

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

**ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600**

UMI[®]

**MARKET, CAPITAL, AND COMPETITION:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE-LANGUAGE
NEWSPAPERS IN TORONTO SINCE THE 1970s**

A Thesis Submitted to the College of
Graduate Studies and Research
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Sociology
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon

By
Yahong Li
Fall 1999

© COPYRIGHT YAHONG LI, 1999. ALLRIGHT RESERVED



National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services

Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

Your file *Votre référence*

Our file *Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-63894-4

Canada

PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor, or professors, who supervised my thesis work, or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying of publication or use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Requests for permission to copy or to make other use of material in this thesis in whole or part should be addressed to:

Head of the Department of Sociology
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
Canada S7N 0W0

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the development of Chinese-language newspapers in Canada since the 1970s. In contrast to the assimilationist view, which sees the ethnic press as mainly a cultural institution, the present study examines the Chinese press as a business and explains the recent development of Chinese papers in Canada in terms of economic and social forces. More specifically, this thesis shows how the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Toronto is related to changes in market, capital, and competition.

Based on evidence from field research in Toronto and from recent censuses, this study has three major findings. First, the Chinese newspaper market in Canada has expanded significantly after the 1970s because the size of the readership market has increased and its composition has also changed, thus raising newspaper consumption. The readership market, made up of a growing segment of affluent Chinese consumers, stimulates the expansion of the advertising market, which has been patronized by both Chinese and particularly non-Chinese firms which place advertisements to appeal to Chinese consumers. The growing readership and advertising markets have provided new business opportunities which help Chinese newspapers to grow. Second, the growth of Chinese newspapers in Canada has been directly associated with offshore Chinese investments. Attracted by the expansion of the Chinese newspaper market, media groups in East Asia have made three major investments in Canada since the 1970s. Each major development of the Chinese newspapers since the 1970s has been influenced by a major offshore capital investment. Third, competitions brought in more capital investments, and improvement to Chinese newspapers with respect to news reporting, production, and

advertising services. The competition among Chinese newspapers can be attributed partly to diverse readerships that demand more than one newspaper. Probably more importantly, well financed media groups in East Asia target similar readerships in Canada and as a result there has been tense competition.

This study concludes that changes in market, capital, and competition have played an important role in the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s. The study indicates the importance of economic forces in the study of immigrant cosmopolitan newspapers and it suggests the need to consider economic factors in addition to cultural causes in understanding expansion of the ethnic press in Canada.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Peter S. Li, for his excellent advice, constructive criticism, and constant encouragement throughout this study. Without his persistent help and support the completion of this thesis would not have been possible.

I also thank my Advisory Committee Members, Dr. Gurcham Basran, Dr. Bernard Schissel and Dr. Valerie Korinek for their helpful advice and critical review of the work. Appreciation is also expressed to Dr. Lloyd Wong who served as my external examiner.

I am especially grateful to many Chinese individuals in Toronto I interviewed for sharing their experiences with me and for giving me access to their documents and newspaper clippings. Although promises of anonymity prevent me from revealing them, their contributions to this research have been invaluable. Many thanks also to my friends Mr. & Mrs. Lai Liang, who provided me with room and board and helped me build community connections while I was conducting research in Toronto.

Grateful acknowledgement is also given to Carrie Horachek, Arvi Kvmaran and Andrew Barnicoat for their editing of the earlier draft of this thesis.

Funding for this research was provided by the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Saskatchewan. The research was also partially supported by the Messer Fund for Research in Canadian History.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Qing Zhang and my daughter Xiaowen Li, whose love, support, and understanding were indispensable.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| PERMISSION TO USE..... | i |
| ABSTRACT..... | ii |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. | iv |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | v |
| LIST OF FIGURE AND TABLES..... | ix |
| CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION..... | 1 |
| CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. | 13 |
| 2.1A Review of Literature..... | 13 |
| 2.1.1 The Ethnic Press..... | 13 |
| 2.1.1.1 The assimilation model..... | 15 |
| 2.1.1.2 The structural model..... | 20 |
| 2.1.2 Ethnic Business..... | 24 |
| 2.1.2.1 The transplanted cultural thesis vs. the blocked mobility thesis..... | 25 |
| 2.1.2.2 Ethnic business: Recent models..... | 28 |
| 2.1.3 Ethnic Enclave Economy..... | 31 |
| 2.1.4 The Mass Media..... | 35 |
| 2.1.4.1 Newspaper competition..... | 35 |
| 2.1.4.2 Newspaper ownership..... | 40 |
| 2.2 The Theoretical Framework of Research..... | 42 |
| 2.3 Conclusion..... | 46 |
| CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY..... | 50 |
| 3.1 Fieldwork Research..... | 50 |
| 3.2 Statistical Data..... | 53 |
| 3.3 Documentary and Historical Data..... | 54 |
| 3.4 Content Analysis..... | 57 |
| CHAPTER 3 HISTORICAL REVIEW: CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND THE CHINESE PRESS BEFORE THE 1970s..... | 60 |
| 4.1 Chinese Immigration to Canada..... | 60 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| 4.1.1 First Period: 1858-1923..... | 61 |
| 4.1.2 The Second Period: 1924-1947..... | 67 |
| 4.1.3 Third Period: 1947-the 1970s..... | 71 |
| 4.2 The Chinese in Toronto..... | 75 |
| 4.3 The Chinese Press in the United States..... | 83 |
| 4.3.1 The Nonpolitical Newspapers: the 1850s to 1890s..... | 84 |
| 4.3.2 Party Organs: the 1900s to 1960s..... | 86 |
| 4.3.3 A Diversity of Voices: the Mid-1960s to Present..... | 91 |
| 4.4 The Chinese Press in Canada..... | 94 |
| 4.4.1 The Rise of Party Organs: 1903 to 1936..... | 95 |
| 4.4.2 War Efforts: 1937 to 1945..... | 100 |
| 4.4.3 The Third Period: From Dominance to Diversity: 1946-1970s..... | 103 |
| 4.4.4 The Chinese Newspapers in Canada: China's Politics and Other Factors..... | 107 |

CHAPTER 5 CHINESE NEWSPAPER MARKET: READERSHIP AND ADVERTISING..... 113

| | |
|--|-----|
| 5.1 Chinese Readership Market since the 1970s..... | 114 |
| 5.1.1 The Increase in the Chinese Readership Market in Canada... | 114 |
| 5.1.2 The Structures of Chinese Readership in Canada..... | 118 |
| 5.1.2.1 Diverse origins..... | 118 |
| 5.1.2.2 Linguistic patterns..... | 124 |
| 5.1.2.3 Social status..... | 129 |
| 5.1.2.4 Demography..... | 135 |
| 5.1.2.5 Geographic distribution..... | 139 |
| 5.2 Chinese Advertising Markets since the 1980s..... | 144 |
| 5.2.1 Growth of Chinese Advertising Market..... | 144 |
| 5.2.2 Advertising by Chinese Businesses..... | 146 |
| 5.2.2.1 Increase in advertising by Chinese businesses..... | 146 |
| 5.2.2.2 Chinese businesses and advertising..... | 150 |
| 5.2.3 Advertising by Non-Chinese Businesses..... | 154 |
| 5.2.3.1 Increase in advertising by non-Chinese businesses..... | 154 |
| 5.2.3.2 Non-Chinese businesses and advertising..... | 157 |
| 5.3 Conclusion..... | 161 |

CHAPTER 6 CAPITAL FORMATION OF CHINESE NEWSPAPERS: CHINESE NEWSPAPERS AND OVERSEAS CAPITAL..... 165

| | |
|--|-----|
| 6.1 Hong Kong and Taiwan: Economic Success and its Impact on Canada... | 166 |
| 6.1.1 Economic Success in Hong Kong..... | 166 |
| 6.1.2 Economic Success in Taiwan..... | 171 |
| 6.1.3 Chinese Investment in Canada..... | 177 |
| 6.1.3.1 Hong Kong and Taiwan-based Chinese | |

| | |
|--|-----|
| investments in Canada..... | 177 |
| 6.1.3.2 Investments of Chinese Business Immigrants..... | 181 |
| 6.1.3.3 Reasons for the increase in Chinese investments in Canada... | 185 |
| 6.2 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership in | |
| Hong Kong and Taiwan..... | 186 |
| 6.2.1 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership | |
| in Hong Kong..... | 187 |
| 6.2.1.1 Media growth in Hong Kong..... | 187 |
| 6.2.1.2 Newspaper ownership in Hong Kong..... | 189 |
| 6.2.1.2.1 Party newspapers..... | 191 |
| 6.2.1.2.2 Newspapers owned by public corporations..... | 195 |
| 6.2.1.2.3 Newspapers owned by private firms..... | 197 |
| 6.2.2 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership in Taiwan..... | 198 |
| 6.2.2.1 Media growth in Taiwan..... | 198 |
| 6.2.2.2 Newspaper ownership in Taiwan..... | 201 |
| 6.2.2.2.1 State-owned newspapers..... | 201 |
| 6.2.2.2.2 Privately-owned newspapers..... | 203 |
| 6.2.3 From East Asia to the Overseas: Media Expansion..... | 207 |
| 6.3 The Overseas-owned Chinese Newspapers in Canada: the Case of | |
| <i>World Journal, Sing Tao, and Ming Pao</i> in Toronto..... | 209 |
| 6.3.1 <i>World Journal</i> | 210 |
| 6.3.1.1 <i>World Journal</i> : Its background..... | 210 |
| 6.3.1.2 <i>World Journal</i> in Toronto..... | 213 |
| 6.3.1.2.1 Agency period (1976-1985)..... | 213 |
| 6.3.1.2.2 The period of locally produced overseas newspaper | |
| (1986-1992)..... | 216 |
| 6.3.1.2.3 The period of maintaining the <i>status quo</i> | |
| (1993-present)..... | 220 |
| 6.3.2 <i>Sing Tao</i> | 221 |
| 6.3.2.1 <i>Sing Tao</i> : Its background..... | 221 |
| 6.3.2.2 <i>Sing Tao</i> in Toronto..... | 225 |
| 6.3.2.2.1 Distributing branch office period (1978-1980)..... | 225 |
| 6.3.2.2.2 The period of locally produced overseas newspaper | |
| (1981-1992)..... | 227 |
| 6.3.2.2.3 Further expansion period (1993-present)..... | 231 |
| 6.3.3 <i>Ming Pao</i> | 235 |
| 6.3.3.1 <i>Ming Pao</i> : Its background..... | 235 |
| 6.3.3.2 Toronto's <i>Ming Pao</i> | 239 |
| 6.4 Conclusion..... | 244 |

CHAPTER 7 STRATEGIES OF SURVIVAL: CHINESE NEWSPAPERS AND COMPETITION..... 253

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7.1 Chinese Newspapers and Competition in Toronto: the 1980s..... | 253 |
| 7.1.1 The Structure of Chinese Newspaper Market in Toronto | |

| | |
|---|---------|
| in the 1980s..... | 254 |
| 7.1.2 Strategies of Competition..... | 260 |
| 7.1.2.1 News reporting and other information..... | 260 |
| 7.1.2.2 Advertising..... | 263 |
| 7.1.2.3 Recruiting skilled journalists and other newspaper staff..... | 267 |
| 7.1.2.4 Circulation..... | 269 |
| 7.1.3 Consequences of Competition in the 1980s..... | 270 |
| 7.2 Chinese Newspapers and Competition in Toronto: the 1990s..... | 272 |
| 7.2.1 The Structure of Chinese Newspaper Market in Toronto after 1993..... | 272 |
| 7.2.2 Competition: <i>Ming Pao</i> | 273 |
| 7.2.2.1 Recruitment..... | 274 |
| 7.2.2.2 News reporting..... | 275 |
| 7.2.2.3 Advertising..... | 281 |
| 7.2.2.4 Circulation..... | 285 |
| 7.2.3 Response from <i>Sing Pao</i> and <i>World Journal</i> | 286 |
| 7.2.3.1 A Collective action: checking <i>Ming Pao</i> | 286 |
| 7.2.3.2 Response from <i>Sing Pao</i> | 287 |
| 7.2.3.3 Response from <i>World Journal</i> | 290 |
| 7.2.4 Consequence of Competition in the 1990s..... | 291 |
| 7.3 Conclusion..... | 292 |
| CHAPTER 8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS..... | 301 |
| 8.1 Summary..... | 301 |
| 8.2 Conclusions..... | 306 |
| REFERENCES..... | 318 |

LIST FIGURE AND TABLES

| | |
|--|-----|
| Figure 5.1 Advertising Pages in Three Major Chinese Newspapers Per Day, Toronto, 1978-1996..... | 145 |
| Table 4.1 Total Chinese Population, Canada, 1901-1941..... | 68 |
| Table 4.2 Chinese Immigration to Canada, 1946-1965..... | 75 |
| Table 4.3 Chinese Population and Chinese Business in Toronto, 1881-1923..... | 77 |
| Table 5.1 Chinese Population in Canada, 1971-1996..... | 115 |
| Table 5.2 Foreign-born Chinese Population, Canada, 1971-1996..... | 117 |
| Table 5.3 Immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China Admitted to Canada, 1971-1996..... | 120 |
| Table 5.4 Mother Tongue and Language Most Often Spoken at Home, Chinese-Canadians, 1981-1991..... | 126 |
| Table 5.5 Chinese Population of Canada: Ability to Speak Official Language, 1971-1991..... | 128 |
| Table 5.6 Occupations of Chinese-Canadians and Other Canadians, 1971-1991..... | 131 |
| Table 5.7 Levels of Schooling for Chinese-Canadians and Other Canadians, 15 Years of Age and Over, 1971-1991..... | 133 |
| Table 5.8 Chinese Population in Canada, by Sex, 1981-1991..... | 136 |
| Table 5.9 Age Composition of Foreign-born and Native-born Chinese-Canadians, 1971-1991..... | 138 |
| Table 5.10 Distribution of Chinese-Canadians by Province, 1971-1991..... | 140 |
| Table 5.11 Distribution of Chinese in Toronto and Vancouver, 1971-1996 | 142 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| Table 5.12 Display Advertisements of Chinese Business in A Major Chinese Newspaper in Toronto, by Number, Space and Cost, 1996..... | 148 |
| Table 5.13 Structural Changes of Chinese Commercial Activity in Toronto CMA, 1971-1994 (Numbers in brackets are percentages)..... | 151 |
| Table 5.14 Geographical Distribution of Chinese Businesses in the Toronto CMA, 1994..... | 153 |
| Table 5.15 Display Advertisements of Non-Chinese Business in A Major Chinese Newspaper in Toronto, by Number, Space and Cost, 1996..... | 155 |
| Table 6.1 Major Growth Indicators of Economic Activity in Hong Kong (In Percentage Per Annum)..... | 168 |
| Table 6.2 Major Growth Indicators of Economic Activity in Taiwan (In Percentage Per Annum)..... | 173 |
| Table 6.3 Foreign Direct Investment in Canada by Selected Pacific Rim Countries (Millions of Dollars)..... | 178 |
| Table 6.4 Foreign Controlled Investment in Canada from Selected Asian Countries, 1980-1987 (Millions of Dollars)..... | 179 |
| Table 6.5 Business Immigrants Admitted to Canada from Hong Kong and Taiwan, Principal Applicants Only, 1983-1990..... | 183 |
| Table 6.6 Chinese Business Immigrants' Net Worth, 1986-1995 (Millions of Dollars)..... | 184 |
| Table 6.7 Ownership of Major Hong Kong Newspapers | 192 |
| Table 6.8 Ownership of Taiwan's Newspapers under the Press Ban (1949-1987)..... | 202 |
| Table 7.1 The Number of Chinese Newspapers in Toronto, 1981-1990 | 255 |
| Table 7.2 Chinese Daily Newspapers in Toronto, the 1980s | 261 |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The present study concerns the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s. Instead of approaching Chinese newspapers as a cultural institution and examining whether or not they facilitate the integration of Chinese immigrants into Canadian society, I view them as an economic institution and explain their recent development in terms of various economic and social forces.

Although Chinese newspapers in Canada have a history that dates back to the early part of this century, it was only in the late 1970s when Chinese newspapers began to expand and transform dramatically. The claimed daily circulation of all Chinese newspapers, for example, remained less than 10,000 copies between 1930 and the late 1960s (*The Canadian Newspaper Directory*, 1930: 234; *Canadian Advertising Rates and Rates*, 1968: 68).¹ However, it jumped to about 19,800 copies in 1985 and 33,117 in 1990.² By 1997 the claimed daily circulation reached approximately 175,673 copies.³ The ownership of Chinese newspapers has also been transformed. Before the 1970s, almost all Chinese newspapers in Canada were published by political interest groups, such as political parties in China or their political arms. In the 1990s, all three major Chinese newspapers are owned and operated by media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The change in ownership has

not only made it possible for Chinese newspapers to have access to larger financial resources, but has also led to the decline of Chinese politics' influence over the newspapers and the improvement in journalistic standards which stress reporting being descriptive, analytical and balanced. Furthermore, Chinese newspaper organisations have increased significantly. In the 1970s, the total newspaper employees are estimated to be less than 100, and many of the newspapers hired only a few people.⁴ In 1997, there were as many as 600-650 people working in the three major Chinese newspapers, mainly published in Toronto and Vancouver, and more than 80 per cent of them working for the two Hong Kong-based newspapers: *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao*.⁵ If we take account of Chinese electronic media (e.g., television networks and radio stations) and other Chinese print media (e.g., weeklies and monthlies), the total employees are estimated to be over 1,000.⁶ Finally, in the 1990s, Chinese newspapers employ a variety of modern technologies, ranging from four colour presses and satellite receivers to computers, all of which were absent in the 1970s. Some technologies such as satellite receivers are so advanced that they are rarely found in most Canadian newspapers.⁷ Today Chinese newspapers are easily available in major Canadian metropolitan centres. Typically the newspapers cover international and national news, news of local Chinese communities, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China, as well as business news, entertainment, and sports. Most newspaper copies are sold on newsstands, and some are delivered to homes. The size of the newspapers ranges from 68 to 120 pages, and each copy costs 60 cents in 1999.

Why and how have Chinese newspapers in Canada expanded and transformed since the 1970s? Previous research on the ethnic press, in which Chinese newspapers in Canada are located, suggests two explanations. The first focuses on the cultural services of the ethnic press as a major force for its emergence and growth. According to the assimilation model, the ethnic press is important means of ethnic cultural retention because it “services primarily the need of unity and understanding among immigrants who do not have the command of the English language” (Kowalik, 1978: 39). It also helps the immigrant to make adjustments to a new environment by providing information needed about the host society (Park, 1922: 55; Turek, 1962: 17-27). It is the cultural functions, though somewhat contradictory, that largely account for the emergence, survival, and eventually decline of the ethnic press in North America. The second position stresses the external factors, arguing that the social structure in which the ethnic press operates, and not assimilation function, accounts for the emergence and growth of the ethnic press. Structural studies have used various structural features to explain the ethnic press. For instance, Carroll (1987: 204-205) argued that the existence of the ethnic press results mainly from the fact that daily newspapers in the larger society cannot appeal to ethnic readerships because of minor economies of scale. Janowitz (1962: 17-27) found that dispersal of immigrants from ghettos within the metropolis to suburbs is largely responsible for the shift of the ethnic press from a community newspaper to a regional and a national ethnic paper. Olzak and West (1991: 471) reported that ethnic conflict may either encourage or discourage the development of

the ethnic press, depending on intensity of conflict and resources available for the ethnic groups.

Without doubt, the assimilation model may be helpful in understanding the ethnic press in North America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the bulk of the foreign-language newspapers were religion-oriented and distributed freely. However, this approach is limited in its ability to account for the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada, since Chinese newspaper are all privately-owned enterprises, and one of their motivations for the newspaper publication is to make profit. The success or failure of a newspaper, therefore, can hardly be understood only through a cultural analysis. In view of Chinese newspapers, the structural model is meaningful for my research because it goes beyond the cultural explanation and stresses economic and social forces in studying changes in the ethnic press. This perspective is more relevant to Chinese newspapers than the cultural approach. However, in its emphasis on external structural forces, this approach overlooks how ethnic papers operate as a business and how competition among the papers plays a role in their development.

In this study, I argue that the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada has been determined mainly by various structural forces. At the macro level, the structural forces concern Canada's changes in immigration regulations after 1967, economic and media developments in Asia during the last four decades, growth and the changed nature of Chinese community in Canada after the 1970s, and Canadian business interest in the ethnic Chinese consumer market in the 1990s. The changes have provided favourable external conditions for the development of

the Chinese newspapers in Canada. At the micro level, the structural forces involve the competitive newspaper market and Chinese newspapers operating as ethnic firms. These micro level forces have encouraged entrepreneurship of Chinese newspapers and push their continual innovations in news reports, production, and advertising services. The macro and micro level structural forces together promoted the expansion and transformation of the Chinese newspapers in Canada in the last two decades.

More specifically, this thesis is intended to explain how changes in market, capital, and competition since the 1970s have been related to the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

The survival of the newspaper relies on its market, including both readership and advertising. A shrinking market will lead to declining demands for newspaper consumption and advertising space, whereas a growing market will lead to greater demands for both. To a considerable extent, the fate of newspapers is determined by market opportunities. With the changes in Canadian immigration policies in 1967, the Chinese have entered Canada in large numbers. The influx of Chinese immigrants, many of them being well-educated and well-off, have led to the growth and changed compositions of the Chinese community in Canada, thus augmenting demands for Chinese newspapers. The increasing Chinese readership, in turn, has attracted more Chinese and particularly non-Chinese firms to advertise in Chinese newspapers. As a result, the advertising market has also been expanded. The growing readership and advertising markets, therefore, have provided greater business opportunities leading to the growth of Chinese newspapers.

In addition to business opportunities, capital is a key element in publishing a newspaper. Without capital, business opportunities cannot be seized. In the case of publishing a daily newspaper, a large amount of capital is necessary because of rising costs. Early Chinese newspapers relied mainly on small Chinese capital in Canada, and the limited financial resources made it difficult for these newspapers to explore the market opportunities that emerged in the 1970s, since they simply could not afford to employ new technologies and hire the best journalists, which were necessary to publishing a newspaper appealing to new Chinese immigrants. Significant to the role of capital is the entry and expansion of offshore Chinese investment. Three major Chinese newspapers in Canada were established by media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The capital investments were part of the global expansion of multinational firms in Asia, and resulted from the economic development in these areas after World War II. With the offshore capital, Chinese newspapers in Canada underwent a shift from small local community newspapers to giant transnational newspapers, thus making it possible to exploit the potentials of the market.

Finally, the existence of three Chinese newspapers, all published by well-financed media groups in Asia, has formed a competitive Chinese newspaper market in Canada. Competition, especially intense competition, is significant because it forces newspapers to explore more market opportunities and expand capital investment. In the case of Chinese newspapers, competition among themselves became intense in the 1990s when two major Hong Kong-based newspapers simultaneously targeted the largest segment of the market - Hong Kong

immigrants. The competitions forced the newspapers to upgrade their physical infrastructure (e.g., plant, press, satellite receiver and computer) as well as improve their news reporting and advertising services. During the process, entrepreneurship, which is characterised by innovation (Barth, 1963: 7-8), was greatly increased. Taken together, the changes in market, capital, and competition played an important role in the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

Toronto's Chinese newspapers were selected for this study primarily for three reasons. First, Toronto has replaced Vancouver as a centre of Chinese newspaper publication since the 1970s. In 1997, Toronto accounted for more than 60 per cent of the total circulation of Chinese newspapers and about half of the total employees in the Chinese media in Canada. Results generated from this study are expected to bear significant importance to Chinese newspapers in other metropolitan cities, though some differences may exist among these newspapers. Second, Toronto is an ideal setting to examine the impact of offshore Chinese investments on the Chinese newspapers in Canada. After the 1970s, the several media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan began publishing Chinese newspapers in Canada, and Toronto was often the first city to host such business ventures. Of major Canadian cities, Toronto has also attracted the largest amount of Chinese investments in Chinese newspaper publication.⁸ An examination of Toronto's Chinese newspapers will help to understand how capital entry and expansion have promoted the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. Third, Toronto has a long history of publishing Chinese newspaper, dating back to as early as in 1916. Although this study focuses on the Chinese newspapers after the 1970s, a historical review of the

newspaper will provide a context in which the development of Chinese newspapers during the last two decades can be better understood.

Methodologically, I have relied primarily on four sources of information to conduct this study: fieldwork research, which was done between 1996 and 1998 in Toronto; statistical data; documentary studies of historical data; and content analysis. Statistical data and content analysis were used to examine readership and advertising markets, while fieldwork and documentary data were used to discuss newspaper capital and competition among the newspapers. Fieldwork and documentary data were limited in their representativeness, because the fieldwork data were collected in a rather unstructured manner through a network of social relations, and documentary data were also selective. However, the unique position of Toronto in the Chinese newspaper industry, as just noted, and my caution in sampling informants, were expected to reduce possible bias in data collection.

This thesis is organised into seven additional chapters. A brief synopsis of each is in order. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the ethnic press, ethnic business, the ethnic enclave economy, and the mass media. The literature review attempts to put this study in the context of theoretical debates. Based on the literature review, a theoretical framework, which focuses on the interaction of market, capital, and competition, is discussed.

Chapter 3 discusses the major methodological approaches to the study of Chinese newspapers in Canada: fieldwork, statistical data, documentary and historical data, and content analysis. The emphasis is on fieldwork research and how

I attempted to increase reliability and validity of the fieldwork data by taking various measures.

Chapter 4 examines the early history of Chinese immigration to Canada in general and to Toronto in particular. It also reviews the historical development of Chinese press in Canada and the United States before the 1970s. These historical reviews intend to provide a context for the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

Chapter 5 examines the Chinese newspaper market in Canada from the 1970s to the 1990s. It first discusses the readership market, with a focus on the changed compositions of readership that might be related to greater newspaper consumption. It then describes the growth of the advertising market and contributions of Chinese and non-Chinese firms to advertising. The changes in the readership and advertising markets provided business opportunities to the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

Chapter 6 examines capital sources of Chinese newspapers in Canada during the last two decades. By describing economic and media development in Hong Kong and Taiwan since World War II, this chapter shows why overseas Chinese investments became major capital sources of Chinese newspapers in Canada. The focus of this chapter, however, is to explain how overseas Chinese capital entered and expanded in the Chinese newspaper market by examining three major Chinese newspapers in Toronto. It shows that the capital entry and expansion were determined mainly by market conditions (e.g., the market size and intensity of

competition) and strengths of media groups themselves. The increase in the capital investment is crucial to the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

Chapter 7 examines competition among Chinese newspapers and how, in turn, the competition affected the newspapers. By comparing newspaper structures in Toronto between the 1980s and 1990s, this chapter demonstrates that competition played a significant role in the recent development of Chinese newspapers.

Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by summarising the main results of this research and discussing some theoretical implications pertaining to the study of the ethnic press.

Endnotes — Chapter 1

1. It should be noted that, as reported in Chapter 4, during the course of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-45, the claimed daily circulation of Chinese newspapers was well over 10,000 copies. However, the thriving period was relatively short and the circulation soon declined back to the pre-war level. See *Canadian Advertising Rates and Data (CARD)*, August 1950, p. 66.

2. During the 1970s and 1980s, most Chinese newspapers in Canada did not report their circulation to *CARD*, and this situation makes it impossible to estimate their circulation figures. To solve the problem, I combined circulation information from *CARD* with that from my interviews in Toronto, whereby relatively complete circulation figures during the period were estimated. For 1985, the total claimed circulation figure of 19,800 is the sum of 10,000 (*Sing Tao* in Toronto), 3,800 (*Sing Tao* in Vancouver), and 6,000 (*World Journal* in Toronto). For 1990, the total claimed circulation figure of 33,117 is the sum of 27,117 (*Sing Tao* in Toronto) and 6,000 (*World Journal* in Toronto). Pigadas (1991: 57) reported that the circulation figure of Chinese dailies was 35,000 in 1990; this figure was based on information from *Sing Tao* and *Shing Wah*, published in *CARD* in 1990. However, it should be noted that, as I report in Chapter 4, *Shing Wah* had ceased publication in 1989. See *CARD*, July 1985, pp. 59-60, and July 1990, p. 75; Interview, Toronto, August 14, 1997.

3. The claimed circulation figure for 1997 was calculated from various sources. The figures for *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao*, both in Toronto, were calculated from data reported in *Ethnic Media and Market* (Winter/Spring), 1997, pp. 11-13, and those for *World Journal*, also in Toronto, were based on promotional materials published by the newspaper in 1994. Figures for Vancouver's three Chinese newspapers, *Ming Pao*, *Sing Tao*, and *World Journal*, came from information in *The Vancouver Sun*, February 1, 1997. The total circulation figure of 175,673 is the sum of 37,176 (*Ming Pao* in Toronto), 40,242 (*Sing Tao* in Toronto), 31,255 (*World Journal* in Toronto), 26,000 (*Ming Pao* in Vancouver), 31,000 (*Sing Tao* in Vancouver), and 10,000 (*World Journal* in Vancouver).

4. The estimate was based on information from interviews in Toronto, July 23 and 30 as well as August 6 and 14, 1997.

5. The estimate was based on information from *The Vancouver Sun*, February 1, 1997, and my interviews in Toronto, May 29, 1996, July 29, and August 22, 1997.

6. In 1997, Fairchild, a major Chinese television network in Canada, hired about 300 employees in Vancouver, Toronto, and Calgary (Personal correspondence, July 16, 1999). The network, together with three Chinese dailies, had a total of 900-950 people working in the Chinese media. In addition, there were dozens of Chinese

radio stations and weeklies or monthlies across this country. Although it is difficult to estimate their employee numbers, it is quite safe to say that the total employees in the Chinese media can be estimated to be more than 1,000.

7. Interview, Toronto, May 23, 1996.

8. For the detailed information about offshore Chinese investments in the newspapers in Toronto and other Canadian cities, see Chapter 5.3.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter reviews the literature on the ethnic press and proposes a theoretical framework for the study of Chinese newspapers in Canada. It begins by discussing the findings of various studies on the ethnic press, ethnic business, ethnic enclave economy, and the mass media, which together provide a theoretical background to the present study. This is followed by a discussion of a theoretical framework whereby the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s can be interpreted. It concludes with a summary of the literature review and the theoretical framework.

2.1 A Review of Literature

2.1.1 The Ethnic Press

The ethnic press refers to newspapers and periodicals published by ethnic organisations or individuals.¹ The contents of such publications are primarily designed to satisfy the needs and interests common to persons of a particular ethnic group or community (Wynar and Wynar, 1976: 14-15). The majority of the Canadian ethnic press has been published in languages other than English or French, although there have been papers published for ethnic groups in the country's official languages (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 177; Pili, 1982: 9-10).

In North America, the history of the ethnic press dates back to 1732, when the German bimonthly *Dir Philadelphische Zeitung* was published in Philadelphia by Benjamin Franklin (Wynar and Wynar, 1976: 15). The first Canadian ethnic publication was a German weekly, the *Neuschottlaendische Calendar*, established in New Berlin (Kitchener) in 1787 (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 172). The historical development of the ethnic press in North America can be roughly divided into three stages (Miller, 1987: xvii-xviii; Boyd, 1955: 46; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 342; Fishman et al., 1966: 59, 63, and 65). The first stage covers the period between 1732 and the 1880s, when the ethnic press tended to be “one-person operations, and often amateurish” (Miller, 1987, xvii). The earliest ethnic newspapers were those in German, French, the various Scandinavian languages, Dutch, and, in the West of the United States, Chinese (ibid.). The second stage, extending from the 1890s to 1930s, is characterised by both an expansion of ethnic newspapers and a trend among more successful papers toward modernisation and professionalization (ibid.). For instance, the number of ethnic publications increased from 799 in 1880 to 1,040 in 1920 in the United States, and from 18 in 1892 to 52 in 1938 in Canada (Boyd, 1955: 46; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 342). The ethnic press also began to utilise the latest technology and, in content, “to move away from sharply defined ethnic-based political commentary toward a tone of journalistic objectivity” (Miller, 1987: xvii). At this time newspapers began to publish in Italian, Polish, Yiddish, Bohemian, Russian, Finnish, Slovak, Lithuanian, Serbia, Portuguese, Ukrainian, Armenian, Greek, and Japanese, among others (ibid.: xvi). The third stage extends from the 1930s to the 1990s, and features a decline and then an expansion among ethnic newspapers. The 1930s and

1940s witnessed a decline among ethnic newspapers in both Canada and the United States (e.g., the number of the ethnic publications decreased from 52 in 1938 to 43 in 1951 in Canada, and from 1,040 in 1920 to 795 in 1950 in the United States) (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 342; Fishman et al., 1966: 59, 63, and 65; Boyd, 1955: 46); however, the ethnic press expanded again after the 1950s, and especially after the 1970s. In Canada, there were 315 ethnic publications in 1980 (The Ethnic Press in Canada, 25 June 1980, cited in Pili, 1982: 9). In The United States, the number of ethnic papers expanded from 795 in 1950 to 960 in 1975 (Fishman et al., 1966: 59, 63, and 65; Wynar and Wynar, 1976: 17). Immigrant groups from non-European countries, especially those from Asia and Latin America, were responsible for the expansion during the period (Miller, 1987: xix). Why did the ethnic press emerge and grow in North America? The question has been answered from two broad perspectives: the assimilation model and structural model.

2.1.1.1 The assimilation model

The assimilation model argues that immigrant and ethnic groups, over time, tend to conform to the language, behaviours, and institutions of the dominant Anglo-Saxon group (Li, 1988: 7). Assimilation, according to Park (1950: 150), is best understood as a path, or a process. In this process the social relations cycle of interaction involves successive stages: contact, competition, accommodation, and finally, assimilation. Assimilation can also be seen as involving distinct, though related, levels or dimensions, the most significant of which are the cultural (e.g. language, religion, diet, etc.) and structural (e.g. increasing roles in general civic life) dimensions (Gordon, 1964: 71).

Concerning outcomes of the assimilation process, three versions are often distinguished (ibid.: 85): Anglo-conformity, melting pot, and cultural pluralism. Anglo-conformity refers to "the complete surrender of immigrants' symbols and values and their absorption by the core culture" (ibid.). The melting pot thesis holds that assimilation results in "a biological merger of the Anglo-Saxon peoples with other immigrant groups and a blending of their respective culture into a new indigenous American type" (ibid.). Cultural pluralism refers to a situation in which immigrants are able to retain their own cultures, which are modified by contact with the core but still preserved in their distinct character (ibid.). While cultural pluralism is the option favoured by most immigrants, Gordon asserts that it has never really existed in the United States. In his view, the acculturation process has led to outcomes best reflected in the Anglo-conformity thesis: "basic values, norms, and symbols taught to immigrants and fully absorbed by their children correspond to those of the dominant culture" (Portes and Bach, 1985: 22).

The assimilation model has informed much of research on the ethnic press. For instance, Robert Park published *The Immigrant Press and Its Control* in 1922, which remains the only work treating the ethnic press in the United States as a whole.² In this book, Park surveyed all the foreign-language papers of the 1920s and presented brief histories and interpretations. One of his major theories in this work is the dual role of the immigrant press. According to Park (1922: 9-10), the immigrant press provided the newcomer with the information he needed about American government, customs, and attitudes. It helped protect him from "shapers and grafters," and it provided a substitute for the face-to-face communication of the village. While it was psychologically satisfying to read one's native language, this also "fostered nationalism and helped turn the lonely

wander's thoughts back to his native land" (ibid.: 55). As a result, the immigrant press can be both a "brake and accelerator" in the process of Americanisation. Although there was a tendency to exaggerate the retarding influence of the ethnic press, Park seemed to support a more balanced view and warned Americans against such tactics of "forced Americanisation" as licensing of the foreign-language press or requiring English translations (ibid.: 359). Park's work influenced the studies of the ethnic press in the United States until the 1970s (Zubrzycki, 1958-1959; Jaret, 1978; Kowalik, 1978; Marzdf, 1979). While most of the research dealt with the press of particular language groups, it was primarily concerned with the relationship between the ethnic press and assimilation or cultural retention. According to this line of research, it is the cultural function that largely accounted for the emergence and growth of the ethnic press.

In Canada, the studies of the ethnic press have focused essentially on the process of immigrant adaptation. In a review of literature on the ethnic media in Canada, Fleras (1994: 271-272) found that ethnic media studies, in which the ethnic press is a major component, fall into four categories. First, with respect to integration and immigrant adaptation, "ethnic media are disclaimed as largely inconsequential in one way or the other as sources of assistance or information about Canada" (ibid.: 271). Lam's (1980) investigation of Chinese print consumption in Toronto falls into this category. Second, the ethnic media are thought to facilitate the integration of immigrants into society by serving as buffers and agents of socialisation. Black and Leithner (1987) provided moderate support for this hypothesis in their analysis of a 1983 metro Toronto survey. Third, ethnic media promote particularism, thus deterring immigrant transition into society "through reinforcement of group specific patterns and ethnocultural values" (Fleras, 1994: 272).

Kim and Kim (1989), for instance, argued that ethnic newspapers (Korean papers in Canada in this case) may isolate the ethnic community socially and culturally, by fostering heritage culture values and links with the home countries. Fourth, ethnic media may discharge a number of concurrent positive functions (Surlin and Romanov, 1985). Ethnic (heritage language) papers create safe havens for ethnic cultures to flourish, while simultaneously fostering newcomer adaptation to the new cultural environment.

Although the theory of assimilation was popular for many years, it has been challenged by many sociologists. For instance, as Bolaria and Li pointed out (1988, 20), in stressing the persistence or disappearance of cultural traits and institutions, the assimilation theory regards the uniqueness in cultural origin as the cause of ethnic differences. However, "there is mounting evidence, and an increasing number of theoretical dispositions, to suggest that the basic assimilationist position is false" (ibid.). For example, Yancey, Ericksen, and Juliani (1976, cited in ibid.) showed that among many groups the maintenance of ethnicity in America is attributed to the structural conditions of that society, particularly to the development of urbanisation and modern transportation, rather than to some transplanted cultural heritage from the Old World. Beattie's study of middle-level Anglophones and Francophones (1975, cited in ibid.) showed that the income gap between the two groups resulted from structural discrimination with the federal government bureaucracy, rather than differences of value orientation. Furthermore, assimilation theories imply standards of behaviour and values to which immigrants and minority groups must adhere to in order to be assimilated. Such standards, however, are often assumed, because it is often difficult for Canadians to define what a Canadian is, let alone explain to immigrants how to become one (Li, 1990: 12). In addition, greater

knowledge of the core language and culture by new immigrants and greater familiarity with members of the dominant group does not necessarily lead to more positive attitudes and more rapid assimilation. As Portes and Bach pointed out (1985: 23-24), "Such conditions can lead precisely to the opposite, as immigrants learn their true economic position and are exposed to racist ideologies directed against them as instruments of domination." Finally, the theory of assimilation suffers from a basic lack of clarity in the way the model is applied. "The confusion arises from the indiscriminant application of the model as a description and explanation of the same phenomena" (Bolaria and Li, 1988: 20).

Assimilationist studies of the ethnic press are also problematic. Four points might be made here. First, as Harzig and Hoerder pointed out (1985: 13), the basic question asked by these researchers has often been: did the ethnic press further assimilation or did it retard it? Such narrow alternatives ignore the fact the role of the press was manifold and varied over the years. Second, while focusing on the assimilation or cultural retention, the assimilationist treats the ethnic press mainly as a cultural institution. It overlooks the fact that the ethnic press also operates as an economic institution. Actually, the Chinese newspapers in Canada are all privately-owned enterprises, and so they are thoroughly integrated into a capitalist economic framework. One of major motivations of publishing newspapers is to make profit. Ignoring this fact undoubtedly leads to a biased understanding of the ethnic press. Third, it is also wrong to attribute the emergence and growth of the ethnic press only to its role in education and communication. In fact, the changes in the ethnic press in North America have much to do with social and economic forces behind the press. In other words, it is the changes in social and economic structures,

such as state policies concerning immigration, the immigration size and composition, capital resources of immigrant groups, that have played a significant role in the development of the ethnic press. Fourth, it should be noted that the assimilationist approach to the ethnic press also shows Social Darwinist overtones. The ethnic press is viewed entirely from a dominant group's point of view, and is judged as "good for us" or "bad for us" depending upon the perspective of that dominant group.

2.1.1.2 The structural model

The structural model places emphasis on the importance of structural contexts of racial and ethnic relations, though the particular structural contexts vary in different studies (Bolaria and Li, 1988; Li, 1990; Morawska, 1990: 213-214; Portes and Bach, 1985; Portes, 1995; Bonacich and Modell, 1980). For instance, Li (1990: 5) treated race and ethnicity as social constructs, in that they are "consequences of unequal relationships, produced and maintained by differential power between a dominant and a subordinate group." For proponents of this approach, the basic question of race and ethnicity is: why are only certain physical and cultural characteristics taken to signify definitions of race and ethnicity in specific circumstances? According to Li (*ibid.*), the question indicates that "physical and cultural traits are the basis for defining social groups only in so far as they are socially recognised as important." Portes and Bach (1985: 25) further argued that such unequal relations resulted from the subordinate position of immigrant minorities in the labour market and from the ideologies employed to legitimise the unequal relations: For instance,

Blacks and Mexicans, like Chinese and Japanese or Poles and Italians before them, have been kept "in their place" because they have formed, each in their time, the mainstay of a segmented labour market. As colonised minorities or fresh labour supplies for the competitive sector, they constitute an indispensable component of the economic structure. Granting such groups admittance into core society on the basis of merit would jeopardise their utility to employers to the entire dominant group. Learning the "right" values and behaviour patterns is thus not usually enough to gain entrance in the core (ibid.).

More recently, Portes (1995: 23-25) proposed a model which includes three different levels of structures. The first level of structure involves the government's policy toward different immigrant groups. For instance, in the case of refugees in the United States, some groups have gained legal entry and access to the same social programs available to the native-born, while "others have been actively persecuted, their claims for asylum routinely denied or granted with an inferior legal status" (ibid.: 24). The second level of structure involves civic society and public opinion. According to Portes (ibid.), for various historical reasons, immigrant groups are treated differently by the host society. Specifically, "Immigrants from Britain and north-western Europe have typically experienced the least amount of resistance, while those of phenotypically or culturally distinct backgrounds have endured much greater social prejudice" (ibid.). The third level of structure involves the ethnic community. The ethnic communities vary in the economic power (ibid.). Generally, some communities provide few economic opportunities if they are composed primarily of manual workers. In contrast, if the communities have managed to create a substantial entrepreneurial and professional presence, they offer new arrivals opportunities for economic mobility unavailable to immigrants who join purely working-class communities.

The central insight of the structural model is that it views immigrants not simply as individuals who come clutching a bundle of personal skills, but rather as members of groups and participants in broader social structures that affect in multiple ways their relations with the dominant group (ibid.). According to the structural model, the unequal power relations between minorities and the dominant group are particularly significant in determining the nature of racial and ethnic relations.

In the studies of the ethnic press, the structural model attempts to explain how social and economic forces shape the changes in the ethnic press. For instance, in his study of the community newspaper in the United States, Janowitz (1962: 17-27) found that the ethnic press had undergone a shift from a community newspaper to a regional and a national ethnic paper. According to him, the shift is related to changes in residential patterns of immigrants. Initially, immigrants collected in ghettos within the metropolis. And the geographic concentration determined that the ethnic press was community oriented. However, the decline of rigid ethnic segregation, together with the decline in the number of the foreign-born, "resulted in a fundamental ecological shift in audiences" (ibid.: 22) for the ethnic press. Because of the dispersal of readers' residences, "the immigrant press no longer addresses an audience predominantly located in a specific community of the urban metropolis The foreign-language paper becomes oriented to all the members of the ethnic minority who reside in the metropolis and eventually it assumes the character of a regional and a national ethnic paper" (ibid.).

Another interesting study in this line of research explored the relationship between ethnic conflict and changes in the ethnic press. In their study of ethnic newspapers in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Olzak and West (1991)

analysed the effects of ethnic conflict on the rates of founding and failure of white immigrant and African-American newspaper organisations. They found that the consequences of ethnic conflict are vastly different for white immigrants and African-American newspapers. Whereas conflict against white immigrants encourages the founding of ethnic newspapers, conflict against African-Americans significantly lowers the creation rate of African-American newspaper organisations (ibid.: 471). Olzak and West (ibid.) explained the opposite effect of conflict on the founding of white versus African-American newspapers in terms of the different levels of collective violence. "Racial violence peaked during this period, while anti-immigrant activity subsided" (ibid.). More specifically, the proliferation of attacks on African-Americans undermined the stock of organisational and economic resources, which reduced their ability to establish and maintain newspapers. In contrast, as hostility to white immigrants dissipated, organisational and economic resources grew stronger for white immigrants, which in turn increased their ability to establish and maintain newspapers when facing ethnic violence.

The structural approach also attempted to explain the emergence and growth of the ethnic press in terms of its relations to daily newspapers in the larger society. Carroll (1987: 204-205) argued that there are two kinds of newspaper organisations: generalism and specialism. Generalism refers to "large newspaper organisations, which undertake a variety of activities within the local industry which, in the aggregate, lead to a substantial share of the overall market" (ibid.: 204). Specialism refers to small newspaper organisations: "They typically publish for only one segment of a metropolitan audience, a specific solidarity group such as neighbourhood, ethnic, or professional community" (ibid.). How do specialist newspapers such as the ethnic press survive? Heterogeneity of

newspaper markets is a major reason. Although daily newspapers in the larger society usually control the dominant share of market, it is impossible for them to have a complete market share within a metropolis: “if the organisation decentralises enough to acquire the special competencies needed to compete with specialist organisations, then it loses many of its economies of scale” (ibid.: 211). On the other hand, “if it remains centralised enough to reap substantial economies of scale, it is likely to have difficulties competing head-on for audience appeal against specialists who invest all their time and energy in cultivating one particular submarket” (ibid.). According to Carroll, the emergence of specialist newspapers such as the ethnic press resulted largely from the fact that generalist newspapers cannot appeal to special segment because of minor economies of scale.³ As a result, specialist newspapers such as the ethnic press can absorb the part of the market left over by the generalists.

The structural model has become increasingly popular in the study of racial and ethnic relations. The perspective not only extends the research areas beyond culture and individuals, but provides insights into the deep roots of existing racial and ethnic relations. Structural studies of the ethnic press are also meaningful, since they show that it is not assimilation functions but social and economic forces that largely shaped the emergence and development of the ethnic press. However, this line of research has paid little attention to how the ethnic press operates as a business. Actually, when the ethnic press operates as a firm, economic pressure and competition become part of economic forces that affect its survival.

2.1.2 Ethnic Business

Because this thesis treats the Chinese newspapers in Canada as a business, it is necessary to review the literature on ethnic business. The concept of ethnic business is debated. Traditionally, "ethnic business refers to the type of business organisations associated with an ethnic community, as characterised by small firms, owned and operated by minority members, that are located in a limited number of specialised markets, such as retailing and food services" (Li, 1998: 56). In North America, a few immigrant minorities, like the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans, prospered in such small businesses. Theories about what prompts them to sustain and succeed in business entrepreneurship can be roughly divided into two types: transplanted cultural thesis and blocked mobility thesis.

2.1.2.1 The transplanted cultural thesis vs. the blocked mobility thesis

The transplanted cultural thesis focuses on characteristics of the minorities themselves. For instance, in analysing the Chinese and Japanese American propensity to be overrepresented in retail trade, Light (1972) stressed an institution that both groups brought from their countries of origins: rotating-credit associations. It is this cultural item that made it possible for them to raise capital, despite discriminatory lending practices by banks, so that they were able to finance their enterprises. Another version of the cultural thesis deals with the importance of internal group solidarity in promoting a concentration in trade. Small businesses, using primordial ties of trust and loyalty, can be more viable than firms run on strictly universalistic criteria (Benedict, 1968). Solidarity is seen primarily as self-generated (Bonacich and Modell, 1980: 27). A variation of this thesis stresses the "sojourning mentality" (Siu, 1952; Bonacich, 1973, cited in *ibid.*: 29-30).

Sojourning, which means to plan one day to return to a homeland, is thought to promote concentration, both directly and indirectly, in trade. Directly, it encourages thrift and hard work for the purpose of amassing capital as quickly as possible. Indirectly, sojourning promotes the retention of ethnic solidarity, which aids business.

Contrary to the transplanted cultural thesis which emphasises the internal context, the blocked mobility thesis sees immigrant entrepreneurship as resulting from the societies in which it is found. As Bonacich and Modell (1980: 24) pointed out, "They are concentrated in marginal trading activities, not because of any inherent group inclination or talent in this direction, but the surrounding society make them assume these positions." For example, it is argued that discrimination and racial barriers in a host society produce unfavourable labour market conditions for minority people. As an alternative, they seek an economic refuge in the ethnic enterprises to avoid competition and hostility from the dominant group (ibid.; Li, 1998: 56-59). Another version of this thesis is to view ethnic groups in retail and small businesses as middlemen minorities, in that they fill a status gap. The status gap is a social gulf between the dominant and subordinate groups which is so wide as to make it difficult for them to interact - even commercially - on a face to face basis. As a result, the dominant group may decide to sponsor a particular group as "middlemen" between themselves and the mass of population. These minorities are ideal scapegoats in times of trouble, serving as a buffer for elites against the anger of the masses (Bonacich and Modell, 1980; Portes, 1995: 27).

Both cultural and structural factors, albeit to varying degree, help to explain the formation of ethnic enterprises in North America during the latter half of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, when racism and racial discrimination were

more institutionalised, and when the deprivation of opportunities compelled some minorities to use ethnic resources to start their business ventures. But as Li (1993: 222) argued, in their emphasis on primordial features, the cultural theories overplay the importance of cultural traits, and overlook the contextual forces of society. Furthermore, the monolithic cultural approach may be adequate to understand an ethnic population from a relatively homogeneous and cohesive background, but with increased occupational diversity and metropolitan sophistication in ethnic groups, its heuristic value becomes dubious (*ibid.*). In addition, with Chinese immigrants now settling permanently in North America, the claim of a sojourning mentality in ethnic business is increasingly untenable (*ibid.*).

Li (*ibid.*: 223) also pointed out that the structural theories are equally insufficient to account for the more recent development of ethnic enterprises. For example, with the repeal of discriminatory laws against the Chinese in the few years following World War II, and the improved employment opportunities for the post-war Chinese immigrants, many Chinese in Canada are not as confined in small businesses as their predecessor. Moreover, there have been profound changes among ethnic businesses in Canada in recent decades. Simply put, ethnic businesses include not only small business (middlemen minorities) but also fairly large, financially stable enterprises (*ibid.*: 226-235). Many of these changes are related to demographic compositions of immigration and economic forces of urban development (*ibid.*: 223).

In the case of the Chinese newspapers in Canada, the traditional explanations of ethnic business, i.e., transplanted cultural thesis and blocked mobility thesis, might partly hold for the Chinese newspapers early in this century. For instance, the editors, publishers,

and reporters - often the same person who handled a paper alone - were "the thin layer of immigrant intellectuals" (Miller, 1987: xv). They had attained some education in China, and sometimes journalistic experience as well. But because of institutional discrimination and the language barrier, they had difficulties in finding middle class jobs in Canada. The Chinese-language press, then, was a logical alternative for these individuals; they could use their general education and perhaps make a living as well. In addition, because of the lack of capital for a publisher, it might be reasonable to assume that ethnic solidarity played a role in raising necessary funds to publish a Chinese newspaper.

However, the conventional theories on ethnic business are not sufficient for explain the recent Chinese newspapers in Canada. For instance, the recent development of Chinese newspapers was largely a consequence of economic forces, including the growing Chinese market in Canada, the capital information in Asia, and competition among the Chinese newspapers, which are irrelevant to the cultural interpretation. It is also groundless to claim that the Chinese newspaper industry in Canada is related to the blocked mobility. Actually, it is the changes in immigration policies and increasing opportunities in the larger society (e.g., the growing advertising from non-Chinese firms) that played a significant role in the development of the Chinese newspapers since the 1970s.

2.1.2.2 Ethnic business: Recent models

More recently, some attempt has been made to develop new models to understand ethnic enterprises. Two of them are worth noting. In his study of Chinese entrepreneurship in Canada, Li (1993: 224) argued that there are at least four categories of Chinese

businesses in Canada: (1) the traditional type of family-operated and individual-owned Chinese businesses mainly in personal services and retails; (2) professional firms owned and operated by Chinese professionals in such fields as medicine, law, and accounting that emerged after World War II and proliferated in more recent decades; (3) firms in Canada owned or controlled through foreign investments by corporations with headquarters in Asia and sometimes subsidiaries in Canada; and (4) capital-intensive investments of recent business immigrants that result mainly from Canada's business immigration program. Although both social and cultural factors are relevant to explain why the Chinese had historically engaged in marginal businesses in food services and personal services, Li argued that the diversification of Chinese businesses into professional services and more recently into corporate investments have been related to some other conditions, such as new opportunities open to the Chinese in professional occupations after World War II, capital formation and capital globalization in Asia, and changes in the immigration regulation in 1978 and 1985 that expanded the admission of entrepreneurs, self-employed and investors under the business immigration program (ibid.: 239-242). The significant implication of Li's "classification model" is that "different explanations may be needed to account for different types of Chinese business, since the conditions under which each type emerges vary" (ibid.: 238).

Waldinger et al. (1990) developed the "interactive model" for understanding ethnic entrepreneurship of immigrant and ethnic minorities who enter business. The model is built on two dimensions: opportunity structures and characteristics of ethnic groups. Opportunity structures consist of market conditions that may favour businesses serving co-ethnics or nonethnic populations. Opportunity structures also concern the access to

business ownership (ibid.: 21). Group characteristics refer to premigration circumstances, a group's reaction to conditions in the host society, and resource mobilisation through various features of the ethnic communities (ibid.). Ethnic strategies emerge from the interaction of all these factors, "as ethnic entrepreneurs adapt to the resources made available in opportunity structures and attempt to carve out their own niches" (ibid.). These strategies include "obtaining capital" and "surviving strenuous business competition," among others. This model attempts to compromise both external and internal ethnic solidarity (Li, 1993: 222), and identifies a wide range of factors which have a impact on ethnic businesses (Wong and Ng, 1998: 67). The model has been utilised extensively in the United States, Europe and Canada (Waldinger, et al., 1990; Wong and Ng, 1998). In their application of this model to a study of Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in Vancouver, Wong and Ng (1998: 81-82) added transnationalism as an ethnic strategy for Chinese entrepreneurs. According to them (ibid.: 83), "regardless of the market condition many Chinese entrepreneurs use transnationalism as an ethnic strategy for business development."

These new developments in the studies of ethnic business may provide useful theoretical perspectives in our understanding of the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. For instance, Li's study of Chinese entrepreneurs in Canada demonstrated that there are different types of ethnic businesses and each type needs a different explanation of its emergence and growth. Chinese newspapers in Canada have been invested in and operated by multinational firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan, making them significantly different from traditional Chinese businesses in Canada. Li's explanation about corporate investment from Asia provides insights into the Chinese

newspapers in Canada. The “interactive model” is also useful, since it identifies a wide range of factors which stimulate immigrant entrepreneurship; some of them, such as market conditions and ethnic strategies (e.g., “obtaining capital” and “competition”) are particularly relevant to the development of Chinese newspapers.

2.1.3 Ethnic Enclave Economy

According to Portes (1995: 27), “enclaves are spatially clustered networks of businesses owned by members of the same minorities.” They are not dispersed among other populations, as middleman groups are, but emerge in close proximity to areas settled by their own group. Enclave businesses serve both the needs of their co-ethnics and the broader market. Their success in doing so and their growth depend on three factors: “the size of the co-ethnic population that provides their core market and key source of labour; the level of entrepreneurial skills among the immigrants; and the availability of capital resources.” All immigrant groups create a few businesses, but the only some have an ethnic enclave economy.

Poters (ibid.: 27-28) also pointed out that all ethnic enclaves share several notable characteristics. First, their emergence is signalled by the transformation of certain urban sectors, which “acquire a ‘foreign’ look that is complete with commercial signs in the immigrants’ language and a physical layout of businesses that accords with the group’s cultural practices” (ibid.). Second, unlike middleman businesses which are concentrated in the area of small financial services and retail trade, enclaves are economically diversified. In addition to trade, they commonly encompass industrial production and specialised services both for the ethnic and external markets (ibid.: 28). Third, at some point in their

development, enclaves become "institutionally complete," allowing newcomers to lead their lives entirely within the confines of the ethnic communities (ibid.).

Although the concept of the ethnic enclave economy has proved to be a seminal idea, it has also stirred up much controversy. The first controversy involves whether immigrant workers in the enclave labour market achieve greater returns on human capital than those who participate in the outside economy. Based on research among recent immigrants in Miami's Cuban community, Portes and his colleagues (1980; 1985) reported that those who work within the enclave have greater probability of becoming self-employed entrepreneurs. They suggested that the enclave economy of immigrants offers an alternative mode of social mobility, and that immigrant workers in the enclave economy and in the primary labour market have similar economic returns on past human capital investments not shared by workers in the secondary market.

Portes's interpretation of such findings has been questioned by Sanders and Nee (1987), who showed that the economic return predicted by the enclave economy thesis applied only to immigrant employers. Immigrant workers in the enclave economy experienced a lower return on human capital, such as schooling, than their counterparts in the open labour market. More generally, by calling attention to this disparity in benefits of the enclave economy, Sanders and Nee implicitly suggested a greater focus on the exploitative aspects of employer-employee relationships between co-ethnics. In addition, Zhou and Logan (1989) showed that male enclave workers in New York City's Chinatown enjoyed positive earning returns from education, but the same effect was not found among female enclave workers.

The second controversy involves whether enclave membership should be defined by place of work or place of residence. For Portes, enclave entrepreneurs are “owners of firms in an area where similar enterprises concentrate,” and enclave workers are “employees of these firms” (Portes and Jensen, 1987: 769). However, Sanders and Nee (1987) defined the enclave in terms of place of residence. Portes and Jensen (1987: 768) argued that the Sanders and Nee definition is inherently biased because the “place of residence” procedure excluded the better-off segment of the enclave participants who may move out of the residential enclave to more affluent neighbourhoods or suburbs elsewhere, and overrepresented the worse-off segment of the population, who are more likely to reside in the geographic enclave.

The debate over the enclave economy has shown that the concept is far from perfect. For instance, for all their emphasis on the effects of ethnicity on relationships within the immigrant firm, Portes and his co-workers had little to say about the immigrant firm itself; with the exception of an item on the ethnicity of a worker’s employer, they collected no information about the internal organisation of ethnic firms, their recruitment and training practices, or their connection to other firms. Their work provided no evidence that ethnic solidarity operated in the hypothesised way (Waldinger, 1993: 446). In addition, two methods of defining the enclave economy (by place of work and by place of residence) have one thing in common: they are both geographically bound. However, the notion of “place” in the context of enclave economies as used in the literature is often so encompassing that it entails an urban centre, wherein ethnic entrepreneurship may range from a business involving ethnic workers to establishments which have nothing to do with ethnic markets or labour. As a result, the enclave thesis only allows broad comparisons

between immigrant business owners and workers located inside or outside a large urban area (Li and Li, 1999: 46).

The research on the enclave economy has focused almost exclusively on the characters of the labour market. However, the formation of the enclave economy certainly affects other aspects of immigrants' social life, including the use of the press. Therefore, it might be interesting to explore the relationship between enclaves and the ethnic press. Three points might be made here. First, the enclave economy is characterised by physical concentration (Portes and Bach, 1985). Once an enclave has fully developed, it is possible for immigrants to live their lives within the confines of the community. Work, education, the press, and access to a variety of services, can be found without leaving the bounds of the ethnic economy. In other words, the formation of enclave economies is related to the establishment of many ethnic institutions such as the ethnic press. And more developed enclaves, in the sense of institutional completeness, might be related to the higher development of the ethnic press. Second, the enclave economy is also characterised by a business network (*ibid.*), which is economically diversified. The operation of business networks necessarily requires the newspaper space for advertising. As such, it is not surprising that the growing enclaves will increase the demand for newspaper advertising, thus augmenting newspaper revenues. Third, the dispersion of immigrant populations in an ethnic group results in the formation of new enclaves or satellite enclaves in surrounding areas, such as in the Chinatowns of New York and Toronto (Zhou, 1992; Lai, 1988). Where several geographic enclaves exist within a metropolis, the merchant's relationship with his customers would be less personal than that in only one geographic enclave, because more complex and geographically diverse enclaves would produce

formal and anonymous relationships (Singer, 1986: 18). The social relations, as Singer (ibid.) pointed out, could facilitate the development of advertising that is "a formal system of interaction or information transmission." In addition, the ethnic population who are spread throughout several enclaves in a metropolitan area, tend to depend more on the ethnic media to get information on their community, than do the ethnic groups who cluster in one enclave in a metropolitan area. Therefore, the geographic dispersion of enclaves may also play a role in the recent growth of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

2.1.4 The Mass Media

There is tremendous literature on the mass media in general, and newspapers in particular. Here I only discuss newspaper competition and ownership, which are related to the study of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

2.1.4.1 Newspaper competition

Literature on newspaper competition is concerned with three basic issues. The first issue involves the newspaper market structure. According to Lacy and Simon (1993: 91-92), all market structures start with a geographic area. This area is defined by the locations where a newspaper chooses to sell its copies and advertising. Given the geographic market, the market structure is determined by three dimensions: the number of firms, the homogeneity of products within the market, and the extent of barriers to entry. Based on these dimensions, markets usually are classified into one of four types: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly or monopoly (ibid.: 91-93; Litman, 1988: 3-14). Perfect competition markets are those with many sellers, products that are

homogenous, and low barriers to entry. Firms in this type of market have no power to set prices. Monopolistic competition markets have many sellers, heterogeneous (or differentiated) products, and slightly higher barriers to entry. In monopolistic competition, no two products are perfect substitutes. Oligopoly markets have relatively few firms which collectively comprise the entire industry. Oligopolies can have homogeneous or heterogeneous products, and barriers to entry are high. Monopoly markets occur when only one firm is in the market. Since there is only one firm, the product is neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous compared to products by other firms. "Monopolies tend to produce fewer units of a good with higher prices than one would find in a competitive market. This means the firm makes monopoly profits" (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 92). Monopolies have high barriers to entry, but technological developments can on occasion open the markets. Litman (1988: 4) argued that newspaper markets are usually located between oligopolies and monopolies.

However, Lacy and Simon (1993: 93-94) pointed out some difficulties in applying the economic theory to newspapers. For instance, it is difficult to define the number of competitors because of the elasticity of the demand for the newspaper commodity. In other words, the markets for some forms of newspaper advertising are likely to have more than a "few" sellers (e.g., substitutability of some types of advertising between newspapers and television). In addition, news commodities are differentiated to attract readers and viewers from other news commodities, but they can also be similar enough to be substitutable because they try to draw from the same pool of information users. These countervailing forces of similarity and differentiation exist across time and are important in shaping the nature of news commodities.

The second issue involves the newspaper trend of monopoly and its reasons. For instance, many researchers (Royal Commission on the Newspapers, 1980; Siegal, 1996; Candussi and Winter, 1988) characterised Canadian newspaper markets as being non-competitive, as Siegel (1996: 123) described in some detail:

In today's press system, newspaper competition has virtually disappeared. The country's 106 dailies are published in 90 cities. Just 13 cities have two or more dailies. Competition is further reduced by presence of both French and English dailies, catering to different audiences, in three cities: Ottawa, Montreal, and Sherbrooke. In four cities - Halifax, Saint John, Thunder Bay, and Vancouver - the two papers are owned by the same publishers and are therefore not in competition with each other. This leaves only eight cities with any newspaper competition: Halifax, Quebec City, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Calgary, and Edmonton. In five of these, the competition comes from relatively new tabloid papers.

Why has competition disappeared in Canada? Siegel (*ibid.*: 125-127) identified four major reasons. First, the changing politics reduced the number of newspapers. The diverse society of British North America brought about numerous political and ideological factions willing to support newspapers that carried their respective message to the public. "When political factions internalised their differences in the process of forming political parties, fewer newspapers were needed" (*ibid.*: 125-126). Second, the adoption of new technology tended to reduce competition. For instance, the printing presses that came into widespread use in Canada late in the nineteenth century could produce thousands of newspapers per hour. In addition, the area of news coverage was expanded by telegraph and phone, while newsprint became easily available because it was made from wood pulp, instead of hard-to-get linen rags. As a result, "instead of serving limited audiences,

newspapers sought a mass audience by catering to broadly defined general interest” (ibid.: 126). Third, economics and the interests of advertisers promoted the tendency towards monopoly. In their discussion about newspaper economies of scale, Lacy and Simon (1993: 70-71) pointed out, “as the number of copies produced increases, the average cost will fall because of the high fixed cost of printing presses. As newspaper copies grow in number of pages, the cost per page declines. The initial costs of preparing to print a minimal number of pages become dispersed among the additional pages that are printed” Also, it is cheaper for an advertiser to buy space in one daily than to advertise in two or three dailies which, through combined circulation, reach the same audience. The publisher, for its part, can charge more for advertising, since advertising rates are tied to circulation. “The ideal situation for both publisher and advertiser is one newspaper in community: a monopoly” (Siegel, 1996: 125). Fourth, monopoly blocked further competition. Once a monopoly has been achieved in a newspaper market, it is extremely difficult to introduce competition. Starting a paper has been likened to economic suicide (ibid.). Major obstacles include raising capital to establish a competitive newspaper and lack of industry support (ibid.).

The third issue involves the effects of competition on newspapers. Some researchers argue that, in general, competition is beneficial for readers and advertisers. For instance, Racick and Hartman (1966, cited in Lancy and Simon, 1993: 101) studied one market under three different competitive conditions - no competition, slight competition, and intense competition. They found that slight or no competition had little impact on newspaper content. However, they conclude that intense competition, which was defined as almost equal shares of market circulation, resulted in a higher proportion of space being

given to local news, pictures, columns of opinion, and immediate-reward information. Another two studies based on national samples of newspapers discovered an important relationship between competition and content (Litman and Bridges, 1986; Lacy, 1987; both cited in *ibid.*: 102). As intensity of competition increases newspapers tend to spend more money on their news-editorial commodity. This manifests through more wire services, more reporters for a given newshole, a larger newshole, and more space given to colour and photographs on the front page. In terms of advertising, some studies (e.g., Owen, 1969) have found that monopoly power increases the advertising cost. Other studies (e.g., Picard, 1986) have found that competing newspapers tend to have lower advertising prices per thousand readers.

In contrast, some other researchers argue that competition has little impact on newspapers. For instance, during the 1940s and 1950s, most research into newspaper competition indicated that having more than one newspaper in a city had little impact on content (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 101). A study conducted in the 1980s continued to support such findings, concluding that economic competition seems to have little impact on newspaper editorial content (Entman, 1985, cited in *ibid.*: 112). In addition, some research found no significant impact of monopoly on the daily advertising rates (*ibid.*: 109). These researches, however, suffered from either measurement problems (based on content categories rather than variables such as wire services and newshole) or small sample.⁴ While denying the relationship between competition and newspaper quality, research of this line argues that monopoly situations are more profitable, and that profit is reflected in greater editorial expenditures (Candussi and Winter, 1988: 140). It also argues

that monopolies are an economic fact, an inevitable development of the marketplace (ibid.).

The literature on newspaper competition is relevant to my study of Chinese newspapers in Canada. For example, the market structure theory, despite its shortcomings as discussed earlier, provides a useful framework for examining the intensity of competition in terms of the number of firms, the homogeneity of products, and the barriers of entry. The discussion about declined competition in the newspaper market can also help to explain why the Chinese newspaper market has been competitive while competition in the Canadian newspaper market as a whole has disappeared. Finally, different arguments about effects of competition on newspapers prompt us to examine whether or not competition among the Chinese newspapers in Canada improved their content and advertising services.

2.1.4.2 Newspaper ownership

According to Siegel (1996: 127), just before World War I, there were 138 daily newspapers in Canada with 138 publishers. In 1995, a mere 11 publishers produced 95 of Canada's 106 dailies. In other words, 90 percent of daily newspapers were involved in some form of common or concentrated ownership (ibid.). The extent of ownership concentration is even more pronounced when examined on the basis of circulation. In 1995, the 11 chains and conglomerates accounted for 93 per cent of the circulation of 5.3 million newspapers. Between them, Thomson and Southam controlled nearly 50 per cent of Canadian circulation. Indeed; they and the next three largest chains account for more than 75 per cent of the total newspaper circulation (ibid.: 128).

According to Kent (Canada, 1980), such tendencies are not the result of malevolence or conspiracy. They result, rather, from the logic of capital accumulation and market relations. These economic forces include the growing capital costs of entering and staying in the industry, increasing competition from broadcasters for advertising revenue, and the tendency for advertisers to gravitate disproportionately to one of several competing papers.

For Kent and other critics (MacLean, 1981: 124-126), chain and conglomerate ownership "raises the spectres of editorial intervention from corporate head offices, increased homogeneity and reduced diversity in commentary and coverage, and reduced independence for working journalists as they fear potential blacklisting by a major chain" (Hackett, 1990: 66). However, some arguments have been advanced to challenge Kent. First, evidence shows that direct intervention by corporate head offices is atypical (*ibid.*). Second, newspaper chains could offer economies of scale and managerial and financial resources not otherwise available to individual papers (*ibid.*). Third, Kent and other liberal critics of the press ignore the profit-orientation of most news media, and the consequent commercial imperative of attracting audiences whose attention is sold to advertisers. "That transaction between media co-operates and advertisers ultimately shapes the logic and limits of the programming and editorial choices in most advertising-based media" (*ibid.*: 67-8).

Ownership of the Chinese newspapers in Canada is also worth noting. Although the Chinese newspapers have undergone a concentration of ownership in the last two decades, the concentration has not led to the point where only one newspaper controls the entire market. Rather, there are three major Chinese newspapers published in Toronto and

Vancouver. Why has the concentration of ownership in the Chinese newspapers not led to a monopoly? How can the three Chinese newspapers compete and survive in a single market? Answering these questions will help to understand the particular conditions in which the Chinese newspapers are published. In addition, although the relationship between the home office and the branch in the three newspapers varies, all the decisions concerning newspaper expansions have been made by the home offices. How this control has impacted the development of Chinese newspapers is also worth exploring.

2.2 The Theoretical Framework of Research

This thesis studies the Chinese newspaper in Canada as a business and attempts to understand the economic and social reasons behind the recent development of the newspaper. This focus is largely influenced by two factors. First, as reviewed earlier, the literature on the ethnic press has been divided into two major perspectives. The assimilation perspective looks at the ethnic press mainly as a cultural institution and is concerned primarily with the role it plays in assimilation and cultural retention. As a consequence, this approach ignores how social and economic forces shape the ethnic press. The structural perspective focuses on how social and economic forces determine the survival of the ethnic press over time. This perspective expands the scope of studies of the ethnic press and also provides a meaningful way for us to understand the development of the press. However, structural studies of the ethnic press have paid little attention to the recent development of the ethnic press and, in particular, the ethnic press as a business. This thesis will contribute to the literature by addressing external economic and social

forces as well as economic activities of newspapers to understand the Chinese newspapers in Canada.

Second, the economic focus of this research is also largely determined by Chinese newspapers themselves. Although Chinese newspapers in Canada were established mainly by local capital before the 1970s, the situation changed in the 1970s when the multinational media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan entered the Canadian Chinese newspaper market. In an attempt to target the growing Chinese market in Canada, these media groups have invested a large amount of capital in newspaper plants and facilities and have hired a large number of staff members. The Chinese newspapers no longer operate as a small local ethnic business, but publish as national newspapers with branches in Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary. Competition among Chinese newspapers also became intense, and it turned out to be one of the major forces behind the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. All these facts suggest that it is impossible to understand Chinese newspapers without examining their economic activities and various economic and social forces behind their development.

In studying the economic and social basis of the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada, this research developed a theoretical framework based on the literature discussed above. This theoretical framework contains three major dimensions: market, capital, and competition. I argue that the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada is largely a consequence of interactive relations between market, capital, and competition.

Market provides a business opportunity for the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. As Waldinger et al. (1990: 21) pointed out, for a business to arise,

there must be some demand for the services it offers. The market of the Chinese newspapers is comprised of readership and advertising. The readership market arises within the Chinese community itself, representing demand for information which is difficult for the larger society to provide. The market size should be examined, because the market size that can be defined as population size is significant in determining the degree to which an ethnic economy can develop (Li, 1992a: 133; Portes, 1995: 27; Jiobu, 1988: 354). The composition of the market should also be examined, because a diverse and middle-class readership is likely to produce a greater demand for newspaper consumption than a homogeneous and working class readership (Li, 1992a: 133). The advertising market represents demand for advertising space. Contributing 80 per cent of newspaper revenues, advertising is very significant in the survival and development of Chinese newspapers. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse changes in advertising markets in relation to the development of Chinese newspapers. In addition, unlike the readership market, the advertising market spans both the ethnic and non-ethnic market, as advertising in the Chinese newspapers is placed by not only Chinese firms but also non-Chinese firms. So, this research also considers these two advertising sources separately and assesses their respective contributions to the Chinese newspapers in Canada.

While the market provides a business opportunity, it is not necessary that the opportunity be seized. To seize the opportunity, ethnic firms have to rely on various resources available to them, probably most significant among them being capital. Capital provides a foundation for the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. The source of capital, however, is different from what Wildinger al et. (1990: 137-140) discussed which mainly applied to small ethnic businesses. The capital of Chinese

newspapers is what Li categorised as “offshore Chinese investments” (1993: 226). The capital is part of the expansion of multinational operation in Asia which resulted from economic development in that areas after World War II. It is also an extension of the globalization of Chinese multinational media groups based in Asia. To understand the capital investments of Chinese newspapers, it is necessary to examine economic developments in East Asia and the expansion of media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, this research will focus on how multinational corporations in Asia started and expanded their investments in Canada’s Chinese newspapers. Two major strategies of their investments can be identified. The first strategy involves starting small-scale operations and gradually expanding them when the market grew. The second strategy involves establishing a big newspaper right from the beginning. The adoption of these strategies is largely determined by market conditions (e.g., the size of market and intensity of competition) and the financial and organisational strength of these multinational corporations. In addition, this research will discuss the process of decision-making concerning the investments in Canada, which is also significant in understanding the capital expansion.

Although market and capital are significant for publishing Chinese newspapers, they cannot guarantee that Chinese newspapers will improve their reporting and advertising services over time. For instance, if the Chinese newspaper market was dominated by one newspaper, the newspapers might not advance as well as they presently do. So, competition may play an important part in facilitating the development of the Chinese newspapers. Competition among Chinese newspapers centred on newspaper reporting, advertising, recruitment, and circulation, in which many strategies were used to

produce innovations in publishing newspapers. The intensity of competition is largely determined by the number of firms, the homogenous products, and the extent of entry barriers (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 92). This thesis will examine whether or not different intensities of competition among the Chinese newspapers impacted their developments. It will also discuss why capital concentration did not lead to newspaper monopoly in the newspaper market, and how this situation influenced the existence of competition and the subsequent dynamic process of development.

2.3 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the literature on the ethnic press, ethnic business, the ethnic enclave economy, and the mass media. The ethnic press has been studied from the perspectives of assimilation and structure. The assimilation perspective is limited because it is concerned primarily with the cultural function and pays little attention to economic and social aspects of the ethnic press. The structural perspective views the ethnic press in terms of social and economic factors, and provides a meaningful way to understand the emergence and development of the ethnic press. However, structural studies of the ethnic press have not been well developed, and especially have not paid attention to how the ethnic press operates as a firm. The literature on ethnic business has been focused on the debate between the cultural and blocked mobility explanations on why a few minorities prospered in small business. These two competing explanations, however, are insufficient to account for the recent development of ethnic businesses, characterised by their large size and multinational nature. Li's "classification model" and Waldinger et al.'s "interactive model" provide useful alternatives to explaining these newly emerged ethnic

businesses. Although the literature on the ethnic enclave economy has been concerned with economic returns of immigrant workers in the ethnic or non-ethnic labour market, the spatial concentration of ethnic populations and businesses is important in establishing and maintaining ethnic institutions such as the ethnic press. The concentration not only constitutes a relatively large ethnic market, but also produces a greater demand for communication and advertising. The review of the mass media is very selective, only focusing on the newspaper competition and the media ownership. In Canada, the general trend in the newspaper industry is a decline in competition and a concentration of ownership. There have been controversies on whether or not the trend effected newspapers negatively.

This chapter has developed a theoretical framework for the study of the Chinese newspapers in Canada. Generally, the present research will study Chinese newspapers as a capitalist enterprise and explore the economic and social forces behind their growth. This focus is influenced by the lack of literature on studies of the ethnic press that combine external economic and social forces as well as internal economic forces. Specifically, this research will study Chinese newspapers as a business by addressing three dimensions. First, it will examine the market opportunities of Chinese newspapers and how the changed market opportunities provided a business opportunity for the newspapers to grow. Second, it will discuss capital sources of Chinese newspapers, with a focus on how overseas Chinese capital entered and expanded in the Chinese newspaper market in Canada. Third, it will examine competition as a survival strategy of Chinese newspapers and explain how the changed newspaper market structure between the 1980s and 1990s led to intense competition, thus facilitating the advancement of Chinese newspapers. It

argues that it is the interactive relations between the three dimensions that play a significant role in the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s.

Endnotes -- Chapter 2

1. The term "ethnic press" is often used interchangeably with "immigrant press" and "foreign language press." According to Lubomy R. Wynar and Anna T. Wynar, the acceptance and usage of these terms is distorted and misleading (1976: 14-15). For instance, the immigrant press serves the need of the immigrant generation, whereas the ethnic press includes publications not only for the immigrant generation but also for second or third generation native-born Americans. Thus, the term "immigrant press" is too limited. The term "foreign language press" is also incorrect when applied to American ethnic publications. Although English is the official language of the United States, many Americans also claim other non-English languages as their native or mother tongue. To them, the use of their native language is by no means interpreted as constituting a "foreign" act or as using a "foreign" language. As a result, the term "ethnic press" is the more useful one.
2. Besides Park's book, the only other volume that attempts to treat the ethnic press as a whole is Edward Hunter's *In Many Voices: Our Fabulous Foreign Language Press*. However, this work has very limited scholarly value because of its xenophobic assumptions (Miller, 1987: xi) and much of its material is unreliable (Johnson, 1988: 41).
3. For a discussion concerning production economies of scale, see Chapter 2.4.1. For a detailed discussion about the theory, see Lacy and Simon, 1993: 70-72.
4. For the detailed discussion, see Lacy and Simon, 1993: 101-102, and 109.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

This chapter is concerned mainly with methodological approaches to the study of Chinese newspapers in Canada. I shall discuss four major methods of inquiry employed in this study: fieldwork research, statistical analysis, documentary studies of historical data, and content analysis.

3.1 Fieldwork Research

The major purpose of the fieldwork was to collect data concerning capital investments of the Chinese newspapers and competition among these papers. To collect the data, I visited Toronto three times from 1996 to 1998. My first trip to Toronto took place in May 1996, during which I obtained some preliminary knowledge about Chinese newspapers in Toronto by interviewing one newspaper manager and three reporters. In my fieldwork, I also found that my initial theoretical framework, which focused on market and capital, was insufficient to account for the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. I learned that competition among the newspapers had played a significant role in their expansion. As a result, I decided to expand my theoretical framework to include competition so as to account for the development of Chinese newspapers. It should be noted that this example, which led to the expansion of my theoretical framework, shows

that fieldwork is useful in formulating a theoretical model (Li, 1985: 75). The second trip, from June to August 1997, was my major period of fieldwork in Toronto. During the three months, I interviewed 33 informants, including those working in Chinese newspapers as well as local leaders and marketing firm staff who have good knowledge about the papers. The interviews provide the basic information for the present research. My last trip to Toronto took place in August 1998. The trip was to conduct a complementary study, with a focus on Chinese newspaper readers who were missed in my previous fieldwork. I interviewed 19 informants. During my three visits to Toronto, I conducted interviews with 56 informants. The duration of the interviews was from half an hour to four hours. In several cases, interviews were held in two or more sessions. Most of the interviews were conducted in Chinese (Mandarin) and a few in English. All interviews were taped.

Informants were selected by snowball sampling, "a technique that begins with a few relevant subjects you've identified and expands the sample through referrals" (Babbie, 1995: 287). The method was chosen mainly because most key informants were difficult to contact.¹ An effort was also made to interview informants from all three Chinese newspapers and with various responsibilities (e.g., newspaper managers, reporters, and advertising staff), because the present research focuses on the three papers and needs various information concerning newspaper operations. However, the informants from one of the three newspapers were underrepresentative in the sample because most prospective informants in that paper did not wish to be interviewed. It is thus likely that the sample was biased toward the other two newspapers.

The interviews were semi-structured, or called "a guided interview" (Tutty et al. 1996: 56). In this case informants were asked some predetermined questions, but each

question was asked in an open-ended manner (ibid.). In order to ask questions that were relevant to informants (Babbie: 1995: 125), different questions were prepared for different informants. For example, questions directed to newspaper managers covered the decisions and processes involved in capital investments, the structure of newspaper organization, and strategies used in competition. Questions directed to reporters covered their professional experiences, work load, self-perception, division of labour in the editorial department, competition in local reporting, and relations with reporters in other newspapers, including Chinese and non-Chinese. Questions directed to advertising staff covered changing advertising markets, advertising organizations, advertising revenues, and competition in advertising. Questions for local leaders and marketing firm staff involved the history of Chinese press, the relationship between the Chinese community and the Chinese newspaper, and estimates about the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto. Questions for readers of Chinese newspapers involved the immigration process, education background, English proficiency, reading habits, and reasons for reading Chinese newspapers.

To ensure the reliability and validity of the data, some other measures were also taken. First, before each interview, I showed the informant a reference letter from my supervisor and explained the purpose of the study. Given the intense competition among Chinese newspapers at the time of this research, identifying myself as a “disinterested” observer hopefully eliminated possible suspicions that might make the informant’s answer less credible. Second, also before each interview, informants were assured of anonymity and confidentiality. This not only has to do with ethical considerations, but also could encourage the informants to speak more frankly (Wong, 1988: 12). Third, as

far as possible the internal consistencies of the answers were checked and verified against various data such as newspaper reports, government records, and my personal observation. In the case that information concerning certain events was inconsistent but nothing else could be checked (e.g., the amount of capital investments), I usually relied on the information provided by people who had been directly involved in the events, but made it plain in the analysis so that the relevant pieces of information should be regarded as tentative.

3.2 Statistical Data

The major statistical data in the present research are from the Public Use Sample Tapes of the 1971 Census, the Public Use Sample Tapes of the 1981 Census, and the Public Use Microdata File on individuals of the 1991 Census. These data sets, which are the most comprehensive sources of the Chinese population at the individual level, were used to examine the Chinese in Canada in terms of size, linguistic patterns, social status, demography, and geographical distribution. This kind of information is then used to understand the growing size and changing nature of the Chinese readership market in Canada.

It should be noted that the readership in my study refers to readers that newspapers can potentially reach, rather than people that newspapers actually reach. Although the unavailability of actual readership data partly influenced my decision to use the potential readership data,² some other reasons are also significant. For instance, research has shown that the size of the ethnic population affects the growth of newspapers, and the potential readership is the most important indicator of newspaper demand (Olzak and West, 1991;

Carrol, 1987). In addition, although the Chinese population includes native-born Chinese who typically do not read Chinese newspapers, some evidence indicates that the media groups in Asia usually took account of the Chinese population as a whole when making their investment decisions in Canada.³ Finally, potential readership data that are based on census figures allow one to examine readership changes over times. In short, the potential readership data will be useful in explaining the development of the Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s.

In addition to the census data, the present research also used data from Immigration Statistics to discuss the diverse sources of Chinese immigrants since the 1970s. It should be noted that, in the statistics published by Immigration Canada, immigrants from all of Hong Kong, Taiwan and China were grouped together until 1970. From 1971, figures for each of these source countries have been reported separately.⁴ In the present research, I used figures only after 1971 to discuss the diversity of the Chinese population. Although the diversity of Chinese population started to appear in the 1960s, when the Government of Canada changed its immigration regulations (Li, 1998), the significant immigration to Canada from Hong Kong, Taiwan and China did not happen until 1973.⁵ Therefore, the lack of data in the 1960s may not lead to an important omission in delineating the diverse structure of Chinese population in Canada.

3.3 Documentary and Historical Data

The historical data about Chinese newspapers in Canada can be found in *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* (1892 to 1942) and *Canadian Advertising Rates and Data* (CARD, 1928 to present), two major sources of newspaper information in this

country.[5] These two sources usually contain basic information about Chinese newspapers, such as location, founding year, publisher, frequency (daily, weekly or monthly), format (broadsheet or tabloid), circulation, and advertising rates, thus providing data concerning the Chinese newspapers in Canada since early this century.

However, two problems arise when information from the two sources is used. First, the number of Chinese newspapers being listed is usually underestimated. For instance, in 1933 *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* reported that there were three daily Chinese newspapers in Canada (Mckim's, 1933: 446), but according to other sources, at least four daily Chinese newspapers were published in that year (Fei, 1976: 125-126; Lo and Lai, 1976: 110, 112 and 116). In 1986 there were at least 12 Chinese publications in Canada,⁶ but CARD listed only 7 publications (1986: 62). Second, no circulation figures of Chinese newspapers have been audited and therefore the circulation figures tend to be inflated, though it is difficult to determine the extent of exaggeration.⁷

With respect to the problem of the underestimation of the number of Chinese newspapers, I have supplemented those data by consulting several other newspaper directories, such as *Ontario Ethnic-Cultural Newspapers, 1935-1972*, *Ethnic Publication in Canada: Newspapers, Periodicals, Magazines, Bulletins, Newsletters*, and *Chinese Newspapers Published in North America, 1854-1975*. Although these newspaper directories contain less information about the newspapers than *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* and *CARD*, they usually have a more complete list of the newspapers. By consulting these newspaper directories, I obtained relatively accurate numbers for the Chinese newspapers published in Canada since early this century.

With respect to the problem of the inflation of circulation figures, actual circulation figures are difficult to obtain. This is because the Chinese newspapers have rarely revealed these figures, even after having been closed for many years. As well, although I was provided with several estimates of circulation during my fieldwork, it is unclear where these figures come from and it is impossible to verify the accuracy of these estimates. As a result, the present research decided to use circulation figures published in *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* and CARD. Three points should be made regarding my use of circulation figures from these two sources. First, when I use these circulation figures, I put “claimed” before the figures, indicating that they are not verified figures but reported by Chinese newspapers themselves. Second, although individual newspapers might inflate their circulation figures, some evidence suggests that there exist certain relationships between the claimed figures and actual figures.⁸ In other words, when actual circulation figures rose, the claimed figures went up too, though the gap between them might vary among Chinese newspapers. If this is the case, I can assume that to a certain degree the increased percentages of circulation calculated from *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* and CARD reflect actual increases in rates of circulation. Third, in the present research the total circulation figure of Chinese newspapers in Canada was calculated for several different periods. This calculation is based on circulation figures claimed by Chinese newspapers listed in *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* (1910-1940) and *CARD* (1941 to present). Because, as just noted, Chinese newspapers in these two sources are underestimated, the total circulation figure based on the two sources is expected to be less inflated than those of individual newspapers.

Several historical publications on the Chinese press in North America also provide valuable information for my research. For instance, Wickberg's book (1981), *From China to Canada*, contains significant information about the Chinese press in Canada early this century. Lum's article (1992), "Recognition and Toronto Chinese Community", provides the first-hand data about the Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Lai's two articles (1987 and 1990), "The Chinese-American Press" and "The Chinese Press in the United States and Canada since World War II: A Diversity of Voices", not only provide a detailed historical review of the Chinese press in the United States from the 1850s to 1980s, but also contain information about the Chinese newspapers in Canada from early this century to the 1980s. Much of my historical review of the Chinese press in Canada and the United States is based on their research. In addition, some government documents such as business registration records, early newspaper file, and personal archives, were also consulted in the study of early Chinese newspapers in North America.

3.4 Content Analysis

The content analysis is based on data collected by Li and Li (1999) in their study on Chinese advertising in Toronto. The data contain information about 9,655 display advertisements in twenty issues of *Ming Pao* which were randomly selected from all the *Ming Pao* newspapers published between February 20 and October 19, 1996. The choice of *Ming Pao* is influenced by two factors: first, authors have access to some newspaper sources to enable them to cross check their findings on *Ming Pao*'s advertising revenue; second, their reading of the newspapers suggests that all three papers are similar in their

advertising patterns. The period was selected to avoid Christmas, New Year and the Chinese New Year, when advertisements may have appeared more frequently than at other times. For each display advertisement, information about the size of the advertisement, the product or service being marketed, the name of the firm, and location of the firm were coded. Firms were coded as Chinese-operated or non-Chinese operated on the basis of their names. Firms that have only English names or Chinese names which are transliterations were coded as non-Chinese firms since Chinese firms do not use transliterations or use only English names; as well, companies that have a Chinese name but are obviously not Chinese firms were coded as non-Chinese firms. Finally, on the basis of the display advertisements in 20 days of *Ming Pao*, the annual advertising revenue was estimated using various calculation which were then extrapolated for the three major Chinese daily newspapers based on their market share. In the present research, the data generated by Li and Li were used to examine the size and nature of advertising in the Chinese newspapers in 1996 as well as advertising contributions by Chinese and non-Chinese firms.

In addition, the content analysis was also performed on several news reports in three Chinese newspapers such as Prime Minister Jean Chretien's trip to China in 1994, the 1995 Ontario provincial election, and the 1995 referendum in Quebec. The information generated from the content analysis was used to compare three Chinese newspapers with respect to their news reporting.

By employing the methodology of fieldwork and content analysis and by using statistical data as well documentary and historical data, we will explain why and how the Chinese newspapers in Canada expanded significantly since the 1970s.

Endnotes — Chapter 3

1. In the early stage of my fieldwork, I made several attempts to directly contact people whom I intended to interview, but all my requests were rejected on the grounds that they were too busy to have time for such an interview.
2. For a discussion concerning actual Chinese readership data in Toronto, see note 2, Chapter 5.
3. See Chapter 6.3.
4. See Chapter 5.1.
5. A McKim Limited in Toronto published *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* every two years between 1892 and 1917 and then turned it into annual publication until 1942. The newspaper directory started to publish information about the Chinese newspaper in 1909. Maclean Hunter in Toronto publishes *Canadian Advertising Rates and Data* (CARD) monthly, and the directory has contained data about the Chinese newspaper in a section “Ethnic Publication” (Or “Foreign Language Publications before 1983). Since 1995, CARD has published a separate journal, *Ethnic Media and Market*, which is developed from the section “Ethnic Publication” of CARD. The new journal is part of CARD publication, but contains more information about the ethnic media than that of “Ethnic Publication”.
6. This number is compiled from information from Gu (1986: 41) and CARD (1986: 62).
7. Several researchers (e.g., Turek, 1962; Pili, 1982) have found that some ethnic papers in Canada reported inflated circulation figures to newspaper directories. For instance, in her study of a Finnish-language newspaper in Canada from 1919 to 1939, Pili (1982: 194) compared circulation figures estimated from subscription income with those reported in *Canadian Almanac*, finding that in the most case the latter was inflated, ranging from 10 per cent to 85 per cent. Such a situation happened partly because the newspaper directories do not require that circulation figures be verified, and partly because advertising rates are determined by a circulation figure and a higher circulation figure would increase advertising rates.
8. For instance, according to *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* (1934: 451; 1939: 469), *Shing Wah* has a claimed circulation of 2,450 in 1934 and 7,000 in 1939. Although it is impossible to verify the circulation figures, it is commonly acknowledged that *Shing Wah* did build its highest circulation during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945 (see Chapter 4.3). Therefore, the increase in claimed circulation figures from 1934 to 1939 somewhat reflects the increase in actual circulation.

CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL REVIEW: CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND THE CHINESE PRESS IN CANADA BEFORE THE 1970S

In this chapter I review the history of Chinese immigration and the Chinese press in Canada before the 1970s, providing context for recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. I first examine Chinese immigration to Canada in general and to Toronto in particular. Then I discuss the history of the Chinese press in the United States, to which the Chinese press in Canada has been closely related. Finally, I look at the historical development of the Chinese press in Canada from 1903, when the first Chinese newspaper was published in Vancouver, to the 1970s, when Chinese newspapers grew.

4.1 Chinese Immigration to Canada

According to Li (1992: 265), the history of the Chinese in Canada can be divided into three periods which roughly correspond to the major changes in Canada's legislation towards the Chinese with respect to civil rights and immigration. The first period is from 1858 to 1923, in which "the Chinese became victims of institutional racism and were intensively subjected to legislative control" (ibid.). The second period, from 1924 to 1947, was characterized by exclusion, and "as a result of the Chinese

Immigration Act, no Chinese were allowed to immigrate to Canada, and the Chinese in this country continued to face legislative exclusion and social animosity" (ibid.). The third period includes the years from 1947 onwards, in which "the discriminatory laws against the Chinese have been repealed, and Chinese Canadians have gradually gained their civil rights and enjoyed an improved social status" (ibid.). The history of Chinese in Canada suggests that the distinction between periods has more to do with broader forces within Canadian society than with any natural process of change within the Chinese community. In other words, it is the Canadian government's policy towards the Chinese and the social reception accorded to them that largely determined the structure and direction of the Chinese community (ibid.).

4.1.1 First Period: 1858-1923

The first wave of Chinese immigration took place in the late 1850s as a result of the discovery of gold along the Fraser River (Li, 1998: 16; Wickberg, 1982: 13-20; Lee, 1967: 59; Lai, 1988: 15-16). According to Lee (1967: 59), the first group of Chinese, who came from California, arrived in Victoria on June 28, 1858. The first Chinese to come from Hong Kong arrived in the spring of 1859 (Morton, 1974: 7). In 1860, several of the ships coming from Hong Kong carried an increasing number of passengers. The *Victoria Daily Colonist* estimated that a total of 4,000 Chinese arrived in Victoria during 1860 alone (cited in Wickberg, 1982: 13). In the early 1860s, as many as 6,000-7,000 Chinese lived in British Columbia (ibid.: 14). Their numbers, however, fluctuated with the prosperity of the mines. By 1866, when gold fever was declining, the governor estimated the Chinese population in the province at 1,750 (Tan & Roy, 1985: 7). The

first census of Canada, in 1871, gave the number of Chinese in British Columbia as 1,548 (Wickberg, 1982: 19). While this figure might underestimate the number of the Chinese in Canada,¹ it is reasonable to believe that “many Chinese departed Canada after the gold rush had petered out and the provisioning and servicing of mining communities no longer provided the lucrative employment it had in the early 1860s” (ibid.).

The second wave of Chinese immigration was inspired by Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) construction, which created a massive demand for labor (Li, 1998: 16; Wickberg, 1982: 20-22; Lai, 1988: 31-33; Lee, 1967: 123-130; Hoe, 1976: 40-43). From 1881 to 1884, a total of 15,791 Chinese entered Canada from the United States and China, more than half of whom came in 1882 and 1883, when the demand for labor for the construction of the railway was at its height (Royal Commission, 1885: v). The lives of the Chinese railroad men were miserable, they were exploited and given low wages. Many died from building the tunnels through the Canadian Rockies and some died from exposure and diseases in the wilderness (Lee, 1967: 130-131). This second wave of immigration, however, substantially increased the Chinese population in Canada. The 1881 Census estimated the number of Chinese in B.C. as 4,400. The number increased to about 9,126 in 1891 (Department of Agriculture, 1893: 134, cited in Li, 1992b: 266). By 1901, the number of Chinese in Canada had reached 17,314 (Statistics Canada, 1941: 684-92, cited in ibid.).

Early Chinese immigration to Canada was essentially driven by two forces: “pulling” and “pushing” (Li, 1992b: 266). The “pulling” force was the need for massive labor power in the development of western Canada. “Since Chinese labor was available

in large quantity and at low cost, it was attractive to railroad contractors, manufacturers and employers in Canada" (ibid.).

The "pushing" force seems to relate to the social and economic disruption in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Population pressure was probably most often mentioned in the literature on Chinese immigration (Li, 1998: 18; Wickberg, 1982: 6; Tan & Roy, 1985: 3). According to one estimate, China's population almost doubled, from between 200 and 250 million in 1750 to about 410 million in 1850, while cultivated land increased only from 950 million mu (mou) in 1766 to 1,210 million mu in 1873 (Perkins, 1969: 216 and 240, cited in Li, 1998: 18). The population pressure was especially acute in the south. In the southeastern province of Guangdong, the population reached 31 million by the end of the Qing dynasty (1911) and the average density was some 600 people per square kilometer (Tan & Roy, 1985: 3). The early emigrants to Canada came mainly from this part of the province. In addition, political instability was another force that propelled the wave of immigration. "A weak and corrupt imperial government was succeeded by incompetent republic governments which could neither impose new political institutions nor control the rampant banditry and persistent chaos and warfare in the country" (Wickberg, 1982: 6). Moreover, the disintegration of China's social economy brought about by western capitalist expansion had much to do with out-migration. On the one hand, the West's forcible opening of the Chinese market and the loss of Chinese tariff autonomy seriously upset the handicraft industries (Li, 1998: 18; Tan and Roy, 1985: 3). On the other hand, as Tan and Roy (ibid.) stated, "the influx of cheap, machine-made foreign cloth of good quality slowed the development of local industry and all but ruined the cottage industry which had

provided peasant families with a source of extra income." Migration, whether it be to the new weaving centers of the cities or overseas, offered an opportunity to enhance the family economy. Finally, social disruption and a series of natural catastrophes were also the "pushing" forces of migration. In the mid-nineteenth century, when the Chinese began to migrate to Canada, China was in the throes of the great Taiping Uprising, a radical millenarian movement that produced a vast civil war in which, by the most conservative estimates, 20 million people perished (Wickberg, 1982: 6). Towards the second half of the nineteenth century China also suffered frequent natural disasters such as floods and famines, which further intensified the social contradiction in China, characterized by the control of absentee landlords and the poverty of peasant-tenants (Li, 1998: 18).

From the beginning of Chinese immigration to Canada, Chinese immigrants were the target of prejudice and discrimination and this led, during the years that followed, to a variety of legal and political barriers being erected (ibid.: 31-37; Wickberg, 1982: 42-51). The first attempt at discriminatory legislation against the Chinese in Canada took place only two years after their arrival, when the relations between the Chinese and whites were thought to be cordial. In 1860 the House of Assembly of the Colony of Vancouver Island proposed a poll tax of \$10 to be levied on each Chinese in the colony (Wickberg, 1982: 42). In the 1870s, the parliament of British Columbia attempted at least three times to levy a special annual tax on the Chinese (Li, 1998: 32). Although these attempts failed and the tax was dropped, the parliament of British Columbia did succeed in passing a bill to disenfranchise the Chinese in 1875 (Statutes of B.C. 1875, no. 2, cited in ibid.), and subsequent legislation continued to bar

them from voting in provincial election (Statutes of B.C. 1896, c. 38, cited in *ibid.*). In 1878, legislation was unanimously passed by the provincial parliament prohibiting the employment of Chinese on public work (Wickberg, 1982: 46). These legislative controls reflected anti-Chinese feeling in the province, which resulted from economic recessions after the 1860s and white labor's fear that the Chinese were undercutting wages (Lai, 1988: 27-28).

By 1884 British Columbia politicians were placing increasing pressure on the Dominion government to restrict Chinese immigration, and as a result a Royal Commission on Chinese immigration was established (Li, 1998: 34; Wickberg, 1982: 53). Earlier the federal government was reluctant to restrict Chinese immigration for fear that labor shortage might jeopardize the completion of the CPR. Prime Minister Macdonald was echoing such concerns when he frankly told the House in 1883: "It will be all very well to exclude Chinese labor, when we can replace it with white labor, but until that can be done, it is better to have Chinese labor than no labor at all" (Canada House of Commons Debates, 1883: 905, cited in Li, 1998: 34).

This argument indicated a utilitarian mentality towards the Chinese, who were considered an inferior race. It also implied that "legislative controls on the Chinese were inevitable as soon as B.C.'s major development projects were completed and Chinese labor became dispensable" (*ibid.*).

In 1885, when the project was completed and Chinese labor was no longer needed, legislation was passed, requiring Chinese immigrants to pay a head tax of \$50 (*ibid.*). The same act limited Chinese passages to one for every fifty tons of tonnage, which "made it impossible for companies to charter ships to bring large numbers of Chinese

immigrants to Canada" (Wickberg, 1982: 57). When entering Canada, the Chinese were given a certificate of entry or residence, which had to be returned to the controller in exchange for a certificate of leave when they left Canada, even temporarily; otherwise they would not be allowed to return (*ibid.*). The new law had an immediate effect on Chinese immigration. Net Chinese immigration was negative in the five years after 1885, and the Chinese population in Canada declined to about 9,100 in 1890 (Wickberg, 1982: 296). However, it soon became clear that the 1885 legislation was not a powerful deterrent to Chinese immigration, and the Chinese population in Canada increased steadily from 9,129 in 1891 to 17,312 in 1901 (Census Canada, 1891 and 1901, cited in *ibid.*). Under pressure from B.C., the House raised the head tax to \$100 in 1900 and \$500 in 1903 (Statutes of Canada, 1900, c. 32 and Statutes of Canada, 1903, c. 8, cited in Li, 1998: 34).

In 1923 the Canadian parliament passed the Chinese Immigration Act, "the most comprehensive legislation to prevent Chinese from entering the country and to control those already here" (*ibid.*). According to the act, only four classes of immigrants were to be allowed to enter. These were university students, merchants, native-borns returning from several years of education in China, and diplomatic personnel (Statutes of Canada 1923, c. 38, s. 5, cited in *ibid.*). All other Chinese were in essence excluded from entry. Those seeking admission were to be segregated from the public for examination. The Act also stipulated that "every person of Chinese origin in Canada, irrespective of citizenship, was required to register with the government of Canada within twelve months after the act came into force and to obtain a certificate of such registration" (*ibid.*). Any Chinese person failing to register would be subject to a fine of up to \$500 or

imprisonment for up to twelve months, or both. Furthermore, "every Chinese in Canada who intended to leave the country temporarily and return at a later date had to give written notice to the Controller before departure, specifying the foreign port or place he planned to visit and the route he intended to take" (ibid.). Those who had so registered before leaving Canada would be allowed to return within two years, while those leaving Canada without registering would be treated as new immigrants seeking entry upon their return (ibid.). As Li (ibid.) pointed out, the Act virtually stopped any future immigration to Canada, and legalized the inferior status of those already in the country.

4.1.2 The Second Period: 1924-1947

During the whole exclusion era from 1924 to 1947, only eight Chinese were allowed into Canada under the Act (Morton, 1974: 243).² "Many older men retired to China; others lacking employment during the Depression were encouraged to return to China. These losses were not balanced by gains in natural growth. There were not enough Chinese women in Canada to produce substantial natural population increase" (Wickberg, 1982: 148). The demographic results of the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act are readily visible in Table 4.1.

In the 1920's natural increase offset the termination of immigration, adding 7,000 members to the Chinese population. After that, deaths and departures caused the population to drop even below the 1921 level. It is not surprising that there were predictions that the Chinese population of Canada would eventually be "dying out" (Woodsworth, 1937: 268-270).

Table 4.1 Total Chinese Population, Canada, 1901-1941

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Total Chinese Population</u> | <u>As per cent of total Canadian population</u> |
|-------------|---------------------------------|---|
| 1901 | 17,312 | .32% |
| 1911 | 27,774 | .39% |
| 1921 | 39,587 | .45% |
| 1931 | 46,519 | .45% |
| 1941 | 34,627 | .30% |

Sources: Census of Canada, 1911, II, p. 367; 1921, I, p. 353; 1931, II, p. 396; 1941, IV, p. 2, cited in Wickberg, 1982: 148.

Another consequence of institutional racism and restrictive immigration policy towards the Chinese was to place the Chinese at a disadvantage in the Canadian labor market. In his study of occupation patterns of the Chinese, Li (1988: 48) found that between 1885 and 1931 some major shifts took place in the occupational patterns of the Chinese. On the one hand, the percentage of the Chinese in the unskilled labor sector remained unchanged. For example, in 1885 farm and other laborers composed about 21 per cent of the Chinese labor force, and by 1921 that percentage had increased to about 30 per cent (farm laborers 6.5 per cent; other laborers 24.4 per cent). This pattern persisted in 1931, with farm laborers making up 7.5 per cent, and other laborers another 21.4 per cent. On the other hand, food canners decreased from 7.6 per cent in 1885 to 3.2 per cent in 1921 and 1.6 per cent in 1931. As Li (*ibid.*) stated, "These changes indicate both the persistence of the Chinese in the unskilled labor sector and their gradual exclusion from the manufacturing occupations in which they had previously

gained a foothold." These figures also support the argument that institutional racism limited the bargaining power of the Chinese and confined them to marginal participation in the labor market (*ibid.*).

Related to the above shifts was the establishment of ethnic businesses among the Chinese. Statistics compiled by Li (*ibid.*: 47) show that in 1885 less than 5 percent of the Chinese were engaged in laundry and restaurant work (servants, cooks and waiters, 3 per cent; laundry workers, 1.7 per cent). By 1921, servants, cooks, waiters, and laundry workers made up 32 per cent, and by 1931, they comprised 40 per cent. The corresponding figures for laundry and restaurant owners were 0.1 per cent for 1885, 15.8 per cent for 1921, and 11.1 per cent for 1931. These figures indicate that, as institutional racism made it difficult for the Chinese to seek jobs in the core labor market, they retreated to an ethnic business enclave, which was noncompetitive with white labor and, at the same time, accepted by the dominant society (Li, 1992b: 269: 1978). The rise of small businesses such as Chinese laundries and restaurants "may be viewed as a survival adaptation, a way of developing alternative economic opportunities within a hostile labor market" (Li, 1998: 53).

Institutional racism and restrictive immigration policy towards the Chinese also delayed the development of the Chinese Canadian family. The early immigrants usually left their families behind; or if they left when they were single, they would return later to get married in home villages. While overseas, they saved money and returned to visit their families in China periodically. It is sometimes argued that the Chinese were reluctant to immigrate with their families because of a "sojourner orientation" (see, for example, Siu, 1952). Li's research (1998: 64-65; 1992: 269), however, showed that the

absence of families in the Chinese communities resulted from economic hardship and social hostility in the period prior to the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, when it was still legally possible to sponsor them. For example, the high cost of the passage money and the head tax made it difficult for the Chinese to bring their wives and children to Canada. As a matter of fact, most Chinese probably had difficulty raising the money for their own entry, let alone for that of family members. Social hostility and rampant discrimination against the Chinese also tended to discourage them from bringing their families with them (Li, 1998: 63-66; also see Yee, 1988: 30). As a witness who testified before the 1902 commission said, "A large proportion of them would bring their families here were it not for the unfriendly reception they got here during recent years, which creates an unsettled feeling" (Royal Commission, 1902: 236). After 1923 and until 1947, the Chinese Immigration Act excluded all Chinese from immigrating, making it legally impossible for many wives in China to join their husbands in Canada (Li, 1998: 65).

As a result of these financial and legal hardships, the Chinese community in Canada remained a predominantly male society (ibid.; ibid., 1992b: 269). For example, in 1911, among the 27,831 Chinese in Canada, the sex ratio was 2,800 men to 100 women; and in 1931, the sex ratio remained 1,240 men to 100 women among 46,519 Chinese (ibid., 1992b: 296). Before the Second World War, the unbalanced sex ratio among the Chinese population was the most severe among all ethnic groups in Canada (ibid.). The separation between husbands and wives created the married bachelor society, since they often lived by themselves in clan associations and did their own cooking and laundry (Hoe, 1976: 271). Since they engaged in low-paying jobs, it took them many years to

save enough money to visit their families in China. However, they could stay in China for only up to two years; otherwise they would lose their permission to return to Canada. Many Chinese would have to wait for decades - until the repeal of legislation in 1947- before they had a chance to reunite with their families (Li, 1992b: 270). The absence of wives and families meant that the growth of a second generation was delayed (ibid.). For example, by 1931, Chinese Canadians born in Canada made up only twelve percent of the total Chinese population, despite a seventy-three-year-long history of immigration (ibid.: 1998: 67). Only with changes in immigration policy in 1947 was a more balanced sex ratio gradually restored among the Chinese community, and a sizable second and their generation of Chinese Canadians began to emerge (ibid.).

4.1.3 Third Period: 1947-the 1970s

The Post-War Chinese immigration to Canada could be divided into two sub-periods: the period from 1947 to 1967 was characterized by the limited admission of Chinese immigrants; in the period after 1968, when Canada adopted a universal point system of assessing potential immigrants, the Chinese were admitted under the same criteria as people of other origins (Li, 1998: 94). Here, I discuss only the Chinese immigration to Canada before 1967, while that after 1967, which is closely related to recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada, will be examined in the next chapter.

As Li pointed out (1992: 270), towards the end of the Second World War, the discriminatory policy towards the Chinese had become an embarrassment for Canada, since China became an ally of Canada and the United States soon after the outbreak of

the war in the Pacific in 1941, and 400 Chinese Canadians from British Columbia joined the Canadian forces (ibid.; Lai, 1988: 102). The war initiated a change in the American government's attitude towards Chinese migration to the United States. Beginning in early 1943 the United States moved toward abandoning its Chinese Exclusion Act, which finally was repealed in 1944 in favor of admitting a small quota of Chinese every year (Li, 1977; Lai, 1988: 102). In addition, the diplomatic relation between Canada and China was upgraded from representation to embassy level in 1943 (Wickberg, 1982: 205), and in the following year a treaty was signed, which did not deal specifically with immigration but included general terms giving nationals of each country rights to travel and reside in an other country (ibid.). As Wickberg (ibid.) said, "It was difficult to see how the 1923 law could be sustained in the face of an such agreement." Moreover, in 1944 the United Nations Charter was formulated, containing statements about human rights and non-discrimination which was contradictory to the 1923 law (ibid.; Li, 1992b: 270). Finally, after the war was over, the Chinese people in Canada started lobbying Parliament to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act while Chinese veterans demanded equal treatment (Wickberg, 1982: 205-206; Lai, 1989: 102).

All these developments inside and outside Canada prompted the Canadian government to reconsider its own policies concerning the Chinese. Eventually, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed on 14 May 1947, "lifting an exclusion of Chinese immigration to Canada that had lasted for twenty-four years" (Li, 1992b: 270). However, the traditional Canadian fear of being "swamped" by the Chinese persisted, as is indicated by Prime Minister Mackenzie King's frequently quoted statement to the House on 1 May 1947:

The people of Canada do not wish a fundamental alteration in the Character of their population through mass immigration. The government is therefore opposed to "large-scale immigration from the orient", which would certainly give rise to social and economic problems, which might lead to serious international difficulties (Canadian Year Book, 1957-58:171, cited in Hoe, 1976: 53-54).

Thus in terms of Order-in-Council PC 2115, admission of Chinese immigrants was restricted to a citizen's wife and unmarried children under eighteen years of age (Wickberg, 1982: 210). However, very few Chinese were Canadian citizens. In 1941, for example, of 34,627 Chinese in Canada, only 2,055 Chinese or 6 per cent were naturalized (Lai, 1988: 103). Therefore, few Chinese were qualified to bring their families to Canada. In the first few years after the Exclusion Act was repealed, an average of about 500 Chinese immigrants were admitted each year to Canada (ibid.). In addition, the age limit also prevented more Chinese children from coming to this country. Many Chinese Canadians had married in China and had adult children there, who were excluded from Canada. Repeal of the 1923 Act seemed a mockery to them (Wickberg, 1982: 211).

On the other hand, preferential treatment was given to European immigrants in order to foster growth of a white population in Canada (Lai, 1989: 103). For example, under the Close Relatives Plan, European Canadians could bring to Canada their parents, sons, daughters, brothers, or sisters together with their spouses and other close relatives. Under the Group Movement Plan, European immigrants, were selected according to the recognized manpower needs by Canadian Immigration Labor teams traveling in Europe, rather than being nominated individually by Canadian residents (ibid.). Chinese and

other Asians did not have the same right of entry into Canada as Europeans chosen under these plans. Of the 282,164 immigrant arrivals in 1957, for example, 36 per cent were British, 11 per cent Hungarian, 10 per cent Italian, 9 per cent German, and 4 per cent Dutch. Only 0.6 per cent were Chinese, 0.3 Indians, and 0.1 Japanese (*ibid.*).

Despite limited admission of Chinese immigrants to Canada in the two decades after 1947, the number of Chinese immigrants increased (see table 4.2). From 1950 to 1959, over 2,000 Chinese immigrated to Canada annually. Between 1948 and 1967, a total of 40,593 Chinese immigrants came to Canada, many immigrating as a family unit (Li, 1992b: 271). The effects of the 1947 repeal were also reflected in the sex ratio of the Chinese population. By 1961, there were a total of 36,075 males to 22,122 females (Wickberg, 1982: 217). As Li (1988: 92) pointed out, "This wave of migration gradually altered the size and structure of the Chinese community in Canada, hitherto characterized by an aging male population."

The new regulations that emerged in 1962 removed the emphasis on the country of origin as a major criterion for admission to Canada. The desired characteristics of migrants were set out in general terms, and the ability of the migrant to establish himself was stressed (Wickberg, 1982: 244). The policy, however, still had a discriminatory clause which permitted a more restricted range of sponsorship than for those applying from Europe and America (Hawkins, 1988: 125-126, cited in Li, 1992b: 271). It was not until 1967, when Canada adopted a universal point system of assessing potential immigrants, that people from all parts of the world were given an equal opportunity to qualify for admission (*ibid.*; Lai, 1988: 105). Under the point system prospective Chinese immigrants were treated exactly the same as immigrants of other nationalities

Table 4.2 Chinese immigration to Canada, 1946-65

| Period | Number of Persons | |
|---------|-------------------|----------------|
| | Total | Annual average |
| 1946-50 | 2,654 | 531 |
| 1951-55 | 11,524 | 2,305 |
| 1956-60 | 10,407 | 2,081 |
| 1961-65 | 11,785 | 2,357 |

Sources: Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Statistics, 1946-65, cited in Lai, 1989, p. 103.

and were selected for admission according to education, training, skills, and other criteria linked to the economic and manpower requirements. As a result, Chinese immigration to Canada accelerated which produced many significant changes in the Chinese community in Canada.

4.2 The Chinese in Toronto

Although the largest concentration of Chinese in Canada remained in British Columbia until the early 1970s, a gradual internal migration of Chinese from British Columbia to the eastern provinces began in the late nineteenth century (see table 14, Lai, 1989: 61). The initial shift of the population might have to do with two events. First, once the CPR was completed, Chinese workers were discharged. As no provision had been made for their welfare, thousands of unemployed Chinese found themselves scattered among small towns which had grown up next to the tracks or in Victoria, then

the largest center on the west coast. A small number decided to travel eastward to the prairies, while others went farther on to Toronto (Nipp, 1985: 148). Secondly, during the late 1880s and early 1890s, new Chinese immigrants still chose to settle in British Columbia where most Chinese had settled. However, the growing hostility toward the Chinese in the province induced many to move east to other provinces.³ Chinese communities appeared in Calgary, Moose Jaw, Regina, and other small towns of the prairie provinces. Some Chinese went further to Ontario and Quebec "where job opportunities were greater and the host society was less hostile" (Lai, 1988: 61). In 1901, only 4 per cent of Canada's Chinese people lived in Ontario and 3 per cent in the prairie provinces, but by 1921 the percentages increased to 14 and 19 respectively (ibid.). As a result, British Columbia's share of Canada's Chinese population declined. In 1881, 99 out of every 100 Chinese in Canada lived in British Columbia. In 1901, 86 out of every 100 lived there, and by 1921 only 59 Chinese per 100 lived in B.C. (compiled from the censuses of Canada 1881, 1901, and 1921, cited in Thompson, 1989: 38-39).

Circa 1890, there were a few Chinese in Toronto, probably numbering about 100 (Wickberg, 1982: 91). The Chinese population in Toronto grew rapidly during the first decade of the twentieth century. Table 4.3 summarizes the population growth and business expansion of Toronto's Chinese community from 1880 to 1923. First, these years saw a tremendous increase in the Chinese population. In 1901, there were 159 Chinese living in Toronto. By 1908, Toronto's Chinese population numbered 1,000, an increase of approximately 6 times over seven years. By 1917, the number increased to

Table 4.3 Chinese Population and Chinese Business in Toronto, 1881-1923

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Population</u> | <u>Business</u> | | |
|-------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|---------------|
| | | <u>Laundries</u> | <u>Restaurants</u> | <u>Others</u> |
| 1880 | 11 | 4 | -- | -- |
| 1891 | 33 | 24 | -- | -- |
| 1901 | 159 | 95 | -- | -- |
| 1908 | 1,000 | 237 | 13 | 2 |
| 1917 | 1,800 | 358 | 32 | 9 |
| 1923 | 2,500 | 471 | 202 | 9 |

Source: Thompson, 1989: 41.

1,800 and to 2,500 by 1923. The majority of these Chinese were male and many were single, but others were married with families in China (Nipp, 1985: 160). Second, laundries were the dominant business among the Chinese in Toronto. In 1891 there were 24 laundries among 33 Chinese in the entire city. By 1901, there were 95 Chinese laundries in a Chinese population of 195. After 1901, Chinese laundries continued to grow and dominate Toronto's Chinese community, although Chinese restaurants emerged and expanded. Laundries were generally run by individuals or close relatives. The initial capital required to set up a laundry was approximately 5 to 6 hundred dollars (Nipp, 1985: 160). This was a manageable amount for most prospective operators. In addition, although the profits of laundries proved to be lower than from other business, they were still a fairly secure investment. During economic slumps the laundry business did not necessarily fluctuate with the changes.⁴ Third, between 1917 and 1923 there was an enormous growth in Chinese restaurants in Toronto. This expansion probably had to

do with Toronto's increase in population and business immediately following World War I, which might have contributed to the rise in demand for Chinese restaurants (Thompson, 1989: 41). More importantly, the small cafe was a kind of business where several Chinese "cousins" would invest together, share the work, and keep business and personal expenses to a minimum, thereby insuring some small margin of profit (ibid.: 42). In other words, like the laundry, the restaurant business was a haven of survival for many Chinese when institutional racism made it increasingly difficult for them to seek employment in the core labor market (Li, 1992b: 269).

As Lai (1989: 97) pointed out in 1900, the city's 200 Chinese residents and 95 Chinese businesses were widely scattered, although a few laundries and stores were concentrated on Church and Yonge streets and along Queen Street East and West. During the period from 1910 to 1915, however, a discernible Chinatown area emerged in Toronto:

By 1910, two clusters of Chinese business establishments emerged. Seven business concerns were set up on Queen Street East, and the Chinese Empire Reform Association also established a local office there. Another group of nine Chinese business concerns or lodgings was located on York Street; on the same street was the Chee Kung Tong lodge. These two Chinatowns were still in the budding stage in the early 1910s. However, after the downfall of the Manchu government, the Chinese Empire Reform Association became defunct; Chinese business near the association moved out and the budding Chinatown on Queen Street east was dead. On the other hand, the budding Chinatown on York Street was growing as the Jewish community there moved to the suburb north of Queen Street and the Chinese people moved in. The increasing number of Chinese residents and business in the York Street area prompted the editor of Toronto's *Saturday Night* to warn the white public of the Chinese influence on the city and advocate the policy of "keeping the Chinese on the move" so no Chinese quarter could develop in Toronto. *Jack Caunck*, another local labor paper, supported this policy, since the development of a Chinatown would have "dangerous consequences" for the city. However, these policies had the opposite

effect, inducing the Chinese to locate their business and residences closer to one another for mutual protection. By 1911, Toronto had a Chinese population of about one thousand, and the Chinatown on the York and Elizabeth streets began to boom. Throughout the 1910s, Toronto's Chinatown expanded rapidly northward along Elizabeth Street to Dundas Street West; after the 1920s, Toronto's Chinatown was the third largest Chinatown in Canada after Vancouver's and Victoria's, a position it held until the end of the Second World War. In addition to a great variety of small business, Toronto's Chinatown had many clan and county associations, Chinese churches, school, theaters, and opera house (Lai, 1988: 98-99).

However, after 1923, like other Chinatowns in Canada, Toronto's Chinatown was seriously affected by the Chinese Immigration Act. By 1930, the number of laundries declined to 355; a loss of 116 in 1923. The decades of the 1930s and 1940s saw a gradual stabilization of Chinese business but at a lower level than during the early 1920s. In 1943 there were 316 laundries and 85 restaurants owned and operated by Chinese (City of Toronto Directory 1943, cited in Thompson, 1989: 43). The decline in business was due mainly to the death of many of the early Chinese immigrants. Their loss was not replaced by either internal migration to Toronto or by new overseas immigration. Between 1931 and 1941 Toronto's Chinese population decreased by more than 400 (Census of Canada 1931 and 1941, cited in *ibid.*)⁵

Despite a drop in population and business, Toronto's Chinese community played an increasingly significant role in various affairs in the Chinese community in Canada, among them the war fund-raising and campaign repealing the Chinese Immigration Act.

When the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, the Chinese government called upon the Chinese residing overseas for financial assistance. The Overseas Chinese, including those in Canada, responded enthusiastically. During the course of the war, 1937-45,

there were fund drives for almost every conceivable military purpose. It is estimated that the Chinese in Canada contributed Can \$5 million - or about \$125 per capita (Wickberg, 1982: 189). Vancouver and Toronto were the collection centers. A major fund-raising organizations in Toronto was the Chinese War Relief Fund, which was under the Chinese Patriotic Federation (CPF).⁶ It was authorized by the Canadian government under the War Charities Act to solicit relief funds, first in Ontario and later throughout Canada. The Chinese War Relief Fund, which provided medical and other aid to the wounded and the homeless, continued to exist after the war. It was estimated that in the five-year period from December, 1941, to December, 1946, over \$4 million was raised for this fund, mostly from white Canadians (Wickberg, 1982: 192).

When the Chinese Immigration Act was before Parliament in 1923, the Chinese communities across the country began to form committees to oppose it, or, failing that, to try to amend it.⁷ A national committee, the Chinese Association of Canada, was formed to lobby in Ottawa (ibid.: 1981: 174-175). In the daily operation of the headquarters, the Toronto influence was strong. The association was housed in the building of the Chinese Christian Association of Toronto at 124 University Avenue. Major leaders of the association were also leaders of the Toronto Chinese Christian Association (ibid., 1982: 142). Finally, of the eight members who went to Ottawa to lobby against the bill, three were from the Toronto Chinese Christian Association (T.C. Mark, Lig Hoan, and E.C. Mark). The others were Joseph Hope, Ho Lem (Calgary), Hum Wuon (Ottawa), and Fairman Wong and Reverend Lee Yuk-chin (Montreal) (ibid.). Vancouver, though the largest Chinese community, had no representative.

Also, in 1946 there was a concerted effort to bring about the repeal of the 1923 law.

The campaign was waged on two fronts. In Vancouver, "a CBA and association leader bombarded government offices with letters and spoke to every white group willing to listen" (Wickberg, 1981: 175).⁸ In Toronto, however, the drive was uniquely a joint white-Chinese enterprise (ibid.). By 1946 a Toronto-centered Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act had been formed. Initially, the executive group was composed of three Chinese professionals: a Chinese surgeon, the first Chinese lawyer in Canada and a professor of Chinese studies. Before long, this group expanded to include one white attorney, two white labor leaders, and two white clergymen (Wickberg, 1982: 205). Of the seventy-one names listed on the letterhead of the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, 80 per cent were not Chinese (ibid.). The Committee sent delegations to Ottawa to speak to the Minister of External Affairs, the Minister of Mines and Resources (who had jurisdiction over immigration matters), and the Director of the Immigration Branch (who was under the Mines and Resources department). It also sent briefs to the government and wrote numerous letters to leaders of Chinese and white organizations (ibid.). With this kind of support Toronto's effort probably became the most effective of all the Chinese communities' drives to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act (Wickberg, 1981: 175).

The greater role that the Toronto Chinese community played than did others might be mainly attributed to two factors. First, as Wickberg (1981: 174) pointed out, "Toronto was the largest Chinese community in eastern Canada. The logic of Canadian politics, in which closeness to Ottawa counts for a great deal, cast Toronto in the key role". Second, it had to do with the connection to the white community. It was the support from beyond the Chinese communities that greatly contributed to the success in

the war fund-raising and the repeal of the exclusive law (Baureiss, 1985; 259).

The repeal of the 1923 Act in 1947 made it possible for Chinese to come to Canada, although before 1962 the only category of immigration open to Chinese was that of sponsored relatives of Chinese-Canadians (Li, 1998: 95). In 1951, prior to the impact of the new immigration laws, Toronto's Chinese population was 2,879, or 9 per cent of Canada's total Chinese population of 32,528. By 1961, the number of Chinese in Toronto had reached 6,715, 11.5 per cent of the total 58,197 Chinese. Between 1947 and 1967, the number of Chinese in Canada increased by about 250 per cent, while the population of Toronto increased nearly 300 per cent to about 8,500 in 1966 (Thompson, 1989: 95-97).

During this period the new Chinese immigrants in Toronto also showed the same patterns as those in Canada in general. In 1951 there were 1,758 Chinese men and only 194 Chinese women in Toronto. By 1961 there were 3,615 men and 2,151 women (Census Canada 1951, 1961, cited in *ibid.*). The decade of the 1950s was characterized mainly by immigration of Chinese women, most of whom immigrated as "wives". As the sex ratio began to balance out a greater proportion of Chinese males began immigrating to Canada as well (*ibid.*).

As Nipp observed (1985: 171), the revival of Toronto's Chinatown came slowly, as the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947 did not create a sudden influx of immigrants. Chinatown gradually shifted northward along with the center of the city. Its business sector was bounded by Elizabeth Street, Bay Street, University Avenue and Dundas street. But in 1955, plans for construction of the new city hall in the center of this block forced the community to move once again. As Nipp (*ibid.*) put it, "Residential

and commercial dwellings were now found farther north and westward. Slowly, the Chinese also sought housing in the former Jewish neighborhood bounded by Spadina, University, Dundas and College streets. Hence a second or 'new' Chinatown was established." However, it was not until two decades later that the second Chinatown began flourishing as a result of expanding Chinese immigration and business in the 1970s.

4.3 The Chinese Press in the United States

Although Chinese immigration to Canada began in the late 1850s, the first Canadian Chinese newspaper was not published until early this century. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese community in Canada was primarily served by Chinese newspapers published in the United States (Lee, 1967: 347). When the Chinese press was published in Canada, many Chinese-Canadian newspapers had connections with Chinese-American newspapers, and some even grew out of Chinese newspapers in the United States. As a result, the Chinese newspapers in the two countries shared many similarities in format, political orientation, and production. The patterns of changes were also similar. To better understand the Chinese press in Canada, therefore, it is necessary to first examine the Chinese press in the United States.

The three major stages can be identified in the history of Chinese press in the United States. The first stage ran from the 1850s to 1890s, which was characterized by publication of nonpolitical newspapers. The second stage spanned a period of about seventy years, from the 1900s to 1960s. In these years many Chinese newspapers were established as organs and the Kuomintang gradually became a dominant power in the

Chinese press. The third stage began in the mid-1960s and extends to present time. During this stage, with a decline of Kuomintang's influence and rapidly growing Chinese immigrants, the Chinese press has been diverse and growing fast.

4.3.1 The Nonpolitical Newspapers: the 1850s to 1890s

During the mid-nineteenth century, the Gold Rush in California attracted thousands of immigrants from areas all over the world, including China. The Chinese population in the state grew rapidly from about 800 in 1849 to 25,000 in 1852, and a Chinese community was established in San Francisco, the major port of entry (Lai, 1987: 27). Lai (ibid.) pointed out, "The open Western society with flourishing technology and commerce in which the new community found itself provided a favorable environment for the birth of Chinese-American journalism."

Historians disagree about when the first Chinese newspaper was published in the United States, but most agree it began in San Francisco with a religious mission (Huntzicher, 1995: 77). In 1854, the Reverend William Speer published a one-sheet religious tract referred to as the *Gold Hill News*, *Golden Hill News*, or *Golden Mountain News*. Speer was corresponding secretary of the Presbyterian Church Board of Education and former missionary in China and in California. The intention of publishing this newspaper was said to "relieve the pressure of religious ignorance, settle and explain our laws, assist the Chinese to provide [for] their wants and soften, dignify and improve their general character" (The *Golden Hills' News*, June 10, 1854, cited in Lai, 1987: 28). The text of the *Golden Hills' News* was handwritten by Chinese brush and ran in vertical columns right to left. Printing was by lithography on a sheet

(approximately 48 cm. by 32 cm.) folded along the width to form four tabloid-size pages (ibid.). This became the accepted format and production method for Chinese newspapers in the United States until the turn of the century (ibid.).

This pioneer journal ceased publication soon afterward when Reverend William Speer announced another journalistic enterprise, the *Oriental*, a weekly which began publication on January 4, 1855. In his 1870 autobiography, Speer said the *Oriental* was lithographed in Chinese on one side and printed in English on the other (Huntzicher, 1995: 77). It might be that the *Oriental* was the first of several nineteenth-century newspapers to include an English section "aimed at increasing the non-Chinese reading public's understanding of China and Chinese in America" (Lai, 1987: 28). The Six Companies, a powerful interest group that controlled Chinese immigrants, subsidized the newspaper by paying for the lithography (Huntzicher, 1995: 77). Other contributions came from those people Speer described as "influential gentleman" of California who "benefited by the presence of the Chinese, and many intelligent and Christian people" who fought repressive legislation against the Chinese (cited in ibid.).

The first Chinese-managed newspaper in the United States was *Chinese Daily News* in Sacramento, which started in December 1856 as a daily (Lai, 1987: 28). Scholars have cited Hong Kong's *Chung Ngoi San Po*, published in 1858, as the earliest Chinese daily newspaper (Ge, 1935: 73); however, *Chinese Daily News* preceded it by more than a year. As Lai (1987: 28-29) put it, "It should not be surprising that the first Chinese daily was founded in the United States, for this was the first country in the West where the Chinese settled in great numbers and where they had excellent opportunities to observe and learn from the Western press."

According to Lo, several Chinese newspapers were established in San Francisco during the 1870s and 1880s, among them the *Chinese Daily Evening News*, which so far as known, was the first Chinese daily in San Francisco (cited in Ma, 1989: 102). When large numbers of Chinese began to migrate eastward from the Pacific coast in the 1870s and established communities in big cities in the Midwest and on the eastern seaboard, the Chinese newspapers were published in cities like New York (1883), Boston (1891), and Chicago (1893).

A case study of the early non-religious Chinese newspapers (Huntzicher, 1995: 79) shows that the newspapers were dominated with shipping and marketing information. Typically, tabulations of available products, prices, and shipping schedules dominated the front page and one additional page of the four-page newspaper. Advertisement filled at least one other page, leaving only small portion of the paper for news and opinions. This remaining space usually listed world news from China and elsewhere. Most news items consisted of routine events from afar, but some items reflected about the anti-Chinese mood sweeping across the country. The Chinese newspapers in the first period were commercial and religious in intent rather than being political (Lai, 1990: 107).

4.3.2 Party Organs: the 1900s to 1960s

The Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 cut the number of Chinese immigrants dramatically. "Chinese immigrants dropped from 40,000 in 1882 (prior to exclusion) to ten persons in the year 1887 For the next 22 years, until 1865, a mere 6,055 Chinese were admitted to the United States" (Sung, 1976: 2, cited in Ma, 1989: 102). Chinese newspapers in the United States, however, progressed gradually. For example,

when examining the Chinese-American newspapers in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Lai (1987: 30-31) found:

In the United States, a number of dailies arose. They standardized on use of large sheets (approximately 52 to 58 cm. by 74 to 76 cm.) as in modern U.S. newspapers. The division of a page into row was once again adopted. Newspapers included more text and advertisements. News reporting was generally categorized and grouped as international, Chinese, national, and local. Frequently there would be an editorial on some current issues

At the same time, lead type came into use. Although typesetting was laborious, since each type is a representation of only a single character, the resulting copy packed more text onto a page, was much more legible and uniform in appearance, and allowed more copies to be printed as a faster rate than by lithograph.

Many forces stimulated the improvements in journalistic standards and production technology. As Ma (1989: 102) pointed out, one of the major influences on the development of Chinese-American newspapers was the Reform movement by Kang Youwei and the 1911 revolution by Sun Yat-sen. These movements spurred the rise of political organizations in America at the turn of the century. These groups, each supporting its political program for China's salvation, "soon turned the overseas Chinese communities into arenas for which they contended. The newspapers they established dominated Chinese-American journalism up to the end of World War II. Nationalistic feelings and China politics became the prevailing themes" (Lai, 1987: 31).

The Reform Party established the first political party newspaper network (ibid.). After the failure of the Hundred Day's Reform in China in 1898, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were driven from China.⁹ In 1899 Kang Youwei arrived in Victoria, British Columbia, where he founded the Chinese Reform Association (later the Chinese Constitutionalist Party) to continue his efforts to pressure the imperial government to

reform. "Recognizing from the outset the importance of influencing public opinion, the Reformers placed emphasis on establishing party news organs in key overseas Chinese communities" (ibid.: 32).¹⁰ In 1899 the San Francisco party branch gained control of *Mon Hing Bo* (*Chinese World*), a weekly which had been publishing since 1892. The *Mon Hing Bo* went to daily publication around 1901 and its Chinese name became *Sai Gai Yat Po* in 1908. According to Lai (ibid.), this paper remained a major voice in the San Francisco Chinese community for more than half a century until it ceased publication in 1968. Reform Party adherents also established the triweekly *Sum Chung Kwock Bo* or *New China Press* (1900-1978) in Honolulu, and the semiweekly *Chinese Reform News* (1904-1937) in New York city (Lai, 1987: 32).

Another political group was the Zhi Gong Tang, also known as Hongmen, which had its origins in the Triad Society and whose original purpose was to overthrow the Qing (Ch'ing) Dynasty and restore the Ming Dynasty (Li, 1998: 78-80). This loosely knit, far-flung group had numerous followers among the overseas Chinese. Inspired by the Reform Party's political activism, Zhi Gong Tang members established the *Tai Tug Eat PO* (*Chinese free press*) in San Francisco under the leadership of Tong King Chong (1903-1927); a successor organ, *Kung Loon PO* (*Morning sun*), was published from 1929-1933. The paper soon sided with the revolutionary movement led by Sun yat-sen (Lai, 1987: 32). The Zhi Gong Tang also established the *Kai Chee Sun Po* (1909-1912) in Honolulu. After the establishment of the Republic of China, *The Chinese Republic News* (1913-1948) was established in New York city (ibid.).

A third political group, the Revolutionary Party (later the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang), was first organized in 1895. Its objective was to the overthrow of

the reigning dynasty in China. It founded two organs in Honolulu, *The Hawaiian Chinese News* in 1903 and *Chee Yow Sun Bo* (Liberty news) in 1908 (ibid.). In the continental United States, the first revolutionary organ, *The Youth*, was established as a weekly in San Francisco in 1909. It changed to the daily *Young China* in 1910 and continued to publish until the 1980s (ibid.). After 1911, the successors to the Revolutionary Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), established *Hun Hey Weekly* (1915-1958; it became a daily in 1927) in New York to facilitate political activities in the Chinese civil war on behalf of the Kuomintang Guangzhou (Canton) regime, which was in opposition to the Beijing (Peking) government (ibid.).

After the Kuomintang established hegemony over all of China in 1927, party organs of other groups were on the decline. As Lai (ibid.) reported, "By 1940 only *The Chinese World* of San Francisco and *New China Press* of Honolulu remained. Even then, their survival depended on financial subsidies from party loyalists." As a result, the Kuomintang became a dominating force in Chinese-American newspapers. Some newspapers unaffiliated with the KMT came under the control of strongly pro-Nationalist chief editors (Lai, 1990: 109). The Kuomintang, especially during the World War II, by virtue of its position as a branch of the ruling political party in China, could monitor and control public opinion in the Chinese American communities. As Lai (1990: 109) said:

In the name of support for the war effort, the party ensured that the press, along with Chinese organizations and institutions in the communities, provided unquestioning support to the KMT and nationalist government. Errant editors were called to task for apparent transgressions. For example, Gilbert Woo, then an editor at *Chinese Times* and a critic of the nationalist government, once wrote

an article in which he placed the Chinese equivalent of quotation marks around Chiang Kai-shek's title, Generalissimo. Woo was summoned to the War Relief Association to explain his action, which appeared to question the legitimacy of Chiang's leadership. Woo also reported another occasion when *Chinese Times* published an article in which the Rice Bowl program to raise money for war relief was labeled undistinguished. Alleging that this hurt the war relief effort, the China War relief Association demanded that *Chinese Times* apologize. In this climate of highly charged nationalistic fervor, few editors dared to risk being accused of being "unpatriotic," and all hastened to conform to KMT views.

Despite the Kuomintang's dominant influence in the Chinese-American press, two points should be mentioned. For one thing, left-wing newspapers began to appear, though with limited financial resources and support (Lai, 1990: 110). For example, *China Daily News* started in New York in 1947. It delivered international, national and community news to the Chinese-Americans and Americans. It also reported news from the People's of Republic of China" (Ma, 1989: 102). Secondly, newspapers not officially affiliated with any political group emerged. One of them was *Chinese Pacific Weekly* in San Francisco, established in October 1946 by several Chinese American liberals (Lai, 1990: 111). "This paper viewed the world from the perspective of American citizens" (ibid.). In 1948 businessman Thomas Tong established another newspaper, the weekly *Chinatown Shopper*, with Herbert Lee and Kew Yuen Ja as editors (ibid.). During the late forties both of these papers translated from the Western press items that were critical of conditions in nationalist China. However, as Lai (ibid.) pointed out, "reflecting the relative weakness of the new middle class, these publications had a small circulation and exerted only limited influence in shaping public opinion."

4.3.3 A Diversity of Voices: the mid-1960s to Present

From the end of World War II through the sixties the Chinese community press was on the decline (Lai, 1990: 113-114). According to Lai (ibid.), this was the result of two factors. Firstly, more and more of the younger American-born Chinese were unfamiliar with their ancestral language. Secondly, readership for Chinese newspapers had only limited growth as older Chinese passed away and the number of newcomers was still limited by restrictive immigration laws. The trend, however, began to reverse in the mid-1960s, when the United States revised immigration laws, which led to an upsurge in immigration from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and later China. The Chinese population in the United States grew from 237,214 in 1960 to 435,062 in 1970. By 1987, the Chinese population in the United States swelled to an estimated 1.4 million (ibid.). The Chinese population growth brought about a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese-American newspapers and periodicals in the United States. In the 1970s fifteen publications were established; in the 1980s, another eight were started (Ma, 1989: 103). A survey published in 1989 shows that there were 41 Chinese-American publications, with a total circulation of 410,003 (ibid.: 107).

Chinese-American newspapers after the 1970s, according to Lai (1990: 116-126), have shown several significant changes. Firstly, nationally distributed newspapers were successfully achieved. Although several daily newspapers sought to publish on both the East and West before the 1970s, none had achieved significant success (Lai, 1987: 37-38; 1990: 116-117). The first successful national newspaper was *Sing Tao Jih Pao* which established separate editions in San Francisco and in New York in 1970. News and feature articles were typeset in Hong Kong and flown to the United States,

where news items on the local Chinese community were added to complete the edition. This newspaper "introduced to North American readers a higher standard of reporting and better writing than that previously found in local publication" (Lai, 1987: 38). The second successful national newspaper was *World Journal*, published in New York and San Francisco by Taipei's *United Daily News* in 1976. The newspaper soon became the largest Chinese language news media in the United States (Ma, 1992: 103). It reported news from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China, transmitted via satellite from Hong Kong and Taiwan (ibid.). By the mid-1980s, there were five national newspapers, all of them were owned by Hong Kong or Taiwan newspaper chains (Lai, 1987: 38).¹¹ The recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada resulted largely from the expansion of these newspapers. However, the entry of these well-financed ventures into the Chinese-American market led to charges of unfair competition from locally owned journals (Lai, 1987: 38).

Secondly, the influence of Chinese politics declined. As mentioned earlier, the Kuomintang was a dominating force in Chinese-American newspapers until the 1960s. After the 1970s, however, the influence declined as a result of the improved Sino-American relations, relaxing tensions between the People of Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, and the influx of Hong Kong immigrants who were often independent as regards Mainland China and Taiwan (Ma, 1989: 103; Lai, 1990: 123; McCue, 1976: 276). The declining influence of China's politics was reflected in some new style newspapers, such as *Sing Tao*, *China Post*, and *Center Daily News*, which were neutral in debate between the two Chinese governments (McCue, 1976: 276; Lai, 1990: 123-124). This was also reflected in less strident political rhetoric and relatively more

balanced reporting of news on Mainland China and Taiwan even in such organs as the pro-Taiwan *World Journal* and the pro-PRC *China Daily News* (Lai, 1990: 123). In addition, some Chinese newspapers changed the dateline (the date of issue), which was described by Lai as a symbol of the declining political influences (ibid.). At the beginning of the eighties both *Sing Tao Jih Pao* and *International Daily News* used a dateline based the number of years since the establishment of the Republic of China in 1911, with the corresponding year a.d. indicated in parenthesis. After the mid-eighties, both papers used only the year in accordance with the Gregorian calendar (ibid.). Thus, by the mid-eighties, the PRC-Taiwan conflict had apparently receded to a position of secondary importance in press coverage (ibid.), though Chinese politics continued to lurk in the background to exert an influence.¹²

Thirdly, increasing attention was given to Chinese community issues in North America. When Chinese politics were major concerns in Chinese newspapers, Chinese community issues did not get enough attention.¹³ This situation was changed when, as a result of the civil rights movement in the United States, many Chinese moved into the mainstream political life. American political issues that affected the Chinese community were increasingly important to many Chinese. Some Chinese newspapers founded during this period, such as *China Post*, began to express this growing concern (Lai, 1990: 125). As Lai (ibid.) pointed out, "By the eighties all papers from left to right on the political spectrum were putting more emphasis on issues of concern to Chinese Americans." Issues such as equal rights, affirmative action, political participation, and political empowerment in the mainstream became of primary interest. No Chinese newspaper can develop its circulation and influence if its editors and reporters are not

sensitive to events, issues, and problems of ethnic Chinese community (Chen, 1994: 45).

4.4 The Chinese Press in Canada

Although the Chinese press in Canada before the early 1970s shared many similarities with its counterpart in the United States, there were at least two significant differences. One difference was that "nonpolitical period" did not exist in Canada; since the Chinese press in Canada started almost half a century later than in the United States, all the early newspapers here were established mainly as a result of political situations in China. The second significant difference was that, unlike the Chinese press in the United States which was dominated by the Kuomintang, the Chinese press in Canada, at least before the 1950s, was influenced by both the Kuomintang and its rival Zhi Gong Tang, though the former was relatively more powerful. As a result, the periodization of the Chinese press in Canada before the early 1970s should be somewhat different from that of the Chinese-American press. The periodization is also not quite correspondent with that of Chinese immigration to Canada, since the fluctuation of Chinese press had more to do with changing situations in China than with changing immigration policies in Canada.

Before the early 1970s, the history of Chinese press in Canada is composed of three periods. In the first period, from 1903 to 1937, competing political parties in China (first the Reformers and the Revolutionaries, then the Kuomintang and the Zi Gong Dang), started to publish newspapers in Canada through their local branches. The newspapers were largely propaganda instruments and attempted to win support of

Chinese Canadians for their respective political cause in China. In the second period, from 1937 to 1945, Chinese newspapers in Canada, despite still being political organs of parties in China, turned much of their attention from internal politics in China to the ongoing wars in China and World War II. So, the newspapers played a significant role in supporting the war against Japan. As well, they increased their circulation among the Chinese communities. In the third period, from 1946 to the mid-1970s, Chinese newspapers in Canada once again turned back to the politics in China, and the Kuomintang became more influential than others. However, this situation was increasingly challenged by emerging newspapers on the political left as well as those which were more concerned with Canada than with China.

4.4.1 The Rise of Party Organs: 1903 to 1936

In the first period, Chinese language newspapers started to publish in Canada. Their establishment and development resulted largely from the politics in China, and specifically, the conflict between the Reformers and Revolutionaries before 1911 and the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Zi Gong Dang after 1911.

In 1903, the first Chinese newspaper in Canada, *Yat Sun Bo* (*Chinese Reform Gazette*), was published in Vancouver by Kang You-wei's China Reform Association (Lee, 1967: 348; Wickberg, 1982: 76). As mentioned earlier, after the failure of the reform movement in China in 1898, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were forced into exile, seeking bases overseas from which to launch their efforts for change in China. Kang Youwei visited Canada three times: 1899, 1902, and 1904 (Wickberg, 1982: 74). During his first visit he established the first North American branch of his reform

association in Victoria (ibid.). By the time Kang visited Canada the third time in 1904, there were twelve Canadian branches of the Reform Association and a reported membership of 7,000, many of them were members of the Zi Gong Tang (ibid.: 74-75; Li, 1998: 162). The Reform Associations also sponsored Chinese school, the Oikwok Konkong, or Patriotic School, in Victoria and Vancouver (Wickberg, 1982: 76). Without doubt, *Yat Sun Bo* was part of the association's efforts to expand reformist influence in Canada where there was a substantial Chinese population by the turning point of this century. Although little is known about the newspaper, three points should be made. First, the establishment of the newspaper might be initiated by Liang Qichao. According to Lee (1967: 348), during his visit to Vancouver in 1903, Liang found that although Reform Associations in Canada were financially strong, they had no organ to propagate reformist ideas. Therefore he suggested publishing a newspaper, and it was accepted by the Vancouver branch. Second, *Yat Sun Bo* was engaged in a newspaper war with revolutionary newspapers from 1910 to 1911 in which the Reformers and Revolutionaries waged battles of ideas; one of the major issues being whether China should seek reform within a constitutional monarchy or promote revolution to replace the Qing dynasty with a republic (Wickberg, 1982: 74). It was the longest newspaper war between the reformers and revolutionaries overseas, during which more than two hundred articles were published (Lee, 1967: 349). Third, the newspaper ceased publication not in 1911 as previously stated, but around 1918, due to a financial crisis (ibid.: 348).¹⁴

Shortly after the reformers' *Yat Sun Bo* began publication, the bilingual *Wah Ying Yat Bo* (Chinese-English Daily News) appeared in 1906 in Vancouver (Lo and Lai,

1977: 112). Originally owned by some missionary authorities to propagate Christianity, it gravitated into the hands of the Reform Association briefly and then to the Zi Gong Tang, before it disappeared in 1908 (Wickberg, 1982: 76). According to Lee (1967: 349), *Wah Ying Yat Bo* was the first Chinese newspaper in Canada which supported Sun Yat-sen's course of revolution. In 1907 the Zi Gong Tang also founded its own newspaper, the *Tai Hon Bo* (to be known as the *Tai Hon Kung Bo*, or "*The Chinese Times*," after 1914, and publishing until 1992) (ibid.; Wickberg, 1982: 76; *Canadian Advertisement Rates and Data*, July 1993: 58). Reflecting growing revolutionary sentiment among Zhi Gong Tang, the *Tai Hon Bo* invited Feng Tzu-yu, a follower of Sun Yat-sen, to head its editorial staff. Feng soon turned that paper in the direction of the revolutionary cause, spurring a newspaper war with reformers' *Yat Sun Bo* (Wickberg, 1982: 76), as just mentioned. The newspaper war played a significant role in politicizing Chinese in Canada, raising journalism standards, and promoting circulation of the newspapers. When Sun Yat-sen traveled overseas to raise funds for the "Canton Uprising" in 1911, the Chinese in Canada had raised more than half of the total funds from all Chinese abroad (Lee, 1967: 349; Feng, 1976: 125).¹⁵ In addition, as Lai pointed out (1977: 7), these competing political factions also ushered in a new phase in the history of journalism in the overseas Chinese communities. "Newspapers were enlivened with editorials, presenting their views on one phase or another of various political, social, or economic questions, locally and in China" (ibid.). Finally, it was not unusual for newspapers representing different points of view to attack each other's positions violently. These exchanges, therefore, often had the desirable effect of increasing sales (ibid.).

In 1911 a revolution took place in China. The Qing dynasty collapsed and a republic was established in its place. However, The Republic had been established through a compromise between the republican supporters and the conservative. As a result, China soon became embroiled in factionalism, division, and violence (Lai, 1982: 103-104). The Revolutionaries, now reorganized as the Kuomintang, spent much energy expanding their overseas base for the support of their revolution in China. Within two years there were Kuomintang branches in all major and minor Chinese settlements in British Columbia and Alberta, and in nine locations further east (Wickberg, 1982: 109). The Kuomintang also established party organs in key Chinese communities in Canada. The first Kuomintang newspaper was the *New Republic (Hsin Min-Kuo Pao)*, which was established in Victoria in 1911.¹⁶ During its infancy the newspaper was affiliated with the Kuomintang newspaper, *The Young China (Shao-nien Chung-kuo Ch'en-pao)*, of San Francisco (Wickberg, 1982: 104). Another Kuomintang newspaper, the *Shing Wah*, was established in Toronto in 1916, when the Chinese people in Toronto were supporting a revolution in China against the conservative, Yuen Shi Hoi, (*The Shing Wah Daily*, 1973: 25). However, the weekly, along with the *New Republic* in Victoria, was forced to stop its publication in 1918 when the Canadian government, because of concern that the Kuomintang might be conspiring with Germany, declared it an illegal organization; indeed, some of their leaders were arrested and put on trial (Wickberg, 1982: 106; *The Shing Wah Daily*, 1973: 25).¹⁷ After the ending of the war, this weekly was recognized and in 1922 became the *Sing Wah Daily Newspaper (The Shing Wah Daily*, 1973: 25).

For these early Kuomintang newspapers, the financial condition was often

precarious. However, there were usually enough local loyal supporters willing to dig into their pockets to keep the publication solvent. For instance, initial capital of *Sing Wah* was largely donated by Kuomintang's members in Ontario (ibid.). In addition, despite their small size and limited circulation, these newspapers once attracted some of most able men in the Kuomintang to work for them. For example, Cheng Tien-fang, while studying at the University of Toronto, served as head of the Toronto branch of the Kuomintang and Chief editor of *the Shing Wah Daily*. Cheng's dissertation, *Oriental Immigration in Canada*, was later published in Shanghai in 1931, which "remains useful and is also of historical interest" (Wickberg, 1982: 335). After 1926, Cheng returned to China where he embarked upon a distinguished career as an educator and diplomat (ibid.: 110). In the west, Chan Sue-yan, who was Director of Party Affairs for Canada and the United States between 1916 and 1922, once served as the editor of the *New Republic* (ibid.). Chan, too, had a distinguished career in China after leaving Canada. From 1932 to 1948 he served as head of the Kuomintang government's Overseas Affairs Commission (ibid.).

After 1911 the Reform Party was losing its influence in the Chinese community, while Zhi Gong Tang (now Chinese Freemason in Canada), with its over forty branches and 10-20,000 members, became the major rival of the Kuomintang (ibid.: 110-111). Zhi Gong Tang leaders had understood that Sun Yat-sen had promised rewards in the form of offices and influences in the new republic to Zhi Gong Tang, in exchange for their contribution to the 1911 Revolution. Instead, they had received no more than an expression of thanks (ibid.: 104). The resentment of Zhi Gong Tang leaders in Canada toward Sun and the Kuomintang seems to be the origin of their friction, which was

intense during the period 1911-1923 and reappeared periodically over next several years (ibid.). In 1927 a Zhi Gong Tang's newspaper for eastern Canada, the *Hung Chung She Bo* (known as the *Chinese Times*, like its western Canada counterpart), was founded in Toronto. The newspaper, along with the establishment of a Toronto branch of the Dart Coon Club, may well have been a Freemason response to the growing influence of the Kuomintang in that part of the country (ibid.: 164). Shortly after its foundation, the *Hung Chung She Bo* and *Shing Wah* had a newspaper war, "full of charges of slander, physical violence, and action in the courts" (ibid.: 165).¹⁸

During this period, the newspaper format and production technology were similar to those in the United States as Lay found (see previous section; also see the *Tai Hon Bo*, 1914 and the *New Republic*, 1934). In 1930, the three major Chinese dailies in Canada, the *Tai Hon Bo*, the *New Republic* and the *Shing Wah Daily*, claimed a total circulation of 9,250 (McKim, 1930: 575).

4.4.2 War Efforts: 1937 to 1945

In the second period, Chinese language newspapers in Canada changed attention from China's politics to China's war against Japan. As a result, the Chinese newspapers played a significant role in activities related to war efforts.

In China the beginning of the war against Japan had led to the formal establishment of a United Front, in which "the ruling Kuomintang and the dissident Communists, agreed to stop fighting one another and fight the Japanese instead" (Wickberg, 1982: 188). Although the United Front was a strange marriage between two parties, it was considered essential for the duration of the war (ibid.). In Canada the

United Front philosophy also prevailed. Rivalries from the past, such as the long-standing Kuomintang-Freemason opposition, "were to be overridden in the interest of united support for China's war effort" (ibid.: 196). For example, in Toronto, the Kuomintang and Freemason now shared the leadership of the Chinese Patriotic Federation, a single unifying fund-raising body in Toronto's Chinatown, though the former's influence was stronger than the latter (ibid.: 197). During the Sino-Japanese war (1937-45), the Chinese communities across Canada had perhaps the greatest unity they had ever known (ibid.: 188; Li, 1998: 83).

Largely as a result of these changes, Chinese newspapers in Canada became less concerned with China's politics than with World War II and China's war effort against Japan. This can be seen from *Chu Ping Essays*, which was selected editorials written by Mr. Yee Chu Ping, who served the editor-in-chief in the *New Republic* in Victoria during the war period. Of total 80 editorials published from 1937 to 1945, 57 were on World War II generally, 15 on the China's war against Japanese, 5 on China's politics but centering around war's effort, and finally, 4 on other international issues (Yee Chu Ping, 1982: 57-238). Although these figures might be biased toward "war efforts", given the position of the *New Republic* as an organ and Mr. Yee Chu Ping as an enthusiastic local Kuomintang leader, it seems that the emphasis of Chinese newspapers did shift from internal politics in China to the ongoing wars in China and in the world.

During the war, the Chinese newspapers became major sources concerning Sino-Japanese war for the Chinese communities in which 75 percent of their members did not know enough English to read other newspapers (Mah, 1976: 22). In an article about the *Shing Wah Daily News* in the early 1940s, *Saturday Night* (1941, Vol. 67:52-53)

reported:

In the Office of the *Shing Wah Daily News* - one of the largest Chinese newspapers in the Dominion - which serves all eastern Canada, news from China received every day Its information, came directly from Chungking, first by radio to Hong Kong, then by cable to San Francisco and to Toronto by overland wire. In this way, the latest developments from far interior of China were received by countrymen here the day after the copy had been filed. News stories arrived in code, which had to be translated and then set in type and printed.

Chinese newspapers also involved various fund-raising efforts and some newspaper managers became prominent leaders in local war-support associations. In Vancouver, the Bond-selling Association was formed in late 1937 and early 1938, requiring that each adult male in the Vancouver Chinese community purchase a minimum of Ch. \$50 (about Can. \$16). To facilitate the bond-selling, the Chinese newspapers published not only stories about the campaign, but also the names of those who did not want to purchase (Wickberg, 1982: 190). In Toronto, two managers from *Shing Wah* were deeply involved in fund-raising activities. One was Chong Ying, who helped establish the *Shing Wah*, and, by 1943, had become its executive director (ibid.: 192). During the war Chong Ying was head of the Chinese Patriotic Federation, a major fund-raising organization in Toronto's Chinatown. The other one was E.C. Mark, who served executive director in *Shing Wah* from 1928 to 1942.¹⁹ E.C. Mark served as secretary of the Chinese War Relief Fund. As mentioned earlier, this organization played a significant role in raising war fund from general Canadian society (ibid.: 192).

The war efforts by Chinese newspapers greatly promoted the growth of newspapers

themselves. Before the war, for instance, in 1934, the total circulation claimed of Chinese newspapers was around 9,450 (McKim, 1934: 451). After the war, by 1939, the claimed circulation increased to 18,450 (ibid., 1939: 469). *Shing Wah*'s growth was the most astonishing. In 1934 *Shing Wah* had a claimed circulation of approximately 2,450 (ibid., 1934: 451), but by 1939 its circulation jumped to about 7,000, an increase of almost 190 per cent (ibid. 1939: 469). The war period witnessed the most flourishing time of Chinese newspapers in Canada before the 1970s.

4.4.3 The Third Period: From Dominance to Diversity (1946-1970s)

In the third period, the politics in China again became a focus of Chinese newspapers in Canada. Pro-Kuomintang's newspapers dominated the first half of this period. However, their influence declined with the emergence of pro-Communist newspapers in the early 1960s. In addition, the publication of several Canadian-oriented newspapers further increased the diversity of the Chinese press in Canada.

First, the Kuomintang was, without doubt, the most influential Chinese organization in Canada after the war, both within the Chinese communities and within non-Chinese political authorities. As Wickberg (1982: 227) pointed out:

Its wartime leadership had enabled the KMT (Kuomintang) to achieve pre-eminence in the various CBAS across the country. Many Chinese communities in the immediate Post-War period were thus "represented" by an organization - a CBA (Chinese Benevolent Association) or CCC (Chinese Community Center, Ontario) - which had legitimacy in the eyes of Canadian governmental organs, but which represented KMT interests while it also attempted to speak for its community.

Given its pre-eminence, the KMT was able to control public opinion in the Chinese Canadian communities. In the west there were two major Chinese dailies, the *New Republic* in Victoria and the *Chinese Times* in Vancouver. The former was an organ of the Kuomintang, while the latter was largely controlled by the Kuomintang in much of the Post-War period, although it was an organ of the Freemason (Fang Jigen and Hu Wenying, 1988: 204). In the east the *Shing Wah* was an organ of the Kuomintang, probably the only one which received public support from a Canadian Prime Minister.²⁰ The only newspaper which sometimes challenged the Kuomintang's legitimacy was Toronto's *Hung Chung She Bo*, an organ of the Freemason. In 1946 the two major forces in China, the Kuomintang and the Communists, were on the verge of all-out civil war. In a congress in Shanghai late in that year, Zhi Gong Tang (now the Minzhitang) "urged an end to the hostilities that were already taking place, a position that was reaffirmed at the Havana Conference of the North American Minzhitang in September, 1947" (Wickberg, 1982: 226). The worldwide Minzhitang and Freemasons in Canada, therefore, took a neutral, mediating position in the politics of China (ibid.). However, in Canada, this was a difficult position to maintain for very long. In the Cold War politics of the early 1950s it was not easy for Freemasons to be critical of Kuomintang activities in Canada and yet avoid being labeled a leftist organization (ibid.). By the 1950s, a Kuomintang-dominated CCC could hurl incriminating "leftist" labels at the Freemasons whenever the latter tried to criticize CCC activities or ideology (Lum, 1992: 230). In fact, allegations that the Freemasons' newspaper, the *Hung Chung She Bo*, held communist sympathies persuaded the organization's board of directors to stop the paper for fear of broader accusation of disloyalty (ibid.). The demise of *Hung Chung She Bo* in

1959 left the *Shing Wah* as the unchallenged Chinese newspaper until the appearance of the *Toronto Shang Bao* (*Chinatown Commercial News*) in June 1966 (ibid.).

Second, although the Kuomintang's influence was dominant in the Chinese press from the 1950 to the 1960s, challenges arose in 1961, when the *Da Zhong Bao* was published in Vancouver. First published semimonthly, then changed to weekly, the *Da Zhong Bao* contained news about China as well as political news about the Chinese communities in Canada (Wickberg, 1982: 258-259). In Toronto, the *Shag Bao* started publication in June 1966, with the purpose of bringing a different voice to Toronto's Chinatown, where the *Shing Wah* monopolized.²¹ This newspaper was run by a group of young volunteers on the political left, with a help from a former editor of the *Hung Chung She Bo* (ibid.). However, it proceeded discreetly, taking care never to portray itself as pro-Communist newspaper. Instead, it claimed to serve the Chinese Canadian community by providing primarily Canadian news and, occasionally, some news about China (Lum, 1992: 232). *Shag Bao's* caution later turned to boldness with the announcement of Canada's impending recognition of the PRC in 1968. In its first editorial on Canada-China relations, which followed the CCC's announcement that it was sending a delegation to Ottawa to lobby against the new policy toward China, *Shag Bao* challenged the representative of the delegation and the CCC's insistence that its posture acutely reflected the stand of the majority of Chinese Canadians (ibid.). The next editorial appeared in December 1969 after Canada had publicized the beginning of the Stockholm talk that later led to bilateral recognition between Canada and China (ibid.: 232-233):

The *Shag Bao* reported the changing international mood toward the PRC and the tough bargaining terms imposed by China. It went on to admonish the Kuomintang for attempting to disrupt the negotiations and for trying to block the PRC's entry into the United Nations. In an inadvertent admission of the weakness of pro-PRC forces at the time of recognition, the editorial condemned the CCC for building up its dominance in Chinese communities on the basis of false rumors, fears, and intimidation (ibid.: 233).

However, *Shing Wah* never treated the *Shang Bao* as a serious challenge, because *Shang Bao* was by-weekly and relied on volunteers, which would not change *Shing Wah's* virtual monopoly over the Chinese readership and advertising since the demise of *Hung Chung She Bo* in 1959. By 1970, however, two former *Shing Wah* editors who became tired of the paper's polemics left to organize a new local newspaper called *Chinese Express*, which soon began to outpace the *Shing Wah*, selling approximately three times as many as newspapers (ibid.: 235). The establishment of *Chinese Express* indicates the beginning of *Shing Wah's* decline, which eventually ceased publication as a daily in 1989.²²

Third, although most Chinese newspapers focused on Chinese politics, especially the Beijing-Taipei conflict, Canadian-oriented press also appeared during this period. One was the *New Citizen*, which was published in Vancouver in 1949 and relocated to Toronto in 1951. This biweekly, at least at the outset, adopted a task which was to present the Chinese-Canadian contribution to the Canadian way of life.²³ The other was *Chinatown News*. Run by its founding editor, Roy Mah, starting in September 1953, this Vancouver-based biweekly magazine quickly established a solid reputation for representing the interests of the local-born English-speaking Chinese in Canada (Ng, 1993: 114; Lo and Lai, 1976: 14). According to Ng (1993: 114-115), from its beginning

to the early 1960s, the editorial stance of *The Chinatown News* advocated the fullest participation of the ethnic group, with the local-born Chinese as the vanguard, in all aspects of Canadian life. It lavished attention on the achievements of Chinese individuals, most of them local-born, in their various pursuits. The first Chinese employee at the City Hall, for example, was made a cover story in late 1953. News about Chinese entering the medical and legal professions, and later, occupying Canadian public office were reported vigilantly. The *Chinatown News* pointed with pride to such "tusheng" organizations as the Lions, the Elks, and the Veterans, arguing that they were the outcomes of "the attainment of. . .personal status and material achievement" (cited in Ng, 1993: 115). However, this kind of press was still weak, among other reasons, due to the fact that the immigrants of the Chinese population in Canada have been predominant.

As of July 1971, in Canada, there were six dailies, one semi-weekly, and two biweeklies. The total claimed circulation was approximately 13,000 (*Canadian Advertising Rates and Data*, 1971: 49). Although the number of newspapers increased, the circulation was much lower than that in the 1939, which reflected a decline of Chinese newspapers in Canada as in the United States in two decades after the war.

4.4.4 The Chinese Newspapers in Canada: China's Politics and Other Factors

The review of the history of Chinese press in Canada before the early 1970s suggests that the politics in China played a major role in the nature and development of Chinese newspapers in the first 70 years of the twentieth century. With few exceptions, most Chinese newspapers were published as party organs and their main mission was to

mobilize Canadian Chinese to support their political cause in China. Before 1911, it was the conflict between the Reformers and the Revolutionaries in China that promoted the publication of first Chinese newspapers in Canada. After the revolution of 1911 and with the growth of Kuomintang in China, pro-Kuomintang newspapers developed quickly in Canada, while the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Zi Gong Dang further increased the number of Chinese newspapers. After the late 1920s, the conflict between Kuomintang and the Communists became a political focus in China. Although pro-Communist newspapers did not appear in Canada until the 1960s, the conflict had already affected Chinese newspapers in Canada, as in the case of the fight between Kuomintang's *Shing Wah* and the Freemasons' *Hung Chung She Bo* in Toronto.

In addition to the politics in China, several other factors are also worth noting. First, the war against Japan caused more Canadian Chinese to read Chinese newspapers: in turn, the newspapers focused more on war efforts than on Chinese politics, and thereby raised the standing of Chinese newspapers among Chinese communities as well as in the larger Canadian society. So the war period witnessed the highest circulation of Chinese newspapers in the first 70 years of this century. Second, the dispersion of the Chinese population from the west to the interior of Canada also helped the development of Chinese newspapers beyond British Columbia, especially in Ontario. Third, the growth of a younger generation of Chinese Canadians, made up of Canadian-born Chinese and those who came after the 1947 repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act, prompted more newspapers which were geared towards the interests of this generation of Chinese, such as the pro-Communist *Shang Bao* in Toronto and the Canadian-oriented *Chinatown News* in Vancouver.

Endnotes — Chapter 4

1. There is reason to doubt this figure, for the same source estimates the Chinese population in 1874 as 3,000. However, even this figure is well below the estimate of 6,000 for 1861. See Wickberg, 1982: 19.
2. Other sources indicate that, during 1924-1947, there were 44 Chinese who were allowed into Canada under the Act. See Kung, 1962: 616; Krauter & Advise, 1978: 63.
3. For example, by 1905 the Chinese were excluded from work in trades and factories, contract labor was virtually non-existent, and the competition among Chinese for the jobs in laundries and restaurants was keen in British Columbia. Anti-oriental sentiment continued at a fever pitch. See Thompson, 1989: 38.
4. Tien-fang Cheng, in his thesis on oriental immigration in Canada, stated that "people could save by eating at home, but all men, except laborers had to change their shirts and collars no matter how bad business conditions may be." See Cheng, 1931: 188.
5. For a detail concerning Chinese population and business in Toronto in the 1930s and 1940s, see Thompson, 1989, pp. 44-45.
6. According to Wickberg (1982: 191), this organization was the result of white Canadian initiative. In December 1941, a group of white Canadians who wished to aid China approached the CPF about creating a joint committee for fund-raising. The resulting committee listed prominent white Canadians as patrons and a few prominent whites and several leaders of the CPF as members.
7. For more detailed information about how Chinese responded to the Chinese Immigration Act in 1923, see Wickberg, 1982, pp. 142-3.
8. CBA refers to Chinese Benevolent Association, and CCC, will be mentioned later, refers to Chinese Community Center, which all were claimed as community-wide organizations. See Li, 1998: 80-81; Wickberg, 1982: 107-108.
9. For a discussion of the reform movement and subsequent coup in China in 1898, see Cameron (1963), *The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1912*, especially pp. 9-64.
10. The following were some of the newspapers established by the China Reform Association from 1899 to 1903:

| Name | Location | Date of Establishment |
|--|---------------|-----------------------|
| China Discussion (Ch'ing-i pao) | Yokohama | 1899-1900 |
| New people's Miscellany (Hsin-min ts'ung-pao) | Yokohama | 1901-1907 |
| Ya-tung pao | Kobe | |
| T'ien-nan (hsin) pao | Singapore | 1900 |
| An English-language paper (China Times) | Singapore | 1900 |
| Tung-hua hsin-pao | Sydney | 1900 |
| New China Daily (Hsin Chung-kuo jih-pao) | Honolulu | 1899 |
| Wen-hsing pao | San Francisco | 1899 |
| Chinese Free Press (Tai Tung Yat Bo) | San Francisco | 1900-1901 |
| China Reform News (Chung- kuo wei-hsin pao) | New York | |
| China Reform Gazette (Sun Bo) | Vancouver | |
| I-yu pao | Manila | 1899 |

Source: Lo, Jung-pang, 1967: 259.

11. In addition to *Sing Dao* and *World Journal*, Hong Kong's *Canter Daily* and Taiwan's *China's Times* and the *International Daily News* also published in the United States nationally. See Lai, 1987: 38.

12. For more details about political influences in the Chinese-American newspapers after the 1970s, see Lai, 1990: 123.

13. In addition to the political reasons, a lack of local news also could be contributed to small operation of the Chinese press. As Lou pointed out, "To try to understand the Chinese-American through the news of these papers could be disappointing. Most of the papers were modest operations that did not have proper staff to cover the community news. As a result, news reporting was very poor in quality, and small in quantity" (Lou and Lai, 1977: x).

14. The literature shows that the newspaper ceased publication in 1911 (Lee, 1967: 348; Wickberg, 1982: 76). However, the data from *The Canadian Newspaper Directory* indicate that, at least until 1918, the newspaper still remained a publication of Vancouver (A. McKim, 1918: 334). The early researchers didn't provide information concerning the source of their data, so it makes it impossible to check original data for verification. On the other hand, the information from *The Canadian Newspaper Directory*, a major national newspaper directory in Canada from 1892 to 1942, is

relatively reliable. Before the publication of each edition, "The newspaper and magazine lists have been carefully corrected, special attention has been given to each paper's circulation and all other details have been closely checked" (A. McKim, 1913: V). Although information in the directory, especially circulation, might not be as accurate as the publisher states, the existence of the papers themselves is probable as a defunct newspaper could not supply its information to the directory, which makes it impossible to continue to be listed in the directory. However, even if a mistake was made over the existence of a newspaper it is hardly possible that such a mistake could last as long as seven years. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that *Yat Sun Bo* remained its publication for at least seven years after 1911. The inaccuracy about the folding date of *Yat Sun Bo* is probably due to the fact that the original newspapers were all lost and researchers had to rely on some personal memories which might not be reliable.

15. For information about "Canton Uprising", see Yen, 1976, pp. 231-238.

16. The *New Republic* was first published in 1905 as an irregular mimeograph, and it became a weekly in 1911 and a daily afterwards. The newspaper was relocated to Vancouver in 1958 when facing financial difficulty. See Lee, 1967, p. 350; Lo and Lai, 1977, p. 114; Yee, 1982, pp. 258-260.

17. According to Wickberg (1982: 105-106): "By early 1917 the Northern (Peking) government in China was moving China into World War I on the side of the Western Allies, hence the concern that the Southern government supporters, the Kuomintang, might be conspiring with Germany. No evidence of such intrigue has been found. Information furnished by the consulate, however, was cited as one factor in the eventual decision to outlaw the KMT (Kuomintang)."

18. However, among the Chinese newspaper in Canada, the most violent event happened in 1927 when the Kuomintang divided into the rightist and left factions in China. The *Canada Morning News* in Vancouver, an organ of the Kuomintang, then sided with "left" faction. In August, editor Lei Ming-xia and associate in the newspaper, Wong Jiu-sheng, were shot and killed in the newspaper office. A left-KMT newspaper in San Francisco said that rightist faction supporters were behind the murders, though the case was dismissed for lack of evidence. For more details, see Wickberg, 1982, p. 160.

19. A mistake appears in *From China to Canada*, which states that C.E. Mark was editor of *Shing Wah*. Available data indicate that C.E. Mark served executive director of the newspaper from 1928-1940 and again, from 1960-1964. He might have been involved in some editing work, but never worked as editor. See *Shing Wah*, 1972: 30-34; 37.

20. The Chinese Community Center (CCC) sponsored at least one dinner celebration a year to mark the founding of the Republic of China on the tenth day of October. One of these occasions received considerable media coverage because the center entertained

Prime Minister Diefenbaker, Ian Wahn, the Liberal member from St Paul's, and Douglas Jung, the former Conservative MP from Vancouver. It is at this nine-course luncheon that Diefenbaker clutched a copy of the pro-nationalist *Shing Wah Daily News* and thundered, "Now there is a paper with which I can agree." See Lum, 1992: 218.

21. Interview, Toronto, July 26, 1997.

22. Interview, Toronto, July 26, 1997.

23. The *New Citizen* was published in Vancouver for the first three years of its existence (1949-51). It regularly profiled Chinese Canadians who had excelled in Canadian society, e.g., Normie Kwong, the professional football player. After the *New Citizen* moved its editorial office to Toronto from Vancouver in 1951, it became much more political in its content, stressing an anti-Communist line. See Wickberg, 1982: 242.

CHAPTER 5

CHINESE NEWSPAPER MARKET: READERSHIP AND ADVERTISING

In its study of the Canadian newspaper industry in the early 1980s, the Royal Commission on Newspapers (1984: 63) pointed out that the newspaper must rely, for its livelihood, on selling to two markets: the reader and the advertiser. The readership market refers to demands for information, including news, editorials, entertainment and advertising, while the advertising market refers to demands for advertising space. These two markets interact because readers use advertising as information. Also, advertisers would not be interested in buying newspaper space if they did not get attention from readers (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 5). Both readership and advertising markets form a business foundation on which the newspaper exists and develops.

This chapter examines changes in the Chinese newspaper market in Canada since the 1970s and how the changes provided greater business opportunities for the Chinese newspapers. It first examines the Chinese readership market in the last two decades, with a focus on its expansion and the changing nature. It then describes the advertising market and explains why both Chinese and non-Chinese businesses increased their advertising significantly in the Chinese newspapers. This chapter is concluded by a brief discussion of the relationship between the changing readership and advertising markets and the recent development of Chinese newspapers.

5.1 Chinese Readership Market since the 1970s

Before discussing the Chinese readership market, I should first make a distinction between actual readership and potential readership. Actual readership refers to readers whom newspapers actually reach, while potential readership refers to people newspapers can potentially reach.¹ The present research is based on potential readership, partly because of unavailability of data about actual readership, and partly because data concerning potential readership, which are based on census figures, allow us to examine changes over time.²

Since the 1970s the size and nature of the Chinese readership market has undergone significant changes. A rapidly growing Chinese population in Canada has greatly increased the number of people who read Chinese newspapers. The Chinese population has also changed in its socio-economic and demographic structures; with their diverse origins and higher social status than before, the Chinese in Canada have demanded for higher quality Chinese newspapers. These changes promoted the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

5.1.1 The Increase in the Chinese Readership Market in Canada

As was discussed in the last chapter, despite the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, Chinese immigration to Canada before 1962 was highly restricted in comparison with the relatively free immigration from Europe and the United States (Li and Bolaria, 1979). As a result, the Chinese population grew slowly during the two decades after World War II. In 1962, the Government of Canada changed its immigration

requirements to remove the country of origin as a criterion for admission to Canada. Further changes in immigration regulations in 1967 finally resulted in a universal point system that was to be applied to all prospective immigrants, irrespective of country of origin or racial background (Li, 1998: 94). Largely as a result of changing immigration policies, the Chinese population increased in large numbers after 1967. As Table 5.1 shows, in 1971 the Chinese Canadian population was 118,815; by 1981, it expanded to 289,245. Between 1981 and 1991, it doubled again to 633,933. By the time the 1996 Census was taken, there were 921,585 individuals of Chinese origin in Canada, accounting for 3.23 per cent of the total population (Statistics Canada, 1999a: 24). In

Table 5.1 Chinese Population in Canada, 1971-1996

| Year | <u>Canada</u> | | <u>Toronto CMA</u> | |
|------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
| | <u>No. of Persons</u> | <u>% Increase from Last Census</u> | <u>No. of Persons</u> | <u>% Increase from Last Census</u> |
| 1971 | 118,815 | | 26,285 | |
| 1981 | 289,245 | 143.4 | 85,800 | 226.4 |
| 1991 | 633,933 | 119.2 | 231,820 | 170.2 |
| 1996 | 921,585 | 45.4 | 359,450 | 55.7 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. The numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, 1971 *Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1976); Statistics Canada, 1981 *Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File; Statistics Canada, 1991 *Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals* (1994); Statistics Canada, 1996 *Census of Canada*, .

short, between 1971 and 1996 the Chinese population in Canada increased by almost eight times. The Chinese population in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) displayed similar patterns, but had faster rates of increase. The increased size of Chinese populations in Canada and Toronto CMA indicates that the Chinese readership market expanded over the last 25 years, which provided a greater opportunity for Chinese newspapers to grow.

The size of the Chinese readership market can be estimated by the size of the foreign-born Chinese population, since the native-born Chinese typically do not read Chinese-language newspapers. Table 5.2 shows an increase in the foreign-born Chinese population in Canada between 1971 and 1996. In 1971 there were 77,800 foreign-born Chinese in Canada; the figure increased to 212,650 in 1981, and 463,600 in 1991. By 1996, the foreign-born Chinese population rose to 632,285, which is approximately eight times as large as that in 1971. The foreign-born Chinese population in Toronto CMA even grew faster; from 1971 to 1996, it increased by approximately eleven times. The increased foreign-born Chinese population further indicates the expansion of the Chinese readership market, since it is largely foreign-born Chinese who create the Chinese readership market. In addition, more than 90 per cent of foreign-born Chinese in Canada came to this country after 1967, when the universal system of immigrant selection was adopted (Li, 1998: 98). The fact that the majority of foreign-born Chinese are recent immigrants suggests a greater demand for Chinese newspapers, since it is commonly acknowledged that recent immigrants read more foreign-language newspapers than do long-time immigrants (Tenezakis, 1984: 203).

Table 5.2 Foreign-born Chinese Population, Canada, 1971-1996

| Year | No. of Foreign Born-Chinese in Canada | | No. of Foreign Born-Chinese in Toronto CMA | |
|------|---------------------------------------|------------|--|------------|
| | | % Increase | | % Increase |
| 1971 | 77,800 | | 18,741 | |
| 1981 | 212,650 | 173.3 | 66,950 | 257.2 |
| 1991 | 463,600 | 118.0 | 188,267 | 181.2 |
| 1996 | 632,285 | 36.4 | 211,025 | 12.09 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1 probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. The Toronto CMA figure for 1971 is an estimate based on the percentage of foreign-born Chinese population in Ontario, due to unavailability of Toronto data in *Public Use Sample Tape* (1971). Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, 1971 *Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1976); Statistics Canada, 1981 *Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File; Statistics Canada, 1991 *Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals* (1994); Statistics Canada, 1996 *Census of Canada, Immigrant Population by Place of birth and Sex, showing Period of Immigration for Canada, Provinces, Territories and Census Metropolitan Areas (20% Sample Data)* 93F0023XDB96003, 1998; Statistics Canada, 1996 *Census of Canada, The Total Population by Visible Minority Population and Sex, showing Immigrant Status and Period of Immigration, for Canada, Provinces and Territories (20% Sample Data)* 93F0023XDB96003, 1998.

However, the growth of the Chinese population or the foreign-born Chinese population is not sufficient to explain the recent development of Chinese newspapers. Circulation of Chinese newspapers in Canada increased by eighteen times from 1971 to 1996, which more than doubled the rate of that of the Chinese population. In addition, many changes in the Chinese newspapers, such as the publication of more than one daily

newspaper and improved quality of newspaper cannot be accounted for by only the size of the population. In fact, the development of Chinese newspapers has also much to do with the changed socio-economic and demographic structures of Chinese population, which might produce greater demands for newspaper consumption. As a result, an examination of the changing structure of Chinese population since the 1970s is important in understanding the growth of Chinese newspapers.

5.1.2 The Structures of Chinese Readership in Canada

The Chinese population in Canada has undergone structural changes since the 1970s as a result of the influx of Chinese immigrants. The structural changes have played a significant role in the recent development of Chinese newspapers. Here, I examine major structural changes of the Chinese population, including origins, linguistic patterns, social status, demography, and geographical distribution, and how these changes are related to growing demands for Chinese newspapers.

5.1.2.1 Diverse origins

Before 1923 when the Chinese Immigration Act was passed, Chinese immigrants were predominantly from the Pearl River Delta in rural Canton, south of China (Lai, 1989: 58). During the two decades after the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, most Chinese immigrants to Canada probably still came from the area due to the fact that the admission of Chinese immigrants before 1962 was restricted to spouses and minor unmarried children of Chinese-Canadians, though many of them had moved to Hong Kong or Taiwan in the late 1940s and early 1950s (Li, 1998: 97; Wickberg, 1982: 213).

After 1967, however, Chinese immigrants have come from diverse geographical regions. As Table 5.3 shows, 614,928 Chinese immigrants arrived in Canada between 1971 and 1995; among them 416,846 came from Hong Kong, 74,170 from Taiwan and 123,976 from Mainland China.

Hong Kong was the main supplier of Chinese immigrants to Canada from 1971 to 1996, accounting for 69 per cent of all Chinese immigrants during the period. Although immigration from Hong Kong outnumbered that from Taiwan and Mainland China at the beginning, the large immigration from Hong Kong started in 1987, when 16,170 Hong Kong Chinese immigrated to Canada, a 274 per cent increase over 1986. From 1987 to 1996, a total of 292,259 Hong Kong immigrants arrived in Canada; this accounts for 70 per cent of all Hong Kong immigrants between 1971 and 1996. The increase in Chinese immigration from Hong Kong is directly attributable to the uncertainty in Hong Kong about the implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984.³ In contrast with earlier Chinese immigrants, Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong have an urban background: "They are from one of the most industrialised and fastest growing regions in Asia and used to the lifestyles of laissez-faire capitalism. Their way of life, work ethic, and mentality were fostered and developed in a physical environment close to the one they have immigrated into" (Zhou, 1992: 73). Immigrants from Hong Kong were most likely to have been admitted on the basis of educational attainments or job skills as compared with those from Taiwan and Mainland China, although in recent years more and more were admitted on account of their business potentials to Canadian society (Luk and Lee, 1996: 21).

**Table 5.3 Immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China
Admitted to Canada, 1971-1996**

| Year | Number of Chinese Immigrants | | | Total |
|-------|------------------------------|--------|----------------|---------|
| | Hong Kong | Taiwan | Mainland China | |
| 1971 | 5,009 | 761 | 47 | 5,817 |
| 1972 | 6,297 | 859 | 25 | 7,181 |
| 1973 | 14,662 | 1,372 | 60 | 16,094 |
| 1974 | 12,704 | 1,382 | 379 | 14,465 |
| 1975 | 11,132 | 1,131 | 903 | 13,166 |
| 1976 | 10,725 | 1,178 | 833 | 12,736 |
| 1977 | 6,371 | 899 | 798 | 8,068 |
| 1978 | 4,740 | 637 | 644 | 6,021 |
| 1979 | 5,966 | 707 | 2,058 | 8,731 |
| 1980 | 6,309 | 827 | 4,936 | 12,072 |
| 1981 | 6,451 | 834 | 6,551 | 13,836 |
| 1982 | 6,542 | 560 | 3,572 | 10,674 |
| 1983 | 6,710 | 570 | 2,217 | 9,497 |
| 1984 | 7,696 | 421 | 2,214 | 10,331 |
| 1985 | 7,380 | 536 | 1,883 | 9,799 |
| 1986 | 5,893 | 695 | 1,902 | 8,490 |
| 1987 | 16,170 | 1,467 | 2,625 | 20,262 |
| 1988 | 23,281 | 2,187 | 2,778 | 28,246 |
| 1989 | 19,908 | 3,388 | 4,430 | 27,726 |
| 1990 | 29,261 | 3,681 | 7,989 | 40,931 |
| 1991 | 22,340 | 4,488 | 13,915 | 40,743 |
| 1992 | 38,910 | 7,456 | 10,495 | 56,795 |
| 1993 | 36,576 | 9,867 | 9,466 | 55,909 |
| 1994 | 44,196 | 7,411 | 12,486 | 64,095 |
| 1995 | 31,746 | 7,691 | 13,291 | 52,728 |
| 1996 | 29,871 | 13,165 | 17,479 | 60,515 |
| Total | 416,846 | 74,170 | 123,976 | 614,928 |

Note: Figures are compiled from information on the country of last permanent residence. Before 1971, Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China are grouped together.

Source: Department of Manpower and Immigration, *1968-1976 Annual Reports* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services); Manpower and Immigration, *1947-1977 Immigration Statistics* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services); Department of Employment of Immigration Canada, *1978-1992 Immigration Statistics* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services); Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *1993-1995 Immigration Statistics*

(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services); Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1996: *Facts and Figures* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1997).

Immigrants from Taiwan accounted for about 11 per cent of the total Chinese immigrants from 1971 to 1996. Despite being smaller in number than those from Hong Kong and Mainland China, immigrants from Taiwan have increased steadily since the mid-1980s. In 1983, 570 immigrants from Taiwan arrived in Canada, but by 1996 the figure increased to 13,165. The number of immigrants from Taiwan grew because of political reasons. Although Taiwan has been one of the flourishing industrialised economies in the last four decades, Taiwan's political development did not match its economic accomplishments until the late 1980s. Martial law was lifted only in 1987 after being enforced for thirty-eight years. Permission was not granted for the organisation of an opposition party until 1986 (Zhou, 1992: 74). Meanwhile, growing independence movement took place among native Taiwanese (84 per cent of the population), which was simply not tolerated by the government of the Mainland. "The unstable political situation and potential threat from both the independence movement and the mainland China haunted many Taiwanese, which was major push force for emigration" (ibid.). Generally, immigrants from Taiwan, like many from Hong Kong, are affluent, well-educated, and skilled.

Immigrants from Mainland China accounted for 20 per cent of the total Chinese immigrants from 1971 to 1996. It should be noted that Mainland China ceased to be the major source of Chinese immigration to Canada during the 1950s and 1960s mainly due to the absence of a Canadian embassy and restrictive immigration policies by both the

Chinese and Canadian governments (Li, 1998: 97; Liu, 1996: 309-311).⁴ With the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China, direct migration from China to Canada resumed in 1974 (Liu, 1996: 311), and the flow of Chinese immigration from Mainland China gradually increased after 1979 when China adopted a “Open Door Policy”. The Chinese from Mainland China immigrated to Canada partly because of China’s poor economic conditions and partly because of limited individual freedom in China. During the 1970s and 1980s, 90 per cent of immigrants from Mainland China were categorised in the family or assisted relatives class (Liu, 1996: 312; Luk and Lee, 1996: 18). They were relatives of the earlier Chinese settlers from the Pearl River Delta, and most of them came from an agricultural or handicraft background in rural or small-town of south China (Luk and Lee, 1996: 20). In the aftermath of the Tiananmen-Square incident in Beijing in 1989, the Canadian government allowed students and workers from Mainland China to apply for immigrant status. By August 1990, approximately 8,000 Chinese nationals, mostly scholars, students, visitors and temporary workers, were granted permanent resident status (Lam and Liu, 1996: 53). In following years, a large number of the Chinese from Mainland China came to Canada as independent immigrants (Luk and Lee, 1996: 20). Most of the independent class immigrants and their spouses were well-educated with urban backgrounds.

The diverse origins of Chinese immigrants effect the development of Chinese newspapers. First, the Chinese immigrants from the three areas had different pre-migration experiences, which shaped their distinctive interest in information in the newspaper. In the post-World War II era, the Chinese territories have been divided de facto into three major entities of the People’s Republic, Taiwan and Hong Kong, each of which developed into a

distinct society in terms of political system, economic development and culture. For example, Hong Kong is a society where the overwhelming majority people are either children of Chinese immigrants and are themselves immigrants from China (Chang and Chuang, 1998: 46). These immigrants and their children built the industrial society of present-day Hong Kong, and together experienced economic and social development from colonial entrepot to a free and open modern city (Luk and Lee, 1996: 22). For decades, Taiwan people experienced the heavy hand of authoritarian rule, as well as the inter-ethnic disharmonies concomitant with that rule.⁵ Meanwhile, Taiwan also underwent successful industrialisation, which not only improved an economic life of Taiwan people, but also led to democratisation of the island in the late 1980. People in Mainland China experienced both the traumatic experiences of the Cultural Revolution between the 1960s and the 1970s and rapid economic growth after the late 1970s. These different experiences of Chinese people in the three long separated territories, to a certain degree, nurtured distinct senses of being Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland. Chinese immigrants from the three areas, therefore, would welcome newspapers providing information that is close to them. The market opportunities may explain why media groups in both Hong Kong and Taiwan decided to publish in the Chinese communities in Canada.

Second, the diverse Chinese population in Canada is also reflected in language differences, which affects newspaper reading. Although the written Chinese language is uniform, immigrants from Hong Kong speak Cantonese and those from Taiwan and Mainland China speak Mandarin. The spoken language differences are reflected in Chinese newspapers. For instance, newspapers from Taiwan use diction which is close to formal spoken Mandarin, but with some Taiwanese accretions, while those from Hong

Kong use modern Chinese with more accretions of Cantonese (Luk and Lee, 1996: 28). There are also vocabulary differences which reflect the social-political differences between Hong Kong and Taiwan. These differences in language may affect the choice of newspapers; for instance, immigrants from Hong Kong tend to read Hong Kong-based newspapers, while those from Taiwan like to read Taiwan-based newspapers. The fact may also explain why more than one Chinese newspaper has been published in Canada.

Third, the diversity of Chinese immigrants segmented the newspaper market. Because Hong Kong immigrants accounted for the bulk of the Chinese immigrants in Canada (69 per cent), Hong Kong newspapers had the largest market share and business potential. Because Taiwan immigrants to Canada made up a small proportion of the total Chinese immigrants (11 per cent), Taiwan newspapers had the limited market. Immigrants from Mainland China accounted for a relatively large portion of the Chinese immigrants (20 per cent), but they do not have Canadian Chinese newspapers of their own.⁶ Both Hong Kong and Taiwan newspapers also tried to attract Mainland Chinese immigrant readers. It is conceivable that because of the similarity of spoken language, Taiwan newspapers attracted more readers from Mainland China's immigrants than did Hong Kong newspapers.

5.1.2.2 Linguistic patterns⁷

Linguistic patterns of the Chinese in Canada have been characterised by a high level of ancestral language retention and a high proportion of Chinese who are capable of speaking English. In the 1971 Census, it was noted that the Chinese showed the highest rate of language retention: a high level proportion cited Chinese as their mother tongue

and Chinese as the language most often spoken language at home (de Vries and Vallee, 1980: 103, cited in Li, 1998: 107). The linguistic pattern remained unchanged in more recent Census data (see Table 5.4). The 1981 Census shows that over 75 per cent of people of Chinese origin cited Chinese as their mother tongue, and that 63 per cent reported Chinese as the language most often spoken at home. In the 1991 Census, the corresponding figures were 77 per cent and 64 per cent. As Li pointed out (1998: 107): “the high level of ancestral language retention among the Chinese has to do with the predominance of first-generation immigrants in the Chinese community.”

Table 5.4 also shows a certain degree of language loss. The problem of language loss is measured in two ways: ancestral shift and current shift. According to de Vries and Vallee, (1980: 101-33, cited in Li, 164), the difference between the number of people in a particular ethnic group and the number of people maintaining the same mother tongue measures the ancestral shift, or the shift that occurred in previous generations. The difference between the number of people claiming a common mother tongue and the number speaking the same language at home measures the current shift, or the shift that occurs in the current generation. In 1991 the percentage of Chinese using English as their home language (32 per cent) was larger than that claiming English as their mother tongue (18 per cent). Specifically, of those whose mother tongue was Chinese 83 per cent still used Chinese as their home language in 1991. In other words, 17 per cent of the Chinese whose mother tongue was Chinese had experienced a language shift in the current generation. Also, since 77 per cent of all those of Chinese origins reported Chinese as their mother tongue, it shows that 23 per cent of those of Chinese origins in 1991 had experienced a language loss in previous generations. In total, 228,500 Chinese, or 37 per

Table 5.4 Mother Tongue and Language Most Often Spoken at Home, Chinese-Canadians, 1981-1991

| Language | 1981 | | | | 1991 | | | |
|----------|----------------|-------|------------------------------------|------|----------------|------|------------------------------------|-------|
| | Mother tongue | | Language most often spoken at home | | Mother tongue | | Language most often spoken at home | |
| | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % |
| English | 61,650 | 21.6 | 98,650 | 34.5 | 111,500 | 17.6 | 202,833 | 32 |
| French | 1,450 | 0.5 | 1,550 | 0.5 | 4,633 | 0.7 | 4,600 | 0.7 |
| Chinese | 214,800 | 75.2 | 178,900 | 62.6 | 488,600 | 77.1 | 405,433 | 64 |
| Other | 7,900 | 2.8 | 6,700 | 2.3 | 29,200 | 4.5 | 632 | 3.4 |
| Total | 285,800 | 100.1 | 285,800 | 99.9 | 633,933 | 99.9 | 633,933 | 100.0 |

Note:

The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Sources:

Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File; Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on Individuals* (1994).

cent of all those of Chinese origins, had experienced some loss of the Chinese language. A similar pattern can be found in 1981. It suggests that the second and subsequent generations of Chinese in Canada are highly susceptible to the loss of Chinese as mother tongue or home language as a result of the compelling forces of linguistic conformity in Canadian society (ibid.). However, it should be noted that, between 1981 and 1991, the percentage of language loss remained unchanged, and even slightly decreased. For instance, 21.6 per cent of the Chinese reported English as mother tongue in 1981; by 1991 the percentage decreased to 17.6. Regarding home language, 34 per cent of Chinese stated

that English was the language most often used in 1981, while the figure was 32 per cent in 1991. It suggests that, although there were some losses of the Chinese language, the mass influx of recent immigrants made the loss somewhat reversed in relative terms.

Linguistic patterns can also be seen by examining data regarding the extent to which the Chinese are capable of speaking either or both of the official languages (see Table 5.5). Two observations might be made here. First, most Chinese in Canada spoke English, and this pattern was consistent in various censuses: 77 per cent in 1971, 76 per cent in 1981, and 77 per cent in 1991. Second, the number of those speaking neither English nor French is substantial, accounting for 19 per cent of all Chinese in 1971 and 1981, and 16 per cent in 1991. As Li (*ibid.*: 108) pointed out, this means that approximately one in every six Chinese persons in Canada in 1991 would likely encounter some language barriers in Canadian society because of inability to speak either official language.

Linguistic patterns of the Chinese population are significant in understanding the recent development of Chinese newspapers. Data about mother tongue and home language provide another measure to assess the size of Chinese readership in Canada. The population claiming Chinese as mother tongue was 214,800 in 1981; by 1991, it increased by 126 per cent to 488,600. With respect to home language, in 1981 there were 178,900 Chinese who mostly spoke Chinese at home; by 1991 it increased by 127 per cent to 405,433. The increase in the Chinese population claiming Chinese as mother tongue or home language again indicates the expansion of the potential Chinese readership market. In addition, the Chinese population that spoke neither English nor French was substantial. Although the percentage of the population

Table 5.5 Chinese Population of Canada: Ability to Speak Official Language, 1971-1991

| <u>Official Language</u> | <u>1971</u> | | <u>1981</u> | | <u>1991</u> | |
|----------------------------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % |
| English only | 96,200 | 77.2 | 216,900 | 75.9 | 490,467 | 77.4 |
| French only | 500 | 0.4 | 1,850 | 0.6 | 7,067 | 1.1 |
| Both English and French | 4,000 | 3.2 | 12,300 | 4.3 | 37,467 | 5.9 |
| Neither English nor French | 23,900 | 19.2 | 54,750 | 19.2 | 98,933 | 15.6 |
| Total | 124,600 | 100.0 | 285,800 | 100.0 | 633,934 | 100.0 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1 probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1976), Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals* (1994).

decreased from 19.2 in both 1971 and 1981 to 15.6 in 1991, the absolute number increased from 23,900 in 1971, to 54,750 in 1981, and 98,933 in 1991. In other words, the Chinese population tripled between 1971 and 1991. Without doubt, many of them had to rely on the ethnic community for basic services, including Chinese newspapers. This group might represent the most loyal readership of Chinese newspapers.

One may assume that the increasing English speaking population might be associated with decreasing readership of Chinese newspapers. In fact, this is not the case for three reasons. First, among 490,497 Chinese who were unilingual speakers of English as an official language in 1991, there were 378,767 persons (75.6 per cent) whose mother tongue was Chinese, and 293,867 (60 per cent) individuals cited Chinese as their home language (Statistics Canada, 1994a). The fact that the majority of the population claimed

Chinese as mother tongue or home language suggests that many of them were able to read Chinese language newspapers. Second, although more than 77.4 per cent of the total Chinese population could speak English in 1991, many of them may prefer to read Chinese newspapers as a preference because the majority of the English speaking Chinese population are immigrants coming to Canada after the 1970s. Third, Chinese newspapers provide information concerning Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mainland China and South East Asia, as well as the Chinese communities in Canada, which is rarely available in the English media. The information is significant because it is relevant to interests of Chinese readers. In addition, many Chinese business immigrants in Canada have businesses in Asia. For instance, among 59 Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs interviewed by Wong and Ng in 1995 (1998: 69 and 81), at least 18 had businesses in Asia to look after. The business linkage determines that the Chinese immigrant entrepreneurs have to pay attention to Asia, because whatever changes in Asia, such as political stability, economic policies, and stock market, will affect their business interest. In search for the information from Asia, they tend to find that Chinese newspapers will be a good source of information, since the newspapers provide much more extensive and detailed information about Asia than do television and radio. In short, the high proportion of Chinese people who speak English does not reduce the readership of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

5.1.2.3 Social status

Since the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, the Chinese in Canada have shown gradual upward mobility in terms of occupation and schooling. The mobility has increased since the late 1960s, and especially after the mid-1980s, when a large

number of middle-class immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan came to Canada, many with professional skills and investment capital (Li, 1998: 119).

The upward mobility of the Chinese in Canada can be seen in changes in their occupational patterns. For instance, 63 per cent of the employed Chinese workers in 1921, and 69 per cent in 1931, worked in the service sector or in menial jobs as servants, janitors, laundry and restaurant workers, or labourers (Li, 1998: 119). Data from recent censuses show that, although many Chinese workers are still employed in service occupations, the proportion has been declining, from 28 per cent of employed Chinese in 1971 to 24.5 per cent in 1981, and 18 per cent in 1991 (Table 5.6). On the other hand, less than half of 1 per cent of the Chinese work force in 1921 and 1931 were in professional occupations (Li, 1998: 119-120). In the censuses of 1971, 1981 and 1991, professional and technical occupations accounted for 18 to 19 per cent of all employed Chinese. In addition, there have been substantial gains in both white-collar and skilled blue-collar jobs. Early in this century, clerical and related occupations were rare among the Chinese, but they accounted for 11 per cent of those employed in 1971, and 18 per cent in 1981 and 1991. Likewise, the Chinese were excluded from many skilled blue-collar occupations at the turn of the twentieth century. In 1971, about 12 per cent of employed Chinese held jobs in processing, machining, and construction; these jobs accounted for 16 per cent in 1981, and 13 per cent in 1991. As Li stated (1998: 121), "These statistics are clear that the Chinese have advanced into the core labour market from the service sector to which they once were confined, and have established a foothold in prestigious jobs that historically were closed to them."

Table 5.6 Occupations of Chinese-Canadians and Other Canadians, 1971-1991

| <u>Occupation</u> | <u>1971</u> | | <u>1981</u> | | <u>1991</u> | |
|--|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Chinese- Canadians % | Other Canadians % | Chinese- Canadians % | Other Canadians % | Chinese- Canadians % | Other Canadians % |
| Managerial, Administrative, and related occupations | 1.0 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 6.4 | 8.4 | 9.6 |
| Professional and Technical occupations | 16.7 | 12.5 | 17.8 | 14.5 | 18.0 | 17.8 |
| Clerical and related occupations | 12.3 | 16.3 | 18.5 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 17.5 |
| Sales occupations | 9.7 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 9.7 | 10.7 | 10.2 |
| Transport-equipment operating occupations | 0.7 | 3.9 | 1.4 | 3.6 | 1.1 | 3.5 |
| Processing, machine, and construction occupations | 11.1 | 19.4 | 16.4 | 20.1 | 13.2 | 15.6 |
| Service occupations | 28.0 | 11.2 | 24.5 | 12.3 | 18.6 | 12.4 |
| Farming and other primary occupation | 2.6 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 6.1 | 1.0 | 5.1 |
| Other occupations | 4.8 | 5.5 | 3.7 | 5.0 | 4.2 | 4.8 |
| Occupations not stated | 13.1 | 9.8 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 3.6 |
| Total | 100.0 | 99.9 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.1 |
| Number | 58,600 | 3,133,900 | 168,100 | 12,995,550 | 357,967 | 12,657,433 |

Note:

The individual file for 1971 is 1% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for the 1981 Census is 2% probability sample of the total population. The 1991 individual file is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Occupation categories are based on the 1971 census classification. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1976)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1984)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals (1994)*.

Table 5.6 also allows us to compare Chinese-Canadians with other Canadians in terms of occupation patterns. In 1971 and 1981, Chinese Canadians were underrepresented in managerial jobs. But in 1991, the gap was closing. The percentage of Chinese employees in professional, clerical, and sales jobs was slightly higher than that of other

Canadians. In 1971 and 1981, Chinese-Canadians were twice as likely as other Canadians to work in service occupations; the disparity was smaller in 1991: about 18 per cent of Chinese-Canadians were in service jobs in 1991, compared to 12 per cent among other Canadians. The statistics indicate that Chinese- Canadian are just as likely as other Canadians to work in professional and white-collar occupations (*ibid.*: 123).

Chinese-Canadians also have more schooling compared to other Canadians (Table 5.7). Two major points can be made here. First, the proportion of Chinese-Canadians with a university degree has tended to be at least double that of other Canadians: 8 per cent in 1971, 18 per cent in 1981 and 21 per cent in 1991, compared with 3 per cent of other Canadians in 1971, 8 per cent in 1981 and 11 per cent in 1991. Second, since 1971 a smaller percentage of Chinese-Canadians than other Canadians has had less than a grade 12 or 13 education.

The social mobility of the Chinese in Canada plays a role in the recent development of Chinese newspapers. Studies suggest that people at a higher level of social status read newspapers more often than those at a lower level, though the relationship between newspaper reading and social status is not straightforward (Gans, 1980: 222-224; Janowitz, 1967:114-119). In his study of the media in the United States, Gans (1980: 223-4) found that affluent, well-educated professionals, technicians and managers are dominant in the print media, while less well-educated blue-collar workers are more likely to be television viewers. Bogart (1989: 96) also found that better-educated persons tend to be oriented more strongly to print than to the broadcast media. For instance, in 1961, among the college educated population, 45 per cent reported that they “would feel quite lost” if they had to get along “for quite some time” without newspapers, but at the same

Table 5.7 Levels of Schooling for Chinese-Canadians and other Canadians, 15 Years of Age and Over, 1971-1991

| Level of schooling | 1971 | | 1981 | | 1991 | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | Chinese-Canadians % | Other Canadians % | Chinese-Canadians % | Other Canadians % | Chinese-Canadians % | Other Canadians % |
| Less than Grade 12 or 13 | 71.6 | 78.6 | 43.9 | 47.8 | 37.3 | 40.5 |
| Completed Grade 12 or 13 | 13.1 | 13.9 | 10.4 | 16.6 | 23.9 | 23.4 |
| Trade school | n/a | n/a | 16.9 | 19.8 | 15.8 | 22.9 |
| Some University Completed | 7.2 | 4.2 | 11.3 | 17.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 |
| University Completed | 8.1 | 3.3 | 17.5 | 7.9 | 20.6 | 11.2 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 110.0 | 99.9 | 100.1 |
| Number | 124,600 | 6,824,267 | 217,250 | 18,389,250 | 492,333 | 20,761,433 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1 probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1976), Individual File; Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File; Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals* (1994).

time they said that they could get used to the absence of television; only 7 per cent gave the reverse answer. However, the proportion of those who would “feel lost” without television and could get along without newspapers rose to 12 per cent among those with no more than a grade-school education, while the proportion who would “feel lost” without newspapers and could get along without television went down to 28 per cent (ibid.). People of higher income and education are more likely to use print media probably because they tend to seek more information, and print media, especially daily newspaper, which “covered so much wider an array of subjects than any other mass medium” (ibid.: 1991: 3), can better meet their demand. As more Chinese-Canadians became upwardly

mobile, their demand for print media, including both Chinese and English-language newspapers, would increase; because the majority of the Chinese in Canada are immigrants, their demand for Chinese newspapers would increase significantly.

Research also shows that social differences are most dramatic when we consider the reader's active behaviour in relation to the newspaper as an institution. For instance, Bogart reported (1989: 96-7) that, in 1982, about 29 per cent of those with college degrees had written letters to editors at some time, while the corresponding figure for readers with a grade-school education was 2 per cent. This suggests that,

as one ascends the social scale there is greater sense of ease, intimacy, and personal relationship between the reader and his paper. It seems as though the better-educated reader is more likely to view the paper as an institution made up of people doing a job, subject to personal influences, and capable of rendering a service. For those lower on the education scale, the newspaper as a major institution of power appears more remote and impersonal (ibid.).

In the case of Chinese newspapers in Canada, similar data are not available; but some evidence does suggest a similar pattern. For instance, Toronto's *Ming Pao* regularly published articles from readers that commented on various issues facing the Chinese community. An examination of these articles indicates that, with few exceptions, they were written by well-educated professionals.⁸ This suggests that Chinese readers of higher social status tend to have a greater influence on Chinese newspapers than those of lower social status; the influence may play a role in pushing Chinese newspapers to improve their quality of reporting and services.

5.1.2.4 Demography

Sex

As noted in the last chapter, although it was legally possible for Chinese immigrants to sponsor their wives before 1923, economic hardship and social hostility made it difficult to do so. Between 1923 and 1947, when the Chinese Immigration Act prohibited the Chinese from immigrating, it was legally impossible for Chinese immigrants in Canada to bring in their wives. As a result, the Chinese communities in Canada were dominated by male settlers. As Table 5.8 shows, in 1911 the sex ratio was 2,800 men to 100 women; and in 1931 it was still 1,240 to 100.

With the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, the Canadian government began to allow entry of a limited number of wives of Chinese-Canadians. More women than men immigrated during the 1950s and 1960s. Sex ratios among new Chinese immigrants were 65 men to 100 women for 1956-67, and 98 men to 100 women for 1968-76 (Li, 1998: 98). The arrival of higher proportions of women balanced the sex ratio in the Chinese community, from 374 men per 100 women in 1951 to 163 men in 1961 and 112 in 1971 (Table 5.8). With the flow of new immigrants and the growth of Chinese families in Canada, the ratio of males per 100 females climbed to 102 in 1981, and finally, 100 in 1991.

As more Chinese women and children came to Canada after World War II, conjugal family life was quickly established in the Chinese-Canadian community. The establishment of a family-based Chinese community likely had some important effects on the readership of Chinese newspapers. Research has suggested that “married

Table 5.8 Chinese Population in Canada, by Sex, 1981-1991

| Year | Total | Male | Female | Male per 100 Female |
|------|---------|---------|---------|------------------------|
| 1881 | 43,83 | | | |
| 1891 | 9,129 | | | |
| 1901 | 17,312 | | | |
| 1911 | 27,831 | 26,813 | 961 | 2,790 |
| 1921 | 39,587 | 37,163 | 2,424 | 1,533 |
| 1931 | 46,519 | 43,051 | 3,468 | 1,241 |
| 1941 | 34,627 | 30,713 | 3,914 | 785 |
| 1951 | 42,528 | 25,669 | 6,859 | 374 |
| 1961 | 58,197 | 36,075 | 22,122 | 163 |
| 1971 | 124,600 | 65,000 | 59,600 | 112 |
| 1981 | 285,800 | 144,550 | 141,250 | 102 |
| 1991 | 633,933 | 316,166 | 317,767 | 100 |

Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Special Report on the Foreign-Born Population* (Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce, 1915: 50); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1911 Census of Canada* (1913, Vol. II, Table XII, pp. 368-9); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1921 Census of Canada* (Population, Vol. I, Table 29, pp. 560-3); W. Burton Hurd, *Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People* (Ottawa: J. O. Patenaude, I. S. O., Table 16, p. 768, 1937); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1941 Census of Canada, General Review and Summary Tables* (Vol. I, Tables 35-6, pp. 694-7, 1943); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1951 Census of Canada, Population, General Characteristics* (Vol. I, Table 31, p. 31:1, 1953); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1951 Census of Canada, Population* (Vol. II, Table 37, p. 37:1, 1953); Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1961 Census of Canada, Population Sex Ratio* (Vol. I, part II, bulletin 1.2-5, Table 35 (p. 35:1-2, 1962); Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1976), Individual File; Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape* (1984), Individual File; Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on Individuals* (1994).

householders are better readers than householders who are single” (Janowitz, 1968: 111).

This might relate to the fact that married households have larger purchase and entertainment wants than do single households. With an increase in Chinese families in Canada, the demand for newspapers probably increased. Moreover, as the Chinese

community became family-based, it began to face social issues such as education of youth, employment of women, and access to services offered by the larger society. Because the Chinese newspapers attempted to provide information geared to the immigrants' needs, reading newspapers became part of family life in the Chinese community. This, in turn, enlarged newspaper circulation. Finally, increased numbers of women tend to produce greater demands for newspapers. Research conducted in Canada (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 1992: 11) suggests that, on average, women spend more time reading than do men. The research speculates (ibid.) that because women are less likely to be in the labour force, they may read more for pleasure. Some data from Chinese newspaper surveys found that Chinese women are more likely to be newspaper readers than are Chinese men. For instance, according to a 1996 survey conducted by Balmoral Marketing in Toronto,⁹ women accounted for 54 per cent of the total *Sing Tao's* readership, while men constituted 46 per cent. In short, more women immigrants in the Chinese communities balanced the sex ratio and likely produced higher demands for Chinese newspapers.

Age

Table 5.9 shows larger proportions of Chinese in adult groups among the foreign-born than the native-born. In 1971, for instance, 83.7 per cent of the foreign-born Chinese were over 18 years age. In contrast, only 37.5 per cent of the native-born Chinese were over 18 years in 1971. As well, in 1991 approximately 87.5 per cent of the foreign-born Chinese were over 18, compared with 40.6 per cent of native-born Chinese over 18.

Table 5.9 Age Composition of Foreign-born and Native-born Chinese-Canadians, 1971-1991

| Age | Foreign-born | | | Native-born | | | Other Canadians | | |
|---------------|--------------|-----------|-----------|-------------|-----------|-----------|-----------------|------------|------------|
| | 1971 % | 1981 % | 1991 % | 1971 % | 1981 % | 1991 % | 1971 % | 1981 % | 1991 % |
| Under 18 | 16.3 | 16.0 | 12.5 | 62.6 | 57.9 | 59.4 | 34.0 | 26.9 | 23.8 |
| 18-24 | 14.4 | 12.8 | 11.2 | 11.8 | 16.5 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 13.6 | 9.9 |
| 25-34 | 21.0 | 27.7 | 22.5 | 6.0 | 7.7 | 13.4 | 13.5 | 17.4 | 17.7 |
| 35-44 | 21.3 | 16.4 | 23.5 | 4.7 | 2.7 | 4.7 | 11.7 | 12.3 | 16.1 |
| 45-54 | 6.4 | 13.0 | 11.4 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 1.8 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 11 |
| 55-64 | 9.4 | 6.3 | 9.6 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 8.9 |
| Over 65 | 11.2 | 7.8 | 9.3 | 7.9 | 9.4 | 7.3 | 9.8 | 10.6 | 12.6 |
| Total over 18 | 83.7 | 84.0 | 87.5 | 37.5 | 42.0 | 40.6 | 66.0 | 73.1 | 76.2 |
| Total over 35 | 48.3 | 43.5 | 53.8 | 19.7 | 17.8 | 15.2 | 40.2 | 42.1 | 48.6 |
| Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.1 | 99.9 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100 |
| Number | 77,800 | 212,650 | 457,667 | 46,800 | 73,150 | 176,267 | 21,277,300 | 23,795,300 | 26,346,767 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1 probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1976)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1984)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on Individuals (1994)*.

Meanwhile, the percentage of native-born Chinese under 18 was 62.6 in 1971, 57.9 in 1981, and 59.4 in 1991, while the figures for foreign-born Chinese were 16.3 in 1971, 16.0 in 1981, and 12.5 in 1991. The differences in the age structure between foreign- and native-born Chinese reflect the long delay in the growth of subsequent generations, and the demographic patterns of immigration (Li, 1998: 106).

Table 5.9 also shows that foreign-born Chinese had larger proportions of persons in the older age groups than other Canadians. For instance, the percentage of foreign-born

Chinese over 18 years old was approximating 17.7 per cent higher than those of other Canadians in 1971, about 10.9 higher in 1981, and about 11.3 higher in 1991.

The large adult proportion of the foreign-born Chinese might affect readership of Chinese newspaper, since it can be assumed that most foreign-born Chinese have obtained some education in Chinese and, therefore, may have read Chinese newspapers before coming to Canada. Immigrants tend to continue reading Chinese newspapers after immigrating to Canada, because many of them still maintain some contacts with their homeland, including family, emotional and business ties to their place of origin. Second, it also suggests that most Chinese are in their working years and need to find jobs in Canada. To participate in the labour force, Chinese immigrants have to rely on various sources for information, and the Chinese newspaper is one of them. With the growth of the Chinese ethnic economy that creates increasing job opportunities, Chinese newspapers become significant in distributing information about the employment opportunities.¹⁰ Third, Canadian research found (Siegel, 1996: 117) that old people tend to read newspapers more than young people. Old people also spent more time reading newspapers (2.2 hours more each week) (ibid.). In this context, the dividing line between “young” and “old” appears to be about 35 years old. Table 5.8 also shows that the foreign-born Chinese have a higher proportion of those over 35 than other Canadians. The age composition suggests that the Chinese-Canadians would have greater newspaper readerships than other Canadians.

5.1.2.5 Geographic distribution

The geographic distribution of the Chinese population in Canada shows three distinctive characteristics. First, as can be seen in Table 5.10, most of the Chinese in

Table 5.10 Distribution of Chinese-Canadians by Province, 1971-1991

| <u>Province</u> | <u>1971</u> | | <u>1981</u> | | <u>1991</u> | |
|--|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|
| | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % | No. of Persons | % |
| Ontario | 40,121 | 32.2 | 114,606 | 40.1 | 294,145 | 46.4 |
| British Columbia | 46,600 | 37.4 | 98,601 | 34.5 | 195,251 | 30.8 |
| Alberta | 14,827 | 11.9 | 36,582 | 12.8 | 79,876 | 12.6 |
| Quebec | 12,709 | 10.2 | 18,005 | 6.3 | 41,206 | 6.5 |
| Manitoba | 3,240 | 2.6 | 7,431 | 2.6 | 13,313 | 2.1 |
| Saskatchewan | 4,984 | 4.0 | 6,573 | 2.3 | 10,777 | 1.7 |
| Nova Scotia | 1,246 | 1.0 | 1,429 | 0.5 | | n/a |
| New Brunswick | 498 | 0.4 | 1,143 | 0.4 | | n/a |
| Newfoundland | 498 | 0.4 | 857 | 0.3 | | n/a |
| Prince Edward Is., Yukon, and Northwest Territories | | n/a | 572 | 0.2 | | n/a |
| Total | 124,600 | 100.1 | 285,800 | 100.0 | 633,933 | 100.1 |

Note:

Individual file for 1971 is a 1 probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1981 is a 2% probability sample of the total population. The individual file for 1991 is a 3% probability sample of the total population. Numbers in the Table have been weighted to population size.

Source:

Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1976)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1984)*, Individual File;
 Statistics Canada, *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals (1994)*.

Canada live in Ontario and British Columbia. In 1971, 37 per cent of the Chinese-Canadian population was in British Columbia, and 32 per cent in Ontario. By 1981 Ontario became the province with the highest Chinese population, accounting for 40 per cent, while British Columbia ranked second, with 35 per cent. These two provinces accounted for 75 per cent of Chinese-Canadians in 1981. By 1991 46 per cent of Chinese in Canada lived in Ontario, and 31 per cent in British Columbia. Another 12 per cent of

Chinese-Canadians lived in Alberta, 7 per cent in Quebec, with remaining 4 per cent scattered throughout other provinces.

Second, among the Chinese in Ontario and British Columbia, a vast majority of them lives in Toronto and Vancouver. Together, these two metropolitan centres accounted for 50 per cent of all Chinese in Canada in 1971, 60 per cent in 1981, and 66 per cent in 1991 (Li, 1998: 104). Cities like Calgary, Edmonton, and Montreal also had sizeable Chinese-Canadian populations, numbering 35,000 to 39,000 in 1991 (*ibid.*). The concentration of the Chinese population in a few large cities results from greater opportunities for education, employment, and investment in these centres and the previous residential pattern (Lai, 1988: 113).

Third, the increase in the Chinese population in Toronto and Vancouver occurred in the suburbs rather than the centres of cities. For instance, as shown in Table 5.11, between 1981 and 1996, the Chinese population in the city of Toronto increased by about 2 times, while Markham's Chinese population increased by almost 15 times, Mississauga's by about 6 times, and Scarborough's by about 4 times. Vancouver also displayed a similar pattern. During the period, the Chinese population in the city of Vancouver grew by about 2 times, but major suburbs increased by 5 to 11 times. The growth of the Chinese population in the outlying areas reflects the fact the Chinese no longer concentrate in Chinatowns and tend to move to the affluent suburb neighbourhoods.

The geographic distribution patterns of the Chinese population in Canada are crucial in analysing the development of Chinese newspapers. The concentration of the Chinese population in Ontario and British Columbia, especially in the metropolitan centres of Toronto and Vancouver, created two large Chinese newspaper markets. In 1996,

Table 5.11 Distribution of Chinese in Toronto and Vancouver, 1971-1996

| | 1971 | 1981 | 1991 | 1996 | % increase (1981-1996) |
|---------------------------------------|--------|--------|---------|---------|---------------------------|
| Toronto | | | | | |
| Scarborough | 1,810 | 17,900 | 65,825 | 96,900 | 441 |
| Markham | 135 | 2,990 | 21,915 | 44,810 | 1,499 |
| Richmond Hill | 35 | n/a | 7,975 | 21,000 | n/a |
| Mississauga | 500 | 5,345 | 18,145 | 33,755 | 632 |
| Toronto City | 17,755 | 32,390 | 52,615 | 64,460 | 199 |
| Other parts of | | | | | |
| Greater Toronto | 6,050 | 30,965 | 65,345 | 98,534 | 318 |
| Greater Toronto (total of above) | 26,285 | 89,590 | 231,820 | 359,459 | 401 |
| Vancouver | | | | | |
| Richmond | 935 | 6,675 | 20,765 | 50,512 | 757 |
| Burnaby | 2,040 | 8,380 | 19,810 | 40,165 | 479 |
| Coquitlam | 380 | 1,415 | 5,785 | 15,530 | 1,097 |
| Surrey | 545 | 1,895 | 5,165 | 14,195 | 749 |
| Vancouver city | 30,640 | 59,620 | 102,950 | 143,115 | 240 |
| Other parts of | | | | | |
| of Greater | | | | | |
| Vancouver | 1,865 | 5,855 | 12,315 | 25,278 | 432 |
| Greater Vancouver (total of above) | 36,405 | 83,840 | 166,790 | 288,795 | 345 |

Note:

Population figures for Greater Toronto are based on data from Greater Toronto census metropolitan area (CMA) as defined by Statistics Canada. Population figures for Greater Vancouver are based on data from Vancouver census subdivision (CD) used to construct the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) as designated by Statistics Canada. They include single-origins Chinese only

Source:

Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, *Population: Ethnic Groups*, Catalogue 92-723, Table 5 and 6, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1974; Statistics Canada, 1981 Census of Canada, *Population: Language, Ethnic Origins, Religion, Place of Birth, schooling*, Ontario and British Columbia, Catalogue 93-930 and 93-934, Table 2, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984; Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Canada, *Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto*, Part B, Catalogue 95-354, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1994; Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Canada, *Profile of Census Tract in Ontario*, Part B, Catalogue 95-338, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1994; Statistics Canada, 1991 Census of Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in British Columbia*, Part B, Catalogue 95-385, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology, 1994; Statistics Canada, 1996 Census of Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario*, Catalogue 95-187XPB, Ottawa: Minister of Industry, 1999; Statistics Canada, 1996

Toronto's Chinese newspaper market was equal to the entire newspaper market of Halifax (total population of 343,300), and Vancouver's was close to that of Victoria (total population of 312,100) (*Canadian Advertising Rates and Data*, 1996: XI). It is the concentration of population that formed sizeable geographic markets where daily newspapers could flourish. If the Chinese population in 1996 were evenly dispersed across Canada, the Chinese newspaper market would not be an attractive investment, since the entire Canada is difficult to serve due to its size, elaborate production and distribution systems required. Neither would it attract advertising, since the Chinese enclave economy would be weakened by the absence of concentration.

On the other hand, however, the local dispersion of the Chinese population stimulated the development of Chinese newspapers. The spread of the Chinese population in metropolitan areas made it necessary for the Chinese to get information about their communities through newspapers. Meanwhile, with the concentration of Chinese ethnic businesses in several different areas rather than traditional "Chinatowns", newspapers become increasingly important in spreading information about goods, services and employment.

In short, the national concentration of the Chinese population created large Chinese newspaper markets, and the local dispersion of the Chinese population increased the importance of newspapers in providing information. The geographic distribution of the

Chinese population proved to be favourable for the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

5.2 Chinese Advertising Markets since the 1980s

Like other Canadian newspapers, advertising accounts for about 80 per cent of revenues of Chinese newspapers in Canada;¹¹ thus, the development of Chinese newspapers had much to do with changes in the Chinese advertising market. Since the 1980s, especially after the early 1990s, the advertising market has undergone rapid expansion. In part the expansion resulted from growing Chinese ethnic businesses that catered mainly to the Chinese population. The expansion was also a consequence of increasing advertising by non-Chinese businesses that intended to target recent Chinese immigrants. Growing advertising by both Chinese and non-Chinese firms funnelled a large amount of money into Chinese newspapers, which stimulated the recent development of newspapers.


The discussion in this section is based on advertising data from three major Chinese newspapers in Toronto. Because the advertising in the three newspapers is estimated to be more than half of the total advertising in Chinese newspapers in Canada,¹² the data are significant to understanding the Chinese advertising market in Canada.

5.2.1 Growth of Chinese Advertising Market

Figure 5.1 summarises data about daily advertising pages in three major Chinese newspapers in Toronto from 1978 to 1996. In 1980 the combined advertising pages per day in *Sing Tao* and *World Journal* were about 21. By 1985, the figure doubled, reaching

approximately 40. By 1990, the advertising pages increased to about 116, which is three times the figure from 1985. By 1996, with *Ming Pao* entering the Toronto market in 1993, the total advertising pages further increased to about 170. In short, daily advertising pages in major Chinese newspapers in Toronto increased by more than 8 times between 1980 and 1996, indicating a rapid expansion of the Chinese advertising market in Toronto. The expansion of the advertising market can also be seen in estimated advertising

Figure 5.1 Advertising Pages in Three Major Chinese Newspapers Per Day, Toronto, 1978-1996



Note: The raw data for Figure 5.1 are calculated from *World Journal* (1980-1996), *Sing Tao* (1978 to 1996), and *Ming Pao* (1993-1996) by the author.

revenues of Chinese newspapers. The fact that the Chinese newspapers do not publish their advertising revenues makes it difficult to do so; however, some available information allows us to obtain some rough estimates of the growing size of the advertising market. In his discussion about Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the mid-1980s, Gu (1986: 41), an expert of the media, estimated that the *Sing Tao's* total revenues were about \$3 million in 1985. If advertising is assumed to contribute 80 per cent of total revenues, *Sing Tao's* revenues from advertising in 1985 would be about \$2.4 million. As well, if *Sing Tao* is assumed to account for 80 per cent of total advertising revenues,¹³ the amount of revenues from advertising in all Chinese newspapers in Toronto can be estimated to be about \$3 million in 1985. More recently, based on a content analysis of one major Chinese newspaper in Toronto, Li and Li (1999: 53) estimated that the total advertising revenues in three major Chinese newspapers in Toronto can be as high as \$34.5 million in 1996. These estimates suggest that the size of advertising revenues in the Chinese newspapers in Toronto increased by about ten times between 1985 and 1996. On a constant dollar basis, the size grew by about seven times during the period.

In sum, the increase in both advertising pages and advertising revenues indicates that the Chinese advertising market underwent rapid expansion during the last two decades, which provided a solid financial base for Chinese newspapers in Canada.

5.2.2 Advertising by Chinese Businesses

5.2.2.1 Increase in advertising by Chinese businesses

Advertising in Chinese newspapers comes from both Chinese and non-Chinese businesses. In the 1980s, Chinese newspapers relied almost exclusively on Chinese

businesses for advertising. In the mid-1990s, despite a considerable increase in advertising from non-Chinese businesses, Chinese businesses still constituted a large part of advertising in the newspapers. Table 5.12 shows the contribution of Chinese businesses to advertising in 20 issues of *Ming Pao* in Toronto. There were 6,657 display advertisements placed by Chinese businesses, accounting for about 69 per cent of a total 9,655 advertisements in the sample. The 6,657 advertisements occupied about 801,050 square cm, which accounted for about 55 per cent of the total advertising space. The space amounts to roughly 530 pages for 20 days, or about 27 pages per day. With respect to revenues, Chinese businesses can be estimated to contribute about \$320, 282 in 20 days, and about \$5,813,126 in a year, accounting for about 55 per cent of total estimated advertising revenues in the paper.¹⁴

Although there are no similar data about *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*, my reading of these newspapers and my field work in Toronto suggest that the percentage of advertising by Chinese businesses in the three newspapers might be similar.¹⁵ Assuming this is the case, we can obtain some estimate of the change in the size of the advertising over time. In 1996, three Chinese newspapers are estimated to publish about 161 pages of advertisements per day, of which 89 pages of advertisements are from Chinese businesses (69 per cent). This figure is about four times that of 1980, and more than double that of 1985, if all advertisements in Chinese newspapers in the 1980s are assumed to come from Chinese businesses. The same method can be applied to estimate advertising revenues. If the total advertising revenue in Chinese newspapers is estimated to be \$29.8 million a year (Li and Li, 1999: 53), the revenue from Chinese businesses may be estimated to be \$16.23

Table 5.12 Display Advertisements of Chinese Business in A Major Chinese Newspaper in Toronto, by Number, Space and Cost, 1996

| Type of advertisements | Numbers of Advertisement | | | Space of Advertisement | | | Estimated Cost/Revenue | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|---|------------------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Total ad (20 Days) | Chinese ad (20 Days) | Chinese ad as % of Total (20 Days) | Total ad (20 Days) | Chinese ad (20 Days) | Chinese ad as % of Total (20 Days) | Total ad (20 Days,\$) | Chinese ad (20 Days, \$) | Chinese ad as % of Total (20 Days) | Total ad (1 Year, \$) | Chinese ad (1 Year \$) |
| Services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Professional services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Accounting and tax filling | 98 | 88 | 0.91 | 3,056 | 2,717 | 0.18 | 1222 | 1,087 | 0.18 | 22167 | 19,729 |
| Banking/insurance/investment | 625 | 291 | 3.01 | 71,948 | 24,347 | 1.66 | 28779 | 9,739 | 1.66 | 522342 | 176,763 |
| Communication related | 134 | 69 | 0.71 | 72,477 | 18,282 | 1.24 | 28991 | 7,313 | 1.24 | 526183 | 132,731 |
| Instructional services | 1,188 | 971 | 10.06 | 73,857 | 56,726 | 3.86 | 29543 | 22,690 | 3.86 | 536202 | 411,824 |
| Health and dental care | 256 | 248 | 2.57 | 11,870 | 11,870 | 0.81 | 4748 | 4,610 | 0.78 | 86176 | 83,672 |
| Legal and immigration services | 663 | 491 | 5.09 | 47,101 | 33,794 | 2.30 | 18840 | 13,518 | 2.30 | 341953 | 245,352 |
| Real estate | 641 | 349 | 3.61 | 438,948 | 210,600 | 14.33 | 175579 | 84,240 | 14.33 | 3186762 | 1,528,956 |
| Traveling and package tour related | 421 | 399 | 4.13 | 88,190 | 86,459 | 5.88 | 35276 | 34,584 | 5.88 | 640259 | 627,700 |
| | | | 0.00 | | | | | | | | |
| Total Professional Services: | 4,026 | 2,906 | 30.10 | 807,447 | 444,795 | 30.26 | 322978 | 177,780 | 30.23 | 5862064 | 3,226,707 |
| Other services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Amusement | 87 | 65 | 0.87 | 27,307 | 21,571 | 1.47 | 10923 | 8,628 | 1.47 | 198249 | 156,598 |
| Auto repairing | 321 | 140 | 1.45 | 28,941 | 10,047 | 0.68 | 11576 | 4,019 | 0.68 | 210112 | 72,945 |
| Decorating/home improvement/repair | 1,147 | 1,049 | 10.86 | 51,316 | 47,103 | 3.20 | 20526 | 18,841 | 3.20 | 372554 | 341,964 |
| Food services | 863 | 828 | 8.58 | 107,765 | 103,505 | 7.04 | 43106 | 41,402 | 7.04 | 782374 | 751,446 |
| Funeral | 133 | 96 | 0.99 | 12,552 | 9,044 | 0.62 | 5021 | 3,618 | 0.62 | 91128 | 65,667 |
| Hair design and beauty | 51 | 37 | 0.38 | 5,571 | 3,191 | 0.22 | 2228 | 1,276 | 0.22 | 40445 | 23,159 |
| Moving/customs | 136 | 113 | 1.17 | 8,712 | 7,232 | 0.49 | 3485 | 2,893 | 0.49 | 63249 | 52,508 |
| Others | 416 | 244 | 2.53 | 49,905 | 23,029 | 1.57 | 19962 | 9,212 | 1.57 | 362310 | 167,198 |
| Radio and TV program | 23 | 12 | 0.12 | 13,843 | 8,281 | 0.56 | 5537 | 3,312 | 0.56 | 100500 | 60,113 |
| Total other services: | 3,177 | 2,584 | 26.76 | 305,912 | 233,003 | 15.85 | 122364 | 93,201 | 15.85 | 2220921 | 1,691,598 |
| Products: | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|
| Automobiles: | 943 | 88 | 0.91 | 172,049 | 14,401 | 0.98 | 68820 | 5,760 | 0.98 | 68820 | 104,544 |
| Books/stationery/handicraft | 34 | 31 | 0.32 | 6,092 | 5,158 | 0.35 | 2437 | 2,063 | 0.35 | 2437 | 37,443 |
| Building materials/home appliances | 692 | 511 | 5.29 | 58,118 | 41,235 | 2.81 | 23247 | 16,494 | 2.81 | 23247 | 299,366 |
| Clothing/shoes | 81 | 38 | 0.39 | 15,534 | 3,287 | 0.22 | 6214 | 1,315 | 0.22 | 6214 | 23,867 |
| Electronic products | 97 | 56 | 0.58 | 20,588 | 6,894 | 0.47 | 8235 | 2,758 | 0.47 | 8235 | 50,058 |
| Furniture | 432 | 289 | 2.99 | 70,466 | 42,681 | 2.90 | 28186 | 17,072 | 2.90 | 28186 | 309,857 |
| Glasses | 60 | 59 | 0.61 | 3,371 | 2,461 | 0.17 | 1348 | 984 | 0.17 | 1348 | 17,860 |
| Jewelry | 14 | 9 | 0.09 | 933 | 486 | 0.03 | 373 | 194 | 0.03 | 373 | 3,521 |
| Newspapers and periodicals | 39 | 36 | 0.37 | 4,785 | 4,647 | 0.32 | 1914 | 1,859 | 0.32 | 1914 | 33,741 |
| Others | 60 | 50 | 0.52 | 4,714 | 2,002 | 0.14 | 1886 | 801 | 0.14 | 1886 | 14,538 |
| Total Products: | 2,452 | 1,167 | 12.09 | 356,650 | 123,252 | 8.38 | 142660 | 49,301 | 8.38 | 142660 | 894,813 |
| Total | 9,655 | 6,657 | 68.95 | 1,470,009 | 801,050 | 54.49 | 588,002 | 320,282 | 54.47 | 8,225,645 | 5,813,118 |

million a year (55 per cent), which is more than 5 times that of 1985 (3.7 times using constant dollar), if all advertising revenues in Chinese newspapers at that time are considered as from Chinese firms. In short, based on the proportion of advertising by Chinese firms in *Ming Pao*, advertising by Chinese firms in the Chinese newspapers in Toronto can be estimated to have increased by about 4 times in terms of pages between 1980 and 1996, and about 5 times in terms of advertising revenues between 1985 and 1996.

5.2.2.2 Chinese businesses and advertising

Why did advertising from Chinese businesses expand? First, the increase is related to the growth of Chinese businesses in Toronto after the 1970s. As shown in Table 5.13, there were a total of 3,698 Chinese firms in Toronto in 1994, compared to only 69 in 1971, and 265 in 1981. In other words, within a matter of 23 years, the number of Chinese businesses in Toronto increased by about 54 times, indicating that the base of advertising market had expanded. More importantly, the bulk of the increase took place due to newly emerged businesses, such as real estate, medical services, business services, financial services, and household/furniture, which demand larger advertising than traditional ethnic businesses such as restaurants (see Table 5.12 and 5.13). For instance, real estate constituted about 4.1 per cent of total Chinese firms, but it was estimated to contribute about 26.3 per cent of advertising dollars from Chinese businesses. Financial services accounted for about 1.8 per cent of total Chinese firms; however, it produced 3.4 per cent of advertising revenues. On the other hand, the food industry made up 24 per cent of

Table 5.13 Structural Changes of Chinese Commercial Activity in Toronto CMA, 1971-1994 (numbers in brackets are percentages)

| Type of business | 1971 | 1981 | 1994 | Change in percentage 1981-1994 |
|---------------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------------------------|
| Auto dealer/service | 0 (0.0) | 0 (0.0) | 172 (4.7) | 4.7 |
| Business service | 1 (1.4) | 4 (1.5) | 382 (10.3) | 8.8 |
| Clothing/shoes | 1 (1.4) | 2 (0.8) | 92 (2.5) | 1.7 |
| Financial service | 0 (0.0) | 20 (7.5) | 66 (1.8) | -5.7 |
| Food store | 21 (30.4) | 45 (17.0) | 343 (9.3) | -7.7 |
| General | | | | |
| Merchandise | 4 (5.8) | 31 (11.7) | 1 (<0.1) | -11.7 |
| Hotel/motel | 0 (0.0) | 0 (0.0) | 7 (0.2) | 0.2 |
| Household | | | | |
| Furniture/service | 0 (0.0) | 18 (6.8) | 434 (11.7) | 4.9 |
| Medical service | 1 (1.4) | 7 (2.6) | 425 (11.5) | 8.9 |
| Miscellaneous | 14 (20.3) | 11 (4.2) | 94 (2.5) | -1.7 |
| Other retailing | 5 (7.2) | 42 (15.8) | 620 (16.7) | 0.9 |
| Personal service | 2 (2.9) | 7 (2.6) | 362 (9.8) | 7.2 |
| Real estate | 2 (2.9) | 6 (2.2) | 153 (4.1) | 1.9 |
| Recreation/ | | | | |
| Entertainment | 0 (0.0) | 2 (0.8) | 35 (0.9) | 0.1 |
| Restaurant | 18 (26.0) | 70 (26.40) | 512 (13.8) | 12.6 |
| Total | 69 (100.0) | 265 (100.0) | 3698 (100.0) | |

Sources: Wong, 1987; *Chinese Consumer Directory of Toronto*; cited in Wang, 1998.

Chinese firms, but it contributed only about 13 per cent of advertising dollars. Thus, both expansion and diversification of Chinese businesses produced greater demands for advertising space in Chinese newspapers.

Second, the geographical diversification of Chinese businesses in Toronto contributed to the increase in advertising. As Wang (1998: 12) pointed out, prior to the

early 1980s, Chinese businesses were concentrated in the three central city Chinatowns: the Old Chinatown (around Dundas St. between Bay St. and University Ave.), the Central Chinatown (centred on the intersection of Dundas St. W. and Spadina Ave.), and the East Chinatown (around Gerrard St. E. and Broadview Ave.). Since 1984, most developments of Chinese businesses have occurred in the suburbs. By 1996, although Toronto city still had the most Chinese businesses (34.2 per cent) among all municipalities in the CMA, there were more in the suburbs as a whole (65.8 per cent) (see Table 5.14). Chinese businesses in suburbs usually would place more advertisements (see Table 5.12 and 5.14). For instance, Toronto city had about 34.2 per cent of total Chinese firms, but only made up about 16.4 per cent of advertising locations. On the other hand, Markham accounted for 7.4 per cent of total Chinese businesses and Richmond Hill 6 per cent, but their advertising locations constituted 9.9 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively. Scarborough accounted for about 29.1 per cent of Chinese firms, and its advertising locations were 24 per cent. This might have to do with the fact that the merchants' relationship with their customers would be less personal in suburbs than in inner city. This is because merchants in the suburbs often attract customers from areas other than neighbourhood. The formal and anonymous relationships, which resulted from the formation of new enclaves or satellite enclaves, could facilitate the development of an "advertising consciousness" (Singer, 1986: 18). In addition, the Chinese who reside in suburbs probably tend to depend more on advertisements for consumption decisions than those in the central city; thus, this dependence stimulates the increase in advertising.

Third, the expansion of advertising from Chinese businesses also has to do with changes in the physical forms of the businesses. As in other North American cities,

Table 5.14 Geographical Distribution of Chinese Businesses in the Toronto CMA, 1994

| CMA division | Municipality | Count | Percentage |
|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| Central city | | 1,246 | 34.2 |
| | Toronto | 1,264 | 34.2 |
| Suburbs | | 2,452 | 65.8 |
| | Scarborough | 1,076 | 29.1 |
| | Markham | 275 | 7.4 |
| | Richmond Hill | 141 | 3.8 |
| | Mississauga | 221 | 6 |
| | North York | 396 | 10.7 |
| | Others | 343 | 9.3 |
| CMA total | | 3,698 | 100.0 |

Source: *Chinese Consumer Directory of Toronto*, 1994; compiled from Wang, 1998

Chinese retailing and consumer services in Toronto's Chinatown all operated in separate, residential-like buildings, which formed unplanned retail strips (Wang, 1998: 14). The post-1985 suburban developments took the form of either plazas or enclosed malls, which provide free off-street parking and have a centrally controlled tenant mix (ibid.). According to Wang (ibid.), by the end of 1996, 52 Chinese shopping centres of various sizes (ranging from 15 store units and 9500 square feet to 200 units and 285000 square feet) have been developed in the Toronto CMA, with a total of 2.9 million square feet of retail space. In addition, 22 Chinese shopping centres were proposed or under construction at the end of 1996. Except for two that were built in Central Chinatown, all (including the proposed) are in suburbs. The concentration of large numbers of businesses in suburban

shopping centres made it necessary for firms to advertise their services or products; otherwise, customers might not notice their existence. In addition, the Chinese population in some suburbs was not large enough to support so many shopping centres. For example, there were only 21,000 Chinese people living in Richmond Hill in 1996, but 11 Chinese shopping centres with 700,000 square feet of commercial space had been built by the end of that year (with an average of 33.3 square feet for each Chinese resident in the town) and 6 more with another 900,000 square feet were proposed or under construction (Wang, 1996: 12). So the Chinese shopping centres had to attract customers from outside Richmond Hill. In doing so, advertisements in Chinese newspapers became a significant means to spread the names of firms as well as information about services and products they provide.

5.2.3 Advertising by Non-Chinese Businesses

5.2.3.1 Increase in advertising by non-Chinese businesses

Table 5.15 shows the contribution of non-Chinese businesses to advertising in 20 issues of *Ming Pao* in Toronto in 1996. Among a total of 9,655 display advertisements, non-Chinese businesses accounted for about 30.3 per cent, or 2,923 advertisements. These advertisements occupied 658,987 square centimetres, accounting for about 45 per cent of total space devoted to display advertisements. On average, non-Chinese businesses had about 25 pages of display advertisements per day. As well, non-Chinese businesses contributed about 45 per cent of revenues from display advertisements, which was estimated to be \$4,784,249 a year. These figures suggest that, although Chinese firms placed more advertisements in the Chinese newspapers, non-Chinese firms contributed

Table 5.15 Display Advertisements of Non-Chinese Business in A Major Chinese Newspaper in Toronto, by Number, Space and Cost, 1996

| Type of advertisements | Numbers of Advertisement | | | Space of Advertisement | | | Estimated Cost/Revenue | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Total ad (20 Days) | Non-Chinese ad as % of | | Total ad (20 Days) | Non-Chinese ad as % of | | Total ad (20 Days, \$) | Non-Chinese ad as % of | | Total ad (1 Year, \$) | Total ad (1 Year \$) |
| | | ad (20 Days) | Total (20 Days) | | Non-Chinese ad (20 Days) | total (20 Days) | | ad (20 Days, \$) | Total (20 Days) | | |
| Services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Professional services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Accounting and tax filling | 98 | 10 | 0.10 | 3,056 | 339 | 0.02 | 1,222 | 136 | 0.02 | 22,187 | 2,468 |
| Banking/insurance/investment | 625 | 322 | 3.34 | 71,948 | 46,270 | 3.15 | 28,779 | 18,508 | 3.15 | 522,342 | 335,920 |
| Communication related | 134 | 65 | 0.67 | 72,477 | 54,195 | 3.69 | 28,991 | 21,678 | 3.69 | 526,183 | 393,456 |
| Instructional services | 1,188 | 215 | 2.23 | 73,857 | 17,062 | 1.16 | 29,543 | 6,825 | 1.16 | 536,202 | 123,874 |
| Health and dental care | 256 | 7 | 0.07 | 11,870 | 320 | 0.02 | 4,748 | 128 | 0.02 | 86,176 | 2,323 |
| Legal and immigration services | 663 | 170 | 1.76 | 47,101 | 13,235 | 0.90 | 18,840 | 5,294 | 0.90 | 341,953 | 96,086 |
| Real estate | 641 | 275 | 2.85 | 438,948 | 221,964 | 15.10 | 175,579 | 88,786 | 15.10 | 3,186,762 | 1,611,466 |
| Traveling and package tour related | 421 | 22 | 0.23 | 88,190 | 1,731 | 0.12 | 35,276 | 692 | 0.12 | 640,259 | 12,560 |
| | | | 0.00 | | | | | | | | |
| Total Professional Services: | 4,026 | 1,086 | 11.25 | 807,447 | 355,116 | 24.16 | 322,978 | 142,046 | 24.16 | 5,862,064 | 2,578,135 |
| Other services: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Amusement | 87 | 21 | 0.22 | 27,307 | 5,528 | 0.38 | 10,923 | 2,211 | 0.38 | 198,249 | 40,130 |
| Auto repairing | 321 | 179 | 1.85 | 28,941 | 18,800 | 1.28 | 11,576 | 7,520 | 1.28 | 210,112 | 136,488 |
| Decorating/home improvement/repair | 1,147 | 97 | 1.00 | 51,316 | 4,189 | 0.28 | 20,526 | 1,676 | 0.29 | 372,554 | 30,419 |
| Food services | 863 | 35 | 0.36 | 107,765 | 4,260 | 0.29 | 43,106 | 1,704 | 0.29 | 782,374 | 30,928 |
| Funeral | 133 | 37 | 0.38 | 12,552 | 3,508 | 0.24 | 5,021 | 1,403 | 0.24 | 91,128 | 25,464 |
| Hair design and beauty | 51 | 14 | 0.15 | 5,571 | 2,380 | 0.16 | 2,228 | 952 | 0.16 | 40,445 | 17,279 |
| Moving/customs | 136 | 23 | 0.24 | 8,712 | 1,480 | 0.10 | 3,485 | 592 | 0.10 | 63,249 | 10,745 |
| Others | 416 | 138 | 1.43 | 49,905 | 25,942 | 1.76 | 19,962 | 10,377 | 1.76 | 362,310 | 188,343 |
| Radio and TV program | 23 | 11 | 0.11 | 13,843 | 5,562 | 0.38 | 5,537 | 2,225 | 0.38 | 100,500 | 40,384 |
| Total other services: | 3,177 | 555 | 5.75 | 305,912 | 71,649 | 4.87 | 122,364 | 28,660 | 4.87 | 2,220,921 | 520,179 |
| Products: | | | | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|--------------|------------------|
| Automobiles: | 943 | 853 | 8.83 | 172,049 | 156,496 | 10.65 | 68,820 | 62,598 | 10.65 | 68,820 | 66,820 | 10.65 | 1,136,154 |
| Books/stationery/handicraft | 34 | 3 | 0.03 | 6,092 | 934 | 0.06 | 2,437 | 374 | 0.06 | 2,437 | 2,437 | 0.06 | 6,788 |
| Building materials/home appliances | 692 | 181 | 1.87 | 58,118 | 16,883 | 1.15 | 23,247 | 6,753 | 1.15 | 23,247 | 23,247 | 1.15 | 122,567 |
| Clothing/shoes | 81 | 43 | 0.45 | 15,534 | 12,247 | 0.83 | 6,214 | 4,899 | 0.83 | 6,214 | 6,214 | 0.83 | 88,917 |
| Electronic products | 97 | 41 | 0.42 | 20,588 | 13,694 | 0.93 | 8,235 | 5,478 | 0.93 | 8,235 | 8,235 | 0.93 | 98,426 |
| Furniture | 432 | 143 | 1.48 | 70,466 | 27,785 | 1.89 | 28,186 | 11,114 | 1.89 | 28,186 | 28,186 | 1.89 | 201,719 |
| Glasses | 60 | 1 | 0.01 | 3,371 | 910 | 0.06 | 1,348 | 364 | 0.06 | 1,348 | 1,348 | 0.06 | 6,607 |
| Jewelry | 14 | 4 | 0.04 | 933 | 423 | 0.03 | 373 | 169 | 0.03 | 373 | 373 | 0.03 | 3,067 |
| Newspapers and periodicals | 39 | 3 | 0.03 | 4,785 | 138 | 0.01 | 1,914 | 55 | 0.01 | 1,914 | 1,914 | 0.01 | 988 |
| Others | 60 | 10 | 0.10 | 4,714 | 2,712 | 0.18 | 1,886 | 1,085 | 0.18 | 1,886 | 1,886 | 0.18 | 19,693 |
| Total Products: | 2,452 | 1,282 | 13.28 | 356,650 | 232,222 | 15.80 | 142,660 | 92,889 | 15.80 | 142,660 | 142,660 | 15.80 | 1,685,935 |
| Total | 9,655 | 2,923 | 30.27 | 1,470,009 | 658,987 | 44.83 | 588,002 | 263,595 | 44.83 | 8,225,645 | 8,225,645 | 44.83 | 4,784,249 |

disproportionate share of advertising pages and revenues. This might relate to the fact that non-Chinese firms are more likely to market high-priced items such as real estate and cars (see Table 5.15), which are more likely to appear in larger and more colourful advertisements than other services or products (Li and Li, 1999: 53).

If the percentages of advertising by non-Chinese businesses in *Ming Pao* are assumed to be similar to those in other two Chinese newspapers, we can obtain some estimates of the size of the advertising market. In 1996, three Chinese newspapers published about 161 pages of advertisements per day, and about 49 pages of advertisements can be estimated to come from non-Chinese business (30.3 per cent). If the total advertising revenue in the Chinese newspapers is estimated to be around \$29.8 million a year, non-Chinese firms probably contribute \$13.5 million a year (45 per cent). Given the fact that non-Chinese businesses placed few advertisements in Chinese newspapers before 1993,¹⁶ the expansion is extraordinary and accounts for the bulk of the increase in advertising space and revenue in the Chinese newspapers in Toronto.

5.2.3.2 Non-Chinese businesses and advertising

Why did advertising from non-Chinese businesses expand? The rapid expansion of advertising from non-Chinese businesses resulted mainly from changes in Chinese readership market. It is the growing size and changed nature of Chinese consumers that attracted non-Chinese firms to increase their advertising in the Chinese newspapers. In addition, three other factors should be considered

First, the expansion of advertising from non-Chinese businesses can be regarded as part of an industry trend that focuses on market segmentation. As Singer pointed out

(1986: 64), since the 1940s there was growing recognition that the mass consumer did not really exist. Rather, mass markets were made up of various groups that differed in needs, tastes, and desires. Thus, there were increasing uses of sociodemographic surveys that stressed different group memberships within the audience such as sex, age, education, ethnicity, occupation, and family structure. This trend resulted partly from an increased sophistication of advertisers and marketers, and partly from industries attempting to decrease the level of competition through targeting some segments of the market (Longman, 1971: 53). As Li (1998: 127) pointed out, the economic influence and spending power of the Chinese-Canadians are being recognised by the business community in Canada, since Chinese-Canadians constitute not only a growing but an affluent consumer sector. Recognising the economic power of Chinese immigrants, established Canadian corporations, including major airlines, banks, jewellers, electronic distributors, and media outlets, are eager to target the market by sponsoring Chinese social and community events as well as advertising in Chinese newspapers.

Second, Canadian trade journals and other business publications played a significant role in the creation of the Chinese consumer market, which influenced the influx of advertising from non-Chinese firms. In his study of Canadian advertising in the 1980s, Rotenberg pointed out (1986: 208-9) that, to a large extent, Canadian advertisers ignored the country's ethnic minorities. "Most advertisers ignore the ethnic market, neither using the ethnic media (which include a considerable number of print vehicles and a growing number of radio and even cable TV stations) nor making sure that messages on the mass media are congenial for ethnic groups within the target market" (ibid.). The situation gradually changed after the earlier 1990s, and especially after 1994. These

changes have much to do with the increased discourse concerning the Chinese market in business publications, which have profound influences on advertisers. An examination of *Advertising Magazines* and *Strategy*, two major trade journals in Canada, indicates that there was an increase in articles about ethnic markets in general and the Chinese market in particular after 1993.¹⁷ For instance, *Strategy* published 9 articles concerning ethnic markets during eight years between 1985 and 1992; however, from 1993 to 1998 the journal published 51 articles about the subject. *Advertising Magazines* has published a special section of "The Marketing Report on the Chinese Market" or "Multicultural Marketing" twice a year since 1995.

The discourse about the Chinese market in business publications was organised around three main components. (a) The Chinese were recognised as viable consumers. In 1995, for instance, *Advertising Magazine* estimated that the Chinese represented 7.4 per cent of the combined purchasing power in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, the largest amount of all ethnic groups in Canada (*Marketing Magazine*, 1995). Another article stated that, "According to a survey commissioned last year by CFMT International, a Toronto-based Multicultural broadcaster, Chinese households in Toronto alone have \$5.2 billion to spend annually. Another survey shows that three in four recent Chinese immigrants buy cars with cash, almost half own homes, and more than half own a personal computer" (Chu, 1998: 72-73). This kind of description of Chinese consumers, seen in almost all articles discussing the Chinese market, actually created an image of the well-off Chinese. (b) Emphasis was placed on language and cultural differences. For instance, one article stated, "A 1994 survey showed close to 70% of Chinese-Canadians had a good command of English, but more than 60% preferred to read in Chinese" (*Financial Post Daily*,

November 24, 1995). Others talked about cultural and psychological differences between the Chinese and non-Chinese. For instance, one article stated, "Many Chinese are superstitious so lucky colours like red and golden lucky numbers like eight and three bring favour. New immigrants are status conscious and pay cash, even for expensive homes" (*Marketing Magazine*, 1991). What the discourse conveyed was clear: although the huge and affluent Chinese market was out there, it was difficult to have access to them because of language and cultural differences. (c) Marketing strategies were suggested. Although many ways to get access to the Chinese market were suggested, advertising in the Chinese media and hiring personnel from the Chinese communities were thought to be the best strategies (Lynn, 1995; *Strategy*, 1996; *Canadian Press Newswire*, 1995). These approaches address the first two components noted above (i.e., the Chinese as valuable consumers, and language and cultural differences). Although the business publications may have tended to exaggerate their knowledge of the Chinese community, their discourse undoubtedly helped to construct a Chinese consumer market and to influence the way non-Chinese firms opened the market. In summary, the advertising discourse in business publications have influenced non-Chinese firms to increase their advertising in the Chinese newspapers.

Third, the relatively low advertising cost was another reason non-Chinese firms increased their advertising in the Chinese newspapers. For instance, in 1996 a weekday full-page black-and-white advertisement cost about \$3,700 in *Toronto Star* (*Canadian Advertising Rates and Data*, November 1996: 23), while a similar advertisement cost about \$2,304 in *Sing Tao*, about \$2,120 in *World Journal*, and about \$1,907 in *Ming Pao* (*Ethnic Media and Markets*, Winter/Spring, 1997: 11-13). The lower advertising cost

might make non-Chinese firms willing to place more advertisements when they target to the segmented market.

This section indicates that the advertising market of the Chinese newspapers in Canada experienced a significant growth since the late 1970s. This growth resulted partly from the growing number of Chinese businesses and their suburbanisation. However, it is largely non-Chinese businesses that contributed to the expansion of advertising. The growing advertising by both Chinese and non-Chinese firms provided a major financial base for the recent development of the Chinese newspapers in Canada.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the Chinese newspaper market since the 1970s. It has demonstrated that it is the expansion of both readership and advertising markets that stimulated the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

The data indicate that the potential Chinese readership market in Canada increased by eight times between 1971 and 1996. More importantly, the nature of readership has undergone significant changes in terms of origins, linguistic patterns, social status, demography, and geographical distribution. These changes imply that the Chinese population would create greater demands for newspaper consumption. It is both the size and nature of Chinese readership that largely accounted for the growth of Chinese newspapers.

The findings also indicate that the advertising market experienced a significant growth in the last two decades. In part, this growth resulted from the growing number of Chinese businesses and their suburbanisation. However, mainly non-Chinese businesses

contributed to the expansion of advertising. While non-Chinese firms accounted for less than 10 per cent of total advertising dollars in 1993,¹⁸ by 1996 their share of advertising revenue was estimated to jump to about 45 per cent. It is reasonable to believe that the non-Chinese firms have been a major force in the recent growth of advertising market. The expansion of advertising from non-Chinese businesses was stimulated by several factors; the most significant factors were the segmentation approach of industry, influences of business publications, and relatively low rates of advertising in Chinese newspapers.

Finally, it should be recognised that both readership and advertising markets are crucial for the survival and development of Chinese newspapers. Advertising provides about 80 per cent of the revenues of Chinese newspapers. Without the expansion of advertising, there would have been no financial base for the recent development of Chinese newspapers. Readership forms a base to attract advertisers. Newspapers must be able to reach buyers in sufficient numbers to justify the cost of the newspaper advertisements. As a result, changes in the size and nature of the Chinese readership market influence the formation of the advertising market, which in turn attracts readers.

Endnotes — Chapter 5

1. For a detailed discussion about actual and potential readership, see Breen and Blankenship, pp. 94-97.
2. Several Chinese readership surveys have been conducted in Toronto and Vancouver since 1994. Most of these surveys were conducted by marketing firms such as DJC, Environics and Angus Reid. The complete survey data gathered by these firms are unavailable or available only at a high price (e.g. DJC charged \$15,000 for its survey result of Chinese readership in Toronto in 1996). In addition, there are no surveys of Chinese readership before 1994, which makes it impossible to examine long-term changes in the actual readership market. As a result, I have determined to use potential readership data that are based on census figures.
3. On 19 December 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed by the Chinese and the British governments. Under the terms of the Declaration, Hong Kong was to be returned to China on July 1 1997.
4. For a discussion about the reasons immigrants from Mainland China to Canada were deterred from coming to Canada before the early 1970s, see Li, 1998: 97.
5. According to Wu (1994: 274), "After World War II, Taiwan was returned to the ROC [Republic of China] from Japan. On 27 February 1947, a (mainlander) policeman, while checking for smuggled cigarettes, had a row with a cigarette vendor woman and brutally gunned down a (Taiwanese) bystander. This incident stirred up latent discontent of the native Taiwanese about the KMT's [Kuomintang] suppressive rule at that time. Public demonstration resulted from this incident the next day in Taipei and similar demonstrations spread quickly throughout the rest of Taiwan. Approximately 10,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese Chinese were killed by KMT troops from the mainland stationed in Taiwan. This unfortunate incident has sown hatred between the mainland refugees and the Taiwanese since the then and has hampered the process of integration within Taiwan's society. After forty years, the memory of this unhappy incident has gradually faded from popular conscious. Nevertheless, some Taiwanese still use this incident as a reason to oppose the KMT's rule in Taiwan."
6. In Canada there were several newspapers from Mainland China, such as the overseas edition of the *People's Daily* from Beijing and the *Yangcheng Daily* from Canton. However, these papers were simply reprinted and, therefore, cannot be regarded as Canadian Chinese newspapers.
7. The discussion of linguistic patterns is based on census figures concerning mother tongue, home language, and official language(s) spoken. This is different from my previous discussion of Mandarin and Cantonese languages.

8. *Ming Pao*, August 1 to September 30, 1995.
9. Data are from a promotional package distributed by *Sing Tao*.
10. Throughout my fieldwork, I found that many new Chinese immigrants read Chinese newspapers primarily for information about job hunting.
11. In their discussion about Canadian Daily newspapers, the Royal Commission on Newspapers pointed out that (1980: 6) "advertisers contribute roughly 80 per cent of the revenues of the daily newspaper, and the readers, subscribers, contribute only 20 per cent. The dependence of the newspaper on advertising income is high. The ratio of financial income is four to one against the subscriber." More recently, advertising accounts for about 75 per cent of the revenues of newspapers in Canada. The decrease resulted from the fact that newspapers have become increasingly expensive. For more detailed information, see Siegel, 1996: 113-115. In the case of Chinese newspapers in Toronto, my interviews suggest that advertising accounted for about 80 per cent of the total revenues in the mid-1990s. Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997.
12. Interview, Toronto, August 6, 1997.
13. The percentage is based on information from an interview, Toronto, August 8, 1998.
14. The number of advertisements and estimated revenues in Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 are compiled from Table 1 and Table 3 in Li and Li, 1999. The information about advertising space is calculated from the original data on which Li and Li's paper is based. For a discussion about the data and methods, see Li and Li, 1999, pp. 47-49.
15. Interview, Toronto, June 18, 1997.
16. For more detailed information about advertising from non-Chinese businesses before 1993, see Chapter 7.
17. The information is from "*Canadian Current Affairs and Business*," an electronic database available in the library at the University of Saskatchewan, and my reading of these journals.
18. See Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 6

THE CAPITAL FORMATION OF CHINESE NEWSPAPERS: CHINESE NEWSPAPERS AND OVERSEAS CAPITAL

Chinese newspapers in Canada have been supported by two types of capital: local and overseas. Local capital refers to that which comes from the Chinese communities in Canada, while overseas capital refers to sources from outside the country, primarily from Hong Kong and Taiwan. For much of this century, local capital was almost an exclusive financial source for establishing and maintaining Chinese newspapers in Canada. For instance, *Shing Wah* was financially supported by the local branch of Kuomintang since its inception in 1923 till its close in 1989, while *Chinese Express* relied on capital from small businesses in Toronto during its 19 years of publication from 1970 to 1989. Since the mid-1970s, however, locally-owned newspapers have suspended publication one by one, and overseas-owned newspapers have gradually controlled the Canadian Chinese newspaper market. By the early 1990s, in Toronto and Vancouver, almost the entire Chinese newspaper market was dominated by overseas capital, and local papers were insignificant.¹ The development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s has been transformed by overseas capital which first seized and finally dominated the Chinese newspaper market.

This chapter explains the formation of overseas capital and how the capital entered and expanded in the Chinese newspaper market in Canada. The first section of this chapter discusses economic growth in East Asia over the last several decades and its impact on Canada. The second section examines the growth of the media in Hong Kong and Taiwan as well as their expansion overseas. The third section discusses overseas-owned Chinese newspapers in Canada, with special attention to three major Chinese daily newspapers, *World Journal*, *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao*, in Toronto. Of interest here is how overseas capital increased the size of investment and enlarged newspaper organisations over time, and it finally became the dominant power of Chinese newspaper market in Canada. The fourth section offers some remarks on the relationship between overseas capital and development of Chinese newspapers in Canada.

6.1 Hong Kong and Taiwan: Economic Success and Its Impact on Canada

In Canada, the overseas-owned Chinese newspapers are part of offshore Chinese investments in this country, which resulted largely from economic success in Hong Kong and Taiwan over the last several decades. To better understand the expansion of overseas capital in Chinese newspaper market, it is necessary to first look at economic development in East Asia and Chinese investments in Canada.

6.1.1 Economic Success in Hong Kong

The principal feature of Hong Kong's economic development during the past four decades from the 1950s to 1990s is its tremendous rate of growth. After the disruptions caused by the Second World War and the Korean War, the Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) of Hong Kong grew by 6 to 8 per cent per annum in the 1950s (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 185). As Table 6.1 shows, that growth accelerated in the 1960s and GDP grew by an average annual rate of 11.2 per cent. The high economic growth continued through the 1970s, despite difficulties caused by the influx of refugees from Vietnam and international stagflation triggered by the energy crisis. Since 1980, GDP growth has averaged 6.5 per cent annually, while per capita GDP has increased fourfold. Hong Kong's economic performance is more than double that of the Western industrialised countries from the 1960s to 1990s (Ho, 1992: 21).

With the rapid growth of the Hong Kong economy, huge capital has been generated in the last several decades. On the one hand, Hong Kong has maintained very high savings and investment ratios. As shown in Table 6.1, from 1971 to 1996, average saving and investment rates are as high as nearly 30 per cent, which is well above the world norm (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 10). On the other hand, Hong Kong's real gross domestic capital formation (GDCF), on par with its GDP performance over time, grew at an average rate of 9.7 per cent per annum from 1961 to 1988: "This high rate of capital formation activity is indicative both of the economy's rapid industrial expansion and of its construction effort" (Ho, 1992: 25).

The economic growth in Hong Kong is accompanied by continual changes involving intersectoral shifts in the economic structure. The first economic transformation in Hong Kong in the 1950s was from a trading entrepot, especially for China, to an export-orientated manufacturing economy. As a result, the most significant change in Hong Kong's industrial structure in the 1960s was a substantial increase in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to the total production. Its share of GDP was about 24 per cent in

**Table 6.1 Major growth indicators of economic activity in Hong Kong
(in percentage per annum)**

| Indicators | 1961-71 | 1971-81 | 1981-91 | 1991-95 |
|---|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Real GDP growth rate ¹ | 11.2 | 9.6 | 7.2 | 5.5 |
| Per capita nominal GDP, in dollars ² | - | 5,268 | 7,689 | 24,489 |
| Share in GDP | | | | |
| Gross domestic saving ³ | - | 28.4 | 33.7 | 35.5 |
| Gross domestic investment ⁴ | - | 27.8 | 28.2 | 29.1 |
| Total GDCF ⁵ | 12.4 | 11.6 | 3.6 | 16.3 |

Notes: ¹ Since the GDP estimate for 1961, unlike its 1971 and other subsequent counterparts, is not subject to the latest revision, the associated growth rate for 1961-71 period may have been somewhat overstated. Data shown are 1961-71, 1971-81, 1981-91, and 1992. ² Data shown are as of 1980, 1986, and 1995 at current market prices. ³ Data shown are as of 1971-80, 1981-90, and 1991-95. ⁴ Data shown are as of 1971-80, 1981-90, and 1992. ⁵ GDCF stands for gross domestic capital formation. Data shown are as of 1961-71, 1971-81, 1981-88, and 1991-95.

Sources: Compiled from Ho, 1992: 22-23; Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 186; Dodsworth and Mihaljek, 1997: 6; Asian Development Bank, 1997: 106-107.

1961 and went up to nearly 31 per cent by 1970 (ibid.).

In the 1970s, the second structural change was the rise of Hong Kong as a fast-growing financial centre in the Asia-Pacific region. According to Jao (1974), until the beginning of the 1970s, Hong Kong's financial sector was almost exclusively composed of commercial banks engaged in retail banking services. However, the situation has changed since the 1970s. According to International Monetary, as of early 1997, Hong Kong hosted over 500 banking institutions, including 82 of the 100 largest banks in the world Fund (Dodsworth and Mihaljek, 1997: 7). The external assets held by banks and deposit-taking

institutions exceeded US\$600 billion, making Hong Kong the fifth largest banking centre in the world. More than 70 per cent of banking business is denominated in foreign currencies, and Hong Kong ranks fifth in the world in terms of foreign exchange market turnover. Hong Kong's stock market is the seventh largest in the world and second largest in Asia in terms of market capitalisation.

In addition to being a leading financial centre in the region, the third structural change occurred in the 1980s, which was the re-emergence of Hong Kong as an entrepot centre for trade with China and with the Asia-Pacific region generally (Ho, 1992: 38). In 1993, re-exports accounted for more than 78 per cent of Hong Kong's total exports of goods and over 81 per cent in the first quarter of 1994. Re-exports grew by 19 per cent in 1993, compared with 13 per cent for the total exports (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 187). China is Hong Kong's largest trading partner. In 1996, China purchased one-third of Hong Kong's total exports and provided 37 per cent of its imports. Hong Kong, in turn, was the destination for one-fifth of China's exports and the source of 6 per cent of its imports (Dodsworth and Mihaljek, 1997: 9). As well, unlike the Post-War period, Hong Kong's new entrepot function has added significant value to trade with banking, insurance, transportation and storage (Ho, 1992: 38).

The economic success in Hong Kong might be attributed to the following factors. First, in the late 1940s, a huge and sudden population increase took place as immigrants flooded into Hong Kong from China. It is estimated that, between 1945 to 1949, about 1.3 million people entered Hong Kong from China (England, 1976: 12). As a result of continual immigration from China, Hong Kong had the advantage of having a reservoir of hard-working and low-cost labour (Ho, 1992: 6). As Vogel put it (1991: 69), "Most of

refugees had limited entrepreneurial experience and little formal education. But they proved to be a resource for industrialisation Some of these refugees provided a willing source of cheap labour, and others were prepared to start small and middle-sized enterprises, both commercial and industrial."

Second, after the Second World War, many Chinese returned to Hong Kong with capital. This influx was enhanced by the 1947-49 turmoil in China. During this period, a large group of wealthy people, businessmen and industrialists from Shanghai and other areas took refuge in Hong Kong (Ho, 1992: 6; Wong, 1988: 42-44; Woronoff, 1992: 148): "Not infrequently they brought along large amount of capital funds, as well we capital goods, especially machinery for textile mills" (Ho, 1992: 6). It was estimated by Fortune magazine (October 1947, p.116, cited in Ho, 1992: 6) that, by 1947, as much as US\$50 million of Chinese wealth had taken refuge in Hong Kong, and 228 Shanghai businesses or industrial concerns had shifted their registration to Hong Kong. Another study indicated that capital funds amounting to US\$310 million had flowed into Hong Kong from China during the period 1949-51 (Wong, 1958: 5). As Ho pointed out (1992: 6-7), this huge capital injection, together with the massive inflow of human resources, formed the basis of subsequent export industrialism.

Third, another key factor, and probably the most important of all to Hong Kong's economic success, is its free market. Hong Kong's British rulers from the earliest days had abided by a policy of strict non-intervention in economic matters and left the organisation and conduct of business to those directly involved, namely businessmen (Woronoff, 1992: 143-144): "They placed credence in a philosophy of laissez-faire and free enterprise that was becoming increasingly outdated in other parts of the world" (ibid.: 144). As such, not

only has Hong Kong maintained a free port position since its early foundation as a British trading post, but control on the movement of capital and on business activities have also been kept to a minimum (Ho, 1992: 8).² By the same token, Hong Kong as a colony of the British, has a well-established legal system, which effectively protects individuals' economic activities as well as property rights and business contracts. Thus, with a stable government and a sound legal framework "Hong Kong was able to quickly capitalise on the influx of the main ingredients of industrialisation from China and other countries in the region, namely, the skilled and unskilled labour, capital, technology and entrepreneurship" (ibid.).

Finally, the infrastructure inherited from its long-standing entrepot economy has also contributed to Hong Kong's industrial development. As a result of hundred years of entrepot activities, Hong Kong has developed substantial physical and commercial infrastructures, including the fine harbour, warehousing and other port facilities, valuable commercial ties and vast marketing experience, as well as efficient banking and communication networks. As Ho pointed out (ibid.: 9), all these "have created an economic environment highly conducive to the development of an export trade in light manufactures which forms the mainstay of its subsequent growth."

6.1.2 Economic Success in Taiwan

Taiwan was the "first little dragon" to achieve an industrial breakthrough after World War Two (Vogel, 1992: 13). But in 1949, when Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan along with over one million mainlanders, the economic prospects did not seem bright. Except for some small textile factories, a few modern sugar refineries and other

food-processing plants, Taiwan had no industrial base, and 60 per cent of the island's work force was in agriculture (ibid.). Its average per capita income was about \$100 a year, about the same as that of India (ibid.; Chan and Clark: 1992: 35). Inflation was rampant, as it had been on the mainland (Long, 1991: 76). Initially, Chiang and other top leaders were more preoccupied with retaking the mainland than with building up Taiwan (Vogel, 1992: 13).

However, in the ensuing four decades and so, Taiwan has become one of the most dynamic economies in the world. In the 1950s, real GDP averaged 7.6 per cent per annum, while during the 1960s and 1970s, the GDP grew by an average rate of 10 per cent per annum. Between 1960 and 1973, prior to the first energy crisis, Taiwan's real GNP increased more than threefold (Deyo, 1987: 26; Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 174). The second energy crisis and the world recession in the early 1980s caused a slowdown of Taiwan's economic growth. However, it recovered faster than most other countries and economic growth peaked at 12.3 per cent in 1987 (ibid.: 175). After 1991, the economy was showing signs of maturity and has been growing at an average annual rate of 6 to 7 per cent (see Table 6.2). During the same period, per capita GDP grew from US\$100 in 1949 to US\$8,000 in 1988, and US\$12,800 in 1996 (Asian Development Bank, 1997: 319). In addition, from 1952 to 1990, the average annual growth rates of its exports and imports were 21.6 per cent and 18.9 per cent respectively; this has generated trade surplus nearly every year since 1971 and huge foreign reserves amounting to US\$81 billion by 1990 (Pang, 1992: 21). Finally, the economic miracle also helped to promote capital accumulation in Taiwan, which in turn financed new development. As Table 6.2 shows,

Table 6.2 Major growth indicators of economic activity in Taiwan (in percentage per annum)

| Indicators | 1961-71 | 1971-81 | 1981-91 | 1991-96 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Real GDP growth rate ¹ | 10.0 | 9.3 | 8.5 | 6.6 |
| Per capita nominal GDP, in US dollars ² | - | 2,357 | 3912 | 12,784 |
| Share in GDP | | | | |
| Gross domestic saving ³ | - | 32.1 | 32.9 | 31.7 |
| Gross domestic investment ⁴ | - | 30.5 | 22.6 | 24.2 |
| Total GDCF ⁵ | - | 20.3 | 8.1 | 6.5 |

Notes: 1. Data shown are as of 1960-70, 1971-80, 1981-1990, and 1992. 2. Data shown are as of 1980, 1986, and 1996 at current market prices. 3. Data shown are as of 1971-80, 1981-90, and 1991-96. 4. Data shown are as of 1971-80, 1981-90, and 1992. 5. GDCF stands for gross domestic capital formation. Data shown are as of 1976-81, 1981-1991, and 1991-96.

Sources: Compiled from Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 175; Deyo, 1987: 26; Asian Development Bank, 1997: 318-319.

over the last several decades, the average saving rate was as high as about 30 per cent, while the ratio of investment was between 26 per cent and 30 per cent, which was also higher than the world norm (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 10).

As Hwang pointed out (1991: 18), Taiwan's economic achievement goes beyond what impressive statistical figures can convey: "Through the years a more mature and strengthened economic structure capable of taking on a faster pace and even more ambitious economic growth in the future evolved on this island" (ibid.). The structural transformation of Taiwan's economy is indicated by the major shifts from agriculture to industry in total production. Overall, between 1952 and 1993, the share of agriculture in GDP fell from about 36 per cent in 1952 to 3.5 per cent, while industry's share jumped

from less than 20 per cent to 40.6 per cent (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997: 176). Commensurate with its growth, manufacturing accounted for 17 per cent of employment in 1952, and nearly 40 per cent in 1993 (ibid.). After 1980s, the growth in the services sector has been driving Taiwan's economy. According to Islam and Chowdhury (1997: 176), the value added in the service sector grew by more than 13 per cent in 1987 and then by about 11 per cent during 1988-89. The share of the service sector in GDP stood at more than 55 per cent in 1993, compared with 42 per cent in 1952, and accounted for nearly half the employment in 1993.

The economic success in Taiwan can be attributed to several factors. First, the legacy inherited from the Japanese colonial period is often considered a contribution to Taiwan's success (Peng, 1992: 22-23; Klintworth, 1995: 26-53; Chan and Clark, 1992: 77-78). The Japanese, in their occupation of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, brought about many significant changes in Taiwanese society. For example, as Chan and Clark pointed out (1992: 77), "Japanese investment in infrastructure, education, and agricultural technology stimulated substantial economic growth, an innovative agricultural sector, some increase in the standard of living, and a population with some rudimentary skills necessary for industrialisation." During that period, the Japanese also removed bureaucratic, legal, and social impediments to economic transformation and created a good investment climate, which undoubtedly was conducive to Taiwan's subsequent development (Peng, 1992: 34).

Second, US aid is another factor often cited as a crucial component in Taiwan's development. Systematic American aid to Taiwan started in 1951 and continued till 1965. During this period, US economic aid, aside from \$2.5 billion of military aid, amounted to \$1.5 billion, averaging about \$100 million per annum (Peng, 1992: 34). In addition, this

financial support was backed up by a substantial cadre of American advisors and experts. By the end of the Korean War in 1953, there were 1,200 operational US personnel in Taiwan, who assisted the Taiwan government to improve its budgetary system and map out several development projects (Long, 1991: 80; Peng, 1992: 34). Taiwan's achievement would have been less spectacular if there had been no US aid. According to one estimate, in the absence of the US aid Taiwan's annual GNP growth rate would have been cut by half, its per capita income would have been reduced by three quarters, and it would have taken the island 30 more years to reach its 1964 living standards (Jacoby, 1966, cited in Chan and Clark, 1992: 99).

Third, Taiwan's economic success may well be because of its Confucian culture which is widely seen as promoting both economic dynamism and political stability in East Asia (Chan and Clark, 1992: 150). Tai (1989, cited in Chan and Clark, 1992: 150-151) specifically argues that Confucianism encompasses an affective culture which can present an alternative basis for development to the Western cultural traditions of individualism, efficiency, and rationality. This effective culture has proved an important stimulus to economic innovation and entrepreneurship in several important ways:

First, loyalty to family as a kinship unit stimulates efforts to increase collective wealth and defer consumption for future benefits. Second, Confucian values emphasise education, hard work, and investment. Third, the affective culture encourages a paternalistic management style and a reliance on personalised business networks that form a distinctive East Asian commercial environment (ibid.).

While such practices contravene conventional western management theory, they are increasingly seen as a key ingredient in the East Asian success story (Chang, 1985; Fei, 1986; Wong, 1986; Wu, 1985). As well, Confucian culture is also widely credited with promoting stability in the regime-society relation, due to its respect for authority and government, the emphasis on consensus and mediation in decision-making, and giving the highest status to scholar-bureaucrats (Chan and Clark, 1992: 151).

Finally, the role of the state is crucial in Taiwan's development (Peng, 1992; Klintworth, 1995: 110-141; Hwang, 1991: 45-58). The major role that the Taiwan government played in the economic development was in central planning. After 1953 nine consecutive economic development plans were implemented. Each plan identified specific development goals based on careful consideration of prevailing economic needs, available resources, and economic capability. These plans were developed by the Council on Economic Development of the Executive Yuan, and the finished development plan was then distributed to the appropriate government office with specific implementation guidelines (Hwang, 1991: 48). In addition, the government facilitated economic growth through (1) controlling the interest rate, the foreign exchange rate, and rate of import duties; (2) manoeuvring the power and influence of government-owned enterprises, and the purchases and sales of government-owned land; and (3) upgrading technical and management resources (*ibid.*). As Peng put it (1992: 36), it was the state that brought the advantages for Taiwan's economic development fully into play. However, the state's role declined since the mid-1980s, when the government declared that its major economic policy goal was to remove obstacles to the free operation of market forces (*ibid.*: 54).

6.1.3 Chinese Investment in Canada

Since the 1980s, Hong Kong and Taiwan, after rapid growth for several decades, have undergone basic changes - "changes sufficiently fundamental that students of East Asia have spoken of as the end of the era of industrial breakthrough" (Vogel, 1991: 103). One of the significant changes is the dramatic growth in outward investment which has had a powerful impact on the world. For example, according to an economic analysis of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, by the end of 1989, cumulative approved investment in Asia from Hong Kong had reached more than \$26 billion, representing 25 to 28 per cent of all foreign investment in the region (OECD, 1993: 83). In the period of 1987 to 91, Taiwan supplied an estimated US\$ 60 billion in foreign investment capital, the third largest amount in the world during that period after Japan (US\$281.4 billion) and Germany (US\$214.8 billion) (Klintworth, 1995: 147). Although the bulk of the outward investment has been made in Southeast Asia, the flow of capital to Canada from Hong Kong and Taiwan has increased immensely over the past two decades.³

6.1.3.1 Hong Kong and Taiwan-based Chinese investments in Canada

Since the mid-1980s, there has been an increase in offshore Chinese investments in Canada. For instance, statistics on foreign investments in Canada indicate that there has been a substantial inflow of capital from Hong Kong. Table 6.3 shows that in 1985, direct investment from Hong Kong was about \$163 million, but it quickly increased to \$429 million in 1986, to \$1.05 billion in 1988, and to \$2.52 billion in 1991. By 1995, direct investment from Hong Kong rose to \$3.18 billion, which represented increase of 2,320 per cent from 1983. Investment from Taiwan, however, has been quite meagre, as compared

Table 6.3 Foreign Direct Investment in Canada by Selected Pacific Rim Countries (Millions of Dollars)

| | Hong Kong | Taiwan | Singapore | Korea | Japan | Total Pacific Rim Countries |
|----------------------|-----------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|-----------------------------|
| 1983 | 137 | 11 | 23 | 87 | 1,611 | 2,147 |
| 1984 | 168 | 12 | 51 | 89 | 1,790 | 1,478 |
| 1985 | 163 | 22 | 41 | 345 | 2,250 | 3,219 |
| 1986 | 426 | 22 | 70 | 281 | 2,679 | 3,978 |
| 1987 | 652 | 25 | 84 | 191 | 3,051 | 5,932 |
| 1988 | 1,052 | 22 | 95 | 202 | 3,582 | 6,575 |
| 1989 | 1,169 | 51 | 104 | 235 | 4,779 | 7,572 |
| 1990 | 1,371 | 33 | 92 | 312 | 5,217 | 8,249 |
| 1991 | 2,519 | 32 | 99 | 260 | 5,547 | 9,769 |
| 1992 | 2,347 | 99 | 110 | 53 | 5,899 | 10,260 |
| 1993 | 2,419 | 102 | 160 | -6 | 6,144 | 11,081 |
| 1994 | 2,705 | 120 | 208 | 19 | 6,552 | 11,315 |
| 1995 | 3,179 | 91 | 244 | 188 | 6,702 | 11,797 |
| Rate of Increase (%) | | | | | | |
| 1983-1986 | 300 | 200 | 636 | 323 | 166 | 185 |
| 1987-1990 | 210 | 132 | 110 | 163 | 171 | 139 |
| 1991-1995 | 126 | 284 | 246 | 72 | 121 | 116 |
| 1983-1995 | 2,320 | 827 | 1,061 | 216 | 416 | 527 |

Source: 1983 to 1990, Li, 1993: 227; 1991 to 1995, Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position*, Catalogue NO. 67-202, 1996, p. 68.

with that from Hong Kong, probably due to historical reason (e.g. Taiwan and Canada never developed historical bonds, such as one existing between Hong Kong and Canada) and political relations (e.g. Canada did not recognise Taiwan after 1970) (Shyu, 1996: 385). Nevertheless, two points should be made. First, between 1983 and 1995, investment from Taiwan increased 8 times which was not only much higher than that of Japan (4 times), but also well over that of overall Pacific Rim countries (5 times). Second, investment from Taiwan increased rapidly after 1992. During the 1980s, investment from

Taiwan was about \$25 million per year, but from 1992 to 1995 it increased to more than 100 million. This trend in investment, combined with the current political instability, will likely mean that Taiwanese capital outflow will continue unabated or increase in the near future.

Statistics Canada also provides information on the foreign-controlled investment in Canada from 1980 to 1987, which is another way to assess the impact of Hong Kong capital on Canada, based on long-term capital investments in industries. Table 6.4 shows that in the early 1980s, Hong Kong-controlled investment was below \$300 million per year. By 1986, it rose to \$582 million; and by 1987, it jumped to \$2.1 billion. Between 1980 and 1987, the capital investment from Hong Kong increased 17 times, whereas that from Japan increased only 4 times.

Table 6.4 Foreign Controlled Investment in Canada from Selected Asian Countries, 1980-1987 (Millions of Dollars)

| | Hong Kong | Japan | Other Asian Countries | Total Asian Countries |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1980 | 121 | 611 | 82 | 814 |
| 1981 | 250 | 780 | 92 | 1,122 |
| 1982 | 262 | 945 | 237 | 1,444 |
| 1983 | 264 | 1,730 | 457 | 2,451 |
| 1984 | 366 | 1,836 | 464 | 1,666 |
| 1985 | 338 | 2,295 | 483 | 3,116 |
| 1986 | 582 | 2,966 | 572 | 4,120 |
| 1987 | 2,134 | 2,572 | 840 | 5,546 |
| Rate of Increase 1980-1987 (%) | 1,764 | 421 | 1,042 | 681 |

Source: Statistics Canada, *Canada's International Investment Position*, Catalogue No. 67-202, 1991, pp. 76-77, cited in Li, 1993: 228.

According to Li (1993: 229-230), large Chinese investments were concentrated in commercial real estate, especially in the Vancouver area. For instance, in the early 1990s, Asian investors, not all from Hong Kong, controlled about 25 per cent of the five hundred commercial properties in Vancouver's West End alone. As well, substantial commercial properties in other Vancouver areas were either owned or controlled by Hong Kong corporate elites and their companies. For example,

[T]he Pacific Landmark office tower on West Pender Street was developed by the Great Eagle Property Development Group, controlled by Lo family of Hong Kong. The English Bay Village next door are projects of Fairchild Holding Limited, controlled by Thomas Fung, the son of Fung Kinghey, the founder of Sun Hun Kai Securities of Hong Kong (ibid.).

Probably the most important development was that the former Expo lands in Vancouver were sold to Li Ka-shing for \$320 million in 1988, on which the \$8 billion Pacific Place, a so-called mini Manhattan was built (Demont and Fennell, 1989: 33).

The Chinese investments also were involved in industries of oil, bank, communication and so on. For example, in 1986, Li Ka-shing bought 43 per cent of Husky Oil Limited for \$473 million (ibid.). In the next year, Li made a \$600 million bailout to rescue Nova Corporation, based in Calgary, and its Husky Oil Limited, in exchange for a total control of 86 per cent of Husky Oil (Li, 1993: 228). In addition, Li, through his control of the Hutchison Whampoa group of companies in Hong Kong is currently the largest single shareholder in the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce holding the legal limit of just under 10 per cent (Mitchell, 1995: 375). In 1993, Westcoast Petroleum based

in Calgary was sold in a private sale to Hong Kong billionaires, Cheng Yu-Tung, Stanley Ho and Lee Shau-kee, for \$248 million (Li, 1993: 228).

Many multinationals in Hong Kong and Taiwan also extended their branch offices in Canada. Better known among them are the Hong Kong Bank of Canada, the Bank of East Asia (Canada), City Telecom, Cathay Pacific Airways, and Jardine Matheson Canada Limited, just to name a few. The three major Chinese newspapers, *World Journal*, *Sing Tao*, and *Ming Pao*, were also set up by their headquarters in East Asia as branches in Canada.

6.1.3.2. Investments of Chinese Business Immigrants

In Canada, business immigration began in the 1950s during the rapid initial growth of global interdependence, but it was not until 1985 that the policy of admitting business immigrants expanded to include entrepreneurs, investors, and self-employed persons (Li, 1996: 108). The “self-employed” are required to establish their own employment, and “entrepreneurs” are required to create employment. In both cases potential immigrants are assessed on their business history, management skills, and capital means to set up a business. For “investors”, in addition to a proven track record in business, there is a requirement of a minimum personal net worth of \$500,000 and investment minimum of \$250,000, \$350,000 or \$500,000, depending on the region of investment in Canada. Unlike the self-employed and entrepreneurs, the investors have no requirement to actually manage the business in which the investment is made (British Columbia, Ministry of Economic Development, 1987). However, since 1985 over 90 per cent have been

“entrepreneurs” and “investors” and just recently, in 1995, the “self-employed” category was discontinued (Wong, 1997: 330-331).

In 1980, the total number of business immigrants admitted was 1,556. It increased to 1,957 in 1985, 4,650 in 1990, and 8,326 in 1993 before tapering off at 6,936 in 1994 (see Table 6.5). According to Li (1996: 110), for the period between 1985 and 1991, Canada admitted a total of 16,984 entrepreneurs, 4,427 self-employed and 3,0393 investors, who, together with their dependants, made up about 93,137 immigrants, or 8.2 per cent of all immigrants to Canada during the period. Although business immigration constituted a relatively minor portion of the total immigrant intake each year by Canada, it made economic impact on Canadian society (Li, 1996: 111). For instance, between 1986 and 1995, 44,850 approved applicants of business immigrants brought into Canada an estimated net worth of about \$50.7 billion (see Table 6.5). These investments have created a great deal of jobs. Between 1987 and 1990, it was estimated that 48,000 jobs were created as a result of investment from business immigration (Li, 1996: 11).

After the mid-1980s, a large proportion of the business immigrants to Canada came from Hong Kong, and to a lesser degree, Taiwan. The data in Table 6.5 show, in 1983, 17 per cent of the business immigrants came from Hong Kong, and another 2 per cent from Taiwan. By 1985, Hong Kong made up about 40 per cent of all business immigrants, becoming the top-ranked country for the first time (Wong and Netting, 1992: 103). The volume of business immigration to Canada continued to increase in the late 1980s and 1990s. In 1989, Taiwan ranked second as a source of business immigrants, and Hong Kong and Taiwan have remained the top two in the 1990s (Wong, 1997: 337). By

Table 6.5 Business Immigrants Admitted to Canada from Hong Kong and Taiwan, Principal Applicants Only, 1983-1990

| | Total Business Immigrants to Canada | From Hong Kong | | From Taiwan | |
|------|---|-------------------|------|----------------|------|
| | | No. | % | No. | % |
| 1980 | 1,556 | 33 | 2.1 | 9 | 0.6 |
| 1981 | 1,903 | 68 | 3.6 | 28 | 1.5 |
| 1982 | 2,040 | 91 | 4.5 | 15 | 0.7 |
| 1983 | 1,982 | 338 | 17.1 | 43 | 2.2 |
| 1984 | 1,900 | 605 | 31.8 | 25 | 1.3 |
| 1985 | 1,957 | 787 | 40.2 | 41 | 2.1 |
| 1986 | 2,189 | 679 | 31.0 | 86 | 3.9 |
| 1987 | 3,140 | 868 | 27.6 | 194 | 6.2 |
| 1988 | 4,013 | 1124 | 28.0 | 336 | 8.4 |
| 1989 | 4,311 | 1295 | 30.0 | 890 | 20.6 |
| 1990 | 4,650 | | | | |
| 1991 | 4302 | 1581 | 36.8 | 750 | 17.4 |
| 1992 | 6991 | 3259 | 46.6 | 1373 | 19.6 |
| 1993 | 8326 | 3506 | 42.1 | 1753 | 21.1 |
| 1994 | 6936 | 3088 | 44.5 | 1146 | 16.5 |

Source: Wong, 1993: 99; Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Facts and Figures*, 1994 and 1996; Smart, 1992, Table 6.3.

1994, Chinese business immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan constituted about 76 per cent of all immigrants admitted under this category.

As Li pointed out (1998: 132), the arrival of Chinese business immigrants since the mid-1980 has not only increased the size of the Chinese middle-class but also brought substantial investment capital to Canada, producing significant economic and social changes in cities such as Toronto and Vancouver. According to Li, between 1986 and 1996, "of the \$3.7 billion in capital brought to Canada by investor immigrants through the subscription of investment fund, about \$1.5 billion can be attributed to Hong Kong investors and \$364 million to Taiwan investors. Their investment is estimated to have

created or maintained 18,624 jobs in Canada between 1986 and 1996” (ibid.). The total net worth of Chinese business immigrants increased from \$635 million in 1986 to a peak of \$9.15 billion in 1993 (see table 6.6). Since 1988 Chinese business immigrants’ net worth values have been between one-half and three-quarters of the total net worth values of all business immigrants, and over the past six years approximately one-half of all immigrants’ net worth. According to Wong (1997: 340), with an increasing global economy and the trend toward greater internationalisation of capital market a sizeable proportion of these business immigrants’ assets are likely to remain abroad.

Table 6.6 Chinese Business Immigrants’ Net Worth, 1986-1995 (Millions of Dollars)

| Year | Chinese Business Immigrants’ Net Worth | Total Business Immigrants’ Net Worth | Total Immigrants’ Net Worth | Chinese Business Immigrants as a % of Business Immigrants’ Net Worth | Chinese Business Immigrants as a % of Total Immigrants’ Net Worth |
|------|--|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 1986 | 635 | 1281 | 2281 | 49.6 | 27.8 |
| 1987 | 990 | 2293 | 4434 | 43.2 | 22.3 |
| 1988 | 1809 | 3421 | 6067 | 52.9 | 29.8 |
| 1989 | 2464 | 4037 | 7001 | 61.0 | 35.2 |
| 1990 | 3565 | 5203 | 8260 | 68.5 | 43.2 |
| 1991 | 5493 | 7152 | 9827 | 76.8 | 55.9 |
| 1992 | 6450 | 8723 | 12,422 | 73.9 | 51.9 |
| 1993 | 9150 | 11,949 | 17,496 | 76.6 | 52.3 |
| 1994 | 4639 | 6678 | 11,891 | 69.5 | 39.0 |
| 1995 | 4671 | 6697 | 10,660 | 69.7 | 43.8 |

Note: The information about Chinese business immigrants is based on principal applicant immigrants from Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Source: Employment and Immigration Canada (1992b); Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1994b, 1995b); cited in Wong, 1997: 340.

6.1.3.3 Reasons for the increase in Chinese investments in Canada

In addition to the economic success and high accumulation of capital in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a number of factors played a part in the growing investments. First, the political uncertainty pushed the outflow of capital. Hong Kong's capital flight, in anticipation of 1997, accounted for its dominance in business immigration. Political uncertainty and domestic issues in Taiwan also likely contributed to the increased capital emigration from the area. However, compared with Hong Kong, Taiwan and other Southeast Asian countries, Canada in fact offered much lower returns in investment due to higher labour cost and higher taxation rates (Li, 1993: 240; Wong, 1997: 337). In spite of this, as Li pointed out (*ibid.*), "Chinese corporate owners often view Canada, as well as the U.S., as desirable countries to diversify their corporate empires which continue to make their fortunes in the booming markets of Hong Kong and Guangdong province of China."

Second, the government of Canada played a significant role in attracting foreign capital. On the one hand, the changes in immigration regulations in 1978 and 1985 expanded the admission of entrepreneurs, self-employed and investors under the Business Immigration Program, which has facilitated the movement of offshore capital to Canada. On the other hand, in the 1980s, federal government initiated many measures to attract foreign investors, such as the privatisation of land, deregulation of the banking industries (Mitchell, 1995: 375-376). Due to timing and deliberate government strategies, the measures proved particularly favourable for Hong Kong business groups interested in Vancouver's burgeoning property market.

The third factor is the global expansion of Chinese multinational corporations based in Asia. In an analysis of real estate market of Hong Kong, Mitchell pointed out (ibid.: 374):

Hong Kong's highly successful export industry of the 1960s produced a tremendous accumulation of capital, much of which went into real estate speculation during the 1970s. Lack of regulation, banking overextension, and rampant speculation caused the real estate bubble to burst three times: in 1964, 1973, and 1981. Following the recession of 1981-82, there was another boom period in Hong Kong, but strategies of capital manipulation began to shift toward greater international diversification. Although property development continued to be highly lucrative throughout the 1980s, the incredible overagglomeration of wealth in this sector by players like Li Ka-shing forced a movement into new geographic arenas. Much capital investment in property was directed toward countries such as Canada.

Although Mitchell's discussion focused on real estate in Hong Kong, her analysis can be also applied to other industries in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Certainly, much of the Chinese investment can be attributed to economic diversification and market expansion. For example, some Hong Kong garment manufacturers set up operations in Canada so that they can benefit from the North America Free Trade Agreement (Wong 1993: 85). For media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan, investments in Canada were to take advantage of a growing Chinese newspaper market in this country in recent decades, when media markets in East Asia were relatively saturated. In this regard, Chinese corporate investments in Canada can be seen as strategies to economise the cost of production and to open up new market (Li, 1993: 241).

6.2 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership in Hong Kong and Taiwan

Major Chinese newspapers in Canada are operated as branches of media groups based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and these media groups expanded as a result of economic success and media development in East Asia. A study of Chinese newspapers in Canada, therefore, necessarily requires an examination of the media in Hong Kong and Taiwan, which has been linked to recent development of Chinese press in Canada. This section shows that Hong Kong and Taiwan have a highly developed media market. It also demonstrates that several media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan have been well established and have dominated the newspaper market there. Finally, it shows that the media in Hong Kong and Taiwan have long sought overseas expansion and have been influential in Chinese communities around the world..

6.2.1 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership in Hong Kong

6.2.1.1 Media growth in Hong Kong

With economic growth during the past four decades, the media in Hong Kong have expanded and readers proliferated as the people of Hong Kong gained higher incomes, better education and literacy, and more leisure time (Hachten, 1993: 82).

Rapid growth of Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong took place after the Second World War. From 1840 to 1940, a total of 163 newspapers were published in Hong Kong (Kan and Chu: 1981: 187). For three decades after 1950, however, a total of 353 newspapers started to be published (about 10 newspapers each month), though most of them were "mosquito press", in the sense that they were very small newspapers which specialised in horse-racing, sex and entertainment stories, and lasted for a short time (Kan and Chu: 1981: 187; Atword and Major, 1996: 64). In the early 1990s, some 485

publications registered with the Hong Kong government. Of these, 57 were newspapers, and among them less than 20 were major daily newspapers (Chan and Lee, 1992: 12). Also, Hong Kong had a daily consumption rate of 350 newspapers per 1,000 population, second in Asia to Japan (497) (ibid.). Hong Kong also teemed with magazines, some of which had been popular not only in Hong Kong but also in Chinese communities in the world (Chan, al et., 1996: 17). In addition, Hong Kong had two commercial television stations in the early 1990s: Television Broadcasts (TVB) and Asia Television (ATV). Both had separate English and Chinese channels, so that four channels, reaching 5.1 million viewers, broadcast a daily average of 70 hours, or 17.5 hours for each channel. TVB, which began in 1967, became the premier broadcaster in Hong Kong, which was watched by 80 per cent of the viewers, compared to ATV's 20 per cent (Hachten, 1992: 84). Radio broadcasting had three operators, one publicly owned, two commercial, running a total of thirteen channels (Chan, al et., 1996: 17).

Hong Kong's economic and political openness, plus its strategic location as a listening post and gateway to China, has long made it the major regional venue for foreign correspondents and international publication (Hachten, 1992: 85). Among the main editorial offices are *Far Eastern Economic Review*, *the Asian Wall Street Journal*, *Asiaweek*, *Asia magazine*, and the Chinese edition of *Reader's Digest*. In addition, "120 foreign correspondents for a wide range of world media - including *Time*, *Newsweek*, *International Herald Tribune*, and *the New York Times*, among others - work out of Hong Kong.

The media growth in Hong Kong has much to do with its economic success. As Hachten pointed out (1992: 86), "the media have floated upward on the rising tide of

economic development and individual prosperity. As people became more affluent, they purchased television sets, hi-fi equipment and VCR, and attended more movies: for an increasing number of the industrious Chinese, there has been more leisure time on recent years to use the media." In addition, two factors might be considered as well, which are especially relevant to newspapers. First, while the colonial government had set some limits on the publication of pornographic and politically sensitive materials, the government's interference in media content was minimal in practice (Chan and Lee, 1991: 193). As a result, Hong Kong in the Post-War years earned the good name of enjoying a high degree of press freedom. By the 1960s, Hong Kong journalists were said to have more freedom than their counterparts elsewhere in Asia, with the exception of Japan and the Philippines (Lau, 1997: 158). Second, the papers were inexpensive to produce in Hong Kong since most papers ran only 12, 16, or 20 pages at most. According to So (1982: 40, cited in Atward, 1997: 65), "A publisher only needs to pay a safety deposit of HK\$10,000 or two guarantors acceptable to the Government and pay an annual registration fee of only HK\$100." The annual fee amounted to about US\$12.82 and the safety deposit of just US\$1,282 was a normal start-up cost.

6.2.1.2 Newspaper ownership in Hong Kong

In literature on the Hong Kong press, there are two major approaches to deal with structure of Hong Kong newspapers (Lee, 1985: 770-776; Chan and Lee, 1991: 13-16; Lau, 1986: 423-437). The first approach, probably the most common, is to look at newspapers in terms of political ideology and partisan allegiance, in which major newspapers fall into four categories (Lee, 1985: 770-776; Chan and Lee, 1991: 13-16): (1)

Ultra-leftist, which refers to newspapers directly financed and supervised by Chinese government as its overseas propaganda tools; (2) Centrist, defined as owing first loyalty to the commercial market of Hong Kong and being critical of both Chinese and Taiwanese governments; (3) Rightist, responsive of the Hong Kong market and supportive of the Hong Kong government, yet mildly tilting to Taiwan due to political ideology and historical ties with Kuomintang rather than for financial assistance; (4) Ultral-rightest, which refers to propaganda outpost of Kuomintang. The second approach is to attempt to combine political ideology with ownership. For instance, in her study of Hong Kong's news media, Lau (1986: 425-437) argues that the major newspapers can be divided into four categories: pro-Communist, pro-Kuomintang, newspapers owned by big corporations, and the so-called independent newspapers. Although ideological-based division is useful to understand newspapers in Hong Kong before the 1990s when struggle between China and Taiwan had much impact on the newspapers, its weakness is evident. For one thing, rightist and central newspapers, despite ideological differences, were commercial press, and their ownership was similar. In this respect, their separation into two categories is not useful conceptually. For another, the meaning of "rightist" and "leftist" is changing but not fixed. A newspaper called "left" in the 1980s might be called "right" in the 1990s, while a "centrist" newspaper may turn to "left", given development of democratic movement in Hong Kong after the later 1980s. Finally, "ultra-Rightist" press no longer existed since the close of the *Hong Kong Times* in 1993, an ideological flagship and mouthpiece for the Taiwan government (So, 1996: 498). So this approach is not appropriate in the study of newspaper structure in Hong Kong. The second way of classification combines political ideology with economic ownership. But, a newspaper

owned by big corporation might be pro-Kuomintang, while a pro-Communist newspaper may be privately owned. These categories are not mutually exclusive. To avoid the shortcomings of the two approaches, I examine the newspaper structure mainly in terms of ownership, which is relatively stable over long-term, from which, different editorial policies are briefly discussed (see Table 6.7).

6.2.1.2.1 Party newspapers

The newspapers in this category refer to those owned by the Chinese government or the Taiwan government as propaganda outposts. They survive mainly on political subsidies but not so much on advertising and subscription.

There are two major newspapers owned by the Mainland Chinese government: *Wen We Pao* and *TA Kung Pao*. The *Wen Wei Pao* is linked to the Shanghai *Wen Wei Pao*, which “theoretically” holds 31.7 per cent of its Hong Kong cousin's shares, but it is an integral part of China's propaganda apparatus under Xinhua's supervision (The concept of stockholding is irrelevant as all of China's media are state-controlled) (Lau, 1986: 425; Chan and Lee, 1991: 16).⁴ Although these papers are concerned with local affairs, reporting and interpreting China's views is their cardinal principle, which is largely responsible for their dismal circulation. The circulation of *Wen Wei Pao* hit an all-time low of 3,000 copies during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s; *Ta Kung Pao* did not fare any better (ibid.). However, two points should be made here. First, in the 1980s both papers undertook localisation program (e.g. hiring more local staff and publishing more local news), and Xinhua also imposed less rigid control of their work policy (Lee, 1997: 123; Lau, 1986: 428-29). The localisation was to boost circulation and profit, though it

Table 6.7 Ownership of Major Hong Kong Newspapers

| Newspapers | Year Founded | Ownership | Ideology | 1986 | | 1996 | |
|---------------------------------|--------------|---|---------------|-----------|-----|-----------|----|
| | | | | N | % | N | % |
| <u>Party-owned</u> | | | | | | | |
| <i>Wen Wei Pao</i> | 1948 | Shanghai's <i>Wenhui Pao</i> holds 31% of the shares, with the rest owned by 11 other China-related individuals and organizations | Pro-China | 55,000 | 1 | * | * |
| <i>Ta Kung Pao</i> | 1948 | Fei Yimin held 51% of the shares, with the remainder owned by 9 China-related individuals. | Pro-China | 57,000 | 1 | * | * |
| <i>Hong Kong Times</i> | 1949 | Hua Hsia Investment (the Kuomintang) | Pro-Taiwan | 35,000 | 0.7 | # | # |
| <u>Public-owned</u> | | | | | | | |
| <i>Sing Tao</i> | 1939 | Sing Tao Group (Sally Aw: Chief stock-holder) | Pro-Hong Kong | 199,000 | 4 | 221,000 | 4 |
| <i>Ming Pao</i> | 1959 | Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation (Tiong Hiew King: Chief stock-holder) | Pro-Hong Kong | 423,000 | 9 | 345,000 | 6 |
| <i>Oriental Daily News</i> | 1969 | Oriental Press Group (Ma Family: Chief stock-holder) | | 1,767,000 | 38 | 1,601,000 | 29 |
| <i>South China Morning Post</i> | 1903 | South China Morning Post Group (Kuok: Chief stock-holder) | Pro-Hong Kong | 278,000 | 6 | 253,000 | 5 |
| <u>Private-owned</u> | | | | | | | |
| <i>Sing Pao</i> | 1939 | Ho Man-fat | Pro-Hong Kong | 850,000 | 19 | 630,000 | 11 |
| <i>Hong Kong Economic</i> | | | Pro-Hong Kong | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|------------------------|------|---------------------------|---------------|---------|---|-----------|----|
| <i>Journal</i> | 1973 | Mr. and Mrs. Lin Shan-muk | | 66,000 | 1 | 61,000 | 1 |
| <i>Apple Daily</i> | 1995 | Jimmy Lai | Pro-Hong Kong | @ | @ | 1,338,000 | 24 |
| <i>Wah Kiu Yat Pao</i> | 1925 | Shum family | Pro-Hong Kong | 100,000 | 2 | # | # |

Note: * Figures not available due to less than 1%; @ Not yet published; # Ceased to exist.
Source: Chan and Lee, 1991: 13; Chan, et al., 1997: 459; Lau, 1986: 426-427.

was not successful due to biased political reporting (Lau, 1986: 428). Second, despite being funded by the government, recently these newspapers have been well financed by advertising revenues from the Mainland China companies, thanks to the windows of opportunity opened up by China's economic change. For instance, in 1995, *Wen Wei Pao's* circulation ranked 12th, but its advertising revenues were 5th in Hong Kong (Lee, 1997: 124). *Ta Kung Pao* also has tried to develop its mainland market and half of its advertising revenues has come from advertisers aimed at reaching mainland consumers (ibid.).

The Hong Kong Times was the Kuomintang's official mouthpiece in Hong Kong, whose finance, staff and ideology were directly controlled by the Taiwan government (Lee, 1997: 122). The newspaper was established in 1949, and as a symbol of the Kuomintang, it commanded the allegiance of refugees in Hong Kong who aspired to return to the mainland (Chan and Lee, 1991: 15). As Chan and Lee (ibid.: 15-16) pointed out, "with most of the older Kuomintang followers now dead, aged, or gone and the younger generation born in Hong Kong turning apathetic to the Kuomintang-Communist rift, Taiwan's traditional anti-Communist enthusiasm has lost much of its appeal." In the 1980s, it claimed a circulation of 20,000, but uncharitable speculation put it at around 1,000 to 2,000 (Lau, 1986: 430). With Taiwan's vast democratic change, the Kuomintang could not draw as freely on the national treasury as in the past to subsidise unprofitable and self-serving operations, including that of *the Hong Kong Times*, which was having an annual deficit of HK\$20 million (Lee, 1997: 16).⁵ Under such circumstances the paper had to close in February 1993, indicating the end of pro-Kuomintang papers in Hong Kong (ibid.; So, 1996: 498).

6.2.1.2.2. Newspapers owned by public corporations

Although most newspapers in Hong Kong are privately owned, there are four owned by public corporations. They are the *South China Morning Post (SCAMP)*, the *Oriental Daily News*, *Sing Tao Daily* and *Ming Pao*. These commercial papers benefited from Hong Kong's rapidly expanding economy and its advertising market. Although covering many Chinese politics, they focused even more on immediate local concerns (Chan, al et., 1996: 17-18).

The *SCAMP* has been considered Hong Kong's premier English-language paper, which began publication in 1903. For a long time, the paper's major shareholder was the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. In 1985, the bank and other shareholders, including Dow Jones, sold the paper to international media magnate Rupert Murdoch (Lau, 1997: 164). Again, the paper's ownership was transferred to Robert Kuok in 1993.⁶ Kuok holds a controlling interest in the paper, 34.9 per cent of the stock worth HK\$349 million, and also owns 33 per cent of TVB, the largest television station (Lee, 1997: 127). Backed by powerful banks, the *SCAMP* is pro-business and pro-establishment. With a circulation of 115,000 copies (which is 87 per cent of the English-language press market but only 4 per cent of total readership), the *SCAMP* enjoys high respect among journalists and provides an essential forum for elite discourse (ibid.).

The *SCAMP* is not only the most influential newspaper in Hong Kong, but probably one of the most profitable of its size in the world (Lau, 1986: 435). In 1984, the group profit after tax was US\$17.5 million, an increase of US\$3.8 million over 1983 (ibid.). Profits for 1988 were projected at US \$48.8 million (Hachten, 1993: 87). In the mid-1980s, in addition to the paper, the group owned 51 per cent of the *Far Eastern*

Economic Review and of Pansia Book Distributors, 100 per cent of Filmset, Lever Printing Factory, and Yee Tin Tong Pring Press. Its associated companies included Asher & Co (Hong Kong), Asia Magazines, Asia Magazine Distributors, Medical News-Tribune, and Asher Security Printer (Singapore) (Lau, 1986: 435).

The *Oriental Daily News* has been the most widely circulated Chinese-language newspaper in Hong Kong since 1978 (Hong Kong Stock News, 1990: 211). The paper began in 1969 in a small crowded office in Wan Chai in the form of a "mosquito sheet", specialising in gambling and drug trafficking news (Lau, 1986: 432). It was founded by flamboyant film-maker and businessman Ma Sik-chun, who was charged in 1978 with trafficking in dangerous drugs and fled to Taiwan, where he has continued to direct the paper by phone since the early 1980s (Chan and Lee, 1992: 72). The paper steers clear of political controversy partly because of Ma's personal plight, but more importantly because the less-educated mass readers to whom the paper caters are not interested in politics. "It focuses on local coverage, soft pornography, violence, and horse-racing trip - always written in simple, vulgar, but lively Cantonese vernacular" (Chan and Lee, 1992: 15). Probably responding to the uncertainty of Hong Kong after 1984, the paper formed a public corporation, and managed to go public before the stock market crash in October 1987; its stock issues were greeted with enthusiasm, reducing the financial risk associated with political uncertainty (ibid.).

Sing Tao became a public corporation in 1972 and *Ming Pao* in 1991. Because both newspapers have played a major role in recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada, I will discuss them in the next section dealing with overseas Chinese newspapers in Toronto.

6.2.1.2.3 Newspapers owned by private firms

Like newspapers owned by public corporations, newspapers in this category are profit-motivated and owe their success to circulation and advertising under the vibrant Hong Kong economy. But unlike public-owned papers, they are individual or family-owned. The bulk of Chinese newspapers in Hong Kong can be included in this category, major players among them being *Sing Pao*, *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, and *Apple Daily*.

Sing Pao, with the second highest circulation before the emergence of *Apple Daily* in 1995, was founded by Ho Man-fat in 1939. The paper has always been profitable, with the exception of a brief period after the war (Lau, 1986: 436). The paper mainly caters to readers with low social status (Chan and Lee, 1991: 72-73). In the past, the paper was politically neutral, and the publisher Ho Man-fat had reportedly never travelled to either Taiwan or China. As Sino-British negotiations proceeded, however, *Sing Pao* noticeably veered toward a pro-China stand, mainly by not publishing stories which are offensive or embarrassing to Beijing. (ibid.; Lau, 1986: 436).

Another influential privately owned newspaper is the *Hong Kong Economic Journal*, founded in the early 1970s by a *Ming Pao* former employee, Lin Shan-muk, and his wife. The paper was founded at the highest point of the stock-market boom and became the first Chinese-language financial daily (Lau, 1986: 436). Although it has had a small circulation, it has been very influential among businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals.

The *Apple Daily* is owned by garment businessman Jimmy Lai, which was launched in 1995 with HK\$700 million (Lee, 1997: 29). "Modelling itself after *USA*

Today in colourful, eye-catching graphic design and its brisk, brief writing, the *Apple Daily* was sold at a 60 per cent discount for the first month and bolstered by HK\$100 million promotional campaigns” (ibid.). In terms of strategy it adopted a purely market-oriented philosophy and put readers’ needs as the top priority (So, 1996: 488). Within months, the paper climbed quickly to reach 300,000 copies, which was the maximum number it then could print daily (ibid.). By 1997, *Apple Daily’s* circulation was said to have climbed towards 400,000 and was almost neck in neck with the *Oriental Daily News* (Lau, 1997: 164). In spite of his well-publicised anti-Communist attitude, “Lai has been steering the expensively invested and commercially successful *Apple Daily* away from political troubles” (Lee, 1997: 131).

6.2.2 Media Growth and Newspaper Ownership in Taiwan

6.2.2.1 Media growth in Taiwan

The media story in Taiwan is different from that in Hong Kong. In 1949, when the Kuomintang government retreated to Taiwan after being defeated by the Communists on Mainland China, it imposed the world’s longest martial law on the island until 1987 in the name of anti-Communism (Lee, 1993: 3). As Lee (ibid.) pointed out, “martial law legalised the government reliance on military and police forces to suppress the press, civil liberties, and pressure for political participation (such as through mass protests).” In the media, the government monopolised all three television channels (with the party, the government, and military each controlling one outlet) and most radio stations (ibid.; 5). Meanwhile, a dozen laws or regulations were passed or issued to control press contents and restrict press development (Chan and Zhu, 1986: 54). For instance, all newspapers

were subject to censorship and any expression that the government deemed unacceptable would be punished (Berman, 1992: 125-26).⁷ In addition, a press ban declared in 1951 foreclosed registration of new press licenses although it allowed existing certificates to be traded (Lee, 1993: 3). The total number of newspapers in Taiwan was thus frozen at thirty-one until 1987, effectively preventing press ownership from falling into the hands of the Kuomintang challengers (ibid.).

In spite of the political repression and various restrictions, newspaper circulation in Taiwan grew slowly in the 1950s and rapidly after the 1960s. The circulation was about 225,400 copies in 1951. It increased to 710,000 in 1961, 1.3 million in 1971, and 3.5 million in 1980 (Chan and Zhu, 1987: 48, 110, 182). In other words, the circulation of newspapers grew almost 16 times during the three decades. Further evidence of newspaper expansion can be found in daily newspaper consumption, which increased from 34 per 1,000 population in 1954 to 200 in 1980 (ibid.: 48, 182). Readership was probably much higher than the circulation indicated since in Taiwan, "as elsewhere in Asia, newspapers are shared with others to a far greater extent than in more affluent nations" (Clayton, 1971: 105). In addition to the rapid growth of newspaper circulation, more impressively there was an increase in advertising revenue. In 1960, the total revenue from newspaper advertising was NT\$102 million (New Taiwan dollar). The figure increased to NT\$ 511 million in 1970, and NT\$4,426 million in 1980, about 40 times growth in a period of 20 years (Chan and Zhu, 1986: 116).

One of the most significant characteristics of the Taiwan press was that the two privately-owned newspapers, the *United Daily News* and the *China Times*, gradually came to dominate the market after the 1960s. According to Berman (1992: 142), by 1987, 'they

accounted collectively for more than 80 per cent of the island's entire 3.7 million circulation. They also enjoyed more than 70 per cent of the country's newspaper advertising revenue of \$200 million in 1986."

The lifting of martial law in 1987 opened a new period of rapid growth in the media. Ten months after the demise of martial law, the number of newspapers increased from 31 to 205 (Chen and Chaudhary, 1990: 227). It reached a record high of 279 in 1994 (GIO, 1994, cited in Wei, 1998: 61). Magazines also expanded, and about 4,500 different magazines were published. In addition, radio broadcasting boomed since the lifting of martial law, with 28 new frequencies being assigned from 1987 to 1993 (*ibid.*). However, as of 1993, the three television networks were still affiliated with the government in varying degrees, and they were occasionally criticised for presenting a rather homogeneous pro-government point of view (*ibid.*).

Besides the recent political transition, media growth in Taiwan has much to do with economic and social changes in four decades between the 1950s and 1990s. As discussed earlier, Taiwan has had one of the most dynamic economies in the world, and thus the average income of its citizens increased rapidly (e.g. it approximately quadrupled over each of two decades during the 1970s and 1980s (Chan and Clark, 1992: 58)). With more money in hand, people no longer regarded subscribing to newspapers as a luxury but as a necessity in everyday life, thus raising the demand for newspapers. The growing economy has also produced a higher demand for advertising space, which greatly promoted the growth of the media. Moreover, a population increase has played a role in the media growth. The population in Taiwan grew from 7.7 million inhabitants in 1951 to 20.5 million in 1995, or an increase of 2.5 per cent per annum (Dessus, et al., 1995: 23).

This population growth resulted in an expansion of the media market, including the newspaper market. Finally, the media growth had to do with the rising educational level of population. The number of pupils increased five fold between 1951 and 1990, more than the rate of population growth. The attendance rate for primary schooling increased from 85 per cent in 1951 to 100 per cent in 1970. The secondary school attendance rate increased from 20 per cent in 1951 to 85 per cent in 1990, while the higher education attendance rate increased from 1 per cent in 1951 to 19 per cent in 1990 (ibid.: 35). With the rising levels in education, people would be more interested in various information, which was related to the media growth.

6.2.2.2. Newspaper Ownership in Taiwan

Before 1987, newspaper ownership in Taiwan could be classified into two groups: state-owned and privately-owned. State-owned newspapers included those owned by party (Kuomintang), government (Taiwan provincial government) and military, most of them depending heavily on public subsidies. Privately-owned newspapers refer mainly to those owned by wealthy families sympathetic to Kuomintang (see Table 6.8). After 1987, although there have been a large number of newly independent newspapers published, the ownership structure has remained unchanged and no newspaper has been publicly traded.⁸

6.2.2.2.1 State-owned newspapers

As table 6.8 shows, during the martial law period (1949-1987), 12 newspapers were directly owned by state. The Kuomintang owned four newspapers: *Central Daily News*, *Chung Hua Ji Pao (Taipei)*, *Chung Hua Ji Pao (Taiwan)*, and *Shang Kung Jih Pao*.

Table 6.8 Ownership of Taiwan's Newspapers under the Press Ban (1949-1987)

| Newspapers | Year founded | Ownership |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|---|
| <i>Central Daily News</i> | 1928 | Kuomintang |
| <i>Taiwan Hsin Sheng Pao</i> | 1945 | Taiwan Provincial Government |
| <i>Chung Hua Jih Pao (Taipei)</i> | 1946 | Kuomintang |
| <i>Chung Hua Jih Pao (Taiwan)</i> | 1946 | Kuomintang |
| <i>Ming Sheng Jih Pao</i> | 1946 | Private; very insignificant |
| <i>Keng Shen Jih Pao</i> | 1947 | Private; very insignificant |
| <i>Chung Cheng Pao</i> | 1948 | Military |
| <i>Kuo Yu Jih Pao</i> | 1948 | Private; caters to school children; non-political |
| <i>Taiwan Hsin Wen Pao</i> | 1949 | Taiwan Provincial Government |
| <i>China News</i> | 1949 | English-language; normally private; heavy Kuomintang capital and personnel |
| <i>Ta Hua Evening Post</i> | 1950 | Nominally private; a spin-off of the Kuomintang's Central Daily News. |
| <i>Ming Chung Jih Pao</i> | 1950 | Private; relied on the Kuomintang's financial support from time to time |
| <i>China Times</i> | 1950 | Private; pro-Kuomintang; one of the two largest newspaper group |
| <i>Ming Chu Evening Post</i> | 1950 | Nominally private; owned by Chiang Kai-shek's former guard; relied on the Kuomintang's financial aid. |
| <i>United Daily News</i> | 1951 | Private; pro-Kuomintang; one of the two largest newspaper groups |
| <i>China Post</i> | 1952 | Private; pro-Kuomintang |
| <i>Shang Kung Evening</i> | 1953 | Kuomintang |
| <i>Chung Kuo Evening</i> | 1955 | Private; very insignificant; relied on government support. |
| <i>Chung Kuo Jih Pao</i> | 1956 | Private; very insignificant; relied on government support. |
| <i>Economic Daily News</i> | 1967 | Private; part of the <i>United Daily News</i> group |
| <i>Taiwan Shih Pao</i> | 1971 | Private |
| <i>Ming Sheng Pao</i> | 1978 | Private; part of the <i>United Daily News</i> group |
| <i>Liberty Jih Pao</i> | 1978 | Private |
| <i>Commercial Times</i> | 1978 | Private; part of the <i>China Times</i> group. |
| <i>Youth Jih Pao</i> | 1984 | Military |
| <i>Hsin Wen Evening News</i> | 1985 | Taiwan Provincial Government |
| <i>Ta Chung Pao</i> | 1986 | Military |
| <i>Quemoy Jih Pao</i> | 1986 | Military; internal circulation |
| <i>Mah-tsu Jih Pao</i> | 1986 | Military; internal circulation |

Source: Based on the Global View Monthly, January, 1987. cited in Lee, 1993: 4-5.

The provincial government owned three papers: *Taiwan Hsin Sheng Pao*, *Taiwan Hsin Wen Pao* and *Hsin Wen Evening news*. Five papers were owned by the army: *Chung*

Cheng Pao, *Youth Jih Pao*, *Ta Chung Pao*, *Quemoy Jih Pao* and *Mah-tsu Jih Pao*. As historians studying the press in Taiwan pointed out (Berman, 1992: 125), during the early years of his administration, Chiang Kai-shek “set for the media the responsibility of propagandising for government, promoting its policies and advancing the cause of reconstruction.” Thus, state-owned newspapers enjoyed numerous advantages over privately-run publications. They had better printing facilities and privileged access to a pool of valuable resources, including money, newsprint, information and special treatment by the authorities (Berman, 1992: 125; Lee, 1993: 5). But these newspapers paid a high price for their special privileges, which proved to be two-edged. According to Berman (ibid.), “in exchange for favoured treatment, the government required these publications to do more than just confine their editorial content within certain parameters. They were expected to print material according to government directives. Ultimately, such papers paid the piper through reduced readership and market share.” From 1949 to 1957, the circulation of state-owned newspapers increased by 58 per cent, while the circulation of privately- owned newspapers increased by 560 per cent, nearly ten times the rate of their quasi- official counterparts (ibid.). In 1986, a year before the lifting of the press ban, the circulation of *Central Daily News*, a top Kuomintang paper, was only about 17 per cent of that of *China Times* or the *United Daily News* (Chan and Zhu, 1987: 207). In the early 1990s, its circulation sank to an all-time low, less than 100,000 copies per day (Lee, 1993: 32).

6.2.2.2.2 Privately-owned newspapers

Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, there were 19 privately-owned newspapers among the total 31 newspapers in Taiwan. Although most of these newspapers were insignificant in terms of circulation and advertising, two of them, the *United Daily News* and *China Times*, became dominant newspaper groups in Taiwan (Lee, 1993: 5; 164-176).

The *United Daily News* was founded in 1951, merged from three newspapers in response to adverse economic conditions (Berman, 1992: 124). In the first year, the circulation of the paper was about 12,000 per day and advertising revenue about NT\$1,400,000 (Chan and Zhu, 1987: 75 and 111).⁹ The 1960s and 1970s, however, witnessed the rapid growth of the paper, largely as a result of economic take-off in Taiwan and the paper's strategy of emphasising on the coverage of social life. By 1970, the paper's circulation increased to 400,000 copies, and the advertising revenue to NT\$80 million, about 33 and 55 times growth, respectively. By 1980, circulation further increased to more than one million copies per day, and advertising revenue amounted to NT\$1.8 billion. At the same time, the paper expanded into a conglomerate. In Taiwan, the *United Daily News* came to own two other papers through the transfer of paper licenses, a publishing firm, and two magazines. In North America, it started to publish the *World Journal* in 1976, which has been one of the largest Chinese newspapers in both the United States and in Canada. By the mid-1990s, the group owned 7 newspapers and other 10 affiliated corporations, located in Taiwan, the United States, Canada, France, and Thailand (*World Journal* Booklet: 4-5). The seven newspapers employed 5,000 staff and revenue was US\$750 million per year.¹⁰

The *United Daily News* was first owned by three people from three newspapers, including Tih-wu Wang. However, Wang finally managed to become the sole owner of the paper in the early 1970. Wang was a graduate of the prestigious Whampoa Military Academy, whose superintendent had been none other than Chiang Kai-shek, to whom Wang later served as a body guard until 1949.¹¹ It is not clear why he gave up his military career and jumped into the newspaper industry which was totally foreign to him. But as historians of the press in Taiwan pointed out, his relation with Chiang and extensive contacts within party and military were the most important resources he could tap. Of course, Wang's ability in management undoubtedly helped his success in the newspaper industry. Given Wang's close ties to the governing party (he even sat on the Kuomintang Central Standing Committee in the late 1970s), it was no surprise that, though privately owned, the *United Daily News* was very pro-Kuomintang (Kuo, 1993: 48). With end of martial law, however, the paper has diverged editorially, reflecting a split within the governing party and the emergence of political pluralism in Taiwan (ibid.). In addition, as Chen pointed out, this paper has been affiliated with the conservative (mainlander) faction of the Kuomintang, and its political support for Kuomintang has weakened since Lee Teng-hui came to power in the early 1990s (Chen, 1996: 39).

The other newspaper group is *China Times*, a long time rival of the *United Daily News*. *China Times* was called *Zhen Sing Times* when it was first published in 1950. In its early years, the paper published four pages, with a daily circulation of 7,000 to 8,000 per day, and it specialised in business (Chan and Zhu, 1987: 72-73). With economic growth in Taiwan, the paper also experienced rapid expansion during the 1960s and 1970s, turning into one of two biggest daily newspapers in Taiwan. The paper was renamed *China Times*

in 1968. Between 1965 and 1980, the paper's display advertising increased 24.2 times and classified advertising 136 times. As well, when the *United Daily News* declared its daily circulation of over 600,000 copies in 1976, *China Times* reached 660,000 copies. In 1979, the newspaper announced a circulation of over 1,000,000 copies per day, one year earlier than the *United Daily News* did. Like the *United Daily News*, *China Times* also underwent business diversification and expanded into a conglomerate. In the 1970s and 1980s, the paper established various offshoot firms, including one publishing company, one newspaper, two magazines, and several overseas publications, including the paper's American edition in 1982 to 1984.¹²

China Times was owned by Chi-chung Yu, who joined the nationalist army at the age of 18, rose to the rank of lieutenant-general during the China's civil war from 1945 to 1949. Like Wang, Yu was also a member of the Standing Committee of the Kuomintang's Central Committee in the late 1970s. Consequently, the newspaper, despite being privately owned, was pro-Kuomintang and in all cases seemed to collaborate with the government in ambushing the opposition (Lee, 1993: 31). However, educated in Britain, Yu seemed to lean toward the liberal faction of the Kuomintang, which made the paper relatively liberal and open as compared to the *United News Daily* (Berman, 1992: 142; Kao, 1993: 48).

Finally, three points should be made here. First, although the two papers' growth was associated with the economic prosperity in Taiwan, the dominant positions they achieved had much to do with political conditions under martial law. Allowing only 31 papers to circulate and with the high price of these licenses, it was impossible for a free newspaper market to develop. In such a situation, only existing newspapers, especially those with close ties to the Kuomintang, like the *United News Daily* and *China Times*,

could benefit from economic growth in Taiwan.¹³ Meanwhile, as Lee pointed out (1993: 5), when the oligopolitical structure was taking shape in the 1970s, the party-state promptly struck what political scientists call a “patron-client relationship”, bestowing immense political and economic interest on the two conglomerates in exchange for their loyalty, which further intensified their dominant positions. Second, the dominant positions of the two giants continued after 1987, making the newcomers difficult to grow or even to survive (Kao, 1993: 47). As Lee observed in 1993 (32), “even though more than fifty newspaper licenses have been granted since 1987, none of them have gained a significant foothold. Barriers to market entry were so insurmountable that the *Capital Daily*, published by Kang Ning-hsiang. . . was forced to close after fifteen months of operation and a loss of \$16 million in U.S. dollars.” Third, despite being criticised due to their monopoly in Taiwan, two giant newspapers, especially the *Untried Daily News*, did play a significant role in the development of Chinese newspapers in the United States and Canada as well as elsewhere in the world. It was their financial power and huge operation that allowed them do so.

6.2.3 From East Asia to the Overseas: Media Expansion

The tremendous growth of media in Hong Kong and, to less extent, in Taiwan, has led to their expansion from East Asia to overseas. This expansion has been driven by both thriving markets in overseas Chinese communities and the financial capacities of some big media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Broadly speaking, the overseas expansion led to cultural products which have been widely circulated in overseas Chinese communities. According to Luo (1997: 176),

because of tight control of the printed press in both Mainland China and Taiwan (before 1987), Hong Kong-based China-watching periodicals such as *Ming Pao Monthly* and *The Nineties* (formerly known as *The Seventies*) had been immensely popular among overseas Chinese from the mainland and Taiwan. Many books published in Hong Kong are also widely read in overseas Chinese communities. In addition, Hong Kong is the biggest production centre of Chinese feature films. Long before Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan made it to the world stage, Hong Kong had produced many superstars who were household names in Chinese communities all over the world. So influential has Hong Kong media been that Professor Wang Gungwu, vice-chancellor of the University of Hong Kong between 1986 and 1995, who grew up in Indonesia and Malaysia and studied and worked in Britain and Australia, described Hong Kong as the cultural capital of the overseas Chinese (ibid.: 1997: 177). Taiwan's cultural products, though being less influential, have been increasingly accessible in overseas Chinese communities.¹⁴

As for newspapers, overseas expansions, especially in North America, started in the 1960s and 1970s, accelerated in the 1980s, and peaked in the 1990s. Probably, *Sing Tao* was the first Hong Kong Chinese newspaper distributed in the United State, while the *World Journal*, part of the *Unite Daily News* group, was the first Taiwanese newspaper published in America (Lai, 1990: 117-8). Despite operating on a small scale and reprinting items from their home office issues during their early times, the two newspapers, together with several others coming later, expanded rapidly in the 1980s due to the growing North American market and intense competition among the Chinese newspapers.¹⁵ Not only were the staff and equipment of the newspapers augmented, but also increasingly editorial contents were locally produced, thus promoting the growth of circulation and advertising.

In the 1990s, overseas-owned Chinese newspapers continued to increase their market share in North America, though the total number of the newspapers decreased.¹⁶ In Canada, since the early 1990s, three major Chinese newspapers, Hong Kong-based *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao* and Taiwan-based *World Journal*, have controlled almost the entire market share of Chinese newspapers in Toronto and Vancouver. Hong Kong and Taiwan-based media groups also have published daily newspapers in Britain, France, Australia, and Thailand since the 1970s; the newspapers have been circulated not only in the host countries but also in neighbouring countries.¹⁷

6.3 The Overseas-owned Chinese Newspapers in Canada: the Case of *World Journal*, *Sing Tao*, and *Ming Pao* in Toronto

Having discussed the economic success and media growth in Hong Kong and Taiwan, this section turns to the question of how overseas capital entered into, and expanded in, Chinese newspaper market in Canada, focusing on the three major Chinese dailies in Toronto: *World Journal*, *Sing Tao*, and *Ming Pao*.

Investment of overseas capital followed two strategies when entering the Chinese newspaper market in Canada. The first strategy involved starting small-scale operations and gradually expanding them when the market grew. The second strategy involved establishing a big newspaper right from the beginning. The history of *World Journal* and *Sing Tao* in Toronto reflects the first strategy. *World Journal* was first run by one agent, while *Sing Tao* was initially handled by a five-staff office. The two papers increased their capital investments only after the markets expanded. *Ming Pao*, on the other hand, adopted the second strategy, creating a big newspaper from the very beginning. The two

strategies of investment were largely determined by market conditions such as market size and intensity of competition. These conditions increased from the 1970s, when *World Journal* and *Sing Tao* published in Toronto, to the 1990s, when *Ming Pao* entered the Toronto market. Despite the difference in investment strategy, all three newspapers focused their capital investment in physical infrastructure and labour force. The newspapers expanded by increasing their facilities (e.g. plant, printer, and satellite receiver) and augmenting their personnel (both in the size of operation and division of labour or specialisation). The purpose of the expansion was to have the newspapers printed in Toronto as well as to cover more local news. During the capital expansion, although local managers influenced the process, newspaper owners in Hong Kong or Taiwan played a decisive role, often taking into account profit considerations and overall overseas expansion.

6.3.1 *World Journal*

6.3.1.1 *World Journal*: Its background

In 1976, *World Journal* was established by Tih-wu Wang in the United States as part of the *United Daily News* group. Several factors contributed to its founding. First, in October of 1971, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations and replaced by the People's Republic of China. This was followed by President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972.¹⁸ These diplomatic setbacks, especially the changed relations with the United States, "represented massive disturbances to the credibility of a regime that had boasted at home and announced abroad that it was the sole legitimate government of China" (Wachman, 1994: 135). Given the general ineffectiveness of existing party organs in reaching the

public, Taiwan authorities felt that a stronger presence was needed in the United States (Lai, 1990: 118). The publication of *World Journal* was largely initiated by the government, intending to keep Chinese-American loyalty to Taiwan that in turn could influence the United States in the interest of Taiwan (Chan and Zhu, 1987: 171; Wang, 1994: 259).¹⁹ Second, Tih-wu Wang was interested in the American market as early as in the early 1960s, when he first visited the United States, but he did not invest there primarily due to inadequate capital (Wang, 1994: 259). By the mid-1970s, the *United Daily News* had become one of the two largest newspapers in Taiwan. Not only was a huge amount of capital accumulated, but also business diversification was under way. With huge capital on hand, Wang was confident that the time was also ripe for his business expansion in the United States (ibid.). Third, the changed conditions of the newspaper market in the United States also prompted Wang to take up the challenge. After 1965, the Naturalisation and Immigration Act repealed the discriminatory quota of 105 Chinese per year and extended the ceiling to 20,000 for each independent country (Chan, 1992: 6). The number of Chinese entering the United States grew rapidly. According to Betty Lee Sung (1980, cited in ibid.), there were 205,107 Chinese (from Taiwan and Hong Kong) immigrants admitted to the United States between 1966 and 1975 (Chan, 1992: 6). About 125,000 more Chinese (from Taiwan and Hong Kong) immigrants arrived between 1976 and 1980. With higher education and higher social participation, these new immigrants had greater demand for information than old ones (Wang, 1994: 260). At the same time, Chinese business prospered as a result of these new immigration waves (ibid.). All these facts were conducive to the paper's survival and development. Fourth, Wang's data about Chinese newspapers in the United States in the mid-1970s showed that *World*

Journal could balance its revenue and expenditure if it could control half of Chinese-American advertising market. This was possible in three or four years, given the greater capital and higher quality editorial of *World Journal* than those of local newspapers (ibid.)

In the beginning of publication in 1976, Wang set up two offices in both eastern and western coasts: a head office in New York, managed by Wang's son-in-law, Houwei Li, and a branch office in San Francisco, looked after by Wang's second son, Bili Wang. The initial investment was US\$600,000, and a total of 39 staff members were sent from Taiwan to the United States to establish this paper (Lai, 1990: 118; Wang, 1994: 269). Using the latest technology in satellite transmission, the paper published simultaneous editions in New York and San Francisco (Lai, 1990: 118). It was said that the *World Journal* is the first Chinese-language newspaper to make use of satellite transmission. Among all newspapers in the US, the *World Journal* was the third to employ satellite transmission of news, after the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Christian Science Monitor* (*World Journal* Booklet: 6).

As Lai (1991: 118) observed, in both format and content the *World Journal* was far superior to existing local papers. Thus, its market share increased rapidly. The paper broke even financially in three years as expected, and then huge profits were made. Most of these profits were reinvested in the *World Journal*, promoting the expansion of the paper (Wang, 1994: 272). For example, in 1984, the *World Journal* implemented three major renovation measures: (1) procurement of colour printing equipment to put out coloured pages, (2) an increase in the frequency of publication—from six days a week to daily (This was a first for any Chinese-language newspaper in North America), and (3) the publishing of *World Journal Supplement*. This compliment copy is featured with

exquisitely designed in-depth reports (*World Journal* Booklet: 6). The growth of the paper can be also seen in that three more branch offices were set up in Los Angeles (1981), Toronto (1987) and Vancouver (1991) (*ibid.*). Business offices were set up in almost all the major cities with a high concentration of Chinese population in the United States, including those in Manhattan's Chinatown, Queens, Brooklyn, all in New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Washington DC, Miami, Honolulu, San Francisco, South Bay, Houston, Dallas and Seattle (*ibid.*). In the early 1990s, this paper owned assets of over US\$100 million and employed more than 600 staff in five newspaper offices (Wang, 1994: 272). It has had the largest circulation among all Chinese newspapers in the United States (Chan, 1997: 39).

During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, *World Journal* was widely regarded as the semi-official voice of the Taiwan regime, supplanting the earlier party organs (Lai, 1991: 118). However, with the changed relationship between Taiwan and China in the late 1980s (e.g., Taiwan began easing restriction on contacts with the Mainland after 1987, see Lai, 1991: 118), the paper began to lessen strident political rhetoric and publish relatively more balanced reporting on mainland China, though it is still noted for its pro-Kuomintang stance (*ibid.*: 123; Chan, 1997: 39).

6.3.1.2 *World Journal* in Toronto²⁰

6.3.1.2.1 Agency period (1976-1985)

When *World Journal* started publishing in New York and San Francisco on February 10, 1976, it was also distributed in some major cities in North America, where Chinese population were concentrated, including Toronto.

In Toronto, *World Journal* was distributed by World Publishing Company, a small agency set up on Tih-wu Wang's instruction. Why Toronto only had a small agency instead of branch office like that in San Francisco might be because of two reasons. First, as just discussed, the publishing of *World Journal* was intended mainly to target the American-Chinese community after the changed relationship between the United States and Taiwan in the 1970s. As a result, all initial capital went to the United States and Canada was not on the agenda. Second, Tih-wu Wang seemed to be unsatisfied with the market size in Toronto. As a former agent said:

When *World Journal* was set up in the United States, someone suggested to Mr. Wang that the paper should be distributed in Toronto, because lots of Chinese people were living there. Mr. Wang said that he didn't know much about Toronto. "How many Chinese are there?" The answer was about 40,000 Chinese, around 10,000 Chinese families. However, many old overseas Chinese and young generations could not read Chinese language newspapers. In that situation, Mr. Wang was not willing to set up a branch here. In other words, Toronto was not qualified to have such a branch office. Neither was business office considered As a result, Mr. Wang suggested establishing an agency to deal with the matter of distribution.

In the agency period, the head office in New York seemed to invest almost nothing in Toronto. In the first several years, the agent had no office, and all he had was a desk and a phone, in a room shared by other businesses. His major duty included newspaper delivery and advertising sales, while working as an engineer in a Canadian farming machinery firm. He remembered:

In that time this paper in Toronto was nothing more than a trial and no one dared to put money here I was still working in a farming machinery firm, but changed to night shift. The paper was printed in New York in the morning and

shipped to Toronto by air in late evening. I went to the airport to pick up the paper around mid-night, and then went to work. Next morning, I delivered the paper to the old Chinatown and the east Chinatown. In the afternoon I had to contact advertisers before going to sleep. In 1976, total retail outlets were 23, most of them being grocery stores The one person business lasted about two years, and then I hired a person to do some office work, such as taking phone and advertising, booking and accounting, and so on.

However, the New York office did offer some benefits to the agent. For example, 1,000 copies of *World Journal* were sent to Toronto from New York each day. The printing and shipping fees were paid by New York. In other words, the agent got free newspapers. This might be regarded as an initial investment in Toronto by *World Journal*, though the amount was very small compared with that in New York and San Francisco. As for the income from newspaper circulation and advertising, the agent shared it with the New York office, and the exact share rate is not clear. According to its former agent, from 1976 to 1978, monthly income from this business was approximately \$700-800. However, some development of this agency in the early 1980s suggested that business in Toronto was profitable. For instance, there were 4 to 5 staff members working for the agent in 1981 and the number continued to increase in the following years. By 1985, there were 22 staff members in this agency. In addition, a relatively large office space was rented in 1984 when the agency moved to 787 Dundas Street. Also, while initially the *World Journal* had no news about Canada and Canadian Chinese communities,²¹ and local advertising only made up about 10 per cent of total advertising in the paper, the situations changed in the early 1980s. The paper occasionally published some Canadian news, including news about the larger society and the Chinese communities (VIP Magazine, 1997: 75), though most of

the news items were translated from English newspapers. In 1984, all advertising was from local businesses.²²

6.3.1.2.2 The period of locally produced overseas newspaper (1986-1992)

In the agency period, *World Journal* was printed in New York and then shipped to Toronto, first by air, and later by greyhound. Usually the paper was on newsstands the next morning, one day later than in New York. As for local news, it had to be faxed to the New York office for editing, so it is normal that local coverage was two or three days behind. Local advertising was even slower, because design as well as production had to be done in New York. All these restricted the development of the paper in Toronto.

The turning point came in April 9, 1986, when the agency was changed to a business office under the direct control of the head office in New York. The business office was registered as World Journal News Inc. In the following three years, several significant changes took place in Toronto, which were intended to turn a distributing agency into a newspaper office, thus printing and producing the paper locally.

It seems that the major force behind the changes was Tih-wu Wang himself. He was concerned with unsatisfactory performance of *World Journal* in Toronto after the mid-1980s, when the paper had taken firm roots in the United States and made large profits. On several occasions, Wang asked Toronto's agent why *World Journal* in Toronto was not doing as well, and pushed him to face new challenges. According to the former agent:

In the early 1986, Mr. Wang went to New York to have an annual meeting with all local managers and agents. He raised a question in the meeting: Why *World Journal* developed well in the United States but was so sluggish in Canada? I answered: "How can I fight without weapon? *Sing Tao* has satellite receiver and so it is fast to receive fax pages. But we have to rely on New York for everything." Mr. Wang said you were right. He immediately made a decision to buy us a satellite receiver. After that, *World Journal* could be printed in Toronto, although in *Shing Wah's* plant.

. . . In early 1987, we had another annual meeting in New York. Mr. Wang criticised me for not going fast enough. I defended myself by saying that there were too many immigrants from Hong Kong but not many from Taiwan, let alone Taiwan's businesspeople, and so it was difficult to expand our business. The only way was to wait. Mr. Wang said that I am wrong. He said that it would be too late for us if other papers had deeper base. "They had plant there, and advertisement coming in the morning can be designed and produced in the afternoon. But we had to sent to New York. Even produced locally, we had to rely on the other paper for printing. That was not under our own control. That was not good. We have to set up our own plant." He then asked Houwei Li how much it would cost to buy a printer. Li answered it would be around US\$ one million I added that the machine was not enough and we also had to buy plant and so on. Wang said : "In any case you people take care of the matter. We have to set up a plant. It is settled!" After his speech, Mr. Wang left Li then asked me to make a plan as quickly as possible

It was because of Tih-wu Wang's decision that Toronto's *World Journal* started a process of rapid growth. The new development was reflected in both capital investment and organisational expansion.

Capital was invested in several projects in order that this paper can be produced in Toronto. First, as just mentioned, a satellite transmission was purchased and installed in Toronto in 1986, so that news pages could be received from Taipei and New York, and these faxpages were then turned over to *Shing Wah*, which made the paper available on the street on the same day as in New York. The cost of satellite transmission was about US\$250,000. Second, with US\$1.15 million, a plant building was procured at 415 Eastern

Avenue, about several minute's driving distance from Chinatown in downtown. The building, with more than an eighty-year history, was old and shabby, and unfit for printing facilities. The renovation took about six months and cost another US\$300,000. Third, a set of colour printers was purchased and installed. Some part of the printers were brand new and some were 10 years old, and they were bought from *Shing Wah* which had just closed down when the deal was made. The total cost of printers was about US\$1 million. Fourth, partly to promote the circulation of paper, *World Journal* Book Store was opened at 305 Spadina Street, which cost another US\$1.5 million. All in all, Tih-Wu Wang invested approximately US\$4 million in Toronto from 1986 to 1989, about 65 per cent of the investment directly going to the newspaper itself. As a result of this huge investment, *World Journal* began to produce its Toronto's edition locally at the end of 1988 (*World Journal*, December, 1988).

Capital investment aside, the newspaper organisation also underwent several significant changes. The first was its relations with New York's *World Journal* office. As just mentioned, the agency in Toronto became a business office in 1986, which was integrated into part of *World Journal* system. The second change was the internal structure of the newspaper office, which was characterised by its division of labour. Before 1986, despite each person being assigned certain responsibilities, division of labour was not institutionalised. With the establishment of the business office in 1986, five sections were developed to take on editorial, advertising, business, designing, and circulation. This organisational structure continued into 1987 when the business office was upgraded to a branch office. In late 1989, the branch office was eventually expanded into a fully-fledged office. An editor-in-chief and a general manager were sent to Toronto from New York and

were under the leadership of the director, the former agent's new title now. The newspaper structure was divided into two departments. One was an editorial department headed by editor-in-chief. Within the editorial department, there were two sections, one responsible for translation (5 staff members) and the other for news reporting (4 staff members). The other was a business department under a general manager. This department oversaw business aspects such as advertising (4 staff members), business (15 staff members), designing (10 staff members), circulation (5 staff members), accounting (3 staff members), printing (7 staff members), public relations (2 staff members) and reception (1 staff member). The total staff was about 60. The organisational structure was similar to that in New York, and remained unchanged until recently.

As a result of capital investment and organisational expansion, the circulation of the newspaper increased. In 1984, this paper sold about 3,000 to 3,500 copies a day. By 1990 when major developments were completed, the circulation grew to approximately 6,000 copies a day, doubling the figure of five years previously. As well, newspaper pages increased from 24 in 1985 to 68 in 1990 (*World Journal*, 1985 and 1990).

Three points should be made here. First, the expansion of *World Journal* during this period resulted from Tih-wu Wang's personal initiative, who saw a growing market in Toronto and attempted to increase his share in this market. Second, more importantly, the expansion had much to do with *World Journal's* success in the United States, which accumulated large capital that made the investment in Toronto possible. Third, the local management's attitude was relatively conservative about the expansion because it worried that the rapid expansion would exceed actual market demand, which would not only make it difficult to recoup capital outlay, but also could lead to the manager's being ousted due

to his inability do so. This conservative attitude, which remained until his retirement in 1996, might have slowed the expansion of *World Journal* in Toronto.

6.3.1.2.3 The period of maintaining the *status quo* (1993-present)

After 1993, *World Journal* made great efforts to maintain the *status quo*, when two Hong Kong newspapers, *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao*, spent large amounts of money to compete with one another. It continued to invest in some projects, though to a much lesser degree than in the 1980s and the other two papers.

There were two major capital investments. From 1993 to 1996, at least \$600,000 was spent to buy and install computers in *World Journal's* Toronto office.²³ Like other Canadian newspapers, the use of computers increased efficiency, reduced cost, and improved the quality of the editorial product (Desbarats, 1981: 5). However, two points should be noted. Firstly, the use of computer by Toronto's office was about three years behind the New York office. According to a *World Journal* booklet (1992: 16), as early as in 1989, the New York office had already decided to computerise its news room and press room, including typing and typesetting, as well as the management in accounting, personal system and inventory of the *World Journal's* assets. The plan was realised in late 1990. Secondly, English and French newspapers in Canada had been using computers from the 1970s in both editorial and business departments (Desbarats, 1981: 1).

The second major capital investment was the further improvement of the transmission quality of news pages. To fully take advantage of huge resources of this paper, in 1995 *World Journal* established a database in Taipei which was connected to all its overseas branches via state-of-the art satellite technology. The editor-in-chief in

Toronto could log on and read and select all kind of news, produced both overseas and locally, which were going to be used in local editions. The monthly cost for renting this satellite line was about \$200,000, which has been shared by Taipei, Hong Kong, San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Vancouver, and Toronto. In addition to faster and better transmission of news, the use of this technology also gave local editors greater latitude running a newspaper fit to meet the demands of local readers. The relatively small investment in the 1990s, compared with *Sing Tao's* \$7 million and *Ming Pao's* \$5 million, probably reflected *World Journal's* long time problem: it is less confident of the Toronto market where most immigrants were from Hong Kong who were more likely to read Hong Kong newspapers than to read Taiwan newspapers. Rather than following the other two papers and spending large sums with probably no corresponding return, *World Journal* invested less money and only attempted to maintain the *status quo*. In addition, most capital was from bank loans rather than from head offices in Taipei and New York, as was the case in the 1980s.²⁴ This may suggest that, despite being a family business that always boasted having huge capital, *World Journal* began emphasising financial independence of branch offices, thus doing business in a way closer to other corporations which attempted to take full advantage of bank capital.

6.3.2 *Sing Tao*

6.3.2.1 *Sing Tao*: Its background

Sing Tao was founded in August 1, 1938 in Hong Kong, the fifth daily in a chain established by the late Aw Boon Haw as part of the Tiger Balm Empire (Fang and Wang, 1992: 76; Lau, 1987: 433).²⁵ The newspaper started as a form of war propaganda in

support of the Kuomintang, and was run by Aw and his third son, Aw Hoe, before their deaths in the early 1950s (ibid.). In 1954, Aw's daughter, Sally Aw, fresh out of a convent school, inherited the newspaper which was then relatively less attractive than other sector of the family's business (Lau, 1987: 433). However, under her, the newspaper developed into a big newspaper group and became most successful among all Aw's family businesses (Zhang, 1995a: 103). Since the flotation of the group in the Hong Kong stock-market in 1972, profits had increased steadily through much of the 1970s and the 1980s. In 1984-85, the group's trading profit showed a 38 per cent growth over the previous year, to HK\$42.9 million (Lau, 1986: 433).

Despite being a Hong Kong newspaper group, *Sing Tao's* business was well beyond the geographical boundary of Hong Kong and the limit of newspaper publishing. It developed the largest international editions of all Hong Kong newspapers. As early as 1961, *Sing Tao* began to air freight its paper to San Francisco in order to develop the North American market (*Sing Tao*, 1988: 57). As Lai observed (1991: 117), the paper soon became a success, reaching out to the increasing number of Hong Kong immigrants eager to keep up with developments in their former home. This success led to the establishment of separate editions for the western and eastern United States in 1970, which were contracted out to William Chang in San Francisco and Edward So in New York, to handle publications and distribution in their respective areas. The paper subsequently started eastern and western Canadian editions in Toronto and Vancouver, respectively (ibid.). However, the management of *Sing Tao* in North America was recovered by Sally Aw in the mid-1970s, because the eastern edition in New York published some articles which were inconsistent with the pro-Taiwan stand of *Sing Tao's*

home office (ibid.: 122). After taking control of the North American editions, Sally Aw gradually increased investments and turned North American editions (New York, San Francisco, Toronto and Vancouver) into localised overseas Chinese newspapers. Also, *Sing Tao* began publishing in London in 1975 and in Sydney in 1982 (*Sing Tao*, 1988: 59). Consequently, *Sing Tao* became the first world-wide Chinese newspaper (Lai, 1990: 117). In 1988, Sally Aw received the Carr Van Anda Award from the Ohio University for her achievement in the world of publishing. Among the major achievements cited by the University, the first one was "for her accomplishments in the publication of *Sing Tao* daily News in seven major cities in Asia, Europe and North America, possibly making it the first truly international newspaper" (*Hong Kong Standard*, 29 April, 1988).

Sing Tao also implemented measures to spread out its risk through diversified investment in several other industries. In addition to newspapers that accounted for the bulk of group profits, this paper was also involved in property, commercial printing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, photofinishing, microfilming, tours, medical and dental clinic, movie making, book publishing, sound recording, and so on (*Sing Tao*, 1987: 8-18; 1996: 137-140). Non-newspaper industries accounted for about 39 per cent of this group's volume of business and 22 per cent of profits in 1986 (*Sing Tao*, 1987: 5). After the mid-1980s, mainly as a result of the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Future of Hong Kong in December 1984, Sally Aw relocated the paper's headquarters to Australia in 1985 and then invested heavily in real estate, on the assumption that real estate values are bound to grow whereas the press is more vulnerable to periods of political instability (Chan and Lee, 1991: 68). Aw earned HK\$300 million from real estate investment in Hong Kong from 1985 to 1989, and plugged more deeply into short-term speculations

(Zhang, 1995b: 104-105). According to Lee (1997: 125), in one single year (1988-89) she purchased properties worth HK\$500 to 600 million in Canada, Britain, and New Zealand. In early 1989 she acquired a commercial building in Hong Kong for HK\$750 million, 90 per cent of which were bank loans, in addition to taking over Cultural Communication that owned the *Tin Tin (Everyday) Daily News*. In late 1989 Aw had incurred a mountain of debt totalling HK\$1.96 billion as the overseas property market started to tumble and Hong Kong's market was devastated by the Tiananmen incident. She was pressured by major bank creditors to reorganise her board of directors and to refocus on the core publishing business (ibid.).

In the early 1990s, Sally Aw began to pursue market opportunities in China. Historically pro-British and pro-Taiwan, Aw finally decided to visit mainland China in August 1992, where she was received by President Jiang Zemin and then Premier Li Peng (ibid.: 126). She instructed her staff to de-emphasise politics by "taking a neutral course" in reporting because it was "infeasible to hold political view in Hong Kong" (ibid.). Aw's warming of attitude toward Beijing was reciprocated when, in 1993, "the *Sing Tao* Group became the first and only overseas press organisation permitted to launch media ventures in China" (Fung and Lee, 1994: 130). In 1993, *Sing Tao* entered partnership with the *People's Daily*, China's top party organ, in publishing a non-political journal - *Xingguang (Starlight Monthly)*. In the same year, she secured a government approval to publish a financial paper (*Shenggang Economic Times*) in Shenzhen. In 1994, her English-language *Hong Kong Standard* became the first and only overseas newspaper allowed to be printed inside China, under an agreement with the *China Daily*, for distribution to Beijing's major tourist hotels (Lee, 1997: 126). By 1995 she had reportedly invested a total of HK\$250

million in Mainland China (ibid.). Unfortunately, these ventures were terminated one by one, probably because China is still not comfortable about opening its media market to outsiders.

Despite recent heavy losses, *Sing Tao* was still growing and it remained one of the biggest Hong Kong newspaper groups. In 1987, its total assets were HK\$737 million. It increased to HK\$1,760 million in 1996. As well, profits increased from HK\$237.6 million in 1987 to HK\$556.7 million in 1994, but it then dropped to HK\$255.4 million in 1995 and experienced a loss of HK\$96 million in 1996 largely because of a newspaper price war and the skyrocketing newsprint cost in 1995, which hurt many other newspapers in Hong Kong as well (*Sing Tao*, 1995: 12).²⁶ *Sing Tao's* property spread around the world, with 42.9 per cent in Hong Kong, 41.1 per cent in Canada, 11.6 per cent in the People's Republic of China, 3.6 per cent in United States, and 0.8 per cent in United Kingdom (ibid.: 30). Under the *Sing Tao* group, the number of principal subsidiaries, associated companies, and joint ventures were more than 40 in 1996, located in Hong Kong, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, mainland China, the United Kingdom, and the United States, engaging in newspaper and other businesses (ibid.: 137-140). By 1997, the market value of *Sing Tao* group was about HK\$1.5 billion (*Ming Pao*, June 5, 1997).

6.3.2.2 *Sing Tao* in Toronto

6.3.2.2.1 Distributing branch office period (1978-1980)

According to all official documents from *Sing Tao* (e.g., *Sing Tao*, 1988: 58; Gu, 1998: 9), the history of this newspaper in Toronto started in August 1, 1978 when a branch office was set up by Sally Aw. However, as mentioned earlier, the paper actually began

distributing in Toronto in the mid-1970 by Edward So, who, through a contract with Sally Aw, was in charge of *Sing Tao's* publication in eastern United States and eastern Canada.²⁷ The paper was printed in New York and then shipped to Toronto. The daily circulation was about 300-400 copies, handled by a small office with a couple of people.²⁸ Because of So's pro-China stand, Sally Aw retook the management of *Sing Tao* in Toronto 1978, as she did elsewhere in North America (Lai, 1990: 122),²⁹ and set up a new branch office under her direct control, which formally opened in August 1 that year (*Sing Tao*, 1988: 58).

Some changes happened after that day. The branch office operated as part of *Sing Tao's* network rather than an agency as in So's times. It was financed by the home office in Hong Kong. A financial controller was also sent to Toronto from Hong Kong to monitor business.³⁰ In addition, a former staff member under Edward So, Richard Yao, was appointed the manager in that office. Mr. Yao, a journalism graduate from Hong Kong's Baptist College, had worked for several newspapers in Hong Kong, including English *Hong Kong Standard*, before he immigrated to Toronto in 1975 (*Chinese Canadian Yearbook*, 1993: 379). Mr. Yao's father-in-law, Jia Nafu, was a long time editor of *Sing Tao* and Sally Aw's tutor in Chinese.³¹ This connection probably helped Mr. Yao to get the management position after Edward So's departure.

Despite the change of management, in large part *Sing Tao* remained unchanged in the first few years. One former staff member said:³²

In the early time, *Sing Tao* was transported from New York and published 12 pages daily. In that time the newspaper was very primitive and nothing interesting. Canadian news was added to the newspaper and majority news was from New York. I did everything when I first worked in *Sing Tao*, such as

translating, reporting, advertising, and circulation. Except for a woman who was an accountant, the other three men had to do everything involving the newspaper.

The number of staff soon increased from four to five and a half. In late 1978 a part-time worker was hired to be responsible for circulation, and in the early 1979 a former editor from Taiwan was recruited to take care of editorial work (Gu, 1998: 9). But the paper still operated as before. For instance, daily Canadian and local Chinese news had only three columns, about two thousand Chinese characters, most of them translated from *The Toronto Star* or *Global and Mail* (ibid.: 9-11). Worse, because the paper was printed in New York, local news had to be faxed there, which took several days to appear in the newspaper (ibid.). In addition, the newspaper was sent from New York via Greyhound in the evening and received the next morning. Delays often happened as in the case of *World Journal*. The total daily circulation remained 300-400 copies (ibid.).

The humble operation of *Sing Tao* during this period resulted from limited capital investment from the home office in Hong Kong, which considered Toronto's market only big enough to maintain such a small office. Like Tih-wu Wang, Sally Aw was very cautious about investment in the beginning and her small initial investment was used to test the waters. Unlike Tih-wu Wang, however, Sally Aw set up a branch office from the very beginning and closely followed market expansion in Toronto with new capital investment.

6.3.2.2.2 The period of locally produced overseas newspaper (1981-1992)

From 1981 to 1985, *Sing Tao* in Toronto underwent a rapid change in terms of physical facilities as well as organisational size and structure. As a result, it developed into a locally produced overseas newspaper in Toronto.

Despite being a smaller circulation than that of *World Journal* in 1978, *Sing Tao* quickly outstripped its rival in 1979 and continued growing in the early 1980s.³³ The growing circulation might be related to several factors. First, the Chinese population in the Greater Toronto Area (equivalent to Toronto CMA), increased from 26,285 in 1971 to 85,800 in 1981, more than three times growth (Lai, 1989: 106). This increase was brought about principally through immigration, and approximately 75 per cent of new immigrants were from Hong Kong (Luk, 1996: 16).³⁴ Second, after the fall of Saigon in 1975, hundreds of Vietnamese people fled from the country, many entering Canada as landed immigrants. In July 1979, Canada offered to provide homes for up to 50,000 Indo-Chinese refugees over a period of two years (Lai, 1989: 109). By 1980, about 2,000 Vietnamese had arrived in Toronto. By 1982, the number grew to 12,000. Between 1983 and 1986, the population of 15,000 doubled, largely through secondary migration (Esterik and Esterik, 1988: 119). Despite no official statistics, it was believed that many of them could speak Cantonese and read Chinese.³⁵ Third, from 1978 to 1984, a total of 136,864 student authorisations were issued to students from Hong Kong, more than half of whom attended universities in Ontario (Employment and Immigration, 1986: 91 and 95). Like the Chinese elsewhere, those in Toronto relied heavily on Chinese newspapers as their main source of information on Canadian society, and perhaps more importantly, on their countries of origins (Chan, 1996: 39).

With the increase in Chinese population in Toronto and nearby regions, not only did demand for Chinese language newspapers expand, but also requirements for more information and timely news reporting emerged. But, with a shipment from New York every day, Chinese people in Toronto had no alternative but to read this paper one day later than those in New York. In addition, relying on the New York office to produce this paper also restricted the space and timeliness of local coverage due to the limited staff there and the relative long process of communication.³⁶ Although *Sing Tao* had much larger potential readership market than *World Journal* due to the composition of immigrants, these problems indeed prevented the paper from fully taking advantage in this regard. To change the situation, the foremost thing needed was that Toronto's office had to print its paper on its own. In 1981, in a proposal to Hong Kong's head office, Richard Yao suggested that a printing plant in Toronto be set up, and this proposal was soon approved by Sally Aw.³⁷ Right after that, a basement on Spadina Street was rented with a monthly rent of about \$1,000. Four sets of refurbished printing machines (black and white) were purchased from Chicago, and a satellite receiver was bought from California. It is not clear how much was spent on the printers, but the satellite receiver cost \$250,000.³⁸ The Toronto office then received news pages from Hong Kong through San Francisco each day and printed them in Chinatown, with added local pages. Thus, *Sing Tao* was available at around 10 in the morning, providing readers with timely information, which *World Journal* could only achieve five years later. As well, the organisational size gradually increased to around 30 staff members and a primary division of labour was formed. In addition to the newly formed production team with 6-7 printing workers, probably the

fastest expanding sections were editorial and advertising, both going from one person to four persons (Gu, 1998: 11).

In 1984, another new project was under way: *Sing Tao* Centre on 417 Dundas Avenue. This project was initiated by management consideration as well as market factor. After 1981, this locally printed Hong Kong newspaper seemed to have met readers' needs well, and daily circulation increased from 2,000 copies in 1981 to 7,000 to 8,000 in 1984.³⁹ However, the printing machines were unable to stand the growing work load due to relatively poor quality and limited number, while the basement where the print plant was located had no room for the further development that was very much needed based on a prediction of new immigration wave from Hong Kong because of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984. In addition, although a rented basement provided much needed space to print this paper, the separation of printing on Spidina Street and the rest of the production on Dundas Avenue also caused some inconveniences for the management.⁴⁰ Therefore, *Sing Tao* started another development at the end of 1984. It first purchased two old properties on 417 Dundas Avenue, which were demolished right away. On this site it constructed a four storey building with 20,000 square feet, which was formally opened in 1985. The total cost for the *Sing Tao* Centre was about \$3 million (Gu, 1998: 13). In addition, printing machines were upgraded and the total staff members of this paper further increased from 30 in 1984 to 40 in 1985 (ibid.).

As a result of the capital investment, *Sing Tao* in Toronto entered a new era. With one of the most luxurious buildings in Central Chinatown, *Sing Tao* showed off its power and wealth for every pedestrian passing it. The development happened to be ready for the rising number of immigrants from Hong Kong after the mid-1980s. Thus the circulation

increased to 10,000 in 1986, about 50 per cent of the total Chinese language newspaper circulation in Toronto.(Gu, 1986: 41). The advertising revenue was even more impressive. An estimated profit of \$600,000 was made in 1985 (ibid.), and it increased another 31 per cent in 1986 (*Sing Tao*, 1987: 10). The growth made Toronto's *Sing Tao* not only the biggest Chinese language newspaper in Toronto, but also the most lucrative branch among *Sing Tao's* overseas offices around the world (ibid.). The command of Toronto's market by *Sing Tao* continued through the late 1980s and the early 1990s 's and not until 1993 was its leading position challenged by a newcomer, also a Hong Kong based newspaper, *Ming Pao*.

In addition to market factors, two points can be made about *Sing Tao's* investment in Toronto during the period. First, as we discussed earlier (also see Chan and Lee, 1991: 68), no sooner had the Sino-British Joint Declaration (1984) been reached than Sally Aw launched active operations to have her capital investments internationalised and diversified. The investments in Toronto coincided with the new overseas investments by Sally Aw, indicating that the Toronto expansion was part of the outward capital. Second, the local initiative seemed to play a significant role in *Sing Tao's* development in Toronto. Actually, both expansions in 1981 and 1984 were first proposed by local management, who convinced the home office the importance of new investment in Toronto. Without the local initiative, *Sing Tao's* growth might not be as fast as it was.

6.3.2.2.3 Further expansion period (1993-present)

In 1993 *Sing Tao* launched new capital investment in Toronto, which attempted to maintain its leading position in Toronto's Chinese newspaper market, where competition became increasingly intense in the 1990s.

If *Sing Tao*'s investments in Toronto during the 1970s and the 1980s were mainly initiated by the paper itself, then the new investment in the 1990s was largely pushed by outside forces, the strongest among them being *Ming Pao* entering Toronto's market in 1993. Like *Sing Tao*, *Ming Pao* is a Hong Kong-based newspaper group attempting to target growing Hong Kong immigrants in Canada. As an editor of *Sing Tao* put it: "this made competition much more intense because of the similarity of our background and targets."¹ Simply put, *Sing Tao* could lose its privilege as the only major Hong Kong-based newspaper in Toronto where the bulk of Chinese immigrants was from Hong Kong. Added to this challenge was that *Ming Pao*, from the very beginning, positioned itself as a thoroughly modern alternative to its older rival. As a reporter wrote (Pollock, 1994: 13):

Right now, *Sing Tao Daily News* operates from cluttered offices in the heart of Toronto's downtown Chinatown. Decade-old issues of *Life* magazine are stacked on wooden bookcases in the small waiting room, while an old printing press crouches in a basement that's too small to accommodate more modern four-colour equipment. *Sing Tao*'s facilities reflect the colourful jumble of business in the neighbourhood, and the paper is well-established and respected member of the community.

The offices of *Ming Pao Daily News* are about a half hour north, close to the burgeoning new Chinese community in the suburb of Scarborough. The contrast between *Ming Pao*'s facilities and those of *Sing Tao* could not be greater. When the paper celebrated its first year of publishing in Toronto late this spring, a photographer took pictures of clients to demonstrate the paper's high-tech prowess. Later that evening, they were handed a four-page insert hot off the press - including a full-colour photo layout of the partygoers themselves.

The management of *Sing Tao* in Toronto had been long concerned with the outdated facilities, and they had suggested several times to the head office in Hong Kong that facilities be upgraded since *World Journal* first printed a four colour newspaper in Toronto in the late 1980s. However, unlike in 1981 and 1984, all these proposals were rejected on the grounds that *Sing Tao* dominated the Chinese market in Toronto and thus it was not prepared to invest more money there.⁴² With the coming of *Ming Pao*, along with more young and well educated immigrants from Hong Kong who tended to read high quality newspapers,⁴³ the home office in Hong Kong finally realised that *Sing Tao* would lose its command position in Toronto if it did not change as quickly as possible.

The new expansions started in early 1993 and were not completed until late 1994. Organisational changes took place first. About 40 people were recruited, making the total staff members jump to near 100.⁴⁴ Although most departments increased their size, the editorial department changed most. From 1986 to 1993, the number of editorial staff remained 6 to 7, while locally produced editorial pages increased from 1 to 4. Not only were editorial staff members overloaded, but also each of them had to handle all kinds of jobs in the news room, including editing, reporting, translating, proof-reading, makeup, and so on, which was a kind of legacy of early ethnic press characterised by one-person operations (Miller, 19887: xvi). As an executive of *Sing Tao* said:⁴⁵

We had no competitors in the past. It did not matter whether an editorial was good or not good, since readers had no choice. And reading a Hong Kong newspaper meant reading *Sing Tao*. But this operation did not sound good, because a person could not be good at all jobs in editorial room. If you asked my colleagues what they could do, they would say they could do everything. This is our old style. Some people wrote well, but they also had to do makeup. Even they could not do well, they had to do so How could people do everything well?

This is not professional style After *Ming Pao's* coming, we decided to reform the editorial department.

The reform increased editorial staff from 6 to 25, making the editorial department the largest one of *Sing Tao* in Toronto. Also, four sections were formed in the editorial department, including editing (6 staff), translating (6 staff), reporting (8 staff), and proof-reading (3 staff), headed by one editor-in-chief and his deputy. Makeup was transferred to artists in production department. As a result, the editorial department not only grew in terms of size, but also increased in the professional division of labour in the same way as its mother paper in Hong Kong and as Canadian newspapers organise their editorial departments.

While organisational expansion and reform were underway, *Sing Tao* also started to expand its plant and modernised its facilities, which included two significant projects, among others.⁴⁶ Firstly, it spent approximately \$2.5 million to purchase 12 new sets of printing machines, which introduced colour for the first time in summer 1994. Secondly, it procured a one-storey building with 8,000 square feet on 46 Power Street, and had it rebuilt into a three-storey plant with 25,000 square feet, which cost another \$3 million. Officially opened in October 13, 1994, this new and spacious building contains editorial and production teams as well as modern printing machines. Advertising and circulation still remained in its Central Chinatown office (Gu, 1998: 15). The total investment during 1993-1994 amounted to around \$6 to 7 million.

As a result of the capital investments and organisational expansions, *Sing Tao* maintained its leading position to some extent in Toronto. Weekday claimed circulation

increased from 22,000 copies in 1993 to 38,500 copies in 1996, about 7,000 copies more than those of *Ming Pao* (CARD, July, 1993: 58-59; *Ethnic Media and Markets*, Winter/Spring, 1997: 11-13). In terms of advertising, during 1996 and 1997, *Sing Tao* ran about 77 pages daily, about 28 pages more than that of *Ming Pao*,⁴⁷ though one former staff member estimated that its actual advertising revenue had fallen down because of the gain of *Ming Pao*.⁴⁸

A final point should be made. Although solid data are not available to indicate the sources of the investment capital, an examination of *Sing Tao's Annual Report* (1997: 3) shows that, among *Sing Tao's* five principal banks, two of them are Canadian banks: Imperial Bank of Commerce and Bank of China (Canada). It suggests that probably part of the capital was from the two banks. Thus, like the *World Journal*, *Sing Tao* relied on host society capital for its further development, indicating that direct foreign investments from Hong Kong and Taiwan have been gradually integrated into the economic system of the host society.

6.3.3 *Ming Pao*

6.3.3.1 *Ming Pao*: Its background

Ming Pao was founded by Louis Cha in Hong Kong in 1959 (Lau, 1987: 429). Cha is "a popular novelist, shrewd businessman, and eminent editorialist" (Chan and Lee, 1991: 70). He published 14 well-known Chinese chivalrous novels under the pseudonym "Jian Yong", which attracted a large number of readers and was crucial for the paper's survival in the early times (Fei and Zhong, 1995: 32). Cha also composed many of the daily editorials for *Ming Pao* and his insights as a China watcher were internationally

acclaimed (Chan and Lee, 1991: 70). He built up a strong reputation for *Ming Pao* in the late 1960s, when the Cultural Revolution spilled over into the streets of Hong Kong. The paper's critical stance against the radicals in China and in Hong Kong won it many supporters (Lau, 1986: 429). In the 1980s, Cha became a firm supporter of China's economic reform, and was appointed by Beijing to the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee. However, he finally resigned from these bodies in protest against the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Lee, 1987: 25).

Starting in the mid-1960s, *Ming Pao* gradually developed into a newspaper group with diversified business interests (*Ming Pao*, 1991: 8). In 1966, it published its first magazine, the *Ming Pao Monthly*, aimed at Chinese intellectuals with analytical articles and commentary on culture, politics, economics and current affairs both in Hong Kong and overseas. In 1968, the publication of its weekly magazine, the *Ming Pao Weekly*, commenced which provided coverage of topics ranging from film and entertainment news to current events. This was followed by the publication of the *Ming Pao Evening News* (1969), the *Ming Pao TV Weekly* (1986), which were closed in 1987 and 1988 respectively. In addition to expanding publications in Hong Kong, in 1976, *Ming Pao* began printing and distributing in North America through a contract with William Chang, who handled the western edition of *Sing Tao* from the late 1960s until the mid-1970s (*Ming Pao*, 1991: 8). The paper printed items from home office issues, rearranged somewhat for the overseas edition, but did not include local news (Lai, 1990: 121). In early 1989, *Ming Pao* began publishing a Vancouver edition of *Ming Pao* in an attempt to capture a large share of the rapidly growing Canadian market (ibid.). However, the venture failed one year later and *Ming Pao's* business in North America was handled again by

William Chang.⁴⁹ In 1991 the group became a public corporation in Hong Kong (ibid.).

Cha sold his paper to Yu Pun-hoi in December 1991, nine months after *Ming Pao* went public (Fung and Lee, 1994: 129). Yu, a former student in the Department of Economics at the University of Saskatchewan, was an ambitious businessman and fancied himself to be a Chinese media empire builder (Lee, 1997: 128). He ventured to set up a global Chinese Television Network (CTN) with capital of HK\$ 312 million (ibid.). In 1993 and 1994, he also established several newspapers, including a tabloid paper (*Hong Kong Today*) in Hong Kong, a daily (*Modern Mankind*) in Gurangzhou, China, and two overseas editions of *Ming Pao* in Toronto and Vancouver, as well as acquiring the controlling interest in the Chinese-language edition of *Asiaweek* (ibid.; Fung and Lee, 1994: 129; *Sing Pao*, December 12, 1994). In addition, Yu heavily invested in real estate and printing facilities and made loans of HK\$ 300 million to a Mainland-Chinese firm (Keenan, 1995: 65; Lee, 1997: 26).

The overextension, however, soon put Yu in financial difficulties. Both *Hong Kong Today* and *Modern Mankind* were abruptly closed down after heavy losses (Lee, 1997: 26). Several events further damaged Yu's venture. First, in September 1993, the *Ming Pao* reporter Xi Yang was arrested in Beijing under the provision of the Chinese state security law. Yu yielded to his staff's pressure and took measures toward openly applying pressure on Beijing. When all these did not work, Yu had to plead with Beijing through personal connections and finally had to apologise in person and in the paper, to the already agitated Chinese government, but all in vain. Xi earned a stiff 12-year imprisonment in March 1994 (Lee, 1997: 129). Largely as a result of the incident, Beijing scotched Yu's plan to use a Chinese-owned satellite for Chinese Television Network

(Karp, 1994: 85), which indicated that Yu's business strategy based on penetrating China's media market was no longer possible to pursue. Second, on October 10, 1994, *Hong Kong Economic News* reported that, as a University of Saskatchewan student in 1979, Yu was convicted of fraudulently using credit cards and cheques totalling C\$4,600 (US\$ 3,400). He was also found guilty of illegally possessing a pistol, and served four months in prison (*Hong Kong Economic News*, October 10, 1994; Karp, 1994: 85). Press revelations of Yu's criminal record further harmed his credibility, status, and financial standing and forced him to resign as chairman of the Hong Kong Newspaper Association (Lee, 1997: 128). Third, in August 1995, auditor Coopers & Lybrand questioned whether *Ming Pao* would be able to recover HK\$300 million in loans and deposits (Keenan, 1995: 65). The loans, together with Yu's heavy investment in real estate and printing facilities, added to *Ming Pao*'s financial problems (Lee, 1997: 128). It was reported that *Ming Pao* had a deficit of HK\$940 million between 1995 and 1996 (*Sing Pao*, August 13, 1996). As a result, Yu had no choice but to relinquish his short reign over *Ming Pao* in 1995 to the Malaysian-Chinese publisher, Tiong Hiew King. Yu retained the control of the unprofitable CTN until 1996 when it was finally sold to Taiwanese interests (ibid.: 129).

After Tiong's take-over, two points should be mentioned about the group's operation. First, by the end of March, 1997, *Ming Pao* group turned loss into profits, gaining about 2.8 million during 1996 to 1997 (*Ming Pao*, Aug. 14, 1997). Although the figure was too small as compared with *Ming Pao*'s profits of HK\$231 million in 1993 (*Ming Pao Annual Report*, 1995: 16), certainly it indicated that *Ming Pao* had started to recover from its difficult years due to overextension. Second, although *Ming Pao* abandoned its newspaper ventures in Mainland China, it continued and even expanded its

overseas editions. Toronto's edition began to make profits in 1996, and so did Vancouver's edition in 1997. With the success of these two overseas editions, *Ming Pao* launched its third overseas edition in New York on April 8, 1997. According to Tiong, *Ming Pao* "would further develop its business in San Francisco and Los Angeles. In addition, Australia, Europe, Central and South America, and Asia are also where we are going to engage" (*Yazhou Zhoukan*, April 14 - 20, 1997: 70).

6.3.3.2 Toronto's *Ming Pao*

In the globalization of Chinese language media in the 1990s, *Ming Pao* published its first overseas edition in Toronto in May 19, 1993. Four months later, it began publishing in Vancouver. Finally in 1997, it landed on the United States, publishing its New York edition.

The developmental pattern is different from what we have found in the history of *World Journal* and *Sing Tao*, in which they published first in the United States, and then, after taking root there, extended to Canada. The pattern of *World Journal* and *Sing Tao*, as discussed earlier, was shaped mainly by forces of population and politics between the 1960s and 1980s, among others. For one thing, the United States had a much larger Chinese population than that in Canada, and therefore the market of Chinese language newspapers was more lucrative there than here. For example, there were 807,027 Chinese as of 1980 in the United States, while the figure in Canada was only 289,245 in 1981 (Kwong, 1996: 4; Lai, 1988: 114). For another, both the Mainland China government and the Taiwan government vied to win over loyalty of Chinese-Americans, whom they sought political support and diplomatic recognition (Chen, 1996: 43). The Chinese press

could play a vital role in political mobilisation. As a result, for many of Chinese language newspapers, publishing in the United States was based on political consideration, as in the case of *World Journal*.

However, when *Ming Pao* started its publication in North America in the early 1990s, situations changed. On the one hand, although the Chinese population in United States increased from 807,027 in 1980 to 1,645,472 in 1990 (Kwong, 1996: 4), the growth of Chinese population in Canada was more impressive: it increased from 289,245 in 1981 to 633,933 in 1991, about 2.2 times growth (Li, 1998: 89). More importantly, the increase in Chinese population in Canada was characterised by (1) about 66 per cent of the Chinese population concentrating in two metropolitan centres, Toronto and Vancouver (ibid.: 104); (2) about 73 per cent of them being immigrants, over two-thirds from Hong Kong.⁵⁰ These facts indicate that, not only did the size of Chinese language newspaper market in Canada expand, but also the market was especially attractive in publishing Hong Kong daily newspapers. On the other hand, the lifting of martial law in Taiwan and the mainland-Taiwan rapprochement has ushered in a period of liberation of the press (Chan, 1997: 44), and therefore political mobilisation was not as important as before in location selection. This was particularly true for newspapers like *Ming Pao* which had been politically neutral in respect to Mainland China and Taiwan.

More specifically, there are three reasons why *Ming Pao* published its first overseas edition in Toronto. Firstly, *Ming Pao*'s decision had much to do with the fact that Toronto is the largest community of Hong Kong people overseas. By 1991, Toronto's Chinese population increased to 231,820, a growth of 2.7 times compared with that in 1981 (Li, 1998: 113). It is estimated that two-thirds of the Chinese population in Toronto

came from Hong Kong (Lary and Luk, 1992: 145). This amounts to more than 150,000 Hong Kong immigrants. The number increased at the rapid rate of about 10,000 a year throughout much of the 1990s (ibid.). As an executive in *Ming Pao* put it: we are here because "Toronto is the largest (Chinese language newspaper) market for us."⁵¹

Secondly, *Sing Tao's* experience influenced *Ming Pao's* decision.⁵² *Sing Tao's* success in Toronto was attributed largely to the overwhelming majority of Chinese in Toronto from Hong Kong, who tend to read Hong Kong newspapers. On the other hand, *Sing Tao's* performance in New York told another story. In New York, the proportion of Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China was relatively equal,⁵³ and so *Sing Tao* had no readership advantage as in Toronto. As well, there were more and stronger Chinese newspapers published there, thus producing much more intense competition among Chinese newspapers. As a result, *Sing Tao*, despite having a leading position in Toronto, only ranked the eighth in New York in the early 1990s.⁵⁴ Without doubt, *Sing Tao's* experience made *Ming Pao* realise that, among large overseas Chinese markets, Toronto's was most attractive, with its large Hong Kong readership and low competitiveness compared to New York, and only after establishing strongholds in Toronto could *Ming Pao* try to enter American market.

Thirdly, hearing that *Ming Pao* attempted to enter Canadian market, Richard Yao, then general manager of *Sing Tao* in Toronto, initiated contact with Yu Pun-hoi, expressing his desire to work for *Ming Pao*.⁵⁵ Having worked in Toronto's *Sing Tao* for last 15 years, Yao was well-known in the Toronto's Chinese community, not only for his role in *Sing Tao's* success, but also for his extensive connections in Chinatown as well as the larger society. Yao was accepted immediately by Yu and was appointed the first

general manager of *Ming Pao* in Toronto, in charge of all businesses concerning publishing *Ming Pao* both in Toronto and in Vancouver. Probably because of Yao's Toronto background, *Ming Pao*'s preparation in Toronto seemed to be faster than that in Vancouver; *Ming Pao* finally published in Toronto on May 28, 1993, and then in Vancouver in September of the same year.

Ming Pao's initial investment in Toronto was \$5 million. Although the amount is very small as compared with that of Conrad Black's *National Post* (\$150 million) or Jammy Lam's *Apple Daily* (HK\$700 million, about \$135 million) (Lee, 1997: 130; *Maclean's*, August 3, 1998), it is the highest initial investment in any Chinese newspapers in Canada. So high was the initial capital that *Ming Pao*, once again, adopted a different strategy from that of other Chinese newspapers. As discussed earlier, both *World Journal* and *Sing Tao* started as small offices whose main duty was no more than to distribute newspapers in Toronto. It was only after controlling part of the market that these papers invested large capital in plants, facilities and organisations. However, from the very beginning, *Ming Pao* was to publish a Chinese newspaper that had a higher standard than that of any existing Chinese newspapers in Canada. When asked about the reasons for doing so, one executive in *Ming Pao* explained:⁵⁶

When *Sing Tao* and *World Journal* started their publications in Toronto, the Chinese community was relatively small and demand (for newspapers) was not so high as when we first came here. However, if we had followed their steps from small to large in 1993, we would have had no competitiveness in this market. In addition, what readers required was different from that of ten years ago. Before, they were only interested in information from homeland. But now, besides homeland news, they are also interested in information about their new home as well as in international news. Their demands are much higher than before Recent immigrants also more value newspaper presentation than past immigrants.

The expanding market, higher demand for news coverage, and modern presentation, all accounted for the reasons why *Ming Pao* had to invest huge capital from the start. However, two points should be added here. First, in the early 1990s, the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto was dominated by *Sing Tao* and to a lesser extent, *World Journal*. To publish a new newspaper meant a rearrangement of market share. Without strong financial support, it was impossible for a new comer to compete with two powerful establishments and thus it would have no chance to survive, let alone to gain a share, as in the case of *Ming Pao*'s venture in Vancouver in 1989, whose failure was mainly due to deficient capital.⁵⁷ Second, the *Ming Pao*'s investment might reflect Yu Pun-hoi's personal way of doing business. Yu has a motto: If you expand fast enough, all the trouble you face today won't be trouble any more (Karp, 1994: 86). Although Yu's failure is largely attributed to his overextension, huge investment and rapid expansion in Toronto did give *Ming Pao* a firm foothold and a competitive edge over other newspapers.

With the US\$5 million, *Ming Pao* purchased a plant in Scarborough (probably \$2 million), 12 sets of colour printers, computers, and other equipment,⁵⁸ making it the best equipped Chinese newspaper in Toronto at that time. In organisation, in a short time, it recruited about 100 new staff members, thus becoming the largest Chinese newspaper ever in Canada in terms of the size of newspaper organisation. The staff members further reached 150 in 1998. With a large number of staff available, it is possible for *Ming Pao* to have an elaborate division of labour. For instance, in the editorial department, not only were editors and reporters separated, but also several special sections were set up to be responsible for sports, supplements, business section, and three weekly magazines (*Property Golden Page*, the *Saturday Magazine*, and the *Sunday Supplement*). Among

Toronto's Chinese newspapers, only *Ming Pao* has such an elaborate division of labour, which its management thought to be necessary for maintaining the good quality of the newspaper.

As a result of the huge capital investment, *Ming Pao* soon achieved success in the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto. Its claimed daily circulation was approximately 19,000 per day in 1994; it increased to about 35,000 in 1996, only about 4,000 copies less than that of *Sing Tao* (CARD, 1994: 60; *Ethnic Media and Market*, 1996, Summer/Fall: 11-12). Revenue from advertising was estimated to be about \$1.7 millions in 1996 (Li and Li, 1999: 53). All in all, by 1996, in Toronto's Chinese language newspaper market, *Ming Pao* was estimate to account for about 34 per cent of the total daily circulation, about 31 per cent of the total advertising revenue (ibid.: 48). The figures were 48 per cent and 52 for *Sing Tao*, and 18 per cent and 17 per cent for *World Journal* (ibid.: 58 and Table 4).

6.4 Conclusions

This chapter has examined the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada in relation to overseas capital. It has shown that Hong Kong and Taiwan have achieved an economic miracle in the last four decades and this success has had significant impact on Canada. The economic success is important in the expansion of overseas-owned Chinese newspapers in Canada. It is the economic accomplishment that led to a high accumulation of capital which has made outward investments possible, including capital investments in Chinese newspapers in Canada. On the other hand, the economic growth in East Asia has been largely maintained through economic diversification, including both

production diversification and market diversification (Ho, 1992: 161). Multinational firms in Hong Kong and Taiwan have heavily invested in China, South East Asia and North America, which have been proven crucial for Hong Kong's sustained growth. In this regard, capital investment in Chinese newspapers is simply part of the economic diversification in which media groups in East Asia have sought new market opportunities abroad due to the saturation of the domestic market.

This chapter has also shown that Hong Kong and Taiwan have had highly developed media markets, and some giant media groups have been well established and have had a relatively long history in overseas expansion. The growth of media in East Asia is also significant in the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. For one thing, financial capital for overseas expansion would be available because the media groups have been capital rich. For another, highly developed media markets in East Asia have produced a large number of experienced journalists and executives, who have been the source of expertise in the overseas expansion, as in the case of *World Journal*, *Sing Tao*, and *Ming Pao*. In this respect, human capital too has been critical. Finally, previous experiences in overseas expansion in other countries might help the media groups to deal more properly and efficiently with later expansion in countries such as Canada.

The relationship between overseas capital and recent growth of Chinese newspapers has been further explored through the case of *World Journal*, *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao* in Toronto. Four observations can be made, among others. First, the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada has been closely associated with changes in overseas capital. In the 1970s, when overseas investments were small, both *World Journal* and *Sing Tao*, which started to publish that time, operated on a small scale.

However, both papers experienced rapid development in the 1980s as a result of large capital investments from their home offices in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In the 1990s, the entry of *Ming Pao* into Toronto's market led to further capital investments of newspapers; thus the Chinese press in Toronto has reached a peak in its history, with about 100,000 daily circulation. Second, overseas capital investments have adopted two major strategies. The first strategy involved starting small-scale operations and gradually expanding them when the market grew, as in the case of *World Journal* and *Sing Tao*. The second strategy involved establishing a big newspaper right from the beginning, like *Ming Pao*. The earlier comers usually were cautious about their investments. This has to do not only with the relatively small size of market but also the less strong newspaper groups themselves. Only after the market expanded and newspaper groups grew stronger did they begin to put in large capital. However, this strategy was no longer feasible when *Ming Pao* entered the Toronto market in 1993, when the market had expanded and competition became intense. So *Ming Pao* had to start as a big newspaper. It can be predicted that if any newspapers attempt to publish in Toronto in the future and want to share the market with the three newspapers, they will have to follow *Ming Pao's* strategy of investment; otherwise, they will have no chance to survive. Third, all three newspapers focused their capital investment in physical infrastructure and labour force. The newspapers expanded by increasing their facilities and augmenting their personnel. By Being printed in Toronto and covering more local news, the papers were established as localized transnational Chinese newspapers. Fourth, although local management influenced the development of overseas Chinese newspapers, as in the case of Richard Yao of *Sing Tao*, capital investments relied

on home offices in Hong Kong and Taiwan. In other words, it is newspaper owners in East Asia who have made final decision with respect to capital investments in Canada.

Endnotes — Chapter 6

1. By 1998, there were still some local Chinese papers published in Canadian cities, such as *Da Zhong Bao* (Toronto), *The Capital Chinese News* (Ottawa), *Eastern Chinese Press* (Montreal), *Chinatown News* (Vancouver), and *Overseas Chinese Times* (Regina and Saskatoon). But all of them were weekly, bi-weekly or monthly, and not a daily newspaper. Moreover, most of these papers were distributed free and were tiny in terms of both the magnitude of revenue and organisational size. As a result, their market share was very marginal and influence very limited.
2. It should be noted that, although Hong Kong is an economy with perhaps the least government intervention, the Hong Kong government did accomplish a number of tasks in the development of local industry. In addition to specific policies to facilitate private sector initiatives, the major success of Hong Kong government was in maintaining social order, in providing a predictable rule of law relatively free of corruption, and in responding to the needs of individual firms. For a more detailed discussion, see Vogel, 1992: 69-72; Woronoff, 1992: 144-147; Sung, 1989: 153-160.
3. For detailed information concerning Chinese investment in Southeast Asia, see OECD, 1993: 31-54; Klintworth, 1995: 142-170.
4. Until 1997, the Xinhua news agency had been both news agency and Beijing's representative in Hong Kong since its founding in 1948. As China's propaganda mouthpieces, *Wen Wei Pao* and *Ta Kung Pao* were under Xinhua's supervision. For more detailed information about Hong Kong's Xinhua news agency, see Lau, 1986: 438-441; Chan and Lee, 1991: 49-62.
5. The Kuomintang was eager to shift the paper from party to state sponsorship in order to subsidise it with public funds, but it was firmly rejected by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). See Lee, 1997: 16.
6. Koon (1997: 181) offers an explanation of why Kuok bought the *SCAMP*. According to him, "the Kuok purchase occurred shortly after the *South China Morning Post* ran a sensational article on 22 August 1993 reporting that \$28 billion Hong Kong dollar of state funds had gone missing in the preceding eighteen months, siphoned off by Bank of China officials. It took a full week before the Chinese government responded with a denial in the *People's Daily* on 28 August. Concerned to put the paper into friendly hands, Beijing asked Kuok to take control of the paper."
7. According Berman (1992: 126), any publications which the government deemed unacceptable were to be punished. For newspapers, punishment often involved no more than suspension of operation for limited period of time. For example, on 10 October 1953, the *Independence Evening Post* was accused of "inelegant language" in its description of the military parade. It was closed down for three months as a punishment. However,

individuals suffered retribution that was considerably more severe. For instance, in 1968, the noted writer Po Yang received a nine-year prison term for his publication of a translated Popeye cartoon in the *China Daily* family section. During the four decades, numerous journalists were sent to prison as a result of political censorship. For more detailed information, see Berman, 1992: 125-129; Lee, 1993.

8. Interview, Toronto, June 18, 1997.

9. Unless noted otherwise, the information in the following four paragraphs from Chan and Zhu, 1987: 49, 111, 115, 134, 165, and 172.

10. Interview, Toronto, June 18, 1997.

11. Whampoa Military Academy was a Kuomintang's training school in the 1920s, with Chiang Kai-shek as President. The Whampoa graduates formed the backbone of the Kuomintang's military structure. See Ch'i, 1976: 40 and 112-113.

12. Interview, Toronto, July 23, 1997.

13. According to Lee (1993: 5 and 34), each license was worth US\$2 to 3 million in the mid-1980s. So high that only the party-state (thanks to its access to the national treasury) and two main private papers had the requisite financial means to acquire them.

14. For instance, since the 1980s books and videos from Taiwan have been easily available in public libraries and Video stores in major cities of Canada.

15. *China Times* began with *Sunday Times Chinese Weekly* in 1977 and then started publishing daily in 1982. The *International Daily News* was also Taiwan-owned paper, which was founded in 1981. The *Centre Daily News* was financed by Hong Kong capital which began publishing in 1982. All the three papers were published in the United States and distributed in Canada. See Lai, 1987: 38; interview, Toronto, June 23, 1997.

16. There were two papers which were closed in the 1980s: one was *China Times* in 1984 due to both financial and political factors; the other was the *Centre Daily News* in 1989 because of financial difficulty. The loss was partly filled by Hong Kong's *Ming Pao* entering North American market in 1993. But the total number was still less than that of the 1980s. see Chen, 1997: 39; interview, Toronto, Aug. 14, 1997.

17. See next section in this chapter

18. For more information about Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks in the 1970s, see Long, 1991: 130-140.

19. According to Chan and Zhu (1987: 171), the Taiwan government initiated a proposal to publish a Chinese newspaper in the United States and consulted both the *United Daily*

News and China Times. Because Chi-chung Yu had no certainty of success, Tih-wu Wang took on the job.

20. Unless noted otherwise, the information in this subsection is from interview, Toronto, August 14, 1997 and August 5, 1998.

21. An examination of Toronto's *World Journal* in 1980 confirmed the information from the interview.

22. See *World Journal*, February 1 and August 1, 1984.

23. Interview, Toronto, May 21, 1996.

24. *ibid.*

25. Aw Boon Haw, a native of Fujian province, emigrated to Beam where he developed an all-purpose medial ointment which he called Tiger Balm after his given name - haw means tiger. He and his brother, Aw Boon Par, left Rangoon for Singapore in the 1920s with the salve and other related products which provided the foundation of Aw empire. See Lau, 1987: 433.

26. For information about the newspaper price war in Hong Kong in 1995 and the rise in newsprint price in the same year, see So, 1996: 487-494; *Sing Tao*, 1996: 27.

27. No data are available about the exact year when *Sing Tao* was first distributed by Edward So in Toronto. However, *Sing Tao* appeared in 1976's edition of *Ontario Chinese Business Telephone Directory*, which suggests that the paper started in Toronto at least in 1976.

28. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

29. According to Lai (1990: 122), after a negotiated settlement, "Edward So founded the pro-China *Peimei News* in New York and Toronto in 1978. This paper became one of the first dailies to adopt the China standard of running Chinese text in horizontal lines from left to right in accordance with Western practice. But it soon had to bow to custom and reverted to the traditional vertical columns reading from right to left." *Peimei's* Toronto edition was closed in 1981 and New York's edition in 1987 both due to financial difficulty. Also see Yang, 1987: 78.

30. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

31. Interview, Toronto, June 34, 1997.

32. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

33. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1987.

34. While the exact proportion of immigrants from Hong Kong, China and Taiwan within Toronto can not be ascertained from official census or immigration statistics, it is normally agreed that it would be close to the ratio of immigrants entering Ontario from these three areas. According to Luk and Lee (1996: 24), from 1971 to 1992, 133,673 from Hong Kong (75.9%), 29,589 from China (16.8%), and 12,955 from Taiwan (7.4%) immigrated to Ontario. As a result, it is assumed that about 75% of Chinese immigrants in Toronto were from Hong Kong during the period.

35. Interview, Toronto, July 23, 1997.

36. *ibid.*

37. *ibid.*

38. Interview, Toronto, July 22, 1997.

39. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1997.

40. As an executive of *Sing Tao* put it: "We wanted to put our printing and consulting in one room, so we decided to buy a piece of land. Putting together, it would be much easier in management. The whole building would include printing, editorial, and sales, all staying in one place. That would be very convenient." Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1987.

41. Interview, Toronto, August 7, 1997.

42. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

43. There are no official statistics on the educational attainment of immigrants settled in the Greater Toronto Area. However, as Lary (1991, cited in Luk and Lee, 1996: 24) showed from immigration statistics, during 1988 and 1990, independent class immigrants from Hong Kong had consistently chosen Toronto over Vancouver as the city for settlement. On the other hand, the choice of business class immigrants was for Vancouver. The independent immigrants tended to be somewhat younger and better schooled than the business immigrants. In addition, in the Hong Kong Institute of Personal Management survey of new immigrants conducted in late 1990, it was found that, among the Canadian cities surveyed, there were more respondents in professional and secretarial jobs in Toronto than in the other cities (Lary and Luk, 1994: 150). The increased young and well educated immigrants from Hong Kong might force the press, including *Sing Tao*, to appease the segment of the market.

44. Interview, Toronto, May 29, 1996.

45. Interview, Toronto, August 7, 1997.
46. Unless noted otherwise, the information in this paragraph is from an interview conducted in Toronto, July 22, 1997.
47. Based on my rough calculation of advertising in the two papers randomly selected from 1996 to 1997.
48. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.
49. Interview, Toronto, July 30, 1997.
50. According to Li (1998: 99), there are 522,061 Chinese immigrating to Canada from 1968 to 1994, among them 68 per cent from Hong Kong. Because Chinese immigrants who arrived before 1970 made up only 10 per cent of the total, the percentage calculated by Li can be seen as a rough estimate of the total Chinese immigrants to Canada.
51. Interview, Toronto, August 10, 1998.
52. Interview, Toronto, May 22, 1996.
53. No data are available about the exact percentage of immigrants from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China in New York. However, the conventional wisdom is that the number of immigrants from the three sources are relatively even. See interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998.
54. Interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998. Although *Sing Tao's* ranking in New York in the early 1990s has not been verified, it is widely believed that its market share was much smaller than that of *World Journal*.
55. Interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998.
56. Interview, Toronto, August 10, 1998.
57. Interview, Toronto, July 29, 1997.
58. Information in this paragraph is from interviews conducted in Toronto, May 22, 1996 and August 19, 1998.

CHAPTER 7

STRATEGIES OF SURVIVAL: CHINESE NEWSPAPERS AND COMPETITION

This chapter explains how competition among Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the 1980s and 1990s played a significant role in their development. It first discusses the Chinese newspaper market structure in the 1980s and how the structure led to competition and changes in Chinese newspapers. It then examines competition among Chinese newspapers in the 1990s, with a focus on *Ming Pao* entering the Toronto's market and how other Chinese newspapers responded to the entry. Finally, it briefly discusses the relationship between competition and the development of Chinese newspapers in Toronto since the late 1970s.

7.1 Chinese Newspapers and Competition in Toronto: the 1980s

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several transnational Chinese newspapers from Taiwan and Hong Kong entered the Toronto Chinese market. The entry of these papers increased the number of Chinese newspapers published in Toronto and brought about competition in wider scope than before. To cope with competition, Chinese newspapers adopted various strategies in an attempt to attract readership and advertising revenue, which produced many innovations and changes.

7.1.1 The Structure of Chinese Newspaper Market in Toronto in the 1980s

In *The Economics and Regulation of United States Newspapers*, Lacy and Simon (1993: 91-2) point out that all market structure starts with a geographic area. This area is defined by locations where a newspaper chooses to sell its copies and advertising. Given the geographic market, market structure is determined by three dimensions: the number of firms, homogeneity of products within the market, and the extent of barriers to entry. According to Lacy and Simon (*ibid.*: 92-3), the extent of competition is associated with these three dimensions. When the market structure is characterised by many firms, homogeneous products and low barriers to entry, competition would increase and intensify; conversely, with few or only one firm, heterogeneous products and high barriers to entry, competition would decrease and even disappear. Here I examine the Chinese newspaper market structure in Toronto in terms of these three dimensions.

The number of Chinese newspapers

The decade of the 1980s witnessed the increased number of Chinese newspapers published in Toronto (see Table 7-1). In 1975, there were two Chinese newspapers in Toronto. The number increased to four in 1981; it jumped to seven in 1984 and remained largely unchanged until 1989. During the 1980s, a total of nine Chinese newspapers were published in Toronto (see Table 7-2). Most of these newspapers were created by Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong or Taiwan, which attempted to exploit the growing Chinese market in Toronto.

According to Census figures (see Table 5.1), the Chinese population in Toronto was 85,800 in 1981; the figure increased to 231,820 in 1991. Although the size of

Table 7.1 The Number of Chinese Newspapers in Toronto, 1981-1990

| | 1981 | 1982 | 1983 | 1984 | 1985 | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Daily | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 3 | 3 |
| Weekly | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Biweekly | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 5 | 7 | 6 | 9 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 5 |

Source: Figures for daily compiled from data in Table 7-2. Figures for weekly compiled from Gu, 1986: 43 and interview, May 25, 1996; figures for biweekly compiled from interview, Toronto, May 25, 1996 and July 26, 1997.

Table 7.2 Chinese Daily Newspapers in Toronto, the 1980s

| Newspaper | Headquarters Location (year founded) | Year published in Toronto | Political Affiliation | Locally Produced | Year Closed in Toronto |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| <i>Shing Wah</i> | Toronto (1923) | 1923 | Kuomintang | Yes | 1989 |
| <i>Chinese Express</i> | Toronto (1970) | 1970 | No party affiliation | Yes | 1989 |
| <i>World Journal</i> | Taipei and New York (1976) | 1976 | Pro-Kuomintang | Yes | |
| <i>Sing Tao</i> | Hong Kong (1938) | 1978 | No party affiliation | Yes | |
| <i>China Times</i> | Taipei (1982) | 1982 | Pro-Kuomintang | No | 1984 |
| <i>Centre Daily</i> | Hong Kong (1980) | 1984 | No party affiliation | No | 1989 |
| <i>International Daily News</i> | Los Angeles (1981) | 1984 | No party affiliation | No | 1986 |
| <i>Chinese Canadian Daily News</i> | Toronto (1984) | 1984 | No party affiliation | Yes | 1989 |
| <i>Sing Pao Daily</i> | Hong Kong (1939) | 1987 | No party affiliation | Yes | 1994 |

Sources: Lai, 1990; Gu, 1986: 41-43; Hong Kong Branch, China News Society, 1993: 329-330; Chan and Lee, 1991: 13; Interview, Toronto, June 14, 1997; *Sing Tao* (Eastern edition), January 30 and October 4, 1989.

Chinese population in Toronto expanded during the 1980s, the market was not big enough to support so many newspapers. As a result, Chinese newspapers had to struggle for a share of the market, thus producing intense competition among themselves during the period.

Homogeneity of Chinese newspapers

Although the number of Chinese newspapers in Toronto increased, the Chinese newspapers were not homogeneous in terms of their background and targeted readership. Generally speaking, the nine Chinese newspapers can be classified into three categories: local, Taiwan-based, and Hong Kong-based; the latter two categories can also be referred to as transnational Chinese newspapers because they are simultaneously published in several countries.

Local Chinese newspapers included *Shing Wah*, *Chinese Express* and *The Chinese Canadian Daily News*. In Chapter four, I discussed *Shing Wah* and *Chinese Express* before the mid-1970s. *Shing Wah*, owned by the branch of local Kuomintang, continued to decline during the 1980s, and its publication would have been impossible without a subsidy from the Taiwan government (*Sing Tao*, October 4, 1989). Supported by small businesses in Toronto, the *Chinese Express* benefited greatly from the decline of *Shing Wah* in the 1970s and captured the largest share of readership and advertising in the market (Lum, 1991: 235).¹ However, with the coming of *World Journal* and *Sing Tao* in the late 1970s, the paper lost money, and the ownership of paper changed hands several times due to financial difficulties (*Sing Tao*, February 2, 1989). Mainly targeting immigrants from China before the 1950s, both older newspapers became marginal in the market in the

1980s.

Relatively active among local papers was *The Chinese Canadian Daily News*, which was founded in 1984 by three investors from Hong Kong, with an initial capital investment of approximately \$1 million.² Although the capital investment of paper was from East Asia, the paper was local by nature due to the fact that it had no affiliation with any Chinese transnational newspapers in Hong Kong or Taiwan, and its operation was limited to Toronto. The paper attempted to appeal to recent immigrants from Hong Kong and Mainland China. In the fight for a share of the market, this paper hired large staff members (over 50 staff members during 1987 to 1988),³ and was the first Chinese newspaper in Toronto to bring computer into editorial department (*Chinese Canadian Daily News*, 1987: 11). The newspaper, however, never made profits and its publication was supported mainly by a major investor's businesses in China and Canada. When these businesses failed in 1989, the paper had to cease publication in the same year.⁴ The newspaper, like other two local papers, was marginal in the Toronto Chinese newspaper market.

Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers included *World Journal*, *International Daily News*, *China Times* and *Centre Daily News*. As discussed in the previous chapter, *World Journal* entered the Toronto market in 1976 and expanded there in the mid-1980s. *International Daily News* was founded by Taiwan immigrant Tao Chan in 1981, with its headquarters in Los Angeles (Lai, 1991: 126).⁵ Right after its publication in the United States, the newspaper started distribution in Toronto, which was handled by a three-staff office (Gu, 1986: 43). *China Times*, as mentioned in the last chapter, had been one of the two largest Chinese daily newspapers in Taiwan since the 1970s. This newspaper began

publishing a daily in North America in 1982, and was for a while *World Journal's* most formidable rival and was especially appealing to intellectuals (Lai, 1990: 119). In Toronto, this paper published a local edition and had a branch office with five staff members. *Centre Daily News* was owned by Chao-chu Fu, who was former owner of the popular *Taiwan Daily News*, which was noted for its reporting of activities of non-Kuomintang dissidents (Lai, 1990: 139).⁶ In 1984, *Centre Daily News* set up a branch office in Toronto to publish a local edition, which included two pages of local news and some local advertising (Gu, 1986: 42).⁷

Despite the strong presence in Toronto, Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers held little appeal for readers from Hong Kong, since editorial contents in these newspapers were primarily concerned with issues of Taiwan rather than those of Hong Kong. They basically targeted Taiwan immigrants who made up a small segment of the market. Therefore, for these newspapers, competition occurred more often among themselves rather than with Hong Kong-based newspapers. Although these newspapers, especially *World Journal* after its expansion in the mid-1980s, attempted to attract Hong Kong immigrants and advertisers, their success was limited.⁸

Hong Kong-based Chinese newspapers consisted of *Sing Tao* and *Sing Pao*. As discussed in the last chapter, *Sing Tao*, after its expansion in the early 1980s, soon seized more than half of the market. Its leading position in the market derived from large capital investments from the head office in the early 1980s, but also, probably more importantly, from the fact that during much of the 1980s it was the only Hong Kong-based newspaper in Toronto, where more than 70 per cent of Chinese immigrants were from Hong Kong. In 1988, *Sing Pao*, another Hong Kong-based newspaper, began to exploit the Toronto

market by publishing a Toronto edition. The publication, however, did not pose a real challenge to *Sing Tao* because its news from Hong Kong appeared four days later than that in *Sing Tao*.⁹

The heterogeneity of Chinese newspapers probably diminished the intensity of newspaper competition brought about by the increased number of papers. However, intense competition occurred among Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers because of their numbers and same market targets. In addition, because the market of Taiwan immigrants was not large enough to support four daily newspapers, these papers had to fight with *Sing Tao* for a share of the larger market. Unsuccessful as they were, they now and then challenged *Sing Tao* and produced some changes in the market.

Barriers to entry

Throughout the 1980s, barriers to entry were relatively low. Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong and Taiwan basically used news contents taken from home offices' editions of these newspapers, with a page or two covering local community news (Lai, 1991: 117).¹⁰ Most newspapers did not install colour press, nor did they use computers in newsroom. In addition, except for *Sing Tao*, *World Journal* and *Centre Daily News*, the rest of the transnational newspapers only maintained small offices in Toronto, and their papers were printed in the United States and then shipped to Toronto. These practices reflected low barriers to publish a Chinese newspaper in Toronto in the 1980s, since newspaper owners, usually based outside of Toronto, saw the Toronto Chinese newspaper market as a secondary one that simply expanded a primary market elsewhere.

* * * * *

The above discussion indicates that the Chinese newspaper market structure in Toronto during the 1980s was not straightforward. On the one hand, the increased number of newspapers and relatively low barriers to entry created intense competition among Chinese newspapers. On the other hand, to a certain degree the diversity among newspapers reduced intensity of competition between newspapers in different categories. The structural characteristics largely shaped general patterns of how Chinese newspapers dealt with competition: local papers, despite being dominant in the late 1970s, were not in a position to compete successfully in this market; Taiwan-based newspapers had to fight with one another for the same segments of the market; and *Sing Tao*, a major Hong Kong-based newspaper, despite challenges from Taiwan-based newspapers sometimes, had no serious rival in the largest segment of the market and did well to maintain its dominant position there.

7.1.2 Strategies of Competition

How did the Chinese newspapers compete with each other in the 1980s? What strategies were adopted in newspaper competition? Here I examine four major areas in which competition occurred: news reporting, advertising, recruitment and circulation.

7.1.2.1 News reporting and other information

Compared with local Chinese newspapers, Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong and Taiwan could publish wide-ranging news stories and other information to appeal to readers, which was impossible for local papers to do. In his study of Chinese newspapers in the United States and Canada, Lai observed (1991: 119-120):

Daily issues of the national papers [transnational Chinese newspapers] increased from 16 pages in the seventies to 24 or 28 pages in the eighties. *World Journal* on occasion runs to as many as 48 to 72 pages, plus a Sunday magazine section. Typically an issue covers international news, business, entertainment, and sports, with an emphasis on America, Canada, local communities, PRC, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Issues also include literary, historical, and other feature articles. In some areas *World Journal* published twice daily. In each major Chinese community, such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Toronto, and Vancouver, different local edition offer a community news section focusing on local events.

Such publications formed a sharp contrast with local Chinese newspapers. For instance, *Shing Wah* and the *Chinese Express*, two local Chinese newspapers in Toronto, ran to only ten or sixteen pages daily, and news and other information (excluding advertisements) only occupied two pages (Lam, 1980: 78). Most news items were unabashedly borrowed from English newspapers, e.g., *the Toronto Star, Globe and Mail*, and the wire services (Ibid.), or clipped and pasted out of newspapers from Hong Kong or Taiwan which were mailed to Toronto (Gu, 1986: 42). Local coverage took up a fairly small portion of both newspapers (Lam, 1980: 78). It is not difficult to understand that transnational Chinese newspapers could increase their market share while local papers were retreating from expansion.

There are two reasons transnational Chinese newspapers could publish broad news stories and other information. One, these newspapers had transnational news network to cover international and national events, which was not available to local newspapers (Fong, 1998: 72). Two, transnational Chinese newspapers made use of the latest communication technology, such as satellites, to link various offices across north America or to home office halfway around the world, thus enabling editions in all cities to use the

same typeset pages (Lai, 1990: 120). Such technology required investment of large amount of capital, which was also usually unavailable to most local newspapers.

Because of the inferiority in news coverage of local papers, competition in this area occurred mostly among transnational newspapers. For instance, according to Lai (1991: 120), in 1983 *International Daily News* began publishing *Chinese Weekly Post*, a magazine supplement distributed with its weekend edition. These moves were quickly emulated by the rival *China Times* and *World Journal*. *Sing Tao* waited until 1989. *Centre Daily News*, however, decided against publishing a Sunday supplement.

Transnational Chinese newspapers also competed with each other for local news. Because of small number of local staff during this period, the newspapers had limited local news coverage (usually one to two pages, including Canadian news in general and news about the Chinese community). In spite of that, they adopted some strategies to make their local news (both the community and the larger society) fast and exclusive. For instance, for several years in the 1980s, *World Journal* regularly sent a reporter at midnight to *Toronto Star*'s printing plant, managing to get a copy of newspaper just printed. When getting back to office, usually at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, the reporter started selecting and translating news items which were of interest to Chinese readers. Since *World Journal* began printing newspaper at 9:00 in the morning, these news items could appear in the paper on the same day as in *Toronto Star*.¹¹ For *Sing Tao* and *The Chinese Canadian Daily News* (which was the only local newspaper to be involved in competition to a certain degree), the main strategy seemed to develop close relations with the Chinese community, from which they obtained many leads for news reporting.¹²

7.1.2.2 Advertising

When Chinese newspapers from Hong Kong and Taiwan first came to Toronto in the late 1970s, Chinese advertising was controlled by two local newspapers, the *Chinese Express* and, to lesser extent, *Shing Wah*. At this point, transnational newspapers had to work hard to beat these local newspapers in order to capture a share of the advertising market. In doing so, *Sing Tao* adopted two strategies: increasing news and extending circulation networks. A former employee of the paper told the author in a detailed fashion:¹³

The early advertising was very hard to come by because most people in Chinatown were from Taishan and very few people from Hong Kong.¹⁴ In addition, most Chinese were running grocery store, restaurant, laundry, and convenient store. These Lao Huaqiao [old overseas Chinese] did not want to buy advertising because they all knew each other and business was good. If they wanted to run advertisements, they usually went to two old local newspapers, *Chinese Express* and *Shing Wah*. We were from Hong Kong, and our paper was thought to be a new overseas Chinese newspaper that had nothing to do with them. They would not read *Sing Tao*. The challenge facing us that time was how to get these people to read our newspaper. Only if they read our paper, would they buy our advertising. To attract advertising from them, we first did something in news. We ran a column of "Toronto Social Life", which reported stories about all kinds of Chinese associations in Toronto's Chinatown, in an attempt to establish contact with them In addition to news stories about Toronto, we also had news stories from New York that were of interest to the Chinese community. In the first year, we started to publish satellite news [from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan and so on] [*Chinese*] *Express* and *Shing Wah* did not have any news from Hong Kong, and we attacked the weakness by having fast Hong Kong news. We emphasised we had news from Hong Kong! We also had news from Mainland China, South East Asia, and so on. Because of large amount of news, especially from Hong Kong, circulation began to increase. The circulation was the most important thing, which was a base for attracting advertising. Second, we established and expanded circulation networks beyond the Chinatowns. The traditional circulation network included restaurants and grocery stores, and we expanded newsstands by double. [*Chinese*] *Express* and *Shing Wah* did not go to many new developing areas, nor did they sell newspapers in the financial district. But we sold newspapers there After the circulation networks were established, the circulation went up. Our strategy was not only to target old overseas Chinese, but also to professionals, and

Chinese students at York University and the University of Toronto. Later we increased our reader services to Niagara Falls, Brampton and Scarborough, as well as all the southern Ontario areas [In addition to the old overseas Chinese] we had different kinds of readers: professionals and young generations, who had high purchasing power. This was so important. When we put these people in, they loaded the market message. They cooperated, they bought, and advertisers were so happy to get these response. "How come we don't have these response in *Shing Wah* and the *Chinese Express*? *Sing Tao* was so effective!" So we built up our customers, [and] we increased our advertising budget year by year.

Sing Tao competed with local papers in advertising by improving its news reporting and distribution service, and easily defeated these local papers. It is clear that to a considerable extent news reporting became a means to increase advertising revenues, which suggests that *Sing Tao*, and also the other Chinese newspapers, largely regarded newspaper as a profit-oriented business.

When *Sing Tao* became a dominant power in the market around mid-1980s, it soon changed its strategies, with a focus on maintaining its domination. The change was linked to the fact that several Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers also attempted to get a share of the market, which was likely to reduce that of *Sing Tao*. Among several strategies adopted by *Sing Tao*, the most significant was so-called "discriminatory policy", which was to prevent other Chinese newspapers from competing with *Sing Tao*. The same former employee of *Sing Tao* said:¹⁵

Most advertisers, they had loyalty to us. We wanted to keep them If we wanted to keep them, we had to make them happy. Our advertising rate was totally different from that in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, you paid one dollar, we put your advertising one day only. We called daily rate charge In San Francisco, it was the same. In New York and Toronto, we changed daily rate to monthly rate in a contract way. You paid the rate of space, and we put

advertisement there for a whole month in one way. We charged in one fixed way. Like business card size, we started to [charge] 30 dollars [a month]. . . so one dollar a day. For most advertisers, this was pretty minor So the trick was that, next year when our circulation went up, new advertisers came to us and had to pay \$35 For old advertisers, because they gave one year contract, we still charged them \$30, or did a bit adjustment, such as one per cent or two per cent or three per cent. There always was a discrimination gap. So even we increased to \$32 dollars [a month], they were still three dollar cheaper than new advertisers. So they knew that they were getting benefits because they were so loyal to *Sing Tao*. And this policy was so effective. But also, in the later stage, that is, in the late eighties and early nineties, it was our weakness, because gap was going to widen. For instance, one business card has three units, and we charged \$55 per unit for one month [in 1992], but for old advertisers we only charged \$40, \$30, or even \$25 something . . . [these long-term advertisers] were so big. . . over 70 to 75 per cent. Until I left *Sing Tao* still maintained pretty high rates of long-term advertisers.

“Discriminatory policy” implied that, with the dominant position in the market, *Sing Tao*’s emphasis of strategies shifted from improving news reporting and other services to building barriers to entry of other newspapers. In other words, *Sing Tao* started to restrict competition by reducing chances of other Chinese newspapers to get access to the market. To a considerable extent this policy worked as expected, in terms of a large number of old advertisers it kept. The policy, however, produced problems for *Sing Tao* from a long-term point of view. With 70 to 80 per cent of advertisers enjoying lower rates, *Sing Tao* had difficulty in raising its revenue. As the same person said: “Because of huge gap [e.g., old rates and new rates], the first and fifth years had lots of differences. By the late eighties, the gap was so huge that when Hong Kong [head office] set a new target, it was getting harder and harder to raise up.”¹⁶

Sing Tao’s dominant position in the market and its strategies to restrict competition, made Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers difficult to survive in Toronto, let

alone to expand. These newspapers first had to compete with each other to capture a share of the Taiwanese immigrant market. They also had to fight with *Sing Tao* for a share of Hong Kong immigrant market. As a result, the Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers were actively involved in competition during the period. For instance, *China Times* adopted a strategy called “buy one and get one”: a customer who purchased advertising space from the paper could obtain similar space free of charge.¹⁷ This strategy indicated that *China Times* was willing to take a temporary loss in exchange for inroads into the market. Nevertheless, it was difficult for any newspapers to keep this practice for a long-term period.

Another strategy adopted by *World Journal* was to establish a large team of advertising, which was called “accounting executive”.¹⁸ In 1986 the paper hired as many as eighteen accounting executives, whose incomes were based mostly on commission. (In *Sing Tao*, there were only four advertising staff, and their incomes were entirely salary-based.) These advertising staff had to go out every day, contacting Chinese businesses for possible advertising throughout Toronto. They also were responsible for half a page of news each day, in which news stories about their customers would be published. This practice attempted to increase advertising share by establishing a rapport with advertisers, which turned out to be successful to a certain degree. In 1985, the paper’s revenues from advertising were about \$100,000 to \$120,000. One year later, the figure jumped to \$700,000 to \$800,000.¹⁹

Strategies used by Taiwan-based newspapers reflected their difficult positions in the Toronto market. They either incurred big losses by adopting “buy one and get one”, or hired a large number of advertising staff to fawn on their customers, including both

Taiwanese and Hong Kong businesses. In doing so, journalism was sacrificed in exchange for advertising dollars.

7.1.2.3 Recruiting skilled journalists and other newspaper staff

Because local branches of Chinese transnational newspapers in Toronto worked primarily for local news and advertising, having experienced journalists and advertising staff would be significant in competition. In his discussion of Chinese newspapers in the United States and Canada during the period, Lai found (1990: 120):

Many staff positions have been filled by numerous intellectuals and university students who have come recently from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the PRC. Some of these people have had journalism training, thus improving the quality of reporting. Many others, however, are relatively unfamiliar with issues and personalities in the Chinese communities of the United States and Canada and thus their coverage often lacks depth.

In Toronto, like elsewhere in North America, there were some experienced journalists working for Chinese newspapers. The number of this kind of journalists, however, was very low. My field work in Toronto indicated that most of editors and reporters, including one editor-in-chief, had no journalistic experience before working in Chinese newspapers in Toronto.²⁰ This inevitably led to competition for experienced journalists among Chinese newspapers. One example was Allen Leung, an experienced journalist from Hong Kong. From 1982 to 1984, he was in charge of Toronto's edition of *China Times*. When *China Times* ceased publication in Toronto in 1984, several newspapers scrambled for recruiting him. Finally, he went to *Sing Tao* and got a position

as director of public relations (Gu, 1986: 42; *Chinese Canadian Yearbook*, 1993: 358). There is no doubt that *Sing Tao's* domination in the market led to its advantageous position in recruiting some of the best journalists during that period.

Taiwan-based newspapers appeared to emphasize recruiting staff with Hong Kong background. This strategy indicated that experienced journalists and advertising staffs from Taiwan were not available in Toronto. More importantly, it can be seen as a step taken by these papers to adapt to a community where the bulk of population came from Hong Kong. As discussed earlier, Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers had little appeal to Hong Kong immigrants because of their Taiwan background, reflected mainly in editorial contents, but also in Mandarin speaking staff. Hiring staff with Hong Kong background not only helped these newspapers to adjust to taste of Hong Kong readers, but also helped them to establish connections with the Hong Kong market. For instance, Tony Wen, an experienced journalist from Hong Kong, was recruited by *World Journal* in 1986.²¹ While working there, he made many suggestions to change the paper to appeal to Hong Kong readers. He also wrote many local news items for the newspaper. It is interesting to note that, when *World Journal* published his news stories, the name of the author was enlarged to almost double the usual size. The implication here was not only to encourage local reporting, but also to show Hong Kong immigrants that it had a Hong Kong reporter and its news was for people from Hong Kong. The strategy partly accounted for an increase in circulation of *World Journal* in the mid-1980s. In addition to journalists, eighty per cent of advertising staff in *World Journal* was from Hong Kong, who, as mentioned earlier, played a major role in *World Journal's* adventures in the advertising market in Toronto.²²

7.1.2.4 Circulation

Circulation was another area in which Chinese newspapers competed with each another. Four main strategies can be identified.

Geographic extension As mentioned earlier, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, *Sing Tao* extended its circulation networks beyond old Chinatowns and into Scarborough and many other areas. This strategy was soon followed by other Chinese newspapers.²³

Morning distribution Chinese newspapers were sold exclusively on newsstands before 1989. Distributing early, therefore, was important to increase circulation. In the first half of the 1980s, all Chinese newspapers went to the streets in the afternoon. When *Chinese Canadian News Daily* was published in Toronto in 1984, it changed its distribution time to 10:00 in the morning.²⁴ This practice was followed soon by *Sing Tao*. Later on, *World Journal* also changed to morning distribution.

Home delivery In 1989, *World Journal* started to accept subscriptions and deliver the paper to homes.²⁵ This practice was especially welcome by Chinese readers who lived in areas where retail points were not nearby, and by senior people who had difficulty going to news-stands. *Sing Tao* soon adopted the practice.

Reader rewards One of the strategies used by *China Times* was to reward readers who purchased the paper. This practice attracted many Chinese readers and challenged *World Journal* for a while. However, no newspapers seemed to follow it, probably due to high cost.²⁶

* * * * *

Three observations can be made from our discussion about competition strategies adopted by Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the 1980s. First, because of their marginal

position in the market, local Chinese newspapers, except for a short time in the early stage, were not able to compete with transnational Chinese newspapers. Second, when *Sing Tao* started publication in Toronto, it had some innovative measures to compete with local papers, such as developing local news reporting and extending circulation network, as well as producing the paper locally as discussed in the last chapter. Nevertheless, when it became a dominant power in the market, it largely lost its enthusiasm about innovations and shifted its strategies mainly to restrict competition. If there were any changes in the paper, in large part they resulted from following other newspapers. The case of *Sing Tao* implied that a dominant position in market might be related to less innovation in competition. Third, Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers were relatively active in competition, producing many innovations and changes in the 1980s. This active role was a result of their market positions. On the one hand, these newspapers usually had a strong financial backing from home offices and could stand a loss for a relatively long period. On the other hand, the small number of Taiwan immigrants and businesses, the existence of several similar newspapers, and the *Sing Tao*'s domination contributed to their difficult situations in Toronto. They had to work harder to capture a share of the market and to survive as a viable business. It was the competition of these newspapers that produced innovations and changes during the period.

7.1.3 Consequences of Competition in the 1980s

The competition among Chinese newspapers in the 1980s proved to be a boon for readers and the Chinese community. News stories, especially those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Mainland China, increased significantly. Distribution networks of newspaper

extended throughout Toronto area and southern Ontario, while time of newspaper distribution gradually shifted from afternoon to morning. Growing advertising provided crucial revenues for the survival of newspapers, and also promoted development of ethnic Chinese businesses in Toronto.

Another consequence was that the number of Chinese newspapers was reduced to three (see Table 7-1 and 7-2). All three local Chinese newspapers ceased publication in 1989, while three Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers, *China Times*, *International Daily News* and *Centre Daily News*, closed their offices in Toronto in 1984, 1986 and 1989, respectively, and only *Sing Tao*, *World Journal* and *Sing Pao* continued to publish in Toronto. Obviously, the local papers were closed down because of their lack of ability to survive in the competitive market. Although this led to the claim of unfair competition from these newspapers, their closing raised standards of journalism of Chinese newspapers in Toronto as a whole. The retreat of three Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers can be attributed to various reasons.²⁷ However, their continuous difficulties in capturing a share of the market undoubtedly played a role in their final departure.

Toward the end of the 1980s, largely as a result of competition, a new newspaper market structure emerged. Because of the marginal position of *Sing Pao*, the market was actually controlled by two newspapers, *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*. The new structure was characterised by both unbalanced and stable situations. The structure was unbalanced because *Sing Tao* had a majority share of the market in terms of both circulation and advertising, while *World Journal* held much smaller share compared with *Sing Tao*. In the meantime, this structure was stable because *Sing Tao*, despite being dominant in Toronto, could not replace *World Journal* due to the fact that Taiwan immigrants, to whom *World*

Journal mainly targeted, was not attracted by *Sing Tao* because of their interest in Taiwan and some linguistic differences.²⁸ For *World Journal*, an impetus for challenging *Sing Tao* diminished with its gradual domination in the Taiwan immigrant market, a consequence of the closing of other Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers. Both newspapers dominated separate segments of the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto, though of different size. The structure remained unchanged throughout the late 1980s until 1993, when *Ming Pao* entered the Toronto market.

7.2 Chinese Newspapers and Competition in Toronto: the 1990s

After 1993, the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto underwent rapid restructuring. With the publication of *Ming Pao*, *Sing Tao* lost its dominant position, and the majority of market was equally shared by *Sing Tao* and its rival *Ming Pao*. Because the two papers targeted the same segments of market, newspaper competition during this period became much more intense than that in the 1980s, thus greatly promoting the development of Chinese newspapers in Toronto.

7.2.1 The Structure of Chinese Newspaper Market in Toronto after 1993

The unbalanced but stable newspaper market structure in the late 1980s led to a decline of competition among Chinese newspapers in Toronto. My fieldwork found that, during 1989 to 1992, there was not much improvement in news reporting, advertising service and circulation. On the contrary, Toronto's Chinese business circle was increasingly discontented with Chinese newspapers, especially with *Sing Tao*, for their poor service in advertising, obviously a result of their dominant positions in the market

(Lu, 1993: 62).

However, the Chinese newspaper market underwent dramatic restructuring after 1993, when *Ming Pao*, another major Hong Kong newspaper, entered the Toronto market. By 1996, *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao* held virtually equal shares, which made up about 83 per cent of the total market, with *World Journal* having the rest of the market share (Li and Li, 1999: 56). *Sing Pao* was driven out in 1994 when even a marginal position was difficult to maintain.²⁹ During this period, while the number of Chinese newspapers remained unchanged and barriers to entry was high, Chinese newspapers experienced fiercer competition than in the 1980s. The intensifying competition resulted largely from the fact that *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao* were competing for the same market segments, a “genuine competition” by industrial standards (Siegel, 1981: 107). The homogeneity of newspapers, in terms of their backgrounds and market targets, was in large part responsible for the intense competition, which led to many significant changes in Chinese newspapers in Toronto.

7.2.2 Competition: *Ming Pao*

In the last chapter, I discussed *Ming Pao*'s entry into the Toronto market in light of capital investment, which can be regarded as part of competition. In addition to the capital investment, *Ming Pao* challenged the existing Chinese newspapers, mainly *Sing Tao*, in almost every field of newspaper operations. Many of the challenges appeared in the form of innovations and changes. Although the competition was largely head-on, *Ming Pao* also sought out new markets in the larger society rather than took away each other's customers. Here I examine the competition in four major fields: recruitment, news reporting,

advertising and circulation.

7.2.2.1 Recruitment

When *Ming Pao* set up its branch office in Toronto in the spring of 1993, its first action was to hire away a number of *Sing Tao*'s key employees. Notable among them were Richard Yao, *Sing Tao*'s general manager; Chan Hin Ying, an editor; Stanley Ng, advertising manager; and Allen Leung, business development manager. They filled the same roles at the new paper (Police, 1994: 13).³⁰

Implications of this action were significant. It was the first successful challenge of *Ming Pao* to *Sing Tao*, because these employees represented the best management, journalists and advertising staffs in Chinese newspapers in Toronto. Over years they had been major players in the *Sing Tao*'s successful story. Their departure, especially turning to a rival paper, at least for a short period, greatly weakened *Sing Tao*'s strength in competing with *Ming Pao*. It also suggested that, from the very beginning, *Ming Pao* attempted to recruit experienced management, journalists and advertising staffs, which was demonstrated later to be crucial for its success in competition with the well-established *Sing Tao*. Actually, most employees recruited in the first year had been working in newspapers or other media.³¹

Ming Pao's high reputation as a newspaper which appeals to the educated in Hong Kong and its potential success in Toronto due to a large capital investment partly accounted for its successful recruitment in Toronto. In addition, two factors should be considered as well. First, internal conflicts within other newspapers provided opportunities for *Ming Pao*'s recruitment. For instance, *Sing Tao*'s management for years enjoyed

generous bonuses associated with profits of the paper. When the head office in Hong Kong ordered a decrease of bonus rate, resentment grew among the management (Lu, 1993: 61). The displeasure was further augmented by the establishment of North American Management Office in Vancouver; the office had authority over all *Sing Tao's* branches throughout North America on behalf of the head office, but, according to a former *Sing Tao's* staff, the new management in Vancouver had little knowledge about newspaper operation overseas.³² In *World Journal*, some staff, especially those from Hong Kong, were not comfortable with the working environment there, which was characterised by a somewhat rigorous hierarchy.³³ These conflicts made many people in the two newspapers uneasy but they did not leave as there was no other attractive alternatives. The coming of *Ming Pao* was just in the right time, and therefore the paper easily recruited a number of employees from *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*. Second, newspaper competition in the 1980s also benefited *Ming Pao*. When several Chinese newspapers folded in the late 1980s, many journalists and other newspaper staff lost their jobs. The publication of *Ming Pao* provided with them an opportunity to go back to newspaper careers. For instance, with the closing of *The Chinese Canadian Daily News* in 1989, its former edit-in-chief had no full time job and had to work in a free distributed weekly to make a living. When *Ming Pao* started publishing in Toronto, he managed to obtain a position in the editorial department of the paper.³⁴ In sum, the availability of some unemployed journalists and internal problems of other Chinese newspapers, as well as its high reputation and large investments, helped *Ming Pao* in its successful recruitment.

7.2.2.2 News reporting

Like elsewhere in North America, editorial contents in Toronto's Chinese newspapers contained those produced by home offices in Hong Kong or Taiwan and those produced locally. Before the mid-1980s, almost all editorial content was from home offices and local news constituted a very small proportion. In the later half of the 1980s, partly because of competition, local editorial contents increased to two to four pages on the average. With the publication of *Ming Pao*, locally produced editorial content, including local news reporting, business, sports and supplement, constituted about 10 to 12 pages in all three newspapers and became one of the most competitive areas.³⁵ Here I focus on local news reporting (both the Chinese community and the larger society) and examine how *Ming Pao* competed with other Chinese newspapers in this respect.

In local news reporting, the most important strategy adopted by *Ming Pao* was to emphasise on the large society and its interaction with the Chinese community. The adoption of this strategy, of course, reflected market demand. With a large number of young and educated Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong after the late 1980s, there had been increased demand for information concerning the Canadian society as well as its relations with the Chinese community. More importantly, this strategy was a direct result of competition. While *Sing Tao* and *World Journal* had local coverage, most of it was about activities of local Chinese associations and kinship organisations.³⁶ News about the larger society, if it existed, was almost entirely translated from English newspapers.³⁷ Obviously, the contents and format of local coverage became increasingly outdated in the early 1990, given the changes of compositions of the Chinese community in Toronto. With a focus on the larger society and its interactions with the Chinese community, *Ming Pao* could produce a fresh image of Chinese newspaper, thus putting the paper in a

favourable position in competition with *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*.

Ming Pao's first action in this regard was the establishment of correspondents who were responsible primarily for news reporting about the larger society. In 1993, it sent a correspondent to the Parliamentary Press Gallery in Ottawa to report news about the federal government and the Parliament.³⁸ It sent another reporter to the city of Toronto to cover news about the city. The reporter soon moved to the council of Metro Toronto, and finally stationed in the press gallery in Queens Park, the Provincial Legislative Assembly of Ontario.³⁹ *Ming Pao*'s practice was the first time not only in the history of Chinese press in Canada, but also, probably, in the history of ethnic press in Canada. These reporters provided Chinese readers with first-hand reporting from the federal and provincial levels, which began to change a long-time practice - only translating news items from English newspapers.⁴⁰ These reporters also reported Canadian news from Asian and Asian-Canadian perspective, which was more relevant to Chinese immigrants in Toronto.⁴¹

In reporting news about the larger society and its interactions with the Chinese community, *Ming Pao* showed several significant changes. One, it dedicated more space to these news stories than other Chinese newspapers. For example, in June 1995, Carole Bell, the deputy mayor of Markham and regional councillor for York Region, warned at a Council retreat that growing concentration of ethnic groups was causing conflict and prompting some residents to move out of Markham (Li, 1998: 147). Bell's statement led to a strong protest from the Chinese community, and *Ming Pao* closely followed the incident and published many news items and comments about it. From August 19 to August 30, when the protest was in high tide, a total of 51 news items and comments were

published in *Ming Pao*, an average of nearly 5 items per day. During the same period, *Sing Tao* published 41 items and *World Journal* 32.⁴²

Two, *Ming Pao* pioneered to publish in-depth and serial reporting among Chinese newspapers in Toronto. For instance, during 1995 Ontario provincial election, *Ming Pao* spent at least 31 full pages to deal with the election, topics ranging from policy comparison of three parties, detailed background of three party leaders, information about 24 election districts in the Greater Toronto Area where the Chinese were concentrated, to candidates with Chinese ethnic background (*Ming Pao*, April 27-June 21, 1995). Much of the reporting was analytical and produced through direct contact with politicians.⁴³ Similar reporting was done on Prime Minister Jean Chretien's visit to China in 1994 (*Ming Pao*, October 11-November 8, 1994) and the 1995 referendum in Quebec (*Ming Pao*, September 12-October 23, 1995), among others. This kind of in-depth reporting was absent before the coming of *Ming Pao*.

Three, *Ming Pao* in large part maintained a critical attitude toward English language media, and this was especially true in affairs related to the Chinese community. For instance, on Aug. 24, 1995, three English language newspapers in Toronto, *Global and Mail*, *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun*, published long reports or editorials concerning the Bell incident.⁴⁴ By the next day, *Ming Pao* published a article to challenge the English media (*Ming Pao*, August 25, 1995). According to *Ming Pao*, the English media focused on social conflict resulting from the development of Chinese malls, but hardly mentioned the positive contributions of Chinese investments to Markham economy. *Ming Pao* particularly criticised a *Toronto Star's* report, in which Bell claimed that her statement reflected the opinion of the larger society. According to *Ming Pao*, Bell's statement was

by no means representative because ethnic groups were excluded from her “larger society”, and *Toronto Star* just reported it without analysing or commenting on it. *Ming Pao*’s critical attitude toward the English media reflected a significant development in the Chinese press in Canada. Earlier, Chinese newspapers not only heavily relied on English language newspapers as major news sources, but took their reporting and editorials as authoritative and often accepted without analysis.⁴⁵ The situation remained largely unchanged for some Chinese newspapers even during the mid-1990s. The same day *Ming Pao* published its criticism, *World Journal* translated and published the editorials from *Toronto Star* and *Toronto Sun* without any comments (*World Journal*, August 25, 1995). There was no doubt that the *Ming Pao*’s strategy attracted more recent Chinese immigrants who are more educated and therefore more sensitive to any racial bias.

Although *Ming Pao* attempted to create a Chinese newspaper with emphasis on reporting the larger society and its interactions with the Chinese community, it also paid much attention to the local Chinese community. In this respect, *Ming Pao* showed two distinctive characteristics, among others. First, *Ming Pao* selected local community news based on importance of issues instead of personalities. Like elsewhere in North America, some Chinese community leaders in Toronto liked to supply information that reflected well on themselves, while Chinese newspapers usually opened doors to what Gans called “publicity seekers” in exchange for good community relations (1980: 122).⁴⁶ Generally speaking, *Ming Pao* objected to helping publicity seekers and tried hard to avoid public-relation personnel who were paid by someone else to be sources.⁴⁷ Although this practice led to complaints from some local community leaders, *Ming Pao* did not yield to the pressure.⁴⁸

Second, compared with other Chinese newspapers in Toronto, *Ming Pao* was relatively open in reporting local Chinese crime in particular and the negative side of the Chinese community in general. The case of Wang Jiehua may provide a good example.⁴⁹ In 1997, Wang, a refugee claimant from China, was arrested by the RCMP and charged with fraud in China. *Sing Tao* published a report of the case immediately, in which Wang was described as an innocent. The story was based totally on Wang's personal account. *Ming Pao* also followed the case closely. After several investigations, including a personal interview with Wang's parents-in-law and a telephone interview with the Chinese officials, *Ming Pao* confirmed that the RCMP charge was based on the facts and Wang was indeed a criminal wanted by the Chinese authorities. This case suggested that *Ming Pao* had no intention to cover up the negative side of the Chinese community, which, by and large, was the normal practice of other Chinese newspapers in Toronto. More importantly, by reporting negative stories of the community, *Ming Pao* attempted to create an image that the paper was not a narrow-minded ethnic community newspaper but a highly professional Canadian newspaper in Chinese. With these strategies *Ming Pao* tried to raise its journalistic reputation, thereby helping its competition with other Chinese newspapers.

As just noted, to a considerable extent the strategies adopted by *Ming Pao* were shaped by the Chinese newspaper competition in Toronto. The question, then, is, why *Ming Pao* was able to make these changes. Without doubt, *Ming Pao*'s stronger financial support in editorial matters than other newspapers was significant.⁵⁰ Many of *Ming Pao*'s practices, such as assigning two correspondents to Ottawa and the Queens Park, using overseas telephone interviews, and so on, were costly. It is impossible for a paper to do so

without a strong financial backing. In addition, several other factors might play a role. First, *Ming Pao* had some journalists once working in the English media. For instance, the first news editor had worked in Associated Press and *Financial Post* for many years before joining *Ming Pao* in 1993.⁵¹ The second news editor was a former reporter in *Hong Kong Standard*, an English language newspaper in Hong Kong.⁵² This experience not only formed their perceptions of journalism in a wider context, but also made it possible for them to work in English speaking society and deal with the English language media. Second, the management and editorial people in *Ming Pao* were relatively new immigrants and most of them came to Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁵³ These recent immigrants often lacked extended connections with the community. But it is this fact that made them less influenced by community relations and handle local news more freely. Third, the distinctive newspaper structure of *Ming Pao* helped to reduce the possibility of management interference with editorial contents. Unlike *Sing Tao* or *World Journal* where a manager or business-oriented director was in charge, Toronto's *Ming Pao* was headed by both a general manager and an editor-in-chief who were responsible for their respective areas and had no authority to interfere with one another.⁵⁴ This organisational structure made it possible for editorial personnel to select news independently, though pressure from advertising department was always present.

7.2.2.3 Advertising

In advertising, *Ming Pao* had at least two significant developments which aimed at taking away *Sing Tao* and, to a lesser extent, *World Journal's* customers. First, *Ming Pao* created an advertising team with ten salespersons, which was about five times that of *Sing*

Tao's during that time.⁵⁵ Unlike *Sing Tao* where advertising staffs were salary-based, *Ming Pao's* salespersons were commission-based, and the system inspired them to work harder and to be more aggressive than salary-based staffs in competition.⁵⁶ The similar system, as noted earlier, was also adopted by *World Journal* in 1986. However, *Ming Pao* was much stricter in recruitment in terms of salespersons' English ability and professional styles than *World Journal*.⁵⁷ Second, *Ming Pao* published three free weekly magazines: *the Sunday Supplement*, *the Saturday Magazine* and *the Property Golden Pages*. The publication of *the Sunday Supplement* was to take up the Sunday market where *Sing Tao* gave up. *The Saturday magazine* was to compete with *Sing Tao* in the Saturday market, where, although *Sing Tao* had its highest circulation of the week, it did not have a magazine. So *Ming Pao's* magazine would take away some readers and advertisers. *The Property Golden Pages* represented *Ming Pao's* other effort to increase advertising dollars in real estate to which, despite rising demands, *Sing Tao* did not pay enough attention.⁵⁸

These developments were well planned and they especially attacked the weaknesses of *Sing Tao*. With these new developments, *Ming Pao* did capture a share of advertising market from its rivals. According to my fieldwork, many of *Sing Tao's* customers jumped to *Ming Pao* or purchased advertising space from both papers, though the exact figures were unavailable.⁵⁹ *World Journal* lost about 30 to 40 per cent of advertising revenue in the first year after the publication of *Ming Pao*.⁶⁰

Although the head-on competition accounted for much of what was happening in the market after 1993, *Ming Pao* also sought out new markets in the larger society rather than only take away others' customers.

Chinese newspapers had a long history in obtaining advertising revenues from the

larger society. In the early times, major advertising revenues of such kind came mainly from the various sectors of government when they advertised in the ethnic press (Royal Commission, 1969: 181). In the 1980s, commercial advertising from the larger society began to enter Chinese newspapers.⁶¹ However, the advertising grew very slowly. By 1993 when *Ming Pao* published in Toronto, advertising revenues from the larger society accounted for less than 10 per cent of the total advertising revenues for *Sing Tao*, and they were even lower for *World Journal*.⁶² The situation had much to do with the fact that Canadian businesses had little information about the booming ethnic community in Toronto. It should be, in part, blamed on Chinese newspapers themselves: they competed bitterly with one another for advertising from Chinese businesses, but hardly exploited the advertising market in the larger society. *Ming Pao* was the first Chinese newspaper in Toronto to change the situation and to shift advertising focus from local Chinese businesses to non-Chinese businesses in the larger society. In doing so, *Ming Pao* adopted three major strategies: working with advertising agencies, sponsoring surveys and establishing joint ventures.

Ming Pao sent half of its sales force to establish contacts with major Canadian advertising agencies in Toronto.⁶³ Rotenberg pointed out (1986: 21): in Canada, “although many advertisers conceive, design, and produce campaigns within their own organisations, most major Canadian advertisers employ the services of an advertising agency that specialises in the development, production, and placement of advertising messages.” So working with advertising agencies was the most efficient way to cut into the advertising market. As one former advertising staff of *Ming Pao* put it: “You are only working with one agency, but your potential customers might be over one hundred.”⁶⁴

Ming Pao also played a significant role in promoting various surveys about Chinese newspaper readership and Chinese consuming power in Toronto. Rotenberg pointed out (1986: 164): "Advertising budgets are limited, so decision as to which media to use must be made on objective data, rather than by feel or personal likes or dislikes." To provide the larger society with reliable data, from 1993 to 1998, *Ming Pao* sponsored at least five surveys concerning Chinese media and consumers in Toronto.⁶⁵ The most influential of them was conducted in 1996 by DJC Research, a division of AC Nielsen company. This survey not only provided the most extensive information about media usage and consuming patterns in the Toronto Chinese community, but also produced favourable results for *Ming Pao*.⁶⁶ The results led to a debate among the Chinese press about the accuracy of DJC research.⁶⁷ In spite of that, this research appeared to be accepted by the larger society due to its syndicated service nature and because AC Nielsen is the largest information-based market research company in the world (Rotenberg, 1986: 168).⁶⁸

Finally, *Ming Pao* established joint ventures with two Canadian publishers to build up its reputation in the larger society. For instance, in 1995 *Ming Pao* established a joint venture with *Toronto Life* to publish the *Toronto Life* Chinese edition (Canadian Press Newswire, September 28, 1995). It also published *The Chinese Yellow Pages* in a joint venture with Tele-Direct Services Inc., publisher of the mainstream Yellow pages in Ontario (*The Globe and Mail*, Jan. 19, 1996). These publications were not necessary to bring in large advertising revenues for *Ming Pao* because of the limited frequency of publication (one monthly and the other yearly) and that publication expenses were mainly covered by *Ming Pao*'s partners.⁶⁹ The reason *Ming Pao* joined these ventures was that it attempted to exploit these big names to build its reputation in the larger society, which in

turn would help develop its advertising customers there. As an executive of *Ming Pao* put it: "We want the mainstream society to know us. Both publications (*Toronto Life* and *Yellow Page*) are of high quality, and [establishing joint venture with them] would help us reach this goal."⁷⁰

In focusing on advertising from the larger society, *Ming Pao* tried hard to convince Canadian businesses that the Chinese community was booming and *Ming Pao* was the best vehicle to reach the market. In doing so, it established extended connections through working with advertising agencies in the larger society. It also followed a common practice in the Canadian society by providing advertisers with factual information. Finally it attempted to increase its reputation in the larger society by establishing joint ventures with respectable publishers. To a considerable extent these strategies worked out. As our content analysis suggests, by 1996, advertising revenues from the larger society were estimated to account for almost a half of *Ming Pao*'s total advertising revenues (Li and Li, 1999: 53). *Ming Pao*'s initiations in this area also benefited other Chinese newspapers as the pie was enlarged.

7.2.2.4 Circulation

Despite increased subscription of Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the 1990s, street sales remained the bulk of newspaper circulation. For instance, in 1995 street sales accounted for about 84 per cent of newspaper circulation for *Ming Pao*, about 95 per cent for *Sing Tao* and about 91 for *World Journal* (*Ethnic Media and market*, Summer/fall, 1996: 10-11). In addition, the circulation network of the three Chinese newspapers largely overlapped: most news-stands sold all the three newspapers, which lay side by side and

competed for Chinese readers. *Ming Pao* initiated several new developments to promote its street sales. For example, *Ming Pao* was the first Chinese newspaper in Toronto to decide to distribute newspaper at 7:00 in the morning, which was about three hours earlier than *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*.⁷¹ Without doubt, earlier distribution could increase the possibility of selling more copies due to earlier availability. Another development was that *Ming Pao* made front pages more attractive: attention-grabbing headlines, big pictures, among others.⁷² Because Chinese readers had choices at news-stands, a more attractive front page would also increase the possibility of selling more newspaper copies.

7.2.3 Response from *Sing Tao* and *World Journal*

The publication of *Ming Pao* in 1993 shocked the Chinese newspaper market in Toronto. *Ming Pao*'s competing strategies and innovations were not piecemeal like what we found in 1980s, but challenged the Chinese newspapers in all major fields: recruitment, news reporting, advertising and circulation. In the face of *Ming Pao*'s competition, what *Sing Tao* and *World Journal* first did was to work together to restrain the expansion of *Ming Pao*. However, *Sing Tao* soon put an emphasis on improving itself and attempted to match *Ming Pao* in all areas. *World Journal* largely took no action, though it changed somewhat. These responses constituted a dynamic process of newspaper competition in the market.

7.2.3.1 A collective action: checking *Ming Pao*

When *Ming Pao* began publishing in Toronto in 1993, the first response from the other three Chinese newspapers was a collective action: *Sing Tao*, *World Journal* and *Sing*

Pao united to check *Ming Pao*'s expansion. In an unplanned meeting of management from the three newspapers, three agreements were reached: 1. The three newspapers should boycott any community sponsorship in which *Ming Pao* participate. On the contrary, the three should join to support any community festivals or activities if one of the three was requested to do so, as long as *Ming Pao* was not invited. 2. Special discounts should be offered to any advertisers who bought space in the three newspapers. 3. The firm to which the three papers contracted out delivery operation was not allowed to distribute *Ming Pao*; otherwise, the contract would be discontinued.⁷³ The agreements were maintained at least until 1996.⁷⁴

Three points should be noted about the collective action. First, the collective boycott reflected the fact that all three Chinese newspapers were disturbed as a result of the coming of *Ming Pao*. The impact was so great that these former competitors had to work together against the new rival. Second, this boycott was to deal with competition by restricting competition. Although this kind of strategy was often used by entrepreneurs in competition (Wong, 1988: 109-110), it did not produce any innovations in the development of Chinese newspapers in Toronto. Third, although the three newspapers joined the action, it appeared that they had different agenda behind it. *Sing Tao* used the boycott to win time to prepare new developments, while *World Journal* and *Sing Pao* simply wanted to reduce the loss resulting from *Ming Pao*'s entry. In sum, the collective boycott suggested a new change in the market, but the boycott itself was not a sign of the new change.

7.2.3.2 Response from *Sing Tao*

As noted in the last chapter, right after *Ming Pao*'s publication in Toronto, *Sing Tao* invested about \$6-7 million in plant, colour printers and other facilities. Meanwhile, the size of the newspaper organisation expanded from less than 60 staff to about 100. All these were *Sing Tao*'s response to *Ming Pao*'s challenges. In addition, *Sing Tao* also responded to *Ming Pao*'s challenges in circulation, news reporting and advertising.

In circulation, *Sing Tao* moved up paper distributing to 7:00 in the morning as had *Ming Pao*.⁷⁵ It was interesting to note that *Sing Tao* made the change right after *Ming Pao* declared its plan of earlier distribution; the change actually occurred before *Ming Pao* officially published in Toronto. Soon *Sing Pao* also published on Sunday, a market which it gave up before.

In news reporting, *Sing Tao* increased coverage about the larger society. It also assigned a reporter to the Queens Park to cover news about the Ontario Government and Legislative Assembly, though the decision was made one year later than *Ming Pao*.⁷⁶ However, as my field work indicated, in several important events in 1995, such as the provincial election of Ontario, the Bell incident, and the Quebec referendum, in-depth reporting in *Sing Tao* was still relatively less than in *Ming Pao*.⁷⁷

In advertising, what *Sing Tao* first did was to improve its relations with the Chinese advertisers, which had been somewhat damaged because of *Sing Tao*'s bad service. In a letter to Chinese advertisers, community associations and readers in May 1993, *Sing Tao* admitted its shortcomings in advertising services, and expressed its willingness to any criticisms and suggestions in this respect (*Sing Tao*, 1993). Given that *Sing Tao* was still in a dominant position that time, such a humble attitude indicated that the paper realised a serious challenge from *Ming Pao* and tried hard to maintain its

position in the market. To keep its customers, *Sing Tao* declared larger discount rates for all advertisers (Lu, 1993: 61). It also followed *Ming Pao* to exploit market opportunities in the larger society. To build up its name in the larger society, *Sing Tao* established joint venture with *Maclean's* to distribute a Chinese-language edition of this magazine (Canadian Press Newswire, September 28, 1995). It also donated \$1 million to the University of British Columbia to build the *Sing Tao* School of Journalism (*British Columbia Report*, August 19, 1996). Here, it is also interesting to note that the first Chinese-language edition of *Toronto Life* was published in September 29, 1995 (*Ming Pao*, September, 29, 1995), while the first Chinese-language edition of *Maclean's* was distributed in Oct. 7, 1995 (*The Global and Mail*, September 28, 1995). The closeness of the date for two publications might be a coincidence, but it implied that *Sing Tao* followed *Ming Pao* closely and attempted to match its rival as fast as possible.

Although *Sing Tao* mostly followed the wake of *Ming Pao*, it had its own innovations. Two among them are noteworthy. First, in 1995 *Sing Tao* set up a radio station (530 Radio) in Toronto and began broadcasting 34 hours a week in Cantonese. The station had wide coverage and mainly targeted the second generation of Chinese who were not able to read Chinese but could understand spoken Cantonese.⁷⁸ Second, *Sing Tao* had two English pages, one for international news and the other for financial news, the latter being provided by the *Financial Post*. These two pages also attempted to appeal to Chinese readers who preferred reading in English to reading in Chinese.⁷⁹ These innovations suggested that *Sing Pao* also attempted to open new markets in competition with *Ming Pao*.

These responses indicated that some significant changes were happening in *Sing*

Tao after 1993. Not only did it publish more and better news stories, it provided better circulation and advertising services. The establishment of radio station was especially significant; *Sing Tao* was the first Chinese newspaper in Toronto to move onto the electronic media. The radio broadcasting was not only an expansion of the market, but also implied that cross-media ownership first appeared in the market.⁸⁰ However, unlike *Ming Pao* that initiated many developments which had never been seen in the market, *Sing Tao's* responses were in large part to reproduce what *Ming Pao* had done. The less innovative approach might be explained by two factors. First, *Sing Tao's* changes were not voluntary but driven by *Ming Pao's* invasion, which accounted for the passive reaction of the paper. Second, as my interview with the management of *Sing Tao* suggested, all these changes *Sing Tao* made were to maintain its leading position in the market.⁸¹ This mentality largely determined the extent to which *Sing Pao* would go: where its leading position was threatened, it would take action to change; otherwise, it might not. *Sing Tao's* case suggests that, even when facing a serious challenge, a newspaper with a dominant position in the market will still tend to be less innovative than its less powerful rivals.

7.2.3.3 Response from *World Journal*

Facing *Ming Pao's* expansion, *World Journal's* responses were basically conservative. Although it made some improvements, such as moving up distribution time to 7:00 in the morning as *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao* had done, increasing local editorial contents, and so on, for most part it took no action, and sometimes even retreated from competition. For example, it stopped the publication of its weekly magazine when *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao* rushed to create various weekly magazines.⁸² The conservative

responses might be explained by two factors. First, *World Journal* had a relatively protected readership market which was not so much affected by *Ming Pao*'s entry. As a result, the paper largely regarded the ongoing competition as a fight between *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao* and had not much to do with itself. Second, *World Journal*'s advertising market was much less protected than the readership market. With the publication of *Ming Pao*, much advertising from Hong Kong customers was taken away. Taiwan advertisers, who made up the majority of its customers, were relatively loyal to the paper, but some of them were also steered away probably in attempts to receive better market responses in *Ming Pao*.³³ The loss of advertising made *World Journal* to condense its operation in order to cut cost, which resulted in the cancellation of weekly magazine; but it had no intention to compete with the *Ming Pao* as *Sing Tao* did, because competing with *Ming Pao* required large amount of capital investment, but, given the limit of *World Journal*'s market, it was almost impossible to recoup the capital outlay at least in a short time. So it is the market position of *World Journal* that largely shaped its conservative strategies to deal with *Ming Pao* and its differences from *Sing Tao*.

7.2.4 Consequence of competition in the 1990s

Largely as a result of competition after 1993, Chinese readers in Toronto enjoyed the best Chinese newspapers ever published in Canada. News stories from Hong Kong, Taiwan and China increased a great deal, while local coverage, including both the Chinese community and the larger society news, grew from about 3 to 5 pages in 1992 to 9 to 11 pages in the mid-1990s. Newspapers were also supplemented by various free magazines, including Chinese language editions of *Toronto Life* and *Maclean's*. More importantly, by

and large Chinese newspapers improved their journalistic standards in terms of in-depth reporting and critical attitudes towards the English media, among others.

The competition also greatly increased advertising revenues of Chinese newspapers. Initiated by *Ming Pao*, Chinese newspapers started exploiting the advertising market in the larger society, and by the mid-1990s, advertising revenues from non-Chinese sources were estimated to account for almost half of the total advertising revenues in Chinese newspapers in Toronto.

With *Sing Pao*'s closing in 1994, the number of Chinese newspapers in Toronto remained three, and barrier to entry stayed high. However, the newspaper market structure was greatly changed by the rise of *Ming Pao*. Unlike the market structure which was unbalanced but stable before 1993, the new market structure was balanced but unstable. *Sing Tao* no longer had a dominant position and the market was basically shared by *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao*, with *World Journal* controlling a small segment of market. Equal market power by *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao* indicated a balanced structure; however, because both papers targeted the same segments of market, and their market power was sensitive to the changing choices of readers and advertisers. Therefore, the two papers had to continue competing with each other and to make new changes to attract readers and advertisers, thus producing an unstable and dynamic market structure.

7.3 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed competition among Chinese newspapers in Toronto during the last two decades. It has shown that Chinese newspapers competed with each other in all major areas related to newspaper operations. It is the competition that drove

many Chinese newspapers out of market. It is also the competition that greatly improved Chinese newspapers in news reporting, advertising and distribution. To a considerable extent the development of Chinese newspapers in Toronto since the late 1970s was a result of competition.

However, the intensity and role of competition were not similar in the 1980s and 1990s. Compared with the 1980s, competition in the 1990s became much more intense and more significant in improving Chinese newspapers. The situation resulted largely from the changed newspaper market structure in Toronto due to *Ming Pao*'s entry and its competition with *Sing Tao* for the same market segments. The case of Chinese newspapers in Toronto suggests that the publication of homogeneous newspapers was more significant than the number of newspapers and barriers to entry in shaping the intensity of competition and, therefore, in promoting changes in newspaper industry.

Chinese newspapers played various roles in competition over time. When *Sing Tao* first published in Toronto in the late 1970s, it competed with two dominant local newspapers by developing local reporting and distributing networks. It, however, shifted to restrict competition when it became the market power in the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, *World Journal* faced competition from other Taiwan-based Chinese newspapers and domination of *Sing Tao*. To survive in the market, it had to struggle to capture a share of market and initiated some meaningful changes. But, with its domination in the Taiwan immigrant market after 1989, it also largely lost enthusiasm about innovations and changes. *Ming Pao* entered Toronto as newcomer in 1993. Despite being a large Hong Kong-based newspaper, it had to build up readership and advertising while facing the dominant *Sing Tao*. This market position compelled *Ming Pao* to adopt aggressive

strategies to create and increase its market share; otherwise, it could not survive in the market. By the mid-1990s, *Ming Pao* captured almost an equal share as *Sing Tao*, but the unstable market structure, as just noted, and probably the desire of domination, made *Ming Pao* continue to compete with *Sing Tao* by making innovations and changes. It is suggested that newspapers that were well-financed but disadvantaged in market, or that were on the way to be dominant, would play an active role in competition. It is the very existence of these newspapers that largely accounted for the dynamic changes in the Chinese newspapers in Toronto in the last two decades.

Endnotes — Chapter 7

1. Interview, Toronto, August 6, 1997.
2. Interview, Toronto, July 10, 1997.
3. *ibid.*
4. *ibid.*
5. According to Lai (1991: 139), Chan made a fortune in Taiwan as owner of the International College of Commerce; he was also founder of the *Commercial News Journal* in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Lai also observed (*ibid.*: 123): “*International Daily News* claims to be a non-partisan newspaper, its editorials often criticising both the Taiwan Kuomintang and the Chinese government. It was the only Chinese American newspaper to assign a reporter to accompany President Reagan during his visit to China in 1984.”
6. According to Lai (1991: 123), “. . . in the seventies Taiwan authorities forced Fu to sell the paper to a company set up by its defence ministry for alleged sum of several million U.S. dollars. In 1978 he left Taiwan for Hong Kong, where he invested in real estate, and then established *Centre Daily News* in 1980s. In 1982, Chao-chu Fu founded *Centre Daily News* in New York as the North American edition of Hong Kong’s *Centre Daily News*. The newspaper professed a non-partisan stance and advocated unification of the China mainland with Taiwan.” Although *Centre Daily News* was first published in Hong Kong, the paper was a Taiwan newspaper by nature because of Fu’s background and its editorial contents that concerned politics in Taiwan and the Taiwan’s relations with the Mainland China.
7. Interview, Toronto, July 10, 1997.
8. Interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998.
9. Interview, Toronto, August 8, 1998.
10. Lai’s finding was confirmed by my reading of these newspapers published in the 1980s.
11. Interview, Toronto, May 21, 1996; August 5, 1998.
12. Interview, Toronto, July 22, 1997; August 8, 1998.
13. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.
14. According to Lai (1975, cited in Li, 1998: 19-20), many early Chinese immigrants to

Canada came from a limited number of counties near the city of Guangzhou, among them the county of Taishan. Lai estimates that about 23 per cent of the Chinese in British Columbia around 1884-85 originated from Taishan. A random sample from the official General Registers of Chinese Immigration to Canada suggests that as many as 45 per cent of the Chinese entering Canada between 1885 and 1903 came from that county (Ibid.). During two decades after the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act in 1947, Chinese immigrants from Taishan probably still constituted the largest part of new Chinese immigrants due to the fact that most Chinese immigrants came as a family unit (see Chapter 4.1).

15. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

16. *ibid.*

17. Interview, Toronto, August 14, 1997.

18. The practice of accounting executive probably started in Taiwan's *Economic Daily*, part of *The United Daily News*. In the paper the advertising staff not only solicited advertising, but also wrote news stories about its customers in an attempt to establish a rapport with them. The practice reflected intense competition in advertising market in Taiwan. However, *The United Daily News* itself did not adopt this practice for fear of that journalistic standards might be affected. See Wang, 1994: 140-41. Information in this paragraph was from interviews, Toronto, June 23, 1997 and August 5, 1998.

19. Interview, Toronto, June 23, 1997.

20. Interview, Toronto, July 10, 1997.

21. Interview, Toronto, June 23, 1997.

22. Interview, Toronto, July 2, 1997.

23. Interview, Toronto, July 10, 1997.

24. Interview, Toronto, August 8, 1998.

25. Interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998.

26. *ibid.*

27. In 1984, *China Times* abruptly ceased publication without any warning. It was widely speculated that a political struggle in Taiwan Kuomintang was the cause of its demise (Lai, 1990: 119). *International Daily News* stopped publication in Toronto due largely to a financial conflict between the head office and local branch (Gu, 1986: 43). With regard to *Centre Daily News*, Lai observed (1990: 124): "In 1989 Chao-chu Fu voiced support for

the PRC government when it ruthlessly suppressed a democracy movement in Beijing and then subsequently arrested numerous dissidents all over the country. But when he ordered his staff in New York to publish a sympathetic editorial, ten editors resigned in protest. Angry supporters of the China democracy movement also pressured advertisers not to patronise the paper. In July Fu was forced to step down as chairman of the board of Centre Daily News enterprises and chief editor of the paper's New York edition. On September 18, 1989, the management of the paper announced indefinite suspension of publication due to large operating deficits."

28. See Chapter 5.

29. Interview, Toronto, July 7, 1997.

30. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

31. For instance, among four editors and seven reporters recruited in the first year, all but one had some journalist experiences in Canada and/or Hong Kong. Interview, Toronto, July 8 and August 18, 1997.

32. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

33. Interview, Toronto, August 12, 1998.

34. Interview, Toronto, August 18, 1997.

35. Based on calculation of sampled Chinese newspapers in 1997.

36. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

37. *ibid.*

38. Interview, Toronto, May 22, 1996.

39. Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997.

40. Research has noticed that ethnic press in Canada relied almost exclusively or mainly on translations from English-and French-language papers. For example, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism pointed out (1969: 179): "Because of lack of staff and financial resources, ethnic publications must rely mainly on secondary sources of information on national and international affairs. The major secondary sources of such information are weekly news magazines and English- and French-language dailies and weeklies. Local news is generally taken from local newspapers."

41. For instance, before and during the Prime Minister's visit to China in 1994, *Ming Pao* published many news stories about the visit, some of them being exclusive, such as inside

stories about a contract that could be worth as much as \$3 billion to sell two Candu nuclear reactors to China. Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997. Also see *Ming Pao*, 1994, October 11 to November 8.

42. Based on calculation of news items concerning the incident in three Chinese newspapers during the period.

43. Interview, Toronto, May 22, 1996.

44. *Global and Mail*, August 24, 1995; *Toronto Star*, August 24, 1995; *Toronto Sun*, August 24, 1995.

45. Interview, Toronto, August 12, 1998.

46. *ibid.*

47. *ibid.*

48. *ibid.*

49. Interview, Toronto, August 15, 1997; August 6, 1998.

50. *Ming Pao's* stronger financial support in editorial can be seen from its journalist numbers compared with those in other two Chinese newspapers. In 1997, *Ming Pao* had 40 editorial staff; *Sing Tao*, 25; *World Journal*, 14. The data were from interview, Toronto, July 29, 1997; August 7, 1997; and August 22, 1997.

51. Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997.

52. Interview, Toronto, August 12, 1998.

53. Although there were several managers and major editorial persons who were long-time immigrants in the early time of *Ming Pao*, most of them left the paper after 1994 for various reasons. Afterwards, *Ming Pao's* major editorial persons were recent immigrants from Hong Kong. For instance, *Ming Pao's* second edit-in-chief (1994-1996) immigrated to Canada in 1989, and third edit-in-chief (since 1996) came to Canada in 1995. Interview, Toronto, July 30, 1997 and correspondence with July Lin, May 13, 1999.

54. Interview, Toronto, July 29, 1997.

55. *Sing Tao* hired about eight advertising staff members in 1993 when *Ming Pao* started publication in Toronto. However, only two of them involved outside sales, and the rest was doing office service. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

56. *ibid.*

57. *ibid.*

58. *ibid.*

59. *ibid.*

60. Interview, Toronto, July 9, 1997.

61. Interview, Toronto, May 25, 1996.

62. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998; June 23, 1997.

63. Interview, Toronto, August 19, 1998.

64. *ibid.*

65. The five surveys were as followings: (1) A survey on the Chinese readership profile in the Metro Toronto area (November 1993, DJC); (2) A survey on the Chinese consumer in Canada (August 1994, DJC); (3) Attitudes of Chinese Canadian in GTA towards Tele-direct Chinese Yellow Pages (January 1996, Environcs); (4) Chinese media index (September to October 1996, DJC); (5) 1998 Chinese Canadian media review (May to June 1998, Angus Reid Group). Data are from *Ming Pao*, 1996: 4-7; Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997; *Ming Pao*, September 12, 1998, D1.

66. For example, according to *Ming Pao's* report (November 27, 1996), DJC's research showed that *Ming Pao* had the lion's share of readership over all other Chinese newspapers and magazine. In terms of cumulative number of Chinese newspaper read in the past week, *Ming Pao* was higher than *Sing Tao* by 35 per cent and higher than *World Journal* by almost 400 per cent.

67. For detailed information about the debate, see Tong Xinshong, 1996: 12-17.

68. According to Rotenberg (1986: 158-159), there are two types of marketing research: customer-designed study and syndicated service. A custom-design study is a piece of ad hoc research developed by or for individual advertiser to provide information on specific aspects of its advertising program, while a syndicated service is available from a research house or group that perform research for several sponsors, providing for the most part the same data to all subscribers. The DJC research adopted a method of syndicated service. The research had many sponsors, including both *Ming Pao* and *Sing Tao*, which probably made the research design unlikely to be favourable to any individual sponsor. Partly because of syndicated service nature, the DJC research was widely reported by the English media and purchased by some Canadian companies interested in the Chinese market. See *Marketing Magazine*, 1996: 3.

69. Interview, Toronto, June 30, 1997.

70. Interview, Toronto, August 10, 1998.
71. Interview, Toronto, May 22, 1996.
72. Interview, Toronto, August 10, 1998.
73. Interview, Toronto, August 5, 1998.
74. *ibid.*
75. Interview, Toronto, July 22, 1997.
76. Interview, Toronto, June 26, 1997.
77. *ibid.*; Interview, Toronto, August 21, 1997.
78. Interview, Toronto, August 12, 1997.
79. Interview, Toronto, May 29, 1996.
80. For a discussion about cross-media ownership, see Hackett, 1990: 65-66.
81. Interview, Toronto, August 7, 1997.
82. Interview, Toronto, May 23, 1996.
83. This analysis is based on interview, Toronto, July 9, 1997.

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has examined Chinese newspapers in Canada as a business over the past two decades. It employed several methodologies to collect data, including fieldwork research, statistical analysis, documentary research of historical data, and content analysis. An analysis of the data confirms this study's initial argument that the changes in market, capital, and competition have played an important role in the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s.

8.1 Summary

The development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s has been significant. For instance, the claimed daily circulation of Chinese newspapers increased more than eighteen times between 1969 and 1997.¹ Chinese newspapers have also expanded in organisational size and advanced in employment of modern technologies. In addition, the contents of the newspapers have become extensive and diversified, the appearance has become colourful and attractive, and advertising costs have declined. Today the Chinese newspapers in Canada are no longer small ethnic community newspapers but subsidiaries of giant transnational Chinese newspapers based in Asia.

How have changes in economic conditions such as market, capital, and competition, played an important role in promoting the recent development of Chinese newspapers? The findings of this study show that the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada is related to changes in the Canadian Chinese newspaper market since the 1970s. The evidence presented in Chapter 5 regarding the Chinese newspaper market, including both readership and advertising, suggests that the Chinese newspaper market has expanded significantly after the 1970s. An increase in the size of the readership market and a change in its composition created greater demands for newspaper consumption. The readership market, made up of a growing segment of affluent Chinese consumers, stimulated the expansion of the advertising market, which were patronized by both Chinese and particularly non-Chinese firms which placed advertisements to appeal to Chinese consumers. The evidence presented in Chapter 6 shows that it was the initial growth of the Chinese newspaper market that attracted owners of media groups in Asia to start their ventures in Canada in the late 1970s. Furthermore, it was the subsequent expansions of the market that stimulated huge follow-up offshore capital investments in Chinese newspapers in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s.

In addition to the market size and composition, owners of media groups in Asia were attracted to the market because it was a market niche and exempt, to a considerable degree, from competition with daily newspapers in the larger society. If the Chinese newspaper market would have been easily reached by English or French Canadian daily newspapers, the market opportunities for the media groups in Asia would have been greatly reduced, and these groups would not be interested in the market as they have shown. Fortunately, Chinese-language newspapers are “cultural products” (Waldinger et al

et., 1990: 22), which, as Aldrich, Cater, et al. (1985, cited in *ibid.*) pointed out, “involve a direct connection with the immigrants’ homeland and knowledge of tastes and buying preferences - qualities unlikely to be shared by larger, native-owned competitors.” The Chinese newspaper market is what Zhou (1992: 111-113) called a “protected sector” of ethnic enclave economy, as opposed to an “export sector”; the former represents, among other things, a “captive market” and maintains “a relatively high level of control and economic independence,” while the latter does not have control over the production process or business operations and is “very sensitive to the fluctuations of the larger economic system” (*ibid.*). It should be noted that the “protected sector” refers mainly to readership and advertising from ethnic Chinese businesses, which the larger society cannot easily access; advertising from non-Chinese firms, on the other hand, belongs to an “export sector” or non-ethnic market, which is sensitive to economic changes in the larger society. However, as long as there exists an affluent Chinese consumer market and Chinese newspapers are one of the main vehicles to reach that market, this sector of the advertising market will remain relatively secure simply because there is no other more effective way to reach Chinese consumers that non-Chinese firms are so eager to target.

The findings of this study also show that the growth of Chinese newspapers in Canada has been directly associated with Chinese offshore investments. Since the 1970s, media groups in Asia have had three major investments in the Canadian Chinese newspaper market. The first major investment took place in the late 1970s, and the investment established the first transnational Chinese newspapers in Canada. The second investment happened in the mid-1980s, when two major Chinese newspapers invested a large amount of capital to expand their branch offices in Canada. This investment made it

possible for the Chinese newspapers to be produced locally, rather than printed in home offices and then shipped to Toronto or Vancouver. The third major investment occurred after 1993 when *Ming Pao* entered the Toronto Chinese newspaper market. Of the three major investments, this was the largest; not only were physical infrastructures (e.g., press, satellite receiver, and plant) modernized, but organisational structure and size also changed significantly. Chinese newspapers became localised transnational newspapers in the sense that they published large editorial pages provided by both the home office and the local branch. The evidence demonstrates that each major development of Chinese newspapers since the 1970s directly corresponded to a major offshore capital investment. Without the capital investments, Chinese newspapers could not have developed to such a degree, since the local capital on which early Chinese newspapers relied simply could not provide enough capital for such a development.

In addition to the growing Chinese newspaper market in Canada, the capital investment also has much to do with media development in Asia. Largely as a result of economic growth in Asia, media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan expanded in the 1970s and 1980s. This expansion led to saturation of the market; there were few opportunities for further market penetration by the product as it was. Thus, the newspapers had to seek new market opportunities to use surplus capital to make more profits. Toronto and Vancouver, due to their large concentration of recent Chinese immigrants, became ideal locations for such capital investment.

The findings of this study also show that competition among Chinese newspapers plays a significant role in their recent development. As I pointed out in the Chapter 2, although market opportunities and capital are significant, they alone cannot account for the

development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. For instance, as Chapter 7 shows, in the late 1980s, the Chinese newspapers in Toronto made no attempts to improve their news reporting and advertising services even though the market was growing and capital was well in place. Two major newspapers dominated two separate sections of the market, therefore, there was no stimulus for them to make any further progress. However, the situation suddenly changed in 1993 when *Ming Pao* entered Toronto's Chinese newspaper market and competed with *Sing Tao* in the most lucrative sector of the market: Hong Kong immigrants. The competition brought in more capital investments and greatly improved Chinese newspapers with respect to news reporting, production, and advertising services. The existence of a competitive Chinese newspaper market, which is absent in most Canadian towns, can be attributed partly to diverse readerships that demanded more than one newspaper. However, this reason is insufficient to explain the existence of competition, since market segmentation also led to a decrease in competition, as was the case in the late 1980s. Probably more important is that well financed media groups in Asia targeted similar segments of the market, as in the case of *Sing Tao* and *Ming Pao*. Because they were almost equally strong in financial and news resources, no one organization could dominate the market, and competition continued to take place. As a result, the Chinese newspapers underwent dynamic changes in their operations.

Taken collectively, these findings suggest that the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s can be attributed mainly to the interaction of market, capital, and competition, which were shaped by economic and social conditions in Canada and Asia. The growing newspaper market, which was largely protected, provided great business opportunities which attracted owners of media groups in Asia. With the

influx of large capital from Asia, where the newspaper market had become saturated, Chinese newspapers in Canada were able to expand their organisational size and employ modern technologies. Because several media groups entered the Canadian Chinese newspaper market simultaneously, there was intense competition among the newspapers, and each had to work hard for its survival. As a result, market, capital, and competition together promoted the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s.

8.2 Conclusions

This study has examined Chinese newspapers in Canada as a business and explained their development in terms of market, capital, and competition in the context of economic and social conditions in Canada and Asia. Obviously, this approach is different from traditional studies that view the ethnic press either as an instrument of assimilation or as a means of cultural retention. Why is the cultural approach (i.e. cultural assimilation and cultural retention) insufficient to study Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s? Why is it necessary to study the recent Chinese newspapers in Canada as a business? In this section, I address both questions again by way of conclusions.

In the studies of the ethnic press in Canada, the cultural approach tends to focus on two basic issues: cultural assimilation and cultural retention (Surlin and Romanow, 1997: 259-260). The theories of cultural assimilation assume that new immigrants face a clash of cultures when they first come to Canada. To help them adjust to the new environment, communication between the host society and immigrants is necessary. However, communication becomes difficult because most newly-arrived immigrants do not speak English or French. In this situation, the emergence of the ethnic press, together with the

ethnic churches and the immigrants' associations, plays a role in creating a bridge between the host society and immigrant groups. In other words, by using their own languages, the ethnic press helps the immigrants "to make adjustments to a new environment, change old habits and form new options" (Park, 1922: 9-10). Here, the inability of immigrants to speak official languages is seen to be the most important reason for the emergence of the press.

This approach may be partly useful in understanding the early ethnic press. For instance, in his discussion of Polish newspapers in Canada early in this century, Turek (1962: 22) found: "For the majority of Poles [who] settled in Canada, who know neither English nor French, the Polish newspapers were the principal source of information about Canadian institutions and the problems of their new country." Similar examples can also be found in other early ethnic presses, such as the German language press (Kalbleisch, 1968), the Finish language press (Pilli, 1982), and the Italian language press (Grohovaz, 1982). However, this approach is not applicable to Chinese newspapers because they developed most rapidly at a time when the majority of new Chinese immigrants could speak English and read English language newspapers. In other words, most Chinese immigrants do not have to rely on Chinese-language newspapers for information about Canadian society; they can simply read English newspapers and obtain whatever information they need to live in the society. As a result, the cultural assimilation approach is insufficient to understand the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada. Other weaknesses of this approach include its extreme narrowness of research focus and the Social Darwinist overtones as discussed in Chapter 2.

The cultural approach also assumes that the ethnic press is a means of cultural retention. Cultural retention in the context of the ethnic press may contain two meanings, the first of which is language retention. As Kirkconnell pointed out (1974: 57), "At a time when the 'ethnic' citizens, and especially those of school age, are rapidly acquiring English (or French), the ethnic press maintains an awareness of the ancestral language." In the other words, reading the ethnic press will help retain ethnic languages which might otherwise be lost. The second, and probably most important meaning is that the ethnic press is an instrument of retaining other aspects of ethnic cultures, such as "the great national traditions from which each community has sprung (Kirkconnell, 1974: 57), "certain 'ethnic' perspectives on the events taking place in society at large", and "ethnic consciousness and identity of those community members" (Isajiw, 1990: 64).

With respect to language retention, there is no strong evidence indicating that the ethnic press can play such a role. Although there has been a substantial increase in numbers and circulation of ethnic newspapers since World War II, the increase may reflect the input of substantial Post-War immigration. Black and Leather (1987) found that 85-90 per cent of the Canadian-born ethnics almost never read the non-official language media written in ethnic languages. Other studies of Toronto's ethnic media, including English-language print and electronic media, found similar patterns of decline for four European ethnic groups (Isajiw, 1990: 65).

It is more problematic to relate the ethnic press to the retention of ethnic culture. Whether in the name of "tradition", "ethnic perspective", or "ethnic consciousness and identity", the approach assumes that there exists unique ethnic culture, which is largely primordial, transplanted, and eternal (Li, 1999: 11). As ethnic groups interact over time

with the dominant group in the host country, their identity with their ethnic culture is believed to weaken (ibid.). By reading the ethnic press, members of ethnic groups could maintain their unique ethnic culture, because the ethnic press provides an opportunity to expose them to such a culture. However, whether or not there exists such a primordial culture is in question. As Li (1999: 11) pointed out, since culture is largely people's responses to external conditions, it is not static. Ethnic culture is not a primordial but a new culture reflecting both the experiences of the past and the present (ibid.: 1998: 9). Since ethnic culture is fluid, cultural retention, in the sense of maintaining ancestral culture, becomes meaningless.

On the other hand, the ethnic press has always been changing. For instance, as this study shows, most early Chinese newspapers were small party organs. After the 1970s, Chinese newspapers developed into part of transnational newspapers and tended to be neutral in Chinese politics. As transnational newspapers, Chinese newspapers experienced continual changes. In the late 1970s, they contained basically editorial pages reprinted from home offices. After the mid-1980s, they started to run editorials produced in Canada, with an increase in local news coverage. In the 1990s, they became fully localised transnational newspapers and provided Chinese immigrant readers with extensive local, national, and international information. Since Chinese newspapers have themselves undergone continual changes, how can we expect them to produce an inertia of Chinese culture? Put another way, if the newspapers' contents have always been changing, how can they maintain something that does not even exist in the newspapers? Therefore, the approach of cultural retention is limited in its ability to understand Chinese newspapers in Canada since the 1970s.

If the cultural approach is insufficient to understand Chinese newspapers, why is the business approach, in the sense of studying ethnic newspapers as a capitalist enterprise, a useful way to study recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada?

Newspapers have two basic roles: social and commercial (Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981: 163-166; Lacy and Simon, 1993: 1). The social or public service role assumes that newspapers are the primary instrument for the immediate collection, organisation, and dissemination of news and opinion to the public at large. The duty of newspapers is to ensure that their readers are fully and fairly informed about the condition of the society in which they live (Royal Commissions on Newspapers, 1981: 163). This role clearly separates newspapers from other businesses (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 1). On the other hand, newspapers are commercial. "If a newspaper does not succeed as a business in the capitalist system, providing some reasonable return to its shareholders, it will not have the resources to carry out the primary role society assigns to it...No profits, no newspapers" (Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981: 163-164). As businesses, newspapers are expected to make a profit. As organisations that affect the political direction of a nation, newspapers are expected to be above mere commercial concerns. This potential, and often actual conflict has characterised the newspaper industry for more than one century and will continue to do so (Lacy and Simon, 1993: 1). Which interest wins in a given situation affects the nature of newspapers making them more journalistic or more commercial. In the early 1980s, some newspaper observers pointed out that, with the dominance of national newspaper chains in Canada, the profit motive, as opposed to the editorial service motive, often ranks higher in the priority scale of some newspaper organisations (e.g. Thomson Newspapers) (Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981:

164). The situation appeared to spread among newspapers in the 1990s. According to Siegel (1996: 122), "In contemporary Canada, the economic interest of owners, not their politics, ideology, or religion, are in nearly all cases the chief motivation for a daily newspaper's existence." The increasing significance of newspapers operating as a business and how this development influences journalistic performance, has become a concern of media researchers and society at large (Royal Commission on Newspapers, 1981; Siegel, 1996; Candussl and Winter, 1988).

The ethnic press in Canada can also be considered in terms of its social and commercial roles. Its social role, including culture but having a much broader meaning, was predominant in the early ethnic press, since the majority of newspapers were sponsored by either churches or ethnic associations and distributed freely (Boyd, 1955: 46; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969: 174). The major duty of the press was editorial, including providing information to help immigrants adapt to the host society. The business side was weak because newspapers relied mainly on sponsoring organisations rather than on the market for their survival. In this situation, a business approach might be limited in understanding newspaper and how they change over time.

However, in the case of Chinese newspapers after the 1970s, although their social services role still was important (A political propaganda role might be included in broad social service framework), the newspapers as a business also became increasingly significant. Social and cultural services, as this study shows, were partly used as means to make more profits. In other words, the nature of Chinese newspapers underwent a profound change.

The change can be summarised in three ways. First, for the owners of the media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan, making money was crucial in their decisions to publish a newspaper in Canada. Early Chinese newspapers were published mainly for political purposes. Although these newspapers often lost money in business, their survival was dependant upon subsidies from political parties which needed them for propaganda. After the 1970s, as a result of entry of offshore capital, the business motivation in newspaper publication became increasingly significant. Why did the media groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan cross the Pacific to publish newspapers in Canada? They came here mainly because there emerged a lucrative Chinese newspaper market which was yet to be explored. Profit-seeking drove owners of the media groups to invest in the Chinese newspaper market in Canada.

Second, Chinese newspapers rely on advertising dollars for their survival. Although early Chinese newspapers sought advertising, this was not usually their main revenue source. When advertising came from rival parties, in fact, newspapers would even refuse to accept advertisements.² Today, success and failure of a newspaper is dependant on its ability to attract enough advertising income, which normally accounts for 80 per cent of the total revenue. During the last two decades, dozens of Chinese newspapers were published in Canada, but most of them ceased publication because they failed in the advertising market. Relying mainly on advertising affects newspapers deeply. All of a newspaper's non-advertising operations, including news reporting, production, and public relations, to a considerable degree centred around attracting more advertising dollars, which is thought to be more important than anything else for the survival of the newspaper.

Third, competition among Chinese newspapers also highlights the business side of newspapers. Competition is not new for Chinese newspapers. As my review of Chinese newspapers early in this century shows, from the very beginning, Chinese newspapers were competing with one another. However, the competition was to try to mobilise Canadian Chinese to support their respective political cause in China. After the 1970s, especially during the 1990s, with the decline of influences of Chinese politics, Chinese newspapers in Canada competed to increase market share, to beat rivalries, and to make more profits.

All these changes suggest that the commercial role of Chinese newspapers has become very important in their recent development. It is the business story that has largely shaped the nature of Chinese newspapers since the 1970s. As a result, studying Chinese newspapers as a business will help to understand better the development of Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s.

Some research has found that the tendency to emphasize business has led to the decline of the public services of newspapers. For instance, in his discussion of some newspaper chains in Canada, Siegel found (1996: 111-112, 122) that the value of news reporting has been undermined by an all-consuming focus on profits, and editorial departments have endured deep cuts. In the case of Chinese newspapers, why did the increasing business role promote their development in editorials? Two reasons among others may be significant. First, off-shore capital, which was mainly responsible for the recent development of Chinese newspapers in Canada, injected a large amount of capital into Chinese newspapers; the entry of capital not only facilitated commercialisation of Chinese newspapers, but also provided opportunities for Chinese newspapers to improve

editorial services (e.g., increasing editorial staff and editorial pages). Second, and perhaps more importantly, there have been competitive Chinese newspaper markets in Canada for the last two decades. The competition maintained a continued pressure on newspapers to change. To survive, a newspaper had to compete with other papers for shares of the advertising market. The advertising market could be seized only by increasing readership because advertisers like to buy advertising space from newspapers with a large and affluent readership. As a result, business pressure led to improvement in editorials, or social services. This case suggests that the newspapers can afford, from their operation as a business, to fulfil their stated purpose of service to the public.

Although this study deals with the case of the Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s, an outstanding question is whether the approach of studying the Chinese newspapers as ethnic enterprises adopted in this study applies to other ethnic newspapers. The answer is likely to be different dependent on the conditions under which the ethnic press operates. For example, this approach may not be quite relevant to early Chinese newspapers in Canada since, as previously mentioned, the Chinese community in Canada before the 1970s was small and so was the market. The Chinese newspapers operated more as an ideological tool for political parties and interest groups than as a profit-oriented enterprise. Under such condition, the newspapers would be best studied as political organs from the theoretical vantage point of public and cultural services of an ethnic community. It would also be inappropriate to use this approach to account for the existence and development of the ethnic press of many other ethnic groups in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although some of these groups, such as the Germans and Poles in Canada had a relatively large number of first generation immigrants, the population spread

over a wide area, and the scarcity of ethnic businesses meant that advertising revenues were small (Turek, 1961). The ethnic papers were mainly sponsored by religious groups, ethnic associations, or political organisations, providing information and emotional support.

However, the study of Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s suggests that under certain conditions the business approach is useful to understand the emergence and development of the ethnic press. The first condition involves the existence of a large number of first generation immigrants who concentrate in metropolitan areas where language is mainly that of the old country from which the immigrants originate. This condition implies that the size of the immigrant market is essential to attract capital investment in ethnic newspapers; the market size also attracts advertisements from businesses in the large society. The second condition has to do with the presence of the enclave economy, which is defined as “spatially clustered network of businesses owned by members of the same minority” (Portes, 1995: 27). Because enclave businesses mainly target their co-ethnics (*ibid.*), it is necessary for them to advertise products and services in the ethnic press, which is probably one of the best ways to reach the customers due to linguistic convenience and cultural preference of immigrants. Therefore, the enclave economy could provide the ethnic press with significant and relatively stable advertising dollars for the survival of the press. The third condition has to do with a role of media groups, especially those from the ethnic group’s country of origin. On the one hand, the media groups can provide the ethnic press with huge capital that is required for its development. On the other hand, the groups, because of their transnational news network, can supply extensive news stories, including both international subjects and those

pertaining to the homeland; the latter is particularly significant in appealing to immigrant readers, but it is not easily accessible to any other media groups. Without this condition, even where there is a large readership market, the development of the ethnic press is limited. The fourth condition involves the competitive ethnic newspaper market. The existence of more than one newspaper in one newspaper market could lead to a competition among newspapers, therefore promoting entrepreneurship of newspaper businesses. All these conditions, when operating together within an ethnic group, are more likely to transform the ethnic press from a local community paper to a cosmopolitan paper. The ethnic press may be highly commercialized and its survival or failure may be largely dependent on its economic performance. Under such conditions, the business approach is useful to understand the development of ethnic newspapers.

Finally, although Chinese newspapers in Canada after the 1970s are studied as mainly a business, it does not mean that culture is insignificant in the development of the Chinese newspapers. The major shortcomings of traditional cultural analysis in the study of the ethnic press are its narrowness, which focuses only on cultural assimilation and cultural retention. As a matter of fact, cultural services should include much broader meanings, such as services of information (political, economic, and social in both Canada and homeland), new knowledge (life, health, and science), and entertainment. Undoubtedly, These cultural services help to make the Chinese newspapers attractive to readers. My study indicates the importance of economic forces in the study in immigrant cosmopolitan newspapers and it suggests the needs to consider economic factors in addition to cultural causes in understanding expansion of the ethnic press.

Endnotes — Chapter 8

1. See Chapter 1.
2. See *The Sing Wah Daily*, 1973, p. 24.

REFERENCES

- Asian Development Bank,
1997 *Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries*. Manila, Philippines: Economic and Development Resource Centre, Asian Development Bank.
- Atword, L. Erwin and Ann Merie Major
1996 *Good-Bye, Gwei Lo: Public Opinion and the 1997 Problem in Hong Kong*. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
- Babbie, Earl
1995 *The Practice of Social Research*. Seventh Edition. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Barth, Frederick
1963 *The Role of the Entrepreneur in Social Change in Northern Norway*. Bergen: Universitets Forlaget.
- Baureiss, Gunter
1985 "Discrimination and Response: The Chinese in Canada." In *Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada*, edited by Rita M. Bienvenue and Jay E. Goldstein, 241-261. Toronto: Butterworths.
- Benedict, Burton.
1968 "Family Firms and Economic Development." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 24 (Spring): 1-19.
- Berman, Daniel K.
1991 *Words Like Coloured Glass: the Role of the Press in Taiwan's Democratisation Process*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Black, Jerome H. and Christian Leithner
1987 "Patterns of Ethnic Media Consumption: A Comparative Examination of Ethnic Groupings in Toronto." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 19 (1): 21-39.
- Bogart, Leo
1991 *Preserving the Press: How Daily Newspapers Mobilised to Keep their Readers*. New York: Columbia University Press.
1989 *Press and Public: Who Reads What, When, Where, and Why in American Newspapers*. 2nd edition. Hillsdale, NJ: Li. Erlbaum Associates.
- Bolaria, B. Singh, and Peter S. Li

- 1988 *Racial Oppression in Canada*. 2nd edition. Toronto: Garamond Press.
- Bonacich, Edna, and John Modell
 1980 *The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community*. Berkeley: University of California.
- Bonavia, George
 1987 *Ethnic Publication in Canada: Newspapers, Periodicals, Magazines, Bulletins, Newsletters*. Ottawa: Secretary of State.
- Boyd, Alan R.
 1955 "The Foreign-Language Press in Canada." In *Immigrants in Canada*, edited by John Kosa, 44-51. Montreal.
- Breen, George Edward and A. B. Blankenship
 1982 *Do-It-Yourself Marketing Research*. 2nd edition. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
- British Columbia, Ministry of Economic Development
 1987 *Business Immigration*.
- British Columbia Report*
 1996 "\$1 Million Worth of Good Will: a Hong Kong Publisher funds a UBC Journalism School (Sing Tao School of Journalism)." 7 (51), August 19.
- Canada, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism
 1969 *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume 4, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*. Ottawa. October 23.
- Canadian Advertising Rates and Rates (CARD)*
 1941-1996 Toronto: Maclean Hunter.
- Canadian Press Newswire*
 1995 "Markets Seek Ways to Lure Ethnic Consumers." September 25.
- Canadian Press Newswire*
 1995 "Maclean's and Toronto Life Launching Chinese-language Editions." September 28.
- Candussi, Dris, and James P. Winter
 1988 "Monopoly and Content in Winnipeg." In *Press Concentration and Monopoly: New Perspectives on Newspaper Ownership and Operation*, edited by Robert G. Picard et al., 139-146. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

- Carroll, Glenn R.
1987 *Publish and Perish: The Organisational Ecology of Newspaper Industry*. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press Ltd.
- Chan, Joseph Man, and Paul Lee
1991 *Mass Media and Political Transition: The Hong Kong Press in China's Orbit*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Chan, Joseph Man, Paul Lee and Chin-Chuan Lee
1996 *Hong Kong Journalism in Transition*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
- Chan, Steve, and Cal Clark
1992 *Flexibility, Foresight, and Fortuna in Taiwan's Development: Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis*. London: Routledge.
- Chang, David W. and Richard Y. Chuang
1998 *The Politics of Honk's Reversion to China*. New York: Houndsmills.
- Chang, S. K. C.
1985 "American and Chinese Managers in U.S. Companies in Taiwan: A Comparison." *California Management Review* 27: 144-56.
- Chen, C., and A. Chaudhary
1990 "Asian and The Pacific." In *Global Journalism*, edited by John Merrill, 123-156. New York: Longman.
- Chen, Hsiang-shui
1992 *Chinatown No More*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Chen, Yu-his
1996 "The Dual Role of the Chinese Press in the United States: Change and Continuity." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 27: 37-47.
- Cheng, Guoxiang, and Ping Zhu
1987 *Forty Yeas of Newspaper Evolution in Taiwan*. Taipei: *Independent Evening Post*. (in Chinese)
- Cheng, Tien-fang
1931 *Oriental Immigration in Canada*. Shanghai: Commercial Press.
- Ch'i, Hsi-sheng
1976 *Warlord Politics in China: 1916-1928*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

- China News Agency, Hong Kong Branch
 1993 *Chinese Newspapers Published in Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and overseas*. Guangdon: Haitian Press. (in Chinese)
- Chinese Canadian News Daily*
 1987 *Special 3rd Anniversary Issue*. Toronto.
- Chinese Canadian Yearbook*
 1993 Markham, Ontario: Chinese Canadian Yearbook Publication Inc. (in Chinese)
- Chu, Showwei
 1998 Welcome to Canada: Please Buy Something: Companies Have Finally Recognise The Enormous Market Potential of Canada's Chinese Immigrant Population. *Canadian Business* 71 (9): 72-73. May 29.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada
 1994a *Facts and Figures: Overview of Immigration*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Citizenship and Immigration Canada
 1994b *Facts and Figures: Preliminary Data Release. Immigration Overview, 1994*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Clayton, Charles C.
 1971 "Taiwan." In *Asian Newspapers: Reluctant Revolution*, edited by John A. Lent, 121-134. Ames: Iowa State University Press
- DeMont, John and Thomas Fennell
 1989 *Hong Kong Money-How Chinese Families and Fortunes are Changing Canada*. Toronto: Key Porter Books Limited.
- Desbarats, Peter
 1981 *Newspapers and Computer: An Industry in Transition*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada
- Dessus, Sebastien, et al.
 1995 *Chinese Taipei: The Origins of the Economic "Miracle"*. Paris: OECD.
- Deyo, Frederic C., ed.
 1987 *The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- deVries, John, and Frank G. Vallee

- 1980 *Language Use in Canada*. 1971 Census of Canada, Catalogue 99-762E.
Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- Dodsworth and Mihaljek
1997 *Hong Kong, China: Growth, Structural Change, and Economic Stability during the Transition*. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Dominion Bureau of Statistics
1913 *1911 Census of Canada*, Vol. II. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1915 *Special Report on the Foreign-Born Population*. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1923 *1921 Census of Canada, Population*, Vol. I. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1943 *1941 Census of Canada, General Review and Summary Tables*, Vol. I. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1953 *1951 Census of Canada, Population, General Characteristics*, Vol. I. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1953 *1951 Census of Canada, Population*, Vol. II. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
1962 *1961 Census of Canada, Population Sex Ratio*, Vol. I, part II, bulletin 1.2-5. Ottawa: Department of Trade and Commerce.
- Ekos Research Associates Inc.
1992 *Reading in Canada: 1991*. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Employment and Immigration
1986 *Immigration Statistics, 1984*. Cat. No. MP22-1/1984. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service Canada.
- England, J.
1976 *Hong Kong: Britain's Responsibility*, Fabian Research Series 324. London: Fabian Society Publication.
- Esterik, Penny Van and John Van Esterik
1988 "Indo-Chinese Refuges in Toronto." In *Ten Year Later: Indo-Chinese Communities in Canada*, edited by Louis-Jacques Dorais, 117-126. Canadian Asian Studies Association.
- Ethnic Media and Markets*.
Summer/Fall, 1996 and Winter/Spring, 1997.
- Fang, Jigen, and Hu Wenying

- 1988 *The History and Present Conditions of Chinese Language Newspapers Overseas*. Beijing: Xinghua Press. (in Chinese)
- Fang, Jigen and Wang Guangming
 1992 *A Survey of Press in Hong Kong and Macao*. Beijing: Sinhua Press. (in Chinese)
- Fei, J. C. H.
 1986 "Economic Development and Traditional Chinese Cultural Values." *Journal of Chinese Studies* 3: 109-24.
- Fei, Yong, and Zhong Xiaoyi
 1995 *Short Stories of "Jian Yong"*. Guangzhou: Guangdong People's Press. (in Chinese)
- Feng, Aiqun
 1976 *The History of Overseas Chinese Press*. Taipei: Student Press. (in Chinese)
- Financial Post Daily*
 1995 "Maclean's, Toronto Life tap Chinese market." November 24, p. c12.
- Fishman, Joshua A. et al.
 1966 "The Non-English and the Ethnic Group Press, 1910-1960." In *Language Loyalty in the United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation of Non-English Mother Tongues by American Ethnic and religious Groups*, edited by Joshua A. Fishman, 135-178. The Hague: Mouton and Co.
- Fleras, Augie
 1994 "Media and Minorities in A Post-Multicultural Society: Overview and Appraisal." In *Ethnicity and Culture in Canada: The Research Landscape*, edited by J.W. Berry, and J.A. Laponce, 267-292. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Fong, Joe Chung
 1998 "Transnational Newspapers: The Making of the Post-1965 Globalized/Localised San Gabriel Valley Chinese Community." *Amerasia Journal* 22 (3): 65-77.
- Fung, Anthony Y.H., and Chin-Chuan Lee
 1994 "Hong Kong's Changing Media Ownership: Uncertainty and Dilemma." *Gazette (Netherlands)* 53: 127-133.
- Gans, Herbert J.

- 1980 *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time.* New York: Vintage Books.
- Ge, Gongzhen
1955 *History of the Chinese Press.* Beijing: Sanlian Shudian; reprint of 1935 edition of Commercial Press, Shanghai. (in Chinese)
- Globe and Mail, The*
1995 "Magazines Launch Chinese edition." September 28.
1996 "Fingers do the Walking in Ethnic Guides." January 19.
- Gordon, Milton M.
1964 *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins.* New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grohovaz, Gianni
1982 Toronto's Italian Press after the Second War. *Polyphony: Bulletin of the Multicultural History Society of Ontario*, Spring/Summer: 105-113.
- Gu, Weikai
1998 "Going forward Hand in Hand: 20 Years." In *20th Anniversary Special Supplement*, 9-15. Toronto: *Sing Tao* (Eastern Edition). (in Chinese)
- Gu, Ying
1986 "The Press in Toronto." *The Nineties*, 199 (August): 41-63. (in Chinese)
- Hachten, William
1993 *The Growth of Media in the Third World: African Failure, Asian Success.* Ames: Iowa State University Press.
- Hackett, Robert A.
1990 *News and Dissent: the Press and the Politicos of Peace in Canada.* New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Hardt, Hanno
1989 The Foreign-Language Press in American Press History. *Journal of Communication* 39 (2): 114-131.
- Harzig, Christiane, and Dirk Hoerder
1985 *The Press of Labour Migrants in Europe and North America, 1980s to 1930s.* Bremen: Labour Migration Project.
- Ho, Yin-Ping
1992 *Trade, Industrial Restructuring and Development in Hong Kong.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

- Hoe, Ban Seng
 1976 *Structural Changes of Two Chinese Communities in Alberta, Canada.* National Museum of Man Mercury series, Canadian Center for Folk Culture Studies Paper Number 19. Ottawa: National Museum of Man.
- Hong Kong Economic News*
 1994 "A Man Having the Same Name as Yu Pun-hoi Served Two Years in Jail in Canada in 1979." October 10.
- Hong Kong Standard*
 1988 "Sing Tao Chairman to receive Top Award." April 29.
- Hong Kong Stock News
 1990 *The Handbook of Hong Kong Stock.* Hong Kong. (in Chinese)
- Hunter, Edward
 1960 *In Many Voices: Our Fabulous Foreign Language Press.* Norman Park, Georgia: Norman College.
- Huntzicher, Lisa
 1992 "The Chinese-American Press in the 19th-century." In *Outsiders in the 19th Century Press History: Multicultural Perspective*, by Frankie Hutton and Barbara Straus, 80-95. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.
- Hurd, W. Burton
 1937 *Racial Origins and Nativity of the Canadian People.* Ottawa: J. O. Patenaude, I. S. O.
- Hwang, Y. Dolly
 1991 *The Rise of a New World Economic Power: Post War Taiwan.* New York: Greenwood Press.
- Isajiw, Wesvold W.
 1990 "Ethnic-identity Retention." In *Ethnic Identity and Equality: Varieties of Experience in a Canadian City*, edited by Raymond Breton et al., 34-91. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Islam, Iyanatul and Anis Chowdhury
 1997 *Asia-Pacific Economies.* New York: Routledge.
- Jao, Y.C.
 1974 *Banking and Currency in Hong Kong: A Study of Postwar Financial Development.* London: Macmillan.

- Janowita, Morris
 1967 *The Community Press in An Urban Setting: The Social Elements of Urbanism*. Second Edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Jaret, Charles
 1978 The Greek, Italian, and Jewish American Ethnic Press: A Comparative Analysis. *The Journal Of Ethnic Studies* 7 (2): 47-70.
- Jiobu, Robert M.
 1988 "Ethnic Hegemony and the Japanese in California." *American Sociological Review* 53: 353-67.
- Johnson, Owen V.
 1988 "Clio among the Ethnic Media." *Ethnic Forum* 8 (2): 40-51.
- Kalbfleisch, Herbert Karl
 1968 *The History of the Pioneer German Language Press of Ontario, 1935-1919*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Kan, Lai-bing, and Grace H. L. Chu
 1981 *Newspapers of Hong Kong, 1941-1979*. Hong Kong: University Library System, Chinese university of Hong Kong.
- Kao, Alice
 1993 "Taiwan." In *The Unfolding Lotus: East Asia's Changing Media*, edited by Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis, 40-53. New York: The Freedom Forum Media Studies Centre at Columbia University.
- Karp, Jonathan
 1994 "Yu Should Know: Scandal Embroils Chief of Hong Kong's Ming Pao." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 157 (October): 20.
- Keenan, Faith
 1995 "Heir to Misfortune: State in Hong Kong's Ming Pao is up for Grabs." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 158 (September): 7.
- Kim Ki Su, and Young Gon Kim
 1989 "Who Reads an Ethnic Language Newspapers, and Why?" *Multiculturalism/Multiculturalism* 12 (1): 28-30.
- Kirkconnell, Watson
 1974 "The Role of the Ethnic Press." In *The Multicultural Press in Manitoba*, 53-59. Winnipeg: Canada Press Club.
- Klintworth, Gary

- 1995 *New Taiwan, New China: Taiwan's Changing Role in the Asia-Pacific Region*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Koon, Heng Pek
 1997 "Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network in Eastern Asia: A Study in Sino-Capitalism." In *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, edited by Timothy Brook and HY Luong, 155-181. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Kowalik, Jan,
 1978 *The Polish Press in America*. San Francisco: R & E Research Association.
- Krauter, Joseph F., and Morris Advise
 1978 *Minority Canadians: Ethnic Groups*. Toronto: Methuen.
- Kung, S. W.
 1962 "Chinese Immigration into North America." *Queen's Quarterly* 68 (4): 610-620.
- Kwong, Peter
 1996 *The New Chinatown*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Lacy, Stephen, and Todd F. Simon
 1993 *The Economics and Regulation of United States Newspapers*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Lai, David Chuenyan
 1988 *Chinatown: Towns within Cities in Canada*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Lai, Him Mark
 1990 "The Chinese Press in the United States and Canada since World War II: A Diversity of Voices." *Chinese America: History and Perspectives*. Pp. 107-155.
- 1986 "The Chinese-American Press." In *The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook*, edited by Sally M. Miller, 27-43. Greenwood Press: New York.
- Lam, Lawrence
 1980 "The Role of Ethnic Media for Immigrants: A Case Study of Chinese Immigrants and their Media in Toronto." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 12 (1): 74-90.
- Lam, Lawrence, and Xiao-Feng Liu

- 1996 "The Economic Integration of Mainland Chinese Immigrants in Toronto, Canada." In *The Chinese Expansion and World Today: North American Experience*. Tokyo: The Centre for Area Studies, Keio University.
- Lary, Diana, and Bernard Luk
 1994 "Hong Kong Immigrants in Toronto." In *Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese*, edited by Ronald Skeldon, 139-162. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lau, Chi Kuen
 1997 *Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Press.
- Lau, Emily
 1986 "The News Media." In *Hong Kong in Transition*, edited by Joseph Cheng, 421-446. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, Chin-Chuan
 1985 "Partisan Press Coverage of Government News In Hong Kong." *Journalism Quarterly* 62: 770-776.
- 1993 "Sparking a Fire: The Press and the Ferment of Democratic Change in Taiwan." *Journalism Monographs*, 138.
- 1997 "Media Structure and Regime Change in Hong Kong." In *Hong Kong's Reintegration with China: Transformation and Challenge*, edited by Ming K. Chan, 1-47. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Lee, Tung-hai
 1967 *Jianada Huaqiao Shi* (History of Overseas Chinese in Canada). Taipei, Taiwan. (in Chinese)
- Li, Peter S.
 1999 "Race and Ethnicity." In *Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada*, edited by Peter S. Li, 2nd edition, 3-20. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- 1998 *Chinese in Canada*. 2nd edition. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- 1996 *The Making of Post-War Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.
- 1993 "Chinese Investment and Business in Canada: Ethnic Entrepreneurship Reconsidered." *Pacific Affairs* 66 (2): 219-243.
- 1992a "Ethnic Enterprise in Transition: Chinese Business in Richmond, BC, 1980-1990." *Canadian Ethnic Study* 24 (1): 120-138.
- 1992b "The Chinese Minority in Canada, 1858-1992: A Quest for equality." In *Chinese Canadians: Voices from a Community*, edited by Evelyn Huang and Lawrence Jeffery, 264-277. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre.
- 1988 *Ethnic Inequality in a Class Society*. Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, INC.

- 1985 "The Use of Oral History in Studying Elderly Chinese-Canadians." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 17 (1): 67-77.
- 1981 *Social Research Methods*. Toronto: Butterworths.
- 1977 "Fictive Kinship, Conjugal Tie and Kinship Chain among Chinese Immigrants in the United States." *Journal of Comparative Studies* 8: 47-63.
- Li, Peter, and Yahong Li,
 1999 "The Consumer Market of the Enclave Economy: A Study of Advertisements in a Chinese Daily Newspaper in Toronto." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 31(2): 43-60.
- Li, Peter S., and B. Singh Bolaria
 1979 "Canadian Immigration Policy and Assimilation Theories." In *Economy, Class and Social Reality*, edited by John A. Fry, 411-22. Scarborough, Ont.: Butterworth.
- Light, Ivan H.
 1970 *Ethnic Enterprise in America: Business and Welfare among Chinese, Japanese, and Blacks*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Litman, Barry
 1988 "Microeconomic Foundations." In *Press Concentration and Monopoly: New Perspectives on Newspaper Ownership and Operation*, edited by Robert G. Picard et al., 3-34. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- Liu, Xiao-Feng
 1996 "Closed Windows, Open Doors: Geopolitics and Post-1949 Mainland Chinese immigration to Canada." *Canadian Geographer* 40 (4): 306-319.
- Lo, Karl
 1977 "Preface." In *Chinese Newspapers Published in North America, 1854-1975*, edited by Karl Lou and Him Mark Lai. Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials.
- Lo, Karl, and Lai, Him Mark
 1977 *Chinese Newspapers Published in North America, 1854-1975*. Washington, D.C.: Centre for Chinese Research Materials.
- Longman, Kenneth A.
 1971 *Advertising*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
- Lu, Jamie

- 1993 "Yu Pun-hoi is Challenging Sally Aw in Canada." *Next*, July 4: 60-62. (in Chinese)
- Luk, Bernard H.K, and Fatima W.B. Lee
 1996 "The Chinese Communities of Toronto." In *The Chinese Expansion and World Today: North American Experience*. Tokyo: The Centre for Area Studies, Keio University.
- Lum, Janet
 1992 "Recognition and the Toronto Chinese Community." In *Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1970*, edited by Paul M. Evans and B. Michael Frolic, 217-240. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Lynn, Jennifer
 1995 "Approaching Diversity." *Marketing Magazine* 100 (26): 11.
- Ma, Yan
 1989 "Chinese American Newspapers and Periods in the United States." *Ethnic Forum* 9: 100-121
- MacLean, E.
 1981 *Between the Lines*. Montreal: Black Rose Books.
- Maclean's*,
 1998 "The Great Paper Swap: Both Sun Media and Southam are expected to Benefit from Deal." 111 (August 3): 38.
- Mah, Valerie
 1976 *An In-depth Look at Toronto's Early Chinatown, 1913-1933*. Multicultural History Society of Ontario.
- Marketing Magazine*
 1996 "Nielsen Plans Toronto Chinese Media Index." 101 (30): 3.
 1995 "The Economics of Growing Communities." 100 (26): 11.
 1991 "Get to know the ethnic market: studying Chinese buyers led to campaign success." 96 (24): 32.
- Marzdf, Marion
 1979 *The Danish-Language Press In America*. ArNo Press.
- McKim, A.,
 1913, 1918, 1930, 1934 and 1939 *The Canadian Newspaper Directory*. Toronto.

McLaren, Duncan

- 1973 *Ontario Ethno-Cultural Newspapers, 1835-1972: An Annotated Checklist*.
Toronto: University of Toronto.

Miller, Sally M., ed.

- 1987 *The Ethnic Press in the United States: A Historical Analysis and Handbook*. New York: Greenwood Press.

Ming Pao (Toronto edition, in Chinese)

- 1998 September 28, D1.
1997 "Sally Aw's Press Empire: Market Value of HK\$1.5 Billion." June 5.
1997 "*Ming Pao* Turned Loss to Profits." August 14.
1996 "Let Advertisers Know the Market." November 27.
1996 *Leading the Way to the Chinese Market* (Advertising package)
1995 April 27-June 21; September 12-October 23.
1995 "The English Media: Lack of Thinking." August 25.
1995 "Toronto Life Chinese Edition published Today." September 25.
1994 October 11 to November 8.

Ming Pao Enterprise Corporation Ltd. (Hong Kng)

- 1995 *1995 Annual Report*. Hong Kong: *Ming Pao*.
1991 *1991 Annual Report*. Hong Kong: *Ming Pao*.

Mitchell, Katharyne

- 1995 "Flexible Circulation in Pacific Rim: Capitalism in Cultural Context."
Economic Geography 71 (4): 364-382.

Morawska, Ewa

- 1990 "The Sociology and Historiography of Immigration." In *Immigration Reconsidered: History, Sociology, and Politics*, edited by Virginia Yans-Mclaughlin, 187-240. Oxford University Press.

Morton, James

- 1974 *In the Sea of Sterile Mountains: The Chinese in British Columbia*.
Vancouver: J.J. Douglas.

Neuman, W. Lawrence

- 1997 *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*.
Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

New Republic (in Chinese)

- 1934 October 10.

Ng, Wing Chung

- 1993 *Ethnicity and Community-Southern Chinese Immigrants and*

Descendants in Vancouver, 1945-1980. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of British Columbia.

Nipp, Dora

- 1985 "The Chinese in Toronto." In *Gathering Place: People and Neighborhood of Toronto, 1834-1945*, edited by Robert F. Harney, 147-176. Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario.

OECD

- 1993 "The Dynamic Asian Economies and International Direct Investment." In *Foreign Direct Investment Relations between the OECD and the Dynamic Asian Economies*, 31-54. Paris: OECD.

Olzak, Susan, and Elizabeth West

- 1991 "Ethnic Conflict and the Rise and Fall of Ethnic Newspapers." *American Sociological Review* 56: 458-474.

Owen, Bruce M.

- 1969 "Empirical Results on the Price of Joint Ownership in Mass Media." *Research Memorandum*, 93: 16. Research Centre in Economic Growth, Stanford University, November.

Park, Robert E.

- 1950 *Race and Culture*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.
1922 *The Immigrant Press and its Control*. New York: Harper.

Picard, Robert G.

- 1986 "Pricing in Competing and Monopoly Newspapers, 1972-1982." *LSU School of Journalism Research Bulletin*.

Pigadas, George

- 1991 "Language Change or Language Stability and Ethnic Press in Canada during the Twentieth Century." *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 23 (3), pp. 48-59.

Pili, Arja,

- 1982 *The Finish-Language Press in Canada, 1901-1939: A Study in the History of Ethnic Journalism*. Helsinki: Suomalainen.

Police, James

- 1994 "Paper Tigers." *Marketing Magazine*, July 4/11: 13-14.

Portes, Alejandro

- 1995 "Economic Sociology and the Sociology of immigration: A Conceptual Overview." In *The Economic Sociology of Immigration-Essays on*

- Networks, Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship*, edited by Alejandro Portes, 1-41. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- 1980 "Immigrant Earnings: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States." *International Migration Review* 14 (3): 315-41.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Leif Jensen
 1987 "What's an Ethnic Enclave? The Case for Conceptual Clarity." *American Sociological Review* 52: 768-771.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach
 1985 *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rotenberg, Ronald H.
 1986 *Advertising: A Canadian Perspective*. Toronto: Allyn and Bacon.
- Royal Commission
 1885 *Report of the Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration: Report and Evidence*. Ottawa
- Royal Commission on Newspapers
 1981 *The Newspaper as a Business*. Hull, Quebec: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Royal Commission on Newspapers
 1984 Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- Sanders, Jimmy M., and Victor Nee
 1987 "Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in The Enclave Economy." *American Sociological Review* 52: 745-773.
- Shyu, Larry
 1996 "Taiwan's Trade and Investment Opportunities in Taiwan." In *Canada and Taiwan (ROC): Evolving Trans-Pacific Relation*. Toronto: Faculty of Management, University of Toronto.
- Siegel, Arthur
 1981 *Politics and the Media in Canada*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited.
- Sing Pao* (Eastern edition, in Chinese)
 1997 "The Former Director of *World Journal*: Qian Shunlin's 20 Years." May 28.
 1996 "Ming Pao had a Deficit of near HK\$940 million." August 13.
 1994 "Ming Pao Expanded but without Controlling Cost." December 12.

- 1993 A Letter to Advertisers, Community Associations and Readers. May.
- 1989 "The *Chinese Express* will Cease Publication from this Saturday." January 30.
- 1989 "About the *Chinese Express*." February 2.
- 1989 "The history of *Shing Wah Daily News*." October 4.

Sing Tao (Hong Kong),

- 1987 *Annual Report, 1986-7*. Hong Kong: *Sing Tao*.
- 1996 *Annual Report, 1995-6*. Hong Kong: *Sing Tao*.
- 1988 *Fifty Years of Journalism in Hong Kong: Special Publication to Commemorate the Golden Anniversary of the Sing Tao Jih Pao*. Hong Kong: *Sing Tao Jih Pao*. (in Chinese)

The Sing Wah Daily

- 1973 *The Souvenir Issue of the Golden Anniversary of The Sing Wah Daily*. Toronto. (in Chinese)

Singer, Benjamin D.

- 1986 *Advertising and Society*. Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley Publishers Limited.

Siu, Paul C. P.

- 1952 "The Sojourner." *American Journal of Sociology* 58: 34-44.

Smart, Josephine

- 1992 "Business Immigration to Canada: Deception and Exploitation." In *Reluctant Exiles?* edited by R. Skeldon, 98-119. Armonk, New York: M. E. Share.

So, Clement Y.

- 1996 "Pre-1997 Hong Kong Press: Cut-throat Competition and the Changing Journalistic Paradigm." In *The Other Hong Kong Report, 1996*, edited by Nyaw, Mee-kan and Lee Si-Ming, 485-505. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Statistics Canada

- 1999a *1996 Census of Canada, Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario*, Catalogue 95-187XPB. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- 1999b *1996 Census of Canada, Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in British Columbia*, Catalogue 95-191XPB. Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
- 1994a *1991 Census of Canada, Public Use Microdata File on individuals Tape, Individual File*;
- 1994b *1991 Census of Canada, Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto, Part B*, Catalogue 95-354. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Science and Technology.
- 1984a. *1981 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape (1984), Individual File*;

- 1984b *1981 Census of Canada, Population: Language, Ethnic Origins, Religion, Place of Birth, schooling, Ontario and British Columbia*, Catalogue 93-930 and 93-934. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
- 1976 *1971 Census of Canada, Public Use Sample Tape*.
- 1974 *1971 Census of Canada, Population: Ethnic Groups*, Catalogue 92-723. Ottawa: Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce.

Statistics Canada

- Various years *Canada's International Investment Position*, Catalogue NO. 67-202.

Strategy

- 1996 "Long-term Presence Crucial to Win over Sceptics." February 25, p. 23.

Sung, Yun-wing

- 1989 "The Hong Kong Development Model and its Future Evolution: Neoclassical Economics in a Chinese Society." In *Economic Development in Chinese Societies: Models and Experiences*, edited by Mok Jao and Ho, 155-176. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Surlin, Stuart H. and Walter I. Romanon

- 1997 "The Uses and Gratification of Heritage Language Newspapers and general Canadian Mass Media by Five Heritage Groups." In *The Mass Media and Canadian Diversity*, edited by Nancoo and Nancoo, 259-275. Mississauga: Canadian Educators' Press.

Tai Hon Bo (in Chinese)

- 1914 February to July.

Tan, Jin, and Patricia E. Roy

- 1985 *The Chinese in Canada*. Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association.

Tenezakis, M.

- 1984 *The Neglected Press: A Study of Arab and Creek Newspapers and Their Sydney Public*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Thompson, Richard H.

- 1989 *Toronto's Chinatown: The Changing Social Organization of An Ethnic Community*. New York: AMS Press.

Tong, Xingsong

- 1996 'Sing Tao is Challenging the DJC Research.' *Ming Pao Saturday Magazine* 70: 12-17. (in Chinese)

- Turek, Victor
 1962 *The Polish-Language Press in Canada: Its History and a Bibliographical List*. Toronto: Drukiem Polish Alliance Press Limited.
- VIP Magazine* (Toronto, in Chinese)
 1978 'James Lin.' 2: 75.
- Vogel, Ezra F.
 1991 *The Four Little Dragons-The Spread of Industrialisation in East Asia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Wachman, Alan M.
 1994 *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratisation*. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Waldinger, Roger
 1993 "The Ethnic Enclave Debate Revisited." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 17 (3): 444-452.
- Waldinger, Roger et al.
 1990 *Ethnic Entrepreneurs: Immigrant Business Industrial Societies*. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Wang, Limei
 1994 *Tih-wu Wang and the United Daily News*. Taipei: Commonwealth Publishing Co., Ltd. (in Chinese)
- Wang, Shuguang
 1998 *Chinese Commercial Activity in Toronto CMA: New Development Patterns and Impacts* (unpublished paper). School of Applied Geography, Ryerson Polytechnic University.
 1996 *New Development Patterns of Chinese Commercial Activities in Toronto*. Toronto: Centre for the Study of Commercial Activity, Ryerson Polytechnic University.
- Wei, Ran
 1998 "Press Developments in Taiwan and the Changing Coverage of the Taiwan-China Relationship." In *Mass Media in the Asian Pacific*, edited by Bryced T. McIntyre, 60-71. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- Wickberg, Edgar, ed.
 1982 *From China to Canada*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart.
- Wickberg, Edgar
 1981 "Chinese Organizations and the Political Process." In *Ethnicity Power*

and Politics in Canada, edited by Jorgen Dahlie and Tissa Fernando, 172-176. Toronto: Methuen.

Wong, Lloyd

1997 "Globalization and Transnational Migration: A Study of Recent Chinese Capitalist Migration from the Asian Pacific to Canada." *International Sociology* 12 (3): 329-351.

1993 "Immigration as Capital Accumulation: The Impact of Business Immigration to Canada." *International Migration* 31(1): 171-90.

Wong, Lloyd L. and Michele Ng

1998 "Chinese Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Vancouver: A Case Study of Ethnic Business Development." *Canadian Ethnic Study* 30 (1): 64-85.

Wong, Lloyd L. and Nancy S. Netting

1992 "Business Immigration to Canada: Social Impact and Racism." In *Deconstructing A Nation: Immigration, Multiculturalism and Racism in '90s Canada*, edited by Vic Satzewich, 93-121. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing.

Wong, P. S.

1958 *The Influx of Chinese Capital into Hong Kong since 1937*. Hong Kong: Kai Ming Press.

Wong, Siu-Lun

1988 *Emigrant Entrepreneurs: Shanghai Industrialists in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.

1986 "Modernisation and Chinese Culture in Hong Kong." *China Quarterly*, 106: 306-25.

Woodsworth, Charles J.

1937 "Canada's Oriental Immigrants." *The Canadian Form*, XVII (November): 268-270.

World Journal (Toronto edition, in Chinese)

1995 August 25.

1990 February 1 and August 1.

1988 December 15-31.

1985 February 1 and August 1.

World Journal Booklet (No published date, but certainly after 1991)

Woronoff, Jon

1992 *Asia's 'Miracle' Economy*. 2nd. edition. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.

- Wu, Hsin-hsing
 1994 *Bridging the Strait: Taiwan, China, and the Prospects for Reunification*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Wu, Y. L.,
 1985 *Becoming an Industrialised Nation: ROC's Development on Taiwan*. New York: Praeger.
- Wynar, Lubomy R., and Anna T. Wynar
 1976 *Encyclopedic Directory of Ethnic Newspapers and Periodicals in the United States*. 2nd edition. Littleton, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited.
- Yancey, William L., E.P. Ericksen, and R.N. Juliani
 1976 "Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformation." *American Sociological Review* 41: 391-403.
- Yang, Manke
 1987 "The closing of *Beimai* and opening of *Yamei*." *The Nineties*, 216 (December): 78. (in Chinese)
- Yazhou Zhoukan
 1997 "Ming Pao Landed on the United States." April 14 – 20: 70. (in Chinese)
- Yee, Chu Ping
 1982 *Chu Ping Essays*. Reprinted in Taipei. (in Chinese)
 1988 *Seventy Years' Sojourning in Canada*. Vancouver: Huaxia Press. (in Chinese)
- Yen, Ching Hwang
 1976 *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution - with Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- Zhang, David Wen-wei, et al.
 1998 *The Politics of Hong Kong's Reversion to China*. New York: ST. Martin's Press.
- Zhang, Shengru
 1995a "Hu Xian (Sally Aw): The Tigress Who Turned the Paper Profitable." *Next*, 258 (February 17): 98-104. (in Chinese)
 1995b "The Rise and Fall of Hu Xian." *Next*, 259 (February, 24): 103-108. (in Chinese).
- Zhou, Ming

1992 *Chinatown: The Socio-economic Potential of an Urban Enclave.*
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Zhou, Min, and John R. Logan

1989 "Returns on Human Capital in Ethnic Enclave: New York City's
Chinatown." *American Sociological Review* 54: 809-820.

Zubrzycki, Jerzy

1958 "The Role of the Foreign-Language Press in Migrant Integration."
Population Studies 12: 73-82.