO archetype	Reorientation
2	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	Delayed
3	schiz. KT/BR	Emb. BR -	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	schiz. EO/BR	reversal
4	Emb. KT	Emb. BR -	schiz. BR/KT	Emb. KT	schiz. EO/BR	oscillatory
5	schiz. EO/BR	Emb. EO	EO archetype	EO archetype	EO archetype	reorientation
6	KT archetype	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. KT/BR	KT archetype	reversal
7	KT archetype	Emb. KT	schiz. BR/KT	KT archetype	KT archetype	reversal
8	schiz. KT/BR	Emb. BR +	schiz. EO/BR	Emb. EO	schiz. EO/BR	reversal
9	Emb. KT	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. EO/BR	unresolved
10	Emb. KT	Emb. BR -	Emb. BR -	BR archetype	schiz. EO/BR	Unresolved
11	Emb. BR -	Emb. BR +	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	EO archetype	Reorientation
12	schiz. KT/BR	Emb. BR -	Emb. BR +	Emb. BR +	schiz. EO/BR	unresolved
13	KT archetype	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/KT	BR archetype	Emb. KT	reversal
14	Emb. KT	schiz. BR/KT	Emb. BR +	Emb. EO	schiz. BR/EO	reversal
15	Emb. KT	KT archetype	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	delayed
16	Emb. KT	Emb. KT	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. EO/BR	unresolved
17	KT archetype	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	delayed
18	Schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/KT	Emb. BR +	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	delayed
19	KT archetype	BR archetype	BR archetype	schiz. EO/BR	Emb. EO	unresolved
20	Emb. KT	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	unresolved
21	KT archetype	Emb. BR +	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	delayed
22	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. BR/EO	EO archetype	reorientation
23	schiz. KT/BR	BR archetype	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	Emb. BR +	reversal
24	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/EO	KT archetype	reversal
25	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	delayed
26	KT archetype	schiz. KT/BR	Emb. BR -	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	Delayed
27	Schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	Delayed

28	Emb. KT	schiz. BR/EO	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. BR +	schiz. EO/BR	Oscillatory
29	KT archetype	Emb. KT	Emb. BR +	Emb. EO	schiz. BR/EO	Reversal
30	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	EO archetype	EO archetype	Reorientation
31	Emb. KT	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. BR/KT	Emb. EO	Unresolved
32	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. EO/BR	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	EO archetype	Reorientation
33	Emb. BR -	Emb. BR +	schiz. EO/BR	EO archetype	EO archetype	Reorientation
34	Emb. BR -	BR archetype	Emb. BR +	Emb. EO	EO archetype	Reorientation
35	schiz. KT/BR	schiz. EO/BR	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. EO	Oscillatory
36	schiz. BR/KT	schiz. BR/EO	Emb. BR +	Emb. EO	Emb. EO	Delayed

Table 2.6. Means and standard deviations of standardized scales illustrating amounts of change activity exhibited over time.

Group 1: all 8 reorienters
Group 2: 3 reorienters which started from an embryonic Boardroom design in 1984
Group 3: all 28 non-reorienters

	Group 1 change	Group 2 change	Group 3 change	Total change
1984 – 1986 (s.d.)	.20 (.33)	.27 (.75)	.27 (.25)	.25 (.48)
1986 – 1988 (s.d.)	-.43 *† (.27)	-.49 *† (.48)	-.34 *† (.14)	-.42 *† (.33)
1988 – 1992 (s.d.)	-.32 ‡ (.25)	-.16 (.47)	-.12 (.2)	-.2 ¥‡ (.33)
1992 – 1996 (s.d.)	.29 (.32)	.19 (.67)	.27 (.23)	.25 (.44)

*   - difference between change periods 1 and 2 significant at the .05 level
†   - difference between change periods 2 and 4 significant at the .05 level
¥   - difference between change periods 1 and 3 significant at the .05 level
‡   - difference between change periods 3 and 4 significant at the .05 level

Table 2.7a. Comparison of scale changes between 1984 and 1986.

Group 1: all 8 reorienters
Group 2: 3 reorienters which started from an embryonic Boardroom design in 1984
Group 3: all 28 non-reorienters

	group 1	group 2	group 3	sig. 1 vs. 3	sig. 2 vs. 3
tecspec	.875	.333	1.061	.809	.553
supper	-.5	.333	1.107	.083	.517
proper	1.25	1	1.536	.735	.679
spvol	-.625	-.333	.679	.493	.193
numco	2.375	.667	1.321	.648	.854
stadmin	2.25	1.667	2.15	.912	.738
stath	3.5	4.667	3.944	.692	.644
stsupp	1.875	4.667	3	.252	.217
stdec	.8	1.667	1.736	.465	.974
steval	1.417	2.778	1.488	.905	.137
cent	-1.35	-4.667	.129	.482	.152
level	-1.075	-3.667	.543	.096	.004
prodec	.625	-.333	.107	.483	.683
profinv	-.75	-.667	-.071	.161	.363

Table 2.7b. Comparison of scale changes between 1986 and 1988.

Group 1: all 8 reorienters
Group 2: 3 reorienters which started from an embryonic Boardroom design in 1984
Group 3: all 28 non-reorienters

	Group 1	group 2	group 3	sig. 1 vs. 3	sig. 2 vs. 3
tecspec	.75	.667	.663	.897	.997
supper	1.125	.667	.786	.672	.897
proper	.625	.333	.143	.468	.844
spvol	0	0	-.429	.65	.778
numco	.75	-.333	-.036	.489	.861
stadmin	1.375	.667	1.429	.937	.443
stath	1	.333	.683	.697	.789
stsupp	1.5	1.333	1	.384	.703
stdec	1.625	2	.679	.287	.32
steval	-.125	-1	.286	.377	.074
cent	.625	0	-.857	.144	.589
level	.625	0	.393	.764	.741
prodec	0	0	.179	.639	.775
profinv	0	0	.286	.356	.573

Table 2.7c. Comparison of scale changes between 1988 and 1992.

Group 1: all 8 reorienters
Group 2: 3 reorienters which started outside schizoid EO/BR
Group 3: all 28 non-reorienters

	group 1	group 2	group 3	sig. 1 vs. 3	sig. 2 vs. 3
tecspec	.875	.667	0	.156	.505
supper	-.5	.333	-.321	.851	.664
proper	-.375	-.333	.071	.371	.733
spvol	-.375	-1	-.5	.904	.769
numco	.25	1.333	.286	.983	.692
stadmin	.5	2	.679	.808	.206
stath	1	2.333	1.54	.552	.579
stsupp	.875	2	1.786	.206	.843
stdec	1.125	2.333	.929	.755	.154
steval	.75	1.333	.75	1	.382
cent	-1.625	0	-1.607	.99	.493
level	-.125	.667	.393	.734	.397
prodec	-.75	-1	.393	.157	.285
profinv	-.125	-.333	.071	.758	.672

<u>Table 2.7d.</u> Comparison of scale changes between 1992 and 1996.

Group 1: all 8 reorienters
Group 2: 3 reorienters which started from an embryonic Boardroom design in 1984
Group 3: all 28 non-reorienters

	group 1	group 2	group 3	sig. 1 vs. 3	sig. 2 vs. 3
tecspec	.875	0	1.25	.733	.455
supper	-1	-.667	-1.5	.617	.605
proper	-1	-2	-1.25	.81	.649
spvol	-3.625	-4.333	-.607	.002	.011
numco	-2.125	.667	-.429	.303	.657
stadmin	.75	.667	.614	.882	.969
stath	4.625	4.333	3.052	.154	.461
stsupp	1.75	-.667	.607	.262	.36
stdec	2.75	2.333	2.257	.533	.949
steval	1.625	1.333	.524	.143	.497
cent	-.125	-1.333	1.586	.2	.167
level	-.875	-2.333	-1.379	.745	.68
prodec	1.5	2.333	.214	.093	.08
profinv	.625	1	-.143	.2	.227

Table 2.8a. Comparison of scale changes over time that occurred in those NSOs that reoriented (group 1).

	1984-1986	1986-1988	1988-1992	1992-1996
tecspec	.875	.75	.875	.875
supper	-.5	1.125	-.5	-1
proper	1.25	.625	-.375	-1
spvol	-.625	0	-.375	-3.625
numco	2.375	.75	.25	-2.125
stadmin	2.25	1.375	.5	.75
stath	3.5	1	1	4.625
stsupp	1.875	1.5	.875	1.75
stdec	.8	1.625	1.125	2.75
steval	1.417	-.125	.75	1.625
cent	-1.35	.625	-1.625	-.125
level	-1.075	.625	-.125	-.875
prodec	.625	0	-.75	1.5
profinv	-.75	0	-.125	.625

Table 2.8b. Comparison of scale changes over time that occurred in those NSOs that reoriented from a starting position of an embryonic boardroom archetype (group 2).

	1984-1986	1986-1988	1988-1992	1992-1996
tecspec	.333	.667	.667	0
supper	.333	.667	.333	-.667
proper	1	.333	-.333	-2
spvol	-.333	0	-1	-4.333
numco	.667	-.333	1.333	.667
stadmin	1.667	.667	2	.667
stath	4.667	.333	2.333	4.333
stsupp	4.667	1.333	2	-.667
stdec	1.667	2	2.333	2.333
steval	2.778	-1	1.333	1.333
cent	-4.667	0	0	-1.333
level	-3.667	0	.667	-2.333
prodec	-.333	0	-1	2.333
profinv	-.667	0	-.333	1

Table 2.8c. Comparison of scale changes over time that occurred in those NSOs that failed to reorient (group 3).

	1984-1986	1986-1988	1988-1992	1992-1996
tecspec	1.061	.663	0	1.25
supper	1.107	.786	-.321	-1.5
proper	1.536	.143	.071	-1.25
spvol	.679	-.429	-.5	-.607
numco	1.321	-.036	.286	-.429
stadmin	2.15	1.429	.679	.614
stath	3.944	.683	1.54	3.052
stsupp	3	1	1.786	.607
stdec	1.736	.679	.929	2.257
steval	1.488	.286	.75	.524
cent	.129	-.857	-1.607	1.586
level	.543	.393	.393	-1.379
prodec	.107	.179	.393	.214
profinv	-.071	.286	.071	-.143

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[1] The scales were not expected to remain stable over time, hence estimates of reliability were restricted to the start of the change period. This is consistent with Kimberly (1976) who cautioned against relying on test-retest reliability measures for longitudinal studies. We therefore follow the example of Kikulis et al. (1995a) who argued that as the changes were implemented over time, so it was probable that some scaled items would change more than others. We likewise stress that our interest is in organizational change, and the degree and direction of that change. Thus, a reliable score in 1984 was taken as an indication that the scales in and of themselves were reliable enough for use over the entire change period.

[2] The .1 level of significance is used in this case instead of the more usual .05 level because of the small number of organizations, eight, in group 1.

Chapter 3
Values and Organizational Change

The importance attributed to the role of values in large-scale, or radical, organizational change has been recognized for several years. Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood (1980a, p. 12), for example, noted that radical change will only occur "if organizational members revise . . . the interpretive schemes which underpin their constitutive structuring of organizations." Bartunek (1984, p. 364) made similar observations in her study of a religious order when she suggested that, "the process of revising the order's interpretive scheme was substantially intertwined with structural change." Interpretive schemes, these authors suggest, comprise the ideas, beliefs, and values held by organizational members.

For the purposes of this work, we draw on Scott's (1995) definition of values as being a conception of what individuals within an organization prefer or desire. Thus any revision of the value structure of an organization is likely to be accompanied by some change in the structural design (Ranson, Hinings, Greenwood & Walsh, 1980b). This is because it is the value structure of the organization, described by Pettigrew (1987, p. 658) as the set of dominating beliefs or ideologies, that "provide[s] systems of meaning and interpretation which filter in and out environmental and intra-organizational signals." Thus the orientation of structures and systems within an organization is provided by the values embodied within them (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a). In other words, the way in which an organization is structured and operated depends in large part on the values held by organization members, particularly those in positions of power. As such, the coherence between structural elements and values must form the basis of any comprehensive understanding of the change process.

Tushman and Romanelli (1985) supported this contention by outlining the importance of a change in the values of an organization during times of transition. Similarly, Pettigrew (1985) discussed the way in which "core beliefs" proved vital in the transformation that took place at ICI. He later explained that "behind the periodic strategic reorientations in ICI are not just economic and business events but also processes of managerial perception, choice, and action influenced by, and influencing,

the operating environment of the firm and its structure, culture, and systems of power and control" (Pettigrew, 1987, p. 665). Clearly, by outlining the role played by managerial perceptions, choices and beliefs, Pettigrew is, implicitly at least, acknowledging the importance of the values that necessarily underpin them. The common thread running throughout these studies is that radical change inevitably requires that new structures and systems be configured to cohere with existing values, or conversely, that a dramatic shift in values must be accompanied by an associated shift in the organization's structures and systems. Despite these various streams of research, an explicit attempt to longitudinally examine the effect of values on the process of organizational transition is yet to be forthcoming. Hinings, Thibault, Slack and Kikulis (1996) did show a fit between the values held by the elite within an organization and the structure adopted. However, this study was cross-sectional in nature and did not seek to investigate the dynamics of the change process.

In stating that values are important in understanding the way in which change unfolds, it should also be made clear that "not all the espoused values in an organization are equal. Power holders in organizations (usually, but not always, senior managers) set up organizational design arrangements according to *their* interpretations of environmental pressures (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a, pp. 43-44, emphasis in the original). Thus, these individuals structure the internal design and processes of the organization based on their own value commitments and beliefs (Enz, 1986). Therefore, it is organizational leaders that "provide the conditions under which a potential transformation can take place" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a, p. 44). As such, it is necessary to differentiate between the values held by elite and non-elite members, and in particular the potential way in which these values reflect a propensity for change within the organization.

In addition to their place in work on change, the role of values in the structures and processes of organizations has received a great deal of attention from institutional theorists. In fact, Philip Selznick (1949, p. 18), one of the pioneers of institutional theory, noted almost 50 years ago that "because organizations are social systems, goals and procedures tend to achieve an established, value-impregnated status." Since then, the importance of institutional values in the structuring of organizations has been widely

studied (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1977).

According to institutional theorists, an organization's chances of survival are greatly enhanced by the demonstration of conformity to the norms and values of the institutional environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This is a result of the tendency of societal institutions, and the general public, to "evaluate the degree to which an organization's structural and procedural characteristics are aligned with prevailing institutional values and beliefs" (Baum & Oliver, 1991, p. 193). The conceptualization of values as originating from outside the organization as opposed to inside highlights a major, but potentially complementary, difference between institutional and change theorists. Conformity to these externally prescribed values provides the organization with enhanced legitimacy and status, which in turn renders the organization less likely to be scrutinized by external bodies (Meyer & Scott, 1983); provides a greater level of predictability and stability (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio, 1988); and can increase an organization's access to scarce resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; D'Aunno, Sutton, & Price, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Thus, survival and effectiveness are seen to depend more on legitimacy acquired from conformity than on efficient production, particularly in environments which are heavily regulated or characterized by strong belief systems (D'Aunno, et al., 1991).

Despite the prominence accorded to the role of values in institutional theory, one of the major criticisms leveled at this approach has been its weakness in explaining the way in which organizations change (e.g., DiMaggio, 1988; Scott, 1995). DiMaggio and Powell (1991) suggested that recent developments in institutional theory, commonly termed neo-institutionalism, are more concerned with the persistence of structures and systems than their transformation. Brint and Karabel (1991), in their study of American Community Colleges, argued that neo-institutionalism is more applicable to the structuring and functioning of institutional forms than their transformation. Ledford, Mohrman and Lawler (1989, p. 8) agreed, holding that institutional theory offers "not much guidance regarding change", while Buckho (1994, p. 90) went further, suggesting that institutional pressures are a "powerful force" against transformational change. Similarly, Kraatz and

Zajac (1996), in their study of American liberal arts colleges, found that technical factors had greater power in accounting for observed changes than did those that were institutionally based.

Recently, however, some researchers have begun to acknowledge the links between institutional theory and organizational change. Dougherty (1994, p. 108), for example, suggested that institutional theory contains "an excellent basis" for an account of change, a view reflected in Christensen and Molin's (1995) study of the Danish Red Cross. The opinion of Greenwood and Hinings (1996, p. 1023) is, perhaps, appropriate.

> "As formulated, neo-institutional theory is weak in analyzing the internal dynamics of organizational change . . . [and is therefore] silent on why some organizations adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional pressures . . . . Nevertheless, neo-institutional theory contains insights and suggestions that, when elaborated, provide a model of change that link organizational context and intraorganizational dynamics."

We agree, and suggest that the nexus of the two approaches lies in the role of values. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to draw together insights from both the institutional theory and transformation literatures in order to investigate the role played by values in radical organizational change. In doing so we seek to further address the problem of how and why some organizations carry out such transitions while others do not. We do this by building a number of propositions that we then empirically test with real-time longitudinal data collected over a twelve-year period. In the next section we further develop the conceptual logic behind our theorizing, building towards some testable propositions. We then outline the site in which our research was set, and the methods used to collect and analyze the data. The final part of the paper is taken up with a discussion and interpretation of the results and their significance.

Theoretical Framework

Most, if not all, changes of a radical nature are precipitated by external events. Pettigrew (1987, p. 665), for example, found that the transformations at ICI followed dramatic environmental incidents. He thus concluded, "real change requires crisis conditions." The changes reported by Allmendinger and Hackman (1996) in East German symphony orchestras, by Bartunek (1984) in a religious order, by Hackman (1984) at People's

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Express, by Hinings and Greenwood (1988a; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993) in local government in the UK, by Warren (1984) at Antioch College, and by Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee (1992) in the British National Health Service, were all initiated by events external to the organization(s) studied. However, the various responses that are made to external pressures are largely dependent on how they are interpreted by the decision-makers within the organization. If they are viewed as largely consistent with the values held within the organization, then the proposed change will likely be embraced by the organization. If, however, the institutionally prescribed changes are not consistent with internally held values, then the response will depend on the strength of the pressures that the dominant institution is able to exert. If this is sufficiently powerful, the organization will likely change in the prescribed direction, even if the dominant values held within the organization are opposed to the move. If the pressures are not strong enough, then the organization will likely exhibit some form of resistance (Oliver, 1991).

The implications of this for radical organizational change are quite pronounced. Barr and Huff (1997) noted that even major environmental changes do not have a homogeneous effect on all firms. This is because "[although] an environmental impetus is probably necessary for change to begin . . . the manner in which the environment affects the change depends on the organization's present interpretive schemes and structure" (Bartunek, 1984, pp. 356-357). In other words, although pressure may be consistently applied to a set of organizations, the response to that pressure will depend on whether the dominant value structure within the organization is broadly supportive of, or opposed to, the changes being prescribed.

If members of an organization hold values that are in opposition to those that constitute the institutional pressures being applied, then the mechanism by which the pressures are being exerted must necessarily be coercive. Coercive pressures can be exerted formally in the shape of rules or laws, or informally in the form of cultural expectations, depending on the nature of the field in which the organization and institution exist (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Whether formally or informally exerted, it is likely that there will be resistance from some organizations in the field. Sunk costs, both financial and intellectual, are inevitably involved in the development of any organization, one

consequence of which is that habits and patterned behaviors become value laden. Over time, these internal forces promote organizational momentum and stability (Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986). Hence resistance to any proposed change which is antithetical to these values will correspondingly increase (Zucker, 1977).

However, there are clearly times when the powerful nature of the pressuring institution forces organizations to comply with the changes being prescribed, regardless of any resistance that may exist within the organization. This is particularly likely when regulatory or other institutional pressures are first altered, for as Scott (1994, p. 35) has pointed out, "in the broadest sense, all scholars emphasize the regulative aspects of institutions: institutions [exist to] constrain and regularize behavior." Thus, in our first proposition, we suggest that coercive pressures will likely play a vital role in instigating programs of radical transformation when there is widespread opposition to the change within the organization. This is somewhat in opposition to those scholars who have suggested that early adaptation will largely be driven by technical constraints (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).

P1:   Strong coercive pressures play an important role in initiating changes in organizations in which the dominant value structure is opposed to the prescribed changes.

Important as coercive, or regulative, pressures seem to be in initiating radical change, the very fact that they have to be imposed raises questions as to their effectiveness in bringing about a long-term transition. Scott (1995, p. 145) acknowledged this when he noted that "regulative control processes seem . . . to result in only a superficial conformity." It would appear logical that more lasting change would require greater consonance between the value structure of the organization and the proposed changes. This is likely because of the way in which normative systems not only define goals or objectives, but also work to designate the appropriate way in which they may be pursued (Scott, 1995). Consequently, a value system incompatible with the changes being proposed will result in a tension that will make long-term change virtually impossible. Our second proposition reflects this by holding that:

P2:   As coercive pressures are relaxed, organizations will, over time, change to a form more compatible with the values held within the organization.

An extension of this argument also appears to offer some useful insight into the process of radical change. Pettigrew (1987) found that changing core beliefs was vital *before* there was any attempt to make structural or strategic changes. Brunsson (1982) articulated this as the need for an ideological shift within the organization when radical change is proposed. Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991, p. 342), in their study of change in the American radio broadcasting system, suggested that new practices became "institutionalized practices by acquiring a normative character when sustained through some form of legitimacy." Therefore, without the mantle of normative acceptance among members, the possibility of new conventions becoming established within the organization virtually disappears. In other words, radical change becomes impossible. Furthermore, the greater the level of acceptance across the organization, the less likely it becomes that any resistance to the proposed changes will be of sufficient magnitude to disrupt the transition process, and, hence, in all likelihood, the faster will be the acceptance of the prescribed changes. Thus, in proposition three, we suggest that:

P3:   The greater the congruence between the values held by organization members and the prescribed changes at the start of the change process, the faster a transition will take place.

Although thus far we have largely discussed the members of organizations as a homogenous group, clearly in any organization, some members' opinions, beliefs, and values matter more than others. It is the responsibility of the organizational elite to make decisions about the type of structure adopted (Walsh, Hinings, Ranson, & Greenwood, 1981). Consequently, change will only occur when either a new set of actors gains power, or when the prescribed changes match the value set held by the current elite (Fligstein, 1991; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pettigrew, 1987). It is the values of those individuals holding the top positions which are promoted and perpetuated throughout an organization, and hence it is the values of power holders to which structures and systems are consistently aligned (Enz, 1986; Filby & Wilmott, 1988; Hage & Dewar, 1973; Hinings et al., 1996; Prahalad & Bettis, 1986; Ranson et al., 1980b). Therefore, the

"values which are most critical to inertia or change are the ones espoused by members holding key positions" (Hinings et al., 1996, p. 888). As such, it is the leadership of the organization that either enables, or prevents, change (Bartunek, 1984; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a). If the values held by the elite of an organization are in coherence with the prescribed changes, then radical change is possible. Without this normative acceptance of the logic of the proposed changes among the organizational elite however, radical change is highly unlikely. Thus our fourth proposition states that:

> **P4:** A radical transformation will not be possible in an organization with an elite value structure inconsistent with the prescribed changes.

Having stressed the importance of a normative acceptance of the proposed changes at the elite level, it is also important to outline the necessity of a coherent value structure throughout the entire organization. Those who have made at least a partial study of this have done so under the rubric of organizational culture (Hinings et al., 1996). Culture is generally seen as a collection of shared values that underpin the structure and systems of the organization (Meyerson & Martin, 1987; Schein, 1986). We prefer the term values because of the ambiguity of meaning that surrounds the use of culture (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg & Martin, 1991; Hinings et al., 1996; Smircich, 1983). "Using the concept values allows us to recognize, emphasize, and make central issues of multiplicity and variation in preferences about behaviors or end-states in an organization" (Hinings et al., 1996, p. 888). When these values are in concert with those held by the organization's elite, they can work to strengthen the organization. When these, in turn, are consistent with the changes being prescribed, then the proposed transition will quite probably be introduced relatively smoothly. If the values held within the organization are predominantly not consistent with the prescribed changes, however, then such changes can be very difficult to introduce. The resistance that will likely be exhibited to the prescribed alterations will result in any change only being accepted, if at all, at a very superficial level, making a radical transition virtually impossible. Thus, in proposition five we propose that:

P5: A radical transformation will only be possible if the dominant value set held by non-elite organization members is consistent with the prescribed changes.

If the values held within the organization are not consistent with the prescribed changes, then there are two possible courses of action open to organization decision-makers. If they are able to withstand the pressures being exerted, those within an organization may be able to enter into some sort of defiant or manipulative behavior in an attempt to alter the nature of the pressures being faced. If they feel compelled to at least give the appearance of complying, then the organization might adopt an avoidance strategy (Oliver, 1991). In other words, contrary to much of the early work on institutional theory which emphasized environmental determinism, the organizational elite does have the opportunity to make strategic choices (Child, 1972; Oliver, 1988, 1991). Based on what we have said previously, the nature of this choice will largely be determined by the values held by the elite.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that organizations, particularly those in heavily regulated environments, will incorporate elements into their structures to give the appearance of legitimacy even if these elements add nothing to the technical efficiency of the organization. Thus, many institutionalized products, services, techniques, policies and programs that may conflict with the efficient operation of the organization are adopted ceremonially (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tolbert, 1985). As such, they function as "rationalized myths", serving to identify various social purposes as technical ones because survival is seen to depend on accommodating institutional expectations even though they may have little to do with technical accomplishments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1987). Consequently, the formal organization structure is often loosely coupled to the technical operating core in order that legitimacy can be secured at minimum cost to operating efficiency.

This can be particularly difficult in fragmented environments in which the organization can be exposed to varying and competing pressures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested that the risk of trying to adopt only those beliefs that fit with internal practices is so great that organizations often adopt inconsistent or even conflicting practices in order to gain legitimacy. D'Aunno et al. (1991, p. 642) found support for this

in their study of drug rehabilitation centers, finding that "practices are combined in ways that satisfy some important institutional demands while minimizing disruptive transformations in established patterns of behavior." In this sense, institutionalization as a process is profoundly political, reflecting the power of organized interests and the actors who mobilize them (DiMaggio, 1988). Thus, "while individual organizations may adopt the structural part of the legitimated design, they may not adopt the associated values" (Hinings et al., 1996, p. 890). In effect, changes to the structures and systems of the organization are carried out for ceremonial purposes. Hence, we propose that:

P6: Some organizations will adopt prescribed changes ceremonially while functioning in accordance with the value structure held within the organization.

Our final point of inquiry is into the effect that radical change has after it has been fully embraced by an organization. Earlier, we theorized that the only way in which radical change can take place is if it is adopted through normative mechanisms. Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller (1989), in their study of Scottish knitwear manufacturers, suggested that socially shared belief structures work to shape and constrain organization behavior by influencing key strategists. In other words, a shared logic emerges that results in a similarity of strategies. Ranson et al. (1980a) outlined the way in which cognitive frameworks structure interaction and mediate organizational routines. Similarly, Scott (1987) noted that shared belief systems establish what to pursue, and the ways and means to go about it. Later, he elaborated on this theme, suggesting that institutionalized roles provide definitions of situations and identities, and in doing so stabilize organizational life by providing a set of shared expectations (Scott, 1994). Fligstein (1991), for his part, suggested that shared cognitions serve as an inertial force. In other words, once a radical prescribed change has been made, the organization will enter into a period of relative stability and calm.

DiMaggio and Powell (1991) explained the reasons why behaviors and structures that are institutionalized are slower to change than those that are not. Technical interdependence and physical sunk costs cause some organizational inertia, but, they suggested, there is a more important factor. Institutions do not just constrain options,

they establish criteria by which people discover their preferences; in other words, some sunk costs are cognitive. Jepperson (1991) articulated this by suggesting that institutionalization brings with it a social order or pattern. As such, once the radical change process has been completed, the values held within the organization are likely to support the structures and systems that are now in place; if they did not, based on our earlier arguments, radical change would not be possible. The need for any further change will therefore likely not be perceived as it would be contradictory to the values held within the organization. Thus, we argue that:

P7: An organization that has undergone a radical transformation will enter a period of relative calm.

These propositions were tested using real-time longitudinal data collected over a twelve-year period. In the next section, we outline the location of the research site from which we collected our data. The methods used to collect and analyze the data are also described. This is followed by a presentation and discussion of the results.

Research Design

Two separate sets of data were collected and used in the study. The first of these comprised structural data collected in 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, and 1996. The second data set, collected in 1986, detailed the values held by members of the organizations under examination. The utility of collecting values data towards the start of the transition process is that it allowed us to view the differing effects which the value structure of the organization had on its propensity to successfully negotiate the prescribed radical change.

Research Site

The data for our study were collected from 35 Canadian Olympic national sport organizations (NSOs). This group of organizations provided an extremely interesting opportunity for study for three reasons. First, we were able to collect data on virtually an entire population of organizations: only one of the 36 NSOs that govern the Olympic sports in Canada did not take part in the study. Second, we were able to study these organizations during what has been probably the most turbulent period in the history of

Canadian amateur sport. This was important because change generally occurs during times of instability (Fligstein, 1991; Scott, Mendel & Pollack, 1996), so meaningful research on transitions needs to focus on the behavior of organizations at these times. Finally, the first year of our study, 1984, marked the start of a period during which these NSOs were put under intense pressure to alter their structures, systems, and values. The final year, 1996, was recently described as the "end of the line for Canada's [amateur] sport system. . . . the last product of Canada's golden age of sport spending" (Christie, 1997, p. A1). Thus we were granted an opportunity rare for field researchers: a period of study with both a relatively distinct beginning and end.

The first task in undertaking a study of this nature is to build up a picture of the backdrop against which the change was taking place (Galaskiewicz, 1991; Pettigrew, 1985, 1987). "Much research on organizational change is ahistorical, aprocessual, and acontextual in character . . . . There are remarkably few studies of change that actually allow the change process to reveal itself in any kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner" (Pettigrew, 1987, p. 655). Understanding the contextual and processual nature of the transition was particularly important here as we needed to determine a way of actually plotting the way in which these NSOs changed over time. For this, we employed Hinings and Greenwood's (1988a) notion of archetypes.

Hinings and Greenwood (1988a, p. 295) defined an archetype as a "set of ideas, beliefs and values that shape prevailing conceptions of what an organization should be doing, of how it should be doing it, and how it should be judged, *combined with* structures and processes that serve to implement and reinforce those ideas" (emphasis in the original). Most changes that take place occur within the archetypal design and involve the organization making a series of relatively minor changes in an attempt to improve coherence among organization elements. Radical change, by contrast, involves moving from one archetype to another. The inevitable disruption to organization routines, and the resistance from groups which perceive that the move will place them in a disadvantaged position, not to mention the actual difficulty in permanently adjusting peoples' values, mark this type of transition as being very difficult to accomplish.

The sector-specificity of archetypes means that although concepts and characteristics may be transferable between populations, the individual archetypes most definitely are not: they are very much institutionally based (Child, 1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a; Kikulis, Slack & Hinings, 1995a). As such, before any attempt could be made to determine specific archetypes, an understanding of the nature of the changes taking place, and the sector in which they were occurring, was first necessary.

Federal government involvement in Canadian amateur sport really began in 1961 with the passage through Parliament of Bill C-131, *An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport*. From this point on, the government became increasingly involved in the provision of amateur sport, primarily, although not exclusively, in an attempt to improve elite-level athletic performances (Harvey & Proulx, 1988; Macintosh, 1988; Macintosh, Bedecki, & Franks, 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990). However, despite increasing involvement, the government remained content to instigate predominantly minor changes at the periphery of the sport system. As such, although NSOs were encouraged to adopt more systematic operating practices and employ more professional staff, they were still very much dominated by volunteers and run in a relatively informal manner. At the start of the 1980s, however, the government decided that the whole amateur sport system required transforming.

In 1983, the federal government's Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport, through its agent Sport Canada, introduced its "Best Ever" program. The original objective behind the Best Ever program was to assist the Canadian team to perform to its maximum at the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics. Buoyed by the successes achieved at the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, the federal government subsequently expanded the Best Ever program to also include all of the Summer Olympic sports. The intent behind the Best Ever program was relatively simple. Rather than persist with the incremental move towards increasing professionalization which had been ongoing since 1970, the Best Ever initiative was designed to bring about radical, frame-breaking change within Canada's Olympic sporting system. The federal government determined that elite level performances would be dramatically improved if NSOs became much more

formalized with their day-to-day operations controlled by professional staff; volunteers would concomitantly be reduced to a supporting role. The government backed up its words with a massive injection of resources. Funding for winter sports, for example, increased from a total of CDN$5.5m per year to CDN$24.2m in 1983, rising to CDN$30.5m by 1988 (UPI, 1983). There was also an extra CDN$9m per year allocated to helping summer sports prepare for the 1988 Olympics (Houston, 1984). The final year of this first quadrennial, 1988, saw federal funding for amateur sport in Canada reach an all-time high CDN$86m (Jollimore, 1996).

From 1988 on, however, the federal government's interest in elite level sport began to wane. That year, at the Seoul Olympics, Ben Johnson ran his infamous 100 meters, shattering the Canadian sporting world when he subsequently tested positive for the banned anabolic steroid Stanazolol. The Canadian Royal Commission, headed by The Honorable Charles Dubin, which conducted a public enquiry into the scandal found that drug taking was prevalent in many parts of the Canadian amateur sporting framework, and questioned the emphasis on high-performance sport at the expense of mass participation. For a short while, elite-level performance became downgraded in emphasis. Jean Charest, Minister for Sport, stated that in the wake of the Johnson affair, there was a need to "redefine the cultural values of sport" as too much emphasis had been placed on winning (*Toronto Star*, 1988, p. C3). Furthermore, Canada, as many other parts of the world, was entering into a period of economic depression. As a result of these two factors, the 1988-1992 and 1992-1996 quadrennials each witnessed an increasingly severe cutback in both the money and infrastructure with which the federal government was willing to support the NSOs. In fact, by 1996, seven of the original 35 NSOs had seen their support totally eliminated as federal spending on amateur sport decreased to CDN$48.6m (Jollimore, 1996). Canada's NSOs were now, to a large extent, expected to support themselves with corporate dollars gained from sponsorship and other agreements.

This period of intense transition inspired the interest of several theorists interested in trying to understand the nature of the changes that had taken place (e.g., Hinings et al., 1996; Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c; Macintosh et al., 1987; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1987, 1992, 1994). However, the work by Kikulis et al.

(1992, 1995a), which investigated this same group of organizations between 1984 and 1988, was particularly apposite for our study. Based on the transitions that the sport system had been through, Kikulis and her colleagues uncovered three different archetypes associated with this set of Canadian NSOs: *Kitchen Table, Boardroom,* and *Executive Office.* The process that they used for uncovering these was laid down by McKinney (1966), and is provided in greater detail in Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995a). Briefly, it involved conducting a comprehensive review of published literature such as official government documents, research reports, journal articles, books, newspapers and magazines. From this, a number of themes were identified which provided the foundation for the archetypes: the growth of Canadian amateur sport; the increase in professional staff; the increased emphasis on measurable effectiveness; and the development of more complex bureaucratic structures. There were three aspects to defining the range of archetypes. First, the data were reviewed according to the structural dimensions of specialization, standardization, and centralization. Second, the value attributes of orientation, domain, principles of organizing, and criteria of effectiveness were each considered. Finally, the characteristics of each individual archetype were identified (see Table 3.1).

Insert Table 3.1 about here

The Kitchen Table archetype was the traditional, institutionally approved, design for Canadian NSOs until the early 1970s (Kikulis et al., 1995a). The emphasis in this type of organization is on volunteer control; in fact, it is internalized and taken-for-granted (Scott, 1995; Zucker, 1977). The appointment to different positions is not based upon individual expertise, but more on loyalty, desire and commitment to the organization. The NSO is operated very informally, with little emphasis given to formal planning or policies. The ultimate goal of the organization is ensuring the satisfaction of the membership.

The Boardroom archetype became the legitimized form following the increase in federal funding that occurred during the 1970s. In this design, greater emphasis is placed on nurturing elite-level athletes, providing high quality competitions, developing technical expertise among in particular professional staff, and increasing administrative efficiency.

Development opportunities and mass participation are still valued, but not as highly as in the Kitchen Table archetype. The organization is still dominated by a volunteer controlled hierarchy that is supported by professional staff who conduct day-to-day operations.

The Executive Office archetype appeared as a direct result of the Best Ever program. The measure of success here is simply the number of medals won at major championships such as the Olympics, Commonwealth Games, World Championships, and Pan-Am Games. Technical expertise is required in both professionals and volunteers. The development and operation of the NSO is placed in the hands of the "expert" professional staff; the volunteer board, which meets much more infrequently in this type of design, is intended to merely set long-term policy and sanction the decisions of the professional staff.

Data Collection

Two sets of data were independently collected, one to gain insight into the structural changes that these NSOs were experiencing, the other to capture the values held within the organizations. We first outline the way in which these values data were gathered, further details of which are available in Hinings et al. (1996) and Thibault (1987). The first step was to identify the institutionally prescribed values being espoused by Sport Canada. Three different methods were used to accomplish this. The first was a review of the official reports on sport that had been released by federal government agencies (e.g., Rea, 1969; Campagnolo, 1977, 1979; Ministry of State for Fitness and Amateur Sport Annual Reports, 1976-1984). Second, interviews were conducted with prominent individuals with a sport mandate in the federal and provincial governments, within sport organizations, and within educational institutions. Third, the published research on Canadian amateur sport was analyzed. From these three procedures, seven values were uncovered that were believed to be at the heart of Canadian amateur sport, and its move to a more bureaucratic and professionally-oriented system (Hinings et al., 1996). These were:

High performance emphasis: a commitment to the identification and development of elite athletes who could successfully compete at the international level.

Government involvement:	a commitment to viewing the federal government as a partner, with a role of supplying resources and expertise to the NSOs.
Organizational rationalization:	a commitment to organizational development in the direction of specifying and codifying activities.
Professionalization:	a commitment to full-time professional staff working in Canada's NSOs.
Planning:	a commitment to long-term planning.
Corporate involvement:	a commitment to the involvement of corporate sponsors to support high performance sport.
Quadrennial plans:	a commitment to the outcomes and objectives of the quadrennial planning process (coterminous with the Olympic cycle).

These, then, were the institutionally approved set of values. In opposition to these were competing values more associated with the traditional mode of operating within these organizations. For example, a commitment to volunteer control over that of professional staff would be a competing value, as would a commitment to mass participation over elite level athletics. Although it difficult to be certain that this constitutes the definitive set of values held by all members of all the NSOs involved in the study, these statements represent the key changes that Sport Canada was trying to impose. Consequently, the values that are associated with these statements are the most important ones in terms of the change process under investigation here. As such, although we may not have captured all of the values held throughout each of the organizations, we are confident that we have captured those most pertinent to the change process.

A questionnaire was developed which included multiple items for each of the seven values listed above. This was then pilot tested on individuals with a prior record of involvement in NSOs, but who were not currently serving members. The questionnaire was subsequently revised to include four items for six of the value scales, and three for "organizational rationalization", each of which was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. The reliability coefficients are provided in Table 3.2.

The questionnaire was translated into English and French in order to ensure that we would gain responses from individuals from French-speaking parts of Canada. This was then sent to all of the key volunteers and professionals involved in implementing the new "Best Ever" scheme in each of the 35 NSOs involved in our study. This took place in 1986, a year seen as appropriate because it was midway through the first quadrennial, and would thus give a good indication as to what extent the institutionally prescribed values had been adopted. Since the structures, sizes, and occupation of different positions varied among the different organizations, the number of individuals to which the questionnaire was sent varied among organizations. For example, Alpine Skiing Canada had 26 individuals included while the Canadian Amateur Boxing Association had only ten. In total, 616 individuals were sent questionnaires, with follow-ups conducted with non-respondents after six and twelve weeks. In total, 501 usable questionnaires were returned for a response rate of 81%.

We then created a value profile of each organization. This consisted of a breakdown of how each member scored on each scale and a summed total of their scores across all seven scales. Each of the 501 scores for each scale, and the summed total, was then designated high, medium or low. If the score fell into the top third of all scores for that scale, it was deemed "high", if it was in the middle third of the scores, it was termed "medium", and if it was in the bottom third of the scores, it was designated "low". The breakdown of the boundaries for low, medium and high scores for each scale is provided in table 3.3. In this way, we were able to construct a model of the values held within a NSO, and the distribution of scores among different roles within the organization.

From this, we could determine whether each member of a particular NSO had a preponderance of high scores, and thus could be said to hold values consistent with the prescribed changes, or a majority of low scores that would indicate a preference for the traditional mode of operating. This in turn allowed us to determine the value preferences

of organization members at different hierarchical levels. We decided that the President and Vice-Presidents of each NSO would be labeled as elite members. These individuals had greater formal authority and control of decision-making structures, and would therefore tend to hold most power within the organization. Other respondents, while also active at the national level, were designated as non-elite members. We were then able to convert the individual scores into an average for each sub-group, elite or non-elite. For example, as illustrated in figure 3.1, NSO 1 had an average elite score of 4.33 (maximum score 7, minimum score −7), indicating that the leadership of the organization held values broadly supportive of the prescribed changes. Furthermore, all three of the elite members surveyed were supportive of the changes, in other words, all recorded "high" responses for at least four of the seven scales. The average score for non-elite members was 2.4 indicating overall support for the changes, but only 5 of 12 non-elite members were actually in favor of the transition taking place. An individual or group with a majority of "low" responses would have a negative score.

In this way, we were able to determine whether each NSO's members held values broadly sympathetic to the prescribed changes, or whether they were largely opposed to them. Scores in the "medium" band were deemed to indicate that the individual was indifferent to that particular value, and thus would neither strongly support nor oppose the prescribed changes (Cooper, Hinings, Greenwood & Brown, 1996). Consequently, we were able to determine the effects of values held by both the elite members and those lower down the hierarchy on the radical change process.

Although we only had one set of values data, collected in 1986, this was not seen as a major problem. Value structures within organizations change slowly. It is usually only major changes in personnel that precipitate rapid shifts in the predominant value structure of an organization. These NSOs are characterized by the longevity of their members. Volunteers tend to remain active in the national organizations for long periods of time. Similarly, many NSOs have professional staff members who have served for extended periods (Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Slack & Hinings, 1994; Kikulis et al., 1995a). When changes in personnel do occur, they tend to happen only incrementally so the dominant value structure of the organization remains largely intact. As Scott (1995, p.

43) suggested, "the development . . . of collective entities and the specification of their endowments, utilities, capabilities, and identities takes place over many years, but once established, they can serve as a cultural model for the molding of other similar forms." The reason for this is that value structures become institutionalized *within* the organization, and thus organizations attempt to attract individuals whose personal values are congruent with organizational values (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). Consequently, the 1986 data set was seen as indicative of the values held in these NSOs in the years ahead.

The values data are clearly important in defining the operational preferences of the NSOs in the study. However, the different archetypes are recognized "through their structural form [as it] is through the structure . . . that organizations can be allocated as archetypal or non-archetypal" (Hinings et al., 1996, p. 899). The structural data used in the study were collected over a twelve year period, starting in 1984 (T_1), and repeated in 1986 (T_2), 1988 (T_3), 1992 (T_4) and 1996 (T_5). Longitudinal studies are seen as vital by change theorists if the true development of organizational designs is to be uncovered (e.g., Monge, 1995; Pettigrew, 1985, 1987; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Institutional theorists have made similar calls (see Scott, 1995). Powell (1991, p. 201) for example, suggested that "a robust institutionalism" depends on "large-scale, longitudinal studies that explore the staying power of institutional arrangements."

Qualitative and quantitative data were collected in a number of different ways. First, a thorough analysis of the high performance report each NSO had to develop as part of the quadrennial planning process (QPP) in 1984 was made. This highly detailed report, running into hundreds of pages in some cases, was prepared by a combination of the professional staff, volunteer board of directors, and two planning consultants hired by Sport Canada to provide additional technical expertise. These reports detailed organization structures, programs, staff and volunteer roles, and patterns of decision-making. Policies and procedures manuals, organization charts and job descriptions were also included. To fill in any gaps in these data, follow up interviews were conducted with either a senior professional, board member, or Sport Canada consultant. Consequently, we were able to draw a detailed picture of the structural arrangement of each NSO at T_1.

Over the next twelve years, a series of interviews were carried out with key professional staff and/or volunteers in each of the NSOs. We tried to keep the same informant, but of course, this was not always possible. This was not viewed as unduly detrimental as at each point in time, the most senior individual directly involved in the planning process was interviewed. In total, approximately 200 interviews were carried out. Each interview followed a reasonably standard format. The first half was spent administering a structured *pro forma* comprising a set of standard questions that were detailed to collect information on the three structural dimensions, and also any formal changes that might have taken place. This was followed by a more open-ended interview during which insight was gained as to why certain events had occurred, and what their implications might be, not just for the individual NSO, but for the amateur sport system as a whole. Each interview lasted between 90 minutes and two hours.

The interview data were supplemented by two documentary analyses, carried out to give additional detail as to what changes occurred over the period, and also to provide a richer contextual picture to the changes that were taking place. The first of these covered all of the federal documents produced on sport between 1961 and 1996. The second comprised every media report on amateur sport that appeared between January 1982 and December 1996 in the national *Globe and Mail*, and *Maclean's Magazine*, and the more parochial *Toronto Star*, *Calgary Herald*, *Winnipeg Free Press*, *Chronicle-Herald* (from Halifax, Nova Scotia), and *The Gazette* (from Montreal). We also used this information to re-examine the archetypes uncovered by Kikulis and her colleagues. Although these have proved conceptually and empirically strong, and have been used as the basis for several published studies (e.g., Hinings et al., 1996; Kikulis et al., 1992, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c), they had been uncovered at the end of the 1980s. Ten years on, we wanted to see if they still held up to scrutiny, given the variety of additional pressures to which these organizations had been exposed. None of the new data collected suggested the existence of any characteristics other than those outlined by Kikulis et al. (1992, 1995a). In fact, all of the documentary and interview data that were gathered strongly supported the existence of the three archetypes, and only those three archetypes, previously described.

Construction of the Archetypes

The structural dimensions used to construct the archetypes were specialization, standardization, and centralization. These have been theoretically and empirically established by a number of researchers (e.g., Hinings et al., 1996; Kikulis et al., 1995a; Miller & Dröge, 1986; Pugh, Hickson & Hinings, 1969; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings & Turner, 1968; Slack & Hinings, 1994). Specialization referred here to the degree to which the organization was differentiated administratively, technically, and in terms of support roles, in both the professional and volunteer domains. Specialization of volunteers (spvol) was measured by counting the number of roles held by different individuals within the NSO, such as president, past president, various vice presidents, secretary, and so on. Specialization of professional (proper) staff was similarly ascertained by counting roles such as managing director, executive director, marketing director, and head coach. Specialization of support staff (supper) covered positions such as assistant coach, marketing assistant and medical staff. Technical specialization (tecspec) was determined by the number of teams operated by the NSO, the number of different coaches used, the breakdown of the coaching staff by gender and technical expertise, and the existence of national teams committees. The number of committees (numco) was measured by a single item scale. Specialization was therefore operationalized by the creation of five separate scales.

The level of standardization was similarly measured using five scales, each of which consisted of between four and ten items. These covered the standardization of decision-making (stdec), administrative operations (stadmin), evaluation procedures (steval), athlete support systems (stsupp), and athlete services (stath). Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which formal procedures existed for each item, varying from 0 if no formal procedures were used, to 4 if that item was extensively formalized.

The degree to which decisions were centralized in each organization was measured using four scales. These covered the locus of final decision-making responsibility (cent), the number of hierarchical levels involved in each decision (level), which final decisions were made by professional staff (prodec), and which decisions volunteers had no input

into (profinv). Each scale consisted of six items covering topics deemed central to the operation of the NSO, such as how national team athletes were selected, which athletes should receive funding under the Athletes Assistance Program, and how coaches were appointed. The eleven multi-item scales were tested for reliability using Cronbach's alpha[1], reported in Table 3.4; the three scales detailing the number of committees, the number of final decisions made by professional staff, and the number of decisions in which volunteers were not involved in, were single item scales.

Insert Table 3.4 about here

The archetypes described are, of course, ideal types, and thus not likely to be found in their purest form (Miller & Friesen, 1984; Mintzberg, 1979). Following the lead of Kikulis et al. (1995a), therefore, we allocated archetypal status to a NSO that displayed an appropriate score on between 11 and 14 scales. Those organizations that displayed 9 or 10 appropriate scores were labeled as having achieved embryonic archetypal status. Those NSOs that had scores on eight scales or less that corresponded to a particular archetype were deemed to be in an unclassifiable state between two archetypes and were thus labeled schizoid. The ideal-type configuration of each archetype is given in Table 3.5.

Insert Table 3.5 about here

Determining the cut-off points between low and medium, and medium and high scores is quite arbitrary. Previous researchers have standardized scores and used means and standard deviations to calculate the point at which a score moves from one distinction to another (eg., Hinings et al., 1996; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988a; Kikulis et al., 1995a). However, despite the sophistication of the statistical techniques used, it is impossible to get away from the fact that assumptions are being made over the distribution of scores. Kikulis et al. (1995a) and Hinings et al. (1996), for example, effectively assumed that 31% of all scores at T_1 would be low, 38%

would be medium, and 31% would be high. This we felt was an unreasonable assumption given that the pressures to which the NSOs were exposed would tend to suggest that scores would tend to reflect the Kitchen Table archetype more at T_1. In other words, most scales would almost certainly have a larger proportion of lower scores in T_1 than medium or high. Instead, we decided to examine all 175 scores gathered over the five time periods for each scale. We then designated the bottom third of scores "low", the middle third "medium" and the top third "high" (further details of this process are provided in paper 1). We were then able to construct a picture detailing how the organizations had changed, archetypally, between T_1 and T_5. We then examined the relationship between the way in which the archetypal profiles for each NSO changed over time and the values data. In this way, we were able to gain some insight into the possible ways in which the values held within the organization coincided with the archetypes uncovered.

Results & Discussion

The first proposition, that coercive pressures would play an important role in instigating the transition process, was well supported by our findings. The organizations that we studied were located in a highly institutionalized environment. From the 1970s onwards, the federal government, ostensibly through its agent Sport Canada, placed increasing pressure on NSOs to structure and operate in a more professional and bureaucratic manner. The relatively low-key nature of these overtures was dramatically altered in 1983/84 with the onset of the Best Ever program. Sport Canada now became more forceful in the demands it placed upon NSOs, and the existence of coercive pressures became ever more apparent. These played an important role early on in the transition process in getting several organizations, some very reluctantly, to change.

These findings are well illustrated in figure 3.1. The different parts of figure 3.1 are explained in the legend attached to the figure. What is clearly apparent in column seven is that over the period between 1984 and 1986, P_1, 30 of the 35 NSOs in the study are represented by arrows pointing up. In other words, 30 NSOs moved in the direction prescribed by the pressuring institution, towards the more professional and bureaucratic

Executive Office archetype, over the first two years of the transition period. Of the remaining five organizations, four remained static, and only one reversed. Thus, there was widespread adoption of those elements that it was thought would legitimate the organization within its institutional environment (Slack & Hinings, 1994).

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         Insert Figure 3.1 about here
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However, columns two and three of the figure, "Elite average" and "Elite support", indicate that of those 30 NSOs which became more professional and bureaucratic, 11 contained an elite which recorded a negative score when their value structures were examined. In other words, they possessed value structures more consonant with a traditional kitchen table design. Furthermore, column five reveals that of the 30 NSOs which moved in the prescribed direction over P_1, 15 had a non-elite membership that held values more appropriate to a kitchen table design. Thus, in support of proposition one, it can be stated with some confidence that half of the NSOs that moved in the prescribed direction did so in a manner not favored by their elite and/or non-elite members. In other words, they were coercively pressured to do so. This is not abnormal in an environment in which a government agency wishes to bring about institutional conformity (Jepperson & Meyer, 1991; Scott, 1987). It is even more likely when, as here, survival and effectiveness are more dependent on the legitimacy acquired from conformity rather than on efficient production (D'Aunno et al., 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Most NSOs were dependent for the bulk of their funding on Sport Canada. Although this was affected, to some extent, by elite level athletic performances, the majority of it was secure, unless the organization entered into a course of behavior seen as unacceptable by Sport Canada. Thus, until the mid-1990s at least, survival was seen as more dependent on conforming to the requirements of Sport Canada than on the specific production of a certain output.

The coercive pressures, not surprisingly, were based upon the conferring of resources and prestige on those NSOs that followed the path set by Sport Canada accompanied by the threat of withdrawal of support and legitimacy from those

organizations that refused to change. There were funding incentives to fill designated professional roles, to operate specific programs, and undertake certain planning exercises. Those organizations that did comply were lauded in government publications and used as examples to which other NSOs were encouraged to follow. Furthermore, certain activities were no longer funded, such as frequent volunteer meetings, senior level recreational activities, and activities that facilitated volunteers making operational decisions. In this way, the transitions that the organizations were permitted to make were considerably shaped by the parameters placed upon them (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988b; Slack & Hinings, 1994).

The pressures to which these organizations were exposed were exacerbated by their relatively small sizes and low incomes. Thus, when faced with a powerful institution espousing certain practices, many organizations felt their very existence to be threatened. This is significant because a necessary condition for any radical transformation is that an organization perceives that its welfare is directly affected by a change in its environment (Barr & Huff, 1997). Consequently, it is of little surprise that even those NSOs which failed to subscribe to the values espoused by Sport Canada proved unable to resist the coercive pressures to which they were exposed, particularly early on in the change process.

Furthermore, the values data were collected in 1986, two years after the introduction of the prescribed changes. As structures and systems both reflect and help reproduce values held within the organization (Ranson et al., 1980a), it is extremely likely that over this two year period some organization members' values altered to become more coherent with the proposed changes. Although there was considerable stability in the workforce of this set of organizations as a whole, some NSOs did experience changes of personnel from time to time. This was often associated with conflict incidents that took place and resulted in some staff and volunteers leaving some organizations (see Amis, Slack & Berrett, 1995, for further details of this point). Slack and Hinings (1994) reported that on the occasions where people did leave a NSO, for what ever reason, a "filtering of personnel" took place so that those of a similar ideological background tendered to congregate in elite positions. This was particularly the case with senior staff

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members, but with the government agent Sport Canada able to rely on legitimate coercion (Scott, 1995), it would also have applied to national volunteer positions in some NSOs. It is likely that at the start of P_1, before the NSOs were being exposed to such substantive institutional pressures, the value structure of most organizations would have been even more reflective of the traditional kitchen table orientation than it was in 1986. Hence, the initial changes that took place were probably even more coercively driven than appears to have been the case here. Over P_2, 1986 to 1988, the number of NSOs which moved in the direction of a more professional and bureaucratic design while containing an elite which favored opposing values had reduced to only five, with eight remaining static and two actually reversing back towards the kitchen table design. In other words, the coercive pressures proved to be at their strongest when the changes were first prescribed, offering further support for proposition one.

In proposition two we speculated that a reduction or removal of coercive pressures would result in an organization reverting to a form more reflective of the values held within it. Support for this contention is also provided in figure 3.2. Coercive pressures started to reduce from 1988 onwards, becoming even less pronounced between 1992 and 1996. As the drugs scandals and recession took their toll, the federal government began to reassess the priority it had accorded amateur sport. Consequently, coercive pressures were reduced, and although some organizations continued to move in the prescribed direction, others began to once again favor the more traditional volunteer-oriented mode of operating.

Further evidence is provided in figure 3.1 by the increasing number of organizations that underwent delays and reversals over periods P_3 (1988-1992) and P_4 (1992-1996). If we look at those NSOs that failed to reorient, it is apparent that over P_1 and P_2, the period in which coercive pressures were at their strongest, only three organizations changed to a less professional and bureaucratic design. Over P_3 and P_4, however, when coercive pressures were relaxed, 12 NSOs started reverting back towards their traditional mode of operating. It should be pointed out that of the five NSOs that by 1996 had reverted back furthest, three had members with values overwhelmingly opposed to the prescribed changes (NSOs 13, 23 & 24). The other two (NSOs 6 & 7) had an elite

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which was moderately supportive, but a general membership that was more strongly opposed to the changes. Seven of the eight organizations that reoriented had an elite and a membership that favored the transformation. The remaining NSO (11) contained an elite with values that were in opposition to the changes, but a membership that expressed at least some support. In other words, there does appear to be support for the contention that when coercive pressures are relaxed, so organization designs will change in favor of the values held within them. However, it should also be noted that a supportive value structure is only necessary for change to take place, not sufficient, a point that will be taken up shortly.

Between 1984 and 1988, the overwhelming trend in NSOs was to become more professional and bureaucratic. In the subsequent years, however, there is clear evidence of a split in direction in which some organizations continued to become more professional and bureaucratic while others became less so. This provides strong support for proposition two. A relaxation of coercive pressures will encourage organizations to favor a design more congruous with the value structure held within the organization, even if that goes against prescribed norms.

Insert Figure 3.2 about here

Oliver (1992) suggested that institutional practices discontinue when organizations fail to accept what was once a shared understanding of legitimate conduct. This may have been the case for some NSOs here, although it is perhaps more likely given the tradition of these organizations that many failed to ever accept the appropriateness of the prescribed changes. Hence, as soon as the opportunity arose they began to revert back to a design more reflective of their value structure, as predicted by Scott (1995). Those NSOs with a value structure consistent with a less professional and less bureaucratic design were able to revert back towards the kitchen table design as coercive pressures were relaxed. Although some started this transition almost immediately, others took much longer, despite a strong prevailing value structure that would have suggested a more rapid response. This may have been because of an innate reluctance of organization members to

"stick their heads above the parapet" until it became clear as to what the consequences of this reversal might entail. They thus waited until other NSOs had started their transitions back to a less professional, bureaucratic design before beginning their own transformation in order to observe possible consequences. In effect, these NSOs were again entering a time of uncertainty, exacerbated because of the proximity of the major transformations that they had been coerced into making, and were thus waiting for organizations to appear which they could then mimic (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

It is also clear that some NSOs favored the move to an Executive Office archetype because it tied in with their own normative value structures. The prescribed model towards which NSOs were expected to move was drawn in large part from a combination of features from different NSOs that Sport Canada perceived to be successful. Thus, some NSOs were immediately predisposed to accept the proposed changes because they were consistent with the value structure already held within the organization. As Cooper et al. (1996) have suggested, except in the most hegemonic of sectors, there will always be alternative archetypes towards which organizations will gravitate. This became apparent here when coercive pressures were relaxed, as shown in figure 3.2.

Insert Table 3.6 about here

Our third proposal, that organizations with greater value commitment to the proposed changes would alter more quickly than those with a lower commitment, is strongly supported by evidence presented in table 3.6. In order to get an appreciation of the overall value commitment of each NSO, it was necessary to combine scores from different scales. This required that each scale be standardized to a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The standardized scale means that were subsequently generated were then combined to provide an overall mean for each group of NSOs: those that reoriented in 1988, 1992 and 1996, and those that failed to complete the transformation. The overall mean scores indicate that members of those organizations that reoriented in 1988 held values that were oriented towards a more professional and bureaucratic design to a significantly greater degree than those NSOs that either reoriented in 1996 or failed to

reorient. Similarly, values held in organizations that reoriented in 1992 and 1996 were significantly greater than in those that failed to reorient. In other words, a greater congruence between the dominant value commitment held within the organization and the prescribed changes seems to make radical change easier to attain. As suggested in proposition three, it seems that the pace at which change can be introduced is increased when the values held within the organization are more in concert with the proposed transformation.

The reason for this is probably because the way in which the environment acts on an organization depends on how it is interpreted by organization members (Oliver, 1991; Ranson et al., 1980a). As Bartunek (1984, p. 369) pointed out, "change in interpretive schemes and structures is fostered by environmental events that present new perspectives. But . . . interpretive schemes, actions, and structure interact to affect the impact of the environment." In other words, conformity to a prescribed norm takes place because of belief in a value standard, not expediency (Scott, 1995). Thus, for the seed of a radical transformation within a NSO, the prescribed changes, to take hold, there had to be fertile ground for it to fall upon. If the value structure within the NSO was sympathetic to the prescribed changes then the ground was conducive to growth and radical change became possible. If, on the other hand, the value structure was not in line with the prescribed changes, then this type of radical change became not only impossible to enact, it was in most cases unimaginable. Tushman et al. (1986) made a similar point when they argued that there is a need for a development of "core values" which can serve as a point of reference for organizations as they evolve through frame-breaking changes. Those NSOs that had "core values" that were supportive of the prescribed changes were thus able to change more rapidly than those that did not.

General support for proposition four, that a radical transformation will only be possible in those organizations with an elite that support the prescribed changes, is also provided by figure 3.1. The four NSOs that made the radical transition by 1992 all had an elite value structure that indicated a normative acceptance of the prescribed changes in 1986. Three of the four organizations that reoriented between 1992 and 1996 also had an elite with a value structure congruous with the institutional pressures. This supports the

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findings of DiMaggio (1988) and Fligstein (1991) who also held that radical change could only occur when either a new set of actors gained power, or it was in the interest of those in power to make the transformations. Christensen and Molin (1995) similarly discovered that elite level support was vital for the adoption of radical change. They suggested that the delay in the formation of the Danish Red Cross, from 1864 when Denmark first signed the Geneva Treaty, to 1876, when the organization was eventually formed, was a result of powerful interests in the government and military blocking its formation. It appears that similar blocking action was carried out in those NSOs that had an elite that did not favor making the prescribed changes, and hence failed to reorient. However, it should be pointed out that what we illustrate here is that elite support is necessary for radical change, but it is not sufficient. There are other factors that impinge on the likelihood of an organization completing a program of radical change, one of which we explore with the next proposition.

In proposition five, we argued that radical alterations are only possible in those organizations with a non-elite that also support the prescribed changes. The congruence of non-elite values with the prescribed changes is apparent in figure 3.1 in all eight NSOs that reoriented. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) acknowledged the importance of wide-scale support when they identified the need for a "reformative commitment" among organization members if radical change is to be achieved. The reason for this is that without this support from lower levels within the organization, the resistance to any proposed large-scale transition will likely prove impossible for change proponents to overcome. Myerson and Martin (1987) suggested, in their "differentiation" and "ambiguity" approaches to understanding organizational culture, that there exists not one culture but several competing cultures within most organizations. Consequently, "there will always be a multiplicity of values, variations in acceptance, and different relationships to organizational structure, systems, and action" (Hinings et al., 1996, p. 888). It is therefore unsurprising when resistance builds up and prevents an organization from undertaking a program of radical change. One NSO, 11, in particular had a number of members who clearly would have been uncomfortable with the proposed changes, but they also had some who were strongly in favor. In fact, organization 11 had a weaker level of

support than some of the NSOs that failed to reorient. However, as we stressed above, possessing a membership which is in favor of the move is a minimum necessary requirement; there are still other preconditions which have to be met if the process is to be successfully accomplished.

In proposition six, we explored the possibility of NSOs exhibiting only ceremonial adherence to the prescribed institutional changes. As Powell (1991, p. 194) has suggested, "much of the imagery of institutional theory portrays organizations too passively and depicts environments as overly constraining." In fact, decision-makers do have the opportunity to configure their organizations according to certain preferences (Child, 1972; Oliver, 1991). In their study of NSOs, Kikulis and her colleagues (1995b) found a similar variation in response to external pressures which they also attributed to the role of individual choices of action. We found that several of the organizations, which responded to coercive pressures early on in change process, exhibited signs of ceremonial conformity. These NSOs introduced structural changes in response to the institutional pressures, while holding a value structure that opposed the transition. In figure 3.1 these NSOs are the ones that have upward pointing arrows indicating a move towards a more professional and bureaucratic organization over P_1 while having elite and/or non-elite members with a negative value score. Consequently, these NSOs introduced measures to give the appearance of conformity while operating in a way that retained many of their traditional operating principles, building gaps between the formal and the technical parts of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Such action is not uncommon during radical changes in which structural forms are altered to ensure their symbolic appropriateness (Ranson et al., 1980a). Tolbert (1985) found evidence of just this in her investigation into the sources of administrative structures in higher education institutions. We were given several quotes by senior volunteers and professionals that the prescribed changes were often largely adhered to in order to secure the additional resources that were available, but in operational terms, things changed very little within the NSO. As one respondent remarked somewhat cynically, the prescribed change was "a very worthwhile undertaking marred only by the gap between what the plan indicates we should be doing, and what [we actually] do."

Our final proposition, that organizations enter into periods of stability following radical transformations, is also supported by figure 3.1. Although we have no information as to what happened to this group of organizations after 1996, it is clear that those that achieved a radical transition immediately entered into a period of relative calm. Not one of the four NSOs, which reoriented prior to 1992 exhibited any structural changes after this date, illustrated by the lack of movement (signified by a "-") over P_3 and/or P_4. Every organization that failed to reorient, however, was characterized by reversals, delays, and oscillations throughout the four change periods. Our findings are consistent with others in the institutional and change literatures. Allmendinger and Hackman (1996, p. 354), for example, found that East German orchestras that underwent revolutionary changes subsequently "exhibited remarkable stability and continuity." Christensen and Molin (1995) discovered that the Danish Red Cross, despite various changes in objectives and rationale, maintained its formal structure, seen as an important carrier of organizational values such as democracy.

Spender (1989) speculated that the reason for this stability was that over time, similar competitive strategies emerge, an industry recipe, which shape and constrain decision-making. This emanates from shared interactions and a desire to come to terms with environmental uncertainty, but results in a comfort level of operating that leads to pronounced stability. Hellgren and Melin (1992) similarly suggested that the emergence of a common framework of ideas and beliefs, termed industrial wisdom, leads to a cognitive structuring of an organizational field which promotes stability of operation once a radical change has been made to correspond to certain legitimated practices and design. Scott (1994) articulated this as a development of institutionalized rules which provide definitions of situations and identities, and in doing so provide a stability to organizational life by providing a set of shared expectations.

Zucker (1977) suggested that the reason for this is that institutionalization results in an increase in the uniformity of cultural understandings which in turn leads to a greater resistance to change through personal influence. In other words, when a NSO achieved the legitimated design, institutional pressures to change were, predictably, removed. Hence, a period of stability naturally followed. This was reinforced by the fact that the

design of the organization was, following the change, consistent with the values held within the NSO. Hence any further change would have once again resulted in an imbalance between the values held by members and the structures and systems in place in the organization. By contrast, those NSOs that failed to reorient were constantly exposed to institutional pressures that were often in tension with the values held by individuals within the organization. Consequently, these NSOs were characterized by oscillations and delays as the competing pressures, internal and external, exerted their influence.

Conclusion

The role played by values in the transition process has received increasing interest over recent years. This has been commented upon, implicitly at least, by Bartunek (1984), Hinings and Greenwood (1988a; Greenwood & Hinings, 1988, 1993), and Pettigrew (1985, 1987; Pettigrew et al., 1992). Our explicit investigation of the way in which values affect the change process uncovered a number of points that are worth highlighting. The first, and most important, of these is the necessity of having a value structure that is supportive of any changes being proposed. Although coercive pressures can be useful in instigating change, unless there is normative support, any changes that the organization makes will only be superficially adopted. In fact, some organizations will likely only exhibit ceremonial conformity while retaining their tradition modes of operating and design (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Furthermore, the greater the congruence between values held within the organization and the changes that are being proposed, the faster meaningful change will take place. These findings go some way towards explaining why some organizations are able to successfully complete programs of radical change while others are not, and why some organizations are able to change faster than others.

The study also showed that following the successful completion of a radical change program, the organization will probably enter a period of pronounced stability. If we accept the proposition that change requires a supportive value structure, then once that change has taken place, values and the organizational design will be in concert. Consequently, any further change will create an organization that is once again out of balance with the values of its members. Hence, the likelihood is that an organization will

enter into a period of relative calm following a radical transition. However, further research into the role played by values in organizational change would be useful in adding to the debate regarding these findings.

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Table 3.1. Institutionally specific design archetypes for NSOs.

Institutional Values	Kitchen Table	Boardroom	Executive Office
Orientation	Private, volunteer nonprofit (membership & fundraising)	Private, volunteer nonprofit (public & private funds)	Private, volunteer nonprofit (govt. & corporate funds)
Domain	Broad: mass-high performance sport	Competitive sport opportunities	Narrow: high performance sport
Principles of organizing	Minimal coordination; decisions made by volunteers	Volunteer hierarchy assisted by professionals	Formal planning; professionally led & volunteer assisted
Criteria of effectiveness	Membership preferences; quality of service	Administrative efficiency & effectiveness	International success
Organizational Structure			
Specialization	Roles based on interest & loyalty	Specialized roles & committees	Professional technical & administrative expertise
Standardization	Few rules; little planning	Formal roles, rules and planning	Formal roles, rules and planning
Centralization	Decisions made by a few volunteers	Decisions made by the volunteer board	Decisions decentralized to the professional staff

(From Kikulis et al., 1995a)

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Table 3.2. Reliability coefficients for the value scales.

Alpha

HPMASS	commitment to high performance sport	.6801
GOVIN	commitment to government involvement	.8072
RATIO	commitment to organizational rationalization	.5173
PROVOL	commitment to full-time professional involvement	.5699
PLNIN	commitment to long-term planning	.7462
CORSP	commitment to corporate sponsors as supporting partners	.6064
PLAN	commitment to quadrennial planning process	.7385

Table 3.3 Parameters for low, medium and high values scale scores.

	low	medium	high	Mean (s.d.)
CORSP	6-15	16-17	18-20	16.4 (2.7)
GOVIN	3-13	14-15	16-20	14.1 (3.5)
HPMASS	4-12	13-15	16-20	14 (3.6)
PLAN	7-15	16-17	18-20	16.1 (2.7)
PLNIN	5-14	15-16	17-20	14.8 (3)
PROVOL	10-17	18-19	20	17.8 (2.1)
RATIO	5-12	13	14-15	12.6 (1.7)

Table 3.4. Reliability coefficients for scales used in the construction of the archetypes.

		Alpha	Standardized alpha
Specialization			
TECSPEC	specialization of technical systems	.6106	.5556
PROPER	specialization of professional staff	.6997	.7048
SUPPER	specialization of support staff	.7659	.7796
SPVOL	specialization of volunteers	.4305	.4176
NUMCO	number of committees	n/a	n/a
Standardization			
STADMIN	standardization of administrative systems	.6711	.6662
STATH	standardization of athletes programs	.6764	.6933
STSUPP	standardization of support systems	.7497	.7554
STDEC	standardization of decision-making	.7457	.7475
STEVAL	standardization of evaluations	.6348	.6313
Centralization			
CENT	locus of final decision-making	.7996	.7966
LEVEL	number of levels involved in final decision	.6382	.6554
PROFDEC	final decisions made by professional staff	n/a	n/a
PROFINV	decisions into which volunteers had no input	n/a	n/a

Note: As some items making up the scales have different response categories, standardized alpha scores are provided.

Table 3.5. Profiles of structural design attributes for design archetypes.

	Kitchen Table	Boardroom	Executive Office
Specialization			
Technical (tecspec)	Low	Medium/High	High
Support Staff (supper)	Low	Low/Medium	High
Professional Staff (proper)	Low	Medium/High	High
Volunteer Roles (spvol)	Low/Medium	Medium/High	Low/Medium
Number of Committees (numco)	Low/Medium	High	Low/Medium
Standardization			
Administration (stadmin)	Low	Medium/High	High
Athlete Services (stath)	Low	Medium/High	High
Athlete Support Systems (stsupp)	Low	Medium/High	High
Decision-Making (stdec)	Low	Medium/High	High
Evaluations (steval)	Low	Medium/High	High
Centralization			
Locus of Decisions (cent)	High	High	Low/Medium
Levels of Involvement (level)	Low	Medium/High	Low
Number of decisions made by professionals (prodec)	Low	Low/Medium	High
Number of decisions in which Volunteers have no involvement (profinv)	Low	Low/Medium	High

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Figure 3.1. Summary of 1986 Values Data.

Reoriented 1988

NSO	Elite Av.	Elite support	Non- Elite Av.	Non-Elite support	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
1	4.33	3/3	2.4	5/12	↑	↑	-	-
5	4.75	3/4	3.33	10/15	↑	↑	-	-

Reoriented 1992

NSO	Elite Av.	Elite support	Non- Elite Av.	Non-Elite support	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
30	3.5	4/4	3.5	9/12	↑	-	↑	-
33	3.75	2/4	2.5	6/15 (2 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	-

Reoriented 1996

NSO	Elite Av.	Elite support	Non- Elite Av.	Non-Elite support	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
11	- 3.2	- 6/9 (1 neutral)	2.6	- 4/8 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	↑
22	2.5	1/4 (2 neutral)	2	6/11	-	-	-	↑
32	4	1 / 2 (1 neutral)	2.8	7/15 (1 neutral)	-	↑	-	↑
34	3.2	3/5	3.1	8/10 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	↑

Non-Reorienters (Elite +ve)

NSO	Elite Av.	Elite support	Non- Elite Av.	Non-Elite support	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
3	3.7	8/11	2.9	7/14	↑	↑	↑	↓
6	2.0	4/7 (1 neutral)	- 2.9	- 5/7 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↓	↓
7	2.7	2/3	- 4.7	- 5/6 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↓	-
8	3.4	2/5 (2 neutral)	3	6/9 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	↓
10	2.1	3/5	- 2.9	- 8/15 (2 neutral)	↑	-	↑	↑
12	2.7	4/7	2.3	5/12 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	-	↑
14	2.25	2/4 (1 neutral)	- 3	- 3/7 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	↓
15	2	2/3	2.7	2/3 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	-	-
16	3.2	2/5 (1 neutral)	2.3	- 3/6 (1 neutral)	↑	-	↑	-
17	4	3/5 (1 neutral)	3.2	3/6	↑	↑	-	-
20	2	3/6 (1 neutral)	2.8	3/6 (1 neutral)	↑	-	↑	↑
21	2.9	3/9 (4 neutral)	2.8	6/10 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	-	-
36	4	3/3	-2.4	- 6/13 (3 neutral)	↑	↓	↑	-

Non-Reorienters (Elite -ve)

NSO	Elite Av.	Elite support	Non- Elite Av.	Non-Elite support	P_1	P_2	P_3	P_4
2	- 2.5	- 1 / 2	- 3.7	- 9/11	↑	-	-	-
4	- 4	- 6/8 (1 neutral)	- 3.8	- 4/6 (1 neutral)	↓	↓	↓	↑
9	- 4.2	- 4/4	- 2.7	- 4/6	↑	-	-	↑
13	- 4.6	- 4/5 (1 neutral)	- 5	- 4/4	↑	-	↑	↓
18	- 2.6	- 3/5	3.3	6/7	-	↑	↑	-
19	- 3.1	- 6/8 (1 neutral)	- 3.4	- 10/12 (1 neutral)	↑	-	↑	↑
23	- 3.3	- 5/7	- 4	- 9/10 (1 neutral)	↑	↑	↑	↓
24	- 1.25	- 2/4 (1 neutral)	- 2.75	- 3/4	-	-	↑	↓
25	- 2.5	- 1 / 2	- 2.6	- 6/14	↑	-	-	-
26	-3.8	- 3/5 (1 neutral)	- 4.1	- 6/7	↑	↑	↑	-
27	- 2.8	- 2/5 (1 neutral)	- 2.7	- 3/6	↑	-	↑	-
28	- 3.1	- 4/9 (2 neutral)	3	5/8	↑	-	↓	↑
29	- 3.3	- 3/3	- 4.2	- 7/5	↑	↑	↑	↓
35	- 2.2	- 2/5 (2 neutral)	- 4	- 5/5	↑	↓	↑	↑

Figure 3.1 Legend

NSO   -   sample number of NSO

Elite Av.   -   there were seven value scales for which each member of each NSO has a score. These were then given a "high", "medium", or "low" rating. The elite av. comprised the average number of high or low scores held across the elite (max. 7). Low scores indicated by a "-".

Elite support   -   the number of elite members who held values consistent with the overall consensus within the elite. If an elite member had more highs than lows, s/he was seen to hold a "high" rating; mediums were scored as neutral and thus did not affect the outcome as it is assumed that the position was not strongly supported either way (Cooper et al., 1996). An overall rating of neutral was given if the number of highs equaled the number of lows. E.g., 6/9 (1 neutral) indicates that of nine members, 6 had a value profile consistent with the prescribed change, 1 had no preference either way, and 2 opposed the prescribed change. A dominance of lows was indicated by a "-".

Elite Av.   -   average number of highs or lows held by non-elite members within the NSO

Elite support   -   the total number of non-elite members interviewed who held values consistent with the overall consensus within the NSO.

P_1 -   direction of movement between 1984 and 1986
P_2 -   direction of movement between 1986 and 1988
P_3 -   direction of movement between 1988 and 1992
P_4 -   direction of movement between 1992 and 1996

↑ indicates NSO becoming more professional and bureaucratic
↓ indicates NSO becoming less professional and bureaucratic
- indicates no change in structure

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Figure 3.2. The dynamics of strategic change in Canadian NSOs between 1984 and 1996.

Legend: KT - Kitchen Table
BR - Boardroom
EO - Executive Office

NB. Order of transition between different designs:
KT archetype *to* Embryonic KT *to* Schizoid KT/BR *to* Embryonic BR- *to* BR archetype *to* Embryonic BR+ *to* Schizoid BR/EO *to* Embryonic EO *to* EO archetype

1992

1996

4 EO
12 Emb. EO

10 Schiz. EO/BR

2 Emb. BR +

2 BR

3 Schiz. BR/KT

1 Emb. KT
1 KT

8 EO
7 Emb. EO

15 Schiz. EO/BR

1 Emb. BR +

1 Emb. KT
3 KT

1988

3 EO
2 Emb. EO
14 Schiz. EO/BR
5 Emb. BR +
1 BR
2 Emb. BR -
9 Schiz. BR/KT

1986

2 Emb. EO
9 Schiz. EO/BR
3 Emb. BR +
3 BR
2 Emb. BR -
11 Schiz. BR/KT
4 Emb. KT
1 KT

1984

5 Schiz. EO/BR

3 Emb. BR -
11 Schiz. BR/KT
8 Emb. KT
8 KT

Table 3.6. Standardized scale means and standard deviations of values held by members of the different groups of NSOs

	Reoriented 1988	Reoriented 1992	Reoriented 1996	Non-reorienters
CORSP	.6	.77	-.07	-.11
(sd)	(.87)	(.55)	(.88)	(1.02)
GOVIN	.26	.28	-.13	-.03
(sd)	(1.09)	(.64)	(.91)	(1.03)
HPMASS	.44	.47	.04	-.09
(sd)	(.81)	(.94)	(.95)	(1.01)
PLAN	.34	-.27	.33	-.09
(sd)	(.7)	(1.14)	(.83)	(1.02)
PLNIN	.6	-.12	.2	-.08
(sd)	(.73)	(1)	(.92)	(1.02)
PROVOL	.1	.43	.06	-.06
(sd)	(.76)	(.62)	(1)	(1.04)
RATIO	.03	.2	.35	-.08
(sd)	(.88)	(.78)	(.76)	(1.05)
Overall mean	*.34 *†*	*.25 ‡*	*.11 ¥*	*-.07*
(sd)	*(.86)*	*(.89)*	*(.9)*	*(1.03)*

* - difference between 1988 reorienters and non-reorienters significant at the .05 level
† - difference between 1988 reorienters and 1996 reorienters significant at the .05 level
‡ - difference between 1992 reorienters and non-reorienters significant at the .05 level
¥ - difference between 1996 reorienters and non-reorienters significant at the .05 level

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[1] Due to an anticipated lack of stability over time, estimates of reliability were only measured at T_1. In this we follow McKinney (1966) who cautioned against relying on test-retest reliability measures for longitudinal studies, and the example set by Kikulis et al. (1995a) who argued that as the changes were implemented over time, so some items would almost certainly change more than others. We similarly stress that our interest is in the way in which the organizations changed over time, particularly the magnitude and direction of that change. A reliable score at T_1 therefore was taken as an indication that the scale in and of itself was reliable.

Chapter 4
Strategic Change and the Role of Interests, Power and Organizational Capacity

There is little doubt that members' values play an important role in determining whether or not an organization is able to complete a program of radical change. However, it is clear from this research that a supportive value structure is a necessary, but not sufficient, characteristic of successful transformations. There are clearly other factors that also play a large part in differentiating those organizations that are able to complete programs of change from those that are not. The purpose of this paper is to provide further insight into the way in which the internal dynamics of an organization impact upon its propensity to undertake and complete a program of radical organizational change.

In addition to environmental factors and value structures, Hinings and Greenwood (1988) discussed three internal dynamics that they suggested significantly affect the ability of an organization to successfully complete a program of radical change. The first of these is the interests of different organization sub-units, and in particular the level of satisfaction that these groups have with their existing share of resources. The second is the distribution of power within the organization because this determines how disagreements over interests are resolved. The third is the "capacity for change": this refers to the competencies and capabilities within the organization that can be used to guide it from one archetypal state to another. Although for the sake of clarity we will discuss these different elements separately, the complexity of their interaction should not be discounted.

In striving for efficient operation, organizations become sub-divided into specialized units, each with different roles and responsibilities. Although these divisions are made on a purely technical basis, inevitably over time different sub-units adopt differing sets of norms and expectations (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). Consequently, organizations can be "conceptualized as heterogeneous entities comprised of functionally differentiated groups pursuing goals and promoting interests" (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996, p. 1024). The extent with which these different groups are satisfied with how their interests are accommodated can become a significant pressure for change (Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood & Ranson, 1981). Those sub-units that feel that their interests will

be enhanced by a program of radical change will tend to support it; those that feel that they may be disadvantaged will likely oppose it.

However, the location of these organization sub-units, in an identifiable social system, means that that they are mutually related by the interdependent nature of their activities (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck & Pennings, 1971). Consequently, the relationship between different sub-units, and individuals, is characterized by the distribution and usage of power (Walsh et al., 1981). Power is a mobilizer for implementing decisions. Actors, in this sense, use their power to protect valued interests over time by establishing, maintaining, and sometimes transforming the rules by which the organization operates (DiMaggio, 1988). There is, therefore, a recognition that transformation may involve a challenge to the dominating ideology, systems of meaning, and power relationships in the organization (Pettigrew, 1987).

The likelihood of an organization being able to make a radical change is also determined by the capability of organization members to make the transition from one operating state to another, the organization's capacity for change. At a base level this requires organizational leaders to make use of their formal power or authority. However, it is also incumbent upon them to convince other organization members of the need for change, of the form that the change should take, and of their ability to lead the organization through the transition process (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). In other words, there must be a level of trust and belief by the members of the organization that the leadership is able to guide the organization through the inevitable uncertainty that accompanies any large-scale transformation. Without this, the resistance that will likely arise will make any subsequent change very difficult to complete.

Consequently, the purpose of this study is to explicitly examine the roles played by interests, power, and capacity for change on the transition process. In the next section we speculate more on how these different dynamics affect organizational change. We then go on to explain how the data for the study were collected and how they were used to construct a number of case studies detailing both successful and unsuccessful programs of radical change. The subsequent section is used to provide insight into the way in which the organizations in our study were influenced by their various internal contexts. We finish up with some brief concluding comments as to the significance of our findings.

Theoretical Framework

The functional differentiation of organizations works to distinguish one group of incumbents from another. Consequently, built into any organization is a structure of advantage and disadvantage (Walsh et al., 1981). Members strive to secure their sectional claims within the organization's structure, which in turn works to mediate and reconstitute their interests (Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980). Inevitably, therefore, there is a constant struggle between groups within an organization to protect their individual interests. In other words, the differentiated nature of an organization results in structuring becoming the privilege of some organizational actors and not others.

Pettigrew (1985, 1987), in his study of ICI, found that sub-units would emphasize different aspects of their organizational context and structure in an attempt to obtain outcomes that were important to them. There is an "ongoing process of symbol construction and value use designed to create legitimacy for one's ideas, actions, and demands, and to deligitimate the demands of ones opponents" (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 659). Organizations are, therefore, best conceived of as political systems in which power and conflict rather than rules and authority are defining characteristics (Ranson et al., 1980; Walsh et al., 1981). Consequently, political self-interest is an important determinant of change (Oliver, 1991). Pettigrew (1985, p. 443) suggested that the reason for this is that "strategic change is likely to be a challenge to the dominating ideology, culture, and systems of meaning and interpretation, as well as the structures, priorities and power relationships of the organization." In other words, many members of an organization will inevitably view the prospect of change as a threat to their sub-unit and individual interests. Change is thus a multi-layered and continuous process with outcomes emerging not as a result of rational debates, but rather shaped by the interests and commitments of individuals and groups (Pettigrew, 1987). In particular, the implementation of programs of radical change places the management and manipulation of individuals at center stage (Wilson, 1992). Tushman and Romanelli (1985) agreed, and stressed that as a consequence, intra-organizational power distributions are critical to the success of any program of large-scale change.

Power, in this sense, is defined as a capacity to determine outcomes. According to Zaleznick and Kets de Vries (1975, p. 109), "power transforms individual interests into coordinated activities that accomplish valuable ends." It represents an ability of what are political units to constitute and recreate the structure of the organization according to their own preferences. Typically, but not always, it is linked to the control and/or mobilization of scarce resources. Fligstein (1991, p. 313) suggested that "change . . . can only occur when either a new set of actors gains power or it is in the interest of those in power to alter organizational goals." Thus the dynamics of power and domination that allow some groups to constitute organization structures to suit their own preferences becomes critical (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; 1996; Pettigrew, 1985, 1987; Ranson et al., 1980). Without power, there is virtually no prospect of instigating meaningful change within an organization.

In the sense in which we have discussed it, power is seen more as a property of the embedded social relationship resulting from the division of labor rather than as a personal characteristic. Power is thus explained by variables that are elements of each sub-unit's function and its links with the activities of other sub-units (Hickson et al., 1971). Hickson et al. (1971) went on to suggest that the amount of power that a sub-unit possesses depends on three factors. The first is the sub-unit's ability to cope with uncertainty in such a way that it is reduced in other sub-units. Organizations abhor uncertainty in the same way that nature abhors a vacuum, thus any group that can eliminate or significantly reduce uncertainty perceived elsewhere in the organization will be highly valued. The second is the sub-unit's degree of substitutability. If a sub-unit's role can be easily imitated or replaced, its power within the organization will quickly be diminished. The third is the sub-unit's centrality to organizational activities, and the consequent effect that it would have on the organization if it ceased to operate. These bases of power are important because they enable or constrain alternative courses of action that are available during periods of radical change.

The way in which power is distributed within the organization is crucial when it comes to understanding radical transformations. Hinings and Greenwood (1988) described a "concentrated" power structure as one in which power is held by a select few. In this setting, change can be facilitated or obstructed depending on the commitment of

the elite. A "dispersed" power structure, by contrast, occurs when power is spread among a variety of different sub-units. Here, change is only possible if there is an overall commitment to reform held by all of the various groups. Without such a general consensus, it is relatively easy for one sub-unit that feels that it is being disadvantaged to block the transformation process (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggested that in addition to supportive power dependences, radical change can only occur if there is "an appropriate capacity for action". An organization's capacity for change can be broken down into behavioural and technical components (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). There must be an ability to mobilize a commitment to change by creating excitement about the anticipated end-point, and convincing other organization members that they will be better off as a result of the change. In other words, there must be a clear vision of the future to guide the organization through the transition process (Child & Smith, 1987). This is the behavioural aspect of the change management process. There is, however, also a need for leaders to demonstrate that they possess sufficient technical expertise to bring about the transformation and understand what is required to operate in the changed state (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). In other words, there needs to be an ability to bring about change in different parts of the organization at different times, and possibly at varying speeds. According to Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee (1992), this requires subtle, pluralist leadership that runs broadly and deeply throughout the organization.

In short, leadership enables, or does not enable, change (Bartunek, 1984). Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990) outlined six key roles that leaders must play if they are to successfully negotiate major programs of transformation. The first of these is to mobilize commitment to change through a joint assessment with various interest groups as to the nature of the problems facing the organization. Second, a shared vision should be developed as to what changes are necessary. Third, there is a need to foster consensus for the vision, competence to enact it, and cohesion to keep it moving. Fourth, the changes should spread throughout the organization without being pushed from the top down. Fifth, it is necessary to institutionalize the change through formal policies, procedures, systems and structures. Finally, there is a requirement that the implemented changes are monitored and adjusted as inevitable problems occur. Greenwood and Hinings (1996, pp.

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1039-1040) summed up this position by stating that "radical change cannot occur without the organization having sufficient understanding of the new conceptual destination, having the skills and competencies required to function in that new destination, and having the ability to manage how to get to that new destination."

To sum up, therefore, there are three basic elements to take into account when trying to uncover the internal dynamics involved in any radical transformation. Individual or sub-unit interests can bring about pressure for change if members of the sub-unit are dissatisfied with their allocation of what are usually scarce resources. Dependences of power determine in whose favor conflicts over interests will be settled. Finally, the capacity of the organization to enter into and complete a radical transformation will be largely determined by the competencies and capabilities that the organization's elite can bring to bear.

It is worth reiterating, and it will have become apparent in the discussion above, that these three dynamics are so closely intertwined that alteration in any one affects the other two. Nevertheless, for conceptual clarity, we have tried to break the discussion down into the three basic components. We now seek to gain insight into the way in which these internal elements affect the change process by building some detailed case studies of a group of organizations on which we collected real-time data during a twelve-year period of sustained change. Next, though, we discuss the nature of the organizations that formed the focus of our investigation, and the methods used to construct the case studies.

Methods

The rationale for the research design adopted here was the attempt to build on the findings of the first two papers of the dissertation to gain further insight into the factors that affected the outcome of the NSOs' attempts at radical change. As part of Sport Canada's "Best Ever" scheme, each NSO had to take part in a planning process known as the Quadrennial Planning Program (QPP). In this plan, it was intended that the organization would detail how it would go about implementing changes to its structure and operations over the subsequent four years. Thus for many organizations the QPP and the Best Ever change process were inextricably interlinked.

In trying to uncover why it was that certain NSOs were able to complete programs of radical change while others were unable to do so, we chose to follow a comparative case study method. This approach was recommended by Yin (1994, p. 9) for use in studies when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control." A similar research design was adopted by Pettigrew and his colleagues (1992) in their study of the British National Health Service. Here, Pettigrew et al. (1992) concentrated on developing a relatively small number of cases in sufficient detail to allow the intricacies of the change process to become apparent. As they suggested (1992, p. 4), "such are the complexities of the strategic change issues . . . that [more] superficial analyses would be in danger of missing key components of the explanation". The insight that we hoped to gain from using a comparative case study method was augmented by the fact that we had the benefit of using real-time data gathered over a twelve-year period. We were thus able to gain an appreciation of the unfurling of events, and the dynamics that precipitated them, effectively as they happened. This longitudinal approach has been stressed as vital when trying to uncover the dynamics of either incremental or radical transformations (Pettigrew, 1987; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994).

We decided to construct nine case studies, four detailing the change process in organizations that reoriented, five outlining organizations that started to change but were unable to complete the transition and ended up following a reversal track (Kikulis, Slack & Hinings, 1995a; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). The data from which these case studies were constructed comprised the 200 interviews that were carried out with individuals centrally involved in each NSO's QPP. The nine organizations were selected to provide as detailed an insight as possible into the effects of internal dynamics on the change process. Hence, each organization in the study operated under at least slightly differing circumstances. Of the four NSOs that reoriented, one completed the transformation in 1988, two in 1992, and one in 1996. Of the five that failed to reorient, three had value structures that indicated at least a superficial support for the proposed changes among the elite. In fact one of these, that detailed in case study nine, exhibited quite marked support, yet still followed a reversal track. The remaining two had value structures that indicated that the elite were opposed to the changes. Although they had

started to become more professional and bureaucratic, they had also ended up following a reversal track. In this way we sought to present as balanced a collection of case studies as possible.

In order to classify the organizations as following a reorientation or reversal track, it was necessary to determine their archetypal status at each of the data collection points, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1992, and 1996. We did this by following the methods described in papers one and two. The values held in each organization were determined in the same way as those in paper two. This allowed us to build detailed case studies on those organizations that we felt would provide a balanced and illuminating view of the change process.

In order to increase the reliability and validity of the method chosen, we used multiple data sources to develop "converging lines of inquiry" (Yin, 1994, p. 92). The primary source of data for this study were interviews conducted with professional staff and volunteers involved in the change process. However, these were supplemented by two documentary analyses. The first involved the examination of every report on amateur sport commissioned by the federal government between 1982 and 1996. This period was chosen because it encapsulated the 12 years of the study, and the two years prior to the introduction of the Best Ever program. The second comprised every article that appeared over the same period in the *Globe & Mail, Maclean's Magazine, Calgary Herald, Winnipeg Free Press, Toronto Star, The Gazette* (from Montreal) and *The Chronicle-Herald* (from Halifax). As well as allowing us to check details provided in the interviews, and gather additional information regarding the change process, these secondary investigations allowed us to collect themes upon which to base the case studies. These included the traditional roles played by volunteers in Canada's NSOs, the prescribed move to make these organizations more professional and business-like, the interaction between professionals and volunteers, the emphasis on high performance sport, the nature of regional differences, and the relationship between administrative and professional staff. These themes, as suggested by Strauss (1987), were framed in the theoretical propositions that underpinned the study, namely the effects of interests, power, and capacity for change on the overall transition process. By constructing the case studies in this way, and incorporating a longitudinal dimension, we were able to

satisfy the call of Pettigrew et al. (1992) for more holistic and dynamic analyses of *changing* rather than mere episodic descriptions of change.

Results

Case Study 1 (NSO reoriented 1988)

This summer Olympic NSO had recognized the need for some large-scale changes within the organization prior to the introduction of the Best Ever program. For example, the desire within the organization to improve elite level performances was confirmed by the decision to appoint a High Performance Director well before this was prescribed by Sport Canada (SC). Consequently, members of the organization were enthusiastic about its early inclusion in the planning process. They embraced the process making many rapid changes to the organization as they tried to adapt quickly to the SC model. However, the NSO experienced problems over the first two years of the transition process. Difficulties in trying to bring about change were accompanied by virtually all of the organization's professional staff being released between March and September of 1985. This led to a comprehensive review of the objectives of the change program and what it was intended to achieve. However, by early 1986, the Executive Director (ED) felt that the organization was "back on track as far as the QPP [was] concerned."

Responsibility for implementing the changes fell to the NSO's ED. In each of the areas in which changes were prescribed by SC, a volunteer Chair was appointed, along with a professional staff member who was required to take the lead on change issues. This seemed to work well with staff recommendations usually supported by their volunteer supervisors. The ED informed us in early 1986 that "the key volunteers involved are very committed [to the change process], but it has been necessary to sell the plan to the membership at large." In addition to the close liaisons between volunteers and professionals, the ED ensured that technical staff, particularly the coaches, were involved in the transition process. In this way, he sought to ensure that they recognized the need for change.

Two years into the change period, the biggest problem being identified by both professional staff and volunteers was the role played by SC. Although the ED felt that the relationship with the SC consultant was a positive one, members of the organization,

particularly volunteers, were voicing their concerns. Several suggested that SC wanted too much control of "their" organization, that SC only made funds available for high performance initiatives, and that they failed to live up to their promises regarding financing and support. The general feeling was that the prescribed changes were beneficial to the organization but that the process was too bureaucratic and cumbersome.

Two years later the optimism regarding the change program was still in place. It was expressed that the organization was undergoing "a change for the better". The newly appointed ED recognized that the changes were sometimes difficult to implement, that the planning process itself was labor-intensive, and that the focus on high performance had caused problems with resource allocation within the organization. However, the commitment of volunteer members to the transformation process had steadily grown over time as they became increasingly involved. Major decisions were now made by a combination of volunteers and professionals in a participative decision-making structure seen as both democratic and effective.

At the start of 1989, the NSO experienced something of a cash crisis. The failure of the organization's teams to reach the Seoul Olympics resulted in a reduction of its SC grant, and the loss of a major sponsorship deal. However, over the next four years, the NSO continued to build on the large-scale changes that had already been implemented. The organization's two high performance centers (HPCs) were accorded greater independence and professional staff were given more responsibility. A much closer working relationship was developed between "partner groups" such as the Canadian Interuniversity Athletic Union and the Canadian Colleges Athletic Association.

The relationships between volunteer and professional members also thrived as levels of mutual trust increased. Staff began to stress that their primary purpose was to provide a service to the organization's members. A direct result of this was that the NSO became much more athlete-centered. There was also a continued attempt to combine the expertise of volunteers and professionals by using committees to formulate policy positions and carry out major decision-making tasks.

Between 1992 and 1996, the NSO experienced further cuts to its funding from SC. The national Youth Team was disbanded, one of the two HPCs was dissolved, and several of the committees were "streamlined". These funding cuts were exacerbated by

the lack of corporate sponsorship that was forthcoming. As the ED told us towards the end of 1996, "I think that we are finding out the hard way that the corporate market place in Canada cannot sustain the type of revenue generation that the sports associations [and the government] thought might be there." The response to these cuts was to implement further changes. Separate "business units" were created, each responsible for its own planning, budgeting and revenue generation. and run by a combination of volunteer and professional staff members. Potential sponsors were actively courted, with some degree of success, and management of international and domestic events was used as a generator of vital income. The organization also became increasingly formalized in an attempt to improve efficiency. There was a belief expressed within the organization that the NSO had to be ready to respond to the environmental changes that members believed would continue impacting the organization. In particular, the need for professional and volunteer leadership with the vision to carry out the changes perceived as necessary for success into the next Millennium, was stated as vitally important.

Case Study 2 (NSO reoriented 1992)

Formal planning along a four-year cycle as a way to advance the organization began in this NSO in 1978. There were therefore several planning initiatives within the organization before the SC prescribed process was introduced. The first SC-approved plan however, was somewhat hastily constructed, and had to be "revamped" in 1986. The changes to the NSO were to be jointly managed by the ED and the Technical Director (TD). The process of change was very front-ended; lots of activities were planned for the first year, many of which were actually achieved. The core sport changes took precedence, with the "soft" activities, such as developing liaisons with schools and colleges, put back to subsequent years.

The major purpose of the QPP was to improve high performance aspects of the sport. For this reason, the volunteers in this organization were content to monitor and evaluate the transition process leaving most of the planning to the professional staff. According to the ED in 1986, the process was most useful in clarifying to the general membership that the focus of the national office should be elite-level performance with development of more recreation-oriented programs left to the provincial associations.

This led to what the ED described as a well developed system that integrated the national office well with the provinces.

From 1986 onwards, there was a feeling that the organization was not understood particularly well by SC. The NSO's emphasis on its World Championships rather than the Olympics was not appreciated by SC. Furthermore, the ED of the NSO felt that its first grant of $300,000 was derisory compared to some sports, especially for an organization with a budget of $4.2 million. This was supported by comments from volunteer members who felt that despite working diligently towards SC objectives, financial and other forms of support had been disappointing.

The relationship between volunteer and professional staff, seen as reasonably good at the start of the first quadrennial, further improved over the twelve years of the study. The Board of Directors, even back in 1986, was made up of business people who believed that the staff were best placed to run the organization. Professional staff were largely responsible for directing the change process, but volunteer input was highly valued.

By 1989, the prescribed changes had, according to the ED, "led to a far better interface between professionals and volunteers. . . . The volunteers now let the professionals get on with the job . . . there has been a development of mutual trust between the two [groups]." This was reified by frequent communication that saw professional staff "in constant touch" with their respective volunteer committees.

Since 1985, there has also been a good working relationship between technical and administrative staff. Prior to this, there had been conflict between the two groups that had resulted in the structure of the organization being altered such that these two facets of the organization each reported directly to the President. The appointment of a new Director General (DG) in 1985 was accompanied by further structural change that resulted in both administrative and technical staff reporting directly to him. The conflict within the organization correspondingly diminished.

There was a definite feeling within the NSO that the prescribed SC changes did not radically alter the direction of the organization, but served instead to focus it. Although the SC grant has never formed a major budgetary contribution (by 1996, it was down to 5% of the organization's total income), the direction prescribed by SC has been

followed by the NSO. The DG stated in 1996 that he felt that the federal government would have curtailed all funding for sport "certainly within the next five years". Despite this, the primary change within the organization "has been the realization by our Board of Directors and Executive Committee that if we are going to make it, it is because we have assembled a good team of professionals working for the organization, and then once that is in place, it's been the need to come to grips with getting out into the market place." The DG felt, by the end of 1996, that to be competitive athletically, there needed to be good event management, an appreciation of the role played by television, and an ability to attract good corporate sponsors and spectators. Consequently, he is trying to augment the sport's massive participant base in Canada with the "tremendous commercial opportunities" that come with hosting world class events. The elite leadership of the organization, both volunteer and professional, commented that they felt that the best way of achieving this was by becoming a highly professional, bureaucratic organization.

Case Study 3 – (NSO reoriented 1992)

This NSO first started a program of quadrennial planning in 1978. It was seen as an important step in "bringing direction" to the organization and motivating its members. This was followed up with a second plan in 1982. The experience that this lent the organization resulted in the NSO serving as something of a model for SC when it started prescribing how organizations should go about implementing programs of large-scale change. The ED, in 1986, felt that this continuity "was probably a mistake as the last [plan] doesn't have the same degree of commitment within the organization; there isn't the same degree of enthusiasm and urgency." He felt that there was also a problem of ownership because of the planning that had previously been carried out within the organization. Consequently, he suggested that "the real issue is to take a plan that is seen as being for SC and turn it into a [NSO] plan." This apathy resulted in the plan being used as little more than a means to enhanced funding. The ED again stated that "as far as I'm concerned, the quadrennial plan is in a box in the next office. . . . Nobody is actively working with the quadrennial plan and if it were not attached to money then the whole thing would be out of the window". The volunteer Board members, by contrast, wanted

the ED to keep quiet about his objections, and just fill in the necessary forms to secure the additional funding.

The changes that the NSO planned to implement over the first quadrennial called for funding of approximately $9 million. The organization was actually granted $2 million which, when added to an existing deficit of $400,000, caused a major revaluation of the change program. This led to problems within the organization because many saw the plan for the first quadrennial as now being worthless without the funding or personnel to implement the proposed changes. This was further exacerbated by the lack of flexibility built into the plan to allow for perceived needed changes in direction. Although there was little conflict within the organization, there was a feeling expressed in 1986 by some volunteers that the professional staff employed were not capable of fulfilling the leadership role required to get the organization through the transition process. It was hoped that the recently appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) would change that.

By the end of the first quadrennial, there was a feeling of disillusionment within the organization that continued over the next quadrennial. Organization members became increasingly frustrated with the "onerous" paperwork and SC's emphasis on high performance sport. Changes were introduced, but only in a minor, incremental way. The general membership failed to buy into the plan, which basically "remained on the shelf" as an exercise for SC. Neither volunteers nor professionals were committed to its implementation.

However, the start of the third quadrennial, 1992, witnessed a pronounced alteration as the NSO started to change in a much more dynamic manner. The organization redefined itself as a service organization that was intended to cater for its member's needs "from the cradle to the grave". A flatter structure was adopted in order to allow more input from the organization's members into the new strategic plan. In fact, over 600 members were involved in the design of the changes that the organization needed. This led to great ownership of the changes by the entire organization. The NSO also became more formalized in order to improve operational effectiveness for, as the CEO told us in 1996, "there would be less gray areas and less doubts in people if they knew what was expected of them." This was also intended to eliminate any doubts

regarding athlete selection and funding criteria. Although decision-making was largely decentralized to professional staff, the CEO stated categorically that "we still value the input of volunteers." Volunteer Board members retained ultimate authority with respect to policy direction, but the consultation between professional and volunteer groups was such that there was rarely a disagreement as to the direction that the organization should take. As part of this, communication became much improved with the introduction of a membership wide newsletter and greater use of electronic media.

Case Study 4 – (NSO reoriented 1996)

This NSO had a "corporate plan" in place through to 1986 before the QPP was introduced. Sport Canada agreed to finance an enhanced plan, which was finished in November 1985. After nine months of planning, it became increasingly difficult to keep volunteers motivated, so it was left to the ED to finish the planning and create a budget. The organization asked for $150,000 and was granted $92,000, which, with some streamlining, was seen as adequate for the NSO's needs.

The organization traditionally had a very strong volunteer base; in fact, the number of volunteers involved in decision-making was a cause for concern for SC, which felt that it made the process unwieldy and inefficient. The NSO, however, felt that because of the subjective nature of the sport, involvement of a high number of volunteers was politically vital in order to maintain a balance between eastern and western Canada, and French- and English-speaking representatives. There was also a concern in 1986 that the proposed changes would involve administrators making technical decisions. Consequently, a Technical-Administrative Council was established which included the NSO President and the Chairs of each of the technical committees. All plans and budgets had to be approved by this committee before they could be implemented. An additional concern, that the QPP only dealt with high performance issues, resulted in the creation of a separate plan for domestic development.

Midway through the first quadrennial, volunteer members of the NSO were being largely optimistic about the prescribed changes. However, there was a concern that SC wanted all organizations to fit into their model, and that volunteers were not being valued. As one high ranking volunteer informed us, "the trend towards more decision-

making in the hands of professionals will destroy us. Volunteers with no responsibilities will leave and donate their time where it is needed. Sport Canada must recognize that volunteers are far more dedicated than paid staff. Who else would work 40 hours per week unpaid?" There was no conflict between volunteers and administrative staff as a result of this because the staff appreciated the situation and cooperated fully with the volunteers. However, there was some conflict between volunteers and those technical staff who failed to accept the role of volunteers in the decision-making process. There was further conflict over the decision by SC to fund only one HPC, not two. This was problematic because Quebecois athletes refused to relocate to western Canada in order to train, an issue that it was decided would be dealt with in the second quadrennial planning period, between 1988 and 1992.

There was a feeling at the end of November 1987 that although many people in the NSO were receptive to the proposed changes, they had not yet, according to the ED, "been incorporated into the culture of the organization." A major reason for this was the reluctance of the volunteers to relinquish decision-making responsibility to professional staff. A second reason was that the Board of Directors, comprised of the Presidents of the various provincial bodies, felt alienated by SC's emphasis on high performance at the expense of domestic development. Despite these concerns, the organization remained remarkably stable with virtually no turnover of staff or volunteers over the first four years of the planning process.

Over the next four years, decisions were delegated away from the Board of Directors to various technical staff. Budget centers were also set up in different parts of the organization, each with managers who reported to the treasurer. The process of decentralization was accompanied by continued relative stability in terms of personnel with the only major alteration a change in President. Despite the increased delegation of authority to professional staff, there was a reluctance of volunteers to cede real decision-making responsibility to the paid employees.

It was not until the third quadrennial, 1992 to 1996, that the NSO had evolved sufficiently that volunteers were willing to devolve significantly greater decision-making powers into the hands of professional staff. The Board of Directors became purely a policy-making body, elected at each annual general meeting. Operational decision-

making and financial authority was moved into staff hands. The ED also emphasized the fact that the NSO had become very much athlete-centered, focused on delivery of services to the organization's athletes. In fact, things changed so radically within the organization over this four-year period that by the end of it, according to the ED, one of the staff's major roles was to provide leadership to volunteer committee members. This was quite a pronounced shift for an organization which only four years earlier, while overtly welcoming the shifts prescribed by SC, were fiercely resisting any reduction in the role played by volunteer decision-makers.

Case Study 5 – (NSO had reversed to Kitchen Table archetype by 1996)

The NSO featured in this case study has long had a fractious, uneasy relationship with SC because of the problems that the sport has had with drug abuse by its athletes. In 1986, members of the organization were reporting that SC was biased against the NSO because of its doping problems. Despite this, some members of the NSO welcomed the proposed changes as being potentially useful for the organization. Others, however, were not so sure, feeling that the prescribed changes were being used as a political tool by SC and the federal government. One prominent volunteer informed us in 1986 that "it would have been to Sport Canada's advantage to use another method than bribing (sic) in order to encourage volunteers to develop self-financing." Despite this type of skepticism, the organization committed itself to making the prescribed changes.

The task of drafting the plan to initiate the transition fell to the staff as the Executive and other volunteer members felt that they already had too many other tasks to carry out. The General Manager (GM) believed strongly in long-range planning, and largely through his cajoling and encouraging, the organization, he assessed, was able to instigate 75% of the new activities planned over the first two years of the change period. He felt that "everything about the plan was positive", and had led to numerous improvements in the running of the organization. He did, however, comment that the national office was understaffed because of the time-consuming nature of the changes that were being introduced. The GM also felt that there was a need for greater focus on junior development within the NSO, and a need to remove funding criteria away from being solely determined by the number of medals won in international competitions.

At the end of 1987, the GM was still positive about the effects that the QPP had had, and would continue to have on the federation. He felt that there was a solid commitment to the changes, despite the fact that the organization had suffered as a result of ongoing doping problems, which had damaged the federation's credibility both with SC and corporate sponsors. The GM felt sure that all of the changes called for in the plan would be implemented by the end of the quadrennial, 1988. He did however, express concern that a lack of funding, a financial deficit, the doping problems, the lack of profile of the sport on a continent seemingly obsessed with professional athletes, and the lack of commitment from athletes, had worked to severely constrain the organization. He also suggested that this had caused severe levels of stress both among volunteers and professional staff. This had in turn led to a rapid rate of staff and volunteer turnover, and a loss of athletes. In fact according to the GM, the athlete turnover rate at this time was between 30% and 40% each year. This, allied to difficulties in recruiting coaches and junior athletes, and paying for training time, resulted in the technical parts of the sport becoming weak, and seemingly irreversibly, getting weaker.

Following the 1988 Olympics, and further problems with drug abuse, there was turmoil in the organization. The Vice President (Technical) was forced to resign, and the turnover of volunteers was even greater than that usually experienced by a NSO after an Olympic Games. The organization was at a crisis point with survival stated as its sole ambition. Staff responsibilities were reorganized, and yet another new anti-doping program was introduced. The number of human resources and provincial organizations continued to decline into 1989, but the number of athletes and clubs started to increase, largely as a result of an increased popularity of the sport among female athletes. Comments were expressed as to the way in which the doping program was overwhelming the organization. Canada, it was stated, was the only country in the world in which each NSO was responsible for its own drug-testing, as opposed to it being carried out by an independent body. As one official told us, "the [NSO] is too small . . . to organize [such a] large program."

Four years later, the organization had managed to achieve some sort of stability. Decision-making authority remained with the volunteer executive which, if anything, had assumed even more responsibility. This had not been opposed by the staff, who seemed

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content to carry out their responsibilities with the minimum of fuss. The lack of funds were still hampering development, but worse was to follow. In 1996, the NSO lost all of its funding from SC. All staff were fired and all committees dissolved, because there was not the money to fund either salaries or travelling expenses. Needless to say, there was still no corporate support. The organization became totally dependent on the President, with help from a Vice President (Technical) and a Vice President (Finance). The group would sit around the President's kitchen table to make decisions.

Case Study 6 – (NSO had reversed to Kitchen Table archetype by 1992)

This winter sport organization was created to take part in the Best Ever program in 1984. Up to that point, it had been combined with another NSO. The ED of the organization told us in 1986 that the informal structure of the organization was more important than the formal one. This was reflected by the way in which some individuals had built up bases of power that they were keen to defend. As the ED informed us, the design of the organization had become such that some "volunteers wield[ed] influence that [did] not derive from their position in the structure." This was somewhat problematic as there was a generally expressed feeling by SC staff that the volunteers who served in the NSO at the time were "particularly useless". There was a corresponding mistrust of SC, with members of the NSO feeling that they were working towards some sort of SC "masterplan". There was also some acknowledgement by volunteer members at the time that the organization was "plagued by weak volunteers with little technical or administrative expertise." Another volunteer commented that the lack of volunteers had rendered any planning to implement change within the organization as being "a virtual waste of time". There was also an expressed need for leadership in key areas, and a commitment from volunteers to implement the proposed changes.

There were also concerns with the staff hired to work in the NSO. There was a feeling expressed by one volunteer that because of the inadequacy of the staff, the organization had "lost at least two years of good development, therefore volunteers had become dismayed and detached, and mistrust had developed." A further concern expressed at this time was that the organization's focus should be on domestic development, not just high performance as dictated by SC.

By the end of 1987, things had improved somewhat. A new, and more effective, ED had been appointed. Communication with the members, media and SC had all improved as a result, as had the financial management of the organization. There had been no real turnover in volunteers, although the Executive had been reduced in size. There was a definite reluctance to acknowledge the changes that SC was prescribing. There were no regular meetings between staff and volunteers in order to try and implement SC suggestions, with the exception of the Annual General Meeting that invariably got dominated by other issues. In fact, the whole change process was very rarely mentioned by either staff or volunteers. The status quo remained pretty much intact over the next two years, although the organization did experience some conflict incidents. These were relatively minor, and usually concerned disagreements between those with administrative and technical responsibilities.

By 1993, the organization had managed to get a squad onto the world circuit, and had secured legacy funding from the Canadian Olympic Association (COA) that would assist in the hosting of world class events. However, because the NSO received only $8000 from SC, the organization had to release all of its professional staff, with the exception of one part-time development officer. The volunteers were once again forced into carrying out virtually all the day-to-day tasks of running the organization. By the middle of 1996, there were no administrative staff employed by the organization. Funding had been totally cut by SC in April of that year, and the desire to insulate the technical programs as much as possible resulted in administrative duties being totally taken over by volunteer members of the NSO. Corporate funding, however, increased, as did money from the Canadian Olympic Development Association, established in Calgary to dispense money that had accrued from the profits of hosting the 1988 Olympic Games. As a result of this, and the improved technical performances of the athletes, the organization was able to continue to send athletes to international competitions, and even host events in Canada. However, by the end of 1996 the number of athletes was decreasing, and the National Coach, was decidedly unoptimistic as to what the future held for his organization.

Case Study 7 – (NSO had reversed to an embryonic Kitchen Table archetype by 1996)

This indoor Olympic sport organization started off its program of planned changes relatively slowly. By the middle of 1987, the organization had accomplished only approximately one quarter of what had been called for in its plan. Perhaps as interesting as what had been implemented was what had been planned but probably would never come to fruition. Steps had been taken to implement a National Team Program, hold regular training camps, appoint a High Performance Director, and open a HPC. Although SC insisted that there should also be a shift in decision-making authority from volunteer to professional staff, there was absolutely no move in that direction, nor was one planned.

The formal plan outlining the changes that would take place in the organization was prepared by volunteer board members. Implementation of the changes, however, was left to the office staff. The reluctance for change within the organization was exemplified by the TD who told us in 1987 that office staff "had to provide lots of push to keep implementation moving." The TD felt that SC's emphasis on high performance was pushing the organization in a direction that it did not want to go. This was causing conflict within the NSO, mainly because of the desire by the majority of members to maintain an emphasis on domestic development. Further tension was caused by SC's desire for professional staff to take full authority over the production and implementation of the necessary changes, something that the volunteers within the organization fought bitterly against. Consequently, all decision-making remained in the hands of volunteer committees.

There was not universal opposition to the changes that SC was prescribing. Several volunteers informed us in 1986 that the direction that the NSO was being expected to travel was potentially beneficial to the organization. However, there was concern expressed that the requirements that were being imposed were overly taxing, both in financial and human resource terms, for an organization of this size. It was also a commonly held belief that there was an over-emphasis on high performance sport to the detriment of domestic development. One volunteer catalogued the litany of problems that she saw with the proposals: an investment in staff who are inefficient; a reliance on "bureaucracy and red tape"; confusion and antagonism between priorities regarding

national development and high performance. These things, she thought, had led to a great deal of conflict between staff and volunteers.

At the start of 1989, one prominent staff member reflected on the problems that had dogged the organization throughout the first quadrennial. She suggested that the major problem was that the volunteers refused to buy into the process, despite the money that was being promised by SC. The root of this was that SC wanted the professional staff to take control of the organization, while the volunteers insisted on retaining their authority. This resulted in staff being committed to the proposed changes, while the volunteers were not. The conflict that emanated from this ultimately resulted in TD and ED both leaving the organization.

However, from this point on, volunteers, on the whole, became much more committed to the change process, and saw the value in it, whereas previously, according to the TD, "it had been rammed down people's throats." However implementing any changes still proved difficult. Although there was a gradual move to become a more professional and bureaucratic organization with professional staff incrementally assuming greater levels of responsibility, change was slow. In 1992, it became apparent that the federal government was going to radically reduce the amount of money it spent on amateur sport. Over the next four years, the NSO was hit progressively harder until in 1996 it had to release its final employee. Although there may have been those within the organization who had been in favor of ceding greater levels of authority to the professional staff, this was no longer possible. The organization now became totally dependent on its volunteers to perform every function. Corporate support was non-existent, and with the organization totally dependent on user fees, donations, and a grant from the COA, the organization considered merging with another NSO. Although the merger was eventually called off, the organization had reached an all time low, unable to plot a course for the future with any degree of certainty. It proved impossible to secure sponsorship or any other type of funding that may have led to the employment of a staff person, and hence helped the organization back onto something like an even keel. Consequently, members of the NSO were very unsure as to what the future would hold.

Case Study 8 – (NSO had reversed to a Kitchen Table archetype by 1996)

This winter sport organization was one of the first to become involved in the Best Ever change program. The plans were developed in 1983 by volunteers and professional staff located in the sport's headquarters in a mid-Canadian city. As part of the criteria to receive additional funding, the sport had to relocate its national head office to Ottawa. This was accompanied by the hiring of new staff, as the previous employees refused to relocate.

The new staff were, according to the TD in 1986, "simply employed to implement the plan, not question it." This provides a good indication of the relationship between staff and volunteers at the time, one characterized by little mutual respect. The staff were largely seen as "not up to the job" by the volunteers; the volunteers were generally viewed as "malleable" by the staff. The TD also suggested that "some volunteers have high status from their role in the organization, and are wary of professional staff and other volunteers who are seen as a threat to their status." The example was given of the National Team Vice-Chairman who "calls a lot of the shots" and has a strong power base as he is also the chair of the officials and manages the major facility in the country. Although, therefore, the first three years of the quadrennial were marked by increases in funding, staff, coaches, and athletes, they were also notable for the high levels of conflict in the organization.

By the end of 1987, conflict was still a major problem for the NSO. There was also great reluctance among volunteers to cede any decision-making authority to the professional staff. The ED suggested that the volunteers lacked the vision and "do ability" necessary to run the organization, therefore she had to take the lead without always having the necessary authority to complete courses of action. There was also a feeling, expressed by the ED, that all that the volunteers were interested in was international travel, and that "the professional staff could do what they like provided they stayed out of [the international organization]." The Chairman of the organization was particularly unreceptive to change and therefore had to be "managed" by the ED, who, not surprisingly, found the whole experience extremely stressful. Problems in the organization were exacerbated by the total lack of volunteer turnover, which when allied

to the lack of leadership that was forthcoming, caused immense friction with the professional staff.

Despite this reluctance to embrace change, there was the acknowledgement that something dramatic needed to be done if the organization was ever going to operate effectively. One volunteer complained that too much money was spent on the National Team to the detriment of domestic development. A second held that "the sport has three good volunteers that keep the sport going, but not growing. There is a need for radical organizational change if Canada is to become competitive."

The start of 1989 witnessed, if anything, a further deterioration in the organization. The volunteers were still not interested in any of the proposed changes being implemented, changes to which the staff felt committed. There was also conflict between individuals based in the west of the country and those in the east; between administrative and coaching staff over differential rates of pay and jurisdiction; and between European and Canadian coaches over training regimens. Each of these disputes arose because one group felt that its status within the organization was being threatened by the other. Needless to say, there was a lot of time and energy expended on conflict management. Ultimately, the ED resigned, largely out of frustration, to take up another position in the Canadian sport infrastructure.

Amazingly, four years later, there was still relatively little change in the Board of Directors or the Executive. The organization had failed repeatedly in international competition and had consequently had its funding slashed by SC, to the point at which most staff, technical and administrative, had been either released or reduced to part-time status. The levels of conflict had, at least, correspondingly reduced.

By the end of 1996 the funding position had worsened considerably. Sport Canada's contributions had been totally eliminated leaving the organization entirely dependent on the COA, members' contributions, and its one major corporate sponsorship deal for funding. In fact, so reliant had the organization become on these sources of finance that members of the NSO were already extremely worried as to what the future would hold when the current sponsorship agreement expired in 1999. One thing that was certain was that SC would not be stepping in to provide any further funding. The organization continued to employ full-time staff, but were questioning how much longer

this could continue. The effects of the years of conflict were still being felt. As times became more litigious, and there had been dispute after dispute over seemingly every decision from athlete selection, to athlete funding, to coaching appointments, policies, procedures, and other forms of documentation were finally reaching an appropriate level for an organization of this type. It promised to be an interesting, and not all together bright, future for the organization.

Case Study 9 – (NSO had reversed to a schizoid Executive Office/Boardroom archetype by 1996)

In the first two years of the planning process, there was a definite feeling of optimism within this NSO. On hearing of SC's proposed changes, the general feeling, particularly among professional staff, was "the sooner the better". The anticipated focus on planning, and the associated extra funding, was seen as being highly beneficial to the NSO. The planning process, started in October 1984 and completed the following May, involved key technical professional staff and volunteers. However, it was pointed out by the National Teams Coordinator (NTC) that the overall membership "were not consulted, informed, or involved in the planning."

By February 1986, as part of the prescribed changes, the NSO had hired a new NTC and a new Technical Coordinator. It had six of its planned eight HPCs in place, and plans to increase professional staff decision-making authority were being formulated. There was, however, some resentment building between volunteers and professionals. Professional staff felt that some volunteers were weak communicators who did not take their responsibilities as seriously as they might, regarding them more as a hobby to be picked up when convenient. By contrast, some of the comments made to us by senior level volunteers at the same time suggested that "the administrative staff were not equipped to do the job." Another, however, suggested that the staff were not the problem, and that it was "some [volunteer] cynics [who had] held the process up."

There was also a general feeling that the NSO was reliant on SC. This was first expressed in 1986, with comments from volunteer Board members that the organization was "totally dependent on the Government . . . to run our programs". It was also expressed that "leadership from SC is essential", and that "SC must spend more time with

volunteers" to improve the way in which the NSO operates. Similar feelings would resurface throughout the next ten years.

The early buoyancy was still in evidence at the end of 1987. All eight HPCs were now in place, the number of athletes had increased, athletic performances had improved, and overall, according to the NTC, "the organization is running more efficiently." He did however, follow this up by saying that the NSO was "reliant on SC, despite attempts to become more self-sufficient." There was also ongoing conflict between professional staff and volunteers over differing organization design preferences, and between those who felt that more funding should be directed towards domestic development and those who favored resources being concentrated on elite-level athletes. The NTC felt that the membership was largely supportive of the proposed changes, but questioned the agenda of the Board of Directors which, he felt, was not entirely supportive of the national program. He did, however, state that the involvement of professional staff and volunteers in the change process had helped bring everyone closer together.

Following the Seoul Olympics, the general optimism regarding the change process was still in evidence. There was a feeling that organization members had learned a lot from the process, although there were concerns about the levels of paperwork, the lack of quality coaches available, and the disappointing results at the Olympics.

The interviews that were conducted in 1993 were also notable for the positive opinions expressed by organization members. The NSO had been given a great boost by the performances at the 1992 Olympics and subsequent World Championships with medals won at both events. Administratively, there were incremental changes in a variety of areas that the ED felt illustrated the continued progress that the organization was making. The improvement in the women's programs was of particular cause for celebration within the NSO.

Athletic performances, especially those of some female athletes, were still a source of great pride in the organization as 1996 drew to a close. There was a reported increase in the number and standard of the NSO's coaches. Administratively, there had also been some changes. The Board of Directors was used more extensively to make decisions because of a perceived need to give more say in the running of the organization to the Provincial and Territorial representatives that comprised the Board. There had

been an increase in the formalization of evaluation procedures to make staff members more directly accountable to the general membership. Selection procedures had also become more systematized following three court appeals by athletes over their failure to be selected for the 1992 Olympics.

Despite an overall sense that positive changes had been made within the organization, there was a general air of despondency over the state of the amateur sport system as a whole. There was a feeling expressed by the Executive Director that although the funding of the organization was secure, largely because of the athletes' Olympic performances, the sport system generally was "in big, big trouble." He went on to say that "there is no high performance sport system, there's no provision for it . . . nobody's putting a vision on the table of where the sport system's going." He also bemoaned the organization's reliance on the Government, and its lack of attractiveness to corporate sponsors. Thus, although athletic performances were strong, the feeling that the organization was facing an uncertain future was clearly expressed.

Discussion
The case studies provide an illuminating insight into the way in which change unfurled within this group of organizations. If we break down our examination into the three dynamics which were discussed earlier, interests, power, and capacity, we begin to see various common factors emerging in both those that were able to complete the radical transformation, and those which were not. These are summarized in table 1 and discussed in detail below.

Insert table 4.1 about here

Interests
The case studies clearly show that each organization is made up of a variety of differentiated groups. There are professional staff and volunteers; there are technical personnel and administrators; there are geographic divisions, most notably between Anglophones and Francophones, and/or between eastern and western Canadians; and there are those who favor an emphasis on high performance sport and those who feel that

the NSO should be at least as equally concerned with recreational sport development. It is apparent here that the relationship between organizational sub-units such as these can serve as either a stimulant or a block to major changes.

Each of these groups had the potential for being dissatisfied with the way in which its interests were being catered for within the organization. Such dissatisfaction can lead to a sub-unit trying to bring about change within an organization (Pettigrew, 1987). These interests may take the form of resource allocation or role within the organization, particularly with regards to decision-making authority. Financially, it was within the interests of all sub-unit members to help the organization make the transition to a more professional bureaucratic form, as such a move would see the NSO heavily rewarded by SC. However, in several cases there were disputes over resource allocation, such as that between those who favored devoting resources to high performance athletes and those who argued that more should be directed towards domestic development, as in case study nine. There were also concerted efforts by volunteers in several NSOs, including those featured in cases seven and eight, to protect their interests by retaining their decision-making authority.

It is apparent that leaders of those organizations that managed to make the transformation to a more professional bureaucratic form went to great lengths to try and accommodate the interests of different groups within the organization. Case study four highlights several of the dynamics associated with the change process, and hence it is this organization to which we first devote some time. Implicitly at least, the organization recognized that completing the transition would be extremely difficult if powerful interest groups within the NSO objected to the change. It therefore attempted to ensure that members of different sub-units played an active role in the transition process. In this way, they could be assured that their interests would be protected during the transition process. This attention to process arose largely as a consequence of the subjective nature of the sport that meant that it had always been vulnerable to conflict developing between different factions. The organization's leaders therefore made sure that all regions of the country were strongly represented within the organization, even though this made it somewhat unwieldy in the opinion of SC officials. The NSO reacted to the possibility of friction arising between technical and administrative staff by creating a Technical-

Administrative Council by which all change plans and budgets had to be approved. It also created a separate plan for domestic development because it recognized that the changes prescribed by SC were focussing the NSO purely on high performance athletics. As well as superficially satisfying members concerns that their interests would be protected when the changes took place, the measures taken also served as useful integrating devices which would have further reduced the likelihood of conflict by exposing members of one sub-unit to the interests of others (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).

The one area where this organization was unable to make rapid progress was in the adjustment of decision-making authority from volunteers to professionals. Volunteer members were very concerned about this proposed shift, as one informed us in 1986: "the trend towards more decision-making in the hands of professionals will destroy us." This reluctance to cede more authority to professional staff remained until the final quadrennial of the study. Despite this, the value of the volunteers was largely appreciated by the professional staff who accepted the situation and worked within the parameters that were set. The important thing was that change was carried out incrementally, with confrontation avoided, until the members of the organization were comfortable enough to complete the transformation (Pettigrew et al., 1992). In this way, trust was built up over time to a point at which the volunteers felt comfortable in handing over greater decision-making authority to the professional staff.

Although there were not the same extent of integrating mechanisms required in the other organizations that reoriented, they also made sure that different interest groups were satisfied with the changes that were being made. Each is notable by the way in which volunteer and professional members worked closely together to bring about the desired changes. In case study one, for example, extensive use was made of committees that comprised both professional and volunteer members to make major decisions. It was expressed that it was to the advantage of all if the skills of professionals and volunteers were fully utilized. Similarly, technical and administrative staff also worked closely together to plan and implement the program of planned changes. Importantly, in this way, each sub-unit could ensure that its interests were not being harmed, and may even be enhanced, by the ongoing transition.

Similar sentiments were expressed in case study two. The volunteers were happy to monitor and evaluate the changes that the staff were left to plan and implement. It was also noted that, since 1985 at least, administrative and technical staff had enjoyed a good working relationship, both groups reporting directly to the DG. Although there was some conflict in the organization focussed upon in case study three, since 1988 there had been a "dynamic" approach to planning and implementing the changes. Again, this was only possible because of the way in which professionals and volunteers each felt that their interests were not threatened by the transformation in the organization.

The overall consensus as to the positive effect that the changes would have on the members of the different interest groups led to an embracing of the change concept and, in three of the cases, relatively swift adoption of the Executive Office archetype design. The non-reorienters that we studied were just the opposite, and were characterized by sub-unit members continually maneuvering to protect their own interests. The prospect of change was generally seen as a threat to their positions within the organization.

The two sub-units that generated most friction were the volunteers and professionals. Indeed, the build up of tension between these two groups has been recognized as the single biggest cause of conflict within this population of organizations (e.g., Amis, Slack & Berrett, 1995; Goldfarb, 1986; Slack, Berrett & Mistry, 1994). There are comments reflecting territorial and philosophical differences between professionals and volunteers in each of the case studies illustrating non-reorienting organizations. Hinings and Slack (1987, p. 145), in their study of the implementation of the QPP among NSOs found that "approximately half the NSOs exhibit medium to high levels of conflict between professionals and volunteers. For the most part, this conflict was over the issue of control." Both sub-units, as we found, were anxious to protect their interests. In other words, political self-interest dictated the way in which members of the organization approached the change issue (Oliver, 1991). The most vivid example of this appears in case study eight. The professional TD, back in 1986, suggested that "some volunteers have high status from their role in the organization, and are wary of professional staff and other volunteers who are seen as a threat to their status." The NSO's ED, at the end of 1987, noted that the only thing that many volunteers were interested in was international travel, and that "the professional staff could do what they

like provided they stayed out of [the international organization]". These disputes continued throughout the twelve years of the study preventing little more than a muddling through of decisions (Lindblom, 1959) with little thought given to trying to implement significant change within the NSO.

Despite this, some volunteers recognized that there was a great need for change. As one informed us, "the sport has three good volunteers that keep the sport going, but not growing. There is a need for radical organizational change if Canada is to become competitive." However, unwilling to enter into any process of reform that they perceived might hurt their interests, even these volunteer voices faded over time. Although unhappy at the state of affairs, the disharmonies within the organization had become taken for granted, resulting in a failure to precipitate any meaningful change (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988).

Although things were not quite as pronounced in the other NSOs featured in the case studies, there were still several comments that indicated that sub-units were anxious to protect their interests and maintain their position of advantage within the organization (Walsh et al., 1981). Several volunteers in the NSO in case study seven were willing to fight bitterly to prevent professional staff gaining greater authority within the organization, and also to protect the organization from what was seen as an over-emphasis on high performance sport at the expense of domestic development. Staff, on the other hand, were committed to making these changes. The result of this was a great deal of conflict early on in the change process and the loss of some key staff. Consideration was only given to the proposed changes when members of the organization realized that their existence was threatened. Such a threat to survival often acts to precipitate the onset of major change as an option of last resort (Barr & Huff, 1997). However, by this time the NSO was facing a funding crisis that prevented it from implementing many of the changes that were previously touted by SC.

The NSOs in case studies six, eight and nine are also characterized by volunteers who were reluctant to cede authority to professional staff. There are also comments that indicate other conflicts arising over varying emphases on high performance and domestic sport development, and between the roles played by technical and administrative staff. These findings replicate those of Hinings and Slack (1987). In case study eight, for

example, there were conflicts between eastern and western Canadians, between administrative and technical staff, and between European and Canadian coaches. Each of these situations arose because one group felt that its interests were being damaged by the other. In case study nine, there is evidence of conflict developing between those who favored resources being directed to high performance sport and those who preferred to see them directed at domestic development.

The disputes that characterized these organizations help illustrate three major points with respect to the effect of sub-unit interests on the change process. The first is that organization sub-units will strive to protect interests that are not necessarily material. This is an important finding because most scholars have argued that the interests that a sub-unit is most anxious to protect are its allocation of resources. Hinings and Greenwood (1988, p. 44), for example, define interests as being "the motivation to enhance or sustain shares of scarce and valued resources." In this, they are supported by, amongst others, Pfeffer and Salancik's (1978) work on resource-based theory, and Alford's (1975) investigation of health reform in the USA.

It is apparent here that the distribution of resources also played an important part at times in understanding sub-unit reactions to the prospect of change, for example for those who wanted to see greater resources devoted to domestic development rather than high-performance sport. However, the most important battle over interests concerned the distribution of decision-making authority. In particular, it involved a reluctance of many volunteers to give up their decision-making roles even if it meant preventing the organization from what was sometimes recognized as much needed change. In this sense, the distribution of material resources was virtually irrelevant. Thus, we extend the scope of criteria to be considered when investigating the possible effect of sub-unit interests beyond the distribution of scarce resources that most analysts have focussed on. Instead, the internal and external contexts should be taken into account to determine the nature of the interests that are important to organization sub-units.

The second major finding pertains to the fact that organizations wishing to complete radical transformations *must* ensure that their various sub-units are put in positions whereby their members can satisfy themselves that their interests will not be harmed by the proposed changes, and may even be enhanced. This is an extension of the

thoughts of theorists such as Hinings and Greenwood (1988) who have suggested that sub-units will seek to instigate change if they are unhappy with their allocation of interests, or oppose change if they are satisfied. Our study illustrates the importance of incorporating influential sub-units into the actual change process in order to prevent their resistance from stifling the transformation.

Our third point of interest further extends this line of thinking by following up on the effects of the conflict that will become manifest if sub-units feel that their interests are threatened by the change process. In those NSOs in which sub-units were continually fighting to protect their interests, conflict resolution required so much time and effort from key staff and volunteers that there was little chance of them being able to focus on strategies for change, even if these were what was desired. This is a point to which we return in our investigation of the organization's capacity for change.

Power

Motivation to protect or enhance interests, therefore, can serve as either a catalyst for, or a motivating force to prevent, change. The power structure of an organization will also play a determining role in the outcome of the transition process (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987). Volunteers have traditionally played a central role in the operation and activity of Canadian NSOs. This status has brought with it a great deal of organizational power (Hickson et al., 1971). The changes prescribed by SC, however, were that while volunteers should set policy, the actual power to operate the organization should be passed to professional staff members. There was thus the potential for power to be concentrated in the hands of either volunteers or professionals, or there was the possibility of limited authority being delegated to the staff resulting in a dispersed power structure (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). We found examples of both types.

In case study one, there was very much a dispersed power structure in evidence. Major decisions were made by committees comprised of volunteers and professionals. The resulting participative decision-making structure was seen as democratic and fair. Because professional staff and volunteers were anxious to make the transition to the new archetype, what Hinings and Greenwood (1988) term a "reformative commitment", change was possible. If there had been a competitive commitment, by contrast, whereby

each group favored a different design, then change would have been virtually impossible with this distribution of power.

A similar position is evident in case study three. Here, once professional staff and volunteers embraced the concept of radical change, a participative decision-making structure was used to get the organization to the desired end-point. More than 600 members of the organization were involved in the change process. This had the beneficial effect of giving ownership of the changes to the membership, hence securing their more rapid acceptance than might otherwise have been the case. Once more there was evidence of a reformative commitment as both groups embraced the desire to move to a new design. Over time, power became more concentrated in the hands of professional staff, but the mutual trust that had developed as a result of the transition process resulted in this causing little change in operating procedures. Volunteer input was still valued, and although the volunteer board had the final say on policy decisions, there was rarely any disagreement in the direction suggested by the staff. Pettigrew et al. (1992, p. 146) suggested that "in human service organizations, the professional-managerial interface is a strong determinant of organizational form, culture and operation. In health care organizations, the clinician-management interface is especially central and influential." It appears that the professional-volunteer relationship in NSOs is similarly important, particularly during periods of transition.

The organization in case study two is a good example of a concentrated power structure. Here, volunteers were happy to monitor and evaluate the change process while leaving the planning and implementing of the changes to the professional staff. Leadership for the transformation was concentrated in the office of the Director General. There was an early realization by the Board of Directors that "if we are going to make it, it is because we have assembled a good team of professionals working for the organization." Thus once the decision was made to attempt the process of radical transformation, the volunteers decided to cede power to the professionals and let them lead the organization forward.

The final organization that achieved the transformation in this study is somewhat different to the others. Here, power was concentrated in the hands of the volunteers for much of the transition process. Although this group appeared keen to make the move to

the new archetype, its members were very reluctant to relinquish their power. This prevented change from occurring at any great speed. Although there were certain valued outcomes that would be gained from entering into the transition process, some members of the organization clearly felt that there would also be results that were less desirable (Pfeffer, 1992). Decisions were gradually decentralized however until by the third quadrennial, there was a definite shift in the organization's leadership away from the volunteer executive to the professional ED. Thus although the transformation was finally accomplished, the power structure in the organization dictated the pace at which it would be achieved.

Within the organizations that failed to reorient, there was more evidence of concentrated power structures than dispersed ones. Not surprisingly, given the overall desire of volunteer decision-makers to protect their interests, this power was used to prevent change from taking place. It is just as important to understand this use of power as it is to appreciate the way in which it can be used to instigate change (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985).

We defined power as being the ability of sub-units through political activity to constitute the organization to their own preferences (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Ranson et al., 1980). Changes in decision-making structures are therefore often a focal point of resistance to transformations because these structures govern behavior, determine whose interests matter, and ultimately establish how things should be done (Kikulis et al., 1995c). The organization that forms the focus of case study eight, for example, contained volunteers that remained directors for a long period of time, and who were more interested in international travel than in entering into any process that might diminish their power within the organization. The ED in this organization was thus given the responsibility of trying to run the organization without being given the authority to actually carry out the majority of her tasks. It is of little surprise that she resigned in frustration in 1989. By maintaining this concentrated power structure, the volunteer Board of Directors was effectively able to prevent any meaningful change from taking place in the organization.

It is a similar story in the NSO featured in case study seven. The first quadrennial was marked by a great reluctance among the volunteer directors to cede any power to

professional staff, nor to sacrifice domestic sport development on the altar of elite athletics. In fact, they fought bitterly against both of these proposals. A concentrated power structure was retained and thus meaningful change was prevented. By the time that the value of implementing a program of changes had become apparent, the organization was overtaken by federal government cuts. With no infrastructure in place to independently maintain a professional staff, the NSO's volunteers were, ironically, forced to retain complete control of the organization.

The NSOs discussed in case studies six and nine also had concentrated power structures dominated by volunteers who were reluctant to introduce any significant organizational changes. The latter organization, ostensibly at least, did contain volunteers willing to see the transition to a more professional bureaucratic organization. In fact, there were even plans in place as far back as 1986 to increase professional authority within the organization. However, these plans were never realized. Redefining volunteer roles and changing the authority structure was a direct confrontation to the traditional role played by volunteers within the organization, and was therefore unsurprisingly resisted (Slack & Hinings, 1994; Kikulis et al., 1995c). Changes that were implemented, therefore, were largely superficial and did not affect the power structure of the organization. Although there was some limited decentralization, by 1996 the Board of Directors was being used to make even more decisions than previously, further emphasizing the reluctance of volunteers to embrace the Executive Office design. Thus, as with the NSOs in cases seven and eight, the distribution of power in the organization proved critical to the outcome of the change program. "Organization members who desire change . . . require access to actual decision-making so that their voices can be heard (power)" (Hinings & Slack, 1987, p. 143, parenthesis in the original). Without this access, there was little opportunity to even raise the prospect of change as a meaningful option.

Case study five is somewhat different. Here, the power struggle was not between different organization sub-units, but between the NSO and SC. The uneasy relationship that the organization had with SC because of its athletes' various drug abuse infractions made members of the organization extremely wary of any SC proposals. Thus, although some members of the NSO were in favor of the proposed changes and thought that they

could be of benefit to the organization, the overall sentiment, particularly among volunteers, was that the changes should be resisted. Kikulis et al. (1995b) reported that because professional staff were seen as close in orientation to the ideals of SC, there was a reluctance among volunteers to transfer power to them because it was seen as a direct loss of autonomy for the organization. That appears to have been the case here. Despite this, the organization did begin a program of change, primarily because the ED believed in the changes that were being proposed and had previously enjoyed wide-scale support within the organization. However, although changes were made, the overall notion of the transformation was not widely embraced by those who held power within the organization. A major part of this was the inability of the leadership within the organization to see past SC as the devil incarnate and try and bring about the transition for its own sake. Thus, although the distribution of power played an important role in preventing change from taking place, the organization's capacity for change also inhibited the process.

There are two possible power distributions within an organization, concentrated or distributed (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). Our findings support this. However, we do extend the work of Hinings and Greenwood by taking into account the specific nature of the organizations that we were investigating. In order to make the transition power had to be ceded by volunteers to the professional staff. This was the only way of making the transition to the Executive Office archetype. In those NSOs that made the transition, a distributed power structure was adopted relatively early on in the process. In this way, professional staff were able to exercise the authority necessary for running the organization. In some cases, this distributed power gradually became more concentrated in the hands of the professional staff as they took on more authority for operating the NSO. In the one NSO that took a longer time to make the transition, power remained concentrated in the hands of the volunteers, effectively preventing it from making the final shift to an Executive Office archetype until 1996. Those NSOs that failed to reorient were characterized by the retention of power in the hands of the volunteer elite. In this scenario, change proved impossible, no matter what steps professional staff took to try and make the transition. We can thus conclude that for change to take place in these types of organizations, power must be given up, at least in part, to professional staff

to produce a distributed power structure. Change can then take place. It is not possible for volunteers to favor the transition and retain a concentrated power structure. By contrast, in such a power distribution with a volunteer elite favoring the *status quo* there is no possibility of change occurring.

Capacity for Change

As well as having a supportive power structure in place, there is also a need for an organization intent on carrying out a transformation to have the capacity to bring about the change (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Unsurprisingly, there were also marked differences between those NSOs that changed and those that did not in the capabilities that each showed to prepare for and manage the transition process. We break these capabilities down into technical and, first, behavioural components that proved to be key in determining which NSOs managed to reorient and which failed.

A vital feature of those organizations that proved able to change was the emergence of a strong leadership figure able to create a vision of the organization's future state (Child & Smith, 1987). It is also clear that this visioning process was seen as such an integral part of the organization's operation that it continued even after the transformation had been completed. Members of the organization in case study one outlined the need for professional and volunteer leadership with the vision to carry out necessary changes as vitally important for success into the next Millennium. The DG of the NSO in case study two outlined that in order to be successful into the future there was a need for good event management, television contracts, and corporate sponsors. The third case study highlights an organization that, according to the CEO in 1996, was redefining itself as a service organization intended to cater to members needs "from the cradle to the grave". The final reorienter featured in case study four was described by the ED as becoming much more athlete-centered. He also stated that the role of professional staff was to adopt a leadership role. All four organizations thus had key individuals who were able to articulate a future state that the organization was moving towards.

The importance of "transformational leadership" has been noted as being particularly important in implementing programs of change (Kanter, 1983; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984). Pettigrew (1987, p. 652) suggested that the transformational leader is able

to unite organization members "in the pursuit of higher goals, the realization of which is tested by the achievement of significant change." This was well illustrated here, not just by those NSOs discussed above, but also by those organizations that failed to make the transition to the Executive Office archetype. Although the NSO in case five had an ED whom enthusiastically embraced the concept of long-range planning, and tried to bring about some of the changes prescribed in the SC plan, the problems with drug abuse overwhelmed the organization. Funding, athlete commitment, the number of coaches and the sport's profile all seemed to be on a continuous downward spiral, leaving the organization perennially in a mode of crisis management. The rapid staff and volunteer turnover also proved detrimental, placing the NSO in a position of struggling for survival rather than possessing anybody with the capability of creating a vision towards which the organization could move. Without a cohesive managerial lead, the organization just drifted along rather than being able to build on its earlier change efforts (Pettigrew et al., 1992). The organizations in cases six, seven and eight similarly lacked an individual able to stimulate a vision for the future. Riddled with conflict, sub-units seemed more concerned in striving to protect their own interests rather than worrying about some future state in which the organization might exist.

The NSO featured in the final case study also conspicuously lacked leadership. Although there was not the conflict that was present in the other non-reorienting organizations, there were continual expressions of a desire for greater leadership from SC. In 1986, there were various comments from volunteers in the organization that the NSO was "totally dependent on the government", that "leadership from SC is essential", and that "SC must spend more time with volunteers" if the organization was to become more effective. The following year, despite optimistic comments as to how the NSO was developing, the NTC stated that the organization was still "reliant on SC despite attempts to become more self-sufficient."

In 1996, the situation had got no better. Bemoaning the NSO's reliance on the government, the ED stated that "there's no high performance system, there's no provision for it . . . nobody's putting a vision on the table as to where the sport system's going." Seemingly unable to create a vision of its own, the NSO was still reliant on SC, and thus felt that although the funding of the organization was secure and athletic performances

were strong, the NSO would be dragged down with the rest of the amateur sport system. If ever there is an example of the need for strong, visionary leadership to enable radical change, then this is surely it. As Pettigrew et al. (1992) found in several divisions of the British National Health Service that were attempting to implement programs of radical change, the lack of effective leadership seems to be a handicap impossible to overcome.

As well as this behavioural aspect to understanding capacity for change, those NSOs that reoriented had leaders that possessed the technical capabilities of understanding what was required in terms of managing the change process and in operating within the new archetypal design. All four organizations that reoriented recognized the need for long-term planning in order to become more effective. In fact, three of the four had already instigated their own long-term planning before SC launched its "Best Ever" program. As such, there was at least an implicit acknowledgement of the fact that change was necessary. They were therefore ready to embrace change as a necessary fact of their existence, even if they disagreed with some parts of SC's prescribed plan, and had some understanding of the technical processes involved. By contrast, the organizations that failed to reorient saw the prospect of change as a threat rather than an opportunity. Consequently, any changes that were made tended to be superficial in nature, designed not to upset the traditional mode of operating in the organization. Members who wanted to bring about change were continually frustrated, and in the case of at least two NSOs, key personnel ended up leaving their organization as a consequence. Thus, there was a major difference between the reorienters and the non-reorienters with respect to this technical component of the change process. Hinings, Brown and Greenwood (1991, p. 388) similarly emphasized the importance of this characteristic of successful change management with their observation that "the role of top management in guiding and reviewing the operation of [a] new organization [is] crucial." We found clear evidence for this here.

Inevitably, problems were faced during the change process, but those organizations with clearly expressed visions of where they were attempting to get to could usually overcome them with some thoughtful management. For instance, the organization in the first case study suffered severe financial cut backs following its failure to qualify for the 1988 Olympic Games as its government funding was cut and a

major corporate sponsor refused to renew its agreement. A similar situation was faced in the 1990s as government funding was further reduced. The organization responded by continuing to build on its previous changes to become even more efficient. These potential threats were seen as an opportunity to increase the organization's commitment to change (Pettigrew et al., 1992).

Those organizations that failed to reorient tended instead to see such setbacks as insurmountable obstacles that required a severe reduction in personnel and/or operations. This is illustrated in case study nine with a NSO which virtually admitted to having little hope for the future because of the perceived demise of the amateur sport system, and its inability to conceive of itself as an independent organization. These varying responses to similar environmental pressures support findings made by Allmendinger and Hackman (1996, p. 364) in their study of East German orchestras. "Some orchestras responded to the threat posed by reunification with inaction or even retrenchment; others exhibited proactive and innovative responses." In other words, despite being faced with seemingly very similar pressures, the interpretation of these pressures and the subsequent choice of how to respond to them is very much in the hands of the power holders of the organization (Child, 1972; Oliver, 1991). As Allmendinger and Hackman found with orchestras and we found with NSOs, some leaders will respond by taking responsibility for their own survival and seek to react to the change in environment in a proactive manner. Others, however, will see no room to maneuver and do nothing but wait for their fate. Almost inevitably, the consequences of this latter course of action will be negative.

The final point to be made in terms of the technical aspect of organizational capacity relates to the previously discussed relationships, primarily between professionals and volunteers, but also between members of other interest groups. All those NSOs that reoriented were characterized by a mutual trust and respect between different sub-units that stemmed from a leadership with strong ideas as to how the change process needed to be managed. The first two case studies have several examples of professionals and volunteers working together, maintaining good lines of communication, and valuing each other's input. Similar sentiments are expressed regarding the positive way in which technical and administrative staff combined to bring about the transformation. The

volunteer-professional relationship is highlighted again in case three, while in case four the need to combine input from volunteers and professionals, administrators and technical personnel, high performance and domestic interest groups, and Anglophones and Francophones are all clearly stated. The ability to solicit input from different parties within the organization was the antithesis of the general situation in those NSOs that failed to complete the change program. This is important because of the inherent difficulty associated with radical transformations. It is thus necessary that an organization harness the skills of as many people as possible if the transition is to be accomplished (Pettigrew, 1987; Wilson, 1992). Those that managed the change seemed to realize this, while those that failed apparently did not.

There has been an ongoing debate in the organizational theory literature as to the importance of the leadership role. Scholars such as Burns (1978), Bass, Avolio and Goodheim (1987), and Howell and Frost (1989) have emphasized the role played by leaders in moving an organization through a program of radical change. Others, such as Pfeffer (1977) and Pettigrew (1987) have suggested that the role of leadership has been over-emphasized. While this debate has been acknowledged in the sport management literature (e.g., Weese, 1996), the substance of these arguments have not been fully debated. Most studies have used various instruments in attempts to quantitatively uncover lists of qualities that define what is assumed to be "the typical" transformational or transactional leader (e.g., Doherty & Danylchuk, 1996; Doherty, 1997; Quarterman, 1998; Weese, 1995, 1996). We suggest that there is a need for studies that investigate the role played by the leader in the context of the other dynamics that impact the organization. Internally, these might include power dependences, sub-unit interests and values; externally, the effect of institutional and resource pressures might be considered. There is thus a need to move beyond the quantitative survey techniques that have thus far dominated the research on leadership in favor of more in-depth qualitative analyses. For as Pettigrew (1987, p. 650) has suggested, leadership is important, but it is only one ingredient "in a complex analytical, political and cultural process of challenging and changing the core beliefs, structure and strategy of the [organization]." Consequently, it seems that both the technical and behavioural aspects of organizational capacity are vital

in managing the change process within an organization, and ultimately determining whether or not it is to be successful.

Conclusion

Bartenuk (1984, p. 369), in her investigation of change in a religious order, suggested that "a perspective that focuses solely on the relationship between environment and structure cannot adequately account for several internal events that had an impact on restructuring." Our findings support this contention. Those organizations that were able to complete programs of radical change were differentiated from those that failed by differences in each of the three internal dynamics investigated here.

Aside from the results that have been detailed in the discussion, it is worth reiterating some of the findings that have a potentially wider impact on studies of organizational change. The first is that sub-unit interests need to be considered in a broader context than is currently the case. Although the protection or enhancement of scarce resources is likely to be the most common form that sub-unit interests will take in an organization setting, we have shown here that in some contexts, other interests may have more effect. In the cases described here, the attempt to protect interests really centered on the decision by volunteers of whether to retain decision-making authority. This is separate to the discussion regarding power because it focussed on the general reluctance of those in a sub-unit to place themselves in a position that might harm their individual interests.

The second point regarding interests is that rather than just being seen as a reason to instigate or block change as most scholars have done (e.g., Hinings & Greenwood, 1988), individual sub-unit interests need to be considered in the management of the actual transition process. Members of influential sub-units need to be placed in positions whereby they can ensure that their interests will not be threatened by the proposed change. They can then communicate this to their members thus overcoming any uncertainty and the potential that this has for the sub-unit blocking any attempted transition.

The third point worth reiterating relates to the specific context of the sector in which these changes were instigated with respect to the power dependences of the

organizations involved. Our findings supported the existence of either a concentrated or dispersed power structure being present within the NSO (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). However, we found that for change to be initiated there had to first be a shift from a concentrated power structure to a dispersed one, and all groups who possessed power had to then be in favor of the transition taking place. Those NSOs that retained a concentrated power structure were invariably in favor of a retention of the *status quo*, and thus no change was possible.

Finally, the organization's capacity for change also plays an influential role. Only those organizations which contain leaders able to create a vision of a future desired state for the organization, communicate that vision, and convince other members of the organization of their ability to lead the organization through the change process will have the possibility of changing. However, we stress the need for the leadership role to be considered in the context of the transformation taking place, something that has really been lacking thus far in the sport management literature.

The effect that each of these three dynamics has on the propensity of an organization to initiate and complete a program of radical change cannot be underestimated. In fact, each plays such a crucial role that any investigation of organizational transformations would be incomplete if it failed to consider each and all of them. However, the three also have a pronounced interactive effect. In other words, as well as affecting the change process individually, they each impact on other internal dynamics that in turn affect the transition. Their effects, therefore, are magnified in importance beyond that which they might initially appear to have. A more detailed study investigating this type of interaction would prove extremely useful in improving our understanding of the change process. In particular there is a need for case study-type work that is both contextualist and processual in nature (Pettigrew, 1987). It is this that will provide the depth of insight that will allow the type of relationships discussed here to be more fully understood.

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Table 4.1. The roles of interests, power and capacity in the change process.

	Outcome	Interests	Power structure	Capacity
Case 1	Reoriented 1988	Sub-units involved in process; sub-unit interests considered	Dispersed among volunteers and professional staff	Leaders able to create vision and motivate members to change
Case 2	Reoriented 1992	Sub-units involved in process; sub-unit interests considered	Concentrated with professional staff	Leaders able to create vision and motivate members to change
Case 3	Reoriented 1992	Sub-units involved in process; sub-unit interests considered	Dispersed among vols. and pros., then concentrated with pros	Leaders able to create vision and motivate members to change
Case 4	Reoriented 1996	Sub-units involved in process; sub-unit interests considered	Concentrated with vols. then dispersed among vols. and pros.	Leaders able to create vision and motivate members to change
Case 5	Reversed to Kitchen Table by 1996	Conflict as sub-units fight to protect own interests	Concentrated with volunteers	No effective transformational leadership present
Case 6	Reversed to Kitchen Table by 1992	Conflict as sub-units fight to protect own interests	Concentrated with volunteers	No effective transformational leadership present
Case 7	Reversed to embryonic KT by 1996	Conflict as sub-units fight to protect own interests	Concentrated with volunteers	No effective transformational leadership present
Case 8	Reversed to Kitchen Table by 1996	Conflict as sub-units fight to protect own interests	Concentrated with volunteers	No effective transformational leadership present
Case 9	Reversed to schizoid EO/BR by 1996	Conflict as sub-units fight to protect own interests	Concentrated with volunteers	No effective transformational leadership present

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to try and uncover the way in which some of the internal dynamics of Canada's national sport organizations (NSOs) affected their propensity to complete programs of radical change. Between 1984 and 1996, Canada's NSOs experienced a variety of pressures to change in certain ways. The most notable of these, particularly during the 1980s, was exerted by the federal government through its agent Sport Canada. These external pressures were designed to make what had traditionally been informal, volunteer run operations much more systematic and professional. This, it was hoped, would result in Canada's athletes being much more likely to win medals at Commonwealth Games, Pan-Am Games, World Championships, and, in particular, Olympic Games, most notably those to be hosted by Calgary in 1988. Following the investigation into Canadian amateur sport inspired by Ben Johnson's infamous run in Seoul, and the onset of a recession, the government committed successively reduced amounts to the sport system in the years 1989 to 1996. In fact, by 1996 several organizations had been totally cut-off from any federal funding and were reliant largely on membership fees, sponsorship money, and income generated by hosting domestic and international events. These conflicting pressures produced a research site that promised great insight into the dynamics of change.

Such an investigation is timely. Most people who were interviewed during the course of this study were resigned to the fact that the Canadian government will almost certainly not return to its previous levels of spending on amateur sport. In fact, several suggested that it might follow the example set by the United States government and remove itself entirely from the funding framework. As such, Canadian NSOs are once again facing a period of great uncertainty and potential change. Knowledge of how to bring about effective, rapid change could therefore prove very useful to this population of organizations.

Extending our analysis of sport further afield, it becomes apparent that it is not just Canadian sport organizations that are facing times of change. The way in which sport is

funded in the United Kingdom has been transformed by the introduction of a highly lucrative National Lottery that has, as one of its mandates, the provision of funding for sport. Needless to say, the vast amounts of money raised, far more than expected, have raised expectations of those involved in the sport system, just as happened in Canada with the introduction of the Best Ever program. As many organizations gear themselves to make use of this finance, others are questioning whether such large amounts of public money should be spent on sport at all, especially with funding for hospitals and education continually criticized as being inadequate. There has already been a reduction in money going to sport to help fund "after school clubs" for children. Examples from the US and Canada of how similar lotteries have evolved over time suggests that it will not be long before further cuts are made into the sport budget. A pattern of change similar to that which occurred in Canada will therefore quite possibly soon start to emerge in the UK.

Australia has also seen changes to the way in which its sport system is organized, with the development of a National Academy and then decentralization to more regional centers. Similarly, the former Eastern Bloc nations have witnessed massive changes to their sport systems over the last decade with the fall of Communism. In short, national sport organizations worldwide are experiencing rapid and large-scale changes. The findings from this study thus have relevance not just for Canadian sport organizations, but also for other similar organizations worldwide. Furthermore, the continued speed with which organizations of all types have to deal with changes in their environments has made the study of organizational transformations very popular. Consequently, the insights provided here should also have value for managers of non-sport organizations. The conclusions from this study that extend our theoretical thinking on the change process are now presented. These will be followed by some suggestions as to where future research might usefully be carried out.

While the broad purpose of the study was to determine why some organizations were able to complete radical changes while others were not, we were specifically interested in the way in which certain internal dynamics affected the change process and yet which have received little attention in the academic literature. The first of these was how the pace and sequence of strategic change affected the propensity of an organization

to complete a transition program. Several researchers have suggested that in order for transformations to be completed successfully, they have to be introduced rapidly (e.g., Burns & Stalker, 1961; Hackman, 1984; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Warren, 1984). Others have cautioned that change should be introduced more slowly and incrementally (e.g., Child & Smith, 1987; Hedberg, Nystrom & Starbuck, 1976; Lindblom, 1959). We found that the pace of change, *per se*, did not affect the ability of an organization to change from one archetypal design to another.

We did, however, find that if changes were made quickly to certain high-impact systems, in our case decision-making, then the likelihood of changes being introduced successfully was greatly enhanced. In this, we were supported by the work of Kanter (1984) and Hinings and Greenwood (1988) who suggested that by changing certain parts of the organization that are central to its operation, a message is sent to the whole organization as to the importance of the changes being introduced. While acknowledging that change to such systems is difficult because of the way in which they are intrinsically tied up with the values held within the organization, it is argued that successful change depends on changing these elements early on in the change process. Thus our first major conclusion is that for a program of radical transformation to be successful, high impact elements must be changed quickly in such a way that they send a message to the entire organization as to the nature and importance of the changes taking place. An extension of this, particularly with respect to voluntary sport organizations, pertains to the importance of decision-making systems. A key component of the transitions that took place in this population of organizations was the change in locus of decision-making from volunteers to professional staff. This study clearly highlights the importance of this alteration in accomplishing change in this type of organization.

We also found in the first study that change occurs in a non-linear manner, characterized by the introduction of changes to certain elements which then have to be withdrawn and tried again at a later date or in a different manner. The social nature of organizations, and the uncertainty associated with any major change, makes predicting the way in which organizations respond to change inherently difficult. Barratt and Camman (1984) in their study of National Steel and Pettigrew (1985) in his work on ICI suggested

that radical changes cannot be implemented in a linear manner, as suggested by some (e.g., Greiner, 1967, 1972; Kotter, 1994). Indeed, Greenwood and Hinings (1988) and Kikulis, Slack and Hinings (1995) found far more examples of organizations whose attempts at change were characterized by delays, reversals and oscillations, than which made the transition in a smooth linear manner.

However, our findings pertain to the way in which individual elements are altered during the transition process, rather than using the organization as a whole as the unit of analysis. As such, they provide valuable information as to how it is more difficult to change some parts of the organization rather than others. For example, several of the elements concerned with making the organization more standardized were altered in a continuous, linear manner. Others featured a great deal of experimentation as elements were altered in first one way then another. Our second major conclusion, therefore, is that managers seeking to implement large-scale transformations have to be flexible in the way in which they introduce changes to the organization. They have to be prepared to experiment with the way in which they alter different elements, while still ensuring that the momentum of the change process is maintained. This particularly applies to those elements that play an important part in the functioning of the organization, such as, in the case of voluntary sport organizations, decision-making systems.

Having explored the impact of pace and sequence, our attention for papers two and three then turned to examining the effects of other internal dynamics on the change process. In chapter four, we explored the way in which interests, power dependences, and the organization's capacity for change affected the transition process. We first, however, discuss the findings of the second study, documented in chapter three, which concerned the way in which the values of those who worked in the NSOs, in either a volunteer or professional capacity, impacted on the change program.

There have been few studies that have explored the way in which values affect the transition process. Most of the evidence that does exist is largely anecdotal rather than a product of *ad hoc* theorizing. The findings from this section, therefore, should prove useful by providing further insight into the transition process. Pettigrew (1987) suggested that it was vital to change the core beliefs of those within the organization before

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attempting any program of radical change. Lebelebici, Salancik, Copay and King (1991) agreed, suggesting that without normative acceptance of the transformation, change becomes impossible. We found support for this in our study. The coercive pressures exerted by the federal government did bring about early change to the design of NSOs, thus providing useful empirical evidence regarding the stage that such pressures may be most influential in the transition process. Once these pressures were relaxed, however, so the organizations began to revert to a form more reflective of the values held within the organization.

Furthermore, only those NSOs that were normatively in favor of the prescribed changes appeared to be able to complete the reorientation. Without this congruence between the changes and the internal value structure, many NSOs adopted the mantle of change ceremonially (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). That is, although they gave the appearance to Sport Canada that they were making the prescribed changes, they in fact carried on operating in much the same way as they had before. Thus, our third major conclusion is that although coercive pressures may play a useful role in getting the change process moving, for radical change to be completed, the values held within the organization must be in concert with the changes being introduced. This means that individuals may have to be convinced of the proposed changes to the extent that their individual values are altered, something that is extremely difficult, or, more usually, personnel may have to be changed. The latter example will likely lead to a "filtering" process whereby those who are hired hold values that are congruent with changes that are taking place. Slack and Hinings (1994) found evidence of this in some NSOs that they studied, as we did here, particularly in case study four in chapter four. It is clearly important, therefore, for change managers dealing with sport organizations to understand the role of values in the transition process. This is particularly the case when, as here, the changes that are taking place are contrary to the norms and traditions that have built up over time.

An important extension to the third conclusion, which we also demonstrate in chapter three, is that the values that really matter in the organization are the ones held by the elite. Although it is possible for change to be blocked by some sub-units that hold values that oppose the changes, if the organizational elite are not in favor of making the

change, then such a proposal will probably not even be raised in the organization. This is a point that was reemphasized in paper three in the discussion regarding the effect of power dependences on the change process. The commitment of the leadership of the organization to change was found to be all-important when power was concentrated in the hands of the elite. If they favored change it tended to happen; if they opposed it, it stayed off the agenda. However, when change did take place, the power structure of the NSO was first shifted from being concentrated to being dispersed. This was a particular function of the nature of the organizations that we studied, in that to operate effectively as more business-like operations, professional staff needed the authority to be able to make decisions. Thus, our fourth conclusion is that it is particularly important that the elite members of an organization hold values that are supportive of the changes being introduced, and ensure that power is distributed accordingly. This, of course, is particularly important when the changes that are being prescribed affect the distribution of power within the organization, as was the case with this set of NSOs.

A significant finding from chapter three was that although values played an important role in explaining some of the differences between those organizations that changed and those that did not, there still appeared to be a significant amount of the variance unexplained. We set out to fill in some of the gaps in our understanding of the changes that these NSOs went through by examining three other internal dynamics in chapter four. We also decided to explore these using a case study method. It was felt that this would provide a balance to the first two predominantly quantitative studies, and allow a depth of insight that is simply unobtainable by any other means. This was seen as necessary given the dynamics that we were studying (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987).

The first element that we focussed upon was sub-unit interests. Despite the importance that we attribute to the role played by sub-unit interests in the change process, "within the organizational literature the notion of interests has appeared only sporadically" (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988, p.53). Thus the findings of our research should prove particularly useful to those interested in this aspect of the change process. Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood and Ranson (1981) suggested that the extent to which different groups are satisfied with the way in which their interests are being accommodated could be a

significant pressure for change. We made two findings in particular that proved interesting. The first was that a wider definition of interests needs to be adopted when considering what it is that organizational sub-units strive to protect. Most theorists have contented themselves with defining interests as being a motivation to enhance or defend a particular distribution of scarce resources (Alford, 1975; Hinings & Greenwood, 1988). The major disagreement over interests in our study, and the one that in particular volunteers were most intent on protecting, was decision-making authority. Several NSOs contained volunteers that were unwilling to enter into any change process that threatened this particular distribution of interests. Thus, the fifth conclusion is that while material resources will usually form the interest that most organization sub-units will strive to protect, this will not always be the case. Theorists need to take into account the context of the organizations that are being examined when trying to determine what interests various sub-units might be trying to defend. In the case of radical changes in voluntary sport organizations, the key interests which sub-units will try to protect will likely centre on decision-making authority.

We also found that those NSOs that were successful in their attempts to change made sure that organizational sub-units were intrinsically involved in the transition process. In this way, they could ensure that their individual interests would not be threatened. By contrast the NSOs that failed to reorient were characterized by sub-units involved in a seemingly desperate struggle to prevent change that they felt would harm their interests. This resistance to change was maintained even at the expense of the well being of the organization as a whole. Thus, our sixth conclusion is that mangers of sport organizations considering a radical transition must ensure that any sub-unit that may be able to block the change is involved in the transformation process. In this way, each group's members can satisfy themselves that their interests are not threatened by the proposed changes.

Our final conclusion was drawn following an examination of the way in which the capacity of the organization affected the change process. We found that those NSOs which were able to make the transition from one archetype to another contained leaders that were capable of creating and articulating a vision of a future state that they thought

the organization should move towards. They were also adept at motivating the entire organization membership, or at least key parts of it, into actively participating in the change process. This is what Hinings and Greenwood (1988) term the behavioural aspect of an organization's capacity for change. The technical aspect of managing the transformation is just as important (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988), and also served to distinguish between those NSOs that completed the transition and those that did not. Those NSOs that reoriented possessed leaders that understood what it took to function in the new archetypal form. In particular, the volunteer elite recognized the importance of employing capable professional staff and giving them the authority to run the organization. The professionals that were employed were also adept at managing the change process. They were able to generate ownership of the change throughout the organization, and they were also able to bring all the capabilities possessed by the NSO to bear on what was an inherently difficult process. Those organizations that did not possess such individuals were unable to make the transition. In this respect, the role of the "transformational leader" seems to be crucial (Kanter, 1983; Tichy & Ulrich, 1984). In fact, Pettigrew (1987) commented that radical change was impossible without such leadership. Our seventh conclusion therefore is that change can only be accomplished if the organization has the capacity to change. It must possesses a leader capable of generating a vision of where the organization needs to get to and articulating that vision to the rest of the organization. The leader must also be able to convince the members of the organization that s/he has the ability to get the organization to the desired end point, and be capable of bringing to bear the various skills and capabilities held within the organization on the transition problem. These functions must be carried out while dealing with the multitude of pressures that will impinge on the change process. Internally, these may include sub-unit interests, power dependences, or members values; externally, there will likely be institutional and resource pressures to take into account. It is thus necessary to approach the leadership role with an appreciation of the other internal and external dynamics that have the potential to impact on the change process.

There are several ways in which the findings from this research could be extended. One area in which this study is perhaps lacking is the size of the population on which data

were collected. In some ways, this proved beneficial, particularly in the studies reported in chapters three and four, because it allowed the collection of a great deal of data on each organization. This proved extremely useful in determining the distribution of values in the individual NSOs and in building the case studies. However, it also resulted in our quantitative work not being as statistically conclusive as it perhaps might have been if the sample groups had been larger. Several times we were able to report results in the direction that we had predicted, but lacking in significance. This might well be rectified by examining a larger number of organizations. However, although the number of organizations might be increased, the longitudinal design of the study should be retained. It is only in this way that the necessary insight can be gained into what is a dynamic process (Pettigrew, 1985, 1987; Pettigrew et al., 1992; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994).

It would also be useful to have an additional set of data exploring the way in which values altered over time in relation to changes in the design of the organization. Although we are confident in our assessment of the impact of the values that we reported in chapter three, there is little doubt that additional perspicacity would be gained if further information could be collected on how members' values changed over time. Given the scarcity of research on organizational values and the change process, there is a big contribution to the literature to be made in this area.

A third way in which our work here might be extended emanates from the fact that the role of the organizational leader in the change process is not well understood, particularly in the sport management setting. Thus far, there have been a number of studies in the sport management literature that have attempted to uncover the various qualities that a transformational and/or transactional leader should possess in order to be effective (e.g., Doherty & Danylchuk, 1996; Doherty, 1997; Quarterman, 1998; Weese, 1995, 1996). It would thus be highly useful for future studies to take into account the context in which leaders have to operate when trying to understand their behavior.

A fourth possible extension of this research also comes from the final study in chapter four. Interests, power dependencies and capacity for change, as we found, all play an important role in the change process. However, they also have a large interaction effect on each other. For example, the distribution of power is important in determining

how change takes place, but it will also affect the way in which resources are distributed throughout the organization. It thus also has an effect on the role of interests, which in turn affects the change process. Similarly, the way in which power is distributed may also facilitate or constrain the actions of leaders within the organization. In other words, as well as affecting the change process in its own right, by influencing the roles of interests and organizational capacity, its effect is correspondingly magnified. An investigation into the way in which these three dynamics interrelate in this way would thus be extremely useful.

Understanding the process of radical change has become increasingly difficult as the speed at which organizations have to respond to changes in their environments, and the complexity of making large-scale changes, continues to increase. It is important therefore that studies into the dynamics of change, whether internal or external, are continued. However, it is also important that these studies be designed in such a way as to capture the unfolding of the change process. Although this type of longitudinal research design can be time consuming and expensive, the richness of data that it can provide will prove crucial to furthering our understanding of the change process.

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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0

150mm

6"