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Cultural Interventions: American Corporate Philanthropy and the Construction of the Arts and Letters in Canada, 1900-1957

by

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A thesis submitted to the Department of History

in conformity with the requirements for

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

This thesis is an examination of how the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Rockefeller Foundation transformed their founders' vast financial resources into cultural power and, in turn, influenced Canadian life. It focuses on the period beginning in the second decade of the century and continuing through to the 1950s, during which the two American foundations penetrated deep into the Canadian cultural and intellectual scene, making substantial contributions to Canadian universities, scholarly associations, cultural institutions, and to individual artists and scholars.

Both the power of American popular culture and the desire of members of the Canadian intellectual and cultural elites to resist the cultural incursions associated with it are undeniable and have been well documented by Canadian historians. This study addresses and begins to balance a historiography in which American "imperialism" has been analyzed at the levels of popular culture, big business, and in terms of formal state relations. My contribution is to explore the parts played by the American foundations in the construction of the "Arts and Letters" in Canada from the late 1920s to late 1950s. At the base of the argument of this thesis is the idea that the American philanthropic trusts filled a cultural void in Canada that existed between two eras and two fundamentally different systems of cultural patronage. It is my contention that the post-1945 federal system of state support for Canadian "Arts and Letters," which has been hailed as one of the key indicators of Canadian/American difference, was, in fact, a product of a series of fruitful exchanges between members of a North American cultural elite.

Acknowledgements

Last things first. Despite his desire to remain a silent-supporter (or perhaps because of it) I begin by thanking George Hood for his contributions during the final stages of this project. First he found me an office -- in fact, a perfect working environment. Later, when I feared I was overstaying my welcome, he not only told me I could stay put, he wouldn't let me out until I had hard evidence that I was submitting a final draft. Strategic philanthropy at its best.

The use of the office would have meant much less if it was not accompanied by the support of the staff of the Ontario Research Development Fund/Canadian Foundation for Innovation Task Force at Queen's University. George, Kathy Arney, Sheilagh Dunn, Martha Grier, and Sheila Norris patiently tolerated my presence in what is a hot-bed of activity. They also were encouraging, interested and on numerous occasions saved me from my technological incompetence.

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food) could.

Like any research project this study would not have been possible without the aid of many archivists. Cindy Campbell, at the National Gallery of Canada Library, guided me through that institution's records relating to the Carnegie Corporation. SueYoung Park, Carnegie Archivist at Columbia University's Rare Book and Manuscript Library, graciously sent me an unusually large number of photocopied records when I was frantically writing and unable to undertake a planned trip to Manhattan. My research at Pocantico Hills was facilitated by two grants from the Rockefeller Archive Center. Even more valuable than this financial assistance was Rockefeller archivist Tom Rosenbaum's knowledge of the Foundation and, more generally, of corporate philanthropy. Tom's knowledge and his critical skills were crucial in helping me to shape my research agenda.

Now for the people I can never thank sufficiently. Karen Brison, my sister, has always been a source of intellectual inspiration. In their unique and very different ways my parents, Jane Badour and David Brison, have each provided me with intellectual, emotional, and financial support. Without this support I never would have wanted to do this. Ian McKay has been, from the start, more stimulating than I ever imagined a supervisor could be. His practical advice on the direction of the thesis has been important, but I value equally our less goal-oriented discussions about history. If I were to try to describe Lynda Jessup's contributions I would start by citing the depth of her knowledge of, and the quality of her thought on, Canadian cultural history. I would acknowledge the help and support she has given me at every step along the way, and thank her for working through numerous thoughts with me. And I would thank her for being my best friend. But that's only a start.

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Introduction: American Philanthropy if Necessary But Not Necessarily American Philanthropy

> ...[W]e face, for the most part without any physical barriers, a vast and wealthy country to which we are linked not only by language but by many common traditions....[O]ur population stretches in a narrow and not even continuous ribbon along our frontier -- fourteen millions along a five thousand mile front. In meeting influences from across the border as pervasive as they are friendly, we have not even the advantages of what soldiers call defence in depth....
>
> ...Money has flowed across the border from such groups as the Carnegie Corporation, which has spent $7,346,188 in Canada since 1911 and the Rockefeller Foundation, to which we are indebted for the sum of $11,817,707 since 1914....Through their generosity countless individuals have enjoyed opportunities for creative work or for further cultivation of their particular field of study. Applied with wisdom and imagination, these gifts have helped Canadians to live their own life and to develop a better Canadianism....Many institutions in Canada essential to the equipment of a modern nation could not have been established or maintained without money provided from the United States....[1]
>
> -- Massey Commission (1951).

The Report of Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, commissioned in 1949 and presented to Canadian Parliament in June 1951, has been accorded an almost mythological status in the history of Canada's quest for cultural sovereignty. Described by historians of this journey by such metaphors as a "watershed," a "cornerstone," and a "turning point," the report has recently been deemed "the most influential cultural document in Canada's history."[2]

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[1]From Chapter 2, "The Forces of Geography," Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), p. 13.

[2]Paul Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), front cover notes; Bernard Ostry, The Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1978), p. 56; and Jamie Portman, "And Not By Bread Alone: The Battle Over Canadian Culture," in Canada and the United States: Differences that Count, ed. David Thomas (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1993), p. 345.

The significance one ascribes to the Massey report (as it was popularly known after the commission's chairman Vincent Massey) depends largely on the degree to which one sees it as the source of cultural policies pursued by successive federal governments years, even decades, after its submission.[3] At the very least the report represented the culmination of many years of the Canadian elites' reflections on the country's cultural sovereignty, and particularly on the role the state might play in fostering and protecting Canadian culture. Following the 1929 Aird Commission on public broadcasting and the 1944 Turgeon Committee on Reconstruction, the Massey report proposed a coherent strategy for federal support for Canadian cultural and intellectual institutions and infrastructure. Asserting the federal state's right, and indeed duty, to provide support for Canadian universities; recommending renewed commitments to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board; pledging support for national cultural institutions; and suggesting the creation of a Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences to support Canadian artists and scholars: in all these ways, the Massey Commission left a powerful legacy. Historian Paul Rutherford has recently argued that the Massey report legitimized "the belief that the state must become a major player in the cultural life of the country."[4] In the colony-to-nation narrative, the Massey report did for

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[3]Paul Litt discusses the fate of specific recommendations made in the Massey report. See Litt, The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission, pp. 245-247. Maria Tippett also questions the emphasis on the Massey Commission in "The Writing of English-Canadian Cultural History," Canadian Historical Review 67 (Dec. 1986): p. 558.

[4]"Made in America: The Problem of Mass Culture in Canada," in The Beaver Bites Back? American Popular Culture in Canada, eds. David H. Flaherty and Frank E. Manning (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 273. For summaries of the major recommendations of the Massey Commission see also Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission, pp. 3-4, 214-215; Portman, "And Not by Bread Alone," p. 346; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies

Canadian culture what the National Policy did for Canadian industry -- it fostered the development of the infrastructure necessary for nationhood.[5]

The Massey commission was formed by Louis St. Laurent's federal government to investigate what historian John Herd Thompson refers to as the "conundrum of [Canadian] cultural sovereignty" -- to study, in effect, Canada's cultural development within the complex rubric that was the North Atlantic triangle.[6] In a very real sense, the experiences of the two world wars and of the tumultuous decades that lay between them ended Canada's junior partnership with Great Britain. With a series of constitutional developments which began in 1923 when, without British approval, Canadian Minister of Marine and Fisheries Ernest Lapointe signed the Pacific Halibut Treaty with the United States and which culminated in 1931 when Canada was granted legal independence in the Statute of Westminster, Canada gradually shed its colonial status.[7] As important, moreover, the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s were decades during which a burgeoning English-Canadian cultural nationalism took root. From 1925 to 1940 enrolment in Canadian universities increased by almost 50% and higher education increasingly served as the fertile environment for an emerging national middle-

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(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), p. 204.

[5]Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission, p. 5.

[6]"Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection, Promotion, and Popular Culture," in North America Without Borders? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico, ed. Stephen J. Randall (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992), p. 273; see also Thompson with Allen Seager, "The Conundrum of Culture" (chapter 8), Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), pp. 158-192.

[7]Thompson with Seager, Decades of Discord, pp. 49-51; Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, pp. 105, 127. The independent status granted by the Statute of Westminster was, by no means, complete and did not represent a "clean break" from Britain. After the statute, the Canadian head of state remained the British monarch and the Canadian constitution could not be amended in Canada.

class culture.[8] As Mary Vipond has pointed out, this era also saw the formation of an English-Canadian nationalist elite made up, for the most part, of male artists, authors, intellectuals, politicians and civil servants from central Canada. Members of this emerging "nationalist network" included such patrons as Vincent Massey and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce president Sir Edmund Walker; the artists of the Group of Seven; bureaucrats such as National Gallery of Canada Director Eric Brown, and his assistant and successor H.O. McCurry; the editors and publishers of such periodicals as Maclean's Magazine, The Canadian Forum, The Canadian Magazine; and university-trained intellectuals such as Frank Scott, Harold Innis, Arthur Lower and Donald Creighton. Together these individuals formed an interlocked web of professional and voluntary associations and collectively sought to map a uniquely Canadian cultural identity.[9]

Yet while the first half of the twentieth century was, on the one hand, a period during which Canada and Canadians gained political, strategic and economic independence from Great Britain and has been seen by many as the golden age of English-Canadian cultural nationalism, it was, on the other hand, an era during which American influence in Canada increased considerably. If Canada was freeing itself from imperial entanglements, it was at the same time becoming integrated into a North American economy and culture. Already of prime importance at the turn of the century, by mid-century American investment in Canadian resource and manufacturing industries had replaced British

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[8]Paul Axelrod, Making a Middle Class: Student Life in English Canada During the Thirties (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), p. 21.

[9]Mary Vipond, "The Nationalist Network: English Canada's Intellectuals in the 1920s," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 7 (Spring 1980): pp. 32-53. See also Thompson with Seager, Decades of Discord, pp. 158-175.

investment as the life-blood of the Canadian economy. At the beginning of the twentieth-century American investment amounted to 14% of total foreign investment in Canada while British investment accounted for 85%.[10] By 1939, at the onset of the Second World War, the balance had been tilted in the opposite direction with the American share amounting to 60% and the British weighing in at just 36%.[11] And by the end of the war, the American share of foreign funds invested in Canada had increased to 70% of the total.[12] American economic power was also reflected in the sphere of popular culture. During the 1920s and 1930s American-based mass culture industries such as film, radio broadcasting, the popular press, and even spectator sports, took hold of Canadian audiences as a North American mass culture solidified.[13]

In the sphere of international politics and foreign affairs, independence from Great Britain was often accompanied and even signalled by warmer relations with the United States. When Canadian statesmen decided in the mid-1920s to develop an independent Canadian foreign policy it was to Washington they looked. Four years after signing the Pacific Halibut Treaty, the Canadian government established its own "Legation" in Washington -- a move accompanied by Vincent Massey's appointment as Canada's "Minister" to the United States. Avoidance of the terms "Embassy" and "Ambassador" only

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[10]J.L. Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, The 1988 Joanne Goodman Lectures (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), p. 17.

[11]Ibid., p. 24.

[12]Ibid., p. 39.

[13]See Thompson with Seager, Decades of Discord, pp. 158-192.

slightly limited the importance of this assertion of independence.[14]

The largely symbolic initiatives undertaken by the Canadian state to establish an independent relationship with the United States in the 1920s laid the groundwork for more concrete developments in the 1930s. The national euphoria over Canada's contribution to victory in the First World War which drove Canadian statesmen to plot an independent foreign policy was, over time, replaced by pragmatic concerns for national defence. As tensions associated with the rise of fascism plagued the European continent between 1935 and 1940, Canadian policy-makers increasingly perceived Canada's relationship with the United States, and not membership in the Commonwealth, as the basis of national security.

On the other side of the border, American officials, worried that in the event of war the inadequacy of Canadian defences might provide foreign powers a foothold on the North American continent, openly pursued responsibility for the defence of Canada. Speaking at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario on 18 August 1938, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned a large audience that a European war might eventually pose a threat to freedoms and values shared by the peoples of Canada and the United States. After paying homage to Canada's British heritage and its membership in the British Empire, Roosevelt assured Canadians "that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."[15] Two years later, in August 1940, Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King signed the

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[14]Ibid., p. 52.

[15]J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), pp. 103-104; Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, p. 24; and Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, p. 147.

Ogdensburg Agreement and thereby established a Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Although each nation's forces remained under the command of its respective leadership, it was agreed that the American and Canadian military cooperatively coordinate continental defence arrangements. The Ogdensburg Agreement, along with the Hyde Park Declaration of 20 April 1941, in which King and Roosevelt agreed to coordinate the production and purchasing of military equipment, have been viewed by nationalist historians such as Donald Creighton as key contributions to Canada's absorbtion into the American Empire.[16] In an ironic twist of Arthur Lower's title for his 1946 survey of Canadian history, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, Harold Innis reflected on what he saw as a fundamental shift in orientation when he concluded that, by the end of the first half of the twentieth century, Canada had merely substituted one metropolitan force for another and thus had been transformed from "colony to nation to colony."[17] As Innis also noted, "autonomy following the Statute of Westminster has been a device by which we can cooperate with the United States as we formerly did with Great Britain."[18]

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[16]Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976). For discussions of William Lyon Mackenzie King, the Ogdensburg Agreement, the Hyde Park Declaration and what Carl Berger describes as "the demonology of [Canadian] nationalism," see Berger, "The Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941: An Overview," in The Road to Ogdensburg: The Queen's/St. Lawrence Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941, eds. Frederick W. Gibson and Jonathan G. Rossie (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1993), p. 29; Thompson and Randall, Ambivalent Allies, p. 155; and Granatstein, How Britain's Weakness Forced Canada into the Arms of the United States, pp. 24-26.

[17]A.R.M. (Arthur) Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans and Green, 1946); Harold A. Innis, "Great Britain, the United States, and Canada," in Essays in Canadian Economic History, ed. Mary Q. Innis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956), p. 405, cited by Paul Litt, "The Massey Commission, Americanization, and Canadian Cultural Nationalism," Queen's Quarterly 98 (Summer 1991): p. 376.

[18]"Great Britain, the United States, and Canada," pp. 405-406.

* * *

To the Massey commissioners, to the representatives of the various institutions and voluntary associations who briefed the commission, and indeed to most of the historians who have studied the commission, the greatest threat to Canada's cultural sovereignty -- the villain that threatened the final stages of Canada's emergence as an independent nation -- was an American-centred mass culture. As Paul Litt suggests, members of the Canadian cultural elite typically and conveniently equated all American cultural influence with this "popular" or "mass" culture, while equating Canadian culture with a more traditional and elite "high" culture.[19] In the eyes of the commissioners, making a stand for what they saw as cultural quality was making a stand for Canadian nationalism. Accordingly, the Commission -- its recommendations shaped by a desire to see the Canadian state take a stand against the influence of a free-market driven culture based in the United States -- has been portrayed as the crowning moment in a "revolt of the highbrows."[20]

Both the power of American popular culture and the obsessive desire of members of the Canadian intellectual and cultural elites to resist the cultural incursions associated with it are undeniable and have been well documented in the work of several authors, including Paul Litt, Paul Rutherford, John Herd Thompson, Allen Seager, George Woodcock, Bernard Ostry, and, most recently, in a collection of essays edited by David H. Flaherty and Frank E.

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[19]"The Massey Commission, Americanization, and Canadian Cultural Nationalism," p. 380. See also Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission, p. 106.

[20]Rutherford, "Made in America," p. 270.

Manning entitled The Beaver Bites Back? American Popular Culture in Canada.[21] However, to assess the American-Canadian relationship only in the sphere of popular culture, and to analyze the Massey report only for what it had to say on that issue is to obscure the depth of American cultural influence in Canada. As the Massey commissioners acknowledged in the section of the report cited at the beginning of this chapter, American influence did not always come in the form of pulp fiction and Hollywood movies. As well as being "pervasive" and "friendly," American influence could be, even in the eyes of the Massey commissioners, "valuable" and could, indeed, help "Canadians to live their own life and to develop a better Canadianism...."

From the early 1930s to the late 1950s the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Rockefeller Foundation penetrated deep into the Canadian cultural and intellectual scene. The two original "Big Foundations"[22] made substantial institutional grants to Canadian universities, to public and private galleries, and to libraries and museums. They supported individual Canadian artists and scholars directly with Foundation and Corporation grants and fellowships, by sponsoring their art associations and scholarly research councils, and by funding special projects that enabled recipients to carry out their research and to publish their work. Together, the American foundations contributed almost 20 million dollars to the economy of Canadian culture (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). It was not, therefore,

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[21]Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission; Paul Rutherford, When Television was Young: Primetime Canada 1952-1967 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); Thompson and Seager, Decades of Discord; George Woodcock, Strange Bedfellows: The State and the Arts in Canada (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1985); Ostry, Cultural Connection; and Flaherty and Manning, eds., The Beaver Bites Back?

[22]This term is borrowed from the title of Waldemar A. Nielsen's study of American philanthropy, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

surprising that the Massey commissioners were quick to acknowledge Canada's debt to American philanthropy. Scores of the organizations that sent briefs to the commission owed their formation, and in many cases their continued existence, to the Carnegie Corporation and/or to the Rockefeller Foundation.[23] Moreover, three of the five commissioners -- N.A.M. MacKenzie as president of the University of British Columbia and as the former president of the University of New Brunswick (1940-1944), Georges-Henri Lévesque as the founder and dean of the faculty of social sciences at Laval University, and Vincent Massey himself, as a trusted adviser to both foundations -- had long-standing relationships with the two American trusts. It is not an exaggeration to argue, as does Paul Litt, that "the Canadian cultural elite was as much affected by American high culture as the general population was by American mass culture."[24] And more specifically, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the ties between members of the Canadian intelligentsia and the two philanthropic trusts that had developed in the 1930s and 1940s had a formative influence on the ideas of many of the individuals, institutions, and associations who briefed the Massey commission, on the thoughts of the commissioners themselves, and, consequently, on the commission's final recommendations for the future structuring of Canadian cultural and intellectual life.

It is my objective in this thesis to address and begin to balance a historiography in which American "imperialism" has been analyzed at the levels of popular culture, big business, and in terms of formal state relations. My contribution is to explore interventions

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[23]Paul Litt notes the dependence of many Canadian "highbrow cultural projects" on the Corporation and the Foundation. See Litt, "The Massey Commission, Americanization, and Canadian Cultural Nationalism," p. 386, n. 11; and Litt, The Muses, the Masses and the Massey Commission, p. 288, n. 5.

[24]"The Massey Commission, Americanization, and Canadian Cultural Nationalism," p. 383.

by the Carnegie Corporation and by the Rockefeller Foundation into what the authors of the Massey report referred to as the "Arts and Letters" in Canada from the late 1920s to late 1950s. I argue that at a time when the Canadian state's involvement in civil society was still fairly limited and when there were few alternative sources of funding, the contributions of these two American philanthropic trusts to Canadian universities, museums and galleries and their support of artists and scholars, and of professional and scholarly associations was of a formative and essential nature. I argue that, in many ways, the national elite consolidation that reached a high-point with the formation and deliberations of the Massey Commission was facilitated by the American foundations' support of the efforts of Canadian artists and intellectuals to organize and rationalize the cultural sphere. The national community conceptualized by individuals involved in the Massey commission, I argue, had its roots in these earlier efforts.

* * *

Of necessity this thesis is as much about corporate philanthropy as it is about Canadian cultural and intellectual history. By the time philanthropic foundations began to operate in Canada corporate philanthropy was already a highly developed technique of influence. The first part of this thesis, "Building Foundations," documents the early years and development of corporate philanthropy and the first forays by American foundations on Canadian soil. Chapter 1, "The Business of Benevolence," surveys the development of Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropy from the early days of relatively modest private giving in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the formation and consolidation of the

Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. It examines the social theories and organizational technologies that enabled John D. Rockefeller Sr. and Andrew Carnegie to extend their power far beyond the world of industry and into the realm of the social and cultural relations of civil society.

For the early period, particular attention is focused on the ideas presented in Carnegie's critical statement on the responsibilities of the wealthy, "Wealth"(1889), and on the thoughts and ideas of John D. Rockefeller Sr. and of his chief adviser on philanthropy, Frederick Gates. The relationship of these ideas to the evolutionary ideology espoused by Herbert Spencer and to Christian notions of stewardship are discussed. The focus then shifts to the gradual and lengthy processes of incorporation which began in the late nineteenth century and culminated in the early 1920s. Of primary importance in these developments was the emergence of a managerial elite, members of which were, as time passed, given more and more direct control and management responsibilities of the founders' businesses of benevolence. After surveying the growing pains associated with the transformation from private to corporate philanthropy, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the role corporate philanthropy played in the development of a national system of higher education in the United States and in the creation of research councils and professional associations in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. It is argued in the chapter that both original philanthropists and the philanthropoids[25] who later

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[25]The term "philanthropoid" was coined by Carnegie Corporation president Frederick P. Keppel. It is now commonly used to distinguish the paid officers (the philanthropoids) who administer the foundations from those who give their wealth for philanthropic purposes (philanthropists). By the late 1920s Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation philanthropoids enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. See Althea K. Nagai, Robert Lerner, and Stanley Rothman, Giving for Social Change: Foundations, Public Policy, and the American Political Agenda (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. 4; and Dwight Macdonald,

ran the foundations, saw corporate philanthropy as a catalyst for reform, and a technique to be used to re-structure and rationalize American society in the same way Rockefeller and Carnegie had reformed and rationalized American industry in the late nineteenth century.

Chapter 2, "The Early Years of American Philanthropy in Canada: Building Schools, Building Canada," explores the first stages of the exportation of American corporate philanthropy to Canada. On the Rockefeller side, activity was restricted to support for medical education, and for public health facilities. The Carnegie program, administered through the separately-endowed British Dominions and Colonies Fund, included support for a broad range of activities from local library programs to large grants to the general endowment funds of universities. Although these activities were not, in every case, directly related to the arts and letters, it was during this period that both organizations began to identify, and indeed to impose, national and regional hierarchies of institutions and to formulate webs of Canadian contacts based on those hierarchies. In short, it was in this early phase of activity that the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation established small footholds in the Canadian social, political and cultural power structures. Working with Canadian collaborators, the foundations began to confront what geographer R. Cole Harris refers to as "the profound structural localism of which this country is composed."[26]

The following three chapters of this thesis -- the body of this study -- are given over to case studies of specific interventions by the American foundations into the Canadian

The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal and Company, 1956), p. 96.

[26]"Regionalism and the Canadian Archipelago," in Interpreting Canada's Past: After Confederation, ed. J.M.

cultural and intellectual scenes. These case studies are divided structurally into two parts corresponding roughly to two of the primary Massey Commission designations, as well as to what became, in 1957, the two sectoral focuses of the Canada Council -- the "Arts" and the "Letters."

Part II, "American Philanthropy, Imagining Communities and the Structuring of the Arts in Canada, 1927-1952," begins with a discussion of the turn by both foundations to matters of culture. This adjustment is discussed in relationship to an ambivalence to modernity expressed by certain officers of the foundations and by members of the Canadian cultural elite. Also, using Benedict Anderson's concept of the "imagined community" as a theoretical starting point, this section explores contributions the foundations made to efforts to conceptualize regional and national communities, on the one hand, and to the construction of national structures on the other.[27] It is the main thesis of this section that Canadian efforts to structure, organize and bring about state support for culture in Canada, cannot be properly considered in isolation from the expansion of both foundations into the cultural sphere in the 1920s and 1930s.

The first chapter in this part of the thesis, Chapter 3, "Rockefeller Philanthropy, 'Cultural Interpretation,' and Imagined Communities in Canada," explores the significance of Rockefeller Foundation support of Canadian intellectuals and cultural producers under its new humanities program in the 1930s and 1940s. Through this new program Foundation officers supported projects aimed at what they referred to as "cultural interpretation." This

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Bumsted (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 486.

[27]Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism

approach to culture combined the work of scholars, broadcasters, folklorists, filmmakers and archivists and aimed at the production and dissemination of knowledge of local, regional, national and even international cultural units. While most of the Canadian projects in this broader program were small and relatively limited in scope, they collectively served to facilitate the flow of ideas and influence from the Foundation to Canadian intellectuals.

In Chapter 4, "The Carnegie Corporation, Cultural Philanthropy and a New Deal for the Arts in Canada," focus shifts to the Carnegie Corporation and to its involvement in cultural philanthropy. The chapter begins with a discussion of the Corporation's turn to culture, which was initiated by Frederick Keppel shortly after he became president of the trust in 1923. Discussion focuses on Carnegie programs in art education, the trust's interest in the development of museums and galleries, and the subsequent extension of these cultural programs to Canada. Particular attention is focused on the Carnegie Corporation's relationship with the National Gallery of Canada, and on the Corporation's role in the creation and development of the Federation of Canadian Artists. It is argued through the case studies explored in both chapters of Part II that the foundations were essential actors in what was an important transitional era in Canadian cultural history. Foundation officers not only provided funds necessary for the formation of national associations and structures but, as technical experts in the management of culture, provided Canadian leaders with valuable advice on how to organize a "cultural" constituency.

With Chapter 5, "American Philanthropy and Intellectual Development in Canada, 1930 to 1957," the thesis turns to the foundations' involvement in the creation of Canadian

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(London: Verso, 1983).

academic infrastructure in the period leading up to the creation of the Canada Council. The chapter begins with consideration of the significance of large research projects sponsored by the foundations in the 1930s. I consider how these projects, while temporary in nature, acted as stimuli for certain Canadian scholars in the social sciences and the humanities -- an influence whose relative significance was substantial in the otherwise barren environment of the Depression years. The support of the American foundations, combined with the call to service by federal and provincial governments, had the effect of legitimizing and empowering academic scholarship.

Following this, the chapter turns to the Carnegie Corporation's and the Rockefeller Foundation's support for the founding of the Canadian Social Science Research Council and of the Humanities Research Council of Canada in the early 1940s, and to the trusts' continuing support for the two research councils until 1957 when they were absorbed into the apparatus of the Canada Council. The critical roles played by the two councils are then discussed along with those played in turn by the Corporation and the Foundation (which together were almost solely responsible for financing the research councils) in the structuring of the social sciences and humanities during this period. The Councils' aid to scholarship programs -- support for sabbatical leaves, research and publication, and large-scale area studies, as well as the establishment of graduate fellowships -- made more permanent the stimulus provided by special projects of the 1930s and thus became models for scholars and officials who were pursuing stronger federal state support for Canadian scholarship.

While support for the research councils was aimed at the general development and entrenchment of the social science and humanities disciplines throughout all Canadian

regions, in large institutions and in smaller ones, in newer institutions and in established centres of learning, both the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation had short lists of individuals and institutions targeted for special status as "national centres." The final section of chapter 5 is devoted to a study of the Rockefeller Foundation's collaboration with Harold Innis and his department of political economy at the University of Toronto. From the late 1930s to his death in 1952, Innis served, in all but name, as the Foundation's Canadian director in the social sciences and humanities. The relationship will be explored for what it tells us about the operation of American philanthropic influence in Canada and as a case study of international elite collaboration. Attention will be focused on the manner in which American support was harnessed and mediated by Innis and his colleagues at the University of Toronto to further a particular agenda for change and on the manner in which officials of the Rockefeller Foundation worked through Innis to pursue their own agenda in Canada.

* * *

In his important early study, Wealth and Culture: A Study of One Hundred Foundations and Community Trusts and Their Operations During the Decade 1921-1930 (1936), American sociologist Eduard Lindeman noted that "what the public wishes to know is the manner in which these large sums of vested wealth tend to influence American life...."[28] At its heart, this thesis is an examination of how the Carnegie Corporation and the

[28]Quoted in Richard Magat, "Introduction to the Transaction Edition," Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture: A Study of One Hundred Foundations and Community Trusts and Their Operation During the Decade, 1921-1930 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936; reprint ed., New Brunswick, New Jersey:

Rockefeller Foundation transformed their founders' vast financial resources into cultural power and, in turn, influenced Canadian life. When American philanthropists funded Canadian "Arts and Letters," they were doing more than merely lending helping hands to struggling scholars and artists -- they were involving themselves in what Ellen Condliffe Lagemann refers to as "the Politics of Knowledge." As Lagemann suggests in The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy, philanthropic wealth had enormous influence on processes of academic and artistic professionalization and organization, on the direction of public taste in the arts, and on the privileging of certain ideas and ideologies in the academy.[29] This, I argue, was no less true when funds were targeted for expenditure in Canada.

This thesis is not, however, a straightforward study of American domination in yet another sphere of twentieth-century Canadian society. Following the lead of the editors and the authors of The Beaver Bites Back? American Popular Culture in Canada, I suggest that the case studies comprising the body of this thesis speak as much of American persuasion and influence, and even of Canadian agency, as they do of American coercion. Members of the Canadian intellectual and cultural elites -- professional artists and intellectuals who were already in the process of building what Mary Vipond refers to as Canada's "nationalist network" -- sought the aid of and were sought out by the American trusts because of shared goals and visions for the making of modern Canada. Canadians who worked with the Americans were thus willing participants in establishing and pursuing objectives with the

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Transaction, Inc., 1988), p. viii.

[29]Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989.

officers who staffed the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. The relationship between these two groups was marked by cooperation, negotiation and, at times, compromise. Although there were points of disagreement, both sides shared a fundamental desire to structure, rationalize, and professionalize Canadian intellectual and artistic activity. There was, moreover, fundamental agreement on the types of structures that should be erected and on who should be in charge of both the construction projects and the resulting infrastructure.

What I am suggesting is that the two groups were instrumental in the creation of cultural hegemony -- in the extension of the federal state's activity from simple political adminstration into the realm of what Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci referred to as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private.'"[30] In the particular case of Canadian culture and the "arts and letters," this formation, I argue, established the patterns and the parameters on which the federal state's cultural policies were later based. As in any such social formation, of course, all actors did not enjoy equal power, and in this case the Americans had two resources the Canadians needed -- the financial strength necessary to build institutions, to fund organizations, to support research and artistic endeavours, and possibly even more significantly, the knowledge and experience to accomplish these objectives. Just as Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller had, in their business careers, controlled the means of production, the men who operated the foundations held ownership

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[30]Gramsci describes the role played by intellectuals in the formation of cultural hegemony in "The Intellectuals: The Formation of Intellectuals," Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), pp. 12-13. See also Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 65-68.

deeds on what Marx referred to as the "material means of mental production."[31]

Thus, if this thesis is not about a crude American cultural imperialism in Canada in the simplest sense, it is, nonetheless, concerned with issues of cultural imperialism. The Americans held an overwhelming advantage in the balance of power and were, without a doubt, the senior partners. As Martin Carnoy points out in his description of hegemony, the dominant group in the formation does not "impose" its views on its allies. Hegemony is rather "a process in civil society whereby a fraction of the dominant class exercises control through its moral and intellectual leadership over other allied fractions of the dominant class."[32] In forming partnerships, the foundations selected Canadians who shared their visions, agendas, and ideologies and they engaged in extensive, though often informal, searches for like-minded Canadians before supporting any project or enterprise. In short, they provided the type of "moral and intellectual leadership" Carnoy refers to. The officers of the two trusts were not at all afraid, when necessary, to exert their influence in even more direct fashion, often, for example, letting Canadians know in advance which proposals would likely be supported and which ones would not, and at times abruptly cancelling support for individuals and organizations who deviated from foundation objectives. Although the "carrot" of persuasion was the favoured tool, foundation officers were always ready with the "stick" of coercion.

In using Gramsci as a theoretical marker in my discussion I am doing so somewhat

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[31]Cited in Clyde W. Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894-1928 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 12.

[32]The State and Political Theory, pp. 69-70.

selectively. That is to say that while I find the concept of cultural hegemony a valuable one that sheds light both on the relationship between the American foundations and members of the Canadian elite and on the broader process of the federal state's expansion into the previously "private" sphere, I do not find cultural hegemony, in the fullest sense, at work in the creation of Canadian cultural and intellectual infrastructure in the period I am studying. Specifically, it is difficult to see where "the 'spontaneous' consent...[of] the great masses of the population...." was ever granted.[33] The processes I describe in this study were negotiated by a relatively small group of men from North America's urban-based political, economic, and social elites. On many occasions in this thesis the argument implicitly turns to a rather direct version of Gramsci's theory of hegemony that some may consider simplistic. I remain nonetheless impressed by the ability of cultural elites to "conspire," that is, etymologically, to "speak together," in order to defend and even to impose certain values, values which were "hegemonic" insofar as they either directly reinforced or indirectly drew attention away from the inequities of a liberal capitalist order.[34] I, in fact, do what cultural historian T.J. Jackson Lears claims in his preface to No Place of Grace he had to avoid when approaching Gramsci's theory -- that is, I "imagine a ruling-class cultural committee conspiring to impose dominant values on hapless [or at least uninterested] workers...."[35]

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[33]Gramsci, "The Intellectuals," p. 12.

[34]In this discussion of the relationship between hegemony and elite conspiracy I have been influenced by E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975); and Douglas Hay, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975).

[35]No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920, revised ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. xiii.

Almost without exception, all the key players studied in this thesis -- Americans and Canadians alike -- were white, financially comfortable, middle-aged males, and all shared what was, at the time, the unusual luxury of extensive post-secondary educations. Membership in this elitist international "boys club" depended on meeting all these implicitly understood but never specified criteria of supposed evolutionary success and "cultural quality."[36] In an absolute sense, the great imbalance of power was not among members of the group but between this leadership group and the rest of society. Needless to say, this leadership group -- all members of a North American intelligentsia -- was not particularly representative of the populations of either North American nation. Professional, educational, class and personal ties that spanned the border made interaction between members of the fraternity easy and informal. These same ties, however, virtually denied many other groups and individuals access to power. Reflecting this, I argue as Robert Arnove does in the introduction to Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: the Foundations at Home and Abroad, that American philanthropy had a fundamentally undemocratic affect on society.[37] American philanthropic trusts were mechanisms designed to transform the financial fortunes amassed by their founders into intellectual and cultural power for a very small segment of the population. Decisions of vast public significance in the United States and later in Canada were made by small, homogenous, privately-selected groups of individuals who owed their power, however indirectly, to their relations with the industrial

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[36]For a discussion of the concepts of taste and quality and their functions in the social relations of power see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[37]Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 1.

giants of the late nineteenth century. That the composition of this decision-making cadre was, in the cases surveyed in this thesis, international in nature makes the process no less imperialistic and undemocratic.

At the base of the argument of this thesis is the idea that the American philanthropic trusts filled a cultural void in Canada -- both in terms of funding and of expertise -- that existed between two eras and two fundamentally different systems of cultural patronage. By the early 1920s, nineteenth-century style private patronage was insufficient to meet the needs of an emerging modern nation. Yet it was not until the early 1950s, and the publication of the findings of the Massey Commission, that large-scale state support for Canadian culture was officially endorsed, and not until 1957 and the creation of the Canada Council that state support became a reality. From 1920 to 1957 Canadian cultural and intellectual institutions existed and developed by combining private patronage with limited provincial and federal support -- and most importantly, as Maria Tippett suggests in Making Culture: English Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission, by leaning on such "foreign walking sticks" as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.[38] The partnership between Canadian intellectuals and American philanthropy thus facilitated the transition in Canada from a private, localized system of cultural patronage to a system of corporate cultural patronage in which the nation-state was the major corporate patron.

During this critical transitional era, Canadians seeking to build institutions, pursue research in their fields, organize and rationalize their particular areas of expertise, and

[38]"Leaning 'on Foreign Walking Sticks': Cultural Philanthropists, Influences, and Models from Abroad" (chapter 5), Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 127-155.

establish themselves as "cultural authorities" in the fullest sense, looked to the Manhattan offices of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation for funding, as well as for ideas and inspiration. The products of these international elite collaborations -- projects that, at the time, were essential components of the structuring and rationalization of the Canadian intellectual and cultural scene -- later, in the post-war era, served as models for future state initiatives and projects. It is my contention that the post-1945 federal system of state support for Canadian "Arts and Letters," which has been since hailed as one of the key indicators of Canadian/American difference, was, in fact, a product of a series of fruitful exchanges between members of a North American cultural elite.

By engaging in this study I want to situate the American philanthropic factor in the equation of Canadian cultural development -- alongside strategic, purely economic, and popular cultural factors -- in larger debates about Canadian identity, American imperialism and American/Canadian difference. Drawing principally upon the under-utilized Canadian collections in the foundations' archives, I suggest that the case of American philanthropy and Canadian culture in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s provides ample evidence that English-Canadian artists, intellectuals, and the politicians who pursued state support for Canadian culture not only inherited "Tory paternalism" from their British imperial past, but also learned to appreciate it and perfect it at the hands of the officers of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. In doing so, I call into question essentialist and ahistorical notions of American Lockean individualism, Canadian Tory paternalism, and of what sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset refers to as "organizing principles" of national

political cultures fashioned at the moment of the American revolution.[39] Canada's national "tradition" of institutionalized public support for the arts and letters was, in reality, invented in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s and was in no way preordained or simply "waiting to happen," as the proponents of the "organizing principles" position claim.[40] It was constructed, moreover, under the watchful eyes of the leaders of American corporate philanthropy.

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[39]For Lipset's discussion of Canadian-American difference see Continental Divide: The Values and the Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990). See also Kenneth McRae, The Structure of Canadian History," in The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, ed. Louis Hartz (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1964), pp. 219-262; and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 3-57.

[40]For a discussion of the concept of invented traditions see Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in The Invention of Tradition, eds. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-14.

Part I: Building Foundations

Chapter 1: The Business of Benevolence

> Taken as a group, that is, as a whole, the trustees of foundations wield a power in American life which is probably equalled only by the national government itself, and by the executives in our dominant financial and industrial corporations.[1]
>
> -- Eduard Lindeman (1936).

In 1936, when Eduard C. Lindeman published his ground-breaking study of American philanthropy, powerful philanthropic foundations were a relatively recent phenomenon. While wealthy Americans had long been involved in charitable activities, the first philanthropic trusts were only endowed in the period around the turn of the century. These early foundations, moreover, were established to operate in limited spheres and for specific purposes. The original and, until the expansion of the Ford Foundation in the 1950s,[2] the wealthiest, most influential general-purpose foundations, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, were not formed until the second decade of the new century and did not take their modern corporate forms until the early 1920s.[3]

Formed to facilitate "the diffusion of knowledge" and to "promote the well-being of mankind" respectively, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation were

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[1]Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture: A Study of One Hundred Foundations and Community Trusts And Their Operations During the Decade 1921-1930 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1936; reprint ed., New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction, Inc., 1988), p. 33.

[2]The Ford Foundation was founded in 1936, but operated as a small Detroit-based fund until 1951 when Paul Hoffman took over its presidency. Hoffman directed a two year program of grants totalling $100,000,000 which established The Ford Foundation as the giant of foundation philanthropy. For details of this expansion see Dwight Macdonald, The Ford Foundation: The Men and the Millions (New York: Reynal and Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 50-94; and Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 78-88.

[3]Robert Bremner, American Philanthropy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 100-115.

encumbered by few restrictions. Working in concert with each other, as well as with other Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies, including the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the General Education Board, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, these philanthropic trusts played crucial roles in establishing national agendas for reform in areas as diverse as medicine, public welfare, and education. Operating in the place of, or in conjunction with, a federal government that often rejected primary responsibility for these spheres, these private organizations were essential actors in the Progressive-era drive for national organization and rationalization.[4]

In the following chapter I examine the emergence of these two general-purpose foundations as a "'third' force [in American society] located somewhere between the 'public' and the 'private' sectors," to cite Donald Fisher's useful formulation.[5] Influenced by the writings of Antonio Gramsci on cultural hegemony, Fisher suggests that American foundations came to play a mediating role between "political society" (the formal political structures we refer to as the public sector) and "civil society" (in Gramsci's own words, "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'"[6]). It is Fisher's contention, tentatively explored later in this chapter, that the foundations represented the interests of the dominant

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[4]Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere 1890-1930," Minerva 19 (Summer 1981): p. 243; Barry D. Karl, "Philanthropy, Policy Planning, and the Bureaucratization of the Democratic Ideal," Daedalus 105 (Fall 1976): p. 131-132. For a thorough discussion of the administrative capacities of the federal state during this era see Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

[5]"The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony: Rockefeller Foundations and the Social Sciences," Sociology 17 (May 1983): p. 224.

[6]"The Intellectuals: The Formation of Intellectuals," Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 12.

economic group and, through support of universities and research councils, contributed to a process of ideological production designed to "maintain and strengthen the system of capitalist democracy."[7]

I begin by considering the private philanthropy of John D. Rockefeller Sr. and Andrew Carnegie in the later years of the nineteenth century, first discussing Carnegie's views on the stewardship of wealth as he espoused them in his classic statement on philanthropy, "Wealth"(1889), and then turning to what Rockefeller referred to as his "Business of Benevolence." Following this, I discuss three stages in the organization and incorporation of Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropy: the formation of the donors' first philanthropic foundations in the first decade of the twentieth century; the founding of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation in 1911 and 1913 respectively; and the early years of the Corporation and the Foundation -- years marked, in each foundation, by struggles over strategy, focus and organization, culminating in both cases in the consolidation and institutionalization of bureaucratic authority. I conclude the chapter by analyzing the source and nature of foundation power in 1920s America.

In reviewing these stages in the development of Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropy, I am exploring the philosophical underpinnings of the donors' philanthropy, the relationship between their business and philanthropic activities, and the extent and nature of their influence on public policy. Particular emphasis is placed on the foundations' role in the development of national cultural and intellectual infrastructure in the United States. In short, I am exploring the processes that were employed by the industrialists and

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[7]"The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony," p. 224.

their advisers to extend their power and influence beyond the world of production and into the realm of broader social and cultural relations of civil society. As a corollary, this chapter is an examination of the transformation of personal wealth to institutionalized authority.

For students of Canadian cultural history, the early years of Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropy are important ones. To understand fully the function these organizations later served in the structuring of Canadian arts and letters we must first comprehend the agendas set and operational methods established by these early donors and their advisers. To come to terms with the meaning of the American philanthropic factor in the development of Canadian national culture we must understand the space these foundations came to occupy in American political, economic and social structures.

The Gospel of Wealth and the Business of Benevolence

Both Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller Sr. began giving away money almost from the moment they started to accumulate it -- though not nearly at the same rates. In 1868, at the age of thirty-three and already in charge of a small business empire, Carnegie outlined a strategy for philanthropy. In a personal memorandum, Carnegie suggested that he devote all capital beyond an annual personal income of $50,000 -- a figure he felt sure his financial enterprises could support within two years -- to "benovelent [sic] purposes." Business, he declared, should be "cast aside forever...except for others...." "The amassing of wealth," he suggested, "is one of the worst species of idolitary [sic]...."[8]

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[8]Quoted in Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 13.

Despite this declaration, the process of accumulating wealth on an extraordinary scale was, in reality, only beginning for Carnegie when he wrote that memorandum. In 1872, having learned of Henry Bessemer's method for mass-producing steel, Carnegie founded the steel company that, during the next thirty years, evolved into the powerful conglomerate U.S. Steel. Carnegie only followed through on his pledge to retire from his active business career in 1901 when he sold his controlling interest in the company to J.P. Morgan for $492 million.[9]

While Carnegie did not dispense with his wealth as fast as he accumulated it, he continued to refine his ideas on philanthropy and in the last quarter of the nineteenth century began to give away vast quantities of his fortune. In his essay "Wealth," published in the North American Review in 1889 and dubbed "The Gospel of Wealth" by English critic William T. Stead, he spelled out his ideas on wealth and philanthropy.[10] The "duty of the man of wealth," Carnegie asserted, was to "set an example of modest, unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance...." After providing "moderately for the legitimate wants of those dependent upon him,..." he should "consider all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called upon to administer...in the manner which, in his judgment, is best calculated to produce the most beneficial results for the community...."[11]

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[9]Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 32.

[10]The essay was originally published in the North American Review 148 (June 1889): pp. 653-664. It was republished as "The Gospel of Wealth," in Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays, ed. Edward C. Kirkland (Cambridge, Massachussetts: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 14-49. Kirkland credits Stead, the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, with the revision to the title. See The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays, p. 14, n. 1. All further references to Carnegie's essay refer to the edited collection.

[11]Carnegie, "The Gospel of Wealth," p. 25.

Carnegie's rationale for the selection of the "man of wealth" as the "trustee and agent for his poorer brethren" was simple and resonated with the evolutionary thought being popularized by Herbert Spencer in the United States at the time.[12] Spencer, a friend of Carnegie's, combined his belief in liberal individualism with a very selective reading of Darwin to create a vision that powerfully linked material and moral progress.[13] As T.J. Jackson Lears notes, the attraction of Spencer's vision for such a man as Carnegie was rooted in the fact that it placed industrialization at the head of progress and dismissed "the suffering and death of individuals as unimportant, the necessary friction on the high road of progress."[14] In keeping with Spencer's vision, the central point emphasized in the "Gospel of Wealth" was that the accumulation of wealth was essential to the "progress of the race."[15]

Following the teaching of Spencer, Carnegie argued that the holders of wealth were the fittest individuals -- the winners of life's competitive struggle and thus also the possessors of "superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer...." It was logical, part of the evolutionary process, Carnegie argued, that these men should apply the qualities that had allowed them to amass wealth to finding solutions for society's ills, "doing for them [society's less fortunate] better than they would or could do for themselves."[16]

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[12]See Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, revised ed. (New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1959), pp. 31-50.

[13]T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-1920, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 21.

[14]Ibid., p. 21.

[15]E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 30. See also Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made it, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 167.

[16]"The Gospel of Wealth," p. 25. See also Robert Bremner, American Philanthropy, pp. 100-103.

Although he felt that the philanthropist should be restricted only by his better judgement, Carnegie had a recommendation for the wealthy. "Indiscriminate charity," he argued, echoing Spencer, was "one of the serious obstacles to the improvement of our race...."[17] Philanthropists should give in the same systematic manner as they conducted their businesses. Instead of scattering relief amongst the poor, Carnegie proposed the wealthy build "the ladders upon which the aspiring can rise...."[18] The types of "ladders" Carnegie recommended included universities, medical institutions, libraries, parks and other recreational spaces.[19] Helping those who could and would help themselves was the central task in Carnegie's "Gospel."[20]

In his insistence on systematic or scientific giving, Carnegie was reflecting a far broader movement away from charity aimed at temporary amelioration of suffering to more organized giving designed to provide permanent solutions to the riddle of poverty. As Gareth Stedman Jones observes in his study Outcast London, middle and upper-class reformers in London in the last quarter of the nineteenth century became convinced that the disorganized nature of private and public charity was actually accentuating poverty by demoralizing "the honest poor" and encouraging the "clever pauper." To address the problem they attempted to organize charity under a single structure, the Charity

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[17]"The Gospel of Wealth," p. 26.

[18]Ibid., p. 28.

[19]Ibid., pp. 28, 32-44.

[20]See Joseph Frazier Wall, Andrew Carnegie, 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 807-814.

Organisation Society (COS).[21] In Canada and the United States, local and national societies patterned after the COS were created shortly after its formation. Like the London model, these new associations were designed to bring systematic study to the problem of poverty, to coordinate and rationalize the distribution of relief, and, ultimately, to facilitate middle-class social control.[22] While Carnegie was not greatly concerned with the poorest members of society, honest or not, he shared this zeal for systematic reform and social control.

Carnegie's adherence to then-current evolutionary ideology explains his thoughts concerning who should control wealth and which members of society were the most worthy recipients of philanthropy, but it does not reveal why he felt compelled to give in the first place. His ideas about the responsibilities associated with the acquisition of great wealth fit uneasily with Spencer's evolutionary doctrines, at least as they were generally construed. Few social Darwinists shared the opinion expressed in Carnegie's "Gospel" that millionaires were "trustee[s] for the poor," or that graduated inheritance taxes should be instituted to distribute the fortunes of those who refused to do so during their lives.[23] As historian Richard Hofstadter points out, most of Carnegie's fellow robber barons "felt secure in their exploitation and justified in their dominion."[24] According to Carnegie biographer Joseph

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[21]Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship Between the Classes in Victorian Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 241-262.

[22]For a discussion of charity reform in late nineteenth-century United States see Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 21. For a discussion of the same issue in Canada see Mariana Valverde, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Inc., 1991), pp. 159-160.

[23]Wall, Andrew Carnegie, p. 814.

[24]The American Political Tradition, pp. 168-169.

Frazier Wall, the roots of Carnegie's philanthropy predated his business career and lie in his family's radical heritage in Dunfermline, Scotland.

The Carnegie family arrived in the United States in 1848, when Andrew Carnegie was thirteen. To that point, Andrew Carnegie had been, according to Wall, a "child of Chartism," a witness to a political movement for reform led, in Dunfermline, by his uncle Tom Morrison Jr. and by his father William Carnegie. Wall suggests that Carnegie's incredible progress in the business world in the United States raised self-doubts about his faithfulness to his predecessors' campaign for equality. To Carnegie, it seemed likely that he and the class of industrialists he led were actually eroding the foundations of the democratic society his family had found in America. It was Carnegie's quest for "refuge from self-questioning," Wall argues, that was most responsible for the industrialist's entry into the world of philanthropy. His "Gospel of Wealth," it would seem, was an uneasy marriage of his robber baron present and his Chartist past.[25]

Carnegie may also have looked back on his radical heritage as a refuge from a more tangible external threat. As social historians of the late nineteenth century have noted, the period was marked by severe social upheaval. The clash between anarchists and police at Haymarket Square in Chicago in 1886, the Knights of Labor strikes of the same year, and the bitter dispute at Carnegie's Homestead iron works in 1892 were merely the flash-points of the broader social disruptions resulting from working-class response to industrial

[25] Andrew Carnegie, pp. 812-813. See also Wall, "Andrew Carnegie: Child of Chartism," History 4 (May 1961): pp. 153-166.

"progress."[26] It is likely that Carnegie found in his memories of the "honest" craftsmen of Dunfermline fighting the good fight for political equality an answer to what T.J. Jackson Lears refers to as the nation's "crisis of cultural authority."[27] Voluntary support for the construction of "ladders upon which the aspiring can rise" probably struck Carnegie as a desirable alternative to radical class-based reform aimed at fundamentally altering the distribution of wealth and authority in the nation.[28] In a biting but undeniably accurate assessment of Carnegie's philanthropy, written in the aftermath of the Homestead lockout, a writer for Locomotive Firemen's Magazine noted that Carnegie and his steel lieutenant Henry Clay Frick were "brazen pirates [who] prate...of the 'spirit of Christ' [and] who plunder labor that they may build churches, endow universities and found libraries."[29] Indeed, with philanthropy Carnegie could escape his self-doubts and, at the same time, restore aspects of society that the industrialist felt were being eroded by the technical rationality, materialism, and class divisions of industrial capitalism.[30]

Despite the rational and integrated system suggested in the "Gospel of Wealth,"

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[26]David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 2, 36-40, 129.

[27]No Place of Grace, p. 31.

[28]Bremner, American Philanthropy, p. 102.

[29]Locomotive Firemen's Magazine 16 (August 1892), cited in Herbert Gutman, "Protestantism and the American Labor Movement: The Christian Spirit in the Gilded Age," in Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrial America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 104.

[30]I am not suggesting that Carnegie was afflicted with the same anti-modern zeal that the subjects of Lears's study were. It is likely, given his habit of referring to his childhood years in Scotland and his later philanthropic focus on his home town, however, that in Carnegie's mind Dunfermline served as a sort of pre-modern Utopia which was juxtaposed with the real world he ruled over.

Carnegie's private philanthropy followed no clear plan or strategy. He instead followed his heart and his mind and gave idiosyncratically to causes that struck him as worthy. As one historian has put it, "Carnegie's philanthropy was a mixture of moralistic programs to civilize the masses, impulsive decisions, and sentimentality."[31] Before the publication of "Wealth," he had already given a library and swimming pool to his home town of Dunfermline, a library to Braddock, Pennsylvania, and a pipe organ to the Swedenborgian Church in Allegheny, Pennsylvania, his family attended in the 1850s. His one gift to higher education in this early period was a small grant to the Western University of Pennsylvania (later the University of Pittsburgh).[32] In the years following the publication of his declaration on philanthropy, Carnegie's giving accelerated substantially, but remained scattered. By 1907, still four years before the founding of the Carnegie Corporation, Andrew Carnegie had given over $40 million to over 1,600 public libraries in the United States and Canada.[33] To schools, colleges, and universities he gave between $15 and $20 million. And asserting his affection for church music, he gave $6.25 million to buy organs for over 7,000 churches.[34] The scattered and personal nature of philanthropy continued even after the formation of the Carnegie Corporation. It was not until Carnegie's death in 1919 that Carnegie philanthropy truly began to operate on a more strategic basis. To understand the next stage in the

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[31]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 32.

[32]Wall, Andrew Carnegie, p. 815.

[33]Barbara Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920: Origins, Issues, and Outcomes," in Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad, ed. Robert F. Arnove (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 31.

[34]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 19-20.

development of scientific philanthropy one has to look at the ideas and actions of the other great philanthropist of the time, John D. Rockefeller Sr., and of the architect of his philanthropic plan, Frederick Gates.[35]

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John D. Rockefeller Sr. was no less convinced than Carnegie that industrial capitalism was the engine driving social progress. His confidence in this position was sustained by the combined influence of Christian and evolutionary thought. He revealed both in an address to a Sunday-school audience:

> The growth of a large business is merely a survival of the fittest....The American Beauty rose can be produced in the splendour and fragrance which bring cheer to its beholder only by sacrificing the early buds which grow up around it. This is not an evil tendency in business. It is merely the working-out of a law of nature and a law of God.[36]

Rockefeller, moreover, was convinced not only of the necessity, righteousness, and inevitability of industrial capitalism, but also of his place in this natural and moral order. He noted in 1905 that "my money is a gift from God," and that "it is my duty to make money and still more money and to use the money...for the good of my fellow man according to the dictates of my conscience."[37]

As was the case with Andrew Carnegie, Rockefeller's days as a philanthropist began

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[35]Judith Sealander, Private Wealth and Public Life: Foundation Philanthropy and the Reshaping of American Social Policy from the Progressive Era to the New Deal (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 17.

[36]Cited in Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, p. 45.

[37]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 33.

when he received his first pay check. As a clerk in Cleveland earning $6 per month, Rockefeller gave 6% of his income to his church. As his income grew so too did his philanthropy. In 1865, at the age of 26, his annual philanthropic expenditures exceeded $1,000, and by the close of the decade he was giving almost $6,000 annually.[38] Reflecting his religious motivations, most of his early giving was directed to Baptist interests.

Given his philanthropic record and his commitment to "building ladders" of his own -- the most impressive of these being the University of Chicago, which he helped found with a $600,000 grant in 1889 -- it was not surprising that Rockefeller was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Carnegie's "Gospel." Writing Carnegie shortly after the publication of "Wealth," Rockefeller noted, "the time will come when men of wealth will more generally be willing to use it for the good of others."[39] Writing much later, Rockefeller applauded Carnegie's "enthusiasm for using his wealth for the benefit of his less fortunate fellows," and noted that "his devotion to his adopted land's welfare has set a striking example for all time."[40]

The question for both men was not whether to give but, rather, how to give. Echoing sentiments expressed by Carnegie in "Wealth," Rockefeller later noted that, by 1890, he had become frustrated with his own "haphazard fashion of giving here and there as

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[38]Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 4.

[39]Ibid., p. 6.

[40]John D. Rockefeller, "The Benevolent Trust--The Value of the Cooperative Principle in Giving," in Random Reminiscences of Men and Events (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1909), p. 166.

appeals presented themselves."[41] Proposing more coherent and rational strategies for philanthropy, Rockefeller asserted that it was the philanthropist's duty to ignore "the impulses of emotion..." and to approach his work "from a more scientific standpoint."[42] And like Carnegie, he had little interest in simple charity. To Rockefeller, the "fundamental thing" was education. "If the people can be educated to help themselves," he argued, "we strike at the root of many of the evils of the world."[43]

In 1889, finding that the intense investigation he felt was required in the search for causes worthy of his beneficence was consuming as much time and energy as was the growth of his substantial business empire, Rockefeller hired Baptist minister Frederick T. Gates to supervise his philanthropic interests. In the final decade of the nineteenth century Gates, working with Rockefeller, developed what he referred to as his "principles of scientific giving."[44]

Essential to Gates's and Rockefeller's philosophy of philanthropy was recognition of the need for scientific research and for the type of structures required to support such research. The goal of the philanthropist, as Gates and Rockefeller saw it, was to unearth the "underlying conditions" responsible for society's problems.[45] The types of scientific research envisioned by Rockefeller and Gates required the development of research facilities,

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[41]Rockefeller, "The Difficult Art of Giving," in Random Reminiscences, p. 156.

[42]Ibid., p. 147.

[43]Ibid., p. 152.

[44]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, pp. 6-7. See also, Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920," pp. 27-28; and Neilsen, The Big Foundations, p. 48.

[45]Rockefeller, "The Difficult Art of Giving," pp. 146-147.

organizations and institutions. The shining example of Rockefeller's early interest in research and research institutions was the continued financial support he provided to the University of Chicago in the years following its establishment.

To Gates and Rockefeller, moreover, it was imperative that both donors and receivers be organized on a corporate scale. Scientific giving necessarily required more time, energy and intelligence than an individual or even a small group of individuals possessed. As Rockefeller questioned rhetorically, "if a combination to do business is effective in saving waste and in getter better results, why is not combination far more important in philanthropic work?"[46]

By the end of the nineteenth century the two men had settled on the idea of the foundation as the particular corporate form best suited to establish philanthropy on a rational and efficient basis. Writing in his memoirs, Gates later noted that, given the "scandalous results" and the "powerful tendencies to social demoralization" that accompanied the inheritance of other great estates, "I saw no other course but for Mr. Rockefeller and his son to form a series of great philanthropies...philanthropies, if possible, limitless in time and amount, broad in scope, and self-perpetuating."[47]

Rockefeller, too, spoke of "Benevolent Trusts" -- organizations designed to "applaud and sustain the effective workers and institutions" and to lift "the intelligent standard of good work in helping all the people chiefly to help themselves." The "directorates of these

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[46]Rockefeller, "The Benevolent Trust--The Value of the Cooperative Principle in Giving," p. 165.

[47]"The Memoirs of Frederick T. Gates," American Heritage 6 (April 1955): p. 80, quoted in Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy," p. 28.

trusts," Rockefeller suggested to other wealthy Americans, would eventually be staffed by "men who not only know how to make money, but who accept the great responsibility of administering it wisely...." "Let us erect a foundation, a Trust," he exhorted, "and engage directors who will make it a life work to manage, with our personal cooperation, this business of benevolence properly and effectively."[48]

The Incorporation of Philanthropy

During the first decade of the twentieth-century both Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller Sr. retired from active supervision of their business empires and devoted their energies to philanthropy. Ushering in what Dwight Macdonald refers to as the "golden, heroic age of American philanthropy" the two industrial giants established numerous trusts and institutions bearing their names.[49] Reflecting his varied interests, Carnegie established the Carnegie Institution of Washington (1902), the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission (1904), the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1905), and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1910). Concentrating his attention on areas he felt most in need of support, including medical research, public health and higher education, Rockefeller created the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research (1901), The General Education Board (1903), and the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (1909).

Looking back over the history of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1951, Raymond

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[48]Rockefeller, "The Benevolent Trust--The Value of the Cooperative Principle in Giving," pp. 186-188.

[49]Macdonald, The Ford Foundation, p. 45.

Fosdick, president of the foundation from 1936 to 1948, observed that, for the Rockefellers[50] and Gates, this early trust-building phase was "in a certain sense preparatory."[51] While Fosdick's reminiscences are open to the charge of reading the past from the perspective of the present, there is no doubt that both Carnegie and Rockefeller used these early organizations as testing grounds for various organizational structures and as mechanisms for the recruitment of the sort of professional philanthropoids who could be trusted to administrate their "business[es] of benevolence."[52]

Recruited from the highest echelons of American society for the purpose of organizing Carnegie's and Rockefeller's first trusts were men such as Henry Pritchett, former president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Carnegie's appointee as first President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching; Elihu Root, Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904, Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909, U.S. Senator from 1909 to 1915 and Carnegie's personal lawyer and trustee for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Dr. Simon Flexner, professor of Pathology at the University of Pennsylvania before being chosen as the Director of the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research; Baptist clergyman Wallace Buttrick, first president of the General Education Board; and Dr. Wickliffe Rose, professor of philosophy at Peabody College and the first head of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission. Collectively, these individuals formed a leadership cadre -- an elite, private class of bureaucrats -- which at the beginning of the

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[50]John D. Rockefeller Jr. joined his father's staff after graduating from Brown University in 1897.

[51]The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 11.

[52]Nielsen, The Big Foundations, p. 49.

second decade of the twentieth century was called upon to help Carnegie and Rockefeller give form to their greatest philanthropic ventures, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. By the early 1920s these men had shaped the two trusts as much, and in some cases more, than had the original donors. Well situated in the political, intellectual, and social power structures of the United States, these men also served as models for future generations of philanthropic leaders.

For Carnegie, Rockefeller, and the members of the managerial elite they were in the process of creating, the end point in philanthropy's evolutionary cycle was the general-purpose foundation -- a fund, as Carnegie would have it, tied to no "fixed cause" and administered by trustees "to meet the requirements of the time."[53] The formations of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation in 1911 and 1913 respectively, however, marked only the beginning of this final evolutionary stage. The charters of the two trusts provided only the vaguest of frameworks for the organizations. The Carnegie Corporation was mandated to "promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding among the peoples of the United States."[54] The mandate of the Rockefeller Foundation, drafted by Gates in the broadest and most inclusive terms, similarly offered few solid guides to the trustees. The purpose of the Foundation, as stipulated in its charter, was to "promote the well-being of mankind throughout the world."[55] In both cases it would take the donors and their hand-picked staffs a number of years to refine these trusts into the

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[53]Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920," p. 32.

[54]Stephen H. Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program 1911-1961 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1963), p. 3.

[55]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 20.

models of scientific philanthropy they were later to become. The early years of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation were marked by false starts, changes in direction, and internal debates over goals, strategies and operating procedures.

The Carnegie Corporation: The Early Years

Ironically, the founding of the Carnegie Corporation initially had little qualitative impact on the broader direction of Carnegie philanthropy. Henry Pritchett, who had transformed the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching from a simple professorial pension fund into an agency that, with Rockefeller's General Education Board, virtually created a comprehensive national university system, later noted, "when Mr. Carnegie formed the Carnegie Corporation, he simply incorporated himself."[56] Under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation, Carnegie's community library program continued, as did support for the provision of church organs, technical education and medical education. Moreover, most early Corporation grants were made to other Carnegie agencies -- not surprisingly, considering its Board of Trustees was dominated by the heads of these organizations. As two of the leading authorities on American philanthropic foundations have noted, Carnegie and his trustees initially operated the Corporation "as a holding company of sorts to manage and supply the others [Carnegie philanthropies], not as an

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[56]Pritchett to Frederick P. Keppel, 4 January 1935, Carnegie Corporation files, quoted in Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 22. For detailed discussions of the General Education Board, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching and the creation of a national university system, see Merle Curti and Roderick Nash, Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 212-237; and Clyde W. Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894-1928 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 60-94.

independent fund with an independent set of purposes."[57]

Carnegie's failing health and then his death in 1919 provided opportunities for Corporation trustees such as Pritchett and Elihu Root to alter the organization's course. Pritchett, in particular, felt that the complexity of the social dilemmas faced by modern industrial society required more scientific solutions than the simple self-help philosophy that underpinned Carnegie's strategy for philanthropy.[58] Simply put, the men who succeeded Carnegie as the Corporation's president during a short but highly significant phase of its history[59] sought to position the trust as a primary force in what Ellen Condliffe Lagemann calls "the Politics of Knowledge." As Progressive-era proponents of more rational and assertive public administration -- scientific management applied to all fields, not the least being the business of governing the nation -- Root, James Rowland Angell, Pritchett and their supporters on the Corporation's Board of Trustees threw the full force of the Carnegie Corporation behind individuals, agencies, and institutions that could provide the United States with the scientific expertise they felt was required for governing a complex modern society.

The clearest indication of the Corporation's altered course was the demise of Carnegie's beloved community library program. Commissioned by Pritchett to make a report on the program in 1915, Alvin Johnson, a professor of economics at Cornell University and a consultant, at the time, for the Carnegie Endowment for International

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[57]Karl and Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundation and the Public Sphere 1890-1930," p. 264; and Curti and Nash, Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education, p. 223.

[58]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 23.

[59]Root (1919-1920), James Rowland Angell (1920-1921), and Pritchett (acting President, 1921-23).

Peace, recommended that the Corporation be more discriminating in its grant-making. In contrast to Carnegie's open-ended approach, Johnson recommended that the Corporation support only the most efficient models of library service. Johnson further advised the trustees that training library personnel was of more value to the future of library services than was the haphazard provision of buildings for community libraries.[60]

Johnson's findings were opposed vociferously by Carnegie Corporation trustee James Bertram who felt, justifiably it would seem, that Johnson's recommendations for a more regulatory role for the Corporation were not in keeping with Carnegie's desire that communities be free to manage Carnegie libraries as they saw fit. In consequence, the report was not immediately endorsed by the trustees. It was not long, however, before Johnson's principal recommendations were enacted. Citing the emergency created by war as the reason, the Corporation temporarily suspended all grants for library building projects in 1917.[61]

The end of the war did not bring with it the re-establishment of the library program. When the Carnegie Corporation returned to the library field in 1926 it was in a manner consistent with Johnson's views. Following prescriptions established in Johnson's report and in subsequent Carnegie Corporation reports[62] the Corporation embarked on a ten-year program of grants totalling over $4 million to improve the training of library personnel, to

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[60]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 26.

[61]Ibid.

[62]William S. Learned, The American Public Library and the Diffusion of Knowledge (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1923); and Charles C. Williamson Training for Library Service (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1923).

support photographic reproductions of records and to increase the size of library collections at the nation's colleges and universities. The program's most noteworthy single achievement was the creation of a new library school at the University of Chicago. By thus emphasizing the training of elite personnel and future leaders in the library profession, and by enhancing the research capacities of academic libraries, the Corporation was focusing on very different social strata than Carnegie himself had targeted with his community library programs. The professional intellectual (and not the honest craftsman or the worthy community) was the beneficiary of this thoroughly modern program.[63]

The shift in the Corporation's library policy was symbolic of broader changes taking place in its programs and policies. Around the time of James Rowland Angell's selection as Corporation President in 1920, the trust made a series of grants to research institutions, research-coordinating agencies and professional associations. Included in this program were substantial grants to the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, the National Bureau of Economic Research, Stanford University's Food Research Institute, the American Law Institute, and the Institute of Economics (which later merged with the Institute for Government Research and the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government to become the Brookings Institution).[64] In funding these organizations, the Carnegie Corporation contributed to the creation of an infrastructure of private institutions which, by fostering research and training expert personnel, in turn served,

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[63]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 112-115. See also Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1935 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1935), pp. 16-19.

[64]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1933 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1933), pp. 18-19.

in Lagemann's words, to expand "the nation's governing capacities...without concentrating power in the elected government."[65]

The Rockefeller Foundation: The Early Years

Unlike Andrew Carnegie, who sold his interest in U.S. Steel to J.P. Morgan in 1901, members of the Rockefeller family were still directly involved in the business of accumulation when John D. Rockefeller Sr. embarked on his most substantial philanthropic venture. Controversy over the relationship between the Rockefeller business and philanthropic empires not only delayed the formal incorporation of the Rockefeller Foundation and marred the early years of its existence, but also left an indelible print on the long-term development of Foundation programs and policies.

The political debate was touched off in March, 1910 when a bill to incorporate The Rockefeller Foundation was introduced to the U.S. Senate. The Rockefellers may have been expecting a relatively safe passage for the bill. The charter for the Foundation was, after all, nearly identical to that of the General Education Board, which had received federal sanction seven years earlier, and the bill, if passed, would have given Congress some jurisdiction over the activities of the Foundation.[66]

Progress was not as smooth for the Foundation. Ida Tarbell's "History of the Standard Oil Company," serialized in McClure's Magazine from 1902 to 1904, both

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[65]Politics of Knowledge, p. 49.

[66]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, pp. 16-17.

contributed to and symbolized the public hostility towards economic concentration in general and to the Rockefeller name in particular.[67] At the time, the Rockefeller brain-trust was seeking incorporation for the Foundation, the national government, reacting to public pressure, was in the last phases of a legal campaign to dissolve Rockefeller's Standard Oil trust. In the minds of several influential congressmen and of key members of the Taft administration, it was difficult to distinguish between the dangers attending concentrations of wealth in business and those in philanthropy. Attorney General George W. Wickersham attacked the idea of the Foundation as "an indefinite scheme for perpetuating vast wealth." In reply to Wickersham's comments, President William Howard Taft himself referred to the Rockefeller request as "the proposed act to incorporate John D. Rockefeller."[68]

After three years and several substantial attempts to make the Foundation's charter more palatable to federal legislators, the Rockefeller group redirected its efforts and sought a charter from the New York state legislature in Albany. Thus it was on 14 May 1913 the Rockefeller Foundation was incorporated by the state of New York. Significantly, revisions to its charter earlier proposed in attempts to woo congressional support and which would have placed the Foundation at least partially under public control were omitted in the state charter.[69]

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[67]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 170.

[68]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 18. Also cited in Bremner, American Philanthropy, p. 113.

[69]Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920," p. 48.

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Raymond Fosdick, president of the Rockefeller Foundation from 1936 to 1948, later noted that, during its first years, the Foundation was "groping its way towards a program."[70] Indeed, its earliest grants were scattered amongst a diverse group of recipients which included a bird refuge in Louisiana, the American Academy in Rome, the Palisades Interstate Park, Wellesley College, and the Rockefeller Institute. While the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 almost immediately provided the Foundation with a temporary focus of activity (from the beginning of the war to its end the Foundation spent over $22,000,000 on various war relief measures) it did little to hasten the establishment of permanent programs and policies. George E. Vincent, appointed president of the Foundation in 1917, later observed that the war work, though essential, came at the expense "of the creative job we could have done with that money in a world of reason and sanity."[71]

In keeping with the principles of scientific philanthropy, the leaders of the Foundation were seeking strategies and focuses that would establish precedents for future operations. In their quest to establish a role in society for the Foundation, the Rockefellers, like Carnegie and his advisers, attempted to build on the strengths of previous philanthropic ventures. Accordingly, the Foundation's first Board of Trustees was dominated by veterans of Rockefeller philanthropy, including John D. Rockefeller Jr., the first president of the Foundation; Gates, still the Rockefellers' chief lieutenant on philanthropy; Jerome D.

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[70]The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 25.

[71]Ibid., p. 28.

Greene, a long-time Rockefeller adviser, trustee of the Rockefeller Institute, and the first executive secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation; and Dr. Wickliffe Rose, the head of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission.

Not surprisingly, moreover, the Foundation's first programs represented expansions of earlier Rockefeller projects. In an attempt to capitalize and expand on the success of the Sanitary Commission's campaign to eradicate hookworm in the southern United States, the trustees established the International Health Commission as a division of the new Foundation. With Rose as its first Director, the commission was charged with the task of extending "to other countries and peoples the work of eradicating hookworm disease." In the interests of establishing long-term solutions, the new Health Commission established agencies in other nations to promote sound public health policies and to disseminate knowledge of scientific medicine. With similar intent, the trustees also established the China Medical Board in order to promote and implement a "comprehensive system of modern medicine" in China.[72]

The war was not the only obstacle to establishing long-term programs and policies based on the principles of scientific philanthropy. The "groping" process Fosdick later referred to could not end until the leaders of the Foundation discovered procedures and strategies that enhanced the Foundation's influence over society and, at the same time, deflected public concern over that influence. While initiatives promoting international public health moved the Foundation a long way in these directions, the trustees' next area of

[72]The China Medical Board, vol. 1, app. 2, p. 357. Cited in Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 25.

focus, industrial relations, only exacerbated concerns about the relationship between the Foundation and the Rockefeller family's financial empire. The international public health policy not only aided capitalist accumulation by improving the health of workers, it was, more importantly, used as an ideological "wedge" to integrate foreign populations into the world of industrial capitalism.[73] This motivation, however, was not immediately apparent to members of the general public. A clarification of public perceptions of the particular social agenda would await the Foundation's foray into industrial relations.

Philanthropy Under Fire: The Rockefeller Foundation, Industrial Relations and William Lyon Mackenzie King

The trustees' decision in the summer of 1914 to use the machinery of the new Rockefeller Foundation to conduct research in industrial relations was made in response to a bitter labour dispute taking place in the coal fields of southern Colorado. In this dispute, miners organized by the United Mine Workers squared off against mine operators led by the managers of the Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. The conflict peaked on 20 April 1914 when members of the state militia, acting in support of the mining companies, set fire to the Ludlow tent colony, which was occupied by striking miners and their families. In what became known as the "Ludlow Massacre," several men, women and children were either shot or suffocated.[74]

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[73]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, pp. 117-132.

[74]The most thorough discussion of the strike and "Ludlow Massacre" is H.M. Gitelman, Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre: A Chapter in American Industrial Relations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988).

Throughout the strike and particularly in the aftermath of the "Massacre," the Rockefellers were the focus of public criticism for their role in the conflict. Despite John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s claim of innocence as an absentee landlord, it was well known that local managers Jesse Welborn and Lamont Bowers were long-time Rockefeller agents and that several Rockefeller insiders served on the Board of Trustees of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. As the public later discovered when the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations, chaired by Frank P. Walsh, released correspondence it had subpoenaed to the press, Rockefeller officials in New York had been instrumental in developing the tactics employed by management during the conflict.[75]

In an effort both to find a solution to the crisis in Colorado and to control the damage inflicted on the Rockefeller reputation, the Rockefeller brain-trust turned to former Canadian labour minister and future prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King. King, recommended by his former professor, Harvard President and Foundation trustee Charles W. Eliot, had already developed a reputation as a moderate labour reformer who favoured mediation of industrial conflict and recognized the importance of collective bargaining, but who also had contempt for strikes for union recognition.[76] King's crowning achievement at this point in his career, at least as far as most Americans were concerned, was his authorship

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[75]Sheila Slaughter and Edward T. Silva, "Looking Backwards: How Foundations Formulated Ideology in the Progressive Period," in Arnove, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism, pp. 71-73.

[76]For a summary of King's record in the Canadian Department of Labour see Paul Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire': Industrial Relations and the Canadian State 1900-1911 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 208-240; and David Jay Bercuson, introduction to Industry and Humanity, by William Lyon Mackenzie King (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. x. Stephen Scheinberg discusses Rockefeller interest in King's work in "Rockefeller and King: The Capitalist and the Reformer," in Mackenzie King: Widening the Debate, eds. John English and J.O. Stubbs (Toronto: The MacMillan Company of Canada, 1977), p. 92.

of the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act (IDIA) of 1907.[77]

In what, by later Foundation standards, would be considered an improper mingling of resources and objectives, King was employed by both the Rockefeller family as a labour consultant and by the Rockefeller Foundation to conduct a broad, scientific study of "Industrial Relations to Promote Industrial Peace." The trustees believed that politicians and public alike could be convinced that, in his capacity as director of this project, King was returning to his academic roots as an independent and objective social scientist or, at very least, that he would draw on his experience as a labour minister and mediator in Canada and represent the public as an "impartial umpire" in this conflict between labour and capital.[78]

The result of King's employment as a company trouble-shooter was the Industrial Representation Plan of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. The scheme, accepted by management in the summer of 1915, was endorsed by an employee vote in September 1915. It included corporate welfare measures, codified grievance procedures, an employee bill of rights, and called for the creation of joint management-labour councils. As Canadian labour historian David J. Bercuson observes, the Colorado Plan offered workers "an illusion of democracy...unsupported by any substantial share in the process of making key decisions."[79]

The significance of King's plan stretched far beyond the coal fields of Colorado. By

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[77]For a thorough description of the IDIA see Craven, 'An Impartial Umpire', pp. 279-317. American interest in the Canadian IDIA was such that King was asked in April 1914 to testify before the Walsh Commission. King's testimony appears in U.S. Congress, Senate, Industrial Relations, Final Report and Testimony Submitted to Congress by the Commission on Industrial Relations, S. Doc. 415, 64th Cong., 1st sess., 1916, vol. 1, pp. 713-718, 732-738.

[78]Slaughter and Silva, "Looking Backwards: How Foundations Formulated Ideology in the Progressive Period," p. 72.

[79]"Introduction" to Industry and Humanity, p. xi.

the end of the First World War politicians and capitalists, inconvenienced by a staggering loss of man-days due to strikes, and fearful that the Bolshevik revolution might be repeated on North American soil, saw in King's Colorado Plan a possible middle ground between the iron-fisted labour management techniques of the nineteenth century and the type of industrial democracy pursued by the more radical unions. The plan became a model for company unionism and was, in various forms, endorsed by such corporations as General Electric, Standard Oil, and International Harvester.[80] Historian Stephen Scheinberg notes that King, more than a mere labour consultant, played the role of the reformer who in a moment of crisis of capitalism helped reform an "older ideological structure [which had] proved inadequate to provide either pragmatic solutions or [to] generate consent." Acting as a "ruling class intellectual," Scheinberg continues, King "worked within the limits of the system, supplying ideas and criticism, making it more functional in a changing social context, resulting in the exercise of corporate power becoming more generally acceptable."[81]

The broadly-based scientific study King was commissioned to direct for the Rockefeller Foundation, on the other hand, was never conducted. Once the managers and the miners endorsed his employee representation plan and peace was restored, King and his employers in New York quickly lost interest in the study. Instead of producing a fully developed scientific report, King concluded this phase of his work for the Rockefeller Foundation with the publication of Industry and Humanity in 1918.[82] Based, for the most

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[80]Scheinberg, "Rockefeller and King: The Capitalist and the Reformer," p. 94; and Bercuson, introduction to Industry and Humanity, pp. xi-xii.

[81]"Rockefeller and King: The Capitalist and the Reformer," pp. 101-102.

[82]New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1918.

part, on King's personal experiences, the volume was a highly idiosyncratic philosophical statement on the causes and solutions of industrial conflict. Members of the Rockefeller brain-trust uniformly damned King's work with faint praise.[83]

In reality, the Rockefeller Foundation's retreat from research in industrial relations had little to do with King or the nature of his study and had much to do with the public and political hostility to Rockefeller power. The focus on industrial relations, by early 1915, had become an albatross around the Foundation's neck. Several federal inquiries, the most noteworthy being the U.S. Commission on Industrial Relations chaired by Senator Frank P. Walsh, questioned the nature of Rockefeller Foundation interest in the subject. Not surprisingly, critics like Walsh suspected a collusion of business and philanthropic objectives and publicly charged that King's work for the Rockefeller Foundation, far from being objective and scientific, was an attempt to whitewash the Rockefellers' role in events in Colorado.[84]

In January 1915, the Walsh Commission moved its hearings from Colorado to New York City to conduct a special session on the "Centralization of Industrial Control and the operation of Philanthropic Foundations." Members of the general public, Walsh stated in his announcement of the session, feared "the creation of the Rockefeller and other foundations was the beginning of an effort to perpetuate the present position of predatory wealth through the corruption of sources of public information."[85] Investigating all of the

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[83]Gitelman, Legacy of the Ludlow Massacre, pp. 257-262.

[84]Slaughter and Silva, "Looking Backwards: How Foundations Formulated Ideology in the Progressive Period," p. 68.

[85]New York Times, 2 December 1914, p. 12, quoted in Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy,

major philanthropic organizations and interviewing most major donors, the Walsh Commission quickly focused attention on the activities of the Rockefellers.

Walsh and his fellow commissioners were concerned, in particular, about the effect on democracy if research on critical social issues -- such as King's study of industrial relations -- was funded by the nation's richest citizens. The possibility of objective social science funded by the most powerful free market forces seemed, to many, to be remote at best. After months of often bitter debate between the commissioners and representatives of the foundations, the Walsh Commission tabled its eleven-volume, 11,224 page report to Congress. Included, along with its recommendations on labour-related issues, was a section titled "the concentration of wealth and influence." Labelling the large general-purpose foundations, such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, "menace[s]" to American democracy, the report recommended that these institutions be strictly monitored and regulated by Congress. To balance the power of the great foundations, the commissioners further recommended that the state itself greatly increase expenditures on social services and research.[86]

The Entrenchment of Corporate Philanthropy: The Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation and Production of Cultural Hegemony in the United States

In the aftermath of the Walsh Commission's report, no legal restrictions were placed

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1900-1920," pp. 34-35.

[86]Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920," pp. 46-47.

on the power of philanthropic foundations, nor was state funding increased as a public counterbalance to private power. In fact, shortly after the tabling of the report and because of several factors related to American involvement in the First World War, public attitudes towards the foundations began to shift. In addition to the $22 million provided by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation gave almost $4 million for various European emergency relief programs.[87] More significant, in terms of the future structure of the national political culture and of the space foundations would soon come to occupy in that culture, was the depth and breadth of the involvement of businessmen and their associates in the war-time bureaucracies created to manage mobilization.[88] Included in the migration of members of the north-eastern social and business elite to government service during the war were most, if not all, of the administrators and trustees of the foundations. Occupying important positions in war-time boards and councils were such men as future foundation leaders Raymond Fosdick; Frederick P. Keppel, Carnegie Corporation President from 1923 to 1941; and Beardsley Ruml, Director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial from 1922 to 1929. In serving their country, Fosdick, Keppel, Ruml and scores of others also paved the way for the emergence in the 1920s of what historians have labelled the "Associative State" -- a state that met the requirements, first, of the war effort and, later, of governing a modern industrial nation by welcoming and, indeed, relying on the resources

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[87]Ernest Victor Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p. 33.

[88]Karl and Katz, "American Private Foundations 1890-1930," p. 251. For the involvement of American businessmen in war administration see Robert Cuff, The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During World War I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

of private power.[89]

Thus, on the strength of the government service of key administrators and due to the goodwill won by humanitarian relief programs -- programs that stand out as anomalies in the histories of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundations -- the great foundations survived their difficult infancies and emerged from the war virtually unscathed and firmly entrenched in the power structures of the nation.[90] Early critiques did, however, contribute to internal reforms within the trusts. For the leaders of the foundations, the findings of the Walsh Commission and the public reaction to the Commission's hearings made it abundantly clear that it was essential that the personal, financial, and ideological interests of the donors and their associates be well hidden from public view.

In the case of the Carnegie Corporation this was not difficult. Andrew Carnegie had long since made good on his early commitment to retire from the corporate world. And, as was discussed earlier in this chapter, the Carnegie Corporation was, by the time the Walsh Commission tabled its report, already undergoing a process of bureaucratization that was distancing the organization from Carnegie's personal interests and control.

For the Rockefeller brain-trust, the critique led, almost immediately, to revisions in programs, policies, and modes of operation. Smarting from the backlash that had resulted from the Foundation's foray into industrial relations, for the best part of the following decade the trustees restricted the organization's activities to less controversial subjects such

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[89]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 29-30. See also James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal and the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

[90]Howe, "The Emergence of Scientific Philanthropy, 1900-1920," pp. 47-48.

as medical education, public health, and agriculture.[91] This did not mean, however, that the Rockefellers and their advisers on philanthropy were leaving the field of social research. Instead, support for this research was channelled through the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) which was created in October 1918 in memory of John D. Rockefeller Sr.'s wife. The LSRM was designed to carry out its work with as little publicity as possible. Annual reports were kept to a minimum and grants were deliberately not publicised.[92] The Rockefeller Foundation only returned to a direct relationship with the social sciences when, in January 1928, the LSRM was incorporated into the Foundation as its new Division of Social Science.

In another effort to distance Rockefeller philanthropy from the interests of the family -- to create the appearance of disinterestedness -- the decision was made fundamentally to alter the relationship between Rockefeller trusts and researchers. Following the example set by the Carnegie Corporation, the trustees decided to dispense funds to intermediary organizations which in turn developed policies to foster research.

Thus, by the 1920s, the transformation from private giving to corporate philanthropy was more or less complete. Haphazard giving had been replaced by the type of scientific philanthropy both Andrew Carnegie and John Rockefeller Sr. had been describing and prescribing since the turn of the century. As historian E. Richard Brown observes, although Carnegie and Rockefeller thought "they understood the need to take more control over

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[91] Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 27. Fisher, "The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony," p. 209.

[92] Martin and Joan Bulmer, "Philanthropy and Social Science in the 1920s: Beardsley Ruml and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, 1922-29," Minerva 19 (Autumn 1981): pp. 381-382.

social institutions, they did not understand how."[93] Where the donors and their small bands of advisers once directed the flow of grants to favoured individuals, causes and institutions, complex bureaucracies staffed by professional administrators now reconciled the interests of the philanthropists with those of recipients.[94] Members of the new managerial elite, who by the 1920s controlled corporate philanthropy, shared the original donors' concern for maintaining the present social relations of production and were distanced enough from the day-to-day concerns of accumulation to pursue this goal over the long term. Scattered philanthropy had truly been transformed into the "Business of Benevolence."

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Although by no means the only field to receive foundation support, higher education was the principal target for foundation attention in the years following the First World War.[95] From the war's end to the beginning of the Great Depression, the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, along with such other Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies such as the General Education Board, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, were involved in a massive campaign to reform the structure of higher education in the United States. Of the over $800,000,000 existing in college and university endowment funds in the

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[93]Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 52.

[94]Karl and Katz, "The American Private Philanthropic Foundations and the Public Sphere," p. 251; and Karl, "Philanthropy, Policy Planning, and the Bureaucratization of the Democratic Ideal," p. 140.

[95]Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education, pp. 122-126; and Eduard C. Lindeman, Wealth and Culture, pp. 24-28.

United States in 1937, about two-thirds, or an estimated $660,000,000, was generated by foundation grants.[96] In the words of Frederick T. Gates, the goal of this campaign was "not merely to encourage higher education in the United States, but...mainly to contribute, as far as may be, toward reducing our higher education to something like an orderly and comprehensive system."[97]

In keeping with the principles of scientific philanthropy, and following the policies established by the General Education Board and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in the first two decades of the twentieth century, Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies concentrated support in a small network of institutions. Although foundation support from 1902 to 1934 was dispersed among 310 institutions (of approximately 1000 in the United States) almost 75% of this funding was directed to just twenty elite schools.[98]

Early preference was shown to such private institutions as the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, Harvard, Yale, Princeton and Stanford. With general strategies of promoting the creation of an integrated national network, however, both Carnegie and

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[96]Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education, p. 287.

[97]Quoted in Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State, p. 82.

[98]Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education, pp. 44, 275. Hollis's figures represent all foundation support, not merely support from Carnegie and Rockefeller sources. Hollis (p. 204) also states, however, that Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies, including the General Education Board, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation were, by far, the largest contributors, estimating that these organizations provided about three-quarters of foundation support for higher education in the United States during these years. Citing Palmer O. Johnson, "Educational Research and Statistics: The Benefactions of Philanthropic Foundations and Who Receive Them," School and Society, 45 (1937), pp. 661-664, Curti and Nash note that 86% of the foundation grants from the five largest foundations went to thirty-six schools. See Philanthropy in the Shaping of Higher Education, p. 222.

Rockefeller programs were expanded to include support of regional centers, including such public schools as the University of North Carolina and the University of Iowa.

Initially, foundation support came in the form of large bloc grants to the general endowment funds of the recipient institutions. This approach extended the influence of the foundations in a number of ways. Large grants to "model" institutions -- "centers of excellence" -- influenced developments not only at the recipient institution, but also at other institutions where administrators attempted to emulate the successful candidates in hope of winning the foundations' support. Endowment grants had the added advantage of appearing to be "without strings," though this fiction only thinly disguised the efforts made by university administrators to win favour and thus grants from the foundations.[99]

Also in the interests of building American research infrastructure Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies -- principally the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial -- underwrote the creation and long-term operating costs of research councils in a range of academic disciplines. Such organizations as the National Research Council, the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Social Science Research Council -- all founded after 1915 -- relied almost solely on foundation support both for the costs of basic operation and for aid-to-scholarship programs. For individual American scholars -- particularly for those in the humanities and the social sciences -- research council subsidies for graduate fellowships, publication, scholarly journals, and conferences were the first of their kind and

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[99]Barrow. Universities and the Capitalist State, pp. 82-88.

revolutionized professional scholarship.[100] On a broader level, it was also these think-tanks, along with the elite universities which, in the 1930s, provided the New Deal state with the personal and intellectual resources to design public policy to confront the Great Depression.[101]

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Did this massive outpouring of foundation funds to the nation's colleges, universities, and research councils constitute "both the production and reproduction of cultural hegemony," as sociologist Donald Fisher, among others, has argued? It is beyond the scope of this dissertation -- a study primarily focused on the influence exerted by these foundations on the Canadian cultural and intellectual landscapes in 1930s, 40s and 50s -- to answer this question.[102] Examination of the hegemony issue can be useful to this discussion, however, if we approach it by asking two questions: Were the professional intellectuals who operated in the system of higher education funded heavily by private foundations truly autonomous? And if not, what class forces infringed upon that autonomy?

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[100]Silva and Slaughter,"Looking Backwards: How Foundations Formulated Ideology in the Progressive Period," pp. 74-75; and Hollis, Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education, pp. 249-250.

[101]G. William Domhoff, "How the Rockefeller Network Shaped Social Security, " in State Autonomy or Class Dominance? Case Studies on Policy Making in America (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, Inc., 1996), pp. 118-125.

[102]A complex discussion of the debate about foundations and cultural hegemony in the United States is found in Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, "Foundations and Ruling Class Elites," Daedalus 1 (Winter, 1987): pp. 1-40. See also Robert F. Arnove, "Introduction" in Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism, pp. 1-29; Donald Fisher, "The Role of Philanthropic Foundations in the Reproduction and Production of Hegemony," pp. 206-233; and Martin Bulmer and Donald Fisher, "Debate: Philanthropic Foundations and the Development of the Social Sciences in the Early Twentieth Century," Sociology vol. 18, no. 4 (November, 1984): pp. 572-587. See also Terence Ball, "The Politics of Social Science in Postwar America," in Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 76-92.

These questions bring to light an issue that is the source of much scholarly debate. On the one hand, formal institutional guarantees of academic freedom, faculty self-government, and peer review for hiring, promotion, and publication appear to make professional intellectuals members of an autonomous and classless social group. On the other hand, the heavy hand of big capital on university boards of trustees and on the professional and scholarly associations that control access to funding and professional advancement would seem to call the former conclusion into question.[103] As sociologist Clyde Barrow observes, "research grants, stipends, and consultantships in turn play a significant role in the opportunities for publication, promotion, and tenure that influence individual positions within the university."[104] An "unequal system of rewards and incentives," Barrow continues, may not formally prevent radical research and teaching, but does serve to authorize the ideas of individuals who choose to "play the game."[105] In extolling the virtues of intellectual freedom in a liberal society we would do well to heed one Canadian historian's recent reminder that "not all 'discourses' circulate equally...."[106]

Barrow's warnings about the limited parameters of intellectual activity sanctioned by the foundations inform my discussion of the Canadian case studies later in this dissertation. I take the position that within the academy there existed what Barrow refers to as a "negotiated range of theoretical free space between absolute autonomy and totalitarian

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[103]Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State, pp. 250-251.

[104]Ibid., p. 252.

[105]Ibid.

[106]Ian McKay, "Introduction: All that is Solid Melts into Air," in The Challenge of Modernity: A Reader on Post-Confederation Canada, ed. McKay (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1992), p. xxiii.

control [that] is real and substantial."[107] Scholars existing in the environment created in large part by the big foundations laboured in this "theoretical free space" and were thus "relatively autonomous." They were not, however, free to pursue the full range of intellectual curiosity. And all ideas, moreover, did not receive equal support and sanction.

What is even clearer is that "private" foundation funding bought influence in an area all agree is in the "public" domain. In doing so, the private foundations provided leadership in what Raymond Williams refers to as a "central system of practices, meanings and values, which we can properly call dominant and effective."[108] In the process, the foundations were exerting power over cultural expression that at least equalled that contained within the formal political structures of the state at the time. Institutions struggled to conform to standards established by the staffs of the foundations. The success or failure of cultural institutions depended on the ability of administrators to win the favour of the foundations. "There can be no doubt," it was noted in a Carnegie Corporation report,

> that the wholesale college giving and the consequent wholesale college begging of the last twenty years have gone far to transform the American college president into a soliciting agent....No men feel this position more keenly than the college presidents themselves, many of whom find themselves circumstanced very much as the ass with the bundle of oats held just far enough in advance of his nose to keep him perpetually seeking to reach it.[109]

Similarly, the financing of the research councils bought the foundations the right to

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[107] Universities and the Capitalist State, p. 252.

[108] "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies, eds. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 413.

[109] Report of the Acting President: For the Year Ended September 30, 1922 (New York, Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1922), p. 18.

influence the course of entire disciplines, giving foundation advisers strong voices in deciding which individuals and institutions were privileged with support and which ones were not. As Ernest Hollis noted in Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education (1938), "The director of...[a] learned association has stated that by the time a given project is ready to recommend to the foundation he cannot tell how much of it was the planning of his own staff and how much of it came from staff members of the three foundations who constantly work with his organization.[110]

The preceding statements are exceptional only for their bluntness. By the end of the 1920s, foundation advisers -- often leading academics in their own right -- held key positions on the executive councils that, in fact, directed scholarly associations such as the Social Science Research Council, the National Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies.[111] By funding these intermediary institutions and organizations, the foundations exerted influence over them, but at the same time were insulated from the inevitable controversies they generated. The philanthropoids sought, through expert investigation, to discover, and indeed to define, the best individuals, methods and organizations in specified fields. The "winners," who rated highly, were then established and subsidized as elite, national models to be emulated by the less worthy. It followed, of course, that while grants were ostensibly made to foster and develop certain models of practice and behaviour, grant-making had the intended result of suppressing alternative and

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[110]Philanthropic Foundations and Higher Education, p. 317, n. 65.

[111]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 33-70. See also Fisher, "Philanthropic Foundations and the Social Sciences: A Response to Martin Bulmer," pp. 584-585.

competing models. Thus, Carnegie Corporation preference for professional training in library service at elite centers of higher education came at the expense of community library initiatives. Likewise, the legitimation of the academic social sciences was accompanied by a rejection of social settlements as appropriate centers for social research.[112]

It was not, of course, a coincidence that there were clear gender, class, and ethnic patterns to foundation preferences. Such organizations as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation supported professionalised, nationally incorporated, academic centers administered almost entirely by men -- institutions whose bureaucratic structures closely resembled those of the foundations. Locally-based, preprofessional organizations such as local libraries and social settlements which, at very least, included women within institutional power structures, were among the losers in the rush for foundation millions.[113]

What is of significance here is that in funding the creation and operation of intellectual infrastructure in the United States in the 1920s and beyond, foundations brought power and influence into collaborative relationships with a large segment of the nation's intellectual elite. As Kathleen McCarthy notes, universities, research councils and philanthropic foundations -- all products of the intermingling of economic and intellectual elites -- were "part of a network of institutions that helped to choreograph the bureaucratic organization of American society after the turn of the century." These institutions, according to McCarthy, "lay at the heart of what would later be termed the 'American

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[112]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 30-31, 67-68.

[113]Ibid., pp. 27, 67; and Kathleen D. McCarthy, Women's Culture: American Philanthropy and Art, 1830-1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 113-114.

Establishment,' part and parcel of a network of 'institutional hierarchies' over which political, professional, and corporate leaders presided."[114]

That the foundations were no longer governed solely by donors -- that philanthropy had undergone, as Althea K. Nagai, Robert Lerner, and Stanley Rothman put it, a "separation of ownership from control [that] paralleled that of the corporate world"[115] -- diversified the social composition of the philanthropic elite only marginally. The bureaucratization of philanthropy placed authority in the hands of a small group of economically-privileged, white, Protestant males, educated -- almost without exception -- at the same north-eastern private colleges and universities that, in the 1920s, received the lion's share of foundation grants.[116] When American philanthropy later became a factor in the development of Canadian culture it represented a continental extension of this group's power -- an extension of the influence of men who were clearly members of what some have referred to as the "American ruling class."[117] The penetration of the foundations into the American economic, political, and intellectual power structures in the 1920s served, in the following decades, as a model for activity on Canadian soil.

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[114]Women's Culture, p. 114. See also C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); and Leonard Silk and Mark Silk, The American Establishment (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

[115]Giving For Social Change: Foundations, Public Policy, and The American Political Agenda (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. 20.

[116]Lindeman, Wealth and Culture, pp. 32-46; and McCarthy, Women's Culture, pp. 114-115.

[117]For a discussion of the social composition of the foundation elite, its relationship to political and economic power, and the idea of an American ruling class see Nagai, Lerner, and Rothman, Giving For Social Change, pp. 41-43.

Chapter 2: The Early Years of American Philanthropy in Canada: Building Schools, Building Canada

> In a society consisting of those races that inhabit the Maritime Provinces one would expect a high degree of educational development. The "stock" is as good as can be found. Where and to the extent that education occurs, this excellence is plainly reflected in the product, but as a *system* of education, calculated to maintain a high level of intelligence among all the people, the arrangements in the Maritime Provinces are open to criticism.[1]
>
> -- William S. Learned and Kenneth C.M. Sills (1922).

> The Canadian people are our near neighbors. They are closely bound to us by ties of race, language and international friendship, and they have without stint sacrificed themselves - their youth and their resources - to the end that democracy might be saved and extended.[2]
>
> -- John D. Rockefeller Sr. (1919).

Differences in institutional focuses, styles and strategies make it impossible to speak of a common program or of specific objectives shared by the leaders of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. As John G. Reid argues in his study of the trusts' activities in the Canadian Maritime provinces in the 1920s and 1930s, however, differences in detail were overshadowed by broad similarities in purpose and philosophy. The foundations shared a fundamental commitment to social progress -- a "progress," of course, directed by their formal and informal advisers, achieved without class conflict and

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[1]Education in the Maritime Provinces of Canada (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1922), p. 6.

[2]Letter to The Rockefeller Foundation, 18 December 1919, cited in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material" (unpublished internal review), vol. 21, pp. 5314-5315, The Rockefeller Foundation Papers (hereafter RF), Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

defined by the systemic requirements of industrial capitalism.[3] Corporate philanthropy's purpose, argued the leaders of the trusts, was to act as a catalyst for reform -- to transform social institutions and to re-structure and rationalize society just as the original philanthropists had reformed and rationalized American industry in the late nineteenth century. As the chosen representatives of the capitalist class, the managers of corporate philanthropy had unquestioned confidence in their ability and duty to lead.

Canada, in the second and third decades of the twentieth century, represented a receptive environment for the American foundations. The Canadian state lagged behind even the American state in both its capacity for and political vision of national administration. In the aftermath of the First World War, however, there was emerging what historian Mary Vipond refers to as the English-Canadian "nationalist network." Individuals who were part of this emerging elite were tied together by an emotional sense of nationalism fostered, in many instances, by Canada's participation in the war and by the pursuit of social and economic reform. They also shared a confidence, not unlike that exhibited by the foundation leaders, in their ability and duty to speak for the nation. Operating, for the most part, outside the formal structures of the state, this self-selected group of intellectual and cultural authorities created a web of formal associations, including the Canadian Historical Association, the Canadian Radio League, the Association of Canadian Clubs, and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Also representative of the impulse to organize, to conceptualize Canadian cultural and intellectual life, and to augment the group's power

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[3]John G. Reid, "Health, Education, Economy: Philanthropic Foundations in the Atlantic Region in the 1920s and 1930s," Acadiensis 14 (Autumn 1984): pp. 67, 76. See also E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

was the creation of such magazines and academic journals as the Dalhousie Review, Queen's Quarterly, and the Canadian Forum.[4]

Far from representing a radical fringe on the edges of society, on the one hand, or a broadly-based populist upsurge, on the other, this group of intellectuals was drawn from the same narrow class base as were Canadian business and political leaders. This intelligentsia was, in fact, as Vipond points out, "an integral part of a broader English-Canadian elite, formed by both birth and merit, but still an elite of education and position, almost entirely British Canadian and resident in major urban centres."[5] Functioning as what Gramsci referred to as "the dominant groups' deputies,"[6] members of the intelligentsia did not seek to alter existing social relations fundamentally but, like the foundations, aimed to pursue reform in order to adapt Canada's social, economic and political structures to the rapidly changing modern environment.[7]

In short, members of the English-Canadian intelligentsia came from the same segment of their society as did the managers of American philanthropy in American society. They shared with the Americans some basic assumptions about the need for and nature of reform. Despite the distinctly British style of the Canadian elite, ties between the two

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[4]Mary Vipond, "The Nationalist Network: English Canada's Intellectuals in the 1920s," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 7 (Spring, 1980): pp. 36-37; and John Herd Thompson and Allen Seager, "The Conundrum of Culture" (chapter 8), Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1985), pp. 158-160.

[5]Vipond, "The Nationalist Network," pp. 33-34.

[6]Antonio Gramsci, "The Intellectuals: The Formation of Intellectuals," Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds. and trans., Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 12.

[7]Vipond, "The Nationalist Network," p. 34.

groups, particularly through education and family, were numerous. Despite close ties to business and political leadership, the Canadians were only beginning to pool their resources and formalize their associations. It was not until the mid-1930s that the Canadian intellectuals forced their way into what Douglas Owram refers to as the "inner councils" of federal political parties and into the Dominion bureaucracy.[8] It is not so surprising that at least some members of this emerging Canadian elite were willing to work with the foundations to pursue shared agendas.

While the attention of foundations in the early stages of their development was focused on reforming American society, both organizations had Canadian programs from the start. Combinations of personal, professional, familial, and academic ties between the leaders of the foundations and the emerging secular network of reform-minded urban intellectuals in Canada made the border between Canada and the United States, if not invisible, at least extremely permeable. Equipped with an overwhelming confidence in the correctness of their ideology, in their duty to lead, and in the necessity of integrating Canadian society into the North American mainstream, foundation leaders extended American programs into Canada. Focusing particularly on higher education in this early phase, the foundations made significant contributions to the general endowment funds of Canadian universities and colleges. As was the case in the American context, the goal of this financial outlay was not merely to support individual institutions, but also to forge what

[8] The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 223.

Frederick Gates referred to as an "orderly and comprehensive system."[9] In many respects adapting American models to fit the existing regional and cultural conditions of Canadian society, and by concentrating support to a strategically-selected network of elite institutions, the foundations reinforced, where they did not themselves impose, a hierarchical network of institutions on the Canadian educational landscape. Faced with a federal state which had limited constitutional authority over education, was bureaucratically ill-equipped, and was directed by a political leadership with little appetite for taking the lead in the reformation of Canadian social and economic institutions, Canadian educational administrators were only too happy to entertain the support of American private foundations.

The discussion that follows documents the early Canadian activities of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. In this period of limited contact American philanthropy played a small but significant part in a far broader campaign to reform Canadian culture. The initial forays of the foundations onto Canadian soil, however, provided the Americans with access to like-minded Canadians and thus set the stage for the more extensive and more substantial collaborations of the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. While neither foundation focused exclusively or even primarily on development in the arts and letters in the early period, it was in this era that both trusts began to gain footholds in the power structures and institutional networks of Canadian society. Looked at from the other side, it was in these years that members of the Canadian elite learned to look to New York for support in building the institutions of a national culture. In short, it was in this early

[9]Cited in Clyde W. Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894-1928 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), p. 83.

phase of interaction that the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation became significant factors in the making of modern Canada.

The Carnegie Corporation British Dominions and Colonies Fund

Shortly after founding the Carnegie Corporation in November 1911, Andrew Carnegie discovered the terms of its charter limited him in using the trust for philanthropic purposes outside of the United States. In consequence, Carnegie followed his original gift to the Corporation with a second gift of $75 million and instructed the trustees that $20 million of that sum should be used to fund "the continuance of gifts for libraries and church organs, as heretofore made by me in Canada and in the United Kingdom and British Colonies." Two years later, Carnegie narrowed the scope of what became known in Corporation circles as the Special Fund by creating a separate philanthropic trust -- the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust for Great Britain and Ireland.[10]

In fact, in its first two decades, use of the Special Fund[11] was restricted almost entirely to support for Canadian projects. It was not until 1921, when a grant was awarded to the Grenfell Mission in Labrador, that the Fund was used outside of Canada. Even after the Carnegie Corporation expanded its British Dominions and Colonies program in 1927 to include projects in Africa, Australia, New Zealand and the West Indies, Canada maintained a

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[10]Stephen H. Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program 1911-1961 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1963), pp. 3,4.

[11]It was later formally titled the British Dominions and Colonies Fund.

favoured status.[12] Of the total of $9,948,909 granted under the fund between 1911 and 1935, $6,241,216 (or 63%) went to Canadian recipients.[13]

For the most part, use of the Special Fund in Canada followed the broader patterns of Carnegie philanthropy. Indeed, it was not until 1945, when Whitney H. Shepardson became Director of the British Dominions and Colonies Fund, that it was administrated as a separate program. In the first years -- years marked by Carnegie's personal influence -- the fund supported community library projects and gifts of church organs.[14] With the cessation of the library program in 1917 and the turn to more strategic, scientific philanthropy, the trustees and the officers who were by then firmly in control of Corporation policy began to direct their attention to higher education and research.[15]

In funding the development of higher education in Canada, Carnegie Corporation officers worked from the same blueprint as that used by the various Rockefeller and Carnegie philanthropies in the building of a national educational system in the United States. As was the case in the United States, the foundations not only filled a financial void when it came to support for higher education, but were also among the very few forces acting in the direction of national or even regional coordination of activity in the area. Although most provincial governments funded, to varying degrees, provincial universities, the Dominion

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[12]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, p. 8.

[13]Lawrence J. Burpee, "Canada's Debt to the Carnegie Corporation," Queen's Quarterly (Summer 1938): p. 233.

[14]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, p. 4.

[15]Burpee, "Canada's Debt to the Carnegie Corporation," p. 232.

government did not systematically fund or direct higher education.[16] This vacuum of central power made the activities of the foundations all the more influential.

To initiate its program, the Corporation concentrated support in the form of large grants to the general endowment funds of what were judged to be the strongest and most prestigious institutions in the Dominion. Favoured centres included McGill University, which received a grant of $1 million for its general endowment fund in 1918; Dalhousie University, recipient of a $500,000 grant in 1920 endowing its school of medicine; Queen's University, which benefitted from a $100,000 gift in 1913 and a further $250,000 grant in 1919; and the University of Toronto, which received numerous grants in the 1920s.[17]

In addition to strengthening these centres, the Corporation also focused on shoring up and even creating complementary regional infrastructure. Most striking, in this regard, was the special interest Corporation officers showed in higher education in Canada's Maritime region. In this region, the Carnegie Corporation attempted fundamentally to alter the existing balance of power and prestige that existed between what the Corporation's Acting-President from 1921 to 1923, Henry S. Pritchett, referred to as the "group of small colleges scattered over the coast provinces...."[18]

In response to requests for financial assistance from all the major colleges and universities in the region, and to an invitation by provincial officials in Nova Scotia to survey

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[16]Robin S. Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada, 1663-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 204-233.

[17]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, pp. 4, 39-49.

[18]Henry S. Pritchett, Preface to Education In the Maritime Provinces of Canada, by William S. Learned and Kenneth C.M. Sills (New York: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1922), p. I.

higher education in their province, the officers and trustees of the Carnegie Corporation decided to conduct a general investigation of education in Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In the fall of 1921, William S. Learned, an official with the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, and Kenneth C.M. Sills, the Canadian-born president of Bowdoin College in Maine, were dispatched to the Maritimes to meet with provincial authorities and school representatives.

Learned and Sills were charged with more than merely ascertaining and evaluating the wants and needs of individual institutions. Following the already well-established pattern of the Carnegie education survey, the investigators aimed their observations and recommendations at forging the loose collection of existing institutions into a centralized, integrated, and efficient regional system of higher education. Even more broadly, Learned and Sills sought, ultimately, to "fit" Maritime institutions into the national hierarchy of institutions the Corporation was helping to create. Both goals were made viable by promises of large Carnegie grants to willing participants.

Learned and Sills began their report to the trustees of the Carnegie Corporation by applauding the exceptional levels of scholarship achieved by individuals at Maritime colleges and universities. Using post-graduate success at prestigious American graduate schools as their standard, the authors approvingly noted that students from Acadia, Dalhousie, Mount Allison and the University of New Brunswick had excelled in graduate programs at Yale and Harvard.[19] Many, indeed, had proceeded to prestigious careers in institutions across North America. In addition to the quality of students produced by the schools, it was noted that

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[19]Learned and Sills, Education in the Maritime Provinces of Canada, pp. 12-13.

the "best thing about the existing organizations is the relatively high character of their personnel...."[20]

While recognizing the record of outstanding individual achievement, a record the authors attributed to a great extent to the above-average British "stock" that made up the majority of the population of the Maritimes,[21] Learned and Sills described the institutions they surveyed as "scattered and comparatively ineffective...."[22] "To seek to perpetuate present arrangements," they suggested, "is foregone defeat. The tendencies to concentration because of large capital outlay and high expenditure for personnel are inherent, and there is no indication of a return to the old type of colleges."[23]

The source of the problem as far as the Americans were concerned lay in the division of scant resources among too many fledgling and small institutions, which contradicted the principles of scientific management the foundations were then in the process of applying to North American higher education. "Six small colleges doing identically the same work," Learned and Sills observed, "are effectually dissipating their energies and sacrificing the chief opportunity which the region possesses for contributing in a distinguished manner to the life of the Dominion."[24] With its population of over 7.5 million people, New England, the authors elaborated, could afford its system of strong small

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[20]Ibid., p. 31.

[21]Ibid., p. 6.

[22]Ibid., p. 30.

[23]Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[24]Ibid., p. 30.

colleges. The Canadian Maritime provinces, populated by just over one million and "walled off to the west by a different race and language,"[25] could not. As a result, each of the institutions -- including Dalhousie University, which Learned and Sills found to be "the largest, best equipped and most important institution for higher education in the Maritime Provinces"[26] -- lacked what were defined by the Carnegie Corporation as the "Modern Requirements of Good Higher Education."[27]

Chief among these requirements was a sound financial base. If the American model was used as the standard for evaluation the existing arrangement of Maritime colleges and universities was, indeed, financially untenable. At the time of the Carnegie survey King's College, Mount Allison University, St. Francis Xavier University and the University of New Brunswick each had general endowment funds of less than $500,000. Even relatively well-off Acadia and Dalhousie had less than $1,000,000 to support undergraduate instruction. The combined endowment of all six institutions was marginally over $2,500,000 for about 1000 students. "Small" New England colleges such as Bowdoin, Amherst, or Williams, boasted of endowment funds well in excess of $3,000,000 dollars for about half the number of students. This lack of a sound financial base, crucial in the eyes of the business-minded officers of the foundations, was reflected in inadequate salaries and poor library and laboratory facilities.[28]

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[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid., p. 18.

[27]Ibid., p. 32.

[28]Ibid., pp. 30-33.

The solution proposed by Learned and Sills spoke not only to creating an integrated system of higher education in the Maritimes, but also more broadly of the function the region's institutions might come to play in a Dominion-wide network. The Maritime provinces should, it was suggested, emulate New England and its "remarkable collegiate and university life." Dalhousie, with its medical school, professional programs and strong college of arts and science, struck the Americans as the only institution with "the proportions and scale of a true university."[29] The Halifax school was, accordingly, at the heart of any plans the Carnegie Corporation had for regional educational development in the Maritimes. Learned and Sills noted that if "the educational efforts of Nova Scotia, not to mention the other provinces, [had] been concentrated at Halifax, a Scotian Harvard might have arisen that to-day would be drawing students from Winnipeg and Vancouver."[30]

The critical question to officers of the Carnegie Corporation was how to redirect the efforts of educators to the end of producing this "Scotian Harvard." One option was for the Corporation to simply select Dalhousie as "the best-located, most promising institution" and to develop it "thru every possible aid and assistance to the exclusion of all others."[31] Both the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation had, in fact, been informally practising this policy for some time. Dalhousie was already recognized by both foundations as the Maritime provinces' regional representative in the Dominion's developing system of education. The largest metropolitan center in the region, Halifax, Learned and Sills noted,

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[29]Ibid., p. 30.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid., p. 33.

was "known the world over, and is...the focal point commercially and politically, of all eastern Canada." Apprehensions concerning its location were raised and conveniently dismissed in the survey. Although the investigators noted that Sackville, New Brunswick, home of Mount Allison University, might seem "more generally convenient" to all three of the Maritime provinces, it was noted that if Newfoundland were taken into consideration, Halifax could be described once again as the more central location for the English-speaking population. Concerns raised about the "evils of a considerable maritime city as a home for college youth...." were dismissed as no more appropriate than moral questions which could be raised about universities in Boston, Montreal, New York, New Haven, Providence or Toronto.[32]

The Carnegie Corporation, one can be sure, would no more shy away from selecting Dalhousie as its focus institution at the expense of the other institutions than U.S. Steel would hesitate before closing inefficient steel mills. Concerns for efficiency and the principles of scientific management always dictated the approaches Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies employed in reforming and/or creating educational infrastructure. Learned and Sills feared that existing provincial, denominational, and institutional loyalties would lead to wasteful and inefficient competition, which, in turn, would impede the emergence of Dalhousie as the Maritime centre. For the plan to work it had to lead to the pooling, not the destruction, of resources.[33]

As an alternative, Learned and Sills recommended that the Carnegie Corporation

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[32]Ibid., p. 34.

[33]Ibid., pp. 34-35.

fund a "confederation" of the existing colleges. Each of the institutions would move to Halifax and be transformed into residential colleges within a larger federated university centred at Dalhousie. Under this thinly-veiled plan to select Dalhousie as the one truly elite institution -- the fittest that should eventually survive and prosper -- appropriate economies of scale, efficiency, and standardization would prevail. While each college would keep its own endowment fund, the financial security of the new university would be secured by a $2.5 million Carnegie Corporation grant to its general endowment fund. Learned and Sills were also confident that the new focus institution would attract other private support as well as provincial and federal subsidies.[34] "If undertaken and successfully carried thru," the authors observed, "the plan would indeed resolve in brilliant manner the last of Canada's difficult situations in higher education."[35]

Upon receipt of the report the Carnegie Corporation pledged $3 million to facilitate the proposals. Opposition to the centralizing aspects of the scheme, however, eventually squelched the creation of the federation. In the end only King's College, which had lost much of its campus at Windsor, Nova Scotia, to fire, merged with Dalhousie.[36] The Carnegie Corporation, nonetheless, followed the spirit of Learned and Sill's report and made

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[34]At the time, the Dominion government did not provide financial support for higher education in Canada. Provincial support in the Maritimes provinces was restricted to a $50,000 annual grant from the province of Nova Scotia to the Nova Scotia Technical College and to a $25,000 annual grant by the province of New Brunswick to the University of New Brunswick. See Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada, pp. 205-213.

[35]Education in the Maritime Provinces of Canada, pp. 49-50. For discussions of the report and the impact it had on Maritime education see Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation: Commonwealth Program, pp. 7-8; Reid, "Health, Education, Economy, Philanthropic Foundations in the Atlantic Region in the 1920s and 1930s," p. 69; and Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada, pp. 353-355.

[36]Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada, p. 354.

Dalhousie the focus of the foundation's Maritime program. As the only two institutions participating in the Carnegie scheme, Dalhousie and King's College also received the bulk of Corporation grants. Between 1922 and 1933 the schools received grants in excess of one and half million dollars. The Carnegie grants were, moreover, part of a broader wave of support by American philanthropy in the 1920s and 1930s for Dalhousie -- support that facilitated the creation of several new departments, programs and faculties and truly solidified the institution's position as the center of higher education for the Maritimes.[37]

At the same time, other Maritime institutions were not entirely neglected. Acadia University, Mount Allison University, the University of New Brunswick, St. Francis Xavier University and Prince of Wales College all benefitted from Carnegie Corporation support in the 1920s and 1930s. With an initial grant of $75,000 to Memorial University College in St. John's, Newfoundland, in 1924, and with continued support for the institution during the school's infancy, the Corporation also made good on its commitment to support education in Newfoundland.[38]

While the officers of the Carnegie Corporation viewed the failure of the proposed Maritime university union with some disappointment, they were convinced that the numerous formal and informal discussions prompted by the plan had compelled scholars and academic administrators in the Maritimes "to think regionally rather than locally."[39] The

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[37]Ibid., pp. 354-355.

[38]Reid, "Health, Education, Economy," pp. 80-83; and Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, pp. 39-49.

[39]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1929 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1929), p. 20.

plan's failure was also recognized as an opportunity to diversify the use of the Special Fund. Because of the number, size and duration of commitments made between 1919 and 1925 in the United States, the financial resources of the Carnegie Corporation had been stretched to the limit. To meet this crisis, a seven-year austerity program was enacted in 1925. During this phase the Corporation continued grants already pledged in the previous program but limited its new grants to smaller and less expensive projects.[40] As a result, the Corporation reduced its net load of committed funds from $29,540,011.03 to $17,074,823.68 by the end of the 1920s.[41] With the failure of the Corporation's plans for a federated university in the Maritimes, however, the separately-endowed Special Fund enjoyed a substantial surplus. "The cancelling of this tentative obligation," noted Corporation President Frederick J. Keppel in his annual report of 1929, "releases for other purposes two million dollars, or the entire income of the Special Fund for Canada and the British Colonies for a period of four years." "The Corporation," he continued, "is now in a position to consider...a number of opportunities that have been brought to its attention elsewhere in Canada and in other parts of the British Empire."[42]

As Keppel directed, the surplus funds were put to use in a variety of ways. Seeking to internationalize the program, the officers of the Carnegie Corporation began to initiate

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[40]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1925 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1925), pp. 3-5; and Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1926 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1926), p. 27.

[41]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1931 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1931), p. 23.

[42]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1929 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1929), p. 20.

projects in other British colonies and Dominions.[43] Back in Canada, the Carnegie program was expanded to reach a broader range of recipients. About $200,000, in the form of emergency grants, was distributed among the four provincial universities in the west.[44] In 1933, a library purchasing program, designed to allow institutions to maintain up-to-date collections during the Depression, reached virtually every post-secondary education institution in the country.[45] At the same time the Corporation's commitment to the elite institutions of central Canada never wavered. Thus, mirroring the 1926 decision to establish a new library school at the University of Chicago, a state-of-the-art training center for Canadian library personnel was established at McGill University in 1927.[46] The University of Toronto received several more Corporation grants supporting, among other projects, educational research, library purchases, language studies and a fellowship program for students in medieval studies at St. Michael's College.[47]

With the institutional cornerstones of a continental education system firmly in place by the late 1920s the leaders of the Carnegie Corporation increasingly adjusted their focus both in Canada and the United States to include methods and projects that facilitated the diffusion of knowledge from centers of learning and research to the broader public.

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[43]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, pp. 8-14.

[44]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1934 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1934), pp. 17, 162-167.

[45]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1933 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1933), p. 31. See also Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, p. 14.

[46]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1928 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1928), p. 27.

[47]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program, p. 48.

Accordingly, the officers were also sympathetic and responsive to Canadian projects that sought to extend the reach of formal education beyond the narrow and elite confines of the academy. Of particular interest were projects that fell within two areas of traditional interest to Carnegie philanthropy: community library service and adult education.

Putting a new twist on to an old Carnegie theme, the Corporation contributed over $100,000 to the British Columbia Library Commission and another $60,000 to a regional library development program in Prince Edward Island.[48] In contrast to Carnegie's earlier library building program, in which public libraries were funded on an individual and somewhat haphazard basis, the Corporation now supported centralized planning associations that were attempting to establish regional library services. Keppel articulated the Corporation's keen understanding of the unique demographic and geographic obstacles to the diffusion of knowledge in the Canadian hinterland: "The attempt to distribute books in the sparsely settled and inaccessible regions of the Province [of British Columbia] creates a technical situation of unusual interest and the success of the Commission in dealing with it will be watched with interest throughout the English-speaking world."[49]

In this period the Corporation also began to fund extension services at several Canadian colleges and universities, including Acadia University, Frontier College, McGill University, the University of Manitoba, the University of Saskatchewan, the University of

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[48]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1933 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1933), p. 30.

[49]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1929 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1929), p. 14.

Alberta and St. Francis Xavier University.[50] Reporting on St. Francis Xavier's renowned Antigonish experiment in 1934, Keppel observed that the program was "of the most original and promising experiments in adult education with which the Corporation is concerned..."[51] Writing, more generally, of the success of Canadian programs in the early 1930s, Keppel noted, "Canada...has furnished some of our most striking demonstrations of other types of adult education, notably in the community work directed by St. Francis Xavier's College in Nova Scotia, in the extension work of the University of Alberta, and in regional library programs."[52]

While efforts to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge beyond the walls of the academy were substantial and presaged greater Corporation initiatives to create a general Canadian cultural infrastructure, the bulk of Carnegie funds, in this early period, were nonetheless targeted for institutions of higher learning. In this way, the Corporation's Canadian program followed the general contours of its American activities. After a short period marked by Andrew Carnegie's personal propensity for the haphazard provision of community libraries and church organs, the trust turned to a more systematic and strategic brand of giving. The concentrated and uneven pattern of grant distribution -- a replicated version of the one established in the United States -- helped shape a Dominion-wide

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[50]Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation Commonwealth Program 1911-1961, pp. 39-47.

[51]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1934 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1934), p. 32. Between 1931 and 1937 the Carnegie Corporation provided the majority of the revenue required to operate the extension program at St. Francis Xavier. See Reid, "Health, Education, Economy," p. 75.

[52]Report of the President and of the Treasurer for the Year Ended September 30, 1936 (Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1936), p. 25.

hierarchically-structured network of institutions of higher learning. The "winning" colleges and universities -- schools selected because of location in the Dominion's major metropolitan centers and/or because they had the most promising financial and intellectual resources -- received the largest shares of Carnegie support. These centers, in turn, became key outposts in a broader continental system -- a system in which philanthropic foundations were key players.

Rockefeller "Medicine Men"[53]

As Robin Harris notes in his voluminous study, A History of Higher Education in Canada 1863-1960, the Rockefeller Foundation more than matched the Carnegie Corporation's efforts during this period.[54] As was the case with the Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller Foundation involvement in Canada began on a small scale soon after the creation of the trust and, by the end of the First World War, blossomed into a major interest. Examples of early Rockefeller activities in Canada include John D. Rockefeller Sr.'s personal donation to a relief fund following the 1914 Newfoundland sealing disaster and the Foundation's involvement in the creation of the Massachusetts-Halifax Health Commission after the Halifax Explosion of 1917.[55] The real story of the Rockefeller Foundation's role in

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[53]Taken from the title of E. Richard Brown's, Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

[54]p. 344.

[55]Reid, "Health, Education, Economy," p. 68. For a detailed discussion of the Foundation's role in relief and public health efforts following the Halifax Explosion, see William J. Buxton, "Private Wealth and Public Health: Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Massachusetts-Halifax Relief Committee/Health Commission," in

the making of modern Canada began, however, with Rockefeller's decision late in 1919 to create a fund within the trust to support the development of medical education in Canada. Indeed, until well into the 1930s, the Foundation's Canadian program was focused almost exclusively on the then-favoured Rockefeller interests of medical education and public health administration. Operating within this limited sphere, the Rockefeller Foundation, nonetheless, had a significant impact on the patterns of power and wealth in the world of Canadian colleges and universities.

Since late in the nineteenth century scientific medicine and medical education had been at or near the top of the Rockefeller empire's agenda for reform. Support for the medical field served the classes in charge of corporate philanthropy in a variety of ways. Advances in health care not only aided the processes of accumulation by improving the health and productivity of individual workers, but also provided evidence legitimizing the capitalist mode of production. In both respects support for medical research stood the Foundation in much better stead than activities in more problematic areas such as industrial relations. As E. Richard Brown points out in Rockefeller Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America, "scientific medicine" was a powerful "ideological weapon in...[the] struggle to formulate a new culture appropriate to and supportive of industrial capitalism." Medical theory appealed to the corporate philanthropists, Brown explains, because it "exonerated capitalism's vast inequities and its reckless practices that shortened the lives of

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Ground Zero: A Reassessment of the 1917 Explosion in Halifax Harbour, eds. Alan Ruffman and Colin D. Howell (Halifax: Nimbus Publishing Ltd. and Gorsebrook Research Institute for Atlantic Canada Studies at Saint Mary's University, 1994), pp. 183-194.

members of the working class."[56]

The Rockefeller role in the development of scientific medicine dates back to 1897 when Frederick Gates read William Osler's lengthy medical text Principles and Practice of Medicine. Gates was attracted to the book for its literary merits, but greatly disturbed by Osler's assessment of "the value of medicine as currently practised."[57] According to Gates, Osler's book was a remarkable demonstration of both the potential and the existing inadequacy of scientific medicine. Despite great advances in understanding health, it appeared to Gates that with the exception of four or five diseases, medicine had no answer for most serious ailments.[58]

Gates quickly became convinced that the root of the problem was not in the science of medicine but in the way it was taught and practised at the time. Unlike other sciences, such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, and geology which all found supportive homes in universities, medicine was being taught and researched, for the most part, at small, inadequately-endowed commercial institutions. In consequence, teachers and administrators were overly reliant on income earned in private practice and thus often had little time to devote to teaching and research.[59] Because of overriding commercial considerations, entrance standards and facilities were also woefully inadequate. These conclusions led Gates first to advise John D. Rockefeller Sr. to create the Rockefeller Institute for Medical

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[56]pp. 10-11.

[57]Frederick Gates, Chapters in My Life (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 181.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid., p. 182.

Research in 1901 as a model institution for full-time medical research and later to lead a broader campaign through the General Education Board to endow medical schools at some of the nation's leading universities.

The initiation of the General Education Board's program in 1913 was also influenced by the publication of a survey conducted for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Medical Education in the United States and Canada, by Abraham Flexner.[60] Flexner's conclusions confirmed Gates's suspicions concerning medical education. Of the 155 medical schools he visited, Flexner found that only a handful were capable of providing what he deemed adequate medical education. The others were impeded by poor laboratories, clinical facilities, low entrance requirements, and staffs of individuals more interested in profits than in medical education.[61] Flexner's thoughts, consistent with Gates's, were given more weight when he joined the staff of the General Education Board in 1913. To Gates, Flexner and their colleagues at the General Education Board, the answer to the problem of medical education in the United States was to support the development of a number of elite schools that would pursue research and teaching of medicine on a full-time basis.[62]

From 1913 to 1919 the General Education Board funded the development of full-time clinical programs at several strategically-selected institutions in the United States

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[60]Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (New York: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1910).

[61]Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 94.

[62]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, pp. 158-161.

including Johns Hopkins, Washington University, Yale, the University of Chicago, and Vanderbilt. Between 1919 and 1921 John D. Rockefeller Sr. gave the Board $45,000,000, thereby enabling it to expand the program from this small base to a far broader network of institutions throughout all regions of the United States. The inclusion of several state-funded universities, though opposed vehemently by Gates, represented the new and more comfortable relationship between corporate philanthropy and the state.[63]

In addition to expanding the American medical education program in 1919, the Rockefeller brain-trust decided to extend the program beyond the borders of the United States. Because the General Education Board was chartered only for activities in the United States this expansion was placed under the authority of the Rockefeller Foundation.[64] In late December 1919, two weeks after presenting the Board with a sizable gift for its medical program, John D. Rockefeller Sr. gave $50,000,000 to the Rockefeller Foundation. Although no formal terms accompanied the gift, Rockefeller suggested that a large portion of it be reserved for the support of "the improvement of medical education in Canada."[65] On Christmas day, Rockefeller Foundation President George Vincent, in accordance with Rockefeller's wishes, announced that $5,000,000 of the donation was to be used to support "the improvement and development of the leading medical schools in the Dominion."[66]

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[63]Ibid., p. 185.

[64]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 105.

[65]"Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5315, RF, RAC; and Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 114.

[66]"Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5315, RF, RAC; and Annual Report for 1920 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1920), pp. 276-277.

In making his bequest to the Rockefeller Foundation, the senior Rockefeller noted that his attention had "been recently called to the needs of some of the medical schools in Canada."[67] R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King's official biographer, confidently credits requests made by King on behalf of Canadian institutions to his friend John D. Rockefeller Jr. earlier that year for Rockefeller support for Canadian medical schools. Indeed, a Foundation official advised King that "our regard for you was not without its influence in causing the gift to be made."[68] Although King's earlier service to the Rockefeller Foundation and to the Rockefeller family may, ultimately, have been responsible for Rockefeller's gift, other influential voices spoke for Canada as well. William Osler, whose medical text had so impressed Gates, was a graduate of McGill University and had, that same year, requested Rockefeller support for McGill's medical school.[69] Lewellys Barker of the University of Chicago, the man who convinced Gates of the necessity of full-time medical faculties, was just one of a number of prominent physicians who had graduated from the University of Toronto before taking prestigious positions in the United States.[70] George Vincent may even have received requests from his cousin Vincent Massey. Whatever the immediate impetus for the interest in Canadian medical education, it is clear

[67]Cited in William B. Spaulding, "Why Rockefeller Supported Medical Education in Canada: The William Lyon Mackenzie King Connection," Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 10 (1993): p. 75.

[68]Quoted in R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Political Biography, 1874-1923 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 331.

[69]Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 165.

[70]Sandra Frances McRae, "The 'Scientific Spirit' in Medicine at the University of Toronto, 1880-1910" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Toronto, 1987), p. 221. See Spaulding, "Why Rockefeller Supported Medical Education in Canada," p. 73.

that, by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, there existed a high degree of integration of Canadian and American elite circles. Given the nature, and extent of the personal and professional connections between Canadians and Americans, it is not surprising that when the Rockefeller Foundation looked to extend its activities outside the United States it looked to nearby Canada.

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In approaching what was later referred to by a Foundation staffer as "the Canadian Problem" of medical education, the Rockefeller brain-trust once again encountered a variant of the central paradox of incorporated philanthropy. In Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, sociologist Clyde Barrow discusses the issue in the context of American educational development. "The problem [facing the foundations]," according to Barrow, "was how to influence educational politics without appearing political. The larger aspect of this problem was how to exert that influence toward the goal of a nationally integrated, socially efficient higher educational system."[71]

In the case of medical eduction in Canada, the situation was complicated by the international boundary. How could the Foundation encourage development of Canadian medical education in a manner consistent with broader Foundation principles and agendas without, at the same time, appearing to compromise Canadian autonomy? As Vincent noted in a letter to his cousin Vincent Massey -- later the first Canadian Minister in Washington

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[71]p. 97.

and later still the Chairman of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences -- "for an outside agency to come in and assume standardizing functions may well be resented."[72]

The problem was exacerbated by the constitutional division of rights and responsibilities among levels of government in Canada. Under the terms of the British North America Act education was under provincial jurisdiction. Since one of the primary pre-conditions of Rockefeller involvement in Canadian medical education was, according to Vincent, that a "Dominion-wide strategy would have to be worked out for the country as a whole,"[73] the lack of a national department of education was a major stumbling block. Without a central agency to work with or through, it was difficult to argue that the impetus for national reform was coming from within Canada.[74]

In the absence of a federal department of education and not wishing to appear to be imposing a plan on Canada, the Rockefeller Foundation relied, instead, on less formal networks of influence. Shortly after the announcement of Rockefeller's gift to the Foundation, Vincent wrote to Massey and former Rockefeller Foundation consultant and close Rockefeller family friend William Lyon Mackenzie King, and asked them to suggest

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[72]George E. Vincent to Vincent Massey, 30 December 1919 quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, pp. 5323-5324, RF, RAC.

[73]Ibid., p. 5320.

[74]Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies had overcome a similar impediment in the United States by funding and colonizing the U.S. Bureau of Education. Formed in 1867 to supervise land-grant colleges and empowered only to collect and distribute statistics on education, the Bureau had by the 1920s taken a leadership role in American education. It could do so only because of direct support from the foundations, by drawing on data produced in studies conducted by private foundations, and by working with experts on foundation payrolls. In short, the Bureau owed its position and intellectual authority as an official central coordinating agency more to the efforts of the foundations than to the support of the public sector. See Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State, pp. 101-110.

others who might be consulted on the matter. Perhaps more importantly, he also asked the two men to suggest procedures that would enable the Foundation "to throw the responsibility upon a group of Canadians."[75] The Foundation, Massey and King were advised, was looking for men who had expertise in the field, but were not directly connected to any institution. In addition, Vincent noted that the Foundation also valued "the advice of persons of outstanding position who, similarly, were interested in education generally but not committed to any one university or locality."[76]

Reflecting, perhaps, how they respectively prioritized the Foundation's interests and Canadian autonomy, Massey and King recommended opposing courses of action. Arguing "that the responsibility of allocating funds must, subject to the general policy which you lay down, be delegated to a group of Canadians," Massey advocated the formation of a formal Canadian committee. "This," Massey continued, "will relieve The Rockefeller Foundation of inevitable criticism from sectional interests and will throw the onus of making difficult decisions on a local body."[77]

Better acquainted with Foundation procedures and priorities and more alert to the political dangers of leaving the "difficult decisions" to a group of Canadians, King suggested an alternative. The individuals Vincent had suggested might administer the endowment in Canada were, King observed, "all citizens of Toronto and all prominent members of the

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[75]Vincent to Massey, 30 December 1919, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5324, RF, RAC.

[76]Ibid.

[77]Massey to Vincent, 3 January 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, pp. 5324-5325, RF, RAC.

Unionist party...." Although "everyone of them is an individual for whom personally I have a very high regard," King felt sure that "the count is certain to suggest to the minds of men of all parties or no party an effort on the part of a small unionist group in Toronto to control the endowment...."[78] No doubt confident of his own privileged position at the top of the Rockefeller Foundation's informal network of Canadian advisers, King suggested that "a conference personally with outstanding individuals would in every way be preferable to formal constitution of an advisory group...."[79] Accordingly, King also suggested that the Foundation determine "upon its own[,] plans in the light of a general survey...."[80]

The procedure suggested by King was, in fact, one well known to Rockefeller officials. By 1919 the educational survey had been a primary tool of Carnegie and Rockefeller trusts for at least ten years. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the General Education Board, the Carnegie Corporation, and the Rockefeller Foundation had all made extensive use of the survey method as a means not only to gather educational information, but also to introduce their standards and their agendas for institutional reform to universities and colleges throughout the United States. While the surveys and the investigators who conducted them suggested the trusts' reform agendas, the promise of financial support to those individuals and institutions who fared well under

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[78]William Lyon Mackenzie King to Vincent, 9 January 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5328, RF, RAC.

[79]King to Vincent, 8 January 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5325, RF, RAC.

[80]King to Vincent, 21 January 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5326, RF, RAC.

scrutiny was a carrot that few academic administrators could resist.[81] One early and particularly effective example of the educational survey was Flexner's Medical Education in the United States and Canada.

By the early 1920s the foundations had so completely infiltrated the American academic elite that it was always possible to find "experts" like Flexner or Carnegie investigators William Learned and Kenneth Sills, who could be relied upon to understand and reflect the interests and agendas of the trusts in carrying out surveys. In the Canadian context the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were much less sure of the ground on which they walked. Finding Canadian advisers who were trustworthy, who had knowledge of the issues at hand, and who had no direct connections to the principal institutions was, at this early date, a daunting task. Not willing to create and legitimize an intermediary organization made up of individuals who could not be trusted to have the interests of the Foundation close at heart, Rockefeller officials instead opted to follow King's advice and conduct their own survey out of the Foundation's New York City offices.

So it was that in the spring and summer of 1920 Vincent and Dr. Richard M. Pearce, the Director of the Rockefeller Foundation's Division of Medical Sciences, engaged in a series of informal fact-finding visits to Canadian universities, including the University of Toronto, McGill, Dalhousie, Queen's, the University of Western Ontario, the Université de Montréal, Laval, the University of Manitoba, the University of Alberta, and the University of British Columbia. In addition to meeting representatives of these institutions, and with leading citizens who were interested in educational development, Pearce and Vincent, acting

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[81]Barrow, Universities and the Capitalist State, pp. 97-101.

again on King's advice, made courtesy calls to municipal, provincial and federal officials as well as to opposition leaders at every level.

As a result of their survey of the Canadian scene, Pearce and Vincent concluded that the Foundation should throw its support behind medical faculties at McGill, the University of Toronto, Dalhousie, the Université de Montréal, the University of Manitoba, the University of Alberta and the University of British Columbia. The rationale for the selection of these institutions reflected more than a technical interest in the Canadian situation. Pearce and Vincent chose these schools in the hope that together in a national system they would address regional, linguistic, cultural and religious, as well as medical, considerations.[82] As the "two major, class-A, university medical schools,"[83] the University of Toronto and McGill were singled out for grants of $1,000,000 each. Dalhousie, the Maritime centre, received $500,000; the University of Manitoba and the University of Alberta were granted $750,000 and $500,000 respectively to meet needs of western Canadians, while support for the Université de Montréal "cared for the French problem." The remaining funds were held for the future development of a medical faculty at the University of British Columbia and also as a fund from which universities which were making the most efficient use of initial grants could draw upon at later dates.[84]

The Rockefeller Foundation program for medical education in Canada represented more than a collection of separate aid packages to several fledgling Canadian medical

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[82]"Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, pp. 5323, 5330, and 5333, RF, RAC.

[83]Ibid., p. 5321.

[84]Ibid., pp. 5334-5335.

schools. The program was an example of central management not only for medical education, but also for Canadian culture. In addressing cultural, social, and political issues, as well as purely medical ones, the Canadian program essentially replicated the scheme already being implemented by the General Education Board in the United States. Both Rockefeller trusts selected institutions strategically to act as national and regional centers of excellence. In consequence, university medical faculties complete with state-of-the-art facilities, full-time teaching and research staffs, and the financial security afforded by philanthropic support, became models to be emulated by the less fortunate. Just as the General Education Board's support established Johns Hopkins as a national center for medical education in the United States, the Rockefeller Foundation's endowment of programs at the University of Toronto and at McGill solidified those institutions' status as the Canadian leaders in the field. In the same way the General Education Board addressed regional and racial issues in the United States by selecting Washington University in St. Louis to represent the mid-western states and, in the American South, Vanderbilt to train white medical students while Meharry Medical College instructed black students, the Rockefeller Foundation selected Dalhousie, the University of Manitoba, the University of Alberta and the Université de Montréal to meet what the authors thought were Canada's unique regional and cultural needs.[85]

The significance of this early foray onto Canadian soil reaches beyond the 1920s and outside the sphere of medicine. In summarizing the conclusions drawn from his survey of

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[85]For an institutional history of the General Education Board's medical education program written by a loyal and life-long Rockefeller official, see Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, pp. 96-104. A more critical assessment is Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, pp. 156-166.

Canadian medical education, Vincent revealed an understanding of the geo-politics of the Canadian scene and the difficulties the Dominion presented for those interested in the scientific management of culture. Vincent's assessment, with minor variations, was shared by most Rockefeller and Carnegie officials who were involved in Canadian programs from the 1920s to the 1950s. "One saw that the country fell," Vincent noted,

> into more or less distinct areas each of which has a certain self-contained unity: the Pacific Coast, the Western Provinces, Ontario, French Quebec, and the Maritime Provinces. Capitals for these regions have been established. Medically these capitals are Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal-Quebec, and Halifax.[86]

And noting the disparity between the ratios of doctors to population that existed between provinces -- ratios ranged from a low of 1 to 800 in Ontario, to a high of 1 to 1,400 for the Yukon -- Vincent foreshadowed the concerns of others, both Canadians and Americans, who sought to build national infrastructure and thus extend the reach of the administrative state: "the Dominion must find a way to distribute its physicians more widely and to bring preventive medicine, hospital care, and medical and nursing service within the reach of the too generally neglected rural population."[87]

The record is clear on another issue. In establishing policy for Canadian medical education, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were fully aware, when they chose their roster of institutions, that they were wading through the murky waters of Canadian social, cultural, and educational politics. Despite Foundation assurances that "comparison [of grants] is practically impossible" and that the levels of support were determined only by

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[86] Annual Report for 1920 (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1920), p. 14.

[87] Ibid., p. 15.

the desire to "bring about the maximum amount of good for the school under consideration," it was obvious and inevitable that the program would be considered a ranking of Canadian universities.[88] The Chancellor of Queen's University, whose institution along with the University of Western Ontario was left out of the program because Rockefeller officers felt that it was better to concentrate its support on one Ontario school instead of scattering smaller grants among three, wrote the Foundation to note that the action was a "serious blow...to the University."[89] Even the big "winners" of the day, McGill and the University of Toronto, took issue with the relative size of the awards. Representatives of McGill, focusing on the support the University of Toronto received as a provincially-funded institution, felt that their school deserved a larger grant.[90] Administrators in Toronto, not surprisingly, saw matters in a different light. Perhaps reflecting on McGill's recent receipt of a large Carnegie grant, a representative for the University of Toronto commented that as "a private corporation [McGill]...has a great

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[88]R.M. Pearce to A.B. Macallum, 4 August 1922, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, 5323, RF, RAC.

[89]E.W. Beatty to Vincent, 23 October 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, 5322, RF, RAC.

[90]Macallum to Pearce, 31 July 1922, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, 5321, RF, RAC. Ironically, it had long been Rockefeller policy to limit support to nonsectarian private institutions. Frederick Gates, the creator of incorporated Rockefeller philanthropy, maintained support for state-funded institutions was "needless and gratuitous." Younger officers and trustees who were taking charge of Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies by the 1920s were more willing to work with the state. Since state universities were predominant in all regions of the United States except for the northeast, the development of a truly national educational system required cooperation between corporate philanthropy and the state. The spirit of cooperation became policy at the General Education Board when in 1923, at the urging of Abraham Flexner and against the wishes of Gates, the trust funded the building of a new medical center at the University of Iowa. Gates, Chapters in My Life, pp. 249-252; see also Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, pp. 177-184.

advantage over a state institution in such matters."[91] An obviously concerned Vincent Massey noted that if Toronto were to receive a smaller grant than McGill, "not only will the Medical school be stamped as inferior, but the University as whole will unquestionably suffer."[92]

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The medical education survey and the resulting appropriations set the pattern for early Foundation activity in Canada. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the Rockefeller program remained focused on the designated national and regional "capitals." Subsequent grants were awarded to these medical centers -- the size and frequency of awards reflecting the hierarchy established in the original survey. As was the case with the General Education Board's American program, the promise of continued support also enhanced the Foundation's influence. Even outside the medical field the institutions cited in Pearce and Vincent's survey became the bases for the Canadian programs of the Rockefeller Foundation.

With the exception of the University of British Columbia, which despite the promise of Rockefeller support did not develop a medical faculty in the 1920s, the regional centers all benefitted from the continued support of the Foundation. The University of Alberta and Dalhousie University fared particularly well. After receiving two annual grants of $25,000,

[91]"Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5321, RF, RAC.

[92]Massey to Vincent, 6 October 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, pp. 5321-22, RF, RAC.

the University of Alberta's medical program progressed sufficiently by 1923 to warrant a Foundation award of $500,000 for the endowment of a clinical teaching program.[93] In 1921, Dalhousie University won a second grant of $500,000 to improve facilities at the Salvation Army Hospital in Halifax.[94] Later in the decade, the school's public health and preventative medicine program also received a boost from the Foundation.[95]

As was the case with the original appropriations to Canadian medical schools, however, it was the two designated "national centers" that received the majority of Rockefeller support. Shortly after receiving the last instalment of the initial $1,000,000 endowment the University of Toronto was the recipient of another major Foundation award. That award came, in 1924, from the Foundation's International Health Division's program of support for institutes of public health and hygiene, a program that began when the Foundation built and endowed the School of Hygiene and Public Health at Johns Hopkins in 1918.[96] Amounting to $650,000, the grant was used to fund the construction of the University of Toronto's public health and hygiene program's main building. It was

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[93] Annual Report for 1923 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1923), p. 294.

[94] Annual Report for 1922 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1922), p. 353.

[95] Annual Report for 1935 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1935), pp. 362-363.

[96] This program also included substantial grants to institutions throughout the world including the School of Hygiene and Public Health at Harvard, the Institute of Hygiene of Sao Paulo, Brazil, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the State Serum Institute in Copenhagen and the Institute of Hygiene in Budapest. See Annual Report for 1924 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1924), p. 29. For an extensive list of institutions receiving grants under the Foundation's public health program see George E. Vincent (President of the Foundation), The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1925 (New York, 1926), p. 23. For a critical analysis of the ideological underpinnings of Rockefeller public health policy see E. Richard Brown, "Public Health in Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and Abroad," American Journal of Public Health, 66 (September 1976): pp. 897-903.

followed in 1931 by an award of $600,000 to that department's general endowment fund.[97] In total the University of Toronto's School of Hygiene and Public Health received a total of $1,287,500 for building, equipment and endowment between 1924 and 1931.[98]

Establishing a pattern that remained in place until well into the 1930s, and which had implications extending far beyond the medical sciences, Rockefeller Foundation support for medical education at McGill in these early years exceeded even the levels of support enjoyed by the University of Toronto. Like Dalhousie, the University of Toronto, and the University of Alberta, McGill was the beneficiary of a second large Rockefeller award in the early 1920s. In 1923 the Foundation gave the university $500,000 to assist with the institution's plans to "develop [the department of medicine] along the lines of a true university clinic."[99] This grant, along with the original endowment, added $1.5 million to university coffers and contributed greatly to the construction of teaching and clinical facilities on the McGill campus. As substantial as Foundation support for medical education at McGill was in the 1920s, it was almost doubled in 1932 by a single grant of $1,282,652. This award, the largest Foundation appropriation in the medical sciences in that year, was made in support of the creation of McGill's neurological institute. In addition to funding the construction of laboratory facilities at McGill's Royal Victoria Hospital, the grant provided for the endowment of new departments in neurosurgery, neurophysiology, neuropathology and

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[97] Annual Report for 1931 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1931), pp. 156-157.

[98] Ibid.

[99] Annual Report for 1924 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1924), pp. 329-331.

clinical neurology.[100]

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While the Rockefeller Foundation's Canadian program in the 1920s and early 1930s was focused on a relatively small number of institutions and was concentrated on medical education, members of the Foundation leadership were interested not only in the production of scientific knowledge at the major centers of learning but also in its dissemination to peripheral areas. If scientific medicine was to be, as one historian puts it, "useful in bringing rural and technologically and industrially naive North Americans to accept the domination of their lives by science and technology..." it would have to reach beyond the metropolitan centers.[101] As a result, in addition to supporting medical education and the growth of public health and hygiene programs at major educational institutions, the Foundation began to work with provincial and local governments in Canada to establish public health services in areas previously out of the reach of modern medicine.

Interest in the provision of health services followed naturally from work conducted by the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission in the first decade of the century. In attempting to eradicate the hookworm from the southern states in their own country, the doctors and scientists who directed the campaign became entangled in the broader crisis of rural public health.[102] Of particular concern to the officers was the disparity in mortality rates and

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[100] Annual Report for 1932 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1932), p. 212.

[101] Brown, Rockefeller Medicine Men, p. 127.

[102] Vincent, The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1926 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1927), p. 31.

sanitary standards between urban and rural areas. As Vincent noted in his review of Foundation activities for 1922, "Comparisons of relative declines in urban and country death-rates in recent years, the contrast disclosed by physical examination of city and country children, and studies of sanitary conditions on farms, all revealed disquieting tendencies."[103] Directly confronting the mythology of the healthy rural existence -- "the pure water of the old oaken bucket, the salubrious country air, [and] the invigorating exercise of bucksaw, spade, and the hoe" -- Vincent also suggested that prevailing assumptions "had to be rudely revised in the light of facts."[104]

Shortly after the formation of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913 the Sanitary Commission was absorbed into the new organization as its International Health Division. Under the leadership of Director Wicklfiffe Rose, the new division's program was expanded to operate outside of the United States and to address a broader range of diseases and public health concerns. By the mid-1920s the Foundation was funding the training of public health personnel and providing on-going financial support to public health units in 52 countries.[105]

In 1926 the provincial government of Quebec passed legislation enabling counties in the province to tax residents for the purpose of funding local public health infrastructure. That same year, as part of the global campaign to bring public health facilities to rural regions, the Rockefeller Foundation funded the establishment of three county health projects in the province. In addition to paying 50% of the costs of operating the units, the

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[103]Vincent, The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1922 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1923), p. 43.

[104]Ibid.

[105]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, pp. 30-45.

Foundation funded the education of the personnel -- a medical director and two public health nurses at each unit -- at a public health training center in Ohio.[106] In keeping with the vision of the Foundation as a catalyst for reform but not a permanent source of support, it was understood that the Foundation's role was only a temporary one and would diminish as local and provincial governments gradually took over the entire costs of training and operation.[107]

By 1928 new units had been established not only in the province of Quebec but also in rural districts in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Already Rockefeller officials noted the decline of mortality rates -- particularly for infants -- in the three counties served by the original Canadian projects.[108] Indicative of the success of the program was the selection of Beauce County, Quebec -- the site of the first Canadian county health unit -- as a training center for public health officials throughout North America.[109]

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Despite these efforts in rural Quebec, the leaders of the Rockefeller Foundation, like their counterparts at the Carnegie Corporation, were committed to the belief that the path of social progress in North America must run through institutions of higher education. Accordingly, leaders of both foundations devoted their efforts to building these institutions

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[106] Annual Report for 1926 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1926), pp. 96-97.

[107] Vincent, The Rockefeller Foundation: A Review for 1926, p. 32.

[108] Annual Report for 1928 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1928), p. 210.

[109] Annual Report for 1931 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1931), p. 114.

to function collectively as components of a rational and efficient system to produce research and to educate future leaders. At the same time, of course, the foundations were building networks of Canadian advisors and of influence. Thus programs of large grants to the endowment funds of elite American colleges and universities such as Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Columbia, the University of Chicago, Princeton and Yale were extended to reach the leading Canadian institutions as well. In addition, lesser but still substantial assistance was provided to supporting regional networks of institutions. By 1939 the two trusts had given a total of $12,000,000 to Canadian universities and colleges -- 30% of the total value of these institutions' general endowment funds.[110]

Ironically, while the leaders of the two trusts were including Canada in their plans for continental social progress and often patterning their Canadian programs on American models, they were also, in the process, aiding in the creation of Canadian regional and national infrastructure. In designing and implementing a "Dominion-wide" plan for the reformation of medical education in Canada, in concocting a scheme to unite universities and colleges in the Canadian Maritime region, in supporting the extension of library services to rural British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, and in helping to provide public health facilities to rural Quebec, the foundations were confronting what Canadian geographer R. Cole Harris refers to as "the profound structural localism of which this country is composed."[111] In doing so, they were contributing to a process of institutionalizing "a

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[110]Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 151.

[111]"Regionalism and the Canadian Archipelago," in Interpreting Canada's Past: After Confederation, ed. J.M. Bumsted (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 468.

political space...across the archipelago" which was Canada.[112]

Of course American foundations were not the only forces influencing this national reformulation. Moreover, they operated only in limited spheres and were not explicitly concerned with the political aspects of nation-building. The foundations were, nonetheless, part of a broader movement to structure and rationalize Canadian society. Often, as was the case with the Carnegie Corporation's planned federation of Maritime education, the Americans did not get their way -- at least not in the precise manner they had planned. In other areas, such as regional library extension and university extension services, it was the Canadian programs that were identified by foundation officials as models for emulation. In all cases "progress," initiated or supported by the Americans, was shaped and mediated by members of emerging local, regional, and national elites who shared with Carnegie and Rockefeller officials a zeal for institution and system-building. In fact, the formation of relationships between like-minded Canadians and Americans in this era was the principal collective accomplishment of the early forays onto Canadian soil by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. What started as a small network of personal and professional contacts had, by the mid-1920s, expanded to include politicians and public officials from every level of government, representatives of most Canadian colleges and universities and, perhaps most importantly, an ever-growing number of what George Vincent referred to as "persons of outstanding position"[113] and individuals who "would be

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[112]Ibid., p. 467.

[113]Vincent to Massey, 30 December 1919, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5324, RF, RAC.

recognized throughout Canada as men who have the welfare of the whole Dominion at heart."[114]

[114]Vincent to King, 5 January 1920, quoted in "Rockefeller Foundation History Source Material," vol. 21, p. 5325, RF, RAC.

Part II: American Philanthropy, Imagining Communities, and the Structuring of the Arts in Canada, 1927-1952

Chapter 3. Rockefeller Philanthropy, "Cultural Interpretation" and Imagined Communities in Canada

Introduction

> We are immensely indebted to such institutions as the Carnegie Corporation for their services to culture and to art....Philanthropic individuals and foundations have acted as patrons in a time when there was no other to call upon. Yet, as Dr. Keppel, the President of the Carnegie Corporation, himself has said, "As believers in democracy we are bound to look forward to the time when the community will take over the functions now performed by the foundations."[1]

These words were spoken by Walter Abell, professor of Art at Acadia University and the founder of the Maritime Art Association, at the Conference of Canadian Artists in Kingston, Ontario, in June 1941. Ostensibly a forum in which professional artists from every region in Canada could freely discuss technical aspects of painting and the position of artists in society, the Kingston Conference was to Abell a "spiritual milestone...perhaps...a spiritual mountain top." Portraying the proceedings at Kingston as a victory for "cultural democracy," Abell told readers of Maritime Art that at this first national gathering of artists in Canada "something in the atmosphere of the group seemed to lift it above sectionalism and divisionism, [and] bind the members together in the experience of a large and liberating unity."[2]

The Kingston Conference was, no doubt, an important "milestone" but not one, as

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[1]Walter Abell, "Art and Democracy," in The Kingston Conference Proceedings: A Reprint of the Proceedings of the 1941 Kingston Artists' Conference (Kingston: Agnes Etherington Art Centre, 1991), p. 30.

[2]Abell, "The Conference of Canadian Art--An Editorial," Maritime Art 2 (October-November, 1941): p. 3.

Abell claimed in his presentation, on the road to establishing a unified "culture of democracy" for Canada.[3] The conference, in reality, reflected the desires of a small group of artists, art bureaucrats, and their backers at the Carnegie Corporation to organize and lead a Canadian artistic constituency. Its success marked a victory, indeed, for the professionalisation and the bureaucratization of the Canadian cultural sphere. Conference participants -- about 150 artists and supporters of the arts from across Canada -- listened to a variety of invited speakers ranging from American muralist Thomas Hart Benton and art administrator Edward Rowan, who spoke of American New Deal public art projects, to Rutherford J. Ghettons of Harvard's Fogg Museum, who discussed technical aspects of painting and preservation. The real business of the conference, however, was to serve as a planning session in which self-appointed leaders, including conference organizer André Biéler, Vancouver artist Jack Shadboldt, Lawren Harris[4] and Abell, among others, citing American New Deal precedents, suggested, gained tacit approval for, and began to implement strategies to bring about a permanent relationship between Canadian artists and the state.

The Kingston Conference thus represents an important moment in the history of the fine arts in Canada. It marked the unification of a powerful national lobby for the arts. Participants in the conference at Kingston emerged from the proceedings as founding members of the Federation of Canadian Artists (FCA). When Abell moved to Ottawa to

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[3]Abell, "Art and Democracy," p. 29.

[4]Harris was not in attendance, but participated with a highly influential letter suggesting the formation of a federation. His letter was read to the conference as the primary motion of business before the participants. See The Kingston Conference Proceedings, p. 103.

take up a post at the National Gallery's Art Centre in 1943, his journal, Maritime Art, was transformed into a national journal appropriately titled Canadian Art.[5] Over the next eight years the FCA's executive, hand-picked by the conference organizers and endorsed by a general vote at the meeting, was seen as the legitimate representative of the arts community. As one of the key member associations in the Canadian Arts Council, which was founded in 1944, the FCA was a primary contributor to a series of briefs to the federal government culminating in recommendations to the Royal Commission on National Development of Arts, Letters and Sciences in 1949. In making this contribution, the FCA and its leading members helped shape a drive for public patronage of the arts that would lead in 1957 to the creation of the Canada Council.[6]

In literature relating to Canadian cultural history, the events at Kingston have been recognized, appropriately, as an important stage on the journey to a national arts policy. The extent and implications of the Carnegie Corporation's involvement and the centrality of the New Deal art projects to discussions at the conference, however, have received little sustained attention. George Woodcock in Strange Bedfellows: The State and Arts in Canada and Bernard Ostry in Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada both suggest that the primary influences that led to the conference and the formation of the FCA were British ones.[7] While Maria Tippett and Paul Litt recognize the

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[5]Maritime Art, the National Art Centre, and Canadian Art were funded by the Carnegie Corporation, as was Abell's salary in his new post in Ottawa.

[6]Maria Tippett, Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts Before the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 156-185; and Francis K. Smith, Andre Biéler: An Artist's Life and Times (Toronto: Merritt Publishing Company Ltd., 1980), pp. 97-107.

[7]Woodcock, Strange Bedfellows: The State and Arts in Canada (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1985),

Corporation's participation, neither explore the depths of the influence that accompanied financial support.[8]

In fact, as will be discussed in greater detail later in chapter 4, the Carnegie Corporation's involvement in the conference was extensive and formative in nature. Corporation officials underwrote the costs of travel and accommodation for participants (thereby legitimizing the claim of "national" scope), provided themes for discussion, successfully recommended a roster of speakers, and influenced the shape of the conference's resolutions. After the Kingston Conference, the Carnegie Corporation gave valuable financial support to the FCA. I suggest in this section of the thesis that this level of influence is indicative of the broader involvement of American foundations -- the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation -- in the structuring of artistic and cultural life in Canada during the 1930s and 1940s. The Kingston Conference was just one of many gatherings of Canadian intellectuals initiated, organized, and funded by American corporate philanthropy. Thus, in addition to symbolizing the efforts of Canadian artists and art organizers in this era, the Kingston Conference can also be viewed as evidence of Canadian reverberations of the fundamental shifts in Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation programs and policies of the 1920s. Indeed, efforts to structure, organize and bring about state support for culture in Canada cannot properly be considered in isolation

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pp. 42-43; and Ostry, Cultural Connection: An Essay on Culture and Government Policy in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), p. 54.

[8]Tippett, Making Culture, pp. 164-166; and Litt, The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), pp. 22-23. The most thorough description of the conference proceedings is Andrew Nurse, "'A Confusion of Values': Artists and Artistic Ideologies in Modern Canada, 1927-1952," (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1991), pp. 112-118.

from the turn to cultural philanthropy by the two American trusts and from their cultural policies.

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In this and the following chapter I explore case studies of American philanthropic involvement in the development of Canadian cultural institutions and associations and in the conceptualization of identities in the Dominion. Through these case studies of Rockefeller and Carnegie involvement in the cultural life of Canada, I argue, as does Canadian film historian Charles Acland in his work on film and education in the 1930s and 1940s, that American foundations were essential actors in what was an important transitional moment in Canadian cultural history. During this era, Acland states, "new networks of cultural authorities" operating "outside the state" made support of culture a national priority.[9] The inclusion of members of the American philanthropic elite in these networks, and the support American foundations provided individuals and professional and voluntary associations were essential in making such men as Walter Abell, André Biéler, Vincent Massey, N.A.M. Mackenzie, Brooke Claxton, Georges-Henri Lévesque, H.O. McCurry, and Sydney Smith, among others, "cultural authorities" in the fullest sense. Canadian individuals and associations depended on the American foundations to support the establishment of "national" headquarters, to fund studies, to publish journals and newsletters, and perhaps most crucially for organizations claiming national constituencies, to fund travel to meetings

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[9]"Mapping the Serious and the Dangerous: Film and the National Council of Education, 1920-1939," Cinema(s) 5 (Fall 1995): p. 115. See also Acland, "National Dreams, International Encounters: The Formation of Canadian Film Culture in the 1930s," Canadian Journal of Film Studies 3 (Spring 1994): p. 8.

and conferences. I argue, in short, that the foundations played a significant supporting role in forging and moulding cultural institutions, unifying traditions, cultural styles and preoccupations which, in turn, contributed to the making of the "imagined community" that is Canada.[10]

Financial hardship was just one of the reasons the Canadians turned to American foundations. In addition to cultivating relationships with American foundations for the purposes of winning financial awards, they also turned to the foundations for strategic advice. The early activities of the foundations in Canada -- activities such as those discussed in chapter 2 -- had taught Canadians that the extent to which they shaped their plans and agendas around the general policies of the foundations was a crucial determinant of the success of subsequent grant applications. Short-term financial gain and the prospect of long-term financial security, however, were not the only factors that motivated Canadian cultural leaders to look to New York City for advice. American foundations, their founders, and the men who, by the 1930s, were in charge of their cultural programs, collectively had been slowly learning the business of organizing culture for over half a century. Men like Carnegie Corporation president Frederick Keppel, Rockefeller Foundation's Humanities Division Director David Stevens and Associate Director John Marshall were, in effect, technical experts in transforming wealth into structures of cultural authority. In the eyes of

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[10]Benedict Anderson's concept of "imagined communities" is at once extremely simple and insightful. All communities, Anderson suggests, no matter how large or small, are "imagined" if they exist in consciousness beyond the level of face-to-face contact. Communities are imagined through a variety of methods and media including the popular press, oral traditions, cultural institutions and scholarship. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised ed. (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 1-8. A useful recent discussion of the concept is Tony Bennett, The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory, Politics (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 141-142, 148.

elite Canadians (who, after all, shared class, racial, gender and educational backgrounds with the leaders of American philanthropy) these were "men of culture" concerned with what they collectively agreed was "cultural quality." Together, this collection of like-minded members of the North American cultural elite self-consciously conspired to build structures that not only worked to secure federal support of the arts and culture in Canada but which also helped give form to government patronage when it finally arrived.

Emphasis on the role of American philanthropy in the creation of Canadian culture is not meant to deny British influences on the imagining of Canada -- these are, more than adequately, documented elsewhere.[11] Nor is it meant to call into question the "genuineness" of the Canadian community. What I am suggesting, following Benedict Anderson, is that communities must be assessed and understood not in terms of "falsity/genuineness, but...[in reference to] the style in which they are imagined."[12] I argue through the following case studies that American philanthropy was an important factor in shaping the "style[s]" in which Canada was imagined in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Assessing and evaluating the American philanthropic factor serves to move us away from narrow, parochial and unselfconsciously patriotic myths of origins that recognize only British contributions. In consequence, Canadian development can be placed in the broader context of the social and political repercussions of the transformation from entrepreneurial capitalism to modern

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[11]See, for instance, Claude Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986); Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971); Ostry, Cultural Connection; and Tippett, Making Culture.

[12]Imagined Communities, p. 6.

corporate capitalism.[13]

Antimodernism, Canadian Culture and American Foundations

In the mythology pervading discussions of the political cultures and of the essential national characters of Canada and the United States, simplistic juxtapositions have, more often than not, reigned supreme. One once-fashionable narrative posits the American Revolution as the defining and originating moment in the histories of both nations. From this starting point, American historian Louis Hartz argues, the United States has developed as the "archetype" of unchallenged Lockean liberalism, distinguished by an egalitarian social structure and unending commitments to individualism and to the free market of goods and ideas.[14] The Revolution's legacy to Canada, on the other hand, was a "tory touch" brought north by the waves of Loyalists who fled the forming Republic, and subsequently nurtured by continued economic, political, and cultural ties to Great Britain.[15] This "touch" of tory paternalism is apparently responsible for a "statist" tradition, and a greater respect for authority and acceptance for social hierarchy.[16] "The American Revolution," Seymour Martin Lipset neatly summarizes, "produced two countries which developed distinct

[13]Lynda Jessup makes a similar point in "Bushwhackers in the Gallery: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven," in Policing the Boundaries of Modernity - Antimodernism and Artistic Experience, ed. Jessup (forthcoming), p. 3.

[14]See The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanich, 1955); and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 7.

[15]Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1964), p. 34.

[16]Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton and

cultures. The United States is the country of revolution, Canada of the counter-revolution."[17]

Canada's tory fragment and supposed statist tradition have been employed to explain such seemingly unrelated phenomena as the dominance of the Family Compact in Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century and the rise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation during the middle decades of the twentieth century.[18] More significant in the context of this discussion, the British inflection or affliction (depending on one's perspective) has also been credited with the suspicion with which members of the Canadian cultural elite viewed American mass culture and for the mechanisms established by the federal state in the 1950s and 1960s to protect Canadian culture. This suspicion and the response it spawned have, in turn, been placed by cultural commentators in the past and present at the very core of an essential Canadian identity.

The consciousness of difference that pervaded the upper levels of Canadian society in the first half of the twentieth century was, to be sure, fuelled with negative stereotypes of American culture, on the one hand, and by a sense of moral superiority due to inherited "Britishness," on the other. Writing in the late 1930s, H.F. Angus noted in Canada and Her

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Company, 1996), pp. 91-93.

[17]Ibid., p. 91. An excellent recent discussion of the mythology surrounding the United Empire Loyalists is Norman Knowles, Inventing the Loyalists: The Ontario Loyalist Tradition and the Creation of a Usable Past (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). Despite being somewhat dated, the analysis of American-Canadian difference based on supposed founding principles has not been completely superseded by more complex analysis. Issues of national identity and national difference, in general, have been relegated to the background in the social history revolution. See Michael Bliss, "Privatizing the Mind: The Sundering of Canadian History, the Sundering of Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 26 (Winter, 1991-92): pp. 5-17; and Carl N. Degler, "In Pursuit of American History," American Historical Review 92 (February, 1987): pp. 1-12.

[18]Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, pp. 3-57.

Great Neighbour that "it is in regarding the United States as a source of undesirable cultural and social influences that there is most unaminity in Canada."[19] In the same collection, a young S.D. Clark summarized a particularly self-congratulatory notion of Canadian nation -- a nation that had somehow managed to combine the best aspects of both the new world and of the old:

> Canadian life is simpler, more honest, more moral and more religious than life in the United States....[I]t lies closer to the rural virtues and has achieved urbanization without giving the same scope to corrupting influences which has been afforded them in the United States.[20]

In attempting to maintain this sense of the moral and spiritual superiority of Canadian culture as the basis for a distinct "national existence," Clark noted, Canadians found it "a great help to be able to count British virtues as well as Canadian."[21]

On the surface, the anti-American sentiment and rhetoric Angus and Clark describe seem to support essentializing theses of national difference. The tendency of members of the Anglo-Canadian cultural elite to cling passionately to the British connection and to fear the United States as the breeding ground of corruption, materialism and immorality can, and should, be examined, however, in the broader context of tensions and reactions associated with the rise of industrial capitalism in the western world. As one Canadian historian puts it, "members of the old elite feared that as Canadian society 'Americanized,' they would lose

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[19]Canada and Her Great Neighbour: Sociological Surveys of Opinions and Attitudes in Canada Concerning the United States (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1938), p. 12. Considering the opinions and attitudes which were documented in this volume it is ironic that it was published as part of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace series on relations between Canada and the United States.

[20]"The Positive Content of Canadian National Life," in Angus, Canada and Her Great Neighbour, p. 245.

[21]Ibid., p. 248. See also John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, Canada 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1985), p. 191.

their status, prestige, and authority."[22] In this respect, the strident anglophilia of "cultured" Anglo-Canadians -- their longing for the "old country" -- paralleled the yearnings for premodern existence that cultural historian T.J. Jackson Lears describes in his work on American antimodernism.[23] Defined by Lears as "the recoil from an 'overcivilized' modern existence to more intense forms of physical or spiritual experience,"[24] antimodernism encompassed a variety of reactions in Europe and North America to the transformation to a modern culture driven by the development of industrial capitalism. At the heart of the Canadians' attitude to the United States was a deep-seated ambivalence with respect to an emerging mass culture that seemed to overwhelm traditional values and notions of community and replace them with something akin to a civic religion based on individualism, material progress, technical rationality and science.[25] In the same way as the discontent with modernity experienced by members of the north-eastern American elite around the turn of the century, which Lears describes in No Place of Grace, should not be treated simply as a localized attempt to resurrect a republican morality, these anxieties of the Anglo-Canadian elite in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s should not dismissed as mere sentimental attachments to the "old country." Nor should national passions and identities be analytically separated from

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[22]Allan Smith, Canadian Culture, the Canadian State, and the New Continentalism (Orono: University of Maine Press, 1990), p. 13.

[23]No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Ian McKay alerts his readers to this similarity in Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), pp. 65-66.

[24]Lears, No Place of Grace, p. xv.

[25]Ibid., p. 4.

the cold, hard class and power concerns that underpin them.

Although historians have much to learn about the relationship between antimodernism and the invention of Canada in the first half of the twentieth century, there is a small but developing body of literature focused on this phenomenon. The search for innocence, authenticity and for simpler, safer premodern spaces within the broader borders of the modern world led to a great variety of personal and collective quests. This antimodern impulse, we now know, was expressed in the rhetoric surrounding the Group of Seven's collective quest to create a national school of Canadian art. In Nova Scotia, cultural producers and the provincial state combined images and ideas of the rural past and of "the traditional" to invent a cultural identity designed to satisfy the need for collective self-definition and to feed outsiders' touristic lust for the premodern "other." The antimodernist inflection also motivated W.D. Lighthall and David Ross McCord in the development of McCord's National Museum collection. Perhaps most suggestive of the antimodern moorings of Anglo-Canadian nationalism is preliminary work documenting the antimodern styles and ideologies of the Arts and Letters Club in Toronto -- the leading men's social club of the central-Canadian English-speaking elite.[26]

In each of these cases, antimodernist thought, action, and rhetoric represented attempts to come to terms with modernity not by rejecting it wholesale, but by moderating it

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[26]Jessup,"Bushwhackers in the Gallery: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven"; McKay, Quest of the Folk; McKay, "Among the Fisherfolk: J.F.B. Livesay and the Invention of Peggy's Cove," Journal of Canadian Studies 23 (Spring 1988): pp. 23-45; McKay, "Twilight at Peggy's Cove: Toward a Genealogy of Maritimicity," Border/Lines (Summer 1988): pp. 28-37; Donald A. Wright, "W.D. Lighthall and David Ross McCord: Antimodernism and English-Canadian Imperialism, 1880s-1918," Journal of Canadian Studies 32 (Summer 1997): pp. 22-48; and Karen L. Knutson, "'Absolute Escape from all the Otherwise Made Toronto': Antimodernism at the Arts and Letters Club, 1908-1920" (M.A. thesis, Queen's University, 1995).

by inclusion of premodern physical and psychological zones of retreat. Members of the Arts and Letters Club such as Vincent Massey and Sir Edmund Walker thus had little trouble moving from the club's medieval-styled headquarters on Elm Street to the boardrooms of national business corporations. Likewise, club members Eric Brown, Charles T. Currelly and George Reid reconciled their passions for the past with their acceptance of modernity by building such modern, professionalised and bureaucratically-structured cultural institutions as the National Gallery, the Royal Ontario Museum, and the Art Gallery of Toronto.[27] Despite charges made by Group of Seven member J.E.H. MacDonald against overly commercialized and therefore "unauthentic" art in Canada, MacDonald and other members of the Group saw nothing compromising in their partnerships with major corporations or cultural institutions. As art historian Lynda Jessup observes in review of the most recent retrospective exhibition of the artists' work, the artists "were astute businessmen, in the business of art to be sure, but in business nonetheless."[28] Noting the inherent contradictions contained in an ultimately "modernizing antimodernism,"[29] Ian McKay reminds readers of his The Quest of the Folk: "It was and is possible to believe on one level in the golden age, the simple life, and the stolid Folk while extolling the virtues of progress, urban sophistication, and the risk-taking entrepreneur."[30]

Anti-Americanism and anglophilia were two related manifestations of a sometimes

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[27]Knutson, "'Absolute Escape from all that Otherwise Made Toronto'," pp. 7-8.

[28]"Art for a Nation?" Fuse 19 (Summer 1996): p. 14.

[29]Jessup, "Bushwhackers in the Gallery: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven," p. 18.

[30]The Quest of the Folk, p. 216. See also Lears, No Place of Grace, p. xv.

desperate, but ultimately successful, attempt by members of the Anglo-Canadian elite to maintain and, indeed, to reformulate their economic, political, and cultural dominance in a changing environment. The condition of modernity -- defined by McKay as "the lived experience of...[an] unremitting process of rapid change" fuelled by the advent and advance of industrial capitalism[31] -- challenged all traditional social, economic and political hierarchies of power. While ultimately committed to the culture of capitalism, this segment of the leadership class provided what Lears describes in the American context as the "eloquent edge of protest"[32] necessary to moderate the new mass culture.

More than explanations based on inherited national character and hinged on "in-the-blood Britishness," this ambivalence with regard to progress -- this desire to stand both outside and within modernity -- sheds light on the pursuit by members of the Canadian cultural elite for strong federal support for culture and on the collective quest to cultivate national and regional identities in Canada. It also helps explain how it was that pro-British, and often apparently anti-American, Anglo-Canadians could comfortably collaborate with representatives of American corporate philanthropy in pursuit of these causes. Just as these individuals did not reject all aspects of modern existence, they did not reject all American influence. "Thinking Americans," Vincent Massey noted in 1948, "are fighting gallantly against spiritual dangers which both they and we face: a distorted sense of values, the standardization of life, the worship of mere bulk for its own sake, the uncritical acceptance

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[31]"Introduction: All That is Solid Melts into Air," in The Challenge of Modernity: A Reader on Post-Confederation History ed. McKay (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992), p. x.

[32]No Place of Grace, p. XII. See also Jessup, "Bushwhackers in the Gallery," p. 18.

of the second-rate."[33] The individuals Massey referred to were not perceived to be merely "Americans," but more accurately members of an enlightened class who understood the importance of maintaining standards and cultural quality, and who shared with Canadians like himself concerns for the fate of western liberal democracy confronted by an international mass culture governed solely by the logic of supply and demand.[34]

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At first glance corporate philanthropy and antimodernism seem to have little in common. The very existence of the foundations, after all, was possible only because of the unprecedented accumulation of wealth by robber-baron donors in the latter years of the nineteenth century. C. Wright Mills expressed the thoughts of many "thinking Americans" when he targeted the entrenched wealth responsible for the large foundations as the enemy of democracy.[35] Furthermore, the short history of American philanthropy to the mid-1920s was a history of activity devoted to the expansion of the culture of industrial capitalism and to broad and successful attempts to harness a broad range of human activity and, indeed, to

[33]On Being Canadian (Toronto: Dent, 1948), p. 124.

[34]Paul Litt suggests that the Canadian critique of modern mass culture was influenced by the thought of such "thinking Americans" as David Riesman, Dwight Macdonald and William Whyte. The critique, according to Litt, was thus as much a cultural import as was the mass culture. See Litt, "The Massey Commission, Americanization, and Canadian Cultural Nationalism," Queen's Quarterly 98 (Summer 1991): p. 383. Litt may have overstated his interesting and revisionist case. As Richard Pells points out, Americans by no means held a monopoly on cultural criticism. European intellectuals had often attacked what they perceived to be the standardization and materialism of American society. See Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 172-177.

[35]The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956). See also T.J. Jackson Lears, "A Matter of Taste: Corporate Cultural Hegemony in a Mass-Consumption Society," in Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 47.

control the natural order. Broad commitments had been made to structure and rationalize higher education, to further scientific research, and to advance scientific medicine and public health on an international scale. Unquestioned commitments to science, technology and bureaucratic rationality made the foundations both the products of and the catalysts for modernity. In both respects the foundations were clearly ideological apparatuses of the modern order.

By the 1920s, however, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, though still relatively young, had evolved into complex corporate entities that reflected, in both cases, a diversity of ideological goals and positions. In addition to representing the views and perspectives of the original donors and their class, the foundations also contained the broader class interests and preoccupations of the emerging corporate, liberal elite. While both organizations maintained focus in the early 1920s on technological and scientific advances, there were strong voices within each expressing concern for the social implications of the forward march of industrial capitalism. Material "progress," it was feared, had been gained at the expense of moral and spiritual health. While it would be a vast overstatement to label these reactions as "antimodern" in nature they, nonetheless, reflected an ambivalence to modernity and a desire to regulate and moderate the excesses of capitalist modernity.

In response to these voices both foundations turned, to varying degrees, to matters of "culture" in the 1920s. For the Carnegie Corporation the turn to the cultural sphere marked, in reality, a return to an area that had been a primary concern of Andrew Carnegie's when he wrote his "Gospel of Wealth." With the selection of Frederick Keppel as president

in 1923 the Corporation embarked on a series of cultural programs designed to introduce the tastes, standards, and values of traditional "high culture" to the citizenry. While the focus of these programs would have pleased Carnegie, they were administered in the method of scientific philanthropy, through professional networks of expertise.[36] Less concerned with "culcha" and more concerned with "culture," the brain-trust of Rockefeller philanthropy expanded the scope of Rockefeller Foundation activities with the creation of the Social Science and the Humanities Divisions in 1928. Working particularly through the Humanities Division, Foundation officers grappled with modern mass culture by funding research and developing programs in the educational use of both new and old media.

The impulse to provide moral and cultural leadership -- to ensure that something other than the logic of supply and demand and the short-term material interests of entrepreneurs dictated public tastes and opinions -- drew members of the American philanthropic elite together with like-minded Canadians. Although there were broad ideological differences between members of the national elites, these differences do not neatly conform to the Tory-statist/Lockean anti-statist stereotypes of Canadian-American difference. On both sides of the border, the interest was not merely in art for art's sake (or culture for culture's sake), but more profoundly in maintaining and reformulating cultural authority and in creating a thinking public that would subscribe to and perpetuate a common sense that legitimated the leadership of the existing political and cultural elites. In the period preceding the advent of large-scale federal support for the arts and letters, this shared goal,

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[36]Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 97.

and the shared sense of social hierarchy it represented, proved greater than supposed inherited national differences.

Rockefeller Philanthropy and the Turn to Culture

The worlds of fine arts and high culture were not, in the early years, the stomping grounds of the Rockefeller Foundation and its officers. Although the fine arts were part of the Foundation's original program in 1913, public health and medical sciences were the dominant interests of the Foundation in its early years.[37] In the philanthropic division of labour and influence the arts were Carnegie turf -- particularly after Frederick Keppel's selection as head of the Corporation in 1923. It was not until the mid-1930s that the Foundation began to develop a cultural program in the United States and later still before this program had a significant impact in Canada. And unlike the Carnegie program of cultural philanthropy, which will be discussed in chapter 4, interest in the development of artistic organization and production was secondary to the concern for the communications potential of certain artistic media.

Rockefeller interest in the arts and culture was first manifested, if only tangentially, in the programs and policies of two other Rockefeller organizations, the General Education Board and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial in the mid-1920s. Raymond Fosdick later attributed this diversification to the growing interest in the upper echelons of Rockefeller philanthropy in "those who fashion ideas, concepts, and forms that give

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[37]Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1952), p. 238.

meaning and value to life and furnish the patterns of conduct."[38] Without those patterns, Fosdick argued, science could just as easily prove to be as destructive as it was constructive.[39] Warning of the dangers of focusing solely on public health and medicine, leading Foundation officer Edwin R. Embree asked a joint meeting of the trustees of the General Education Board and the Rockefeller Foundation in January 1924, "[o]f what good is it to keep people alive and healthy if their lives are not to be touched increasingly with something of beauty?"[40]

In order to provide a counterweight to the scientific emphasis in Rockefeller philanthropy, and to begin to address what they perceived to be moral and spiritual health, the officers of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial initiated a grant program to support individual scholars in the humanities.[41] In 1926 officers of the General Education Board also turned to the humanities with a strategy borrowed from the organization's campaign to reform medical education in the United States. After convening a national conference attended by representatives from university departments of Art, Archaeology, Languages, Literature, Religion, History and Philosophy, the General Education Board distributed a series of large block grants to Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Johns Hopkins, the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, and the University of Virginia. The

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[38]Ibid., p. 237.

[39]Ibid., p. 28.

[40]"Memorandum on the Conference at Gedney Farms," 18-19 January 1924, the Rockefeller Foundation files, cited in Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 238.

[41]Minutes of the General Education Board, 10-11 October 1924, p. 108, cited in Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 238.

grants came with few restrictions and were to be used by the recipient institutions, at their discretion, to build departments, and to support faculty research and publication in the humanities.[42] As had been the case with the medical program, the goal was to establish recipient institutions as national models to be emulated by less fortunate schools. True progress, in the eyes of the men who managed corporate philanthropy, always followed from the building of strong "national" programs.

This program of term grants to major centres of learning and a related General Education Board initiative to strengthen the position of the American Council of Learned Societies by funding its fellowship programs, and by supporting large research projects endorsed by its committees, had the combined and desired effect of entrenching the humanities in these elite institutions. Between 1925 and 1933 almost $12 million dollars was given by various Rockefeller philanthropies to promote studies in the humanities in the United States.[43] Looking back over this initial Rockefeller humanities program, a Foundation officer later noted that it encouraged and invigorated studies in the humanities to the extent that it "made possible such major projects as other countries develop only under state support."[44]

These programs remained in force even after the 1928 reorganization of Rockefeller philanthropy. At that time, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial was absorbed into the

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[42]"Humanities - Program and Policy: Past Program and Proposed Future Program: Extract from Agenda for Special Trustees Meeting, April 11, 1933," pp. 53-60, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 9, Papers of the Rockefeller Foundation (hereafter RF), Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

[43]Ibid.

[44]"The Humanities Program of the Rockefeller Foundation: A Review of the Period 1934-1939," p. 14, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

structure of the Rockefeller Foundation with the creation of new Social Science and Humanities Divisions. In addition, the General Education Board's program in the humanities was integrated with the Rockefeller Foundation's new Humanities Division's program -- a situation facilitated by John Marshall's appointment as the Assistant Director of both organizations.[45] This consolidation formally marked the beginning of Foundation involvement in the humanities. It was not until 1932, however, when Marshall and new Humanities Division Director David Stevens took charge, that the Foundation began to depart from the programs and policies established by the directors of the General Education Board and of the Laura Spelman Memorial.

The Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Division and Cultural Interpretation

Soon after taking control of the Humanities Division, Stevens, Marshall and several other Rockefeller officers began expressing dissatisfaction with the program they had inherited and with the way in which American universities approached the humanities. While clearly placing the humanities on firm footing in the academy, the program did little, the men argued, to bring the "humanities from books, seminars and museums into the currents of modern life."[46] Rockefeller philanthropy, it was felt, had placed millions of dollars into the hands of the "elder statesmen" who dominated the traditional fields of

[45]William J. Buxton, "The Emergence of the Humanities Division's Program in Communications, 1930-1936," Research Reports from the Rockefeller Archive Center (Spring 1996): p. 4.

[46]"Humanities - Program and Policy: Extract from DR 486, Report of Committee on Appraisal and Plan, December 11, 1934," p. 72, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 9, RF, RAC.

humanistic study. "While advancing human knowledge," noted a Rockefeller officer later, "we were strengthening the aristocracy of scholasticism."[47] And of Abraham Flexner, the architect of the General Education Board's strategy for the humanities, David Stevens, the new director of the Humanities Division, frankly observed, "I like his faith in excellence and in first-rate men, but he asked nothing openly of them beyond a refinement of the scholarly traditions of Europe."[48]

As a result of this dissatisfaction, a "Committee of Plan and Appraisal" was created by the trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1934 to review former programs and policies and to make recommendations on future activities in the humanities. In making their recommendations to this committee, officers repeatedly expressed the feeling that the earlier program had supported only a small number of senior scholars, focused too narrowly on studies of European culture and, in consequence, had spoken not at all to the issues of the day. The old program, it was noted in one brief, "is getting us facts but not necessarily followers. We have more detailed information about a great number of rather abstruse subjects, but that does not logically mean that the level of artistic and aesthetic appreciation has been measurably raised."[49] Long-time Rockefeller officer Jerome D. Greene went further, questioning the utility of the very traditional approaches to the humanities which had been privileged by the early program of support: "put in its crudest form, a common

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[47]"The Humanities Program of the Rockefeller Foundation: A Review of the Period 1934-1939," p. 14, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[48]David H. Stevens, "The Humanities in Theory and Policy," 31 March 1937, p. 3, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[49]"New Program in the Humanities," 10 April 1935, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

knowledge of classical and mythological allusion has been used as a shibboleth for admission to intellectual gentility rather than a means of enlarging the common stock of ideas, [and] the vocabulary of enlightened human intercourse."[50]

What the officers were looking to do with their new program in the humanities was to reach deeper into American society -- not to operate "above" the emerging mass culture, but rather to engage with it and bring the Foundation's considerable influence to it. The officers saw as their target nothing less than a reformulation of the humanistic tradition that would allow it to speak to Depression-era America. As cultural leaders who wanted to maintain the existing social hierarchy, men like Marshall and Stevens saw humanism as a way of thought that could be used to combat the sense of rootlessness and the accompanying crisis of authority which were brought on by the boom-and-bust rhythm of unregulated capitalism. In an effort to bring the Foundation's work in the humanities "more directly into contact with daily living" and to gain a clearer idea of "the ways in which the American public now gains its culture" the trustees committee commissioned a series of surveys of experts in broadcasting, motion pictures, music, drama and handicrafts, museums and libraries, and adult education.[51] As a result of these investigations, the emphasis of the Foundation's program in the humanities was shifted from simply searching for "ways to increase knowledge" to finding "better use of means to disseminate knowledge...." Officers like John Marshall and David Stevens pledged their support to "those men and methods able

[50]Jerome D. Greene, "The Place of the Humanities in a Program of Human Welfare" (report made at request of Appraisal Committee, 1934), p. 5, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 9, RF, RAC.

[51]"New Program in the Humanities," 10 April 1935, pp. i-ii, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

to influence contemporary tastes in large masses of population."[52]

Discussing the transformation of the Foundation's humanities program in the mid-1930s, David Stevens revealed the extent to which it was predicated on the fear on the part of Foundation leaders that they and the class they represented were losing a competition in the free market of ideas. In words that would not at all seem foreign or out of place in the Massey report, Stevens described what he perceived to be the devastating effects of mass culture: "At all levels we are assailed by masses of print, sound, film, broadcast, and advertising that strive to mechanize our emotional responses each as capable of establishing within us its own brand of syndicated emotion as a special variety of syndicated opinion."[53]

The unregulated, unopposed mass production of information -- particularly at a time of extreme economic crisis -- represented a grave challenge to the authority of what men like Stevens saw as properly constituted knowledge, and thus to the structures of knowledge the Foundation was building. Able to provide leadership in the development of public health, medical education and of scientific knowledge, Rockefeller managers had come to the startling realization that their humanities program was helping to train an intellectual leadership that nobody outside the academy understood or even had the opportunity to listen to. While the old program had had great impact in the narrow circles of America's social and cultural elite, it had little resonance for most Americans. Noting that "you and I

[52]"Humanities Program of the Rockefeller Foundation: A Review of the Period 1934-1939," p. 15, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC. For a brief, but informative discussion of the Rockefeller Foundation's interest in communications see Buxton, "The Emergence of the Humanities Division's Program in Communications, 1930-1936," pp. 3-5.

[53]David H. Stevens, "The Humanities in Theory and Policy," 31 March 1937, p. 2, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

require more than informed critics and known resources within and without, to bring us spiritual freedom,..." Stevens suggested Americans "must develop a real power of resistance and of selection if we are to feel and to believe This instead of That."[54]

With the new program in the humanities, Stevens and Marshall sought to establish the Rockefeller Foundation as a major presence in the world of communications and thus influence how Americans created their "own forms of mental, emotional and spiritual freedom."[55] Content that the traditional humanities disciplines were safely and firmly established in the curricula of major institutions of higher education, the Foundation gradually brought the term-grant program to an end.[56] To replace these grants Foundation officers were authorized to initiate and support projects in drama, film, radio, and in the collection of local and regional history and folklore.[57] Using new and old media alike -- from the airwaves to the stages of community theatre projects -- intellectuals supported by the new regime attempted to bring educational and cultural material, and thus their own authority and that of the Rockefeller Foundation, to broader audiences. Combatting the assumption that "culture" was something foreign, they attempted to foster "a larger appreciation of those elements in American life that constitute our national heritage..." and to promote "cultural understanding amongst nations."[58] The primary concern was for the

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[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid., p. 1.

[56]"Extract from Statement of Program Presented at Special Trustees Conference, December 15, 1936," RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[57]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 242.

[58]"Program in the Humanities, March 1934," RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 9, RF, RAC.

survival (or indeed the re-creation) of a cultural identity at a time when older notions of community were being challenged by great social, economic, and technological change. In taking measures to create or re-create local, regional and national heritages, of course, the intellectuals and the Foundation were engaging in the selection and ordering of the "elements" of that heritage. Discovery of "the various means of reaching minds, [of] how communications succeeds and how by interpretation understanding becomes humane," became the "recognized task of the Foundation in the Humanities."[59]

Thus, under the new program, building the national heritage became a central goal for the Foundation. Accordingly, Humanities Division grants to the Library of Congress were designed to support activities related to the institution's collections of folklore and regional history material. With the help of the Foundation, the Library was able to develop and make available to the public unique collections. These included the over 20,000 recordings collected by Alan Lomax and his staff for the Archives of American Folk Song, as well as the collection of folklore materials compiled by the Federal Writers' Project. In a related move, the Foundation provided the Library of Congress a $100,000 grant that enabled it, in turn, to support researchers who wished to use the collections.[60]

In another effort to move further from the "antiquarianism" and "scholasticism" of the earlier humanities program, and to influence a broader constituency, the Rockefeller Foundation moved tentatively into the mass communications fields of radio and film.

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[59]"The Humanities Program of the Rockefeller Foundation: A Review of the Period 1934-1939," p. 25, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[60]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 246.

Seeking to bring "informed public opinion...into constructive relations with the industry,..."[61] and thus to increase the volume of educational content on the airwaves and in film, the Foundation supported a number of projects in the two fields. Noting that it was the function of intellectuals working out of regional centres to interpret and disseminate information about "their section of the country for the rest, or even, as international broadcasting develops, for the world at large,"[62] the Foundation funded the establishment of experimental educational radio organizations such as the Chicago Broadcasting Council, the Rocky Mountain Radio Council and the World Wide Broadcasting Foundation of Boston.[63] Perhaps the most innovative work supported under the new humanities program in the later 1930s was supervised by Paul Lazarsfeld at Princeton University and later at Columbia. Bringing together experts in public opinion and social psychology, Lazarsfeld's project explored "the entire field of listener response and listener interest" in an attempt to discover "the genuine interests of radio listeners and [to evaluate]...the possibilities of cultural broadcasts under present circumstances."[64]

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[61]"New Program in the Humanities," 10 April 1935, p. 15, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[62]Ibid., p. 22.

[63]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, pp. 245-246. See also The Humanities Budget (Extract from Director's Report on Program), Trustees Meeting, 11 December 1935, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[64]"The Humanities Program of the Rockefeller Foundation: A Review of the Period 1934-1939," p. 49, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC. Lazarsfeld, previously a member of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, was one of an extraordinary group of intellectuals who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Many European intellectuals were aided by the Rockefeller Foundation's Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars which was formed in 1933 and funded the employment of European intellectuals at American universities. Lazarsfeld's former Frankfurt School colleague, Theodor Adorno, joined the Princeton Radio Research Project in 1938 before leaving for California in 1941. See Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 22-26, 179.

Although reluctant to get involved in film production, the Foundation did support efforts to coordinate the activities of educators and producers and to facilitate the collection and distribution of non-commercial films. In 1935 a Foundation grant helped establish the American Film Center, an organization which was to serve as a clearinghouse for educational film distribution. Another Foundation grant went to the Museum of Modern Art's Film Library, which became the repository for an impressive collection of non-commercial film and for published works on the history of the medium.[65]

While much of the new program was devoted to experimental projects in the use of new media, the officers of the Humanities Division were particularly interested in innovative use of a very old medium. Even before the formal reorientation of the Foundation's humanities policy, community drama programs -- often but not always centered at a universities or colleges -- caught the interest of the officers. Providing valuable training for personnel, projects at the University of North Carolina, Cornell University, the State University of Iowa, Western Reserve University, the Cleveland Play House, Yale and Stanford University were also selected for Rockefeller support "for the...constructive reason that they were centers having a continuing influence in the cultural life of large sectors of the country."[66] Offering greater potential for audience participation than anything in film or radio, community drama projects brought together young writers, actors, producers and used local history and folklore as source material. In addition to making grants directly to the

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[65]Ibid., pp. 44-45. See also "The Humanities Budget (Extract from Director's Report on Program), Trustees Meeting," 11 December 1935, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[66]"New Program in the Humanities," 10 April 1935, pp. 10-11, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC. See also "The Humanities Budget (Extract from Director's Report on Program), Trustees Meeting," 11 December 1935, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

programs mentioned above, the Foundation encouraged this non-traditional mixture of scholarly training in art, history and literature by funding students to train at both the undergraduate and graduate levels at these centers. Drama, it was ironically noted in an internal Foundation report, was "perhaps the strongest force for giving a modern spirit to humanistic studies."[67]

By funding these various cultural projects the Humanities Division officers had by the late 1930s established the Rockefeller Foundation as an important factor in the American cultural arena. What had started in the mid-1920s as a program to reinforce the stature of the humanities at strategically-selected elite universities had been transformed into an ambitious effort to intervene in the politics of mass culture and identity formation. The shift to culture was predicated on the officers' concern for what they perceived to be a moral and spiritual void in American life that accompanied material and economic progress and their fear of the threat this void might pose to the existing social order. The advent of the Great Depression only made these efforts by corporate philanthropy and the state to fill this void and to provide cultural leadership all the more urgent.

With its emphasis on "cultural interpretation," the Rockefeller Foundation and the intellectuals it funded experimented in the use of a variety of media to create and to propagate a consciousness of what president Raymond Fosdick later described as "cultural inheritance."[68] Balancing, to some extent at least, purely commercial forces, the Foundation engaged in a complex process of cultural selection, selecting those intellectuals whom the

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[67]"New Program in the Humanities," 10 April 1935, p. 11, RG 3, Series 911, Box 2, Folder 10, RF, RAC.

[68]Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 253.

officers perceived to be "the best" to engage in quests to uncover "authentic" American traditions and histories.

In these projects, it is significant to note, the Rockefeller Foundation often worked in conjunction with the state. What once had been a bitter adversarial relationship between the state and corporate philanthropy -- a relationship best exemplified by the proceedings of the Walsh Commission in 1916 -- had been transformed into one of cooperation. The Foundation's program of "cultural interpretation" did not simply parallel the state's cultural New Deal in the 1930s, but intersected with it. In the same way as the Foundation began to support medical education in public institutions in the early 1920s, it could, in the 1930s, complement government programs such as the Works Progress Adminstration Federal Writers' Project and the Federal Theatre Project or work through such permanent public institutions as the Library of Congress. When it came to discovering, as Fosdick put it, "who we are and where and what we came from, [and creating] a fuller interpretation of American life,..."[69] the border separating the public from the private was blurred at best.

The Humanities Division and Canada: Cultural Interpretation and the Idea of North American Regionalism

Two primary objectives of the new program in the humanities paradoxically led to its exportation to Canada. On the one hand, in Marshall's and Stevens's eyes, American culture and American ideals were not bounded by the borders of the nation-state. As Marshall later

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[69]Ibid., p. 256.

observed, "[i]f the cultural history of the United States were to be studied, the basis had to be not political units, not the nation, but the human regions that made up North America, the United States and Canada."[70] On the other hand, Canada's status as an independent nation made it -- particularly after the start of the Second World War and the advent of closer and more coordinated relations between Canada and the United States -- an object of the Rockefeller Foundation's desire to improve "cultural understanding amongst nations." As had been the case earlier when the Rockefeller Foundation had first extended its public health and medical education programs north of the border, Canada was thus peculiarly and contradictorily treated both as a collection of northern regions of the American culture and as a foreign nation. Consequently, the Foundation's Canadian programs were, at times, merely regional extensions of pre-existing American policy, while at other times, Rockefeller officers displayed acute sensitivity to Canadian national leadership. The tension associated with this contradiction was present in every phase of Foundation's Canadian activities through to the 1950s.

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Between September 1941 and November 1942, John Marshall, the Associate Director of the Rockefeller Foundation's Humanities Division, toured Canadian centers engaging in what he later described in his formal diary as a "general exploration."[71] In fact,

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[70]Quoted in Charles R. Acland and William J. Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy: A Rockefeller Officer's Impressions of the Humanities in the Maritimes," Acadiensis 23 (Spring 1994): p. 75.

[71]John Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Quebec and Ontario, September 29 - October 3, 1941," p. 1A, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

Marshall was surveying the Canadian intellectual and cultural scenes for opportunities for Rockefeller Foundation's humanities program, and searching the landscape for individuals and institutions whose ideas and ambitions meshed well with the programs and policies developed in the United States during the later 1930s.

During his cross-Canada tour Marshall searched for individuals and institutions which could, with the helping hand of the Rockefeller Foundation, contribute to "a better interpretation of Canadian tradition."[72] The focus of the Foundation's program in the humanities, he explained to the Canadians he met, lay somewhere between the levels of purely academic investigation and of mass diffusion. The Foundation was interested in "activities which aimed at formulating the findings of investigators and at interpreting them in ways which made them available for purposes of general diffusion."[73] What Marshall and the Foundation were, in fact, looking to do in Canada was to contribute to a process of organizing the raw material on which a set of unifying traditions could be based -- to effectively structure the past for the purpose of identity-formation in the present. Of course, in making such a contribution, the Foundation was also influencing the nature of the finished product.

As was the case for those searching for American traditions, the building blocks of a Canadian national tradition, Raymond Fosdick later noted, were thought to be "the rich regional cultures" of North America.[74] In keeping with the metropolitanism that infused all

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[72]Ibid.

[73]Ibid., p. 2A.

[74]The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation, p. 256.

Rockefeller philanthropy, each of these "human regions" was seen to emanate from a metropolitan base which served as the center of overlapping transportation, economic, and educational systems. Within the Rockefeller Foundation's framework, cultural consciousness, like medical education and public health, was to be organized and distributed from a system of regional centers. Culture in the age of mass communications, in this definition, was not only inherited from the indeterminate past, but was the product of modern organizing and structuring forces. Paradoxically, these regional cultures -- the components of North American "national" cultures -- were not necessarily bounded by the political border that formally separated Canada and the United States. In Marshall's eyes, at least before his fact-finding mission, it was not at all clear that the principal metropolitan forces acting on cultures in Canada were or should be located north of the border.

Not surprisingly, Marshall's proposal for regional interpretations of North America provoked a variety of responses from the leading Canadian intellectuals he met. Perhaps more surprising from today's perspective, and considering the present status of many of the intellectuals involved in the discussions as founding fathers of modern Canada, is the fact that, in general, Marshall's arguments were taken very seriously. While not all his Canadian hosts accepted all the implications of the approach -- although some seemed to -- Marshall's ideas had general resonance among the men he encountered.

Of course, this was no accident. As was the case with all surveys conducted by Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropies, the process of cultural selection began long before the officer actually set foot in Canada. Following the pattern earlier employed by representatives of American foundations in Canada, Marshall established his itinerary in a

manner which would ensure that he would speak with men who would listen. In short, Marshall's Canadian hosts were individuals who in the most basic respects were very much like himself. Within the extremely limited parameters Marshall set for selection, his list of Canadian contacts represented a diversity of political and ideological perspectives. But if we adjust our perspective and assess the composition of the group against an unlimited range of possibilities, it is easy to see that Marshall's contacts were drawn from an extremely narrow segment of Canadian society. With very few exceptions, all of Marshall's contacts were men.[75] All, moreover, were members of an urban-based national elite which had been coalescing since the early 1920s. Employed, for the most part, at major Canadian universities or cultural institutions, members of this elite, like the managers of American philanthropy in their own country, enjoyed firm connections to the state and business elites. They, like Marshall, assumed that it was their duty to provide leadership.

Little was left to chance. Almost every one of Marshall's contacts had some previous exposure, however indirect, to American corporate philanthropy. Most were employed at institutions that had received major contributions from one or both of the large American foundations in the 1920s and 1930s. Many had been the recipients of Carnegie, Rockefeller, or Guggenheim fellowships while at graduate school in the United States or as distinguished senior scholars visiting American campuses and research facilities during sabbaticals. Many more had been involved in one or more of the special research projects sponsored by

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[75] Charles Acland and William Buxton correctly attribute this to the "largely unstated masculinist assumptions that underpinned the philanthropic and academic practices of the period." See Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 84, n. 63.

American foundations in the 1930s.[76]

In addition to the social composition of the group and the previous contacts its members had had with American corporate philanthropy, there were other compelling explanations for the generally warm reception Marshall received on his mission. Canadian intellectuals may have been suspicious of Marshall's sense of the precise sources and parameters of North American regional cultures, but most shared the Rockefeller officer's zeal for imagining, defining and structuring cultural spaces in North America. In a rapidly changing modern environment altered by continual waves of immigration, by urbanization, by economic depression and by war, many intellectuals in Canada were also struggling to maintain or reformulate the foundations of community and identity. The idea, moreover, of cultural regions within North America was not new to Canadians. In an article he wrote for the American Journal of Sociology in 1927, Carl Dawson, a sociologist at McGill University, had theorized regional boundaries similar to the ones Marshall had in mind. Far from minimizing the differences between the United States and Canada, Dawson had argued that the existence of a greater number of these regions in Canada contributed to the country's unique national character. He also argued that although topographical barriers largely defined regions, systems of communication and transportation also contributed to regional formation. Canada, he asserted, was held together by the dominant social, economic, and political forces of the central region in a system he described as "decentralized

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[76]Three of these special projects -- The Canadian Frontiers of Settlement Series, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace text and conference series on Canadian-American relations, and McGill University's Social Science Research Project -- will be discussed in depth in Chapter 5.

centralization."[77]

The men Marshall met and spoke with on his tour included many members of what could be termed a nationalist vanguard. Members of this group were connected loosely by membership in a complex web of professional, intellectual and cultural associations formed in the 1920s and 1930s. These men were also intricately involved in building what they hoped would be the institutional cornerstones of a national culture -- universities throughout Canada, and cultural institutions, including the National Gallery of Canada, the National Museum, the Art Gallery of Toronto, and the Royal Ontario Museum. With the social and economic upheaval of the Great Depression followed immediately by the outbreak of war again in Europe, an increasing number of these intellectuals became involved in the state either on a permanent basis as civil servants or temporarily as members of or researchers for government commissions. A large number of Marshall's hosts as he toured Canada in 1941 and 1942, for instance, had been involved in the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations of 1937 (the Rowell-Sirois Commission) or were currently involved in the Advisory Committee on Reconstruction chaired by McGill University Principal Cyril James. Involved in this flurry of activity related to the conceptualization of and the relationship between local, regional and national communities and, indeed, in the remaking of the nation, members of this vanguard did not necessarily perceive Marshall's preoccupation with issues of community consciousness and identity as at all "foreign."

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[77]"Population Areas and Physiographic Regions in Canada," American Journal of Sociology 33 (July 1927): p. 50. For other early discussions of regions in Canada see W.N. Sage, "Geographical and Cultural Aspects of the Five Canadas," The Canadian Historical Association: Report of the Annual Meeting Held at McMaster University, Hamilton May 22-25, 1937 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1937): pp. 28-35; and Reginald G. Trotter, "The Appalachian Barrier in Canadian History," The Canadian Historical Association: Report of the Annual Meeting Held at Montreal May 25-26, 1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1939): pp. 5-21.

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In his survey trip to western Canadian cities in October 1941, Marshall found considerable interest on the part of Canadians for the idea of making regions both the subject of research as well as the organizational base for scholarly inquiry in North America. After his meeting with John W. Dafoe, the publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press, and George Ferguson, the newspaper's editor, Marshall noted in his diary that "Winnipeg is the center of...a most enlightened Canadian nationalism."[78] "Ferguson sees and states clearly," Marshall ironically elaborated,

> the cultural disunity of Canada. It is, in his words, not yet a nation at all. It is, in fact, committed still to a kind of cultural pluralism, which speaks habitually of the peoples of Canada rather than of the Canadian people.[79]

Dafoe, for his part, impressed Marshall with his remark that Confederation was a "miracle" which could not have occurred either ten years before or ten years after 1867.[80]

Where he did not find a particularly strong sense of nation on the prairie, Marshall did discover, to his delight, an eagerness in the academic community to organize on a regional basis. University of Saskatchewan President James S. Thomson, "a Glasgow man" whom Marshall described as "a somewhat older and somewhat more sententious version of

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[78]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Second Part: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Vancouver, October 20 - 30, 1941," p. 4, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[79]Ibid.

[80]Ibid., p. 5. Upon repeating Dafoe's comment to a group of scholars at Saskatoon, Marshall was asked in return "if the same might be true of the adoption of the U.S. constitution." See Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Second Part: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Vancouver, October 20 - 30, 1941," p. 7, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[Government Film Commissioner] John Grierson,..."[81] suggested his desire for regional organization to Marshall during his stay in Saskatoon. Thomson had, Marshall later recollected, "for some time been considering what his university and those of Manitoba and Alberta could do toward a better interpretation of the Canadian West."[82] Even more encouraging was Thomson's assessment that the University of Alberta, the University of Manitoba and his own institution could "readily and congenially cooperate in such matters."[83] In subsequent conversations with members of the faculty of the University of Saskatchewan, Marshall uncovered a willingness to extend that spirit of cooperation beyond the border. "Emphasis," Marshall later recalled in apparent delight, "was laid on forgetting the border -- which, after all, hardly existed until recent times in the study of the Canadian West."[84] Historian W.M. Whitelaw in particular caught Marshall's attention with his discussion of factors of development common to the western states and provinces, including innovations in agricultural technique and the mechanization of agricultural production.[85] In response to Whitelaw's assertion that, despite rich common ground, western Canadian scholars had "difficulty...making contacts with scholars working in this field across the line,"[86] Marshall suggested that the Rockefeller Foundation might be persuaded by the right

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[81]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Second Part: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Vancouver, October 20 - 30, 1941," p. 5, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[82]Ibid., p. 12.

[83]Ibid.

[84]Ibid., p. 14.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

proposal to fund a conference of scholars from western Canadian and American universities to discuss future possibilities for joint research. In addition, Marshall observed that Rockefeller support for student and faculty exchanges between American and Canadian institutions could ensure that "the next generation of scholarship would see the common factors on both sides of the line."[87]

Once formulated at Saskatoon, the idea of a conference on the Great Plains region met with substantial support at the other provincial universities. At Edmonton, George Smith, head of the Department of History and Dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta, expressed his keen interest in both the conference and the fellowship proposals. To illustrate the need for such cross-border interaction, Smith noted that at the time it would be very unlikely that even an "able student" studying the populist movement in Minnesota would investigate parallel developments in western Canada. While "in the normal course of things" this shortcoming might be highlighted in reviews and subsequently "dealt with properly when the subject was next treated," Smith felt the deficiency could more efficiently be eliminated by freer exchanges between Canadian and American universities.[88]

Marshall completed his survey of the Canadian west secure in his assessment that the "possibility of such joint studies...is real and promising."[89] He came away from his discussions in Winnipeg, Saskatoon, and Edmonton with the strong feeling that "there is clear recognition of the problem of Canadian nationality -- or lack of it," and that "the time

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[87]Ibid.

[88]Ibid., p. 15.

[89]Ibid., p. 42.

is ripe for helping Canada to a better interpretation of herself."[90] Not surprisingly, considering the ready interest Marshall perceived for his idea and approaches, he anticipated "that requests which may come in from the prairie universities may offer the RF a chance to help in developments which can build on an unusually solid foundation."[91]

Marshall's next stop in his Canadian journey was the province of Quebec, which he visited in January of 1942. There he met with French-speaking intellectuals in Quebec City and Montreal including Georges-Henri Lévesque, the Director of the School of Social Sciences at Laval University, and Université de Montréal Secretary Edouard Montpetit. Marshall decided that "French Canada" (loosely equated in his mind with Quebec) must be treated as a region in its own right and was deeply impressed by the potential opportunities the province provided for the Rockefeller Foundation Humanities program. He, in fact, considered French Canada as somewhat of a model for his notion of a cultural region. "There is among [French Canadians]," Marshall noted,

> still something of 18th century cultural tradition in which every scholar remained in part a humanist. Their own voluminous literature about themselves, though perhaps diffuse and impressionistic in many instances, manifests this bias. More than any other group in Canada, they have interpreted themselves and as a result have a self-consciousness of their own life and the problems it involves, which proves a good base at least for creating understanding of them elsewhere.[92]

At the suggestion of Marine Leland of the Department of French Language and Literature at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, Marshall decided initially to

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[90]Ibid., p. 41.

[91]Ibid., p. 44.

[92]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 19 - 23, 1942," p. 25, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

channel Foundation Humanities Division interest in French Canada through the newly established North American French section of the Rockefeller-sponsored Modern Language Association (MLA).[93] Leland and Marshall smugly agreed that French-Canadian literature was superior to anything produced in English Canada. Stemming from a "tradition [that]...dates back to colonial days," Leland noted in a letter to Marshall, "it has shown tremendous improvement in the last ten years."[94]

As this last remark suggested, Leland believed that traditions could be altered and improved. In much the same way as Marshall and his colleagues in the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation believed that the western liberal tradition was in need of reformulation, there was a sense that the tradition of French Canada was ripe for refurbishment. Bringing "French Canada" into the continental mainstream, Leland felt, was necessary to eliminating the obstacle of isolation: "If only French Canadians writers can get some means of coming in contact with other Americans who are interested in this continent, they will get greater confidence in themselves and produce more solid works."[95] To that end and, as Marshall put it, to "help American scholars in this section of the MLA, through discussion, to get at some of the fundamental realities of French Canadian life,"[96] the Foundation sponsored a conference in March 1942 in New York. Noting that the study of "North American French" was obviously one area in which Canadian scholars were far in

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[93]Marine Leland to John Marshall, 20 December 1941, RG 2, Series 427R, Box 222, Folder 1545, RF, RAC.

[94]Ibid.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16, 1942," p. 10, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

advance of their American colleagues, Marshall observed that "the section for the study of North American French in the Modern Language Association will make a grave mistake if it does not give full recognition to the studies of the Canadian French which have been carried on in Canada over forty years."[97]

Where Marshall had perceived the fragility of national feeling in the prairie provinces to be at the root of interest in regional analysis of North American culture, he encountered in Montreal a group of Anglo-Canadians who saw both continentalism and regionalism as essential components of post-war Canadian nationalism. In consequence, after meeting with C.A. Dawson, professor of Sociology at McGill University and the Chairman of the Canadian Social Science Research Council; F.R. Scott, McGill professor and a founding member of the League for Social Reconstruction; and Raleigh Parkin, Vincent Massey's brother-in-law, an executive of the Sun Life Assurance Company, and a key advisor to the Carnegie Corporation, Marshall termed "the possibilities for North American regional studies...most encouraging."[98]

In discussions with Marshall, moreover, the group quickly went beyond mere acceptance of the concept to the task of defining the parameters of the potential regions. All agreed that three regions were clearly established: the northern Pacific coast region, which included Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, and Alaska; the Plains region; and a north-eastern Appalachian region which encompassed the New England states and the Maritime

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[97] Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 19 - 23, 1942," p. 25, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[98] Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16, 1942," p. 11, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC. Parkin was also a trustee of the Crane Foundation of New York.

provinces.[99] Dawson further recommended that Marshall discuss with University of Toronto economist Harold Innis the feasibility of studies of a Great Lakes region.[100] In response to Marshall's suggestion that a regional study supported by the Foundation's Humanities Division should aim to put "together...basic data in something aimed at a total cultural interpretation...[and that] such interpretation...might be so organized as to be readily useful for purposes of mass communication, in print, radio and film," Dawson agreed that it would be useful to have the participation of Canadian Film Board Commissioner John Grierson in planning sessions.[101]

Scott, for his part, was intrigued by the potential Marshall's approach had for raising awareness "of the geo-physical organization of the North American continent."[102] A year earlier Scott, who at that time was holding a Guggenheim Fellowship and conducting research at the Harvard Law School, had published a short book, Canada and the United States, in the World Peace Foundation series "America Looks Ahead." In this book Scott discussed liberal democratic values and the "unity of historical origin and purpose" shared by the two nations.[103] Scott, according to Marshall, was "convinced that some North American

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[99]Dawson, most likely, was responsible for outlining the boundaries of the regions. They conformed to the ones he postulated in 1927 in his article, "Population Areas and Physiographic Regions in Canada."

[100]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 19 - 23, 1942," p. 11, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[101]Ibid., p. 12.

[102]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16, 1942," p. 12, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[103]Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941, p. 11.

or North Atlantic organization should prevail in post-war reconstruction."[104] Indeed, in his book, Scott theorized how military cooperation and the coordination of continental defence strategies might profitably lead to a greater level of political and economic integration following the war. Under the surface of discussions of defense, Scott noted, there was "a more fundamental process at work":

> Mass production, the industrialization of warfare, the perfection of the internal combustion engine, the science of planning -- these basic factors have rendered obsolete the anarchic world of small national sovereignties in which we used to live. A supra-nationalism, a higher federalism, seems to be developing.[105]

Scott even queried his readers whether the defense agreement between Canada and the United States announced at Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940 might prove to be "the first clause of a North American constitution."[106] In his discussions with Marshall, Scott expressed his desire that national cooperation in North America serve as an example for international relations for the world. Revealing his deeper agenda, Marshall stated that although Rockefeller Foundation support for regional study was not intended to have that result, "it could hardly be neglected if one let his mind follow the natural implications of such studies."[107]

Parkin liked what he saw as the "realism" of the regional approach and the effects he

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[104]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16, 1942," p. 12, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[105]Canada and the United States, p. 64.

[106]Ibid., p. 7.

[107]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16, 1942," p. 12, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

felt that such studies would have for Canadian scholars in the humanities. Regional studies of geographic areas that included Canadian soil would allow Canadian scholars, Parkin argued, to collaborate on equal footing with American colleagues. The use of regions as basic units for investigation had the advantage of making it more feasible to bring "Canadian scholars together with each other and with Americans thus helping to defeat 'Canada's greatest enemy, distance.'"[108]

From his conversations in Montreal, Marshall developed a greater understanding and respect for what he saw as a burgeoning national elite. "Despite the enormous distances which Canada has to reckon with," Marshall noted, "its able men have perhaps more of a chance to make themselves felt in Canada's small population than able men do in the enormous American population."[109] It appeared to Marshall, moreover, that this opportunity to contribute at the national level -- an opportunity increased exponentially by the Second World War -- was "energizing" Canadian intellectuals.[110] What Marshall was, in fact, witnessing was a process which had begun earlier in the century when individuals like William Lyon Mackenzie King and Queen's economist O.D. Skelton left the academy for government service. The trickle to Ottawa had, by the mid-1930s, accelerated to a steady flow as greater numbers of intellectuals made their way into what historian Douglas Owram refers to as the federal state's "inner councils."[111]

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[108]Ibid.

[109]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 19 - 23, 1942," p. 26, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[110]Ibid., p. 26.

[111]The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of

Marshall was particularly impressed by the zeal for planning exhibited by men like Parkin, Scott, and Montreal lawyer and McGill professor Brooke Claxton. He had gained the impression that "such topics as post-war reconstruction were very much more in the forefront in Canada than he had believed to be the case on this side of the border [in the United States]."[112] Marshall further applauded what he saw as "relatively advanced ideas...in the air" relating to the North American political realignment, which his informants felt was an inevitable component of post-war reconstruction.[113] He hypothesized that it was the existence of such thought that accounted for "an unexpectedly cordial interest in what might be done toward interpretative studies which would make clearer to people generally what North America tradition may come to mean."[114]

Perhaps the harshest criticism Marshall encountered on his Canadian tour came from the Maritime region, which he visited in the spring of 1942. In what was later described by Marshall as "a two-hour inquisition," George E. Wilson and D.C. Harvey grilled Marshall on the motives behind the Foundation's interest in the Maritimes-New England region. At one point Wilson, a Professor of History at Dalhousie University, wondered aloud whether making the continent the broader frame of reference was "a kind of American imperialism." Dalhousie historian and provincial archivist Harvey inquired about whether a regional project sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation would include support for his work at the

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Toronto Press, 1986), p. 160.

[112]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 19 - 23, 1942," p. 26, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[113]Ibid.

[114]Ibid.

archives in collecting source materials in the province of Nova Scotia.[115] Marshall suggested that he could not respond "until the officers had a total picture of what a study of the Maritimes-New England region would comprise..." and then, dangling a carrot in front of Harvey, he suggested that "the price of getting an answer would be...[his] help in elaborating that picture."[116]

Harvey declined such a role in the proposed study, pointing out that he had "laid out the lines of my work, and at my age I must hold to them." While this discouraged Marshall, he noted in his diary that the archivist was "undoubtedly sound and thorough."[117] Moreover, when it came time to invite a group of Canadians to a Conference on the Eastern Maritime Region held in Rockland, Maine, in August of 1942 to discuss the possibilities for the regional study, Harvey was included.[118] It is also important to note that Harvey's opposition did not discourage Marshall from seeking his advice on other matters or, indeed, from supporting Harvey's work at the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia, though certainly not to the extent that others were favoured.[119] Within the acceptable bounds of gentlemanly conduct Rockefeller agents rarely shied away from academic debate.

In contrast, Stewart Bates, R.A. Mackay of Dalhousie's Institute of Public Affairs, and economist S.A. Saunders "Immediately agreed [with Marshall] that the questions basic

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[115]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 16, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[116]Ibid., p. 17.

[117]Ibid., p. 11.

[118]Ibid., p. 18. See also Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," pp. 83-84.

[119]Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," pp. 89-90.

for a study of the Maritimes-New England region were 'What outlook is characteristic of the region?' and 'What parts of the world does it comprise?'"[120] Bates noted that the line of analysis was consistent with his work on the east coast fisheries.[121] All concurred, moreover, with Marshall "that there was room for a study of the human element in the Maritimes-New England region, and that such a study might well prove enlightening and invigorating."[122]

Marshall also found enthusiastic support from C.F. Fraser, the editor of the Halifax Chronicle and a former student of Harold Laski's at the London School of Economics; Alfred G. Bailey, Professor of History at the University of New Brunswick; and University of New Brunswick President Norman MacKenzie, later the President of the University of British Columbia and a member of the Massey Commission and later still one of the original members of the Canada Council. Marshall recalled in his diary that he "had hardly explained the hypothesis he was testing when Bailey proceeded, of his own volition, to outline it himself."[123] MacKenzie, for his part, privately told Marshall "that he would warmly welcome the University's participation in any work to which the acceptance of the hypothesis might lead...." particularly if such participation enabled the University of New Brunswick to retain Bailey, "a young man" who Marshall and MacKenzie agreed had "a large contribution to make in the provincial situation, and a man whose own inclination would lead him to remain

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[120]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 17, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[121]Ibid.

[122]Ibid., p. 18.

[123]Ibid., p. 19.

there if he could find even moderate scope for his abilities."[124]

The final stop on Marshall's itinerary was the province of Ontario in November 1942. During his tour of the University of Western Ontario, the University of Toronto, and Queen's University, he encountered a variety of opinions on his regions proposition. The complexity of the ideas discussed during his stay convinced him that any future Foundation humanities program would have to reflect a diversity of approaches and that simple reliance on a regions paradigm would be unproductive. Far from being discouraged, however, Marshall completed his journey more convinced than ever of the potential for future Foundation activity in Canada.

Interest in Marshall's proposition for regional study in Ontario was highest at the University of Western Ontario in London. This was perhaps a result of what Marshall perceived to be a more general interest in and need for Rockefeller financial aid. Though impressed by the cohesion of the institution and the sense of common purpose amongst its varied schools and faculties, he observed that "the atmosphere was that of a small and underprivileged university, to be sure, in an area of its own, but almost inevitably under the shadow of the University of Toronto."[125] Whatever the motivation, however, Marshall had little difficulty winning the support of a number of interested scholars.

At a small gathering in President W. Sherwood Fox's office, Marshall presented his thoughts on regional study to selected members of the University's History, Biology,

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[124]Ibid., p. 20.

[125]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942, p. 1B," RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

Geography, French and Extension departments. While the group quickly persuaded Marshall that "contacts across or around the lake, or consciousness of them" were minor at best, and that analysis of "a lake region would be forced," the assembled did make a case for a region including south-western Ontario and the near mid-western states.[126] As Marshall noted in his diary, "Western Ontario is acutely conscious of being on the 'land bridge' between Buffalo and Detroit."[127] Fred Landon, who represented the department of History at the meeting, further suggested that Kingston and the eastern section of the province were part of another cross-border region -- "one more closely identified," Marshall recalled Landon suggesting, "with the Eastern Townships of Quebec, with New York State and with Vermont and New Hampshire."[128]

At Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, Marshall found a willing accomplice in Principal Robert C. Wallace.[129] A member of McGill University Principal Cyril James's federal Advisory Committee on Reconstruction, Wallace informed Marshall that he felt the

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[126]Ibid., p. 8B.

[127]Ibid. In his contribution to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace series on Canadian-American relations, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1941), Landon documented how American settlers had used this land bridge in their westward migrations. As a consequence, Landon maintained, there had historically been a ready and constant exchange of political, educational and religious values. See Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 154.

[128]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942," p. 8B, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[129]Wallace was thoroughly acquainted with American philanthropic foundations. While president of the University of Alberta he had, like Carl Dawson of McGill, served on the organizing committee of the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored Frontiers of Settlement series. Throughout the 1930s he served on the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian advisory committee on museums and later, as principal of Queen's, he worked with Corporation officers on the conferences on Canadian and American affairs and to bring the Conference of Canadian Artists to Kingston.

future development of Canada was likely to proceed along regional lines.[130] Wallace -- formerly President of the University of Alberta and new at Queen's in 1938 -- had, in fact, been pushing the university to "examine its regional responsibilities" for some time before Marshall's visit to Kingston.[131] As a consequence, he had planned to bring together a group of scholars in the social and natural sciences to discuss the issue. Having read the report produced at the Rockefeller-sponsored Northern Plains Conference, which had resulted from Marshall's discussions in western Canada, and eager to get from Marshall a summary of the proceedings of the Maritimes-New England conference, Wallace was also well aware of the Foundation's interests in North American regions.[132] Marshall recalled in his diary,

> [Wallace] said...that he would be glad to see inquiry pressed in this area, to discover what that region would be in terms of human outlook, saying that people would never be content with any regional organization which did not in large measure coincide with their consciousness of regionality.[133]

In response to Marshall's inquiries Queen's historian Reginald Trotter offered two critiques of the Foundation's regional program.[134] His first was that regional analysis could be seen as too presentist -- that the desire to render the border invisible in cultural terms

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[130]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942," p. 9B, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[131]Ibid.

[132]Ibid., pp. 9B-10B.

[133]Ibid., p. 9B.

[134]Trotter was, at the time, Chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation-funded Social Science Research Council of Canada (SSRC), and had served as the principal Canadian organizer of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Canadian-American Affairs conference series. He was, therefore, no stranger to American philanthropy.

might be privileging immediate conditions over past realities.[135] Trotter's second concern was related to what he termed the "perils" of sectionalism in Canada. He warned Marshall that provincial governments in Canada had the tendency to emphasize provincial consciousness. With recent debates about the division of powers occasioned by the findings of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (the Rowell-Sirois Commission), Trotter feared that regional studies might fuel sectionalist sentiment. Although he would not go as far as to say that cross-border regional study should be avoided or even "that the present inquiry would enhance those perils," he felt that anybody participating in regional interpretation should "be aware of these perils, and [prepared] to face up to them."[136]

In response to Trotter's second concern, Marshall pointed out that the Foundation's interest was in the integration of regions into larger political units. Trotter, however, did not need to worry. Marshall had already concluded that the Foundation's cultural regional approach was not applicable to all of Canada's geographical areas and certainly could not be applied in eastern Ontario. Personally impressed with Trotter, Wallace, and the influence Queen's University had won in national administration, Marshall perceived little potential for the study of the broader cross-border region suggested to him by both Wallace and Landon.[137] After confirming his impressions with Martyn Estall of the Department of Philosophy at Queen's, and C.A. Curtis, a member of the university's Political Science

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[135]Ibid., p. 10.b.

[136]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942," p. 10B, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[137]Ibid., p. 7B.

department and a federal Liberal Party insider, Marshall concluded that eastern Ontario would have to be considered either as "a unit by itself, or of Ontario."[138] "In fact," Marshall noted in his diary,

> Eastern Ontario seems to think of itself pretty much as a separate unit. Contacts across the St. Lawrence are still few and far between. The erection of the Thousand Island Bridge has brought about some contacts with Western New York, and these may develop. But the only present reason for considering Eastern Ontario along with sections across the line would be the likelihood of such developments in the future - such, for example, as might be brought about by the St. Lawrence Waterway.[139]

If there were still any doubts, Marshall's meetings at the University of Toronto convinced him that while the time was right for the Rockefeller Foundation support of the humanities in Canada, such support could not be wholly encompassed in a regional program of development. "After two days of talk in Toronto," Marshall recalled,

> ...[I] arrived at the tentative conclusion that no one in the University there would be either ready or interested -- of his own accord. Everyone was ready to chat about the subject, but with the clear implication that he had far more important concerns of his own which pretty much preempted his attention.[140]

Chester Martin and Donald Creighton of the department of History, as well as sociologist S.D. Clark, all claimed to be intrigued by Marshall's ideas. Creighton even obtained from Marshall a copy of the transcript of the Maritimes-New England conference held at Rockland, Maine, in August 1942. A little more than a month after Marshall's visit Creighton wrote to clarify his interest. After reading the material from the conference

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[138]Ibid., p. 9B.

[139]Ibid.

[140]Ibid., 8B.

Creighton noted, "I am still dubious of the validity of your 'regions' which seem to me to break apart at the international boundary in more than one important way. But I am interested in the questions which you raise...."[141] Creighton would have been interested in attending a Great Lakes region conference, but one never took place.[142] The case was more or less closed when Harold Innis agreed with Marshall "that to press inquiry at present would probably be to force it."[143]

That the University of Toronto was not a hospitable environment for what had been Marshall's favoured project did not deter him from assessing the institution and its faculty in very positive terms. Innis was by that time already a trusted adviser of the Foundation. As a member of the American-based Committee on Research in Economic History, which was sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of the United States, he had come in to contact with Anne Bezanson and Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division in the late 1930s.[144] He was, at the time of Marshall's visit, already engaged in a successful collaboration with Bezanson and Willits to solidify the position of the Social Science Research Council of Canada.[145] Creighton had published The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 in the Carnegie Corporation-sponsored text series, The

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[141]Donald Creighton to John Marshall, 6 January 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[142]Ibid.

[143]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942," p. 10B, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[144]Creighton, Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 113.

[145]This collaboration is the subject of in-depth discussion in chapter 5 of this thesis.

Relations of Canada and the United States, and had recently won a Guggenheim Fellowship.[146] Not surprisingly given these connections, Marshall reserved his highest praise for "Innis' group" which he described as "patently of high calibre," and for Creighton whom he assessed as "vigorous and articulate."[147] The university, according to Marshall, had "the feel of a university like Chicago or Minnesota," had a stronger faculty than either McGill or Dalhousie, and was "far and away the most favored Canadian University" he had toured.[148]

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Marshall had come to Canada expecting to expand interpretation of American regions into a broader regional analysis of the North American continent. This desire not only reflected the way Rockefeller Foundation officers perceived North American history, but also their biases concerning the present situation. Instead, he discovered thinkers in each of the cities and universities he toured who, though clearly in need of financial backing for their projects and willing to engage in discussions and debates, had a variety of agendas of their own to pursue. The existence of these elite networks and the strengths and variety of ideas expressed by their members caused Marshall to reconsider the Humanities Division's approach to Canadian development. He came away convinced, according to Charles Acland and William Buxton, that Canada could not be "viewed as a horizontal

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[146]Creighton, "Harold Adams Innis: A Special and Unique Brilliance," in The Passionate Observer: Selected Writings, (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 152.

[147]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Ontario, November 22 - 27, 1942," p. 4B, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[148]Ibid.

mosaic extending northwards from the United States." Canada, these writers conclude, "was now considered as a distinct region of its own whose metropolitan elites were to receive and administer the largesse of the Rockefeller Foundation."[149]

Acland and Buxton briefly support this conclusion with references to the Foundation's shift from regional initiatives to support of national associations and organizations like the Canadian Library Council, the National Film Society, the Canadian Association for Adult Education and the Canadian Humanities Research Council.[150] Certainly, Marshall was impressed by the men he spoke with and his positive impressions led to significant escalations in both the Humanities Division's and the Social Science Division's Canadian activities.[151] Moreover, both divisions increasingly attempted to work with and through national bodies in much the same way as the foundations had been doing in the United States since the early 1920s. In addition to playing significant roles in building these associations -- which, in the cases of the Canadian Humanities and Social Science Research Councils, will be analyzed in chapter 5 -- the Foundation continued to favour what the officers perceived to be the national educational institutions of central Canada.

The transition, however, was not as seamless or as complete as Acland and Buxton

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[149]"Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 92.

[150]Ibid., p. 92.

[151]The Social Science Division was staffed by a separate set of officers. Division Director Joseph Willits and Canadian-born Associate Director Anne Bezanson were the two officers in charge of the Foundation's Canadian activities in the social sciences. Although formally independent of each other, the divisions cooperated on many projects. This was particularly true in Canada where the boundaries between the social sciences and the humanities were defined differently than in the United States. Although they conducted their own surveys and investigations, both Bezanson and Willits read and were influenced by Marshall's Humanities Division reports.

suggest. Nor was Marshall's evaluation of Canadian culture and of Canadian metropolitan elites so easily characterized. In the provinces of western Canada, in the Maritimes and in French-speaking Quebec, Marshall discovered what he perceived to be cultural regions -- regions that to varying degrees shared attributes with and could benefit from contacts with geographically contingent American regions, but distinct regions nonetheless. In these areas, Marshall believed, the Foundation would do well to fund and encourage projects aimed at sharpening the collective awareness of regional heritage, tradition and identity. Direct contact between regional elites and the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation would also serve the purpose of bringing these regions more intimately into the continental mainstream. If these regions could not be treated merely as northern extensions of an American culture or cultures, many intellectuals from these regions were nonetheless willing and eager to look across both to build networks with and to learn from American interpreters.

In the metropolitan centers of central Canada, on the other hand, Marshall thought he encountered not a region, but a nation. In Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa and even Kingston, Marshall immediately assessed his hosts as being of "national" stature. These men, it went almost without saying, were too busy with existing research, matters of national or even international administration to be concerned with local and regional matters. Playing the part of a cultural diplomat, Marshall treated men like F.R. Scott, Harold Innis, S.D. Clark, Raleigh Parkin, and R.C. Wallace as important members of a friendly, but foreign, national elite. They, to be sure, were worthy of support. But their concerns were not exclusively "regional" in nature.

There are a number of possible explanations for this contrast. In a simple sense it

can be explained as a reflection of the realities and disparities of Canadian Confederation. Needier individuals from newer and/or less financially secure institutions were willing to do more to attract the support of the American foundation. Marshall's presence undoubtedly provoked -- as the visit of a foundation officer invariably would -- energetic attempts by university officials and scholars to ascertain what he wanted to hear and what sort of projects he would recommend for support. If regional analysis and regionally-based projects were important parts of the Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Division's program, many Canadians may accordingly have surmised that these were worth pursuing. Considering the history of regional discontent with central Canadian dominance, it is also not unlikely that exploring regional histories and traditions and even accepting a greater north-south orientation was considered a small price to pay to win Rockefeller support.

Marshall's perceptions, however, were also influenced by the history of Rockefeller Foundation involvement in Canada and by the ideological position of the Foundation. Since the beginning, Rockefeller officers had assumed that Toronto and Montreal occupied a position of dominance roughly equivalent to that of the metropolitan centers of the north-eastern United States. This assumption represented not only an acceptance of how things were, but also an evaluation of how they should be. Since the early 1920s the Foundation had relied on the advice of men like Massey and Mackenzie King, and had deemed central Canadian institutions such as McGill University and the University of Toronto as truly national centers of education and research. With large contributions to the general endowment funds and to the medical schools of these two schools, the Foundation made a concerted effort to strengthen the positions of these two institutions on top of the hierarchy

of Canadian higher education. To the Rockefeller Foundation, Ontario (and English-speaking Montreal) was not a region, it was simply "Canada." Of course in accepting this hierarchy, which also designated the rest of Canada as the nation's "regions", the Foundation was contributing to, naturalizing, and thus legitimating the dominance of the central-Canadian elite. By focusing on McGill, the University of Toronto and, to a lesser extent, Queen's University as national centers, Marshall was contributing to the institutionalization of a central-Canadian regional ideology of Canadian nationality.[152]

"Cultural Interpretation" of Canada's "Regions"

Given the duality of Marshall's assessment of the Canadian scene, it would be a mistake to claim that, after his tour, programs of regional interpretation gave way to nationally-focused initiatives or even that the two approaches must be juxtaposed as opposite and mutually exclusive. The lesson of earlier Rockefeller philanthropy in both Canada and the United States was that national and regional development must go hand-in-hand if the goals of the Foundation were to be achieved. Accordingly, national focus did not completely replace support for local and regional projects, nor did it necessarily mean an immediate relinquishing of control by the Americans to a Canadian national elite. The

[152] Jessup discusses the institutionalisation of a central-Canadian regional ideology in the 1920s and 1930s in the context of the development of cultural institutions including the National Museum and National Gallery of Canada. The argument, however, applies equally well to educational institutions. See Lynda Jessup, "Bushwhackers in the Gallery: Antimodernism and the Group of Seven," in Policing the Boundaries of Modernity - Antimodernism and Artistic Expression, ed. Jessup (forthcoming), pp. 13-14. Ian McKay discusses the tendency of Ontario leaders to identify their interests with those of the nation as a whole in "Introduction: All That is Solid Melts into Air," in The Challenge of Modernity: A Reader on Post-Confederation Canada, ed. McKay (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992), pp. xx-xxi.

national associations, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, were modelled closely after American organizations that had been created in the 1920s with the aid of significant philanthropic influence and support. And even after the creation of these associations, decision-making was rarely, if ever, left solely in the hands of the Canadians who staffed them. Moreover, the idea of interdisciplinary local and regional focus was not abandoned, and Canadian projects aimed at regional cultural interpretation received the encouragement and support of the Foundation. In fact, at the same time the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were working with members of the central-Canadian elite to develop national programs in the social sciences and humanities, they also worked directly with other Canadians from the areas Marshall had designated as the "regions." Following American patterns, and importing personnel and technical knowledge from the United States, the Rockefeller Foundation supported a number of projects designed to stimulate knowledge of local and regional heritage. The overriding concern, of course, was to situate regional traditions in the broader contexts of national and continental traditions.

In extending its program of cultural interpretation to Canada in the early 1940s, the Rockefeller Foundation influenced work in Canada in keeping with the Foundation's interest in the development and diffusion of regional consciousness. The exportation to Canada was facilitated in a number of ways. Ideally, influence was exerted simply by privileging Canadian individuals whose approaches already meshed well with Foundation objectives. Canadians who fit the bill were given support for their projects and often were provided fellowships for study at American projects supported by the Foundation. Responding to

what Marshall had perceived to be the "lack of institutional bases"[153] on which to establish Canadian cultural interpretations, the Foundation also funded limited-term appointments of American scholars at Canadian universities for the purpose of establishing programs that would later be supported by the host institution.

In every case, projects were initiated only where there was enthusiastic local consent. Projects were never forced on unwilling individuals or host institutions and, indeed, were only pursued after consent had been thoroughly negotiated by the Foundation and the recipients. Of course, the fundamental fact of all relationships between Canadian intellectuals and American foundations in the era preceding systematic programs of federal state support for culture and higher education was the extreme imbalance of resources. The relationship between Canadian intellectuals and American foundations was not one of overt social or intellectual control, but one which can more correctly be characterized as cultural and intellectual hegemony. This was not, in other words, a case of the Rockefeller Foundation forcing Canadians to do research or establish programs, but a case of providing support for those who wanted the same things and who thought, or who were willing to think, the same way as the Foundation's cultural leadership. In this way, intellectual freedom was not threatened by coercion but, more specifically, by an unequal distribution of rewards and benefits. Canadians who participated in the exchange saw their projects privileged and their own professional and intellectual status enhanced. In addition to stimulating the exploration of the regionality of those areas Marshall and other officers had judged to be

[153]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "First Part: Quebec and Ontario, September 29 - October 3, 1941," p. a, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

Canada's regions, the Foundation embedded its influence in Canada by building direct links with regional institutions and intellectual leadership.[154]

The following discussion represents a selection of case studies of the Foundation's program of cultural interpretation at work in Canadian regions. With these projects in western Canada, "French Canada," and the Maritime provinces, the Foundation supported attempts to reconcile the past with the present and to explore and build the consciousness of local and regional cultures in a rapidly changing modern environment. In each case, the participants studied the relationship between the traditional and modern condition and attempted to find a useful place for the past in the present.

Western Canada

Marshall completed his tour of western Canada in October 1941 favourably impressed with the provincial universities and confident that the "time [was]...ripe for helping Canada to a better interpretation of herself."[155] Where he did not perceive a strong sense of Canadian national identity -- in fact, John Dafoe and George Ferguson of the Winnipeg Free Press led him to believe "that national feeling in Canada is still largely non-existent..."[156] -- there was, he thought, great interest in fostering regional identity and organization.

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[154]For a discussion of how foundation support for research can be linked to theories related to the construction of cultural hegemony, see chapter 1.

[155]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Second Part: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Vancouver, October 20 -30, 1941," p. 41, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[156]Ibid., p. 7.

As a direct result of his conversations with University of Saskatchewan President James S. Thomson, Marshall pledged Foundation support for historian A.S. Morton's efforts to build a provincial archives at the university. Over the months that followed Marshall's commitment, Foundation grants were made to the university to employ assistants and apprentices to help the elderly and "somewhat feeble Morton" gather and catalogue material from the early history of the area.[157] Under Morton's direction, the primary research materials he had gathered for his history of western Canada[158] and for his history of the fur trade[159] were organized and catalogued for use by future scholars. In addition, Morton contributed rich collections of business records and pioneer narratives and helped retrieve from Ottawa copies of public documents from the province's territorial period (1870-1905).[160]

As a result of his meetings with scholars and administrators in Edmonton, Marshall concluded that the University of Alberta should act as host for one of the most diverse and innovative regional projects sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. In September 1943, American Robert Gard was brought to Edmonton on a Rockefeller Foundation grant to work with Donald Cameron, the director of the university's extension department, and George Smith, the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, to establish the Alberta Folklore and Local

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[157]Ibid., p. 12.

[158]A History of the Canadian West (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1938).

[159]A History of the Canadian West to 1870-1871: Being a History of Rupert's Land (The Hudson's Bay Company's Territory) and of the North-West Territory (Including the Pacific Slope) (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1939).

[160]Ibid., pp. 12-14.

History Project.

Gard brought with him impressive credentials. In the late 1930s, with the aid of a Rockefeller graduate fellowship, he had worked under A.M. Drummond, a pioneer in the regional theatre movement, on Cornell University's New York State Play Project. The University of Alberta was, moreover, a receptive environment for the sort of project Gard envisioned. Faculty members Sidney Risk and E.M. Jones, themselves former holders of Rockefeller Foundation fellowships, had studied at community theatre projects at Cornell and the University of Iowa, respectively. Frederick Koch of the University of North Carolina and another of the pioneers of the American regional theatre regularly taught in the summer at the university's Banff School of Fine Arts.

When Gard arrived in Alberta he was, almost immediately, struck by what he thought was the previously untapped potential of the province for regional interpretation. To Gard, here was a real region -- even if the inhabitants needed a little help to recognize its existence. "Up here," Gard wrote his former supervisor Drummond,

> our work is a new idea. So far the folk have been too busy living.....I was constantly told that Alberta folk have no feeling for the land. No loyalty to their region. This is false. The feeling is there -- and perhaps more deeply rooted because of the struggles they have made. I will find it an interesting year, and a satisfying one in helping to awaken a keener interest in the traditions and deep loyalties of this land.[161]

Over the following two years[162] Gard travelled extensively throughout the province, collecting stories and tales and disseminating to Albertans a sense of their "traditions and

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[161]Robert Gard to A.M. Drummond, 14 September 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 286, RF, RAC.

[162]The Rockefeller Foundation and the University of Alberta agreed to extend his term to two years.

deep loyalties."

To do so, Gard employed an impressive variety of techniques and used a variety of mediums. Using the stories he had collected as source material, Gard wrote regular columns on local history for provincial newspapers including the Calgary Herald and the Edmonton Journal and for the folklore project's journal, the Alberta Folklore Quarterly. He also provided student playwrights at the Banff School of Fine Arts with historical material for the purpose of contributing to the beginnings of a community theatre movement centered at the University of Alberta. Gard himself published a collection of Alberta folk tales, Johny Chinook.[163] In addition to giving weekly radio lectures on his project's work for the University of Alberta's station, CKUA, and for the Prairie Regional Network of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Gard and others wrote and performed several plays -- including Johny Dunn, Hatfield the Rainmaker, the Ballad of Frank Slade, and Twelve foot Davis -- which were broadcast nationally by the CBC.[164]

Gard's work in the mass media was accompanied by efforts to build a more permanent infrastructure which would serve as supports for the development of local and regional identity. Using Folklore Project funds, ten Alberta writers were given financial support to attend the first Alberta Writers' Conference at Banff in August 1944. Gard's mentor, A.M. Drummond, was brought up from Cornell -- ironically it now seems -- to lead discussion on the idea of a distinctly Albertan or Western Canadian literature. Discussion

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[163]Johny Chinook: Tall Tales and True from the Canadian West (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1945).

[164]Robert E. Gard, "The Alberta Folklore and Local History Project (Final Report)," pp. 1-3, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 288, RF, RAC; and Gard to David H. Stevens, 15 August 1945, pp. 1-9, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 288, RF, RAC.

was focused specifically on the preservation of folklore and historical material and the use of these as source material for drama, fiction, and radio programming.[165] Intent on fostering "a National People's Theatre in Canada," and to promote drama as a means of education at the secondary and post-secondary levels, the Foundation provided funds to bring together individuals from the four western provinces to take part in the Western Canadian Theatre Conference.[166] Working with Solon Low, the Minister of Education for the Social Credit government, Gard distributed material throughout the provincial public school system in order to increase the amount of regional history material included in the curriculum.[167] At Marshall's suggestion, Gard also successfully lobbied the provincial government's Committee on Reconstruction to make a formal commitment to establishing, after the war, a professionally-staffed, state-funded provincial archives at the University of Alberta.[168]

In the summer of 1945, after almost two years in Edmonton, Gard accepted a job at the University of Wisconsin to establish and direct a project modelled after the Alberta Folklore Project. The Alberta project had not only established Gard's prominence in the field, but was also considered by the staff of the Rockefeller Foundation to be one its most successful forays into regional analysis. Gard attributed the success of the project to the fact that Alberta was, in reality, a unified region. In addition to the economic and geographic factors that held it together, Gard felt that there existed a self-consciousness of shared

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[165]Tippett, Making Culture, p. 163.

[166]Ibid.

[167]Gard to Drummond, 14 September 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 286, RF, RAC.

[168]See John Marshall to R. Newton, 17 February 1944, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 287, RF, RAC; and Newton to Marshall, 26 February 1944, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 287, RF, RAC.

identity. "[T]he people," he advised David Stevens,

> had a sort of common folklore based on the common knowledge of the region and its distinguishing characteristics. (In other words, the stories they liked best to tell were distinctly regional in that they dealt with rains, hails, drouth [sic], the Chinook wind, dust, the various industries of the region: ranching, dry farming, etc.)[169]

Gard did not, however, discount the role his own folklore project had played in disseminating this "dramatic lore of the West." In his radio broadcasts and his newspaper columns, Gard noted, "I studiously tried to build up such heroes as Twelve Foot Davis (the little fellow with a giant's heart); Dave McDougall (hero of the tall story); Bob Edwards (editor, champion of the under-dog); Nigger John Ware (American Negro, hero of the ranching country); and others, as a part of the regional consciousness."[170]

The lasting impact of the Alberta Folklore and Local History Project is difficult to assess. In retrospect much of the activity can be seen as a temporary reaction to the external stimulus provided by Gard and the Rockefeller Foundation. The Alberta Folklore Quarterly and the Alberta Folklore Association -- both established with funds from the project -- were not maintained following Gard's departure. Their loss, however, was mitigated somewhat by the reorganization and revitalization of the Alberta Historical Society at about the same time. By 1948 the provincial government had still not made good on its pledge to create a provincial archives. The University of Alberta did make provision for the inclusion of a university archive in its new library facility.[171] On the positive side of the ledger, the

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[169]Gard to Stevens, 15 August 1945, p. 4, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 288, RF, RAC.

[170]Ibid., p. 6.

[171]R. Newton to Stevens, 12 November 1948, p. 2, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 288, RF, RAC.

Foundation's support for the Folklore project provided the impetus for the creation of the University of Alberta's new department of fine arts -- a department that, like no other in Canada, included divisions in visual arts, music and drama. The drama division, in particular, was the product of work supervised by Gard and of the efforts of instructors such as E.M. Jones and Sidney Risk who had trained in leading drama departments in the United States. Encouraged by the success of community drama in Alberta, the Rockefeller Foundation supported the creation of a chair of drama at the University of Saskatchewan in 1945. The original Alberta Writers' Conference -- initially a product of American organization, supervision and financing -- had, by 1948, evolved into a permanent institution, the Western Writers' Conference.[172]

Perhaps the impact of the program cannot be accurately assessed only in terms of its tangible benefits. The goal of corporate philanthropy was to plant seeds for reform, to establish influence and to lead by example. The goal of the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Division was to intervene in and thus engage with the development of a mass culture. Projects like Gard's provided forceful, if only temporary, evidence of the effectiveness with which educators, the state and private foundations could intervene in the politics of identity and of mass culture.

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[172]Ibid. See also Newton to Stevens, 28 November 1946, p.1, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 29, Folder 288, RF, RAC.

"French Canada"

In approaching the region he called "French Canada" Marshall perceived a society that in some senses was a model for his concept of North American region. Here was a community with a deeply-rooted sense of cultural heritage and a clear self-consciousness. Clearly, the Foundation's assistance was not required -- as it had allegedly been in Alberta -- to make citizens aware of their common cultural inheritance. What was lacking in the region, according to Marshall and his American advisors like Marine Leland, was exposure to the rest of the continent. And this was an area -- particularly where it concerned the relationship of the province to the United States -- in which the Rockefeller Foundation had a vital interest. Accordingly, shortly after his visit in January 1942, Marshall convened a conference in New York City to bring together scholars and intellectuals from Quebec with their American counterparts. Partly as a result of this conference, Marshall and Humanities Division Director David Stevens agreed to send Everett C. Hughes, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and a former member of the sociology department at McGill University, to teach in the School of Social Science at Laval University for the 1942-1943 academic term.

The Foundation's support of Hughes's exchange to Laval, as well as the support it had earlier provided for research the sociologist conducted while at McGill in the 1930s, is a particularly illuminating example of the tremendous and long-term intellectual power the organization could wield in Canada. Hughes's work on French Canadian society, his interest in French-English relations in the context of urbanization and industrialization and his application of the approaches and theoretical models of Chicago school sociology to these

issues influenced a generation of French-Canadian sociologists. Though quick to point out what they saw as historical shortcomings of his work, Hubert Guindon, Marcel Rioux and Jean-Charles Falardeau all considered the work Hughes supervised in preparing his book on Drummondville, French Canada in Transition, an important foundation to the understanding of their society's difficult transformation from a traditional-rural to a modern urban-industrial society.[173]

Hughes's exchange to Laval resulted indirectly from the Rockefeller Foundation's New York City conference on the culture of French Canada in March 1942. According to Rockefeller Foundation records, the participants at the conference -- scholars from Quebec and the United States -- were preoccupied with "the evident need for contact between French Canadian and American universities."[174] Reverend Georges-Henri Lévesque, Director of the School of Social Science at Laval, was in attendance and likely contributed to that sentiment. In addition to recruiting European scholars for his school, Lévesque had encouraged promising Laval graduates including Falardeau, Maurice Tremblay and Maurice Lamontagne to pursue graduate studies at the University of Chicago and at Harvard.[175] With

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[173]Everett C. Hughes, French Canada in Transition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943). While at McGill, Hughes supervised anthropologist Horace Miner's research for St. Denis, A French Canadian Parish (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939). For discussions of the significance of Hughes's work see Hubert Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 26 (November 1960): pp. 533-551; Marcel Rioux, "Remarks on the Socio-Cultural Development of French Canada," in French-Canadian Society vol. 1, eds. Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), pp. 162-177; and Jean-Charles Falardeau, "The Changing Social Structures of Contemporary French-Canadian Society,"in French-Canadian Society vol. 1, pp. 106-122. For a discussion of the influence of Hughes's work on Guindon, in particular, see Roberta Hamilton and John L. McMullan, "Introduction" in Quebec Society: Tradition, Modernity, and Nationhood, by Hubert Guindon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. xv-xxxix.

[174]Grant-in-Aid to Laval University, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[175]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Third Part: French Canada - Montreal and Quebec, January 12 - 16,

his zeal to develop his school, and to reform the provinces's educational system, Lévesque was open to the general idea of cultural and intellectual exchange with American institutions. Consequently, it was probably not very difficult to convince him of the value of a visit by a renowned University of Chicago sociologist. Despite the fact, however, that Lévesque welcomed the visit and eventually, in August 1942, authored a formal request to the Rockefeller Foundation for a grant to enable Hughes to begin work at Laval the following month, it is clear that the idea was initiated by Hughes in conjunction with Marshall and David Stevens earlier that summer.[176]

In late May, responding to an earlier telephone conversation, Hughes wrote Stevens asking him whether the Foundation might "be interested in having me spend the fall term at Laval University as a sort of liaison officer."[177] During his years at McGill (1927-1938), Hughes had developed strong ties with the Rockefeller Foundation and to Quebec's intellectual community. Unlike most English-Canadian intellectuals at the time, he spoke French fluently and had willingly made French-Canadian society the focus of his research. With the support of McGill's Social Science Research Project and the American Social Science Research Council -- both of which depended on Rockefeller Foundation funding for their existence -- Hughes had attempted to apply a model developed by Chicago anthropologist Robert Redfield in his work on Mexico[178] to the economic and cultural

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1942," p. 3, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

176Georges-Henri Lévesque to Marshall, 21 July 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC; Grant-in-Aid to Laval University, 24 August 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

177Everett C. Hughes to David Stevens, 20 May 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

178Robert Redfield, The Folk Culture of Yucatan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

transformations experienced in Quebec during 1920s and 1930s. Drawing also on Léon Gerin's characterization of nineteenth-century French Canadian society as predominantly rural and traditional,[179] Hughes attempted to portray Quebec's development as a local manifestation of a universal process of transformation from simple peasant to complex urban-industrial social formations.[180]

In his letter to Stevens, Hughes made it clear that his mission could serve a variety of objectives. Participating in seminars and directing individual studies, Hughes felt he would be in a good position "to diplomatically present to students, staff, et al. some American methods, ideas, literature etc."[181] In return, Hughes hoped the visit would enable him to continue his studies of Quebec society and, specifically, to learn "a good deal more about the mentality of the French-Canadian intellectual class."[182] With his book, French Canada in Transition, about to be published, Hughes was eager to learn more.

While both of these objectives fit in well with broader Humanities Division policy, Hughes also offered a third reason for supporting his stay at Laval -- a rationale which, given the Humanities officers' often-stated desire to facilitate friendly relations between nations, must also have seemed appealing. Hughes noted he had recently come to the conclusion

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[179]Léon Gérin, Le Type économique et social des canadiens: Milieux agricoles de tradition française (Montreal: Editions De L'A. C. F., 1938).

[180]S. D. Clark, "Sociology in Canada: An historical Over-view," Canadian Journal of Sociology 2 (Summer 1975): pp. 228-229; Shore, The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School, and the Origins of Social Research in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 255-258. For the debate over the applicability of the folk-society concept to Quebec see Phillipe Garigue, "Change and Continuity in Rural French Canada," Culture 18 (December 1957): pp. 372-392; Guindon, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered."

[181]Everett Hughes to David Stevens, 20 May 1942, RG 1.1., Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[182]Ibid.

"that a minority can be dealt with easier at its heart than on its more defensive and agitated frontier...[and that] in Quebec [City]...a person could and would be accepted as a guest rather than as an intruder."[183] He felt, as a visiting scholar at Laval, he would be able to influence popular attitudes in Quebec towards the United States. "It would be my hope also," he advised Stevens accordingly, "that intimate contact precisely in such circumstances might affect somewhat the interpretation of the United States and its culture which the students of such a university - as journalists, professional men, teachers, etc. - will later make to French-Canada." In the process he might be able to "ease somewhat...the anxiety which the intellectuals of French-Canada feel concerning contact with the intellectual groups in this country."[184]

It is likely that Stevens and Marshall had already informally discussed the possibility of such an exchange before Hughes wrote his letter. In any case, both officers, along with Anne Bezanson of the Foundation's Social Science Division, immediately supported the project.[185] Unsure of the institutional and cultural politics involved at Laval and concerned that the initiative at least appear to originate from the host institution, Marshall suggested that Hughes approach Jean-Charles Falardeau, his former student at the University of

[183]Ibid.

[184]Ibid.

[185]Marshall to Hughes, 3 June 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC. The Social Science Division's approval and Bezanson's personal endorsement were registered in a handwritten note in the margin of a copy of Hughes' letter to Stevens of 20 May 1942. That the project was carried out through the Humanities Division, albeit with the approval of the Social Science Division's officers, indicates that the project had more than purely academic dimensions.

Chicago, in an attempt to gain a formal invitation from Lévesque.[186]

By late in July the negotiation of consent had been completed. Lévesque wrote to Marshall that he would, indeed, welcome Hughes to Laval.[187] With this informal "request" for Hughes in hand, Marshall wrote Lévesque and advised him that the Rockefeller Foundation would look favourably on a formal application for a grant-in-aid to facilitate Hughes's stay at Laval. Marshall also suggested that Lévesque include in his application the inference that the idea for the project had had its origin in the conference held in New York in March.[188] Marshall, apparently, wanted to underscore to the Foundation's trustees the value of his series of regional conferences.

In thanking Lévesque for inviting him to Laval, Hughes stressed how valuable he felt the intellectual exchange could be for both the visitor and the host. He was convinced, he wrote Lévesque, "that the most significant study of the social life of a people will be made by those who are part of it, provided that the investigators broaden their view by comparison with other societies and that a lively exchange of ideas and methods occurs between the students of one society and those of others."[189] It was his purpose at Laval to bring to the study of Quebec's culture "some closer knowledge of certain methods of study developed by sociologists and social anthropologists of the English-speaking world...." In return, he hoped he would gain "some further understanding of the role of the intellectuals in a rich,

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[186]Marshall to Hughes, 3 June 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[187]Lévesque to Marshall, 21 July 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[188]Marshall to Lévesque, 29 July 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[189]Hughes to Lévesque, 4 August 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

traditional culture such as yours."[190]

On the way from Chicago to Quebec City before taking his post at Laval, Hughes paid a visit to Rockefeller Foundation headquarters in New York City to confer with Marshall. During this meeting, Marshall clearly laid out what the Foundation wanted in return for its support of the project. In keeping with Hughes's interests in the province's intellectuals, Marshall requested that the sociologist study what he referred to as "the organization of influence in French Canada."[191] Marshall noted that he and the leaders of the Foundation were particularly interested in discovering the individuals and groups who held influence and power and where "potential leadership [might] reside."[192] In a sense, Marshall was simply reminding Hughes of his offer to Stevens that he act "as a sort of liaison officer" for the Foundation.

Marshall's second concern went far beyond a detached academic interest in the nature of authority in Quebec and involved the Foundation, through its support of Hughes, directly in the politics of French-Canadian nationalism and made it a factor in the relationship between Quebec and the United States. Having heard that Lévesque's School of Social Science was the "academic center" of a populist movement representing the coalition of nationalist forces, trade unions, and a new progressive clergy, Marshall asked Hughes to make special note of the school's "character."[193] Side-stepping the thorny issue of Canadian

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[190]Ibid.

[191]Transcript of interview between Marshall and Hughes, 15 September 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[192]Ibid.

[193]Ibid.

national identity, Marshall wanted to know, "[is the school] as 'separatist' as has been alleged, or rather...is it committed to the idea that French Canada must develop its external continental relations of a cultural nature?"[194] In the event that the latter was closer to the truth, as Marshall suspected, Hughes would be acting as a "liaison" not only for the Foundation, but also for the United States.

Hughes's visit proved to be an equally productive one for the Rockefeller Foundation and Laval University's School of Social Sciences. Working with Lévesque, Hughes created a program for future research and instruction at the school. Published in the form of a pamphlet at the end of Hughes's stay, the Programme de recherches sociales pour le Québec[195] directed faculty and students to sociological research at the grass-roots level. In keeping with the direction of Rockefeller Foundation policies since the early 1930s and with the teachings of the Chicago school of sociological inquiry, Hughes shifted the emphasis in the curriculum away from subjecting students to "too many...well-organized lectures" towards exposing them to "parish records," "bill-collector[s]," and "bingo parties."[196] Reflecting his own interest and that of the Rockefeller Foundation in the relationship between cultural inheritance and economic transformation, he worked diligently to "sell" his French-Canadian colleagues and students "on the notion of harnessing their esthetic (sic) interest in traditional popular art to some of the social movements of the day."[197]

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[194]Ibid.

[195]Everett C. Hughes, Programme de recherches sociales pour le Québec, Cahiers de l'Ecole des Sciences Sociales, Politiques et Economiques de Laval, vol. 2, no. 4 (Laval: Presses Universitaires Laval, 1943).

[196]Hughes to Marshall, 4 December 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[197]Hughes to Marshall, 16 December 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

While art for art's sake was not a primary interest of Hughes or of the Rockefeller Foundation officers, the relationship between popular art forms, folklore and other social phenomena was. Hughes was particularly interested in linkages between aspects of the Catholic Action revival -- labour unions, cooperatives and "even...the revival of plain song" -- and class politics. "It is all very nice," he wrote Marshall,

> to hurry up with the collection of the old songs before they are completely lost. I am for it. But it ought to be something more than preserving for an admittedly indifferent posterity. It ought to be tied to an interest in the art forms of the city people of the lower classes.[198]

After Hughes's return to Chicago in 1944, his research program was continued under the direction of Jean-Charles Falardeau. Falardeau, who according to Hughes had only "really begun to see what sociology and anthropology are about" at the time of Hughes's visit, was to become a crucial figure in the development of a French Canadian sociology. The department at Laval, in turn, was at the center of that development until well into the 1960s.[199] In a broader sense, Lévesque's Laval School was at the heart of the development of the post-war generation of Quebec City intellectuals.[200]

The officers of the Rockefeller Foundation also got what they wanted out of the Hughes project -- goodwill, greater access to information concerning social movements in the province of Quebec, and an opportunity to work with and subtly influence intellectual and cultural leaders in French Canada. In formally acknowledging receipt of the grant that

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[198]Ibid.

[199]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 270. See also David Nock, "History and Evolution of French Canadian Sociology," Insurgent Sociologist 4 (Summer 1974): p. 21.

[200]Michael D. Behiels, Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution Liberalism Versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), p. 34.

brought Hughes to Laval, Lévesque noted that he felt the enterprise was "deeply significant evidence of your willingness to encourage cultural relations between our two peoples."[201] Camille Roy, Rector of Laval, noted that the "visit will remain as a new promising step in the closer relations of Laval University with the American intellectual life...."[202]

Confirming Marshall's position, Hughes found little evidence to warrant rumours that Lévesque's School of Social Science was separatist in orientation. Convinced "of the good sense and good faith of the members of its faculty,..." and impressed by the provincial government's decision to give the school $25,000 a year in support of social research, Hughes recommended that the Foundation "continue to work with Père Lévesque...on the ground that his activities, and all that they stand for, will have increasing importance in the life of the province."[203] Hughes's prediction was an accurate one. Not only was Lévesque to play a large role in the development of French Canada, but, as one of five members of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts and Letters and later the first Vice-Chairman of the Canada Council, he was an important influence on the cultural and intellectual life of postwar Canada. The inclusion of Lévesque in the Foundation's ever-expanding network of influence may well have been the most significant aspect of Hughes's visit to Laval.

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[201]Levesque to Stevens, 22 September 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[202]Camille Roy to Marshall, 29 September 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 26, Folder 259, RF, RAC.

[203]"Interviews: JM (John Marshall), Laval University, Quebec, 30-31 December 1942," RG2, Series 427, Box 239, Folder 1655, RF, RAC.

The Maritimes

Of the regions he visited in Canada, Marshall found the Maritimes to be the most complex and perplexing. In this, he was not unlike William S. Learned and Kenneth C.M. Sills, who had visited the Maritimes twenty years earlier to conduct their survey of education for the Carnegie Corporation. Echoing also the observations of his colleague at the Rockefeller Foundation, Anne Bezanson, the Associate Director of the Social Science Division,[204] Marshall discovered in his short tour of the Maritimes in April 1942 "individual strength and tough-mindedness" mired in what seemed, from his perspective, to be a disorganized and unhealthy environment.[205] Marshall, in fact, found the region so lacking in administration of basic social services, let alone education, that he likened the requirements for Foundation aid to those of the American southern states. In consequence, he felt that the main thrust of Foundation activity would, more appropriately, fall under the domains of the International Health Division and the Social Science Division.[206]

Marshall was, nonetheless, impressed enough with the engagement and intelligence of individuals he met at Fredericton and Halifax that he was ready to recommend that "modest" opportunities existed for the Foundation Humanities programs. Reflecting

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[204]Bezanson was a native Nova Scotian who went south for higher education. She received a Bachelor of Arts from Radcliffe in 1915 and Ph.D. in Economics from Harvard in 1929. From 1929 to 1945 she was the director of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. She became a part-time officer of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1939. Bezanson's advice to Marshall was offered after her tour of Canada for the Social Science Division in the spring of 1942. See Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 75, n. 15.

[205]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 4, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[206]Ibid., p. 27.

perhaps on the interrogation he received at the hands of Wilson and Harvey in Halifax, Marshall registered the stubborn ferocity with which the Maritimers he met engaged in intellectual debate by repeating in his diary what one informant told him: "Give them a proposition and just watch them tear it apart." He found this ability to tear ideas to pieces "most profitable," and further observed approvingly that "in no other talks" on regional studies had he seen his proposal "so thoroughly grappled with, nor its basic assumptions so clearly brought into scrutiny."[207]

Marshall's strategy for Humanities Division involvement in the Maritimes called for two related courses of action. First, to begin to address the problem of isolation, the Foundation convened a conference on the "Eastern Maritime Region" at Rockland, Maine, in August 1942. The conference, which was chaired by Marshall, Stevens, and Bezanson, brought together intellectuals from the Maritime provinces and from the New England states to discuss the possibilities for regional cultural interpretation. Included in the roster of Canadians invited to attend the conference were men who had impressed Marshall during his preliminary survey, including Alfred Bailey, D.C. Harvey, R.A. Mackay, N.A.M. MacKenzie, Stewart Bates, C.F. Fraser and radio producer Clyde Nunn.[208]

The Rockland conference did not result in Rockefeller Foundation support for broad regional (and cross-border) studies, but the discussion did encourage Marshall and the other officers to continue a program of support for individuals in the Maritime provinces whose

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[207]Ibid., p. 4.

[208]Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 84. Bates, Fraser and Mackenzie did not attend because of previous commitments.

work fit in well with the Foundation's American programs. Although the focus of projects supported by the Foundation and conducted by Nunn, Bailey and folklorist Helen Creighton was on aspects of culture in the Canadian provinces alone, Rockefeller Foundation aid did facilitate, at least in two of the three cases, the importation of American ideologies, approaches and technical knowledge of cultural interpretation. In all three instances, the support was an important boost to the recipients' standing and professional status in Canada and, by extension, for their approaches as well. The Foundation's involvement, moreover, provided it with a foothold of influence in the Maritime and established valuable connections with members of the regional intelligentsia.

During the summer of 1942, even before the Rockland conference, the Foundation provided Clyde Nunn, the director of St. Francis Xavier University radio station CJFX, with a grant-in-aid of $800 to allow him "to undertake a study of the use of radio in adult education in the United States." Although the size of the grant was relatively small, its influence was enhanced by the relationship of Nunn's project to previous initiatives undertaken by American foundations. Under Nunn, CJFX was to become a leader in the field of educational broadcasting. Its operations were coordinated with St. Francis Xavier University's extension program to promote adult education in rural Nova Scotia. Nunn's goal was to use the "program in radio...[as an] adaptation of the work...[the university had] been doing through field organization."[209] The university's renowned Antigonish experiment in adult education had, throughout the 1930s, depended on the Carnegie

[209] Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 86.

Corporation for the majority of its operating revenue.[210] The Rockefeller grant was, moreover, used by Nunn for visits to most of the Foundation-sponsored radio-broadcast study programs in the United States. Over the summer of 1942, Nunn visited the University of Iowa, the Rocky Mountain Radio Council in Denver and Paul Lazarsfeld's Columbia University Office of Radio Research to learn more about the use of radio for educational purposes.[211] From the perspective of Foundation officers learning more about a particular field usually meant learning more about what the Foundation wanted people to know.

If Marshall had harboured doubts about the advisability of offering Foundation support to University of New Brunswick historian Alfred Bailey, Bailey's performance at the Rockland conference stilled them. Bailey was the most active of the Canadians in attendance, giving a strong opening address and delving ambitiously into the concept of cultural interpretation throughout the conference. In the immediate aftermath of the conference, Marshall wrote University of New Brunswick president N.A.M. MacKenzie and noted that "everyone went away with the feeling that Bailey was a man of unusual promise who ought to get all possible support and encouragement."[212] Even before the conference, Marshall had noted that if financial assistance could be the "means of enabling Bailey to remain with satisfaction in the place where he in many ways belongs,..." it should be given

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[210]John G. Reid, "Health, Education, Economy: Philanthropic Foundations in the Atlantic Region in the 1920s and 1930s," Acadiensis 14 (Autumn 1984): p. 75.

[211]Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 86.

[212]Marshall to MacKenzie, 2 September 1942, cited in Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 84.

top priority in any Rockefeller Foundation humanities program.[213]

Marshall's enthusiasm for Bailey is not surprising. Bailey's approach to the study of history was almost a perfect fit for Marshall's program of North American cultural interpretation. While a graduate student in the department of history at the University of Toronto in the early 1930s, Bailey had become dissatisfied with the "rather narrow variety of political history" on which he had felt compelled to focus.[214] With the encouragement of Chester Martin, the head of the department, and of Harold Innis, Bailey began work supervised by anthropologist T.F. McIlwraith on a study of French and Eastern Algonkian contact in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[215]

The result of this collaboration of anthropological and historical analysis was Bailey's dissertation, "The Conflict of European and Eastern Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700, A Study in Canadian Civilization." In addition to documenting the gradual decline of Algonkian culture and the "inevitable conflict between European and Algonkian cultures,"[216] which he claimed occurred after contact, Bailey also discussed what he saw as the "fusion of

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[213]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 28, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC. This was not the first time that officers of an American foundation worked with local officials to make the environment in Fredericton more attractive for Bailey. In the mid-1930s the Carnegie Corporation provided the New Brunswick Museum with several grants to support Bailey's employment at the institution. See Earnest R. Forbes, Challenging the Regional Stereotype: Essays on the 20th Century Maritimes (Halifax: Acadiensis Press, 1989), p. 56.

[214]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 19, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[215]Bruce Trigger, "Alfred G. Bailey -- Ethnohistorian," Acadiensis, 18 (Spring 1989), p. 4. See also Bailey, "Retrospective Thoughts of an Ethnohistorian," Historical Papers: A Selection from the Papers Presented at the Annual Meeting Held at Fredericton 1977 (Canadian Historical Association): pp. 16-17. McIlwraith's major work in native history, The Bella Coola Indians, though completed in manuscript form in the late 1920s was not published until 1948, and then, ironically enough, with the aid of a Rockefeller Foundation publication grant.

[216]Alfred G. Bailey, The Conflict of European Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700, A Study in Canadian

Indian and European elements" which resulted in the creation of a "new culture which was neither European nor Indian." This new culture and the process of fusion which created it, Bailey argued was the basis of a unique "Canadian" culture.[217]

Bailey's conclusions challenged conventions in both history and anthropology. Bailey argued that Native cultures had begun processes of alteration and adjustment due to contact with Europeans much earlier than anthropologists had previously thought. His work, by arguing that French and Algonkian cultures were both altered by cross-cultural exchange, also failed to tell the conventional tale of native acculturation to European cultures. Because of its unconventionality and because it was originally published by the New Brunswick Museum where Bailey was Assistant Director -- far out of the academic mainstream -- Bailey's work was easy to ignore and received little critical comment in the 1930s. Rediscovered by a new generation of scholars in the 1960s, however, the manuscript was republished for broader distribution by the University of Toronto Press in 1969. Anthropologist Bruce Trigger argues persuasively that Bailey "is without a doubt North America's first identifiable ethnohistorian,"[218] and that The Conflict of European Algonkian Cultures, 1504-1700, A Study in Canadian Civilization was "the first recognizable work of ethnohistory published anywhere in North America."[219]

Bailey's unique brand of cultural history was exactly the type of history Marshall and

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Civilization (Saint John: Publications of the New Brunswick Museum, 1937), p. i.

[217]Ibid.

[218]Trigger, "Alfred B. Bailey -- Ethnohistorian," p. 21

[219]Ibid., p. 3.

Stevens were seeking to promote through the Rockefeller Foundation's Humanities program. Bailey's work aimed at discovering the roots of North American culture and stressed that, although such "culture" was related to European civilization, it was not merely a new world transplant. Foundation support for Bailey was given not only in order to help Bailey establish his own career at the University of New Brunswick, but also to promote his approach and to establish it in the Maritimes.

With a series of sizable grants awarded to Bailey between 1943 and 1946, the Foundation helped the scholar establish an ambitious research agenda not only for himself, but for his department at the University of New Brunswick. In mapping this research program in the "human element of the province's tradition," Bailey outlined 31 possible thesis topics for future graduate students. Rockefeller funds, Bailey proposed, would be used to fund publication of the best of these studies.[220] In August 1945 Bailey proudly announced that the grants had been used to foster "the desired 'intellectual ferment'" in cultural studies at his university.

As was the case with many grants, the precise effect of Foundation's support for Bailey and his approach is difficult to judge. With funds provided from Rockefeller grants, Frances Firth, Katherine MacNaughton and Joan Vaughan published studies on various aspects of provincial history.[221] The ambitious regional and provincial studies program Bailey had envisioned did not, however, become a reality. MacNaughton's The Development of the Theory and Practice of Education in New Brunswick, 1784-1900 was

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[220]Forbes, Challenging the Regional Stereotype, p. 57.

[221]Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 85.

the only study in Bailey's program that was published as a book.[222] Bailey's own cultural history of Canada -- a project he began in the early 1940s -- was, likewise, never completed.[223] Bailey himself remained at Fredericton, as MacKenzie and Marshall had hoped he would, and enjoyed a long and distinguished career as an administrator and teacher at the University of New Brunswick. Although Bailey subsequently published more poetry than ethnohistory, he was, nonetheless, an early and vigorous proponent of both regional and social history in Canada.[224]

Funding for Bailey should also be considered support for N.A.M. MacKenzie's leadership and an effort to further solidify an already strong relationship with MacKenzie. In 1944 MacKenzie left New Brunswick, as Marshall expected he might, to take up the presidency of the University of British Columbia and thus was not in Fredericton to share in the benefits resulting from his collaboration with Marshall. The enhancement of the relationship between MacKenzie, who in 1949 would be selected along with Lévesque as a member of the Massey Commission, and the Rockefeller Foundation is one of many examples of how the Foundation's influence was woven into the fabric of Canadian culture and power structures.

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[222]See Forbes, Challenging the Regional Stereotype, p. 57; and Acland and Buxton, "Continentalism and Philanthropy," p. 85, n. 72.

[223]Bailey, "Retrospective Thoughts of an Ethnohistorian," pp. 24-25.

[224]P.A. Buckner, "'Limited Identities' and Canadian Historical Scholarship: An Atlantic Provinces Perspective," Journal of Canadian Studies 23 (Spring-Summer 1988): p. 179. Bailey's published collections of poetry include Thanks for a Drowned Island (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1973); Miramachi Lightning: The Collected Poems of Alfred Bailey (Fredericton, New Brunswick: Fiddlehead Poetry Books, 1981); and The Sun, the Wind, the Summer Field (Fredericton, New Brunswick: Goose Lane Publishing, 1996).

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By the time Helen Creighton came into contact with the Rockefeller Foundation, she had already established herself as figure of some importance in the field of folklore. Creighton, the Dean of Women at King's College in Halifax, had published several articles and two books on the topic.[225] She nonetheless considered herself an amateur in need of formal instruction to help her hone her skills as a collector.[226] The war, which freed her from administrative duties at King's College,[227] and the Rockefeller Foundation which provided her with the financial means to attend centers of folklore study in the United States and to carry out and later publish her research in Nova Scotia, combined to contribute critically to Creighton's development as one of Canada's preeminent professional folklorists.

Creighton's specialization made her a natural candidate for Rockefeller support. With its new Humanities program, the Rockefeller Foundation had been instrumental in the promotion of folklore studies in American institutions in the 1930s. Although American involvement in the war led to a curtailment of this support in the United States, the officers of the Humanities Division saw in the study of folklore and related subjects in Canada potential for furthering the continentalist perspective and fostering a sense of international goodwill.

Marshall met Creighton during his survey of the Maritimes in April 1942. In search

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[225]Helen Creighton, Songs and Ballads from Nova Scotia (Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1932); and Creighton and Doreen Senior, Twelve Folksongs from Nova Scotia (London: Novello, 1940).

[226]Helen Creighton to Marshall, 13 July 1944, p. 3, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[227]The college had been converted, during the war, to a naval training center.

of individuals and projects worthy of his division's support, he was intrigued by Creighton's earlier work and immediately noted its relationship to folklore studies programs the Foundation had been involved with in the United States. At the first meeting between the two, Marshall inquired whether or not the Canadian had heard of the Summer Institute of Folklore at Indiana University and whether or not she was planning to attend. Creighton responded that she had never given a thought to attending the institute, and if she had the war would have made such a thing impossible. She did, however, ask Marshall to keep her informed of any plans the Foundation might have in the field in Nova Scotia.[228]

Before leaving Halifax, Marshall informed Dalhousie University president Carleton Stanley that the Foundation would look favourably on a request by Creighton for a Foundation fellowship to allow her to attend the Summer Institute of Folklore at the University of Indiana.[229] Although Stanley admittedly knew little about Creighton's work, he agreed to pursue the matter with her. Creighton, who by this time had realized that Marshall's inquiry was really an offer of support, immediately agreed to attend and in little more than a month Creighton was granted a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship.[230] Later that summer she was arguing about the pronunciation of "zees" and "zeds" with preeminent American folklorists including Alan Lomax, Stith Thompson, and John Jacob Niles.[231]

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[228]Helen Creighton, A Life in Folklore: Helen Creighton (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1975), p. 129.

[229]Marshall, "Canada: Diary of Visit," "Fourth Part: The Maritime Provinces, April 22-30, 1942," p. 25, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 27, Folder 264, RF, RAC.

[230]Ibid., p. 130. Fellowship Cards, Canada - Nova Scotia; Creighton, Miss Mary Helen, p. 1, RF, RAC.

[231]Creighton, A Life in Folklore, p. 131.

Creighton's summer at Bloomington, Indiana, proved to be fruitful for her both in terms of the exposure to new approaches and techniques and for the contacts she made with these influential American specialists. This experience and subsequent contacts with American folklorists fundamentally altered her approach. It was at the Summer Institute in Indiana that Creighton began the process of transformation, as Ian McKay puts it, from "a British-style 'Ballad Stalker'...[to] an American-style folklorist."[232] Creighton benefitted particularly from the opportunity to work with Alan Lomax, of the Archive of American Folk Song at the Library of Congress. Listening to recordings Lomax made of black-American folk singers for the Archive, Creighton became aware of the superiority of this medium for collection purposes. "I realize," she wrote Lomax shortly after the end of the summer term, "how necessary it is in a proper study of the folk song to have these melodies on records from the singers themselves." She "noted the difference in the voices of northern singers and the influence of the negro, beginning faintly at first and then growing more and more decided as we went further south." Every region had "its own distinctive way of singing" and, Creighton noted, "this cannot be realized at all from the printed text. It must be heard to be fully appreciated."[233]

Creighton also made a strong impression on Lomax, who suggested that she visit the Archive of American Folk Song to continue her education before returning to Halifax.[234] With Marshall's permission to use the remaining funds from her Rockefeller fellowship,

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[232]The Quest of the Folk, p. 78.

[233]Creighton to Alan Lomax, 17 September 1942, p. 1, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[234]Fellowships: Creighton, Helen, p. 2, RG 10, RF, RAC.

Creighton took Lomax up on his offer. At the Library of Congress, armed with Lomax's personal recommendation, Creighton convinced Dr. Harold Spivacke, Chief of the Library of Congress Division of Music, to lend her a recording machine to enable her to make recordings of folk songs sung by troops stationed at Halifax during the war.[235] Again at Lomax's urging and with his support, Creighton applied for a Rockefeller grant-in-aid to support her project.[236]

Although the Rockefeller Foundation was, by this time, no longer funding the collection of folklore in the United States, Marshall was receptive to Creighton's request. Writing Spivacke, he noted that the Foundation "might find some way of considering this a special case....It certainly is a good thing at this juncture to have collaboration between Canadians and Americans whenever that is feasible and purposeful, as I for one think it is in this instance."[237] Writing a little more than a year later, Marshall underscored the importance of North American collaboration as a motive for Foundation interest in Creighton's work: "it seemed on the whole desirable to make an exception in Miss Creighton's case, partly (between ourselves) on the grounds that it involved useful collaboration with a Canadian scholar."[238] Compelled by this motive and adhering to a common Foundation practice of

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[235]That the project involved servicemen was critical to Creighton's success in winning the support of the Library of Congress and of the Rockefeller Foundation. When Spivacke informed Creighton that it was Library policy to support only "recording expeditions...directly connected with the war effort,..." Creighton convinced him "that the material to be found in and about Halifax today" was directly connected to that effort. See Harold Spivacke to Marshall, 3 September 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[236]Interview between Marshall and Creighton, 26 August 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC; and Fellowship Cards - Canada - Nova Scotia, Creighton, Miss Mary Helen, p. 1-2.

[237]Marshall to Harold Spivacke, 1 September 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[238]Marshall to B.A. Botkin, 15 December 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

providing returning fellows with research funds to enable them to apply newly acquired knowledge to their fields of study, Marshall approved a grant of $600 to the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia to be used in support of Creighton's recording project.[239]

The centers of American folklore studies, individuals like Lomax, Spivacke, and Botkin, and Foundation officers like Marshall were not, of course, the only inspirations for Creighton's work. Her already extensive efforts at collecting folk ballads were influenced by other early folklorists, Canadian and British musical experts, and by such popularizers of "folk events" as J. Murray Gibbon.[240] As Marshall was himself aware, Canadian National Museum ethnologist Marius Barbeau's recordings made in Quebec and in British Columbia during the previous two decades made him a pioneer in the field. As historian Ian McKay points out in The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century Nova Scotia, Barbeau's influence, in particular, was critical in Creighton's development as a folklorist.[241]

Closer to home, provincial archivist D.C. Harvey was also supportive of Creighton's work. When asked by Marshall for his opinion on the advisability of Foundation support for Creighton's work, Harvey responded in the affirmative. He advised Marshall that, although he had been unable to employ Creighton at the Provincial Archives in Nova Scotia, he "felt

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[239]The Rockefeller Foundation preferred to make grants of this nature to institutions rather than individuals. Accordingly, Marshall asked archivist D.C. Harvey to administer the grant for the Foundation. In addition to doing so, Harvey provided Creighton with work space. In return, copies of Creighton's recordings were deposited in the Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia. See Marshall to D.C. Harvey, 26 April 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC; and Harvey to Marshall, 30 April 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[240]McKay, The Quest of the Folk, p. 44.

[241]Ibid., p. 56.

that it was important that such folk-song material as is available in Nova Scotia should be collected now before the old ballad singers pass on."[242] His inability to hire Creighton even on a part-time basis was, he assured Marshall, due only to budget limitations.[243] Eager to have recordings of the province's folk songs added to his institution's collections, Harvey summed up his feelings about the value of Creighton's project and its urgency in his reply to Marshall:

> I think Miss Creighton's type of work has a definite time limit and should be done as soon as possible. Obviously, the work she proposes to do amongst the forces can only be done while the war is on and that should be of general interest: but the work she was doing hitherto, in the purely Nova Scotian field, should also be done as soon as is possible, because I have a feeling that only the older generation sing or are interested in preserving the old ballads.[244]

As Harvey indicated in his letter to Marshall, Creighton's project had two fundamental components. Taking advantage of the influx of servicemen from all parts of Canada, as well as the increased international traffic in Halifax harbour, Creighton recorded folk songs from her base at the Canadian Legion in the city. Using transportation provided by the Legion, Creighton also travelled throughout the province to record folk songs and lore in what Harvey referred to as "the purely Nova Scotian field." Although it was the work among the armed forces that formally justified Creighton's receipt of Rockefeller Foundation funds, it was the "pure" Nova Scotia folklore that most excited Harvey and Creighton.

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[242]Harvey to Marshall, 19 April 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[243]Ibid.

[244]Ibid.

Despite the unique opportunities for collecting in Halifax provided by the war, Creighton's first interest was in materials indigenous to the province. Exposure to Lomax's recordings of Black folk songs in the United States likely was responsible for Creighton's discovery of an "entirely new field" in her own back yard. Despite her avid professional and personal interest in folk material, she had not previously been aware that the "local negroes [living near Halifax] were singers."[245] Initially convinced that "negroes near my home" had little to contribute to her collections, she soon became interested in the spirituals they sang. Eager to "find out how good their material is," Creighton met with "an old Coachman," listening to him sing while he worked in the gardens of one of her friends.[246]

More in keeping with patterns established in her previous research and with her essentialized and ethnicized notions of the real Nova Scotian folk, Creighton also travelled to Yarmouth to record "a number of sea captains who sailed before the mast and who sang chanties in the traditional way...."[247] Displaying a sense of urgency common to those who thought they were preserving a quickly disappearing past, Creighton noted that as "invaluable" records of this material would be, "the matter must not be left too long. These people drop off one by one, so we can't collect from them too soon."[248] Expressing thought fully consistent with Marshall's notion of North American cultural exchange, Creighton noted to Lomax that the "Nova Scotia sea dogs....had a fine reputation in the old days, and

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[245]Creighton to Marshall, 3 October 1942, p. 1, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[246]Ibid.

[247]Creighton to Lomax, 17 September 1942, p. 2. RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[248]Ibid.

many of the songs were exchanged with your fishermen along the north eastern coast."[249]

Creighton found a three-week visit to Cape Breton to be most fruitful. There she recorded songs and legend told by local inhabitants in Gaelic, French and Micmac. Much to her disappointment she found that there was very "little left among the Indians, although...a few of the very old ones...tell legends."[250] In general, she found Micmac singing was "devoted entirely to the Roman Catholic prayer book which they chant in their own tongue."[251] Despite her difficulties in making recordings that conformed more clearly to her notion of the authentic, she did manage to "get a few good things...which must be interesting to any student of the Indian race."[252] Despite Marius Barbeau's urging that she "get all she could," or perhaps because of them, Creighton "only touched the fringe" in recording songs and lore of the French-speaking inhabitants of Cape Breton. This was due to the fact, she informed Marshall in her summary of her project, that "practically everything done in Canada so far has been done among the French speaking people."[253]

In addition to the recordings she made for the Archive of American Folk Song, Creighton also completed research for a scholarly publication on the folklore of Lunenburg County. While she had not "found much in the way of traditional song there," she judged

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[249]Ibid.

[250]Creighton to Marshall, 13 July 1944, p. 2, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[251]Ibid.

[252]Ibid.

[253]Ibid.

"that part of the province...rich in story and superstition."[254] The Lunenburg book, she told Marshall, was superior to her first volume of ballads and songs because there was so "much material [in it] that is really beautiful, and truly folk."[255] Despite Marshall's earlier protestations that the Foundation could not consider another grant in support of her research, he and Stevens awarded Creighton a grant-in-aid in December 1945 to enable her to complete the Lunenburg manuscript under the supervision of Stith Thompson at the University of Indiana.[256]

The collaboration between the Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Division and Helen Creighton proved enormously fruitful for all involved. Creighton later noted the timely loan of the Library of Congress's recording machine allowed her to lay claim to material a competitor in the field was also in a hurry to record.[257] During the war, Creighton was the only scholar actively collecting folk material for the Archive of American Folk Song. As B.A. Botkin, who succeeded Lomax as the official in charge of the Archive, pointed out, Creighton's collection of Canadian material provided "an unusual opportunity for comparing British and American influences."[258]

The Rockefeller Foundation and Creighton mutually benefited from the scholar's subsequent development as one of Canada's leading professional folklorists. As D.C.

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[254]Ibid.

[255]Ibid., p. 3.

[256]Fellowship cards: Creighton, p. 4, RF, RAC.

[257]Creighton, A Life in Folklore, p. 131.

[258]B.A. Botkin to Marshall, 20 December 1943, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

Harvey noted in the late-1940s, Rockefeller aid had not only allowed Creighton to develop her own skills and to carry out important research in her field, but it also "called the attention of both provincial and national authorities to her work, thereby giving promise of a continuing effect."[259] As so often is the case with Canadian cultural producers, status and recognition received outside Canada predated and led to greater acceptance in Canada.[260] At least partially as a result of the Rockefeller Foundation's and the Library of Congress stamps of endorsement, the National Museum of Canada not only published Creighton's volume on Lunenburg,[261] but also hired her to continue work on her various collections. Similarly, the provincial Department of Education in Nova Scotia helped her publish another volume of "Songs and Ballads of Nova Scotia."[262] In the decades that followed Creighton's flame burned ever brighter. On permanent staff at the National Museum in Ottawa by early 1949, Creighton published numerous scholarly and popular books and articles on folklore and held memberships in several professional and voluntary associations in related fields including the Canadian Authors Association, the American Folklore Society, that American Anthropological Association and the Canadian Folk Music Society. In 1964, benefiting from the Canadian federal state's commitment to cultural funding -- a commitment that not coincidentally resembled that exhibited by American foundations in an earlier era -- Creighton received a Canada Council grant to help her permanently record and transcribe

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[259]Harvey to David H. Stevens, 18 November 1948, RG 1.1, Series 427R, Box 28, Folder 279, RF, RAC.

[260]McKay, The Quest of the Folk, p. 76.

[261]Folklore of Lunenburg County, Nova Scotia (Ottawa: National Museum of Canada, 1950).

[262]Creighton with Doreen Senior, Traditional Folksongs from Nova Scotia (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1950).

her entire collection of folk songs and tunes.[263]

The benefit derived by the Rockefeller Foundation from its support for Creighton is a little less tangible. Creighton's transformation from "ballad stalker" to "folklorist" certainly did not have earth-shaking impact on relations between Canada and the United States. But if the Foundation's goal was to subtly foster the growth of a common scholarly community in North America and to thus create common cultural practices, attitudes and policies then, as Ian McKay suggests, "Helen Creighton's file can only be regarded as an outstanding success story."[264]

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The support the Rockefeller Foundation provided for the likes of Gard, Morton, Hughes, Bailey and Creighton is strong evidence of the fundamental expansion of the base of American corporate philanthropy in the second quarter of the twentieth century. Through the new addition to the superstructure of the Foundation, the Humanities Division, its leaders expanded their focus to include emphasis on the "human" elements of modern life. Applying the same techniques of influence that had proven so effective in such fields as medical education and public health -- the selective survey and formal and informal conferences designed to forge consensus -- the Rockefeller Foundation had, by the early 1940s, become a powerful factor in the politics of culture in North America.

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[263]Fellowship Cards: Creighton, pp. 4-5, RF, RAC.

[264]McKay, The Quest of the Folk, p. 78.

It would be a gross exaggeration to claim that support for projects of local and regional interpretation alone constituted even an attempt at the scientific management of Canadian culture. In conjunction with the activities of the Carnegie Corporation in Canada and with the Foundation's efforts to facilitate national organization of the humanities and social sciences in Canada in the 1940s, however, the support for regional studies and for the creation of regional infrastructure was a significant intervention in Canadian culture. This was particularly true at a time when, due to the constraints first of economic depression and then of the war effort, there was much talk but very little action on the need to support culture and scholarship in Canada.

The financial support and the access to American expertise the Rockefeller Foundation provided was an invaluable aid to Canadians who were in the process of defining Canadian local and regional traditions and cultures. Foundation initiatives designed to develop the study of cultural history, sociology, and folklore had a lasting impact in Canada both in terms of making the work of Creighton, Bailey, and others possible and by influencing how these individuals approached their areas of specialization. In negotiating this support, the Foundation was also involving itself in, and lending its support to, the emerging network of Canadian institutions, associations and individuals coalescing around the impulse to structure and lead Canadian culture. In this manner, the Rockefeller Foundation contributed, in no small way, to the emergence of such men as N.A.M. MacKenzie, Georges-Henri Lévesque, F.R. Scott and Alfred Bailey as cultural authorities -- thus helping them in their ascension to positions of leadership and influence.

Chapter 4: The Carnegie Corporation, Cultural Philanthropy and a New Deal for the Arts in Canada

Before Frederick Keppel took office as president of the Carnegie Corporation in the fall of 1923, the fine arts had received very little support from either of the giants of corporate philanthropy. Keppel's personal interest in the arts and in "high culture" in general placed these fields near the top of the Carnegie Corporation's agenda for the following two decades. As one author has noted, Keppel's pursuit of cultural philanthropy established the Carnegie Corporation as a "decisive influence on the institutional development of American culture."[1] As I argue in this chapter, that influence extended beyond the northern border of the United States.

Keppel's selection as president and the Corporation's subsequent turn to cultural philanthropy marked a significant departure from the type of scientific philanthropy pursued by leaders Elihu Root and Henry Pritchett in the years following Andrew Carnegie's retirement in 1917. These men had been most concerned with the development of scientific expertise and research infrastructure. Keppel, on the other hand, returned the Corporation's focus to other areas of activity close to the donor's heart. In his seminal statement on philanthropy, the "Gospel of Wealth," Carnegie had listed art galleries, museums, concert halls, public parks and libraries, along with universities and medical schools, as worthy targets for philanthropy.[2] In addition to addressing the physical and material requirements

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[1]Paul J. DiMaggio, "Support for the Arts from Independent Foundations," in Nonprofit Enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint, ed. DiMaggio (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 115.

[2]Andrew Carnegie, "The Gospel of Wealth," in Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth and Other Timely Essays,

of life, Carnegie believed it was the duty of men of great wealth to provide American society with a culture that was both "instructive" and "elevating."[3] Whereas arts and high culture were peripheral to the main direction of Rockefeller philanthropy -- even where its Humanities Division was concerned -- these fields of activity were near the top of the Carnegie Corporation's agenda under Keppel.

At the core of Keppel's strategy for public enlightenment in the arts was his desire, as one historian puts it, "to find ways to disseminate traditionally elite culture to a larger number of people."[4] To do so Keppel attempted to bring the techniques and structures of scientific philanthropy into the world of high culture by organizing the power of a national cultural elite in a series of bureaucratically-structured committees, institutions and associations. Thus, in addition to increasing access to high culture, the Carnegie Corporation under Keppel was engaged in a campaign to facilitate the transfer of cultural authority and guardianship from individual patrons and entrepreneurs to a new incorporated, national network of cultural professionals.[5] Without a trained, organized and structured cultural elite, Keppel feared that free market forces and the materialism of individual entrepreneurs would claim victory over the values he held dear. Like Carnegie, Keppel believed that culture should serve a greater function in American society than merely

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ed. Edward C. Kirkland (Cambridge, Massachussetts: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 32-44.

[3]Ibid., p. 45.

[4]Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge: The Carnegie Corporation, Philanthropy, and Public Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 7.

[5]Ibid., p. 100.

providing entertainment and amusement for cultural consumers and profits for cultural producers. To preserve traditions[6] of western culture passed down from classical times, the Corporation should, in Keppel's view, support the reinfusion of elements of a classical liberal education, including fine art, music, literature, and poetry into American culture. It was the duty of the Corporation, according to Keppel, to act as a custodian of national culture and to empower a group of like-minded cultural leaders.[7] In this respect, at least, his concerns were not that different from such Rockefeller Foundation officers as David Stevens and John Marshall or, for that matter, from those of Canadians such as Vincent Massey. All would agree that, in the aftermath of the First World War, their leadership was needed as much in cultural affairs as it was in business and science.

One of Keppel's first actions as president of the Corporation was to finance a survey of the arts in America supervised by Richard F. Bach of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. The resulting report, "The Place of the Arts in American Life," became the starting point for a new Carnegie Corporation program in the arts. Not overly concerned with the work of individual artists, Bach's report documented the low level of education in fine art and art history offered in American colleges and universities. Most institutions, Bach's investigators found, offered little or no opportunity for study in these fields. The few that did offer courses did so, generally speaking, without the benefit of trained specialists. There were, in

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[6]I am using the term "traditions" in the manner discussed by Raymond Williams when he defines what he refers to as the "selective tradition." As Williams suggests "certain meanings and practices" from history are selected "from a whole possible area of past and present" to represent the "significant past." See Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Rethinking Popular Culture: Contemporary Perspectives in Cultural Studies, eds. Chandra Mukerji and Michael Schudson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 414.

[7]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 100.

fact, only a few instructors who had received doctorates in the areas in which they taught. The majority of members of the few existing art and art history faculties either held advanced degrees in related fields, such as History and English Literature, or held no higher degrees at all.[8]

Keppel's next step in the direction of taking positive action to strengthen the position of the arts in American society was to convene a conference of prominent leaders in the art community to review Bach's findings and to develop strategies for improvement. Individuals who Keppel brought in to advise him on the program in the arts included such men as Frank Jewett Mather Jr., director of the Princeton University Art Museum and the art critic at the Nation; Richard Aldrich, formerly the music critic at the New York Times; Royal Cortissoz, art consultant for the New York Tribune; Royal B. Farnum, Massachusett's Director of art education; and Paul J. Sachs, a professor at Harvard in fine arts and the Director of Harvard's Fogg Museum. By selecting critics, curators and educators known not only for their expertise and influence in northeastern elite circles, but also for their conservative and traditional views,[9] Keppel was assured that reinforcement of the cultural standards of established elites would be high on the list of the group's objectives. The group also represented the leaders of a newly professionalised cultural elite -- men like Keppel himself, who saw the management of culture as their business.

In order to establish the arts on firmer footing, Keppel's cultural brain-trust

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[8]Brenda Jubin, Carnegie Corporation: Program in the Arts 1911-1967 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1968), p. 5.

[9]Cortissoz and Mather, for instance, were both vehement and out-spoken critics of the 1913 Armory Show which introduced Postimpressionism to North America. See Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 108.

recommended a multi-pronged plan to improve art education in colleges and universities throughout North America and thus provide appropriate training for future generations of educators, museum personnel and, by extension, cultural leaders. To address the shortage of qualified instructors the committee proposed that the Carnegie Corporation create a fellowship program. As a result of this proposal, the Corporation awarded 80 fellowships to promising students throughout North America between 1925 and 1931. Selection was administered by a committee of museum directors and art historians drawn from the same circles as was Keppel's original advisory group.[10] Selected on the strength of their undergraduate transcripts, study plans and recommendations, this group of students formed what one Corporation official later referred to as "a veritable 'Who's Who'" of the outstanding art historians and museum and gallery directors of their generation.[11] To ensure that the power and influence of the Keppel's selected elite was perpetuated, the Corporation steered the great majority of these future leaders to programs of study supervised by either Frank Jewett Mather Jr. at Princeton or Paul J. Sachs at Harvard.[12] At both institutions, wide-ranging formal academic study in the humanistic tradition was combined with practical and theoretical instruction in gallery practice.

On the committee's recommendation, the Carnegie Corporation also made a

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[10]The first selection committee consisted of: Frank Morley Fletcher, Santa Barbara Community Arts; Edward W. Forbes, Harvard University; Keppel; Frank Jewett Mather, Jr.; Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia University; Catherine Pierce, a former professor at Mount Holyoke College; Edward Root, Hamilton College; Walter Sargeant, University of Chicago; and Alfred J. Hyslop, of Carleton College. Report of the President and of the Treasurer For the Year Ended September 30, 1926 (New York: The Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1926), p. 15.

[11]Florence Anderson, "Introduction" in Carnegie Corporation Program in the Arts 1911-1967, p. 3.

[12]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, p. 110.

substantial effort to supplement materials available to university and college art instructors. In order to do so, Keppel formed another sub-committee and entrusted the group to put together standardized "teaching sets" consisting of "a representative collection of material" deemed necessary for adequate instruction in art history. Drawing heavily from photograph collections of classical art at the Morgan Library and the Frick Art Reference Library, the group compiled sets of over 1,800 photographs of architecture, painting and sculpture; two collections of original prints and textiles; and over 400 volumes on the history of art.[13] In 1926 the teaching sets were distributed to 20 schools in North America, including Queen's University, the University of Toronto, and Dalhousie University.[14] By 1941, 302 sets had been distributed to colleges, museums and secondary schools throughout the United States and the Commonwealth.[15]

To further solidify the status and position of fine art and art history in college and university curriculum, and following precedents established in other fields of study by both major trusts, the Carnegie Corporation also gave a series of large grants for development, support and endowment of visual art departments at a number of selected institutions. In keeping with the established formula, the Corporation dispersed these grants to facilitate the development of both regional and national centers of study. Recipient institutions included Harvard, Indiana University, Yale, Iowa State University, University of Georgia, Stanford, the University of Michigan and, in Canada, Acadia University, University of Alberta,

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[13]Report of the President and of the Treasurer For the Year Ended September 30, 1926, pp. 16-17.

[14]Ibid., p. 17.

[15]Jubin, Carnegie Corporation Program in the Arts 1911-1967, p. 7.

McMaster University, and the University of Toronto.[16] By the early 1930s the Carnegie Corporation had begun the process of entrenching the study of art in North American higher education.

The Carnegie Corporation, The National Gallery of Canada and the Canadian Museums Committee

Although the focus of the Carnegie Corporation's program in cultural philanthropy was initially on education in colleges and universities, Keppel and his cultural advisers knew that museums and galleries had important pedagogic functions as well. In 1928 Keppel convened a sub-committee to study the role these institutions might play in educating future members of the general public and future cultural leaders and in influencing public taste. At the suggestion of members of this committee, the Carnegie Corporation began to grant awards to a number of cultural institutions. Although the grants were all made to support educational activities at the recipient institutions, specific programs varied greatly. The Carnegie Corporation subsidized Yale University's Edward S. Robinson's research in viewer reaction to various types of exhibits and displays. With a grant to the Cincinnati Art Museum, the Corporation supported adult education classes related to the temporary exhibits then at the gallery. Acting on the belief that broad segments of the population found high culture physically inaccessible, the Corporation granted the Philadelphia Museum of Art $45,000 in 1931 to establish a branch museum.[17] All funded programs were designed

[16] Ibid., pp. 10-11. Canadian recipients are listed on p.36.

[17] Ibid., pp. 13-14.

to meet both main objectives of the Carnegie agenda: to increase public access to the values of high culture and to professionalize the cultural sphere.

In 1931, Keppel decided to extend the Carnegie Corporation's program of support for museums and galleries beyond the borders of the United States. To initiate this extension the Corporation granted $30,000 from its British Dominions and Colonies Fund (the Special Fund) to the British Museums Association to conduct surveys of cultural institutions in several British colonies and dominions. With this support, Museums Association president Sir Henry Miers, H.C. Richardson and S.F. Markham researched and published reports on the state of museums and galleries in Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon and Fiji. Finding that a number of institutions in these countries had impressive collections, Miers, Markham and Richardson found that most lacked the financial capabilities and trained personnel to take full advantage of the quality of their material.[18]

Reacting to the findings of Miers and Markham's study of museums and galleries in Canada[19] and wishing to extend the reach of his program in cultural philanthropy, Keppel initiated the formation of a Canadian committee to work with the Carnegie Corporation to "suggest ways and means of aiding the advancement of Canadian Museums and Galleries by direct financial assistance and grants for training."[20] Like the group of American cultural

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[18]Ibid., p. 15; See also S.F. Markham, "Museums of Empire: The Need of Links and Loans," The Times Weekly, 28 September 1933, photocopied clipping in RG 7.4 C, Outside Activities/Organizations, Carnegie Corporation - General, File: September 7, 1933 - April 23, 1934, National Gallery of Canada Archives (hereafter NGCA).

[19]S.F. Markham and Henry Miers, A Report on the Museums of Canada (Edinburgh: T.A. Constable Ltd., 1932).

[20]Eric Brown to W.C. Constable, 3 February 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925 - 1956, NGCA.

critics, administrators and educators Keppel had called together to create the Corporation's program of cultural philanthropy in the first place, the membership of the Canadian advisory committee represented Keppel's best efforts at elite-level consensus building. As was the case with his American brain-trust, the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian committee was selected with the reproduction and reformulation of existing hierarchies of cultural authority in mind. Each member was well-connected to business and political elites and every member of the committee represented a major cultural institution -- institutions that Keppel believed would have to act as the foundation of an emerging national culture. Accordingly, local museum associations, smaller institutions from smaller towns, leaders of regional movements and, indeed, all individuals interested in culture but not part of the national elite were excluded from participation.[21]

Care was taken to give the committee the appearance of adequate regional representation, and its members came from institutions scattered fairly evenly across Canada.[22] To this end, the great enemy of national organization in Canada, geography, was overcome by Carnegie Corporation travel grants which enabled committee members to attend annual meetings in Ottawa. This regional representation was a thin disguise for the real balance of power on the committee, however. The selection of J. Clarence Webster of

[21]Conforming to the early patterns of professionalization and incorporation in modern western culture, Keppel's committee included no women. Conforming to the already established pattern of supposedly "national" cultural associations in Canada, there was no French-Canadian representative either.

[22]The members of the committee were F. Kermode, Director of the Provincial Museum in Victoria; R.W. Brock, former director of the National Museum in Ottawa but at the time a Dean at the University of British Columbia; Robert C. Wallace, President of the University of Alberta and future Principal at Queen's University; Vincent Massey; Eric Brown, the Director of the National Gallery and his assistant H.O. McCurry; E.L. Judah, of McGill University; and committee Chairman J. Clarence Webster, of the New Brunswick Museum.

the New Brunswick Museum as committee Chairman was no more than a smoke-screen. Just as Keppel directed his American programs from his offices in New York with the aid of representatives of the dominant cultural institutions (newspapers, galleries and universities) in the northeastern United States, he made Ottawa and the National Gallery his Canadian headquarters, and a small group of central Canadians his principal advisers. H.O. McCurry, the Assistant Director of the National Gallery, was responsible for selecting all of the members of the committee, and the committee's business was conducted out of his office in the gallery. The gallery's dominance was only enhanced when, in the spring of 1934, McCurry received Keppel's endorsement to add H.S. Southam, Chairman of the Board of Trustees at the National Gallery and the publisher of the Ottawa Citizen, to the committee.[23] By 1935 it was common practice that all major issues that came up between annual meetings were discussed and decided on by a small informal executive committee consisting of National Gallery director Eric Brown, McCurry, Webster, Southam and Vincent Massey.[24]

The National Gallery's position of dominance was not merely established by decree from New York. By allowing McCurry to form the committee, Keppel established the National Gallery as the initial base and focus of the Corporation's Canadian cultural activities. For the National Gallery to emerge from the arrangement as Canada's primary cultural institution -- as the center at which Carnegie cultural policy was mediated and thus nationalized, and from which this policy emanated -- required that its leaders constantly

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[23]H.O. McCurry to Frederick P. Keppel, 3 April 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: September 7, 1933 - April 3, 1934, NGCA.

[24]McCurry to J. Clarence Webster, 29 March 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA. Again, Webster's inclusion was more for appearance's sake than a reflection of his power. Although McCurry kept him informed, he was not privy to all Ottawa-New York communications.

negotiate and renegotiate the terms of authority both with the corporate patrons in New York and with other members of the Canadian cultural elite. McCurry and Brown, in effect, had to offer leadership if they were to be granted it. Thus, in addition to spearheading programs that appealed to the Carnegie bosses, McCurry and Brown had to maintain dominance over institutions from across Canada and fend off competition from within central Canada -- particularly from Toronto. The first task was not difficult, considering Keppel's desire to work through a central base. In times of economic depression and general lack of support for arts and culture, fledgling regional institutions with limited access to funding and professional expertise had little choice but to follow Ottawa's lead. The second task -- dealing with competing candidates for national leadership -- required careful maneuvering by McCurry and Brown.

In nominating candidates for inclusion to Keppel's Canadian committee McCurry could not entirely by-pass representatives of such rival institutions as the Art Gallery of Toronto[25] and the Royal Ontario Museum. In addition to being two of the most influential cultural institutions in Canada, both had large collections necessary for the success of any serious regional extension programs the Canadian committee might wish to pursue.[26] Instead of selecting a curator or other active staff member to represent these two institutions, McCurry recommended Vincent Massey, a trustee for both. Massey's national prominence, his interest in Canadian culture, and his close ties to the American

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[25]The Art Museum of Toronto, now the Art Gallery of Ontario, changed its name to the Art Gallery of Toronto in 1926.

[26]Webster to McCurry, 10 July 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

philanthropic elite ensured that he would have been selected for the committee with or without McCurry's support.[27] Charles Currelly, director of the archaeology section of the Royal Ontario Museum -- one of the small handful of Canadian institutions endorsed by the Miers and Markham survey and one of the largest museums in any British Dominion[28] -- was notably excluded from participation. Currelly was left off the committee, Keppel later explained to Massey, "because he was antagonistic to the whole idea, and it was felt necessary to start the job with a group that could work together."[29]

If Currelly was truly antagonistic to the national committee in the fall of 1933, he was more than willing to participate by the spring of 1934. At that time Massey and Webster both began to lobby Keppel and McCurry to have Currelly, and the Royal Ontario Museum's Director of Zoology, J. R. Dymond, added to the committee. In response to an inquiry from Massey, Keppel suggested that he personally thought it was appropriate that the matter should be brought before the committee for consideration. Keppel added however -- deferring to the authority he had, partially at least, bestowed on McCurry -- that Massey should first consult McCurry "who knows the whole background."[30] Keppel noted that he hesitated to pursue the matter himself because he and his colleagues in New York

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[27]Vincent Massey had also been a member of the National Gallery's Board of Trustees since 1925 and had close ties to both McCurry and Brown. As the former minister in charge of the Canadian legation in Washington, he was well known to leaders in American philanthropy.

[28]Lovat Dickson, The Museum Makers: The Story of the Royal Ontario Museum (Toronto: Royal Ontario Museum, 1986), pp. 69-72.

[29]Keppel to Vincent Massey, 12 June 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA. Currelly and other directors at the Royal Ontario Museum were stung by the suggestion in the Miers and Markham report that the Museum could make better use of its large reserve collection of artifacts. See Dickson, The Museum Makers, pp. 69-70.

[30]Keppel to Massey, 12 June 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

felt that it was "of the first importance that the initiative for enterprises in the Dominions should come from the Dominions themselves...."[31]

To continue to keep Toronto men off of the committee McCurry engaged in an elaborate campaign of sleight-of-hand throughout the summer and fall of 1934. To start with, he advised Currelly that the Canadian committee was "still of a temporary and experimental nature" and that it would be more appropriate to discuss additions to the committee at some later date.[32] At the same time, McCurry claimed to have surveyed the members of the committee on the issue. Despite the fact that both J. Clarence Webster, officially the committee's chairman, and Massey were strongly in favour of the inclusion of the Toronto men, McCurry closed the matter claiming that committee members were unanimously against adding Dymond and Currelly.[33]

In order to maintain his position of dominance McCurry knew too that he would have to justify his opposition to Keppel. He also realized he would have to negotiate a compromise with the representatives of the Toronto institutions. Presenting his own outlook and interests as "comprehensive" and representative of "some understanding of the needs of the country as a whole," McCurry wrote Keppel that there were others who would prefer to focus the committee's work on the needs "of a particular institution."[34] He further suggested to Keppel's assistant John M. Russell that the move to nominate Currelly and

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[31]Ibid.

[32]McCurry to Webster, 9 October 1934, p. 2, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

[33]Ibid.

[34]McCurry to Keppel, 18 June 1934, p. 2, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

Dymond was the product of an unholy alliance among Massey, Webster and Currelly. Webster, in particular, was "unable to view the Canadian problem as a whole; he persists in a sectional and more or less 'quid pro quo' attitude." McCurry even suggested that Currelly had promised to give material from the Royal Ontario Museum's collection to Webster's New Brunswick Museum in exchange for inclusion on the Canadian committee.[35] To prove to the Carnegie officials that his focus was truly national, his motives pure, and his stance towards Toronto sympathetic, McCurry proposed a plan that would recognize, to a limited extent, Toronto's sphere of influence while at the same time side-stepping the issue of further additions to the Canadian committee. In McCurry's plan, the Royal Ontario Museum would serve as a "mother museum for the province, performing somewhat the functions in the provincial field as the National Gallery of Canada now does for the whole Dominion in the field of art."[36] In presenting the proposal to Keppel and to representatives of the Royal Ontario Museum, McCurry was acknowledging not only that institution's position as a provincial center, but also his own institution's national mandate. In McCurry's dreams selected members of the Toronto elite would look after Ontario, while he and Eric Brown directed national cultural policy (in collaboration with the Carnegie Corporation, of course) from his office in Ottawa.[37] And in reality, while other Canadian institutions

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[35]McCurry to John M. Russell, 4 September 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

[36]McCurry to Keppel, 3 December 1934, p. 4, 7.4 C, File: May 1934 - May 1935, NGCA.

[37]McCurry submitted his proposal to an informal committee which included Arthur Lismer, member of the Group of Seven and Educational Supervisor at the Art Gallery of Toronto; Martin Baldwin, Curator of the Art Gallery of Toronto; John Alford, holder of Carnegie-sponsored Chair of Fine Arts at the University of Toronto; and L.S. Longman, whose position in Fine Arts at McMaster University was supported by the Carnegie Corporation. In addition to sharing strong ties to the Carnegie Corporation, members of this committee were all allies of the National Gallery. See "The Carnegie Corporation of New York: Canadian

received large Carnegie Corporation grants,[38] none threatened the National Gallery's status in Keppel's eyes as Canada's primary cultural institution.

If the outcome of the relationship of mutual influence between McCurry and Keppel was that Ottawa and the National Gallery were the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian hubs, Keppel also made very sure that the primary external metropolitan influence on the advisory committee was New York and not London. The Carnegie boss was determined, for example, that Henry Miers and S.F. Markham, the representatives of the British Museums Association who surveyed Canadian museums and galleries for the Carnegie Corporation, not attend meetings of his Canadian committee. Despite the fact that the two men expected to be invited to the inaugural meeting in September 1933, and despite the fact that McCurry and Webster were eager to have their input, Keppel would not hear of it.[39] "Mr. Keppel," his assistant Robert Lester wrote McCurry shortly before the first meeting of the Canadian committee on 6 September 1933, was insistent "that the initiative as to future action of the advisory group should come from Canada rather than from the British Museums Committee."[40] Although Eric Brown later noted that Keppel was very much in favour of W.G. Constable, the Director of the University of London's Courtauld Institute of Art, and

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Committee on Canadian Museums, Progress Report," 26 August 1936, p. 11, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1936, NGCA.

[38]The Art Gallery of Toronto received $50,000 from the Carnegie Corporation between 1932 and 1937 and the Art Association of Montreal received $29,000 between 1938 and 1942. In both cases the grants were used primarily in support of educational programs designed and supervised by Arthur Lismer. See Jubin, Carnegie Corporation Program in the Arts 1911-1967, p. 40.

[39]For McCurry and Webster's positions see McCurry to Webster, 11 August 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933. NGCA.

[40]Lester to McCurry, 20 July 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933, NGCA.

other British experts in the field advising the Canadians on "art educational matters," he also emphasized the Corporation chief's opposition to British influence on the committee.[41] Selective use of British expertise was fine and in fact desirable. In the mid-1930s Great Britain was, more than ever, an important pillar of the western tradition Keppel was fighting to preserve.[42] But control over policy had to be mediated between Ottawa and New York. That McCurry -- accustomed to dealing with British cultural authorities -- was not necessarily in agreement on the matter is indicated by a comment he made in a letter to Webster. In the letter, McCurry lamented that the committee would have to do without British counsel until the time he could "put a little sense into our New York friend."[43]

Despite McCurry's privileged position as Keppel's Canadian lieutenant, it was thus clear, even before the committee's first meeting, that the Carnegie Corporation's decision to work through a centralized committee of Canadian experts in no way represented a relinquishing of power or control. McCurry's power and by extension the Gallery's, were dependent on Keppel's favour. As S.F. Markham noted confidentially to McCurry, Keppel could always make his point stand because "he is paying the shot."[44] If the Canadian leaders wanted to hear British advice they would have to do so in an unofficial capacity or in a manner approved of by officials in New York. Eager to use British expertise selectively,

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[41]Brown to McCurry, 26 June 1933, 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933, NGCA.

[42]For a study of British influence in upper-class circles in the United States see Douglas Chamberlain, "Interaction Between Anglo-American Elites: Oxbridge Influence at Harvard, Yale and Princeton, 1900-1948," (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford University, forthcoming).

[43]McCurry to Webster, 11 August 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933, NGCA.

[44]S.F. Markham to McCurry, 11 August 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933, NGCA.

Keppel did not want to share his influence formally with British authorities.

The mechanisms of influence employed by the Carnegie Corporation were subtle and persuasive. Members of the committee were given earlier and current Corporation programs as models for their own plans and the committee's activities were closely monitored by Keppel. To make sure the Canadian committee conformed to his general strategies, Keppel renewed its supporting grant on a year-to-year basis through the life of the body. Though McCurry was given a considerable amount of power over the committee, clearly the base of that power was Keppel's on-going support. In any case, the formation of a Canadian advisory body stands in marked contrast to the practices of informal consultation at both regional and national levels preferred by the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation until well into the 1940s. The contrast was, most likely, a result of both the long-standing tradition of a separately endowed Special Fund for the British Colonies and Dominions and Keppel's own executive style.

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From the time of its first meeting in September 1933 to the fall of 1938, when the Carnegie Corporation altered its Canadian strategy and withdrew its support for the group, the Canadian committee's programs and policies reflected the complexity of a three-cornered relationship that included the leadership of the Corporation, members of the central-Canadian elite, and British art administrators. The general strategy, in accordance with the American pattern established previously by the triumvirates' senior partners, called for solidifying the infrastructural base of a national culture in central Canada while, at the

same time, developing what was seen by all parties involved in decision-making as a complementary (but subordinate) regional infrastructure in the western and Maritime provinces.

Shortly before the formal creation of the Canadian committee, Brown and McCurry convinced Keppel of the value of Carnegie support for a series of Dominion-wide lecture tours to help galvanize support for the arts. Noting that a number of new galleries and museums had been created in western Canada in recent years, McCurry advised Keppel that "well directed lecture work would, we think, build up an intelligent body of support for these embryo centres of art education."[45] After receiving a grant of $5,000 from the Carnegie Corporation, the National Gallery leaders, with Keppel's support, selected artist and art educator Arthur Lismer to conduct a lecture tour of Western Canada.

A better agent for the National Gallery's cultural agenda and for Keppel's goal for increased scientific and professional management of Canadian culture could not have been found. In addition to being a leading member of central Canada's preëminent art association, the Group of Seven, and a strong ally of the National Gallery,[46] Lismer was the Educational Director at the Art Gallery of Toronto, and taught art courses for the Extension Department at the University of Toronto and for the Ontario Department of Education. During his tour of western Canada, which took place in March and April 1932, Lismer spoke

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[45]McCurry to Brown, 25 April 1931, p. 2, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925-1956, NGCA.

[46]The Group's and its members' relationships with the National Gallery are well documented in the literature on the history of Canadian art. See, for instance, Charles Hill, The Group of Seven: Art for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1995). For a more critical examination of the construction of the alliance see Lynda Jessup, "Canadian Artists, Railways, the State and 'the Business of Becoming a Nation,'" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Toronto, 1992).

at galleries, universities, high schools and to professional and voluntary associations. Repeating messages he had published in his earlier promotional work for the Group, Lismer attempted to situate the fine arts in modern society and more specifically within what he presented as an emerging national culture.[47]

This inaugural tour to western Canada was followed in the summer of 1934 by a series of presentations given by Marion Richardson, art inspector for the London County Council Schools in England, and by a second Lismer tour in the summer of 1935. Both of these subsequent campaigns were pitched specifically at the issue of art education in public elementary and secondary schools and were coordinated jointly with provincial departments of education in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.[48] These lecture tours were coordinated with a series of grants to regional institutions designed, as well, to stimulate interest in the arts and in high culture in western Canada.

From the perspective of the leaders of the Canadian committee and the Carnegie Corporation, true progress in the regions could only follow the development and support of a strong base in central Canada. Lismer's first lecture tour was thus followed by a series of lectures given by W.G. Constable, the Assistant Director of the National Gallery in London

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[47]"The Carnegie Corporation of New York: Canadian Committee on Canadian Museums, Progress Report," 26 August 1936, pp. 28-29, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA. Examples of Lismer's early publications include "Art and the Average Canadian," Canadian Courier 24 (1 February 1919): p. 13; and "Art Education and Art Appreciation," The Rebel 4 (February 1920): pp. 208-211. See also the foreword to the catalogue of the Group's first exhibition, Group of 7 Exhibition of Paintings (Toronto: Art Museum of Toronto, 1920). For an extensive discussion of the polemic for a national art developed by Lismer and other members of the Group see Jessup "Canadian Artists, Railways, the State, and 'the Business of Becoming a Nation.'"

[48]"The Carnegie Corporation of New York: Canadian Committee on Canadian Museums, Progress Report," 26 August 1936, pp. 26-30, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

and the Director of the Courtauld Institute of Art, on the place of the arts in higher education. Although Constable, like Lismer, was selected to represent the center to the periphery -- to, in effect, advertise and legitimize the national scale of the National Gallery of Canada's cultural leadership -- he was also employed by Brown and McCurry to encourage development of art education at the elite universities of central Canada. Both objectives fit in well with the broader Carnegie agenda, and Constable's tour met with Keppel's full approval.[49]

Constable's selection was the result of an exhaustive search by McCurry and Brown for a prominent Englishman who could convince wary and cash-strapped university administrators of the necessity of the fine arts departments at their universities. In a letter dated 6 September 1933 -- the day following the first meeting of the Canadian Museums Committee -- McCurry invited Constable to speak in Canada. After recounting the events of the previous day, McCurry suggested that Constable come to Canada to explain to Canadian audiences the importance of training and scholarship in the fine arts and to impress upon Canadians "the National Gallery's place in the scheme, past, present and future...."[50] Constable agreed and from late October and December of that year toured Canada with McCurry. In addition to speaking to audiences in most large Canadian cities west of Montreal,[51] McCurry and Constable held private discussions with provincial education officials and with university administrators. Upon his return to England, Constable

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[49]Brown to McCurry, 26 June 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: December 1932 - August 31, 1933, NGCA.

[50]McCurry to Constable, 6 September 1933, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925 - 1956, NGCA.

[51]Stops were made in Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton, and Vancouver.

summarized his thoughts in a memorandum, "Art Activities in Canadian Universities," which he sent to several of the officials and administrators he had met in Canada.[52]

Constable's thoughts on the place of the fine arts in liberal education had immediate resonance in central Canada and provided support for McCurry's and Keppel's plans to improve art education in Canada. At the time of Constable's tour, officials at Queen's University and members of the Kingston Art Association -- encouraged by McCurry and his assurances of at least limited Carnegie Corporation support -- were taking the first tentative steps in the direction of creating a department of fine arts. After winning a small three-year Carnegie grant from the Canadian committee, Queen's University and the Kingston Art Association joined forces to hire Goodridge Roberts to serve as resident artist for the university. In August 1934, the University of Toronto made a more substantial entry into the world of high culture by hiring Constable's colleague at the Courtauld, John Alford, to fill a new a Chair of Fine Arts endowed by the Carnegie Corporation.[53]

During his three years at Queen's, Roberts gave public lectures at the university and in the Kingston cultural community, taught non-credit courses in painting and helped organize art exhibitions.[54] Although the appointment did not result in the creation of a Carnegie-endowed chair at Queen's -- as McCurry, Queen's Principal Hamilton Fyfe, and

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[52]"The Carnegie Corporation of New York: Canadian Committee on Canadian Museums, Progress Report," 26 August 1936, pp. 25-26, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA. See also Frances K. Smith, André Biéler: An Artist's Life and Times (Toronto: Merritt Publishing Company Ltd., 1980), p. 82.

[53]McCurry to R.W. Brock, 28 August 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925 - 1956, NGCA.

[54]"The Carnegie Corporation of New York: Canadian Committee on Canadian Museums, Progress Report," 26 August 1936, p. 10, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

Kingston Art Association President Reginald Trotter hoped it might[55] -- the experiment did lead to the more gradual development of an art department at Queen's. At the end of Roberts's term, the university and the community art association pooled resources and, operating without Carnegie Corporation financial support, hired André Biéler as the new resident artist. Having received the support of Kingston and Queen's University patron Agnes Etherington for the project, the university also approved Biéler's proposal for the inclusion of new credit courses in art history and fine art instruction in September 1936, on the eve of the academic year.[56] Another important central-Canadian base for the arts was thus established.

McCurry and Brown were less successful in their efforts to use their influence with the Carnegie Corporation to support the establishment of art departments at other Canadian universities. Late in 1933, Keppel suggested to McCurry that the Carnegie Corporation would consider supporting the temporary employment of German scholars who were displaced from their positions by the newly formed Nazi regime.[57] After conferring with members of the Canadian committee, McCurry wrote Constable, who was coordinating the plan from the Courtauld Institute in London for Keppel, and advised him that the Canadian leaders favoured "good British men" overwhelmingly over German scholars.[58] Members of

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[55]McCurry advised Fyfe that "Mr. Keppel was decidedly favourable [to the idea of establishing a chair of fine arts at Queen's]...[and] is well disposed towards Queen's and admires what you are doing there." See McCurry to Fyfe, 28 August 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council.

[56]Smith, Andre Bieler, pp. 80-82.

[57]McCurry to Brock, 27 March 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

[58]McCurry to Constable, 1 June 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

the committee felt strongly that British or even Americans were better at appealing to the Canadian cultural community.[59]

Less than a year later, seeing Keppel's proposed Empire Fellowship program as a possible vehicle to further his campaign to establish the study of art in Canadian higher education and ignoring the previous decision of the Canadian committee, McCurry reversed this position. Deferring to Constable's request, McCurry contacted top administrators at several Canadian universities and advised them of the Carnegie Corporation's offer of support.[60] Before receiving any formal responses to his inquires, he also wrote Constable enthusiastically about the strong possibilities for the program at Queen's, McGill, the University of Saskatchewan, and even at his own institution.[61] Despite several enthusiastic replies from Canadian university officials to McCurry's inquiries, none would commit to establishing permanent academic positions and programs in the fine arts at their institutions.[62] With the limited commitment of Canadian educators to the fine arts McCurry's attempt to follow Constable's prescription -- "to hammer away at Keppel and his

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[59]See, for instance, Brock to McCurry, 19 April 1934, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA. The efforts of the leaders of American philanthropy to find and fund employment for European scholars were often met with nativist sentiment in the United States as well. Few institutions were willing to offer permanent employment, though certain programs including Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, New York University's Institute of Fine Arts, and the New School for Social Research built considerable reputations by employing European scholars fleeing fascism. The New School under Director Alvin Johnson recruited a remarkable 178 refugee intellectuals with the aid of a $540,000 grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. See Richard Pells, Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II (New York: Basic Books, 1997), pp. 25-31.

[60]Constable to McCurry, 24 January 1935; and McCurry to Constable, 4 February 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

[61]McCurry to Constable, 4 February 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

[62]See R.W. Wallace to McCurry, 18 March 1935; W.H. Fyfe to McCurry, 23 March 1935; and McCurry to Dr. Julius Held, 30 March 1935, RG 7.4C, Outside Activities/Organizations, Carnegie Corporation - General,

people and see what you can get out of them..." -- was without effect and the program was dropped.[63]

The establishment of new art programs at Queen's, University of Toronto, McMaster University, and Acadia University was, nonetheless, a strong beginning for those who wanted to see the study of art become an accepted part of higher education in Canada and marked significant progress on Keppel's and McCurry's shared agenda.[64] The leaders of the National Gallery were particularly concerned, however, about the existence of one key chink in the armour of Canadian high culture. Despite the fact that the upper-class English-speaking community in Montreal enjoyed, as Brown put it, "fine collections and collectors,...much art interest,...good artists and lots of money,..." the gallery of the Montreal Art Association lacked an "active Director" and McGill University had never had a program of fine arts.[65] "The art situation in Montreal," Brown advised Keppel, "is rather like sheep having no shepherd."[66] In early 1937 Brown and McCurry attempted to bring the interests of the art association and the university together with Carnegie support, as they had done on a smaller scale in Kingston, to create a joint position modelled after John Alford's at the University of Toronto. Noting that Constable had left the Courtauld, Brown suggested to

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File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

[63]Constable to McCurry, 27 June 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: Academic Assistance Council, NGCA.

[64]Acadia and McMaster both received grants directly from the Carnegie Corporation to start art programs. With this support, Acadia hired Walter Abell in 1928 and McMaster hired Lester D. Longman in 1932. See Stephen H. Stackpole, Carnegie Corporation: Commonwealth Program 1911-1961 (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1963), pp. 39, 44.

[65]Brown to Keppel, 13 April 1937, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925-1956, NGCA.

[66]Ibid.

Keppel that the Carnegie Corporation should consider granting McGill a chair of fine arts. The foundation, however, was in the process of broadening the scope of its Dominions program and would not commit support to another permanent position in the arts in Canada.

Despite the failure of the McGill scheme, McCurry and Brown had, in helping to create other professional and academic bases for art and culture, successfully collaborated with the Carnegie Corporation to enhance the size, power and prestige of the central-Canadian cultural leadership in the 1930s. Through the Canadian committee's projects aimed at regional development, the National Gallery officials also contributed to the creation of complementary infrastructure that could serve to extend the influence of this national elite throughout the Dominion. At a time when the National Gallery's annual budget was shrinking at a considerable rate,[67] collaboration with the Carnegie Corporation not only allowed McCurry and Brown to maintain the National Gallery's programs, but actually enhanced its ability to act as a central, primary and authoritative high cultural institution in Canada.

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By the mid-1930s, internal shifts to the Carnegie Corporation's British Dominions program of cultural philanthropy occurred that fundamentally altered the relationship

[67]The National Gallery's budget decreased from $130,000 in 1929 to $25,000 in 1934. See Charles Hill, Canadian Painting in the Thirties (Ottawa: National Gallery of Canada, 1975), p. 14. From 1935 to 1945 the budget levelled off at around $75,000 per year, although about $30,000 of this was committed to staff salaries. See yearly Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., B.A., L.Ph., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, Controller of Stationary).

between the Corporation and members of the Canadian cultural elite. In the fall of 1935, after approving the Carnegie Corporation's yearly grant of $30,000 to the Canadian committee, Keppel advised McCurry that the Canadians should "watch this sum pretty closely because in all fairness we will now have to turn to other Dominions."[68] Days later correspondence from Robert M. Lester, the Secretary of the Carnegie Corporation, confirmed that the trustees were "contemplating certain shifts in our arts program, and may decide that we had best go easy for a while in Canada."[69]

Although the Canadian committee's allowance was renewed again in the fall of 1936, it was clear that the well was almost dry. Committee members, including McCurry initially, were aghast at the thought of being cut free of Carnegie support. McCurry implored Keppel to "keep up the good work in Canada at least a little longer....There are some at least of our activities where withdrawal at present would be a calamity."[70] A year later, after it was announced that the Canadian committee's grant would not be renewed, an agitated J. Clarence Webster, still nominally the group's chairman, suggested to McCurry that it would have been preferable for the Carnegie Corporation to have "left us alone than to have made a start and then to have dropped us unceremoniously."[71] Noting the extent to which the committee's programs had been designed to "function according to...[Keppel's] requests and plans,..." Webster felt that the Canadians could not be expected to "learn to stand alone in

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[68]Keppel to McCurry, 25 October 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

[69]Robert M. Lester to McCurry, 1 November 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

[70]McCurry to Keppel, 17 October 1936, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

[71]Webster to McCurry, 11 October 1937, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

such a short time."[72]

By the fall of 1937, McCurry had adjusted his strategy and was, he informed Webster, "relieved" to see the committee work "drawing to a close."[73] This is less surprising than it might seem on the surface. In four years, he had transformed the Canadian committee from a simple advisory body to a mechanism for negotiating and solidifying his personal authority and that of his institution both with other members of the Canadian cultural elite and with Keppel and the Carnegie Corporation. In both respects the committee had, by 1937, largely outlived its usefulness. While its death marked the abandonment by the Carnegie Corporation of many other Canadians and Canadian institutions, it signalled an alteration, not an end, to the foundation's relationship with the National Gallery and its leaders.

The expansion and internationalization of the Carnegie Dominions program was, in fact, encouraged by McCurry and Brown and grasped by these officials as an opportunity to internationalize the National Gallery's programs and activities and to enhance their own spheres of influence. From mid-decade onward the National Gallery increasingly became not only the hub of Carnegie Corporation Canadian operations, but also an important base for the organization's expanded program of cultural philanthropy in other dominions. In a related shift, indirect support for the National Gallery, which had previously been channelled through the Canadian committee, gradually gave way to direct support for the institution's domestic and international activities.

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[72]Ibid.

[73]McCurry to Webster, 6 December 1937, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

A close examination of the National Gallery's role in the extension of the Carnegie Corporation's Dominions program reveals how the transfer of influence between New York and Ottawa was not an entirely one-way process. In March 1935, as the exhibition "Contemporary Paintings by Artists of the United States" -- an exhibition developed jointly by the National Gallery and the Carnegie Corporation -- was touring Canadian galleries, McCurry suggested to Keppel that the Carnegie Corporation should consider a series of exhibition exchanges between the United States and the British Empire. "Some such scheme," McCurry wrote, "has far-reaching possibilities for good and would be another strand in the bond of English speaking co-operation and understanding."[74]

McCurry's suggestion followed closely and was probably influenced by an invitation by Homer Saint-Gaudens, Director of the Department of Fine Arts at the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh, to Brown, Lawren Harris, and Martin Baldwin (Director of the Art Gallery of Toronto) to help select Canadian canvasses for inclusion in the 1935 edition of the Carnegie Institute's "International Exhibition of Paintings." Probably as a result of Carnegie Corporation interest in Canadian art, 1935 was the first year in many that the Carnegie Institute included Canadian art in the annual event.[75] Seeking a "fine representation of Canadian work," Saint-Gaudens requested that Harris, Brown, and Baldwin "choose for us the painters who you think could best present contemporary painting in your land."[76] The

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[74]McCurry to Keppel, 7 March 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: Interchange of Exhibition between British Empire and the United States, NGCA.

[75]Homer Saint-Gaudens to Brown, 20 February 1935, p. 1, RG 5.4 C, Canadian Exhibitions/Foreign, File: Carnegie Institute International Exhibition of Paintings, 1935, NGCA.

[76]Ibid.

American, already having a clear notion of what constituted the most representative Canadian art, did not leave the Canadian much room for selection. Saint-Gaudens requested ten canvasses, all works in oil, painted by ten different artists -- "about one third, perhaps, of the Group of Seven, one third of older painters and one third of younger painters from outside the Group of Seven."[77] In addition to being asked to help select the canvasses, Harris was asked to contribute one of his own, Icebergs, Smith Sound. Perhaps inspiring McCurry's own overtures to the Carnegie Corporation concerning exhibition exchanges, Saint-Gaudens hoped that the inclusion of Canadian works might be "an opportunity to promote the good will and understanding between the people of the United States and their northern neighbours."[78]

The tour of "Contemporary Painting by Artists of the United States" in Canada in the spring and summer of 1935, and the inclusion of Canadian works in the Carnegie Institute's "International Exhibition" that fall marked the beginning of a period of closer and more direct collaboration between the National Gallery leadership and the Carnegie Corporation. Interaction around these exhibitions also marked the formal acceptance by Carnegie leadership of the National Gallery as the center of Canadian art. When, in the future, the Corporation needed advice and expertise on Canadian high culture, its leaders turned first to the Gallery.

In 1936, for instance, the Carnegie Corporation and the National Gallery collaborated on the development of the "Exhibition of Contemporary Canadian Painting,"

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[77] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[78] Ibid., p. 3.

which toured South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition to placing Brown in charge of selecting the works to be exhibited, the Carnegie Corporation also sent the Director of the National Gallery as its representative on the tour. In this capacity, Brown was in charge of "building up a representative collection of Canadian, South African, Australian, and...New Zealand work."[79] Brown's selections in turn formed the nucleus of the "Empire Exhibition" which was presented at the Palace of Fine Arts in Johannesburg from 15 September 1936 - 15 January 1937. Also accompanying the tour as a representative for the Carnegie Corporation was Arthur Lismer. While in South Africa, Lismer lectured on art education, discussing the projects he had developed with the support of the Carnegie Corporation at the Art Gallery of Toronto and for the Ontario Department of Education. Impressed with the results of Lismer's speaking tour and with his earlier Canadian art activism, the Carnegie Corporation funded an extension of the artist's stay in South Africa.[80]

The Southern Dominions Exhibition and the exchange of American and Canadian shows in the mid-1930s were followed in the early 1940s by more extensive interaction between art elites in the United States, Canada, and other British dominions. In the spring of 1940, the National Gallery, under the leadership of its new Director, H.O. McCurry,[81] and the Carnegie Corporation again combined forces, this time to bring an exhibition of New

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[79]Keppel to Brown, 29 August 1935, RG 7.4 C, File: 1925-56, Carnegie Corporation - General, NGCA.

[80]Lismer was attracted to the idea of a return to the vocation that had done so much to establish the Group of Seven as Canada's national art movement. Lismer wrote Brown from South Africa, "I am back to my old job of stumping the country as in Ontario - ten years ago....It is steady pioneering, the only difference is that here I get the ears of the powers that be, and in Ontario I'm beating against a brick wall as far as official education is concerned." See Lismer to Brown, 13 February 1937, RG 7.4 C, File: June 1935 - May 1956, NGCA.

[81]Eric Brown died 6 April 1939.

Deal public art to Canada. Opening at the National Gallery, "Mural Designs for Federal Buildings from the Section of Fine Arts" toured Canadian galleries over the summer of 1940. Less than two years later the Carnegie Corporation brought an exhibition of Australian art to the Gallery as part of a broader North American tour.

In addition to these international exchanges, the Carnegie Corporation also increased direct support for the National Gallery's domestic programs. The most significant example of this escalation was support for the creation of the National Art Centre in 1939. Made possible by a $30,000 Carnegie Corporation grant and by the promise of matching support from the federal government, the National Art Centre was conceived of by Brown, McCurry and Keppel as a replacement for the defunct Canadian committee. The Centre was, accordingly, designed to coordinate lecture tours, organize study groups for scholars and teachers, establish art education programs for children and organize art activities across Canada.[82] Arthur Lismer, who had returned from his tour of South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in 1937, and who had subsequently held Carnegie-sponsored posts at the Art Gallery of Toronto and at the Teachers College of Columbia University, was selected as the Centre's Educational Supervisor and Director.[83] Brown's death and Canadian entry in the war in Europe meant the suspension of activities at the new Centre, and Lismer transferred his projects to the Art Association of Montreal.[84] In 1943, however, the Carnegie Corporation and the National Gallery -- reacting to the upsurge in art organization which

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[82]Maria Tippett, Making Culture: English-Canadian Institutions and the Arts before the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 150.

[83]See also Hill, Canadian Painting in the Thirties, p. 24-27.

[84]The position in Montreal was, again, supported by a Carnegie Corporation grant.

was occurring in central Canada -- agreed to revive the program. Walter Abell, still Professor of Fine Arts at Acadia University, president of the Maritime Art Association and editor of the journal Maritime Art, was brought to Ottawa as the new Director of the National Art Centre.

The significance of this flurry of development is clear. By the early 1940s, Canadian artists and art administrators like Lismer, McCurry, and Abell[85] had joined an international art elite that included cultural authorities from Great Britain, from other British dominions, and representatives of the Carnegie Corporation. The creation of this network, and the inclusion of Canadians in it, was not, of course, solely the work of the Carnegie Corporation. The organization was, in fact, attracted to these Canadians because of their ability to negotiate the terms of their own influence on both national and international levels. Once selected and approved, members of the Canadian leadership group held considerable power -- power underwritten by and still contingent on Carnegie Corporation financial resources. Through its support of the Canadian committee and of the National Gallery of Canada, the Carnegie Corporation had already made a substantial contribution to the creation of a professionalised, corporatized and bureaucratized cultural leadership in Canada by the beginning of the 1940s.

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[85]Walter Abell was an American by birth and returned to the United States to take a position at the University of Michigan after the war. As one of the few professional art historians in Canada and as a leading art administrator in Canada from 1928 to 1946, however, he should be included in this group.

The Kingston Conference, The Carnegie Corporation and a New Deal for the Arts in Canada

This earlier period of involvement by the Carnegie Corporation in Canadian cultural politics forms the context within which the Conference of Canadian Artists held at Queen's University in June 1941 must be understood. Hailed appropriately, it seems, as one of the defining moments in the history of art in Canada[86] -- as a turning point in the battle to win state support for the arts -- events at Kingston have been fundamentally misunderstood. Cultural nationalists have conveniently omitted notice of the key role played by the Carnegie Corporation in providing a suitable cultural environment for the gathering, initiating the conference, providing a roster of speakers, and in shaping the agenda for discussion. Far from being a gathering at which Canadian artists spontaneously came together in an effort to build an "art of the people" or to move closer to a state of "cultural democracy," as some writers have suggested,[87] the Kingston Conference and the Federation of Canadian Artists that emerged from it were products of elite level collaboration and accommodation between leading North American artists, art bureaucrats, and representatives of the Carnegie Corporation. Moreover, in blindly accepting tired and problematical assumptions of Canadian/American difference based on founding fragments of Lockean liberalism and Tory paternalism, we forget that the shining example of state support for the arts was, for most Canadians in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the American New Deal Public Arts

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[86]See Tippett, Making Culture, p. 166.

[87]See for example Frances K. Smith, André Biéler: An Artist's Life and Times (Toronto: Merritt Publishing Company, 1980); and Michael Bell, "The Welfare of Art in Canada," introduction to The Kingston Conference Proceedings: A Reprint of the Proceedings of the 1941 Kingston Artists' Conference, p. iii.

projects. In the concluding section of this chapter, I explore the implications of American influence -- both of the New Deal art projects and of the Carnegie Corporation's cultural philanthropy. I argue that the Corporation's participation in the politics of Canadian culture in the 1930s and 1940s was a critical factor in the incorporation of Canadian arts and in the related pursuit by members of the Canadian art community of federal state support.

One of the products of the collaboration between the leaders of Canada's National Gallery and of the Carnegie Corporation was the tour of an exhibition of mural designs executed for the American Federal Works Agency's Section of Fine Arts, which travelled Canada in the summer of 1940. This exhibition, funded with a grant from the Carnegie Corporation and brought to Canada at the request of Director McCurry, opened first at the National Gallery in Ottawa. Over the summer, it was also shown at the Art Gallery of Toronto, at the Art Association of Montreal, and at both the Winnipeg and Vancouver Art Galleries. An abbreviated version of the exhibition also toured the Maritime provinces.

The purpose of the exhibition, wrote Forbes Watson, an administrator with the Section of Fine Arts, was to give Canadians a broad idea of the Section's murals, which in final form adorned American post offices, court houses and other public buildings.[88] Under Franklin Roosevelt, the American government had set aside 1% of the construction costs of public buildings to pay for murals and sculptures. Artists chosen in national and regional competitions were then commissioned to execute murals in public buildings across the

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[88]Edward Rowan, Mural Designs for Federal Buildings From the Section of Fine Arts (Ottawa: National Gallery of Canada, 1940), p. 3.

United States.[89]

Indeed, the collection of images exhibited provided Canadians with a varied sampling of the common themes, content and styles of New Deal public art. In the words of one art historian, Section murals were almost always "readable images of something."[90] Of the thousands of murals commissioned by the Section, only one, Lloyd Ney's New London Facets, was an abstract work. The "something" most often depicted was the American Scene. As defined by Section Head Edward Bruce and his assistant Edward Rowan, the American Scene was a homogenous, recognizable and often heroic cultural landscape.[91] Easily read visual narratives, many of the murals presented viewers with a usable past -- historical scenes that documented and at times created national traditions and culture. Others depicted an equally usable present, showing viewers how technology and the state could be valuable allies in the search for prosperity.[92]

Typical examples of Section muralists' use of historic themes are Steven Dohanos's The Legend of James Edward Hamilton and Jared French's Cavalrymen Crossing a River (fig. 1). In each, it is a heroic past that is visited. In the post office in West Palm Beach,

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[89]The best sources on the Section of Fine Arts are Karal Ann Marling, Wall-to-Wall America: A Cultural History of Post Office Murals in the Great Depression (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Marlene Park and Gerald Markowitz, Democratic Vistas: Post Offices and Public Art in the New Deal (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984); and Barbara Melosh, Engendering Culture: Manhood and Womanhood in New Deal Public Art and Theater (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991).

[90]Marling, Wall-to-Wall America, p. 9.

[91]Ibid., pp. 43-47; and Park and Markowitz, Democratic Vistas, pp. 139-142.

[92]Marling, Wall-to-Wall America, p. 38. For discussions of the broader quest for a "usable past" in the Depression see Alfred Haworth Jones, "The Search for a Usable Past in the New Deal Era," American Quarterly 23 (December 1971): pp. 710-724; and Jane De Hart Mathews, "Arts and the People: The New Deal Quest for a Cultural Democracy," Journal of American History 62 (June 1975): pp. 316-319.

Florida, where Dohanos's mural was painted, it is the legend of mail carrier James Edward Hamilton's mysterious disappearance that is celebrated; in Richmond, Virginia, where French's mural appeared, the brave efforts of Confederate soldiers are glorified.

Another favourite theme of the New Deal muralists, and one that was also in evidence at the Canadian exhibition, was the fruitful relationship of technology and nature. In Joe Jones's Men and Wheat (fig. 2), executed for placement in a post office in Seneca, Kansas, the wheat harvest was depicted. William Gropper's Construction of the Dam (fig. 3), which had the distinction of being selected to adorn the walls of the new Department of Interior building in Washington, D.C., provided its viewers with a vision of a new mechanized future. Both these murals spoke powerfully of humankind's ability -- supplemented, of course, by state planning and advances of science and technology -- to harness and control nature.

Often, the muralists took the theme of humanity and nature one step further to express the theme of the New Deal and nature. The Section and its artists were not above trumpeting the virtues of other New Deal programs. In another mural design chosen for inclusion in the Canadian exhibition, David Stone Martin's Electrification (fig. 4), New Deal workers are shown hard at work bringing electricity to the Tennessee Valley -- thus providing Canadians with visual evidence and a compelling narrative of one the New Deal's more noteworthy projects, the Tennessee Valley Authority.

Probably the most striking of the mural designs shown in the Canadian exhibition was Symeon Shymin's Contemporary Justice -- The Child (fig. 5). Designed for the Justice building in Washington, D.C., the mural depicts a child who is presented with two paths of

life from which to choose. In the catalogue that accompanied the exhibition the paths are described by Edward Rowan:

> The planned road, symbolized by the great hands holding the triangle working on the blueprint of a modern housing project, leads by the lines of direction up through the school and college laboratory to the pinnacle of healthfully employed leisure. The other path, through the factory and child labour, leads inevitably downward through the group of undernourished and underprivileged children to the sleeping vagrants under the trestle....[93]

The clear message of the mural: the New Deal state could not eliminate poverty and want altogether, but with proper social engineering, and an appropriate commitment to science and education, it could provide individuals the opportunity to choose between the two paths. This was a message too that spoke directly to the need for the type of scientific management of culture advocated and pursued jointly by the leaders of American corporate philanthropy and by members of the Canadian cultural elite. It was, in fact, both a ringing endorsement of those who were trying to organize authority under a central state and a stern warning to those who advocated a return to laissez-faire.

Although Canadians were appropriately impressed by what H.O. McCurry described as "an amazing and varied survey of American life and customs,"[94] they seemed more enthralled by the notion of state patronage of the arts. Writing in review of the exhibition and of lectures given by Edward Rowan, Canadian commentators time and again speculated about the possibility of establishing federal art projects in Canada. "It is to be hoped," wrote a reviewer for Saturday Night magazine,

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[93]Rowan, Mural Designs for Federal Buildings from the Section of Fine Arts, p. 22.

[94]"Prize Winning U.S. Art to be Shown in Ottawa," Ottawa Citizen, 15 April 1940, p. 3.

> that the showing will stimulate our own Federal government to give thought to a project along similar lines. The divorce of art from industry has been pretty complete in the country, and this would seem one excellent way of bridging the gap between them.[95]

To a writer for the Ottawa Citizen, the exhibition revealed "what can be done...when artists of a country are given an opportunity to disclose their talent under government sponsorship."[96] Lamenting the "clean white walls" of Canadian post offices, Saturday Night magazine's art critic Graham McInnes, himself a recipient of a Carnegie Corporation grant during the 1930s, even felt it logical that they be adorned with depictions of the past -- the exploits of Cartier, Mackenzie, Champlain and Thompson; the building of the railroads; the digging of the Welland Canal; and other themes in Canadian history.[97]

A theme that repeatedly appeared in Canadian commentary on the exhibition, and one stressed even more comprehensively later at the Kingston Conference, was the democratizing effect of the American public art projects. In opening the exhibition at the National Gallery, American Minister to Canada James H.R. Cromwell suggested that "something very exciting" was happening in the American art scene. While artists in the past had, in his words, "painted for themselves and for a limited group of critics,..." they could now reach broader audiences by placing their work in post offices and other public buildings.[98] Globe and Mail art critic Pearl McCarthy agreed, advising her readers that "this trend to use fine art in public buildings involved the average citizen as art patron." She

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[95]Graham McInnes, Saturday Night, 16 March 1940, p. 21.

[96]"Exhibition of Mural Designs for Public Buildings Opens Tomorrow," Ottawa Citizen, 18 April 1940, p. 6.

[97]Graham McInnes, "We Want Brighter Post-Offices," Saturday Night, 18 May 1940, p. 31.

[98]"Hon. J.R.H. Cromwell Opens Exhibition of U.S. Mural Art," Ottawa Journal, 20 April 1940.

claimed that the new relationship between artists and the public would be to the benefit of both. "In a healthy democratic way," she argued, "the people of the United States have expressed their opinions freely on these murals, not sparing the severest criticism which they felt like making...."[99]

To some extent, McCarthy was correct. Artists painting murals in public buildings were often subjected to the harsh criticism of citizens in small American towns. On the other hand, artists and the viewing public were, in reality, only junior partners in what art historian Karal Ann Marling describes as a "triumvirate of interests."[100] By far the most powerful partner in this relationship was the patron -- the New Deal state. The Section operated in a "healthy democratic way" only in terms of the provision of benefits. Through it and other New Deal programs, the state did employ thousands of artists at a time when there was little employment in the private sector. In doing so, as McCarthy suggested, the state also brought fine art out of urban art galleries and into public buildings throughout the nation. But in terms of production and decision making -- who decided what was painted, when, and where -- the Section was distinctly un-democratic.

In fact, the Section's structure of authority, like that of other incorporated cultural associations including foundations, galleries, universities and museums, was decidedly "top-down." Section heads Rowan and his superior, Edward Bruce, saw themselves -- in much the same manner as McCurry, Brown, and Keppel perceived their own roles -- as leaders of an elite responsible for cultural guardianship. In their hands lay all the day-to-day authority

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[99]Pearl McCarthy, Toronto Globe and Mail, 11 May 1940.

[100]Wall-to-Wall America, p. 5.

and the power to privilege some styles and certain subject matter. As I suggested earlier in the discussion of the mural designs exhibited in Canada, patriotic, positive and realistic images fit Bruce and Rowan's definition of good mural art. Overtly political art, abstract, avant-garde, or any painting the Section heads viewed as overly modernist and thus European, was frowned upon. For this reason the nudes that appeared in design sketches were often tastefully clothed in the finished product. Jared French's Confederate cavalrymen, for instance, had removed their pants in order to cross the river in the artist's original design (fig. 6), but left them on for their appearance in the finished mural.[101]

Decisions to avoid the overtly political and contentious are somewhat ironic. The New Deal visual arts projects were, after all, inspired by the Mexican state-sponsored mural projects of the 1920s and by such Mexican muralists as Diego Rivera and Jose Clemente Orozco. But the model for Section muralists was not Rivera's Rockefeller Center mural, the work John D. Rockefeller Jr. ordered removed because it depicted Lenin leading exploited workers to a new social order. With direct reference to the incident, Roosevelt qualified his approval of the Section with the warning that he would not stand for "a lot of young enthusiasts painting Lenin's head on the Justice building."[102] From its inception, it was clear that murals would be scrutinized for radical content.

The overwhelmingly positive response registered by leaders of the Canadian artistic

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[101]Ibid., pp. 293-328; Park and Markowitz, Democratic Vistas, pp. 138-177. This discussion of French's murals follows Marling's closely. See Marling, Wall-to-Wall America, pp. 283-286.

[102]Franklin D. Roosevelt cited in Steven C. Dubin, Bureaucratizing the Muse: Public Funds and the Cultural Worker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 159. For a discussion of the Rockefeller Center controversy, see Lawrence P. Hurlburt, The Mexican Muralists in the United States (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), pp. 159-174.

community to the 1940 Section of Fine Arts exhibition represented either a naive or an intentional misreading of the reality of the New Deal. In the reviews that appeared in Canadian newspapers and journals, artists and critics typically ignored the tension in the New Deal between centralizing forces and grassroots local and regional impulses. In turn, members of the Canadian cultural elite could conveniently ignore the fact that, in the broader experience of the New Deal, it was centralization and bureaucratization, not democracy, that most often won the day. With the New Deal, a new relationship between American artists and the state was established, at least temporarily. The self-appointed leaders of the American art community, like leaders of so many other constituencies, were invited into the state as the state's sphere of influence increased. What seems to have been lost on most Canadians who commented on the development was that this new relationship did not represent an unambiguous step in the direction of cultural democracy; it signalled the institutional flowering of New Deal liberal hegemony.

* * *

This did not seem to bother leading Canadian artists who were, in any case, accustomed to forming alliances with their own cultural bureaucrats. In addition to making idle comments about the success of American art projects, many Canadian critics and artists suggested that Canadians, too, should pursue state patronage. While doubting that much could be done during the war, art critic Robert Ayre exhorted artists and art organizations to, as he put it, "carry on a persistent lobby...so that the demand [for programs] will be

widespread."[103] Indeed, Ayre could report that following Edward Rowan's lecture to the Contemporary Arts Society in Montreal on the eve of the exhibition opening, members of the Society "[e]agerly asked the man from Washington how they could get the men at Ottawa to do something about starting a federal art project in Canada."[104]

By late 1940 some Canadians were already taking preliminary steps to influence "the men in Ottawa." McCurry's interest in the American exhibition in the first place was grounded, no doubt, in the example it would set for the Canadian government. In early November, André Biéler suggested to Frederick Keppel and Stephen Stackpole, another senior official at the Carnegie Corporation, that it might be a good idea to bring Canadian artists together for what Biéler described as "a kind of weekend house party...to learn from an outsider something about the modern technical aspects of painting...." Using the same sort of rhetoric employed by Edward Rowan in his description of Simeon Shymin's Contemporary Justice and the Child, Biéler explained the predicament of the "Canadian artist":

> the Canadian artist, having travelled a glorious way has reached a turning point, a fork in the road. The lettering on the sign post has been blurred. He knows not what direction to take. We are not going to tell him which way is right but our job at the Conference is to reletter the sign so that, knowing the facts, he will in all confidence choose the way for himself.[105]

Stackpole and Keppel, who liked the idea and, no doubt, the rhetoric, recommended that Biéler hold his conference at Queen's University in Kingston immediately following the

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[103] "Art Project Here a War Casualty," Montreal Standard, 4 May 1940, p. 9.

[104] "Canadians Would Like Art 'Project'," Montreal Standard, 27 April 1940, p. 9.

[105] Biéler to Keppel, 21 January 1941, File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists, Carnegie Corporation of New York Archives, Columbia University (hereafter CCNYA).

Carnegie-sponsored Canadian-American Conference scheduled there for June 1941.[106]

It is not surprising that Biéler turned to American philanthropy for funding. As we have seen, the Corporation's work first with its Canadian committee and later with the National Gallery made it, by this time, a major patron of many Canadian cultural projects and thus a major influence in the politics of Canadian high culture. Queen's University, in particular, had a number of strong ties to Keppel and the Carnegie Corporation. Biéler's own position had been created as an indirect result of an earlier Carnegie grant. Historian Reginald Trotter, who as president of the Kingston Art Association had been instrumental in winning support for the creation of a fine arts program at Queen's, was also the primary Canadian organizer for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Canadian-American Affairs conferences which were held alternately at Queen's University and at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York. It should also be noted that Queen's Principal Robert Wallace, who as president of the University of Alberta served on Carnegie's Canadian committee, was a strong supporter of the arts and had a long association with American philanthropy.[107]

The extent of Carnegie influence can be clearly seen in the preparations for the Kingston Conference. As late as January 1941 -- four months before the conference began -- Biéler maintained that the primary purpose of his "house party" for Canadian artists would be to discuss painting technique. In a proposed schedule he sent to Keppel, no plans were

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[106]Carnegie Corporation memorandum, 1 November 1940, File: "Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists," CCNYA. See also Tippett, Making Culture, p. 164.

[107]In addition to serving on the museums committee, Wallace had been on the organizing committee of the Canadian Frontiers of Settlement project which was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation through the American Social Science Research Council in the 1930s. The latter project is discussed in chapter 5.

included for a discussion of the role of artists in society, nor was it mentioned as a possibility.[108] Shortly after this timetable was sent, Biéler indicated to Keppel that "there might be a seminar on Art Education [but the] general theme of the conference...should be 'Art, Its Creative and Technical Aspects.'"[109]

The idea of discussing the position of artists in society may have been that of long-time Carnegie ally Walter Abell. When asked by Carnegie officials for his thoughts on Biéler's initial idea, Abell immediately expressed his approval, but added that it would be encouraging if a permanent and national arts association styled loosely after the American Federation of Artists were to be formed as a result of the meeting. Abell also suggested that museum personnel and art educators be included in the get-together.[110] Both suggestions were passed on to and heeded by the organizers of the conference.

The selection of guest lecturers was another area where Carnegie influence was manifested. As Biéler assembled his list of speakers, he solicited, and for the most part followed, the advice of Keppel and Stackpole.[111] As Stackpole wrote to Carnegie-cultural adviser Edward Forbes of the Fogg Museum at Harvard, "Canadian artists are not too well

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[108]André Biéler to Keppel, 6 January 1941, "proposed Timetable," File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists," CCNYA. The record of the interview between Stackpole and Biéler on 27 December also supports the conclusion that Biéler saw the conference primarily as a technical one. According to Stackpole's notes, Biéler was "evidently putting the main emphasis on the technical side...." See Biéler and Stackpole interview, 27 December 1940, File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists," CCNYA.

[109]Biéler to Keppel, 21 January 1941, File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[110]Carnegie Corporation memorandum, 18 December 1940, File: Walter Abell, CCNYA.

[111]See, for instance, the record of a discussion between Biéler and Stackpole in which Biéler approved Stackpole's recommendation of the Harvard technicians (from the Fogg Museum) and asked for the name of a suitable painter to accompany the group. Record of interview, Biéler and Stackpole, 16 March 1941, File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Art, CCNYA.

informed [on the technical aspects of painting] and may have much to learn from experts in this field in the United States."[112] Apparently Biéler agreed. Most of the main invited speakers, including muralist Thomas Hart Benton, Rowan, Abell, Fogg Conservator R.J. Gettens, and the members of the Painters Workshop in Boston, were Americans with strong associations to the Carnegie Corporation. Others, such as John Alford of the University of Toronto and H.O. McCurry had seen their careers advance at the hands of Keppel.[113]

Once the conference commenced, it proceeded as it had been scripted by its organizers. The participants were treated to speeches on American regionalism, on "Art and Democracy," and on New Deal art projects. Although discussion of technical aspects of painting did take place, the main business of the conference was, as Abell had suggested it should be, to form a permanent association of Canadian artists and to consider how the artists could establish a financially beneficial relationship with the state.

There was a wide range of ideas about how the association should be structured and what its purpose should be. Artists at the conference wanted to know whether the new body would be a federation of existing local art societies. What would be the membership criteria? Would only artists be included? Would it operate as a trade union or a pressure group? Or, as artist Jack Shadbolt put it in his capacity as chair of the final session, should it be designed to "face the government with practical problems such as the organization, say, of a National mural project or something similar to the P.W.A. [Public Works

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[112]Stephen Stackpole to Edward Forbes, 27 January 1941, File: Queen's University - Conference on Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[113]All of these men had been recipients of Carnegie fellowships or grants. See Brenda Jubin, Carnegie Corporation Program in the Arts 1911-1967.

Administration] or the W.P.A. [Works Progress Administration][?]"[114] Shadbolt came close to the intentions of the Conference's planners again when he suggested that if organized on a broad base, the association would have

> the added advantage of having a spirit that would commend itself to philanthropic organizations who would be likely to make some donation towards the organization of such a body. We are not permitted to mention names in that respect, but in the back of our minds we all know that this particular conference was made possible through some such agency as that....[115]

Although there were many at the conference who felt that these matters should be debated in the open forum the conference provided, it was decided abruptly by the conference organizers that a small continuation committee would be chosen and that this new body would debate the nature and purpose of the new association. Not surprisingly, the committee consisted of Biéler, Abell, Arthur Lismer and, in the words of a Carnegie official, "two others," namely, A.Y. Jackson and sculptor Frances Loring.[116] The inclusion of Lismer, Abell and Biéler ensured that the Carnegie Corporation had strong representation on the executive of what would soon be the new Federation of Canadian Artists.

With this, the Federation of Canadian Artists was born -- born, but not yet ready to leave its provider. In his report on the success of the Kingston Conference, Lismer wrote to the Carnegie Corporation and requested, in his words, that it "give the Federation initial status by funding its newsletter."[117] He felt that the conference had gone over very well and

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[114]The Kingston Conference Proceedings, p. 98.

[115]Ibid., p. 99.

[116]Cross reference sheet, 16 July 1941, File: Federation of Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[117]Ibid.

that it "had revived the movement for a Canadian Federation of Artists."[118] Noting the inspiration provided by Rowan and the New Deal Art projects, Biéler wrote Keppel that the

> spiritual vitality of the conference made us feel that the time is ripe in Canada to give form to the awakening art consciousness. Recent developments in the United States such as those presented at the conference by Edward Rowan make us eager to promote similar activities in Canada.[119]

At about the same time, Biéler was gaining more "status" for the organization by securing Carnegie funds to pay the salary of a secretary and to cover the travel expenses of members of the executive committee.[120] The Carnegie Corporation would continue to support the Federation of Canadian Artists until 1945 when the Corporation re-examined its entire program of cultural funding. The Carnegie connection was crucial to the development of the Federation as a major lobby group. In 1945, executive secretary of the Federation H.G. Kettle wrote to Robert Lester of the Carnegie Corporation to acknowledge the debt: "I think you will see that without the Carnegie grant it would have been quite impossible for us to have built up our organization and to have developed our projects."[121]

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If history was seamless, and human activity as ordered and controlled as the leaders of American corporate philanthropy would have liked, the creation of a strong centrally-based federation of Canadian artists supported by leading professional artists, critics,

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[118]Carnegie Corporation cross reference sheet, 16 July 1941, File: Federation of Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[119]Biéler to Keppel, 30 July 1941, File: Federation of Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[120]Biéler to Keppel, 23 July 1941, File: Federation of Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

[121]Kettle to Lester, 17 January 1945, File: Federation of Canadian Artists, CCNYA.

educators and organizers would have led quickly and directly to the implementation of a comprehensive system of federal state support for the arts and culture. In contributing to the creation of the federation, the Carnegie Corporation had helped create another nationally-incorporated base which along with the new university fine arts programs and the National Gallery formed a solid foundation for such a system. At the same time as the artists were coalescing under the banner of the Federation of Canadian Artists, McCurry's empire at the National Gallery was advancing in a significant manner. In 1943 McCurry decided to revive the National Art Centre and Walter Abell was hired away from his posts at Acadia and with the Maritime Art Association to serve as the new centre's Director. In his new position, Abell quickly set about establishing the previously-planned educational programs, lectures and exhibitions which made the National Gallery a real focus of cultural activity. Most significant to the advance of a national art movement, Abell transformed his regional journal Maritime Art into Canadian Art. Published out of the National Gallery, the new journal became a mouthpiece for both the new artists' federation and for the gallery.

Despite recognition by leaders within the federal state that cultural policy would be an important issue in the post-war reconstruction, and despite the appointment of Vincent Massey and other leading members of the central-Canadian cultural elite to the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (the Massey Commission) in 1949, the road to state support was not as smooth and as straight as McCurry and others would have liked. The construction of hegemonic apparatus for the arts required a complex process of negotiation between competing interests. The impediments to this construction process were both external and internal to the national art

movement. From the outside there was considerable suspicion about the value of and the motivations for a federally-based cultural policy. Provincial politicians in Quebec were particularly concerned that the federal Liberals were attempting to usurp provincial powers over education. Internally, the activities sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation in the 1930s and early 1940s -- the virtual creation of the discipline of art history in Canadian universities, the establishment of formal art education at institutions such as the Art Gallery of Toronto, the Art Association of Montreal and the National Gallery, and the creation of the Federation of Canadian Artists -- had all served to empower a number of groups and individuals who represented a variety of interests and ideologies. Once these various agendas took hold it became far more difficult to control the movement or to create and maintain a consensus even amongst those who were sharing cultural power.

In July 1944, the leaders of the Federation of Canadian Artists combined with those of fifteen other national cultural and intellectual associations[122] to present a common "Artists' Brief" to the House of Commons Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment (the Turgeon Committee). The resulting brief, largely based on a proposal from Federation of Canadian Artists president Lawren Harris, differed considerably from McCurry's notion of a national culture emanating from the central base of a powerful and authoritative new National Gallery in Ottawa. In his plan, Harris called for $10,000,000 in federal support for the creation of community art centers in every metropolitan area in the

[122]Royal Canadian Academy, Sculptors' Society of Canada, Royal Architectural Institute of Canada, Canadian Society of Painters in Water Colour, Canadian Group of Painters, Society of Canadian Painters-Etchers and Engravers, Canadian Society of Graphic Art, Canadian Authors' Association, Canadian Performing Rights Society, Federation of Canadian Music Teachers, Canadian Society of Landscape Architects and Town Planners, Canadian Handicrafts Guild, Dominion Drama Festival, Canadian Guild of Potters, and the Arts and Letters Club of Toronto.

Dominion. Drawing his inspiration, at least partially, from his own selective reading of the American cultural New Deal which had brought public art to public buildings throughout the United States, Harris argued that a true national art movement must be nurtured at the grassroots.[123] While the "Artist's Brief" did make provision for the extension of the National Gallery's staff and the construction of a new facility, these were to follow the construction of the community centers and only if the resources to accomplish these tasks remained. The brief, Federation of Canadian Artists vice-president Fred Taylor noted, was a direct repudiation of McCurry's "dream of the great new National Gallery 'palais des beaux arts' in which he would be enthroned...."[124] The "Artists' Brief" gained added significance when it was revived and put back into service as the Federation of Canadian Artists brief to the Massey Commission.

Despite the endorsements of the Federation of Canadian Artists and the new Canadian Arts Council[125] for Harris's scheme, the center held firm. Massey himself had been a member of the National Gallery's Board of Trustees since 1925. In addition to his service with McCurry in the 1930s on the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian committee, Massey had worked closely with the National Gallery's director on the war artists'

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[123]For fuller descriptions of the Community art centre concept see Richard E. Crouch, "A Community Art Centre in Action,"Canadian Art II (October-November 1944), p. 22; "Regional Support Promised for Community Centres," Canadian Art II (October-November 1944), p. 38; and Lawren Harris, "Community Centres -- A Growing Movement," Canadian Art II (December-January 1944-1945), p. 62.

[124]F.B. Taylor to Kettle, 9 December 1943, Box 2, File: 2049, Queen's University Archives (hereafter QUA), cited in Bell, "Welfare of Art in Canada," p. xv.

[125]The formal federation of the organizations that coalesced behind the "Artist's Brief" in 1944.

program.[126] When it came time for the commission to make its formal recommendations to the federal government, Massey was firmly committed to a centralized, "top-down" structure for federal cultural programs.

Central coordination of arts and culture was, moreover, a concept that fit much better than Harris's decentralized plan in the managerial agenda and corporate vision of the federal Liberal government at the time. Thus, while the commissioners recognized the value of improving the regional extension services of the National Gallery, the priority in their final recommendations to the government was the creation of a new, vastly improved and more substantially endowed National Gallery in Ottawa.[127] The other primary recommendation relating to the future of high culture in Canada was that the federal government create the Canada Council. Supporting the arts and scholarship in the social sciences and the humanities, the new council was to be operated out of a central office in Ottawa and administrated by two full-time civil servants and their staff. Operating very much in the same manner as the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian committee had two decades earlier -- although on a much larger scale -- decisions regarding funding would be juried by a broader council of unpaid "distinguished and public-spirited citizen[s]" which would meet periodically throughout the year.[128]

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[126]Claude Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 147.

[127]See Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), p. 316.

[128]Ibid., p. 377-78.

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That Carnegie cultural philanthropy and the cultural New Deal were such important components in the creation of the system of federal support for the arts in Canada now seems ironic. At the very moment that members of the Canadian cultural elite such as Massey, Lismer, Bieler, McCurry and Harris were being inspired in various and diverse ways by these programs, both were coming to their ends in the United States. With Keppel's retirement in 1941, the Carnegie Corporation gradually began to turn away from cultural funding. By 1946 the Corporation, under the leadership of President Devereux C. Josephs and Vice President Charles Dollard, was increasingly turning to strategic grants in the social and natural sciences.[129] The New Deal art projects suffered an even more abrupt end and did not survive past American entry into the Second World War. When Lismer visited Washington shortly after Pearl Harbour he found "all signs of community efforts W.P.A. - F.P.A. - American Artist's Congress. - Artists Inter-relations organizations - are all gone."[130] It was not until 1965, during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, that a direct relationship between the state and the arts was re-established with the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities. In Canada, however, the cultural New Deal and Keppel's brand of cultural philanthropy served as a more immediate and powerful symbol in the period of post-war reconstruction.

The order of these political developments in the two nations should give pause to

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[129]Lagemann, The Politics of Knowledge, pp. 147-153.

[130]Lismer to Kettle, undated, box 4, file 2050, QUA, cited in Bell, "The Welfare of Art in Canada," p. xxiii, n. 19.

those who hold dear essentialist and ahistorical notions of American Lockean individualism and Canadian Tory paternalism. There was nothing inevitable or pre-ordained about the Canadian state's paternalistic relationship to the arts that developed in the 1950s or about the individualistic and private system of cultural production which existed at the same time in the United States. These were due to specific historical events in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, and not to what Seymour Martin Lipset refers to as "organizing principles" of political culture fashioned at the moment of the American revolution.[131] Indeed, the collaboration between Canadians such as Massey, Brown, McCurry, and Lismer, and the officials of the Carnegie Corporation, and the role these partnerships played in the transition in Canada from a private localized system of cultural patronage to a system of corporate cultural patronage in which the nation-state became the major corporate patron, should also give pause to those who see a stark delineation between the supposedly "public" and "private" spheres.

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[131]See Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1990); Kenneth McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History," in The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia, ed. Louis Hartz (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1964), pp. 219-262; and Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 3-57.

Part III: Organizing Canadian Scholarship

Chapter 5: American Philanthropy and Intellectual Development in Canada, 1930 to 1957

Introduction

> The President informed King that he was coming up on the following day, Saturday, to Ogdensburg, to review American troops, that he hoped King would come down in the evening to spend the night in his private railway car, and that they could discuss the common problems of North American defence together. King instantly agreed. He was electrified with eager enthusiasm. He behaved like a puppet which could be animated only by the President of the United States.[1]
>
> -- Donald Creighton, The Forked Road (1976).

> It was Mr. King who led us to this point. And his leadership has been so completely accepted that today only the Communists and a diehard remnant of Tories go about talking of "American Imperialism." Well, no, this isn't quite correct. There are also those academic intellectuals in our universities who are still thinking up nasty wisecracks about American imperialism regardless of the fact that most of their own pet research projects are apt to be financed by money from Rockefeller or Carnegie or Guggenheim.[2]
>
> -- Frank H. Underhill, Canadian Forum (1950).

In the two quotations that open this chapter we are presented with two very different interpretations of William Lyon Mackenzie King's influence on the relationship between Canada and the United States. Both Creighton and Underhill would agree that the Ogdensburg Declaration of 18 August 1940, in which Mackenzie King committed Canada to participation in a new Permanent Joint Board of Defense with the United States, marked a significant and symbolic departure in Canadian foreign policy. To Frank Underhill -- an

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[1] The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1976), p. 43.

[2] "Concerning Mr. King," The Canadian Forum (September 1950): p. 122. A shortened version of this quotation is included in the conclusion of Kenneth McNaught, "Frank Underhill: A Personal Interpretation,"

avowed continentalist – external affairs was "the one field in which he [King] did give a definite lead." Basing his course on a realistic assessment of power relations, according to Underhill, King resisted all emotional temptations to draw Canada closer to Great Britain. At the same time, without "arousing that anti-American fever," he deftly made economic and military commitments to the United States that were not only desirable, but absolutely essential to Canada's future prosperity and security. From the early 1930s through to the end of the Second World War, Mackenzie King was "clear headed and persistent in moving towards a goal which he saw from the start."[3]

To Donald Creighton, the Ogdensburg Declaration also represented a turning point in Canada's history -- the moment Canada accepted a junior position in the "American Empire" and abandoned Great Britain in exchange for security.[4] In Creighton's version of events, Mackenzie King fell victim to American President Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal charm, flattery and wealth. In the hands of the powerful and persuasive American leader Mackenzie King, according to Creighton, was a mere "puppet," easily convinced to accede to any and all propositions. In the Creighton narrative of Canadian history, the Ogdensburg Declaration was the successful culmination of Franklin Roosevelt's scheme to "organize the whole North American continent, under American leadership, for the defence of the United

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Queen's Quarterly 79 (Summer 1972): pp. 134-135.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 43; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1994), p. 155; and Carl Berger, "The Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941: An Overview," in The Road to Ogdensburg: The Queen's/St. Lawrence Conference on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941, eds. Frederick W. Gibson and Jonathan G. Rossie (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1993), p. 29.

States."[5]

In either case, if Mackenzie King really chose the continental option on the "forked road" of Canadian foreign policy -- either because he fell prey to Roosevelt's power and charm or as a result of cold and rational calculation -- he was responding to forces that must have been very familiar to both Creighton and Underhill. The characterization of a Canadian leader at the beck and call of a powerful American should have been a particularly uncomfortable image for Creighton. As Underhill, Creighton's colleague in the Department of History at the University of Toronto, suggested, the leading "academic intellectuals" of their generation -- imperialists and continentalists alike -- looked to American philanthropy for what little aid there was for scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences in Canada in the 1930s, 40s and 50s. It was with the aid of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation that such men as Creighton, Underhill, Harold Innis, and a host of others conducted their research, published the fruits of their labour and built the infrastructure vital to the development and professionalization of several academic disciplines.

In this chapter I focus on the influence of American philanthropy on the development of scholarship in the humanities and social sciences in Canada from the early 1930s to the formation of the Canada Council in 1957. In the first section of the chapter I briefly describe a series of special projects in Canada initiated and funded by either Rockefeller or Carnegie philanthropy in the 1930s. Projects to be considered here are the

[5]Donald Creighton, "The Ogdensburg Agreement and F.H. Underhill," in The Passionate Observer: Selected Writings, ed. Creighton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 120.

Frontiers of Settlement series, which resulted in the publication of a number of studies on pioneer settlements in Canada; McGill University's Social Science Research Project, in which a large group of faculty and graduate students were engaged in studies of unemployment and immigration in Montreal; and the 25-volume series on Canadian-American relations funded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in which leading Canadian historians, economists, sociologists and political scientists grappled with various issues. I suggest here that, collectively, these projects not only provided vital stimulation to research and publication in the otherwise dark days of the Depression, but also acted to professionalize intellectual activity and to insulate it from the demands of the day. In both respects, these programs served as models, to both Canadian scholars and the foundations, for more permanent programs of scholarly aid.

In the chapter's second section I turn to the Carnegie Corporation's and the Rockefeller Foundation's support for the creation and operation of permanent infrastructure in the social sciences and humanities in the 1940s and 1950s. Focus is placed on the foundations' role in the development of the Canadian Social Science Research Council and its sister council, the Humanities Research Council of Canada. The foundations funded pre- and post-doctoral grant and fellowship programs, sabbatical leaves for senior scholars, research funds, travel grants, scholarly conferences, and support for publication through these organizations, which in turn depended on American philanthropy for 90% of their funding until they were absorbed into the apparatus of the Canada Council in 1957.[6] In

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[6]Donald Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada: 50 Years of National Activity by the Social Science Federation of Canada (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press in collaboration with The Social Science Federation of Canada, 1991), p. 27.

addition to serving as models for future state-supported programs for scholarly aid, the research councils also served to organize and strengthen the collective voice of a self-selected intellectual elite.

To conclude this chapter I focus on the Rockefeller Foundation's campaign from the early 1940s into the later 1950s to support what officers of the Foundation deemed "the best" institutions and individuals involved in the social sciences and humanities in Canada. Particular emphasis is placed on the Rockefeller Foundation's support of Donald Creighton, Harold Innis, and the development of the University of Toronto as the national center, focal point and model institution in the social sciences and humanities in English-speaking Canada. In addition, Innis's role as the leading Canadian Rockefeller consultant in the social sciences and humanities is examined as a case study of the flow of influence between intellectuals and philanthropic foundations. In discussing the period from Innis's death in 1952 to 1957, I focus on Rockefeller programs initiated jointly to commemorate Innis and to complete his (and the Rockefeller Foundation's) vision for his Department of Political Economy at the University of Toronto. The University of Toronto's position of leadership both before and after Innis's death are examined.

In presenting these three sections I am documenting the incremental qualitative and quantitative alterations of American philanthropic support for the social science and humanities disciplines in Canada from the 1930s to the late 1950s. During the Great Depression the foundations ventured onto Canadian soil sporadically, sponsoring special studies and/or specific departments. When they did so, they operated either directly or through the intermediary American associations they had helped to create in the 1920s, such

as the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). By the late 1930s, the officers of the trusts, having gained close working knowledge of the Canadian scene and having developed close personal relationships with some members of Canada's scholarly community through these limited excursions, began to collaborate with Canadians in efforts to create Canadian-based structures designed to function in the same way as the American councils did. The goal was not so much to diminish the power of the foundations, but merely to mediate it through networks of trusted Canadians who shared many of their fundamental objectives. With the establishment of a comprehensive network of intellectual "branch-plants," foundation officials and Canadian scholars became more comfortable with each other's goals, strategies, and methods of operation. As the years passed, the process of mediation became ever more sophisticated and American influence became less overt and more nuanced.

I. Negotiating Frontiers: Philanthropy and the Social Sciences and the Humanities in Canada during the Great Depression

In 1957, having risen to the pinnacle of his profession, Donald Creighton looked back on the years of the Great Depression as critical ones for Canadian scholars in the social sciences and humanities. It was during these years, Creighton observed with more than a hint of nostalgia, that Canadian intellectuals displayed a growing "sense of collective unity." They became "conscious of their increasing influence and prestige in the universities" and, perhaps more important, they became "aware...of the rapidly growing importance which they were acquiring in the eyes of government and society." With society facing the

catastrophe, first, of economic depression and later of world war, "scholars were drawn into....anxious inquiry" and "agitated debate" about the important issues of national administration.[7]

Without doubt, it is true that economic, international and constitutional crises encouraged politicians as well as members of the general public to look to intellectuals for solutions. As historians Douglas Owram and Barry Ferguson argue, the political and social climate at the time was receptive to scholars from many disciplines who could legitimately claim expertise and offer social remedies.[8] Or, put another way, as political economist Harold Innis observed, it took complete economic collapse to compel desperate politicians to put aside their natural suspicions and to seek the counsel of academic intellectuals.[9] In any case, as the decade of the 1930s passed, a growing number of Canadian social scientists were called into public service. Some, including Innis, Creighton, and University of Toronto political economist Vincent Bladen, served on or briefed federal and provincial inquiries such as the Royal Commission on Banking (1933), the Nova Scotia Royal Commission of Economic Inquiry (1934), and the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (1937-1939). Others, such as Queen's economists Clifford Clark and W. A. Mackintosh, joined the ranks of full-time bureaucrats.

Coincident with these manifestations of their greater relevance, Canadian scholars in

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[7]Creighton, Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 80-81.

[8]"Social Scientists and Public Policy from the 1920s through World War II," Journal of Canadian Studies 15 (Winter 1980-81): p. 4. See also Douglas Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986).

[9]Ferguson and Owram, "Social Scientists and Public Policy," p. 13.

the humanities and social sciences also took action to professionalize and structure their disciplines. As far back as the 1920s, Canadian historians had founded a national research journal, The Canadian Historical Review, and a national organization, the Canadian Historical Association. Political scientists and economists followed suit by revitalizing the Canadian Political Science Association in 1929 and by publishing the Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science in 1935. Similarly, Canadian geographers formed a national association and founded their own scholarly journal in 1929 and 1930 respectively.[10]

Despite this flurry of professionalization and the self-consciousness and self-confidence it represented and encouraged in the leadership ranks of Canada's universities, the reality of day-to-day existence in the Depression era was as bleak for scholars as it was for most other social groups. Simply put, growing interest in the views and ideas of intellectuals did not translate into significant and on-going indigenous support for research outside the natural sciences. By themselves, Canadian sources of support were not sufficient to sustain the kind of intellectual and professional ferment that Creighton would later look back upon. While creating the need for scholarly inquiry into the social and economic crises of the 1930s, hard times limited the funds available to scholars to support research and teaching.

In addition to the generally low level of support available to Canadian universities during the Depression, the social sciences and humanities were hit particularly hard by the economic collapse. Canadian scholars in these fields laboured for low wages, endured heavy teaching loads, and received little support for research and publication. During the academic

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[10]Ibid., p. 4.

year 1937-38 only 26 out of a total of 205 post-graduate fellowships awarded in Canada were ear-marked for scholars in the social sciences and the humanities.[11] With few Canadian institutions offering financial aid to graduate students, and only Queen's, McGill and the University of Toronto offering Ph.D.s, students wishing to pursue advanced degrees looked for the most part to the United States or to Europe for support.[12] Aid for senior scholars was no more plentiful. Even by the late 1940s, the University of Alberta was the only Canadian university providing faculty with regular paid sabbaticals. And apart from special projects sponsored by the American foundations, funding for publications was practically non-existent.[13]

By the start of the Depression American foundations had begun to alter their strategies for support of North American higher education. In place of large block grants made to enhance the endowment funds of selected institutions and designed to strengthen the institutional base of the entire educational system, the foundations increasingly directed grants and awards to specific departments and to specific programs of study.[14] Support of this nature, along with the government work in which Canadian humanists and social sciences were called upon to engage, became important sources of intellectual stimulation

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[11]J.E. Robbins, "Research in the Social Sciences as a Group: Some Observations," in "Research in the Social Sciences in Canada: Some Conclusions from a Preliminary Survey," p. 25, RG 2, Series 427, Box 181, Folder 1303, Papers of the Rockefeller Foundation (hereafter RF), Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC). See also Donald Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 6.

[12]Anne Bezanson, "AB's Report on Social Sciences in Canada" (internal Rockefeller Foundation memorandum), 4 June 1941, RG 2, Series 427, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

[13]Robbins, "Research in the Social Sciences as a Group," p. 27.

[14]Merle Curti and Roderick Nash, Philanthropy in the Shaping of American Higher Education (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p.218.

and professional support for Canadian scholars during the 1930s. Against an otherwise bleak backdrop, projects such as the Rockefeller Foundation-sponsored Frontiers of Settlement series, the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Research Project at McGill University, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace series of conferences and texts on Canadian-American relations appeared as oases to Canadian scholars looking for opportunities to pursue individual research and collaborative study.

In commemorating the efforts of Innis and others of his generation, Donald Creighton later argued that the interest of the American foundations was "probably...a natural consequence of the evidently growing strength of Canadian scholarship in history and the social sciences."[15] To some extent Creighton was correct in his analysis. The officers of American foundations were attracted to the work of Canadian scholars because of its quality. Men like Innis and, by the late 1930s, Creighton himself, were judged to be scholars of the highest ability, equal or even superior to the "best" Americans in their fields. Both men, as we will see later, were not only supported by the foundations, but were also viewed by the foundation personnel as model scholars in their respective disciplines. However, foundation officers were also motivated by their desire to influence the development of higher education in Canada and to see the Canadian academic system fit more comfortably into continental structures. As American philanthropy had sought to influence the development of the social sciences and the humanities in the United States by establishing such organizations as the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) in the 1920s, it began to be a force in the

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[15]Creighton, Portrait of a Scholar, p. 78.

development of the social sciences and humanities in Canada in the 1930s.

Frontiers of Settlement

The Frontiers of Settlement series was the first large-scale collaborative social research project sponsored by American foundations in Canada. The idea to study the settlement of the Canadian prairies emerged from the broader interest of North American social scientists in the 1920s in issues related to migration, immigration and agricultural settlement. Master-minded by Isaiah Bowman, the Canadian-born founder and Director of the American Geographical Society, the project was intended to bring together economists, sociologists, historians, and geologists to study patterns of migration and land use in the Canadian west. Seeing Bowman's project as a potential model, which if successful might be applied to studies of other "frontiers" in Siberia, Manchuria, Australia, South Africa, and South America, the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC)[16] offered its support. Echoing Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, the leaders of the SSRC were intrigued by what they thought was the potential of these frontier regions to act as "safety valves" to relieve population in older societies, and by the potential these regions held for agricultural production and as sources of raw material. The Canadian project was seen as a suitable pilot project because of its accessibility and because there were already interested social scientists working in the area.

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[16]As I discussed in chapter 1, the SSRC depended on Carnegie and Rockefeller philanthropy for its operational expenses, and for funding all of its scholarly aid activity. Officers of numerous philanthropic organizations, including the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial, the Carnegie Corporation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the General Education Board, and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching served on the executive councils which charted the SSRC strategies for developing the social sciences in the United States.

After endorsing the Canadian study as the first phase of a broader frontiers project at the annual meeting of the executive of the SSRC at Dartmouth College in 1928, the SSRC turned supervision of the project over to a group of Canadian scholars organized by W. J. Rutherford, Dean of the University of Saskatchewan School of Agriculture. The Canadian Pioneer Problems Committee, as the group was formally titled, included scholars and academic administrators from across Canada, including D.A. McArthur of the department of history at Queen's University; Carl Dawson, a sociologist from McGill University; University of Toronto historian Chester Martin; R.C. Wallace, President of the University of Alberta; and the project's director of research, W.A. Mackintosh, a professor of politics and economics at Queen's University.

As research director, Mackintosh had little trouble finding qualified scholars wishing to take advantage of the research funds provided by the American SSRC for the studies. Studies of soil and climatic conditions to determine what unsettled land was still open for settlement were already being conducted by provincial and dominion governments. Comparative research of the agricultural economics of recently settled regions was supervised by R.W. Murchie, a professor at the University of Minnesota Department of Agriculture and formerly a member of the faculty at the Manitoba Agricultural College. The historical dimension of western Canadian settlement was turned over to Chester Martin and A.S. Morton of the University of Saskatchewan. Working to produce a collaborative volume on the topic, Martin expanded the focus of his study of the history of land policy, while Morton revised his existing work on the history of the region's early settlement. Carl Dawson supervised three studies in which he and his collaborators aimed at what might be

termed a "sociology of pioneer life" on the Canadian prairie. Meanwhile, Harold Innis and Arthur Lower worked together on a study of the mining and forest frontiers.[17]

By the time the volumes were published, the economics and politics of prairie settlement had changed so drastically that the series was of little consequence for future dominion and provincial settlement policy.[18] In addition to providing Canadian scholars with a substantial source of support, however, the series had a broader, though largely unintended, significance for Canadian public policy. As Innis pointed out in 1935 in his review of preliminary articles produced by the authors of the series, the project had implications for then-current debates concerning the political and economic problems of the Dominion. Though the series was "concerned primarily with the more immediate problems of Western Canada," according to Innis, it provided "a fundamental basis for an approach to the problems of Canada as a whole." "In many ways," Innis noted, "Western Canada is to the industrial center of Canada what the fringe is to the center within the western provinces, and a provincial regional problem becomes a Canadian problem." To Innis, the volumes constituted "a first preliminary in the attack on the difficulties of provincial-federal relations, and their importance is enhanced by the opportune date of the study and of their appearance

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[17]The following books were published as part of the project: W.A. Mackintosh, Agricultural Progress on the Prairie Frontier (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1936); Chester Martin and A.S. Morton, History of Prairie Settlement and Dominion Land Policy (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1938); C.A. Dawson, The Settlement of the Peace River Country (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1934); Dawson, Group Settlement: Ethnic Communities in Western Canada (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1936); Dawson, Pioneering in the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1940); Harold Innis and Arthur Lower, Settlement and the Forest and Mining Frontiers (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1936). For a thorough discussion of the Frontiers of Settlement project see Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, pp. 162-194. I have drawn heavily from Shore's account for this summary discussion of the series.

[18]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 193.

in the years of the depression."[19]

Innis's analysis of the significance of the Frontiers of Settlement series provides us with an excellent example of how Canadian scholars could use American support for their research to explore their own preoccupations and focuses. In a pattern that was to be repeated in many instances over the following decades, American philanthropic support and the influences and biases that came with it were combined with the interests of Canadian scholars in numerous creative ways to produce truly collaborative results. Clearly, Canadian scholars were not mere slaves to their American masters. But by carrying out their research under the umbrella of American philanthropy and American scholarly infrastructure, Canadian scholars were integrating their work more fully into the mainstream of North American scholarship.

McGill University's Social Science Research Project

In addition to funding such broad interdisciplinary projects in the social sciences as the Frontiers of Settlement series, the foundations followed the patterns of institution- and program-building they had originally tried and tested in other fields in Canada and the United States. Building on strength, foundation officers awarded large long-term grants to promising programs and departments in order to foster the development of national, regional and international "centers of excellence."[20] These "centers" in turn were, if

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[19] "Canadian Frontiers of Settlement: A Review," The Geographical Review (January 1935): pp. 105-106.

[20] See chapter 2.

successfully constructed, to serve as the foundations' Canadian headquarters from which the officers and selected Canadian leaders would work together to preside over the business affairs of Canadian culture.

In the early 1930s, the newly-created Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation began to distribute large awards to what the officers saw as "centers of excellence" in North America and Europe. In the United States, social science programs at the Brookings Institution, Columbia University, Harvard University, and the University of Chicago were singled out as the key components of a "national" system. In addition to these schools, the Foundation selected "secondary centers" to meet regional needs. The institutions categorized in this way for still substantial support were the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Virginia, Stanford University and the University of Texas in Austin. Outside of the United States the London School of Economics and McGill University were selected.[21]

McGill's inclusion as a foreign center of excellence in the social sciences was the result of a variety of factors. As I discussed in chapter 2, McGill and the University of Toronto had been recognized as national institutions in the Foundation's development program for medical education in Canada. During the 1920s, the two institutions continued to receive the bulk of Foundation dollars earmarked for medical education and for the natural sciences in Canada. In 1932 the largest single appropriation made by the Foundation in the medical sciences was a grant of $1,282,652 to support the creation of a neurological

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[21] Annual Report for 1932 (New York: The Rockefeller Foundation, 1933), p. 270. See also Allan Irving, "Leonard Marsh and the McGill Social Science Research Project," Journal of Canadian Studies 21 (Summer 1986): p. 11.

institute at McGill.[22] It was not surprising that Foundation officials would look also to McGill as a suitable center for social science development in Canada. Supporting the development of research in the social sciences at McGill, it was believed, would have significant influence in legitimizing social research more generally throughout Canada.[23]

In addition to the personal and institutional links established in the course of the Rockefeller Foundation's support for McGill's medical faculty in the 1920s, McGill benefitted from the existence of a small group of Canadian scholars with strong connections to the American foundations and to the American social science community. Sir Arthur Currie, McGill's principal until his death in 1933, served on the Advisory Committee on International Relations for the American Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations with James T. Shotwell, the director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. According to Marlene Shore, two scholars from the University of Toronto's department of psychology, Edward Bott and Clarence Hincks, were also influential in persuading the Rockefeller Foundation to fund a social science project at McGill. Bott and Hincks were both deeply involved in an American social science network, which also included the leaders of the American SSRC and their partners and colleagues in the foundations. Bott was a member of the American SSRC's executive committee responsible for formulating programs and policies. Hincks, the director of the

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[22]See chapter 2. Between 1919 and 1950, of the $11,661,190.75 the Rockefeller Foundation spent in Canada, $3,528,044.48 was granted to McGill, and $3,278,316.10 went to the University of Toronto. The recipient of the next largest amount of support was Dalhousie University which received just over $900,000. See Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), pp. 440-441, Appendix V., B.

[23]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 262.

American Committee for Mental Hygiene served with Bott on the SSRC's Advisory Council on Personality and Culture.[24]

In 1929, Hincks, together with C.F. Martin, the dean of Medicine at McGill and an officer with Hinck's Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene, and Edmund Day, the director of the newly-created Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, discussed with Currie the possibility of a sizable grant to McGill to support an interdisciplinary social science research project modelled after existing Foundation-sponsored projects at Yale and the University of Chicago.[25] After lengthy formal and informal discussions concerning research focuses, the precise use of Foundation support, and the prospects for permanent university support of the social sciences after the term of the grant, it was decided that the Rockefeller Foundation would award McGill $110,000 over a period of five years for support of a social science research project directed at the related issues of employment, urbanization and immigration in the city of Montreal.[26]

With graduate students from the departments of Economics, Sociology, Psychology, Education, Medicine, Law, Mental Hygiene, and Engineering doing the bulk of the research, the project began with a demographic survey of employment in Montreal, statistical surveys of unemployment and relief organizations, labour mobility and education, juvenile employment, and immigration.[27] During the period covered by the initial grant and by the

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[24] Ibid., p. 200.

[25] Yale's Institute of Human Relations and the University of Chicago's Local Community Studies project.

[26] Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 215; and Irving, "Leonard Marsh and the McGill Social Science Research Project," p. 11.

[27] Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, pp. 218-219; and Irving, "Leonard Marsh and the McGill Social

subsequent four-year extension, 38 students were involved in the McGill Social Science Research Project. Most of these young scholars received grants of between $500 and $700 per year as research assistants. In addition to contributing to the broader studies, students used their research to contribute to the completion of their Master's degrees.[28]

With financial aid for students in the social sciences in Canada so rare, the research project at McGill attracted an impressive group of students from universities throughout Canada. Several students used involvement in the McGill project at the M.A. level as a springboard to prestigious academic careers. Oswald Hall, who finished an economics undergraduate degree in 1935 only to find little hope for employment, switched to sociology in order to work on one of McGill sociologist Carl Dawson's studies. Finding the field to his liking, he went from McGill to the department of sociology at the University of Chicago for his Ph.D.[29] Lloyd Reynolds was lured away from part-time employment at Eaton's department store near Edmonton by the promise of graduate funding through the project. Working with Dawson, Reynolds produced a highly controversial study which was published as The British Immigrant: His Social and Economic Adjustment in Canada.[30] Finding success in his research at McGill, Reynolds completed his graduate career at Harvard, earning a Ph.D. in economics. A future beneficiary of Rockefeller Foundation, S.D. Clark,

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Science Research Project," pp. 12-16.

[28]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 220.

[29]His work for Dawson formed the body of his M.A. thesis, "Size and Composition of the Canadian Family With Special Reference to Sample Areas of the Metropolitan Regions in Central Canada" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1937).

[30]Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1935.

also worked on a Master's thesis under Dawson, "The Role of Metropolitan Institutions in the Formation of a Canadian National Consciousness."[31]

The project also proved very beneficial to faculty at McGill. Dawson put his students and assistants to work preparing studies of various immigrant communities in the city of Montreal. For Everett Hughes, involvement in the program was part of a long and fruitful relationship between the scholar and the Rockefeller Foundation. Leonard Marsh, the scholar hired by McGill from the London School of Economics to direct the research project, used data collected by students, assistants, and faculty to produce his study, Canadians In and Out of Work: Survey of Economic Classes and their Relation to the Labour Market.[32] This study, which attested to the deep socio-economic stratifications existing in Canadian society, served as a base on which a national policy of welfare could be constructed.[33]

Judged by the extent to which the Social Science Research project at McGill fulfilled the objectives set out for it by the Rockefeller Foundation, the project's record was mixed at best. Rockefeller support did not succeed in establishing McGill as a permanent center of social research in Canada. Driven by the perception that the research project was controlled by leftists, the university's upper adminstration, which was closely connected to Montreal's financial elite, began to have misgivings about the orientation of the social research. In

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[31]M.A. thesis: McGill University, 1935.

[32]Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1940.

[33]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, p. 261. See also Denis W. Wilcox-Magill and Richard C. Helmes-Hayes, "Leonard Charles Marsh: A Canadian Social Reformer," Journal of Canadian Studies 21 (Summer 1986): pp. 53-54.

1938, McGill's new principal, L.W. Douglas, warned faculty involved in the project that he would not fund its continuation after the expiration of the second Rockefeller grant or even support a third application to the Foundation. For its part, the Rockefeller Foundation followed its established practice of gradually reducing support in the expectation that worthy programs, if provided with initial start-up support, would be able to find alternative funding to sustain operation.[34]

Ironically, while Rockefeller support in the 1930s did not make McGill the center of research in the social sciences (that role, as we will see in the concluding section of this chapter, was to be played by the University of Toronto), the Social Science Research project did have far-reaching effects on the development of the field in Canada. Required to leave McGill when the university redefined tenure, Leonard Marsh went on to serve as the research director for the federal government's Committee on Reconstruction under McGill principal Cyril James. Using material and knowledge gained during his years as director for the McGill project, Marsh was influential in forming the committee's recommendation to the federal government for post-war federal planning. While Hughes left Canada to become a leader of American sociology, he maintained his contacts with French-Canadian social scientists at Laval University, including Jean-Charles Falardeau, and a future member of the Massey Commission, Georges-Henri Lévesque. With these contacts he was able to work with the Rockefeller Foundation to influence the development of the social sciences in Quebec. Dawson, on the other hand, remained at McGill and redirected his promotional

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[34]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, pp. 265-266, and Irving, "Leonard Marsh and the McGill Social Science Research Project," pp. 20-22.

efforts for the social sciences toward the foundation of the Canadian Social Science Research Council. In this pursuit, his contact with the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation Social Science Division proved helpful.[35]

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Study of Canadian-American Relations

Of the interventions by American foundations in Canada in the social sciences and humanities during the 1930s, the most influential project was the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace study of Canadian-American relations.[36] Involving almost "every professional Canadian historian...at one time or another,"[37] the project "functioned," as Carl Berger notes, "as a combined Social Science Research Council and Canada Council to Canadian scholars in the 1930s and early 1940s."[38] By the completion of the project, 25 volumes on various aspects of the relationship between the two nations had been completed. As an off-shoot of the text series, the Carnegie Corporation also supported four conferences hosted jointly by Queen's University and St. Lawrence University between 1935 and 1941. Like the two projects discussed earlier in this chapter, the Carnegie Canadian-

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[35]Shore, The Science of Social Redemption, pp. 268-271.

[36]Although the Carnegie Endowment was formally a separate organization, the funding for the Canadian-American study was provided entirely by the Carnegie Corporation.

[37]Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing Since 1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 151.

[38]Carl Berger, "Internationalism, Continentalism, and the Writing of History: Comments on the Carnegie Series on the Relations of Canada and the United States," in The Influence of the Unites States on Canadian Development: Eleven Case Studies, ed. Richard Preston (Durham: Duke University Press, 1972), pp. 43-44.

American relations text and conference series revealed both the tremendous influence exerted by American philanthropy on the development of the social sciences and humanities in Canada, and the ability of Canadian scholars to mediate that influence. This project, along with the others, also served as a tentative experiment on which more permanent American interventions were soon based.

The Canadian-American study was the brain-child of two Canadian-born historians who taught at Columbia University, James T. Shotwell and J.B. Brebner. In 1931 Brebner presented a paper, "Canadian and North American History," at the annual meetings of the Canadian Historical Association. In his paper, Brebner called on Canadian historians to apply "North American, that is, continental, contours to the histories of Canada and the United States" and to avoid being "hindered" in historical analysis "by what to hundreds of thousands of North Americans was a negligible political boundary...."[39] Brebner's suggestion was not an entirely new one. As Carl Berger notes in The Writing of Canadian History, by the late 1920s there was "a general impulse" in the direction of assessing Canadian history in a continental context.[40] Brebner's piece did, however, capture the attention of Shotwell who, in addition to teaching at Columbia, was the Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. Shotwell's interest and, by

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[39] Report of the Annual Meeting held at Ottawa, May 26 and 27, 1931 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association), pp. 37, 43.

[40] Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, p. 137. Other manifestations of this impulse are W.B. Munro, American Influences on Canadian Government: The Marfleet Lectures Delivered at the University of Toronto (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1929); Hugh Keenleyside, Canada and the United States: Some Aspects of the History of the Republic and the Dominion (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1929); and W.N. Sage, "Some Aspects of the Frontier in Canadian History," Report of the Annual Meeting held at Winnipeg May 24-25, 1928 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association), pp. 62-73.

extension, the interest of the Carnegie Corporation made Brebner's appeal significant indeed.

Shotwell's interest in the relationship between the two countries and in continental developments generally had more to do with his internationalist leanings than with any specific knowledge of, or interest in, North American historiographic trends. An adviser with the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Shotwell had edited for the Carnegie Endowment a 150-volume study of the social and economic history of World War I. Brebner's article, and the continentalist approach suggested by it, appealed to Shotwell. As Shotwell told the audience at the final Conference of Canadian-American Affairs at Queen's University in June 1941, he had seen in a broad analysis of the North American relationship a useful model for international conduct: "I was of the opinion at that time...that it would be well to turn from war to peace, from the ultimate war, the world war, to the ultimate structure of peace, that between Canada and the United States."[41] It was not the case that Shotwell naively believed the mythology of the undefended border. In fact, it was the history of tension, controversy, and the creation of informal and formal methods of peaceful resolution -- the "structure[s] of peace" -- that attracted Shotwell to the study of the Canadian-American relationship.[42] At a time when his dreams of collective security were being dashed by events in Europe, Shotwell thought it was appropriate to reëxamine and emphasize those structures.

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[41] Conference of Canadian-American Affairs Proceedings, eds., Reginald G. Trotter and Albert B. Corey (Toronto: Ginn and Company, 1941), p. 5. The conference was held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 23-26 June 1941.

[42] Berger, "Comments of the Carnegie Series," pp. 42-43.

In the first Carnegie conference on Canadian-American affairs, held at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York, in June 1935, Shotwell outlined the broad contours of the study he had in mind. Using words similar to those used by David Stevens and John Marshall, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation responsible for that organization's program of North American "cultural interpretation," Shotwell proposed a study he described as "nothing short of the great American epic," an analysis of "the major facts of the interrelation between Canada and the United States, from the colonial days to the present." While maintaining that "James Truslow Adams' 'Epic of America'...[was] a fine and stirring tale," Shotwell pointed out that it was really only "the epic of New England and the trek west from the seaboard, the story of the United States and of it alone." What he wanted was an exploration with "a larger and richer content....[the story] of those who took possession of the whole continent north of the Rio Grande, and who have developed two great systems of federal government, singularly alike, yet treasuring their differences as part of the heritage of freedom."[43]

Rhetorical excesses aside, Shotwell and Brebner initially attempted with the Carnegie series, as Carl Berger puts it, to emphasize "the North Americaness of the Canadian experience."[44] If there was a consistent theme or message that ran throughout the volumes of the series, it was that economic integration and the free flow of population transcended the formal political boundaries separating Canada and the United States. But as Berger also

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[43]Conference of Canadian-American Affairs Proceedings, eds., Walter W. McLaren, Albert B. Corey, and Reginald G. Trotter (New York: Ginn and Company, 1936), p. 9. The conference was held at The St. Lawrence University, Canton, New York, 17-22 July 1935.

[44]The Writing of Canadian History, p. 137.

observes, possibly the most noteworthy characteristic of the series was the "diversity and individuality of view point" contained in the 25 volumes.[45] Indeed, Brebner's own volume, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, published in 1945 and in a very different international environment than the one existing when the series was conceived, amended his earlier claim that historians should focus exclusively on the "continental...contours" of North American history.[46] In this volume, which served to conclude the series, Brebner engaged in a broad survey of the triangular network of influence and exchange which contributed to the economic and political development in North America.

I will not attempt to analyze in full the diversity of views expressed in the Carnegie Canadian-American volumes. The series and the conferences that accompanied the publications have been adequately discussed elsewhere.[47] It is important to note in the context of this discussion, however, that the great majority of authors involved in the project treated some aspect of the economic, diplomatic, social or political relationship between Canada and the United States. The series, as a result, fulfilled its editors' objectives of focusing attention on the continental contribution to Canadian development. In the case of

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[45]Ibid., p. 150.

[46]Toronto: Ryerson Press.

[47]See chapter 6, "A North American Nation," in Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, pp. 137-159; Berger, "Internationalism, Continentalism, and the Writing of History"; and Robin S. Harris, A History of Higher Education in Canada, 1663-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 339-344. The most recent work on the conferences is The Road to Ogdensburg: The Queen's/St. Lawrence Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1993), eds., Frederick W. Gibson and Jonathan G. Rossie. This volume, which is an edited collection of selected papers from each of the four conferences, includes an introductory essay by Berger: "The Conferences on Canadian-American Affairs, 1935-1941: An Overview." In this paper Berger builds on arguments he had introduced in his earlier work.

a small number of authors and topics, the Carnegie Corporation used the series to publish works on Canadian economic development that had little to do with the views of the series' general editors. These works were edited separately by Harold Innis.[48]

Attesting to the editorial freedom granted to some of the contributors, however, the series even contained two works that fundamentally challenged Shotwell's basic presuppositions. Innis's own contribution, The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy,[49] which Shotwell pronounced "a fundamental contribution to our knowledge" and Brebner deemed "a magnificent achievement," called into question the extent of North America's social and geographic isolation. In it, Innis discussed the importance of European, political, social and, primarily, economic forces on North American development. Donald Creighton's Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850 expanded on a thesis postulated in an earlier work by Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History.[50] Challenging the idea that the border between the United States and Canada had historically been invisible, Creighton argued that the border, in fact, indirectly reflected the axis of an east-west trading network that had developed as part of a broader imperial trading system. Creighton's Laurentian thesis thus firmly linked historical developments in Canada directly to the metropolitan centers of western Europe.[51] Brebner's own work, of course, reflected the importance of the British

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[48]See, for example, G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Transportation in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938); and J.A. Ruddick, The Dairy Industry in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938).

[49]Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940.

[50]Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937; and London: Oxford University Press, 1930, respectively.

[51]Creighton, Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar, p. 105. Ironically, as Berger notes, Creighton's

connection in the development of both the United States and Canada.

Over time it has been Creighton and Innis's Laurentian thesis, and not Shotwell's continentalism, that has dominated Canadian historiography. In terms of "winner's history," then, the development of the Laurentian thesis can be seen, ironically, as the Carnegie series' most important contribution to the field of Canadian history. A further irony, and one that their University of Toronto colleague Frank Underhill noted in the Canadian Forum article cited at the beginning of this chapter, is that Creighton and Innis were the ones who led the charge against "American imperialism" later in their careers. In The Strategy of Culture (1952), Innis warned Canadians that they "must remember that cultural strength comes from Europe." Canadians, he argued, "can only survive by taking strategic action against American imperialism in all its attractive guises."[52] Similarly, in his presidential address to the Canadian Historic Association in 1957, Creighton, no doubt empowered by the knowledge that the Canada Council had finally replaced the American foundations as the primary supporters of social research in Canada, took aim at the continental approach to Canadian history. To Creighton, the desire to study Canada from the continental perspective was inextricably linked to "the astounding concessions of the summer of 1940" when Mackenzie King's Liberal government agreed to allow the United States to lease military bases in Newfoundland and when Canada joined with the United States in a

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Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence was originally included in the series as a study of "the Canadian business and the 'development of Canada as a field for foreign investment.'" See Berger, "Comments on the Carnegie Series," p. 52.

[52]The Strategy of Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1952), pp. 2-3, 20, cited in Berger, "Comments on the Carnegie Series," p. 53.

Permanent Joint Board on Defence.[53] "In these inspiring circumstances," Creighton suggested to his audience,

> Canadian historians found it easy to convince themselves of the ineffable wisdom of the Frontier thesis. In North America, we were, thank God, just folks; and here was a simple, straightforward, homespun, honest-to-gosh theory, which glorified the backwoods and the frontier and extolled the independent creative power of rugged simplicity.[54]

The problem with the frontier thesis and, more broadly speaking, with making the continent the essential context in which to understand Canadian national development, was that it denied what Creighton perceived to be the basic facts of Canadian history. To Creighton the question of an essential Canadian identity was an "either/or" proposition. Ignoring the nuance of Brebner's exploration of the "interplay" that existed between the three corners of the North Atlantic triangle, Creighton reminded his audience, "Canada had never broken with Europe: Canada had never identified herself solely with the Western Hemisphere." The British North American colonies had "in fact, consciously stood aloof from the familiar, commonplace western revolutionary movement, which had been originated by the United States." It was by maintaining "her vital connection with Europe," Creighton explained, that British North America achieved "a distinct and separate political existence in the Western Hemisphere."[55]

To understand the depth of the irony of Creighton's and Innis's positions one has to understand not only that these scholars benefited from the temporary and sporadic support

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[53]Donald Creighton, "Presidential Address," Report of the Annual Meeting Held at Ottawa, June 12-15, 1957 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association), p. 8.

[54]Ibid., p. 9.

[55]Ibid., pp. 10-11.

of the American foundations in the 1930s, but also the extent to which the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation made their professional, scholarly and intellectual dreams realities in the 1940s and 1950s. Creighton and Innis, as we shall see in the following sections of this chapter, were exposed to and benefited from, over a long period of time, "American imperialism" in its "most attractive guises."

II. American Interventions in the 1940s and 1950s: the Canadian Social Science Research Council and the Humanities Research Council of Canada.

American Foundations and the Early Years of the Canadian Social Science Research Council.

In thanking the Carnegie Corporation for its support of the final conference on Canadian-American relations in 1941, Queen's University Principal R.C. Wallace noted that the organization had been "one of those institutions that goes far beyond polite phrases across a boundary line, that does things to make possible a real integration of thought and action in this country."[56] In fact, the foundations had only just begun to be involved in the process of which Wallace spoke in the 1930. Projects sponsored by American foundations, along with provincial and federal inquiries and commissions, not only provided Canadian scholars in the 1930s with access to funds for research and publication, but also served as preliminary stages in the process of formation of a national community of scholarship. By

[56]See "North America in the World," Conference of Canadian-American Affairs Proceedings (New York: Ginn and Company, 1941), p. 14. The conference was held at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 23-26, 1941.

late in the decade, however, a number of Canadian scholars who had participated in projects sponsored by the American foundations looked to replace these "important but spasmodic" initiatives with "sustained and energetic encouragement...[for] independent research."[57] The foundations, though cautious and hesitant at first, welcomed, and indeed encouraged, this transformation in the relationship between American philanthropy and the Canadian intellectual elite. Over the following two decades, the officers of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation worked with Canadian scholars to build national structures designed to support national systems of scholarship in the social sciences and humanities in Canada. In doing so, the officers were, in fact, aiding in the formation of infrastructure in which their own influence and ideologies would be embedded, thus repeating a strategy that had proven successful earlier in the United States. Ironically enough, these officers and the foundations they represented became, in the process, critical actors in the realization of federal support of arts and letters in Canada.

Although Innis would later advise Canadians to reject "American Imperialism," in broadly philosophic terms, he had simple and practical reasons for responding positively in early 1938 to Dominion Statistician Robert H. Coats's suggestion that he investigate the possibility of establishing a national research council for the social sciences.[58] Innis's motivations had nothing to do with rejecting the support of American foundations. He, in fact, was seeking to re-create in Canada the relationship between the foundations and

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[57]H.A. Innis, "Economics," in "Research in the Social Sciences in Canada: Some Conclusion From a Preliminary Survey," p. 6, ed. J.E. Robbins, May 1939, RG 2, 427, box 181, folder 1303, RF, RAC.

[58]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 8.

research councils which he had witnessed first-hand as a consequence of his service in the 1930s with the American Social Science Research Council.[59] Explaining the need for "a sort of Canadian Social Science Research Council" to act for scholars in the social sciences as the National Research Council did for those in the natural sciences, Innis noted that it was the "haphazard fashion" of philanthropic support of Canadian activities that disturbed him. "The foundations -- Carnegie and Rockefeller --" Innis explained to an American friend, "are leaving themselves open to serious criticism with the present arrangement or lack of arrangement." A Canadian "social science research council would at least sift the various proposals before they were pushed on to the foundations if the foundations gave it support."[60] A Canadian council, Innis might have added, would give voice to Canadian expertise and recognition to Canadian professional standards and structures.

Sharing what John Robbins, Chief of the Education Branch of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, would later describe as "a feeling of dissatisfaction with the existing provision for social and economic research" in Canada, a group of social scientists met informally at the Chateau Laurier in Ottawa on 22 May 1938 to discuss potential remedies to the problems Canadian social scientists faced.[61] At the Chateau Laurier meeting it was agreed that Robbins -- already a full-time federal bureaucrat -- would serve as the group's secretary, a position he would hold for most of the years leading up to the formation of the Canada

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[59]Innis served as a member of the Programs and Policy committee of the American Social Science Research Council in the mid-1930s.

[60]H. A. Innis to John V. Van Sickle, 18 November 1938, RG 2, Series 427, box 164, folder 1199, RF, RAC.

[61]J.E. Robbins, "Preface," in "Research in the Social Sciences in Canada: Some Conclusion From a Preliminary Survey," May 1939, RG 2, 427, box 181, folder 1303, RF, RAC.

Council in 1957. Innis and Reginald Trotter joined Robbins as members of a largely self-selected inner cabinet.[62]

As sociologist Donald Fisher points out in his short history of the Social Science Federation of Canada,[63] although almost every original member of the Canadian Social Science Research Council (CSSRC) had had some previous contact to the foundations, Innis, Trotter, and Robbins were particularly well connected.[64] Since Canada had no federal department of education, Robbins was seen by officers in charge of the Carnegie Dominion fund as a particularly important adviser. Trotter was the Canadian organizer for the Carnegie conferences on Canadian-American relations and had been involved in negotiations with the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian Museums committee on the establishment of an art department at Queen's University. In addition to writing and editing several volumes in both the Frontiers of Settlement and the Carnegie series, Innis also served on the American Social Science Research Council's influential Programs and Policy committee. Of particular relevance in this context was the fact that, through service on that committee, Innis met and became friends with Joseph Willits, the Director of the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, and Anne Bezanson, the Associate Director of the Division, who

[62]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 8.

[63]The organization was founded as the Canadian Social Science Research Council. In 1958 it was renamed the Social Science Research Council of Canada. Since 1977 the organization has been called the Social Science Federation of Canada.

[64]Other members of the original Canadian Research Council in the Social Sciences were Benoit Brouillette, E.A. Bott, R. MacGregor Dawson, N.A.M. MacKenzie, T.F. McIlwraith, H. Angus, C.A. Dawson, R.A. MacKay, F.C. Cronkite, R.H. Coats, Gustave Lanctot, J.F. Booth, and W.A. Mackintosh. See "Canadian Research Council in the Social Sciences: Constitution," p. 4, sent to F.P. Keppel from Reginald Trotter, 3 August 1940, File: Canadian Social Science Research Council (hereafter CSSRC), 1938-1945, Carnegie Corporation of New York Archives (hereafter CCNYA), Columbia University.

during the 1940s and 1950s was in charge of the Foundation's Canadian social science program. Innis was already a valued member of the American intellectual community that included in its higher councils leading American social scientists and members of the philanthropic elite.

Given these strong ties, it is not surprising that Robbins, Innis, Trotter and such other veterans of American-sponsored projects as Coats and C.A. Dawson looked to American foundations for both financial support and expert advice. After all, the foundations, in addition to providing such opportunities for Canadian researchers, had been giving both these valuable commodities to such American research councils as the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) since the early 1920s.[65] The foundations were, for their part, interested in at least exploring the possibility of establishing Canadian counterparts to the American research councils.

Officers from both American foundations encouraged the Canadians to study the policies and operating procedures of the American research councils. In November 1938, Keppel sent Wesley Mitchell, Head of the Department of Economics at Columbia University and one of the founders of the American SSRC, to attend a meeting of the Canadian social scientists. Mitchell addressed the group on what he saw to be the best aspects of the American SSRC's programs, focusing specifically on the council's scholarship and grants-in-aid of research initiatives as well as the success the organization had enjoyed in breaking down what was seen as "the excessive departmentalizing of the social sciences

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[65]See chapter 1.

within the universities."[66] As Robbins noted to Carnegie officer Charles Dollard, Mitchell's presence "greatly reduced...[Robbins's] obligation to put before the committee some of the lessons to be learned from the experience in the United States."[67]

In a broader sense, the American research councils and their relationship to philanthropy was, as Donald Fisher points out, "an important source of ideas for Canadian social scientists and became the model for the institution [the CSSRC]."[68] To keep the Rockefeller Foundation apprised of the state of the social sciences in Canada, Coats sent the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division a copy of the group's "Preliminary Survey of Research in the Social Sciences in Canada."[69] In March, 1940, six months before the first official meeting of the Canadian Social Science Research Council (CSSRC), Trotter sent Willits a draft of the new council's constitution. In a letter accompanying the document, Trotter noted that, in writing the draft, he had tried to follow Willits's advice that he keep the organization simple and flexible. He also asked the Rockefeller Foundation Director for any "criticisms or suggestions" he might have given his "experience with the development of

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[66]"Points on Which the Members of the Group Seem To Be in Agreement," Memorandum sent by John E. Robbins to Charles Dollard (Carnegie Corporation officer), 8 November 1938, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA.

[67]Robbins to Dollard, 8 November 1938, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA.

[68]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 9. Reginald Trotter, the first chairman of the CSSRC, attended the annual conference of the American SSRC held at Skytop, Pennsylvania in September 1939. See "Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on Research in the Social Sciences held in the Senate Room, Old Arts Building, Queen's University, 9:30 A.M., Saturday, November 4th, 1939," sent from Robbins to Dollard, 9 November 1939, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA.

[69]R.H. Coats to the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation, RG 2, Series 427, Box 181, Folder 1303, RF, RAC.

such organizations."[70] Revealing his sensitivity to the Canadian scene, Willits later observed that in leaving out "provision for geographical or institutional representation," the Canadians "might be following the example of American SSRC too closely."[71]

From their offices in Manhattan, Carnegie and Rockefeller officers kept a close watch on developments in Canada. Acting almost as if they were officers in a single corporation, Willits and Keppel shared information and analysis; when it came time for action, they coordinated their grants for what they hoped would be maximum effect. While it is tempting to see the two foundations as rivals for cultural power, it is important to note that in the interests of efficiency -- interests which were at the heart of corporate philanthropy and of the scientific management of culture -- Carnegie and Rockefeller officers practised a careful division of labour. Accordingly, when information was obtained by one organization, it was often quickly shared with the other.[72]

As a consequence of this cooperation, officers from both foundations were already reaching some tentative conclusions about the Canadian Social Science Research Council even before its first formal meeting in September 1940. Reacting to advice from Raleigh Parkin, an executive with Sun Life Assurance and Vincent Massey's brother-in-law, that a Carnegie grant to the new council might set off a power struggle between the organization

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[70]Reginald Trotter to Joseph H. Willits, 5 March 1940, RG 2, Series 427, Box 201, folder 1421, RF, RAC.

[71]Willit's observations were made in a handwritten note on a copy of Trotter's letter which was circulated to all Rockefeller Foundation social science officers. Indeed, the council was almost entirely made up of scholars from English-speaking institutions in central Canada.

[72]See, for instance, the exchange of minutes of the early meetings of Canadian social science group. Frederick Keppel to Joseph Willits, 3 November 1939, and Willits to Keppel, 15 November 1939, RG 2, Series 427, Box 181, Folder 1304, RF, RAC.

and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Keppel sought Willits's impressions of "both the setup and of the men on [the council's] slate."[73] In response, Keppel noted that in "dealing with the Canadians," he had found Robbins to be "one of the most promising," and he was particularly anxious for Willits's assessment of his role in the new council. Was "the proposed arrangement," Keppel wondered, "for the purpose of promoting Robbins or of side-tracking him[?]"[74] Assuring Keppel of his confidence in the Council's structure, Willits noted that Robbins's position as permanent secretary was likely to be the most important one in the association. "Incidently," he noted in conclusion, "I quite fell in love with Trotter."[75]

Cautious as always (it was not the habit of foundation officers to venture boldly into only slightly charted waters) both American foundations felt comfortable enough with the new Canadian research council to offer small grants in the CSSRC's early days. By the time of the council's first meeting, the Carnegie Corporation had already agreed to fund a study of differential birthrates in Canada conducted by Dr. Enid Charles for the CSSRC. By the end of the year, the Carnegie Corporation provided the CSSRC with some security in the form of a two-year grant of $10,000 to cover administrative and transportation costs.[76]

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[73]Keppel to Willits, 14 August 1940, RG 2, Series 427, Box 201, folder 1421, RF, RAC. Parkin's warnings are recorded in "Carnegie Corporation Cross Reference Sheet - JMR and Parkin," 13 November 1939, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA. Keppel was later warned by E.A. Corbett, head of the Canadian Association of Adult Education that, of the members of the CSSRC, "[Harold] Innis is the one most completely divorced from reality." See "Office of the President: Record of Interview SHS (Stephen H. Stackpole) and E.A. Corbett," 16 December 1940, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA.

[74]Keppel to Willits, 14 August 1940, RG 2, Series 427, Box 201, Folder 1421, RF, RAC. See also Keppel to Willits, 1 November 1939, File: CSSRC, 1938-1945, CCNYA.

[75]Willits to Keppel, 19 August 1940, RG 2, Series 427, Box 201, Folder 1421, RF, RAC.

[76]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 9.

Predictably, the Rockefeller Foundation -- by far the more bureaucratically-structured of the two organizations -- was slower to act. The activities of Innis, Robbins, Coats, and Trotter impressed Willits and compelled him to consider re-orientating his division's programs to include a broader commitment to Canada. In this he was also, no doubt, influenced by the interest in Canada by John Marshall, Associate Director of the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation.[77] While "in full sympathy with the thought being given to South American programs," Willits reminded his colleagues in the Social Science Division "that the area to the north of us, which intellectually and industrially has so much in common with us is entitled to an equally great share of our interest."[78]

In the short term, Rockefeller "interest" would be less lucrative for the CSSRC than was the Carnegie Corporation's. Willits and others in the Foundation were content, at first, to supplement the Corporation's sustaining support with small grants to meet specific and clearly defined needs. In the long term, however, the significance of the Foundation's re-orientation was much greater. While clearly not yet ready to commit to CSSRC in the way both foundations had embraced American research councils, the Social Science Division began to move steadily in the early 1940s in the direction of acceptance of the CSSRC leadership group as the legitimate representatives of the social science community in Canada.

It was indicative of the guarded nature of the Rockefeller officers' optimism that they were not, however, ready to allow the CSSRC to act as the sort of clearing-house Innis had

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[77]See chapter 3.

[78]Inter-Office Correspondence, Subject: Scholarly Work in Canada, JHW (Joseph H. Willits) - Social Science, 11 March 1941, RG 2, Series 427S, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

envisioned when he began his efforts to organize Canadian social scientists. Before acting, Willits wanted to survey the social sciences in Canada in general, and learn more about the CSSRC in particular. In the spring of 1941, Willits dispatched Associate Director Anne Bezanson to conduct a three-week survey of the social sciences in Canada.

In summarizing her findings in a document that established the pattern for Rockefeller Foundation support for the social sciences in Canada in the 1940s, Bezanson noted that it "would be easy to do harm by assuming the pattern of work in the United States...." "If we do anything," she advised her colleagues at the Foundation, "we should have a long-time program which is planned to fit Canadian needs."[79] Intrigued by the quality of Canadian scholarship in fields such as economics, political science and history,[80] she was impressed by the opportunities for the Foundation to "encourage scholarship in Canada" with relatively small outlays. Despite her association with Innis she was less sure that the Foundation should work through the CSSRC.

Bezanson, like so many earlier advisors for both American foundations, discovered in Canada much individual talent but little in the way of central structures to facilitate and to coordinate research. "There is no doubt," Bezanson noted in her report, "that Canadian institutions have enough leading men to carry on work by mature scholars at the research level." Echoing the words of earlier foundation surveyors, Bezanson observed, however, that these "leading men" were scattered at struggling institutions across half a continent,

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[79]Anne Bezanson, "AB's Report on Social Sciences in Canada," p. 22, RG 2, Series 427, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

[80]History was included in the American SSRC and, until the creation of the Humanities Research Council of Canada, was also among the disciplines represented by the CSSRC.

loaded heavily with undergraduate teaching, and trying to keep graduate work alive.[81] Noting in particular the "surprising number of able economists, with broad training in economics, economic history, and political science," Bezanson singled out for praise Innis and W.A. MacIntosh, who she was sure were "scholars who would be hard to match with equally trained men at most of our own universities." After these scholars she grouped Clifford Clark of Queen's and Vincent Bladen, the Dean of the Graduate School at the University of Toronto.[82]

Bezanson also suggested that the Foundation might wish to address the lack of an adequate number of pre-doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships, and of funds for publication. In noting these deficiencies, of course, she was only repeating what Canadian social scientists had been telling the American foundations since the late 1930s.[83] Even as Bezanson was preparing her report, Reginald Trotter, writing as Chairman of the CSSRC, was advising Willits that there were numerous manuscripts and many research projects languishing without funding.[84] Aware of this scarcity of resources and of the impact that even small Rockefeller grants would have on the Canadian scene, Bezanson warned that the Rockefeller Foundation had to be particularly careful if it was to make more fellowships available in Canada. Echoing Innis's concerns about the haphazard fashion in which

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[81]Bezanson, "AB's Report on Social Sciences in Canada," p. 9, RG 2 , Series 427, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

[82]Ibid.

[83]See, for instance, J.E. Robbins, ed., "Research in the Social Sciences in Canada: Some Conclusions from a Preliminary Survey," May 1939, RG 2, Series 427, Box 181, Folder 1303, RF, RAC. The report was also sent to the Carnegie Corporation, see File: CSSRC, 1938-1959, CCNYA.

[84]Reginald Trotter to Joseph Willits, 27 May 1941, RG 2, Series 427S, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

American organizations selected Canadian candidates, she noted that because

> they have few good fellowships to award...they pride themselves upon finding all likely candidates to consider. When suddenly, Guggenheim or some American group picks, without consultation, a man who never would get onto their preliminary lists, it puzzles them to figure out the basic of the selection....They will always feel that we should seek more advice.

With the recent creation of the CSSRC she wondered: should the Foundation "take some thought about the method of selection?"[85]

Everywhere she visited, she was told of the need of a fund for support of academic publishing. Although she observed that "Professor Shotwell's committee [for the Carnegie Canadian-American relations series] solved part of the problem by getting work in process finished and printed," this had only provided temporary relief.[86] To illustrate for her colleagues in New York the problems of Canadian academic publishing, Bezanson cited the case of H.A. Logan, an economist at the University of Toronto. Despite the fact that his manuscript "A Social Approach to Economics" was praised by other leading scholars in the field, he was initially unable to publish it. It was finally published, but only after three professors at the University of Toronto agreed to fund production out of their own salaries. As Bezanson reported, "there is no real publishing house in Canada as we understand the term." Canadians scholars wishing to publish material likely to command a limited Canadian market could only do so if the work was funded by some outside agency.[87]

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[85]Few of these errors in selection, she was sure, were made by the Rockefeller Foundation or by the Foundation-sponsored American SSRC. Bezanson, "AB's Report on Social Sciences in Canada," p. 10, RG 2, Series 427, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

[86]Ibid., p. 22.

[87]Ibid., pp.16-17.

The question as Bezanson saw it was, how could the Foundation most effectively support and influence scholarly research and publication in Canada? In attempting to answer this question, Bezanson cautioned against working exclusively with and through the new CSSRC. Worried about the legitimacy of the council's claim of leadership in the social sciences, Bezanson noted, "if it loses, as it may, some of its best sponsors, we would do well to work on our own."[88] She further noted that, in designing any program of scholarly aid in the social sciences, the Foundation had to account for Canada's unique cultural and regional requirements. Because any system had to meet the needs of French Canadians, as well as scholars from western Canada, she warned that the Foundation could not simply "favor the obvious road of building up one really strong graduate school."[89]

At this early stage, Bezanson recommended that the Foundation implement a program designed "to aid individual scholars doing specific pieces of work of their own choosing." The program, she advised, should include a fund for publication, graduate scholarships, and research support for the "best" senior scholars. Although the CSSRC could be used in an advisory capacity, she felt that the Foundation officers should make all final decisions, at least for the time being. "We cannot be sure at this stage," she offered, "that we can depend upon their inexperienced counsel for our selections. They might know the applicant's qualifications, but they could not inquire about available means for pursuing his project, as we could."[90]

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[88]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

[89]Ibid., p. 24.

[90]Ibid.

Bezanson's report set the tone for the Rockefeller Foundation's early relations with the leadership of the CSSRC. Willing to offer some encouragement for social scientists in Canada and eager to see the CSSRC leadership group emerge as the legitimate representative of Canadian social scientists, the Foundation nonetheless hesitated before fully supporting the CSSRC with its full power. Reflecting this position in September 1941, the Foundation awarded the CSSRC a $5000 grant to create a fund to aid in the publication of manuscripts.[91] This fund, Bezanson felt, "was much needed," and "would strengthen the Council." Reiterating her earlier position, Bezanson wrote Willits at the time that she opposed placing funds with the Canadian council in aid of research. "These [projects]," she argued, "should be selected by us, for the present at least until their Council forms experience and irons out its own relationship to other associations." As far as the future was concerned, it was possible that "their advice could be used on scholarship awards," although she had begun to "doubt that RF should ever put research funds with the CSSRC for allocation."[92]

Bezanson's mission should be understood in the light of foundation practice and earlier surveys, dating back to George Vincent's and Richard Pearce's investigation of medical education for the Rockefeller Foundation. As a visiting cultural diplomat representing the Rockefeller Foundation -- already a potent force in the politics of knowledge in Canada -- Bezanson was engaged in far more than simply gathering information. The role of the foundation officer was to judge individuals and organizations,

[91]Grant Record, RF 42076 - Canadian Social Science Research Council, 19 June 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

[92]Bezanson to Willits, 25 August 1941, RG 2, Series 427, Box 222, Folder 1548, RF, RAC.

to form strategic alliances with valued advisors in the field, and to determine effective strategies for philanthropic influence. Despite the trappings of scientific investigation, these judgements were made impressionistically and, more often than not, were based on an officer's only vaguely defined sense of "quality."[93] In this case Bezanson was willing to endorse -- but only tentatively -- the leaders of the Canadian SSRC in their campaign to take control of the direction of the social sciences in Canada.

Despite Bezanson's tentativeness it was not long before the Rockefeller Foundation Social Science officers were expressing far more confidence in the CSSRC. By spring of the following year, the officers were already considering an escalation in the foundation's support for the CSSRC. McGill sociologist C.A. Dawson's replacement of Trotter as chairman of the council for 1942 meant that another friend of the foundations was formally in charge.[94] By bringing McGill formally into a network formerly dominated by intellectuals in Toronto, Ottawa and Kingston, the Council was providing itself with a stronger and broader institutional base of support. At the same time, Dawson's leadership further centralized scholarly authority in central Canada -- a process encouraged also by both American foundations which preferred to work through central bases or hubs.[95]

As had been the case in the 1930s with Keppel's Canadian cultural committee, the

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[93]For a discussion of the concepts of taste and quality and their function in the social relations of power see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[94]The post rotated annually.

[95]On Dawson's appointment, see Roger F. Evans, handwritten note on a copy of a letter from Janet M. Paine (Joseph Willit's secretary) to C.A. Dawson, 23 April 1942, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC. See also Interview: Innis and Anne Bezanson, 15 November 1941, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 318, RF, RAC.

desire for a central base did not signal disinterest in the periphery on the part of the Rockefeller Foundation. To justify full support, the leadership of the CSSRC had to present evidence that its scope was truly national. Encouraged by the council's handling of the publications fund, and apparently eager for the CSSRC to enter into a program of truly national proportions, the Rockefeller Foundation rewarded the CSSRC with a second, larger grant in June 1942. Although the grant was made with no formal restrictions on its use, it was expected that the council would use the funds to "encourage individual research especially in the smaller and newer institutions of western Canada and the Maritimes." This grant of $20,000 over two years established a pattern of general support of $10,000 annually, which the Foundation maintained until the late 1940s. In limited recognition of the CSSRC's autonomy, and of the scope of its leader's knowledge, the Foundation stipulated that it was allowing the council's disciplinary sub-committees to distribute research aid from the grant.[96]

Although increasingly supportive of the CSSRC's direction, the Rockefeller Foundation was not ready to abandon other avenues for the social sciences in Canada. After travelling again to Canada in the fall of 1943, this time to survey the scene in western Canadian universities, Bezanson updated her position on the Social Science Division's Canadian policy. In her report to her colleagues in the Social Science Division, Bezanson recommended that the organization "continue to work, aid and encourage the Canadian Social Science Research Council, depending on them for advice, for discovery and aid to

[96]Rockefeller Foundation Grant Record, RF 42076 - Canadian Social Science Research Council, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

young scholars, [and] for recommending young scholars for fellowships."[97] Bezanson also recommended, however, that the Division should pursue two policies independently of the CSSRC. In a reversal of her earlier position regarding the dangers of focusing attention on any single institution, Bezanson suggested that the University of Toronto "should be supported as the center for advanced graduate work in Canada." To offset the dangers of such concentrated support, she also recommended that the Foundation award a number of "modest grants-in-aid to the ablest mature scholars and rising scholars in institutions far from Toronto."[98]

The number and size of Rockefeller grants to the CSSRC that immediately followed discussion of Bezanson's second report reflected the growing desire of the officers to work primarily, if not exclusively, with the leaders of the research council. In addition to renewing the CSSRC's two-year grant for $20,000 in September 1944, the Foundation also funded two special projects -- studies of the Canadian northland and of the Social Credit movement -- to be carried out under the council's supervision.[99] In the official record of the Foundation's

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[97]Responding to the last point, Willits suggested that the Division "have an understanding with them [the leaders of the CSSRC]" that the Foundation would reserve three fellowships from its American competition "for them to fill."

[98]Inter-office Correspondence from JHW (Joseph Willits) to AB (Anne Bezanson) and RFE (Roger F. Evans), 22 December 1943, p. 1, RG 2, Series 427, Box 257, Folder 1768, RF, RAC.

[99]The study of Canada's northern region was financed by a Foundation grant awarded in December 1943. The Social Credit study was financed by a grant awarded in June 1944. See Grant Record, RF 44078 - Canadian Social Science Research Council, 16 June 1944, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC; and Matthew D. Evenden, "Harold Innis, the Arctic Survey, and the Politics of Social Science During the Second World War," The Canadian Historical Review 79 (March 1998): pp. 36-67. Of the two projects, Social Credit inquiry was by far the most successful. Published work from this project represented a wide-range of perspectives and ideologies. Included in the series were such noteworthy texts as: W.L Morton, The Progressive Party of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: The Theory and Practice of a Quasi-Party System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1953); J.R. Mallory, Social Credit and Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954); V.C. Fowke,

sustaining grant to the CSSRC in 1944, it was noted that the organization had been in operation for three years and had "already" earned "a place of first-rate importance to Canadian scholarship." While it was recognized that previous to the creation of the CSSRC "research in the social sciences in Canada was on a considerable scale," the officers observed that "no general overseeing of research activities existed and no attempt had been made to appraise them from a distinctly Canadian viewpoint and in relation to Canadian problems as a whole." Content that the leaders of the CSSRC, aided by the strong support of the Rockefeller Foundation, would be able to provide centralized structure and leadership, the officers decided to back the research council. Support for the CSSRC, the officers concluded, was "the most effective means of supporting social science research in Canada."[100]

The Rockefeller officers' confidence in the council's leadership was, no doubt, enhanced when J. Bartlett Brebner conducted a report on the state of the scholarship in Canada in 1944.[101] Brebner's study for the CSSRC (paid for by a Rockefeller grant) provided independent confirmation by a trusted advisor and foundation-insider of the Canadian leadership's assessment of the requirements of Canadian scholars. In any case, by the end of 1946, Innis's dream of a semi-autonomous national research council with the power to provide leadership and to operate a range of programs of support for the social sciences in

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The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957); S.D. Clark, Movements of Political Protest in Canada, 1640-1840 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); and John A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

[100]Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[101]Scholarship for Canada: The Function of Graduate Studies (Ottawa: CSSRC, 1945).

Canada was within reach.

In the following year both American foundations moved in directions that indicated the growing confidence they had in the CSSRC. Willits and his staff at the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division decided that it was time to fund a fellowship program for Canadian social sciences. On the advice of Donald Young, Chairman of the American SSRC, the Rockefeller Foundation awarded a grant to the CSSRC of $10,000 to cover four fellowships per year.[102] The Carnegie Corporation continued to provide to the CSSRC with what were, by this time, relatively small sustaining grants to cover the Council's operating expenses. More significantly, at about the time the Rockefeller Foundation was handing the council a fellowship program, the Carnegie staff approved a $15,000 grant to the group to supervise what was intended to be a major exploration into aspects of English-French relations in Canadian history.[103] At the proposal stage the project was to include several studies in which both the tensions between the two peoples and the accommodations that had kept the nation together were to be examined.[104] After several unsuccessful attempts at breaking ground on the ambitious project, it was decided by members of the CSSRC and officers of the Carnegie Corporation that all would have to be satisfied, if not pleased, with a

[102]During the previous decade the American council had reserved two fellowships per year for Canadian candidates. See "Interview: Willits and Evans with Donald Young, 30 December 1946," RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 321, RF, RAC. Although the Foundation reduced the level of support suggested by Young by half in its grant of September 1947, less than a year later the award was raised to the full amount. The Rockefeller Foundation also maintained its general support for the CSSRC. See Rockefeller Grant Record, RF 46074, 21 June 1946, Rockefeller Grant Record, RF 48088, 18 June 1948, and Rockefeller Foundation Grant Record, RF 48089, 18 June 1948, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

[103]Stackpole to Corry, 24 May 1948, File: CSSRC, 1938-1959, CCNYA.

[104]J.A. Corry, "Report of the Chairman of the Canadian Social Science Research Council, 1947-48," sent to Robert M. Lester (Secretary of the Carnegie Corporation of New York) by John E. Robbins, 28 September 1949, File: CSSRC, 1945- 1955, CCNYA.

single volume of papers edited by Mason Wade, the Director of Canadian Studies at the University of Rochester.[105] Many years later the collection was published as Canadian Dualism/La dualité canadienne: Studies of French English Relations/Essais sur les relations entre Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais.[106] By that time, due in large part to influence exerted by the CSSRC and its sister council, the Humanities Research Council of Canada (HRCC), on the federal state, Canadian scholars in the social sciences and the humanities were basking in the glow of the Canada Council's light.

Canadian Research Councils, the Massey Commission, and the Winding Road to State Support.

In an era when there was little consistent state support for scholarship outside the natural sciences, the leaders of the CSSRC, aided crucially by the officers of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation, had made their organization a powerful force in Canadian cultural politics. That cultural power increased exponentially when, in 1949, Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent created the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences and appointed Vincent Massey as chair. The Massey Commission provided such groups as the CSSRC and the HRCC an unprecedented audience and formal access to political power. The influence these groups exerted was reflected by the commission's recommendations for the establishment of a state program of

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[105]Stackpole to Jean-Charles Falardeau, 30 December 1953, File: Canadian Social Science Research Council - Studies of Biculturalism, CCNYA.

[106]Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960. See Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 23.

support for scholarship. When, much later in the 1950s, a national council to encourage development in the arts, social sciences and humanities was finally created, the new council incorporated the work of the research councils and used the programs they had developed in collaboration with the American foundations in the 1940s as models for the new state system.

It would be misleading to suggest that the Massey Commission was made up of individuals who were merely sympathetic to the idea of greater public support for scholarship and culture. In fact, commission members Georges-Henri Lévesque, N.A.M. MacKenzie, and Massey had already devoted good portions of their careers to the building of Canada's cultural and intellectual infrastructure. Broadly speaking, they were part of the collective project to organize Canadian "Arts" and "Letters" long before their appointments to the Royal Commission. The structure of the commission's work, moreover, guaranteed that the research councils -- and, indirectly, the American foundations -- would be granted far more than just a fair hearing. While Massey, Lévesque, and Hilda Neatby, a history professor from the University of Saskatchewan, took primary responsibility for the commission's recommendations concerning art and high culture, MacKenzie, an original member of the CSSRC, was left to chair the commission's Advisory Committee on Scholarships and Aid to Research.[107] In addition to Mackenzie's strong presence, the CSSRC was represented on the committee by Reginald Trotter and John Robbins. As the group's secretary, in fact, Robbins was responsible for drafting the Scholarship

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[107]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 32.

subcommittee's recommendations to the commission.[108]

In representing Canadian scholars before the Massey Commission, the CSSRC was accompanied by the Humanities Research Council of Canada. Created with the support of the CSSRC and of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1943, the HRCC had been attempting to provide Canadian scholars in the humanities with the same services the older council had provided for its constituents. With leaders who were largely unknown to the officers of the American foundations the HRCC had not, however, managed to win support on the scale Canadian social scientists had achieved. In spite of this fact, the council maintained its existence with small sustaining grants from the American foundations and even managed to provide limited support to Canadian scholars.

In August 1949, the leaders of the two research councils presented separate briefs to the Massey Commission. Delivered by T.F. McIlwraith and Jean-Charles Falardeau, the CSSRC's contribution called for the creation of a state-funded system of research grants, fellowships, and scholarships for the social sciences. To ensure that such support for scholarship would be free of state interference, the authors of the brief offered the services of their own council to administer the program. In addition, the CSSRC called for the creation of a national library, better preservation of public records, and the reorganization of the National Museum.[109]

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[108]Robbins to Stackpole, 10 October 1949, File: Humanities Research Council of Canada (hereafter HRCC), 1944-1962, CCNYA. For the entire pre-Canada Council lives of the humanities and social science councils Robbin's salary as joint secretary was paid for by grants from the Carnegie Corporation.

[109]"Brief to the Rt. Hon. Vincent Massey, P.C., C.H., Chairman and Members of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences," discussed in Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 32.

Speaking for the humanities were HRCC chairman J.F. Leddy and former Council Chairman Maurice Lebel. Describing the HRCC's purpose and structure, Lebel and Leddy discussed ideas developed earlier by Council's founders Watson Kirkconnell and A.S.P. Woodhouse in their Rockefeller-sponsored survey, The Humanities in Canada (1947). In this volume, Kirkconnell and Woodhouse documented the obstacles that had hindered the development of the humanities in Canada, including inadequate research facilities, little support for publication and research, and heavy teaching responsibilities.[110] Outlining the HRCC's attempts to confront these obstacles with limited resources, Leddy and Lebel informed the commissioners that the organization had survived almost exclusively on funds provided by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.[111] Acknowledging their gratitude for the support of the foundations, Leddy and Lebel pointed out that it could not, "and indeed should not, be expected to continue indefinitely." "It is significant commentary on the maturity of our culture," Leddy and Lebel offered,

> that such an as organization as the Humanities Research Council of Canada should have been financed almost entirely by grants from the United States. The irony of this situation has not been lost on the members of the Council who have felt for some time that many of its enterprises contribute in a direct and effective way to the cultural development of Canada, as a whole, and that the Council should therefore most properly receive the support of Federal grants for the continuance of its work.[112]

MacKenzie, although convinced of the broader necessity for greater Canadian

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[110]"A Brief Presented by the Humanities Research Council of Canada to the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences," 15 July 1949, pp. 2-3, sent to Stackpole by Robbins, 10 October 1949, File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

[111]Ibid., pp. 5-6.

[112]Ibid., p. 6.

support of the social sciences and the humanities, was not impressed by the HRCC's brief. He felt the leaders had failed to present their case forcefully and that Canadian humanists, in general, had failed to link their research to practical problems confronting the modern world. The social scientists, Carnegie Corporation officer Stephen Stackpole noted after hearing MacKenzie's assessment, were "getting better in this respect as their trained men are finding useful jobs to do." For this to happen in the humanities, Stackpole continued, "will take something more than money."[113]

During the proceedings, it was rumoured that the commissioners were intending to recommend the government form a national council for arts and letters. Fearful that the social sciences and the humanities might fall between the jurisdictions of the new arts council and the National Research Council (NRC),[114] the leaders of the CSSRC and HRCC convened a joint session of the two councils for the purpose of preparing a supplementary brief to the commission.[115] On 19 January 1950, McIlwraith and Leddy presented the document to the commission.

The two scholars began by asserting "the great importance of scholarly research in the social sciences and the humanities for the cultural and intellectual life of the Canadian

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[113]"Cross Reference Sheet, WHS, SHS and Norman A.M. MacKenzie - Humanities Research Council," File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA. The unwillingness of members of the HRCC to look beyond the narrow confines of the traditional academic studies in the humanities had long been a source of frustration to the officers of both American foundations. The officers were particularly disturbed by the lack of dialogue with French-Canadian scholars. This dissatisfaction was, in large part, responsible for the disparity between the foundations' support for the CSSRC and the HRCC. See "Interviews: JM and Stackpole," 5 December 1947, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 80, RF, RAC; and "Office of the President: Record of Interview, SHS and Mr. John Marshal, R.F., 5 December 1947, File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

[114]The federal funding agency for research in natural sciences.

[115]Fisher, The Social Sciences in Canada, p. 32.

community." The social sciences and humanities were, Leddy and McIlwraith argued, "the necessary complement to the natural and physical sciences, and they cannot, without the gravest danger to the national culture, be allowed to languish, for from them it receives an important part of its impetus and direction." Although they recognized that "the mere collection and classification of facts" was of little importance, Leddy and McIlwraith argued that "the vitality of academic study in Canadian universities, and the quality of teaching in the entire educational system, depend[ed] on the maintenance of a high level of scholarly research in these subjects." Noting that the CSSRC and the HRCC were created with the maintenance of this standard in mind, the scholars spoke proudly of their councils' programs of scholarships, fellowships and of grants-in-aid for individual and collective research projects.[116]

Echoing the warning sounded earlier in the HRCC's brief, Leddy and McIlwraith then turned to the issue of the councils' dependence on American philanthropy. The councils' support for Canadian scholarship was funded, the leaders told the commissioners (who knew all too well), by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation. Although the leaders welcomed and appreciated this aid, it was "the considered opinion of the two Councils, [that] it is necessary that the interests which they serve should receive further support; and it is especially desirable that this support should come from Canadian sources." Accordingly, the brief concluded with a request that "the interests of research and scholarship in the humanities and social sciences should be effectively represented" in any

[116]"A Supplementary Brief Presented to the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences by the Canadian Social Science Research Council and the Humanities Research Council of Canada," sent to Stackpole by Leddy, 28 January 1950, Box 175, File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

new organization or council created to provide stimulation in the arts, and letters.[117]

It was known before the formal proceedings began that Massey favoured the creation of a body styled after the British Arts Council, which had been created by the British government in 1945 to support theatre, ballet, opera and the fine arts.[118] With the support of Neatby, MacKenzie and especially Lévesque, however, there was little chance that the research councils' interests would be ignored in the commission's recommendations. The American philanthropic foundations and such Canadian collaborators as Innis, Trotter, and Dawson had so effectively established the American model of the research councils that they could not be ignored or superseded by recommendations for the creation of federal academic infrastructure. All that was at issue, in reality, was whether the commissioners would recommend the creation of one Canada Council or of separate bodies for the arts and the academic disciplines. Even in that respect, models established in the 1930s and 1940s by the interventions into Canadian culture by American philanthropy were too powerful to ignore. In the end, the commissioners agreed that the safest way to ensure that both constituencies would be looked after was to recommend the creation of one council.[119] The Canada Council which emerged in the commission's recommendations to the federal government thus resembled more the uniquely American multi-purpose philanthropic foundations than it did the British Arts Council.

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[117]Ibid.

[118]Claude Bissell, The Imperial Canadian: Vincent Massey in Office (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 227. For a discussion of the British Arts Council, see F.F. Ridley, "State Patronage of the Arts in Britain: The Political Culture of Cultural Politics," Social Science Information 17 (1978): pp. 449-487.

[119]Fisher, The Social Sciences is Canada, pp. 32-33.

The Massey Commission's lengthy report was released to the public in June 1951. In it, the commissioners recommended that the federal government create a "Canada Council for the Encouragement of the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences...."[120] Little in the way of formal structure was suggested, and there was no explanation of the financial details involved in such "encouragement." While neither group expected quick action on the part of the government, both the representatives of the research councils and of the American foundations assumed that the new council would be established over the next couple of years and would, in some manner, make use of the existing programs of the CSSRC and the HRCC.[121]

As Paul Litt points out, "something of a creationist myth for Canadian cultural nationalists" has been constructed around the Massey Commission.[122] Massey biographer Claude Bissell hints at the roots of this narrative when he claims that the report functioned "to bless and release the energies that awaited an authoritative summons."[123] It is no doubt true that the commission's commitment to state support for culture and scholarship was a significant victory for the research councils and for the leaders of the artistic community. The officers of the American foundations took it as an indication that the programs they had been so instrumental in creating would some day be absorbed into the Canadian public infrastructure. However, the Massey Commission's report only really signified the end of

[120]"Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences," p. 377.

[121]"Interview: Marshall and Stackpole, 7 June 1951," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 81, RF, RAC.

[122]The Muses, the Masses, and the Massey Commission (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 5.

[123]The Imperial Canadian, p. 236.

one campaign and the beginning of another. What the Massey Commission's recommendation did -- and this was the victory -- was to encode and legitimate a private interest group's agenda as official objectives for public policy. That agenda was created, and had been nurtured for years, before the Massey Commission was formed. Making the federal government pursue elements of this agenda would consume the efforts of both the leaders of the research councils and their American collaborators for the next five years.

A particularly harsh reminder that the war for state support was not over was the fact that at the very time the Massey report was being released to the public, the research councils were facing the prospect of extinction. The promise of state support in the unspecified future did nothing to provide funds for the next academic year's sabbatical, research, publication, and fellowships programs. So at the moment of victory, the leaders of both the CSSRC and the HRCC turned hat-in-hand to their patrons in New York.

In the case of the CSSRC, negotiations were painless. The Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division had already made plans for a three-year extension of the council's grant, complete with an increase to counteract the effects of increased demand and inflation.[124] It was the Canadian leaders who suggested that the Foundation might prefer a more temporary measure while both sides waited to assess the fallout from the Massey Report. Writing Social Science Division Associate Director Roger Evans, C. Cecil Lingard, the CSSRC's new Secretary-Treasurer, suggested that the Foundation might wait "to be fully advised of the Commission's recommendations and their fate at the hands of our government before considering an appeal from our Council for a longer period than the year

[124]Grant Record, RF 51079, RF 51080, 31 May 1951, RF 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

1951-52."[125] Noting that "if it had not been for the imminence of this report," they would have been fully prepared to approve the longer term, the officers acceded to the wishes of the CSSRC and approved a one-year award of $50,000.[126]

The situation in which the leaders of the HRCC found themselves was quite different and significantly less comfortable. The contrast, in fact, is evidence of the extent to which Canadian scholarship in this era was susceptible to the whims, biases, and strategies of the officers as well as to the bureaucratic idiosyncrasies of the American foundations. Noting that the level of support the HRCC offered Canadian humanists was far below that which the CSSRC provided for its constituents, humanities council chairman Donald Creighton requested a substantial increase in the size of the Rockefeller Foundation's grant to his council.[127]

While the Foundation's Humanities Division officers were sufficiently satisfied with the Canadian humanists to award the group a two-year grant worth a little less than $20,000, they were not about to bring the HRCC grant up to the level of the CSSRC appropriation. To make matters worse for Creighton and his council, the Rockefeller Foundation award was earmarked specifically for "planning and development."[128] Accordingly, it could not even be used in the way deemed most appropriate by the council's leadership, and the HRCC was forced to finance its entire financial support program with the $5,000 per year

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[125]C.Cecil Lingard to Roger F. Evans, 18 April 1951, RG 1.1, Series 427, Box 31, Folder 324, RF, RAC.

[126]Grant Record, RF 51079, RF 51080, 31 May 1951, RF 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

[127]Donald Creighton to Edward F. D'Armes, 12 March 1951, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 81, RF, RAC.

[128]Charles B. Fahs to Creighton, 22 May 1951, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 81, RF, RAC.

grant it received from the Carnegie Corporation.[129]

The reaction of the representatives of the American foundations to Creighton's concern about the inadequate level of support the HRCC provided Canadian scholars dramatized the power relations at play in these relationships. After meeting with Creighton at the annual meetings of HRCC in June 1951, Carnegie officials noted, as if describing a sibling rivalry between two small children, that the "HRCC, which is only half as old as the CSSRC, is rather jealous of the position the latter has achieved for itself and in particular, of funds it has been able to spend." Noting, paternalistically, that the humanities council had developed "into a sound and useful organization," the Carnegie officers were somewhat sympathetic to the HRCC's frustration over the fellowship shortfall. Their assessment of Creighton's attitude was anything but sympathetic. Creighton, who by this time was already a preëminent Canadian historian, "seemed particularly irritated and found it hard to understand how one arm of the RF (social sciences) could have one policy toward fellowships and another arm a different one." Impatient with what was perceived to be the historian's petulant attitude, the Carnegie officials thought that "Creighton lent a somewhat 'cry-baby' attitude to the meetings, which was hardly justified...."[130]

While leaders of the foundations and the research councils remained optimistic about the promised formation of the Canada Council, both groups also made contingency plans. It was clear to all, even at this apparent high-point of Canadian cultural nationalism,

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[129]"Carnegie Corporation of New York, Cross Reference Sheet, letter from John Robbins to the Carnegie Corporation, 31 October 1955," File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

[130]"Record of Interview, Subject: Humanities Research Council of Canada, 1 June 1951," File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

that the short-term existence of the councils' scholarship programs depended on maintenance of the patron-recipient relationship with the American foundations. While attending the 1952 annual meeting of the HRCC, Carnegie officer Stephen Stackpole discussed prospects for the two research councils with Lester Pearson. Although Pearson told the American that the formation of the Canada Council was on the top of the government's agenda, Stackpole concluded privately that it only seemed "likely that funds for the Humanities and Social Sciences would be forthcoming within two or three years."[131]

When the academic year 1951-52 had passed without action from the federal government, the leaders of CSSRC again turned to the Rockefeller Foundation's Social Science Division. Again they encountered little resistance and received a three-year grant totalling $176,000. In the official Foundation record of the grant it was noted that the previous award had been made on a temporary basis pending government action on the Massey recommendations. Such action, it was further noted, "now seems indefinitely deferred by defense claims and the political complications involved in entering a field that has constitutionally been a Provincial prerogative."[132] While the officers were sympathetic to the plight of the social sciences and were willing to help resolve the temporary funding crisis, they also advised the CSSRC's leaders that they would not continue to support the council at the level of the present grant and that "the base of Council support [should] be broadened

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[131]Carnegie Corporation of New York, Record of Interview: "SHS at Quebec, Humanities Research Council of Canada," Folder HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

[132]Rockefeller Foundation Grant Record, RF 52112, 20 June 1952, p. 1, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 31, Folder 319, RF, RAC.

from other sources."[133]

By the summer of 1952 the HRCC again faced the task of negotiating with the foundations to preserve its programs. Discussions with the Carnegie Corporation were relatively routine. After the exchange of several polite letters, Stackpole and A.S.P. Woodhouse, the HRCC's chairman for 1952-53, agreed on a three-year grant of $25,000 in support of the council's programs.[134] Negotiations between Woodhouse and the Rockefeller Foundation's Humanities Division were far more involved, but, in this case at least, surprisingly fruitful.

The dialogue began in earnest with discussions over the telephone between Woodhouse and Humanities Division Associate Director John Marshall in early May 1953. Marshall asked Woodhouse and his colleagues at the HRCC to apprise the Foundation of "its present needs...in light of the present situation in Canada...." He further advised Woodhouse that "the discussions of the Council...on this score should be in no way influenced by the supposed interests of the RF."[135]

In response to this invitation, Woodhouse marshalled an impressive case for a substantial increase in the Foundation's support of the HRCC and for the use of the funds to enhance the council's scholarship programs. In correspondence and conversation with Marshall, Woodhouse noted that "planning and development" should no longer be viewed

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[133]Ibid., p. 2. See also Roger F. Evans to Jean-Charles Falardeau, 5 May 1952, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 325.

[134]Stackpole to A.S.P. Woodhouse, 19 November 1952, Box 175, Folder HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNY.

[135]"Telephone interview: John Marshall and A.S.P. Woodhouse, May 11,12," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

as the HRCC's highest priority. Grateful that Marshall and the Foundation were open to a change in policy, Woodhouse observed that he and his colleagues now felt that "Aid in the Development of Personnel" should be placed on top of the research council's agenda.[136]

Woodhouse pointed to two main reasons for changing the size and conditions of Foundation support for his council. First, he noted that expanded enrolment in Canadian universities had increased the demand for humanists in Canada. Without greater support for graduate work in the humanities, promising students would continue to flock to natural sciences, and the social sciences and the supply of humanists would fall even further behind demand. To support his second point, Woodhouse informed Marshall of Louis St. Laurent's statement in the House of Commons on 27 April 1953 that he would move to create the Canada Council if his government was returned to power in the up-coming federal elections. In the event of the promised legislation, Woodhouse argued, "the best way to ensure that the needs of the Humanities will be recognized and supplied is to have in being a pattern which the government can take over and expand." Accordingly, Woodhouse recommended that the Foundation enable the HRCC to increase its fund for pre-doctoral fellowships from $5,000 to $45,000 and its post-doctoral fellowship fund from $3,000 to $15,000. "If this plan or some modification of it," Woodhouse concluded, "could be put into operation before the Canada Council was set up, our hope and expectation would be that the Canada Council would take it over and administer it, either directly or through the HRCC,

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[136]Woodhouse to Marshall, 29 May 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC; and Rockefeller Foundation Interoffice Correspondence, from Marshall to Joseph H. Willits, Edward F. D'Armes, and Charles B. Fahs, 30 May 1953, "Subject: DH aid to the Canadian Humanities Research Council," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

expanding it as the need arose."[137]

Marshall and the Humanities Division had all but decided to continue with the program of modest support for "planning and development" it had been extending the HRCC.[138] The logic of Woodhouse's presentation, however, caused the officers to re-think their position. They were persuaded by Woodhouse's warnings the humanities might be permanently neglected if the Canada Council took over an underfunded system of support. Marshall noted at the time that "levels of support [were] apparently quite adequate in the natural sciences, fairly so in the social sciences...but utterly inadequate in the humanities."[139] Although he hoped that the new council would "rectify this disparity," he agreed with Woodhouse that "the chances of its so doing would be enhanced if it were faced by support for the humanities already established at a more adequate level."[140]

Meanwhile, Marshall's other Canadian friends were sending him mixed signals about the likelihood of the formation of the new Canada Council. University of Toronto president Sydney Smith informed Marshall that the legislation needed to create the council would be presented to Parliament in the fall of 1953 and that it would be operable before the 1954-55 academic year. Smith referred Marshall to then Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton for

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[137]Woodhouse to Marshall, 29 May 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[138]Rockefeller Foundation Interoffice Correspondence, from Marshall to Joseph H. Willits, Edward F. D'Armes, and Charles B. Fahs, 30 May 1953, "Subject: DH aid to the Canadian Humanities Research Council," pp. 1,5, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[139]Ibid, p. 2.

[140]Ibid, pp. 2-3.

confirmation.[141] John Robbins, secretary-treasurer for both the CSSRC and the HRCC and long-time friend of both foundations, was less optimistic: "The intention apparently is to proceed with establishment at some time after this year's election. But it is two years this week since the Massey Report was issued; years slip by quickly."[142]

Apparently convinced by Smith and Woodhouse that the Canada Council was nearing reality, the Humanities Division approved an award to the HRCC of $65,000 over a period of two years. In justifying the substantial increase, the officers noted that during the previous year the HRCC had offered Canadian scholars a total of $8,000 in support, while the CSSRC and the National Research Council had provided $37,000 and $226,000 respectively.[143] In acknowledging the grant for the HRCC, the council's new chairman, Ray Daniels, noted,

> it is difficult for me fully to express our pleasure and our gratitude to the Foundation; this will be a milestone in the history of Canadian research in the humanistic disciplines and it will serve as a springboard to project a programme of humanistic research into the plans of the Canada Council...."[144]

A.S.P. Woodhouse, the Canadian architect of this expansion, suggested to Marshall that he "may have done more for the ultimate well-being of the humanities in Canada than even you

[141]Ibid., p. 4.

[142]John E. Robbins to Marshall, 1 June 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[143]Rockefeller Foundation Grant Record, RF 53088, 19 June 1953, p. 2, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 79, RF, RAC.

[144]Daniels to Flora Rhind (Secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation), 4 July 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

can guess."[145]

With this grant the HRCC could finally offer programs similar to, if not yet equal to, those offered by the CSSRC. Both councils -- still funded almost exclusively by the foundations -- were able to claim undisputed leadership in their fields and both were, moreover, ready to play major roles in a new Canada Council. If history had worked in exactly the way that its major actors intended, the Canada Council would have been formed some time in 1954 or early 1955 and the American foundations would have quietly left the scene secure in the knowledge that their power had been institutionalized in the new state apparatus. But history, particularly Canadian cultural history, is not so neat -- or at least it was not in this case. Despite a steady parade of promising signs and signals, among them a November 1954 speech St. Laurent gave at an Ottawa conference on the humanities and government in which he came close to announcing the formation of the council, the research councils once again faced uncertain futures.[146] The CSSRC, with its longer history of high levels of foundation support, was, at least temporarily, able to finance its program. In the summer of 1955, however, Donald Creighton, again chairman of the HRCC, found himself in the uncomfortably familiar position of heading a nearly bankrupt organization. In what was by this time a well-practised pattern of dependency he turned to New York in search of support.

Since the formations of the CSSRC and the HRCC the Rockefeller Foundation had

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[145]Woodhouse to Marshall, 13 July 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[146]Carnegie Corporation of New York, Memorandum, Subject: Humanities Research Council of Canada: Conference November 19 and 20, 1954 in Ottawa on the Humanities and Government, File: HRCC, 1944-1962, CCNYA.

used "carrots" and the promise of more of them to reward individuals and collective activity of which the officers approved. While it was true that the social scientists took in far more of these prizes than their colleagues in the humanities -- by August 1955 the Foundation had contributed $541,195 to the coffers of the SSRC and $112,750 to the HRCC[147] -- neither council had been seriously threatened with the "stick." At least not until the summer of 1955.

Upon taking over the chair of the HRCC in early June, Creighton was informed by the out-going chairman J.F. Leddy that he had just received bad news concerning federal support for the social sciences and the humanities. J.W. Pickersgill wrote Leddy that the government, after carefully considering the matter, had decided against giving either research council direct grants. The leaders of the councils had already resigned themselves to the fact that the Canada Council was not likely to be created in the current session of Parliament, but it had also been thought the federal government would provide funding directly to the research councils as a temporary measure. Pickersgill's letter eliminated even this temporary remedy.[148]

Outlining the dilemma he again faced, Creighton advised Marshall in a letter that he did not "believe...that the Government has altered its intention of establishing the Canada Council and supporting the kind of work which we have been carrying on." The Prime Minister had, in fact, recently reaffirmed his intentions in the matter. Moreover, Pickersgill

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[147]"RF Grants to Canadian Research Councils," August 1955, RG 1.2 Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[148]Creighton to Marshall, 7 June 1955, p. 1, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 325, RF, RAC.

had stressed to Leddy that the Council would likely be formed some time in 1956. Creighton assured the Rockefeller officer, "we in the Humanities Council have done our very best to induce the Government to proceed with its declared plans and thus to relieve the Rockefeller Foundation of some, at least, of the burden which it has been carrying so long on our behalf."[149] The Canadian historian also promised that, at the time the Foundation approved the previous terminal award for fellowships and grants-in-aid, "we really believed that other resources would be available" by the time the grant expired. Fearing that his "chairmanship would be marked by an abrupt break in the continuity of the work upon which our academic community has come to rely,..." and noting that his position was "a very embarrassing one," Creighton wondered whether Marshall and the Foundation could "help us out for another year...."[150]

Creighton had his answer in fast and somewhat furious fashion. After conferring with Marshall on the history of the previous grant to the HRCC and receiving the officer's firm advice that the Foundation should not reconsider its position, Foundation president Dean Rusk replied to Creighton's pleas for help.[151] Citing the "heavy demands upon our limited funds from urgent requirements all over the world," Rusk told Creighton, "we do not believe that we should continue support for an ongoing educational and scholarly need in a country which is fully able to do what it considers important to do." Lecturing the historian on the intricacies of Canadian cultural sovereignty, Rusk further noted that the "regular

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[149]Ibid.

[150]Ibid. p. 2.

[151]Interoffice Correspondence, Marshall to Rusk, 9 June 1955, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 325, RF, RAC.

activities to which our grants to the Council have contributed....[surely] fall within the view of the Massey Report that long-term responsibilities in Canada should now be Canadian."[152] "The decision," Rusk concluded, "of the Canadian Government not to go forward at this time with the Canada Council does not seem to us to increase our responsibility."[153]

Rusk's letter seemed to close the door to further Rockefeller aid. Creighton wrote Rusk that the president's response was a "heavy blow" to the HRCC, but that he realized the real source of his organization's financial crisis was the government's refusal either to create the Canada Council or to offer the research councils direct support. True cultural nationalist that he was, Creighton agreed with Rusk that projects providing support for Canadian scholarship should be, and soon would be, funded by Canadians. He fully understood Rusk's "reluctance to do once more what the Canadians apparently refuse to do themselves."[154]

If not for the intervention of Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson, the matter would have ended there. The prospect of the end of Rockefeller Foundation support for the humanities in Canada before the expected government take-over compelled Pearson to act. Pearson advised Rusk that the Canada Council would be formed and, when it was, the existing research councils would be at the "top of the list" of beneficiaries. Apprising Rusk of the cultural and constitutional politics involved in introducing legislation that would "in some provinces [be seen] as conflicting with provincial

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[152]Dean Rusk to Creighton, 13 June 1955, p. 1, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 325, RF, RAC.

[153]Ibid. p. 2.

[154]Creighton to Rusk, 15 June 1955, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 325, RF, RAC.

rights and activities in the educational and cultural field," Pearson nonetheless reaffirmed the government's commitment to do so and requested the American's patience.[155]

Pearson's appeal did not bring about an immediate reversal of the Foundation's decision, but it did open the door ever so slightly. In response, Rusk asserted (as he had to Creighton) that "the role of government in this matter is a policy question for Canada." Noting that the Rockefeller officers were of the impression that the Canadians had not vigorously pursued private Canadian support, he promised to reconsider the matter if Pearson in turn would pressure the HRCC in that direction.[156] With the matter re-opened, at least, Marshall sought the advice of other trusted informants at the Canadian Writers' Conference at Queen's University in late July 1955. In response to the Rockefeller officer's queries, Mason Wade, who was involved in the CSSRC's bi-culturalism study, assured Marshall that the legislation required to create the Canada Council was already in print and that the Council would be announced in the 1956 Throne Speech.[157] Raleigh Parkin, Vincent Massey's brother-in-law and Marshall's "most trusted adviser in Canada," assured the officer that Pearson was trying to borrow time and that the federal government would likely go ahead with the Canada Council after a conference on federal and provincial relations in October which Quebec premier Maurice Duplessis had agreed to attend. Parkin, an officer with the Crane Foundation in New York and thus well acquainted with the strategies of corporate philanthropy, suggested the Rockefeller Foundation make any future

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[155]Lester B. Pearson to Rusk, 28 June 1955, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[156]Rusk to Pearson, 1 July 1955, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[157]"Interview: Marshall and Mason Wade, 30 July 1955," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

grant in a manner likely to encourage private donations from Canadians.[158]

By late August it was becoming clear that the Foundation would provide the HRCC some support but only if such action would be matched by Canadian support for the council. In a telephone discussion with John Robbins, Marshall confidentially informed the Canadian that, although the official position remained unchanged, Dean Rusk was "mulling over Pearson's letter." Robbins, in return, told Marshall of the successful fund-raising campaign Montreal lawyer Arthur Goldenburg was directing for the CSSRC and the HRCC.[159] Another optimistic message was delivered to Marshall by his fellow Foundation officer George W. Gray. While in Canada reviewing the progress of the Mackenzie King biography, which was supported by a large Rockefeller Foundation grant, Gray had discussed the prospects for the Canada Council with Pickersgill. Echoing Pearson's words, Pickersgill tried to reassure the Foundation that the long wait for government funding was about to end:

> I hope you do something for Robbins. Please tell the Foundation that I have the cause of the Council very much at heart, and I feel sure that we should be able to get through a government appropriation or grant at the next session of Commons.[160]

With several trusted advisers making pleas for more time, the prospects of Canadian support looking much brighter, and the assurances of at least two federal cabinet ministers,

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[158] "Interview: Mr. and Mrs. Raleigh Parkin and Marshall, 29 July 1955," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[159] "Telephone Interview: Marshall and Robbins, 23 August 1955," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[160] Inter-office Correspondence, George W. Gray to Marshall, 1 September 1955, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

Rusk and Marshall were ready to make a final grant to the HRCC. Using a technique which had long been favoured by the foundations in the United States but was used only infrequently for Canadian projects, the Foundation awarded the council up to $50,000 over two years provided that the amount was matched dollar for dollar by Canadian contributions.[161]

Once again an action, or series of actions, in the New York offices of the Rockefeller Foundation seems to have had fundamental reverberations on Canadian national culture. During the fall of 1955, the HRCC's fund-raising campaign, assisted by Chairman of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects Walter Gordon, was beginning to show some success. From September 1955 to May 1956, the HRCC raised almost $25,000, effectively matching the Rockefeller Foundation's yearly grant. With the level of self-confidence and arrogance typical of a Foundation officer, Marshall suggested to Creighton that the Foundation's provision of matching funds "has made a real contribution to the general development of philanthropy there."[162] Creighton, writing Marshall on 9 January 1957, was less willing to give all the credit to the American foundation, noting that "Mr. Walter Gordon's name no doubt effected the magical change...."[163]

By the time Creighton wrote this he could afford to be defiant. The previous day, in the Throne Speech for 1957, St. Laurent announced that his government would soon be presenting a resolution to the House of Commons that would finally lead to the creation of

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[161]Rockefeller Foundation Grant Record, RF 55123, 30 September 1955, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 8, Folder 79, RF, RAC.

[162]Marshall to Creighton, 19 December 1956, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[163]Creighton to Marshall, 9 January 1957, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

the Canada Council.[164] Just a little more than a month later, on February 13, the Canada Council bill was approved by the House of Commons.

As was expected, the new council absorbed the existing decades-old cultural infrastructure. While the Canada Council took over the responsibility of granting fellowships in the social sciences and humanities, the research councils were maintained and supported as advisory boards to screen applicants for assistance. Although they were greatly expanded -- in the first year alone the Canada Council handed out four hundred awards divided equally between the social sciences and the humanities -- the new council's programs for support of scholarship were based heavily on the ones it inherited from the CSSRC and the HRCC.[165]

Although the Canada Council was allegedly created, in large part, to replace American philanthropy and to provide Canada with defensive apparatus to protect it from all-pervasive American cultural influences, the Council's leadership was more than willing to learn from the American foundations. Several members of the council (including Chairman Brooke Claxton, Vice-Chairman Georges-Henri Lévesque, N.A.M. MacKenzie, and W.A. Mackintosh) were veterans of projects supported by American philanthropy, and these men consciously and sub-consciously looked at their experiences to guide them in creating the new council. Accordingly, it was not surprising that, along with Dean Rusk, representatives of the Carnegie Corporation and the Ford Foundation also spoke at the first meeting of the

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[164] Ibid.

[165] "Interview: Marshall, Robbins, and Woodhouse, 16 September 1957," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

Canada Council.[166] Ironically, it seems, the American foundations, and the research councils they helped to establish in both Canada and the United States, were the models on which the Canada Council's scholarship programs were patterned.

It would be inaccurate to argue that the foundations simply imposed American patterns onto the Canadian intellectual landscape. As Rusk had pointed out to Pearson, the Rockefeller Foundation had no specific interest in creating a national publicly-funded system of support for Canadian scholarship. The system that emerged was not a mere replica of the one that the foundations did so much to help create in American society. In the United States the foundations had negotiated another formula for influencing the structuring of culture. It would be an equal disservice to history to be overtaken by nationalist pride and to pretend that the creation of the Canada Council shielded Canadian scholarship from American influence and that intellectuals were members of the one Canadian social group not affected by American culture. As I have argued thus far in this chapter, the Canada Council, the men who directed it, and the programs of support it offered were all products of a culture in which American foundations were key players. Far from being opponents of strong federal programs of support for culture, the leaders of American philanthropy had worked hand-in-hand with representatives of the Canadian state to create federal infrastructure. Offering "carrots," and very infrequently showing the "stick," to such Canadian builders as Innis, Robbins, Trotter, and Creighton, the foundations also provided the knowledge gained from previous experience in the structuring of cultural activity. When

[166] J.L. Granatstein, "Culture and Scholarship: The First Ten Years of the Canada Council," Canadian Historical Review 65 (Dec. 1984): p. 449.

the Canadian state absorbed the infrastructure the foundations had worked so hard to create, the period of the American's direct influence came to an end. In a broader sense, however, that influence was embedded in the new system of public patronage.

III. "Innis of Canada,...Men of Toronto": Building Excellence in Central Canada

That the foundations played such a key role in creating the broad, national structures of Canadian scholarship in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s should not obscure another equally important facet of their programs. To the leaders of the foundations, it was impossible to create a system that was collectively healthy without providing extraordinary incentives for the "best" individuals and institutions. So in addition to building national organizations designed to raise the general level of scholarship throughout Canada, the Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, selected and supported certain individuals as scholars and leaders of unusual ability. Following this pattern on an institutional basis, the University of Toronto was singled out for particular attention as the Canadian center for research in the social sciences and humanities. In the same way that the Carnegie Corporation had encouraged the development of the National Gallery as the hub of a national program for cultural institutions in the 1930s and 1940s, the Rockefeller Foundation worked with Harold Innis and his colleagues to construct the University of Toronto as its Canadian base for the social sciences and the humanities.

Like the policy that led to the establishment of the research councils, support for leading individuals such as Harold Innis, Donald Creighton and their colleagues at the

University of Toronto also had roots in foundation-sponsored research projects of the 1930s. It was during the 1930s that the foundations were exposed to most of the prominent scholars in the social sciences and the humanities in Canada. As we have seen, personal and professional ties that developed then were significant when it later came time to begin building Canada's academic infrastructure. The bonds forged in the 1930s were no less important when it came time for the foundations to select scholars for particular support.

Despite Anne Bezanson's initial judgement in 1941 that academic talent in the social sciences in Canada was too dispersed to allow the Rockefeller Foundation to focus attention on a single institution, it was not long before Bezanson and the other officers of the Social Science Division decided that the University of Toronto's department of political economy deserved preferential treatment. By early 1943 the officers were convinced that the Foundation should assist "the unusual group" in Toronto. With its large staff and relatively high level of support within the university, the department -- which formally included political science, economics and sociology and informally included the department of history -- was already making broad contributions to the development of the social sciences in Canada in a variety of ways. In addition to providing junior scholars on temporary appointments in the university with light teaching responsibilities and thus time to use above-average research facilities, the department subsidized members of its staff to teach at smaller Canadian institutions for short terms. Many of the more senior faculty members served as editors of the professional journals in their fields. "It was easy to see," Bezanson concluded in a letter to the department's leader Harold Innis, "that Toronto men are

working too hard, [and are] sacrificing too much of their strength...."[167] "Please understand," Bezanson advised Innis, "one of the things that interests us is getting a man named Innis a chance to work with a little less sacrifice than he is now making."[168]

To address their interests in the scholar and his department, the officers invited Innis to New York for consultation. Innis agreed with the Rockefeller staff that whatever the Foundation did it must be careful to act "without impairing the exceptional standards of work, scholarship, integrity, and sense of values,...[and without disturbing] the fine relationships...both within the Univ. of Toronto, and also between the Univ. and other educational institutions throughout Canada...."[169] While Innis's friend Joseph Willits, Director of the Social Science Division, was prepared to go ahead with a sizable fluid grant to be used by Innis as he saw fit, it was decided, at Innis's insistence, that the Foundation would provide Innis with a small experimental grant which the Canadian would distribute to members of his staff at the University of Toronto to defray research expenses. Innis made clear to the officers that he would use the grant "to take the immediate load off [Donald] Creighton and to help a man like [S.D.] Clark to get ahead."[170]

At about the same time the Social Science Division of the Rockefeller Foundation was courting Harold Innis, officers from both the Humanities and Social Science Divisions were, like Innis, investigating ways of freeing Creighton from his heavy teaching load.

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[167]Bezanson to Innis, 5 January 1943, RG 1.2, 427S, Box 17, Folder 166, RF, RAC.

[168]Ibid.

[169]"Interviews: Willits, Bezanson, Evans, and Innis," 25 January 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 17, Folder 166, RF, RAC.

[170]Ibid. p. 5.

Creighton had caught the attention of Bezanson and Humanities Associate Director Marshall with his work for the Carnegie series. His Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence impressed Marshall as "a major work," and led the officer to conclude that Creighton was "one of the ablest if not the ablest historian...[he has] encountered in Canada." After returning from a trip to Toronto in December 1942, Bezanson advised Marshall that Creighton was having trouble completing his general history of Canada, The Dominion of the North, because of teaching commitments. The officers agreed, a record of their interview indicates, "that it would be both strategic and generally advantageous to make known to Creighton the readiness of the RF...to consider assistance which would bring him release from teaching to complete his work."[171]

The idea of a direct award to Creighton was dropped in early 1943, at least temporarily, after it was learned that Innis had plans to use a large part of his Social Science Division grant to support Creighton in the completion of Dominion of the North. Confused by the lines of division between the humanities and the social sciences in Canada, the officers noted that at the University of Toronto, history was treated as a social science. In any case, they observed after speaking to Innis, "Creighton...is now a member of the group around Innis."[172] Significantly, the officers agreed that Creighton might still require assistance at a later date and that the lines of communications should be left open.

During the early months of 1943, Marshall and Creighton corresponded about two

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[171]"Interview: Marshall and Bezanson, 16 December 1942," RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[172]Inter-Office Correspondence, "Subject: Possible aid to Professor Creighton, University of Toronto," 26 January 1943, Marshall to David Stevens, and Bezanson, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

of the former's favourite projects. Creighton wrote to Marshall after reading the manuscript of the Rockefeller Foundation's August 1942 New England-Maritime Region conference in Rockland, Maine. The Canadian historian was not convinced by the validity of the regions Marshall was intent on investigating. He thought that, despite the best efforts of the Rockefeller Foundation, the regions "break apart at the international boundary in more than one important way,..." but he admitted he was intrigued "by the questions which [were] raise[d]...." by the investigation.[173] He would, he added, be interested in attending a similar conference on the Great Lakes region if he was available.

Of more lasting significance to Creighton's career was Marshall's interest in the relationship between the study of history and the values of modern society. The Humanities Division had helped a number of American historians receive release from teaching to consider the issue in the American context. In April 1943, Marshall wrote Creighton asking him his advice on whether or not there would be any interest in a similar inquiry in Canada. Noting that he was "drawn to the idea," he admitted that he had "no means of knowing whether or not the climate of opinion in Canada would make Canadian participation appropriate." He asked Creighton if he knew of historians in Canada who would "be interested in it of their own accord."[174]

Over the next couple of months it became clear that the Foundation was offering to include Creighton in the project when he finished his general history of Canada. Even before discussing the proposal with Creighton in any specific sense, in fact, Marshall had

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[173]Creighton to Marshall, 6 January 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[174]Marshall to Creighton, 22 April 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

received assurances from University of Toronto president H.J. Cody that, as long as the Rockefeller Foundation was willing to pay the bill, the university would release Creighton from his teaching responsibilities for a period of time.[175] With the release thus already approved, Marshall wrote Creighton on 9 June 1943 to inquire whether or not he would be interested in participating. In offering Creighton support, Marshall noted that it was his "conviction that there is a very important contribution here which...you are uniquely qualified to make...." Marshall claimed that he and the others at the Foundation

> should certainly not wish to be in the position of suggesting this study, although it clearly has grown out of talks which both Miss Bezanson and I have had with you....[but] If this is something you really wish to undertake I shall be only too glad to see what I can arrange on this end....[176]

Despite the opportunity provided by Marshall to escape teaching, Creighton was not about to replace his own research agenda with Marshall's. He began his response to the Rockefeller officer by observing that the scheme Marshall presented to Cody in order to get the latter's approval for Creighton's sabbatical was "rather more concrete...[than] the scheme you and I have been discussing by correspondence and about which I talked to Miss Bezanson at Hamilton towards the end of May."[177] He thought Marshall's question: "What values in Canadian History its study should bring to realization?" to be "general and inclusive...." Although he admitted he was intrigued, he did not feel he had time to get involved in the inquiry or that he wanted to make it a priority. He further noted that he understood it to be Foundation policy to make grants of assistance to scholars "on request."

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[175] Marshall to H.J. Cody, 3 June 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[176] Marshall to Creighton, 9 June 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

He did not, he informed Marshall, "like being put in the position of making such a request...."[178]

After a series of conversations involving Marshall, Bezanson, Innis and Creighton, the air was cleared.[179] Assured by Innis that the Foundation would be interested in supporting a project of his own, Creighton wrote Marshall and thanked the officer for his interest and for the "assistance [the Foundation] is ready to extend me in my work." While he was still in the last stages of writing his Canadian text he was almost ready to "discuss the suggestions which you have made and perhaps to settle upon some project which would be satisfactory to us both."[180]

Almost a year later, in late March 1944, having completed Dominion of the North,[181] Creighton wrote Marshall requesting the Rockefeller Foundation's support for his next major project, a biography of Canada's first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald. In making his application Creighton argued that "the subject justifies itself pretty well. Unless there is no value in the study of British North American history, it must be conceded that Macdonald is a figure of central importance and interest." Noting that there was "no biography of any value" on Macdonald, Creighton proposed "a definitely interpretative study

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177Creighton to Marshall, 9 June 1943, p. 1, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

178Ibid., p. 3.

179Innis to Bezanson, 17 June 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

180Creighton to Marshall, 22 June 1943, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

181Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1944.

of the man and of the whole generation to which he belonged."[182] To enable him to begin the project, he requested that the Foundation arrange with the University of Toronto a release from his teaching responsibilities for the following academic year. He further requested funds to cover the costs of research which he assured Marshall would exceed what he could pay for out of his regular annual salary.[183]

True to his word, Marshall wrote Creighton immediately and informally approved the historian's application. "The importance of such a study," Marshall observed, "is perfectly patent both for itself and for its larger implications." More importantly, he informed Creighton, he approved of the project "because it is the thing that you yourself have come to after what I know to be full and mature deliberation."[184] On a copy of Marshall's letter to Creighton that was circulated to Humanities and Social Science personnel at the Foundation, Anne Bezanson wrote prophetically that she "was cheered by this grant....[and that the study it supported was an] important subject in the hands of an able man at a time that may well mark a turning point in his career."[185]

Clearly, the Foundation's support made possible research which under normal conditions would have taken Creighton years to pursue. Sounding every bit as "electrified with eager enthusiasm," as he later accused Mackenzie King to be on the eve of his meeting

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[182]Creighton to Marshall, 31 March 1944, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[183]Ibid., p. 2.

[184]Marshall to Creighton, 4 April 1944, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[185]Handwritten note by Bezanson, 17 April 1944, on a letter from Marshall to Creighton, 4 April 1944, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

with Roosevelt at Ogdensburg,[186] Creighton wrote Marshall of his excitement: "The whole prospect which you have opened up before me seems almost too good to be true and I am still a little dazzled by the opportunities which will be open to me in the next twelve months."[187] During this time Creighton worked studiously at Macdonald's papers at the Public (now National) Archives of Canada in Ottawa. Finding the materials rich, Creighton wrote Marshall enthusiastically about the potential for the finished product. "I despair," he wrote the Rockefeller officer at the end of the year, "of ever thanking you and the Foundation adequately for the great opportunity which you have given me."[188] Ironically, considering how far Marshall had gone to convince the historian to work on a project of the officer's choosing, he wrote in return to Creighton's letter:

> I think I shall always look back to this grant as one of the happiest I have had anything to do with. You seemed to me perfectly clear in your mind as to what you wanted to do; and by your present account the job proved even more interesting and, as you say, more exciting than you had anticipated.[189]

It was late in 1952 when the first volume of Creighton's biography was finally published.[190] At that time, Creighton made a second application to the Foundation in support of a research trip to England that was necessary for the completion of the second volume of the biography. After consultation with University of Toronto president Sydney Smith, Marshall approved a grant of $2000 to assist Creighton. Three years later Creighton

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[186]See the quotation which opens this chapter from Creighton, The Forked Road, p. 43.

[187]Creighton to Marshall, 21 April 1944, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[188]Creighton to Marshall, 14 July 1945, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[189]Marshall to Creighton, 18 July 1945, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[190]John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1952).

completed his work on Macdonald with the publication of his second volume.[191]

The Rockefeller Foundation's support of Creighton's work was an exceptional case, but it was not unique. In 1946 the CSSRC applied to the Foundation for a grant to enable the research council to establish a program of sabbatical support. The Foundation's social science officers preferred, instead, to control the selection and suggested that the CSSRC put forward candidates for consideration on a case-by-case basis. Following Innis's advice and trusting their own perceptions based on an ever-expanding web of interaction, the officers provided direct aid in this way for a small group of Canadian scholars. Arthur Lower, for example, was given leave from United College in 1946-47 to complete a manuscript "Metropolis and Hinterland"[192] and to contemplate future projects.

When approached about the arrangement, the principal of United College was reluctant to give his consent, fearing realistically that Lower would go east and never return.[193] It was likely this scenario was not only a possibility, but was actually what the Rockefeller officers and Innis had in mind in selecting Lower. This motive is suggested in correspondence between Willits and Bezanson during the summer of 1946:

> Lower needs no comment. He has been the centre of the intellectual group in Manitoba for many years. I can't help hoping that he will go elsewhere now that the younger men are returning [from the war]. I half think Innis agrees, and that the year will mature both their plans.[194]

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[191]John A. Macdonald: The Old Chieftain (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1955). See Marshall to Sydney Smith, 15 January, 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 14, Folder 128, RF, RAC.

[192]The manuscript was never published.

[193]"Interview: Roger F. Evans and Innis, 26 April 1946," RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 338, RF, RAC.

[194]Interoffice Correspondence, Bezanson to Willits, 25 July 1946, RG 1.1, Series 427S, Box 32, Folder 338, RF, RAC.

Like Creighton, Lower was singled out for attention because of his reputation in the United States and even more because he had the Harold Innis stamp of approval. He was one of the few individuals not employed at the University of Toronto who was so blessed (although even in his case the decision to support his work was clearly predicated on the hope that it would facilitate his move to central Canada -- which it did, in 1947, when he took up a position at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario). By mid-decade the Rockefeller Foundation was following, informally, a policy designed to solidify the University of Toronto's claim to be the primary center of advanced study in Canada in the social sciences and the humanities. The trend of direct support to the University of Toronto was accelerated after 1946 when the leaders of the HRCC and the SSRC decided that the two councils would focus on the needs of the smaller regional institutions and leave the major centers to support scholarship internally.[195] Knowing that scholars from the University of Toronto would thus be all but ineligible for assistance from the research councils, the officers felt justified in increasing the level of direct aid to Innis's group.

Other developments probably contributed to the increase of Foundation support for Innis's group at the University of Toronto. In 1946 the University of Chicago offered Innis a senior position on its faculty. At about the same time, however, developments were occurring at the University of Toronto that promised to bring Innis's plans for his political economy group closer to fruition. The new president of the university, Sydney Smith, established an internal fellowship fund for scholars in the humanities and the social sciences

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[195]Bezanson, "Education in Canada: Report on Toronto Conference" (internal memorandum), p. 1, May 1946, RG 2, Series 427S, Box 344, File 2330, RF, RAC.

at the university. Innis himself was given a raise of $2,000 as part of general campaign by the university to increase salaries. Committed to running his Canadian empire out of the University of Toronto and pleased with Smith's initiatives, Innis decided to remain where he was.[196]

The social science officers of the Rockefeller Foundation, equally committed to keeping Innis as their Canadian lieutenant and pleased also with Smith's support for the social sciences, again approached Innis with offers of support for his personal research and for his department of political economy. In March 1948, Willits wrote to inquire on the progress of Innis's history of communications. Expressing concern that the study was restricted by "the terrible burdens you are carrying,..." Willits wondered whether Innis's "coming trip to England could not additionally provide the chance for a sabbatical part-year." If Innis was interested, Willits added, he was sure the Foundation could arrange support.[197]

Although Innis did not think that the next year was a good possibility, he was clearly receptive to the idea of a sabbatical in the next couple of years. He was particular intrigued, he wrote Willits, with "India and other countries in the east." Revealing the direction in which he was now heading, he wrote,

> I am becoming very enthusiastic about certain developments in the work on communications and in particular on the whole place of oral tradition. I have come to feel that we have completely overlooked its enormous significance, and would like to get a clearer picture of such countries as India

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[196]Ibid., p. 1. See also Bezanson, "Report on Trip to Toronto, Canada," 15 July 1947, RG 2, Series 427S, Box 344, File 2330, RF, RAC.

[197]Willits to Innis, 25 March 1948, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 17, Folder 166, RF, RAC.

where it is still extremely important.[198]

It was agreed the Rockefeller Foundation would, for the time being, give Innis a $5000 grant to support his summer research and other work that he wished to pursue in the future.

At the same time, the officers continued to provide support to the group of scholars at the University of Toronto on a case-by-base basis and always on Innis's recommendation. In 1951 the Foundation awarded the department a series of grants totalling $14,000 to support S.D. Clark's work on Social Credit, Edgar McInnis's study of international developments which followed the end of the war, and a number of small research projects.[199] One can only speculate on how long this informal relationship might have continued if not for Innis's death in early November 1952. Even before the leader's death the Foundation was moving in the direction of greater and more consistent support of the department. With Innis no longer on the scene to direct social science policy both at the University of Toronto and for Canada, the officers of the Rockefeller Foundation were forced to clarify their objectives on their own.

The Rockefeller Foundation's response to Innis's death could serve as a model for corporate efficiency in times of personal and professional crisis. Anne Bezanson, long a friend of Innis, was despatched to Toronto to represent the Foundation at his funeral and to assess future policy in light of discussions with the remaining leaders at the University.

In writing her superior Joseph Willits from Toronto, Bezanson observed that the

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[198]Innis to Willits, 2 April 1948, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 17, Folder 166, RF, RAC.

[199]Grant Record, "Grant in Aid to the University of Toronto to be used as a general fund for the furtherance of research in the social sciences," 28 May 1951, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 17, Folder 166, RF, RAC.

recent events required an "over-all review" of the situation in Canada. No one man, she observed, could be selected by the Foundation to replace Innis as its representative with the CSSRC or even within his group at the university. "With his prestige," Bezanson eulogized, "the advice of Innis was sought without his initiative, because he was thought of as 'Innis of Canada'; his colleagues, however unselfish in aim, will be thought of as 'men of Toronto.'"[200] Bezanson recommended that the immediate focus of the Foundation should be to aid in the collection of Innis's research and the editing of any material ready, or nearly ready for publication.[201] These tasks, she felt, should be entrusted to a group of his colleagues, which would include Clark, Creighton, C.A. Ashley, Alexander Elliott, Vincent Bladen, Alexander Brady and W.T. Easterbrook.[202] "It would not take much imagination," Bezanson offered, "to see that this project might become the starting point for a centre for the interpretation of Canada's economic development." Reflecting on an idea that had first surfaced in her reports on the social sciences in Canada in the early 1940s, Bezanson observed that she had "long felt that the Foundation would deepen and enrich their work by modest support of a research centre [at the University of Toronto]."[203]

The Foundation was quick to act on Bezanson's advice. A little more than a month after Innis's death a grant of $5000 was approved. An advisory committee led by Clark, Creighton, and Easterbrook was struck to begin the difficult task of combing Innis's

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[200]Bezanson to Willits, 18 November 1952, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 160, RF, RAC.

[201]The project was actually suggested to the Foundation by S.D. Clark five days before Innis's death. See S.D. Clark to Willits, 3 November 1952, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 160, RF, RAC.

[202]Bezanson to Willits, 18 November 1952, pp. 1-2, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 160, RF, RAC.

[203]Ibid., p. 3.

voluminous notes and unpublished writings.[204] A little more than half a year later the Foundation moved on Bezanson's more long-term advice. On 19 June 1953, the Foundation awarded the University of Toronto a six-year grant of $215,000 "for a program of research on the problems of Canadian development" in commemoration of Harold Innis.[205]

To put the size of this of this grant in perspective in the context of the pre-Canada Council era, the Rockefeller Foundation had given a similar sum ($220,000) to the CSSRC over the council's twelve-year existence to that point.[206] It cannot be said that the grant elevated the political economy group to leadership status. That status had been achieved earlier -- the grant was made in recognition of the fact. It did, however, solidify the University of Toronto's position as the national center. Administered by a committee of former Innis followers, the yearly grant of $40,000 was to be distributed to scholars engaged in "the study, over time, of problems of Canadian development - economic, political, social, historical, and international - since Confederation." One senior scholar per year would be selected as the "Harold A. Innis Visiting Professor,"[207] while smaller grants would be distributed to other scholars in support of research.[208]

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[204]"Grant-in-Aid to the university of Toronto toward the cost of assembling, typing, and organizing the unpublished materials of the late Professor Harold A. Innis," 11 December 1952, Rg 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 160, RF, RAC.

[205]Grant Record, RF 53086, 19 June 1953, p. 1, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 156, RF, RAC.

[206]During its shorter life the HRCC had received $46,500. See "RF Grants to Canadian Research Councils," August 1955, RG 1.2, Series 427R, Box 9, Folder 82, RF, RAC.

[207]Despite this designation the scholar could be on permanent faculty of the University of Toronto.

[208]Grant Record, RF 53086, 19 June 1953, p. 2, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 156, RF, RAC.

The University of Toronto grant accompanied the large grant to the CSSRC that was discussed earlier in this chapter and a smaller, but still significant, grant to the economics department at Queen's University.[209] These grants signified not only a quantitative adjustment in the Foundation's Canadian policy, but also a qualitative change. By placing more money and resources in Canadian hands the Foundation was, of course, giving away direct influence. As Director Willits wrote to Vincent Bladen, who was serving as the chairman of the Innis committee, "in a certain sense the committee will be discharging functions analogous to those of the Foundation."[210]

However, this should not be misinterpreted as an abdication of authority but, more precisely, as a transformation in the network of authority. All of the grants were, as always, provided on a limited basis. Furthermore, the Foundation was only comfortable making these larger grants with few restrictions after years of working with, funding and influencing members of what had by this time emerged as a Canadian leadership group. More direct intervention by the Rockefeller Foundation was unnecessary. The Foundation was more than sufficiently represented by men such as Creighton who -- despite his later-day anti-American rhetoric -- clearly understood and shared the world view of the Foundation officers when it came to the scientific and professional organization of culture.

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To argue that Innis, Creighton, Lower, Carl Dawson, Clark and scores of other

[209]The Queen's grant was for $45,000 over three years.

[210]Willits to Bladen, 19 June 1953, RG 1.2, Series 427S, Box 16, Folder 160, RF, RAC.

Canadian academics relied heavily on the support of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation does not, of course, make them "puppets" whose work was "animated" by American wealth. Certainly, in Creighton's case, the fact that some of his most memorable work -- The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence, 1760-1850,[211] his two-part biography of Sir John A. Macdonald, and his tribute to Harold Innis[212] -- was assisted by Carnegie Corporation and Rockefeller Foundation grants for publication, for research, and for release time from teaching commitments did not in any simple or obvious manner bias his analysis. In his later years he made very sure that his reputation for anti-American sentiment was unquestioned. Likewise, Carnegie Corporation sponsorship of the Canadian-American text series did not compromise Innis's nationalism, either as the author of The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy (1940), or as the series editor for the volumes relating to Canadian economic history.[213] As Creighton later pointed out in Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar, Innis used his editorship to ensure that Canadians were fully responsible for contributions to the series, and throughout his dealings with the series general editors "insisted on the independence of Canadian scholarship."[214] The same might be said of the manner in which Innis had used his role as the Rockefeller

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[211]Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937.

[212]Dominion of the North could be added to the list of Creighton publications aided by American philanthropy. Creighton worked on the text during his tenure as a Guggenheim fellow in 1941.

[213]Berger, "Internationalism, Continentalism, and the Writing of History," pp. 44, 52. See also Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 151, 158. In addition to Creighton's contribution, Lower's The North American Assault on the Canadian Forest: A History of the Lumber Trade between Canada and the United States (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1938), J.A. Ruddick's The Dairy Industry in Canada, and G.P. Glazebrook 's A History of Transportation in Canada were produced for the series under Innis's editorship.

[214]Donald Creighton, Harold Adams Innis: Portrait of a Scholar, p. 79.

Foundation's adviser on the social sciences and the humanities in Canada.

It is quite possible that, particularly in Creighton's case, the practice of repeatedly appealing to Americans for support only enhanced the sense of urgency he felt for finding or inventing Canadian sources of support. Nonetheless, as Frank Underhill reminded readers of the Canadian Forum in 1950, these men and the structures they helped establish depended on American support in this critical era of development, and that irony is too tantalizing to ignore. With needed funds and with the knowledge of how to build research councils and research centers, the foundations set the parameters for Canadian development in the days before the creation of the Council. Even the Canada Council itself -- that supposed bulwark against the negative influence of American centred mass culture -- was patterned after models built in New York City. It may be said that, in importing these models, Innis, Creighton and other "accomplices" of the foundations may have been doing precisely what Creighton would later criticise Prime Minister Mackenzie King for doing -- turning to Americans for protection when there was nowhere else to turn.

Epilogue

The final draft of this thesis was completed, ironically enough, in a spare office in a building otherwise inhabited by the staff of the Ontario Research and Development Fund/Canadian Foundation for Innovation Task Force at Queen's University. It is the function of the task force to help scholars at Queen's obtain funding for the development of academic infrastructure through "unconventional partnerships" with the private sector. The provincial and federal states, acting through the Ontario Research and Development Fund (ORDF) and the Canadian Foundation for Innovation (CFI) respectively, encourage these partnerships by pledging matching support for proposed collaborations that meet the programs' criteria.

The existence of the ORDF and the CFI -- both essentially government foundations -- and of the Queen's University task force are evidence of the new realities of Canadian academic culture. In contrast, the classification of private sector support for academic infrastructure as "unconventional" is lingering evidence of older realities. In the new academic environment, the previous system of open-ended, "hands-off" transfer payments originating from the federal government, and passed on from the provinces to public institutions[1] is being replaced by a system of strategic government grants to programs, departments, and individual scholars able to prove worthiness by winning the support of the private sector. Thus, under the new system, programs are judged, even more directly than

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[1]The system of federal transfer payments to the provinces for higher education that was legislated in 1952 was the first recommendation of the Massey Commission to be adopted. The policy was actually endorsed by the federal cabinet even before the commissioners tabled their final report. See Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond

before, in terms of the social and technological requirements of capital. In this new mixed political economy of knowledge, "accountability" and "profitability" are the morally encoded catchwords of success. In this sense, the motives behind this reduction and reorganization of state support for higher education are not all that different from those of late-nineteenth-century middle-class reformers who rationalized and structured charity so that only the deserving poor were eligible or, for that matter, from the forces that motivated the founders of "scientific philanthropy" who gave only to the "best" individuals and institutions. It takes little imagination to see that requirements of the supposedly free market may leave very little on the table for Canadian arts and letters. Once again, academic and artistic agendas will be dictated by the need to "fit" with the mandates of private foundations and the interests of individual entrepreneurs.

Of course, activity such as that carried out by the ORDF/CFI Task Force at Queen's is only a small example of the adjustment Canadian universities are making to the new mixed economy of knowledge. Faced with yearly decreases in the size of its annual operating grant from the provincial government -- last year alone the grant was reduced by $54 million -- the University of Toronto has embarked on a massive and precedent-setting fund-raising campaign.[2] Although dwarfed by the now almost commonplace billion dollar fund-raising drives of such "public" American institutions as the University of Michigan and Ohio State University, the University of Toronto's goal to collect $400 million by the year 2000 doubles McGill University's recent $200 million effort, the largest previous campaign by a Canadian

Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), p. 355.

[2]Tanya Talaga, "A New Degree of Raising Funds: Campaign by U of T sets a Precedent Others Can't

academic institution.[3]

The strategies and tactics employed by the University of Toronto in this campaign are reminiscent of an earlier era and system of intellectual patronage. The financial and cultural brains and brawn of the operation is the high-powered and high society Group of 175. Included on the group's roster are former Ontario premiers William Davis, David Peterson, and Bob Rae; Toronto art patrons Toby and Joey Tanenbaum; and such business executives as General Motors president Maureen Kempston Darkes and publishing mogul Avie Bennett. Using the university's national status and a combination of political, financial, and cultural leverage, the group has already collected $350 million dollars. They have reached this target far in advance of their schedule by winning donations large and small from individuals and from corporate donors, including the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Royal Bank Financial Group.[4] In the case of an elite institution in the financial heart of central Canada, higher education clearly sells. For less fortunate institutions, it probably will go for a lower price.

It sells, at least in Toronto and likely too in Kingston and Montreal, but at what price? It should come as no surprise to students of earlier philanthropy that private support comes with strings attached, no matter how invisible they may be. Upper adminstration at the University of Toronto denies that the institution is selling academic freedom but as U. of T. professor of Social Work Ernie Lightman points out, "some people believe there is no

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Ignore," The Toronto Star, 5 April 1998, pp. F1, F4.

[3]Ibid, p. F4.

[4]Ibid.

free lunch." Lightman also notes the obvious and the indisputable fact that a large donation "can lead a certain department in a certain direction."[5] Of even greater significance to the future of higher education in Canada is the fact that certain disciplines and forms of research will inevitably "sell" better than others. Again, one is led to ponder the future market for Canadian arts and letters.

Universities and higher education are not alone in experiencing the process that has recently been described as "the commodification of Canadian culture."[6] The arts in Canada are "up for sale" as well. In the new context of free trade agreements, cuts to cultural programs, and the general impulse to reduce the size and scope of state activity, artists and art organizations are again, and increasingly, dependent on private sector support.[7] The recent decision by McDonald's of Canada to distribute True North Comics, which are produced by McClelland and Stewart and the CRB Foundation and based on CRB's "Heritage Minutes" series, highlights the dilemma now faced by Canadian cultural producers. In a recent article on the True North acquisition and on the "Heritage Minutes" series, writer Katarzyna Rukszto suggests some of the dangers of the new cultural economy. In the effort to create a national heritage fit for "consumption," the question, Rukszto warns her readers, "becomes which stories will be told, which aspects of Canadian collective memory

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[5]Ibid.

[6]Katarzyna Rukszto, "Up For Sale: The Commodification of Canadian Culture," Fuse Magazine 20 (August 1997): pp. 7-12.

[7]Susan Crean, "Now You See it, Now You Don't: Two Decades of Cultural Nationalism and the Arts in Canada," Fuse Magazine 19 (Spring 1996): p. 17.

will be financed."[8] The free market, not the "higher" values shared in the earlier era by officers of philanthropic foundations and members of the Canadian elite, once again will dictate artistic and intellectual production in Canada.

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The central irony (or even paradox) described in this thesis is that for anyone who considers the effects of reliance on the private sector for support of culture, the best indication of what lies ahead can be found in the records of the American philanthropic foundations in the process of creating what became an official "public" culture in Canada in the 1930, 1940s and 1950s. It is a testament both to the desire and ability of the American foundations to cloak their influence with ingeniously-designed disguises and to the chauvinism of nationalist historians that the history of Canadian cultural structures has been so effectively "cleansed" of this element of American cultural imperialism. It is as if the "arts and letters" was the one aspect of Canadian culture too pure to be sullied by American influence.

In the simplest possible terms, the American foundations rarely influenced Canadian development by forcing Canadian scholars, artists, and administrators to pursue certain agendas. Far more frequently, the leaders of the foundations exerted their influence subtly by selecting Canadians for support who in terms of race, gender, class, and educational backgrounds were very much like themselves and who were already pursuing goals and objectives consonant with their own. In a broad sense, both national elites had as their goal

[8]Rukszto, "Up for Sale: The Commodification of Canadian Culture," p. 7.

the establishment of national, professionally-managed and bureaucratic structures of cultural authority.

The collaboration between Canadian intellectuals and American foundations was manifested first in informal relationships and later with the creation of a network of intellectual and cultural branch-plants which included such associations as the Carnegie Corporation's Canadian museums committee, the Federation of Canadian Artists, the Canadian Social Science Research Council, and the Humanities Research Council of Canada. In the cases of each of these associations, as time passed the influence of the American corporate patron became less overt, less direct and more institutionalized. The ultimate stage in this process of institutionalization was achieved when the Canadian federal state absorbed a policy or program that had been created with and nurtured by support from one or both of the foundations. Taken as a whole the new federally-funded cultural and intellectual systems were remarkably in keeping with the world view of both foundations. Constructed to serve the long-term requirements of liberal capitalism, Canadian cultural and intellectual programs were nonetheless insulated (or so it seemed) from the ebb and flow of the free market and from the whims of individual entrepreneurs.

In making the case for the significant role played by the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation in the making of modern Canada, I have tried to interrogate and transcend simplistic notions both of American/Canadian difference and of the border between the "public" and "private" spheres. From a narrow cultural nationalist perspective it would have been appealing to add American philanthropy to the colony-to-nation narrative of Canadian history by telling a glorious tale of Canadian agency and resistance to

American cultural imperialism. In such an epic, Massey, Brown, McCurry, Innis, Creighton and all the rest took the wealth of the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation and "ran with it" to strengthen the foundations of the Dominion. Elements of this story ring true. Members of the Canadian elite did use their ties to American philanthropy to pursue their own nationalist agendas and to supplement their own power. It is equally true that aspects of the cultural policies that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s did not greatly resemble the politics of culture in the United States. The system that emerged was, as a whole, unique to Canada. The reality of the matter, however, was that there was no fundamental contradiction between the nationalist agendas pursued by the Canadian cultural elite and the foundations' pursuit of the scientific management of culture. In the case studies discussed in this thesis, the shared upper-class notions of cultural and intellectual guardianship and leadership were ultimately telling; the potentially oppositional models of culture "the nation" might have pursued were marginalized. Herein resided the long-term significance of the foundations' involvement in the Arts and Letters in Canada.

Table 1. Carnegie Corporation Grants to Universities, Colleges and Schools in Canada and Newfoundland, 1911-1949.*

Institution	Amount
Canada (total)	$5,990,576
Alberta	
Mount Royal College	1,500
Provincial Institute of Art and Technology	1,325
Strathcona High School	1,325
University of Alberta	241,500
British Columbia	
Department of Education	8,975
Kitsilano High School	2,000
Shawnigan Lake School	3,000
University of British Columbia	72,550
Victoria College	3,000
Manitoba	
Kelvin High School	2,000
Ravencourt School	2,000
Riverbend School for Girls	1,325
University of Manitoba	67,550
New Brunswick	
Mount Allison University	152,050
University of New Brunswick	4,500
Newfoundland	
Memorial University College	293,325
Nova Scotia	
Acadia University	328,700
Dalhousie University	1,412,126
Halifax Ladies College	1,475
King's College	800,500
St. Francis Xavier College	144,000
Ontario	
Alma College	2,000
Assumption College	2,400
Bishop Strachan School	2,000
Frontier College of Canada	10,000
McMaster University	57,750
Ontario Agricultural College	4,250
Ontario Ladies College	2,000
Pickering College	2,000
Queen's University	408,350
Trinity College School	2,000
University of Ottawa	4,500
University of Toronto	243,250
University of Western Ontario	40,050
Upper Canada College	152,000
Ursuline College	1,500
Waterloo College	2,400
Quebec	
Baron Byng High School	2,000
Bishop's College School	2,000
Bishop's College University	4,500
Laval University	6,000
Lower Canada College	1,475
McGill University	1,249,900
Montreal High School for Girls	2,000
School of Higher Commercial Studies	3,000
Stanstead College	1,800
University of Montreal	8,000

Saskatchewan

Campion College	1,500
Luther College	2,400
Regina College	22,550
University of Saskatchewan	121,500

*From Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, And Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), Appendix V, pp. 436-437.

Table 2. Carnegie Corporation Grants to Institutions Other than Universities, Colleges and Schools in Canada and Newfoundland, 1911-1949*

Institution	Grant
Canada (total)	1,355,612
Arctic Institute of North America	56,500
Art Association of Montreal	29,000
Art Gallery of Toronto	55,000
Brome County Historical Society	1,000
Calgary Public Museum	1,000
Canada-U.S. Committee on Education	5,000
Canadian-American Conferences	9,002
Canadian Association for Adult Education	152,500
Canadian Bar Association	30,000
Canadian Bureau for the Advancement of Music	38,000
Canadian Citizenship Council	4,000
Canadian Council for Educational Research	10,000
Canadian Education Association	1,500
Canadian Institute of International Affairs	96,000
Canadian Libraries	4,000
Canadian Library Council	20,000
Canadian Museum Development	35,800
Canadian Museum Workers	7,300
Canadian Social Science Research Council	47,300
Canadian Universities' Conference	16,000
Committee on Cultural Relations in Canada	2,000
Edmonton Museum	1,500
Federation of Canadian Artists	1,500
Humanities Research Council of Canada	10,000
Institution des Sourds-Muets	1,000
International Association of Medical Museums	5,000
International Conference of Agricultural Economists	1,225
International Labour Organization	30,000
Jubilee Guilds of Newfoundland	4,000
Lady Tweedsmuir Prairie Libraries	3,000
Maritime Provinces, Central Advisory Committee on Education	20,754
Maritime Provinces, Study of Education	3,132
Manitoba Museum	1,500
Montreal Botanical Garden	6,200
Montreal Children's Library	5,000
National Council of Y.M.C.A. of Canada	4,000
National Gallery of Canada	74,649
Newfoundland Adult Education Association	19,500
Newfoundland Public Libraries Board	10,000
Newfoundland Exchange of Visits	750
Nova Scotia Regional Libraries Commission	50,000
Prince Edward Island Libraries	97,000
Public Archives of Nova Scotia	1,500
Public Library Commission of British Columbia	125,000
Quebec Association for Adult Education	10,000
Royal Canadian Institute	6,500
Royal Society of Canada	163,000
Société Canadienne d'Enseignement Postscolaire	3,000

Toronto Public Library Association	500
Vancouver Art Gallery	3,500
Vancouver City Museum	1,500
Victoria Provincial Museum	2,000
Winnipeg Art Gallery	1,500
Workers Educational Association of Canada	23,500
Workers Educational Association of Ontario	22,500

*From Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, And Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), Appendix V, pp. 438-439.

Table 3. Rockefeller Foundation Grants to Canadian Institutions and Associations, 1913-1950*

Institution	Amount
Canada (total)	11,661,190.75
Baptist Union of Western Canada	40,000.00
Bibliothéque Municipale de Montréal	44.57
Canada--Provincial Departments of Health and Field Office	763,928.61
Canadian Institute of International Affairs	113,396.70
Canadian National Committee for Mental Hygiene	306,706.13
Canadian Political Science Association	1,928.49
Canadian Social Science Research Council	162,918.77
Connaught Laboratories	460.55
Dalhousie University	907,937.90
Humanities Research Council of Canada	19,090.62
Laval University	3,500.00
McGill University	3,528,044.48
McMaster University	270.24
Montreal General Hospital	5,534.68
National Film Society of Canada	38,863.11
National Research Council	14,028.63
"Northern Plains in a World of Change"	352.15
Ontario Medical Association	23,727.07
Public Archives of Nova Scotia	1,083.00
Royal Ontario Museum of Archaeology	25,000.00
St. Francis Xavier University	577.33
Travel of Visiting Scientists	2,623.39
Travel and Training of Public Health Workers	24,470.49
United College	1,000.00
University of Alberta	606,977.20
University of British Columbia	37,955.42
University of Manitoba	551,693.08
University of Montreal	386,335.52
University of New Brunswick	11,689.42
University of Ottawa	1,019.83
University of Saskatchewan	27,815.43
University of Toronto	3,278,316.10
Visits by Individuals and Commissions	2,208.81
Western Canada Theatre Conference	955.00
Fellowships	748,162.03
Grants-in-Aid to Individuals	22,576.27

*From Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, And Sciences, 1949-1951 (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, C.M.G., O.A., D.S.P., Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, 1951), Appendix V, pp. 440-441.

Figure 1. Jared French, Cavalrymen Crossing a River, Parcel Post Building, Richmond, Virginia. (Photograph courtesy of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)



Figure 2. Joe Jones, Men and Wheat, Post Office, Seneca, Kansas. (Photograph courtesy of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)



Figure 3. William Gropper, Construction of the Dam, Department of Interior Building, Washington, D.C. (Photograph courtesy of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)



Figure 4. David Stone Martin, Electrification, Post Office, Lenoir City, Tennessee. (Photograph courtesy of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)

Figure 5. Symeon Shimin, Contemporary Justice -- The Child, Department of Justice Building, Washington, D.C. (Photograph courtesy of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)

Figure 6. Jared French, detail from "Preliminary sketch for Parcel Post Building." (Photograph courtsey of Fine Arts Collection, Public Buildings Service, General Services Administration.)

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