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TENSIONS AND CONTRADICTIONS IN POST-COLD WAR CUBA

by

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**Submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts**

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ABSTRACT

1999 marks the Cuban Revolution's 40th anniversary. The Cuban government and its economy have shown remarkable resilience over the past forty years; the government has retained power and has withstood the break up of the Soviet Union. However, the rise in uni-polarity, neo-liberalism and globalization have brought new challenges. This thesis examines the tensions and contradictions that are being produced within the Cuban political economy as the Cuban government attempts to forge its 'third way' within the new international political economic order. Analysis of these tensions and contradictions is essential to understand the constraints that Cuba's Revolutionary government faces as it approaches the year 2000, as well as those which any government might face should it pursue an alternative to the neo-liberal route. In order to provide a comprehensive analysis which recognizes the uniqueness of the Cuban situation, Cuba's history from 1492 to the present is covered and dependency theory is used as the theoretical framework. Indeed, this study reveals that the greatest challenge to the government is the conflict between the Cuban identity fostered by the Revolution and the rise in inequality brought about by the economic reforms.

DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mum, my uncles, David and John Linehan, my friends, Shelly Abdool and Silvia Fernandez, and my granddad.

My mum (Che), by some miracle, has put up with me for all these years, been constantly supportive and a true friend to me.

My uncles, David and John, provided me with a good laugh when I really needed one! Also, Uncle David's EastEnders' Lovely Bubbly served as a wonderful incentive to finish this work!

Shelly's kindness, sense of humour and timely warnings to "step away from the thesis," have made me consider myself very lucky to have her as a friend.

I have also been very fortunate to count Silvia Fernandez, whose classes at the University of Havana sparked my interest in 'Cubanology,' as one of my friends.

Above all, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my granddad, Ted Brown. His kindheartedness, honesty and willingness to help anyone will never be forgotten.

My friends from Mexico (Amber, Bill, Hugo, Jorge, Ken, Manon and Sergio) also deserve a special dedication and thanks for being good friends and for all the help, fun and laughs they have given me.

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INTRODUCTION

The flood of analyses of Cuba's political economy following the Soviet Union's disintegration largely relied on over-simplified comparisons to Eastern Europe. These studies ignored the historical specificity of the Cuban Revolution, and thus resulted in erroneous predictions that the Cuban Revolution's demise was imminent.¹ The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the changed international political economic order is influencing Cuba's success in carving out an alternative to the neo-liberal route, and the tensions and contradictions that are resulting. In contrast with the aforementioned studies, this paper analyzes current Cuban tensions and contradictions within a historical context. Accordingly, the period from 1492 to the present is covered.

1999 marks the 40th anniversary of the Cuban Revolutionary government. Throughout most of its history, the Revolution has managed to surmount tremendous obstacles, most notably U.S. aggression, and to achieve numerous successes, such as the eradication of illiteracy and the attainment of one of the highest human development index rankings in Latin America.² With the fall of the Soviet Union, however, the Revolution has had to face its most severe challenges yet. The impact on the economy has been devastating. Within two years, Cuba lost credits and subsidies estimated at US\$1.4 billion per year.³ Further, markets for Cuban goods were lost, with exports plummeting by 80%.⁴ Sources of imports were also lost, imports plunged by 75%,⁵ including key commodities, such as oil, which was imported at 10% of previous levels.⁶ At the end of 1993, the Cuban government estimated the total cost of the collapse of the

¹ In his article, "Cuba and Cuban Studies," Cubanologist, Manuel Pastor, noted the shortcomings of recent studies, writing, "the seemingly urgent need to respond to these twists and turns...means that many new volumes on Cuba do not step back to paint a historical picture within which...[to] contextualize the more fundamental reasons for the Cuban transformation." Latin American Research Review Vol. 31, No. 3, 1996, p.220.

² "Human Development Index," United Nations Development Programme 1998. N.pag. Online. Internet. July 12, 1999.

Available: www.undp.org/hdro/98hdi2.htm

³ "Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (July, 1997), p.38, Online, Internet. June 17, 1999.

Available: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latin/viewdocument-e.asp?continent=Latin&country=11&name=cuba

⁴ Pedro Monreal, "Sea Changes: the New Cuban Economy," NACLA Report on the Americas March-April, 1999, p.23.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Louis Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.383.

Soviet bloc to Cuba's economy at US\$5.7 billion;⁷ the Cuban economy had lost 70% of its purchasing power⁸ and its GDP had decreased by approximately 50%.⁹

The economic crisis has been intensified by several external developments, most notably, the transition to uni-polarity, the rise of neo-liberalism and the proliferation of globalization. The emergence of uni-polarity has had a more profound impact on Cuba than most Third World countries due to the United States' economic blockade of the island. Not only is the island cut off from the world's largest consumer market, it is unable to purchase goods made by U.S. firms and, in addition, foreign firms conducting business in Cuba are subjected to retaliatory measures. In addition, the embargo prohibits the U.S. government from participating in any international organization which grants aid or loans to Cuba. Thus, in marked contrast to the Eastern European countries, Cubans have received little aid due to lack of access to these sources. In December of 1998, Carlos Lage, Vice President of the National Assembly, stated that the embargo costs the island approximately \$800 million per year.¹⁰

The proliferation of globalization and neo-liberalism has meant that Cuba is increasingly reliant on economic interaction with a world in which it has few ideological allies. Marcos Portal, the Cuban Minister of Basic Industries, explained the impact of the change in the international economic order and the Cuban desire to prevent future situations of economic dependency, stating, "We went to bed one night and when we woke up, the Soviet Union was gone, so we had to begin all over again. The same thing had occurred years before with the United States. This is not going to happen again to us."¹¹ Indeed, this new international economic order has forced the Cuban government to enact numerous free market economic reforms, including the encouragement of foreign investment, the legalization of public possession of U.S. dollars, the creation of agricultural co-operatives and markets, the legalization of self-employment and the reduction of public expenditures. The government is, in essence, attempting to forge a

⁷ Susan Eckstein, Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.93.

⁸ Eckstein, p. 93.

⁹ Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Hiram Marquetti Nodarse, "La economía Cubana. Actualidad y tendencias," Economía y Desarrollo September 1995, Vol. 117, No. 1, p.33.

¹⁰ Caribbean & Central America Report January 19, 1999.

¹¹ Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, "What Cuba Can Teach Russia," Foreign Policy Winter 1998, p. 4.

'third way,' that is, to maintain the achievements of its Revolution while increasing the island's economic growth. However, the successful implementation of this third option is highly tenuous. Externally, globalization, uni-polarity and neo-liberalism are placing numerous constraints on the Cuban capacity to pursue autonomous development. Moreover, these external forces are serving to create friction internally. As explained by Fernando Martínez Heredia, the head of the Department of Regional Studies at the *Centro de Estudios sobre América*, the success of this third option depends on "whether tensions which are developing between our specific interests and the homogenizing tendencies that are gaining ground in the world today will grow to critical proportions or remain within manageable bounds."¹²

From a broader perspective, the Revolution's success in forging a 'third way' has significant repercussions internationally; it provides an example for other Third World countries of the challenges faced in endeavouring to pursue an alternative to the neo-liberal route. Francisco Lopez Segrera of UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) has remarked on this, observing, "if Cuba fails, it will have tragic consequences not only for this island, but at a global level, both in the South and in the North."¹³

This work is comprised of four chapters. The first sets out the theoretical framework. It provides an overview of dependency theory, outlining the various schools of dependency theory and explaining both their strengths and weaknesses. The reformist perspective is selected as the theoretical framework for analysis because it recognizes the historical specificity of the state and studies the interplay between external actors and domestic forces in the shaping of the domestic political economy.

The second chapter provides a brief analysis of the Cuban political economy from 1492 to 1959. Given the expansive time period covered in this chapter, it represents more of a brief overview than an in-depth analysis. The goal of this chapter is to isolate the formation of political economic trends, such as monoculture, the lack of an internal

¹² Fernando Martínez Heredia, "Cuban Socialism: Prospects and Challenges," trans. Janell Pierce *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 69, Vol. 18, No.2, Spring 1991, p.35.

¹³ Francisco López Segrera, "Rejoinder to Edelstein," *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 87, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 1995, p.36.

market and the origins of the one-party system, which continue to influence the Cuban political economy to this day.

The period from 1959 to 1989 is covered in the third chapter. A more thorough analysis is provided in this chapter. This chapter uses indicators of dependency to highlight particular areas in which the Cuban government remained reliant on external forces and where greater autonomy was achieved. Particular attention is paid to the creation of a Cuban identity.

Last, the fourth chapter represents an attempt to utilize the information from Cuba's history to explain the current challenges that the Revolution faces. This chapter builds on the set of indicators used in the previous chapter and highlights the friction between the new international economic order and the creation of the 'third way,' particularly the internal manifestations, such as the friction between the Revolutionary identity and the new reality.

CHAPTER ONE: DEPENDENCY THEORY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CUBA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

The disintegration of the socialist camp has had a profound effect on Cuba's political economy. Indeed, the changes accompanying the Soviet Union's collapse, namely, the 'triumph' of neo-liberalism, the rise of uni-polarity and globalization, have devastated Cuba's economy and left it ideologically isolated. This changed international political economic order has forced the Cuban government to undertake a variety of economic and political reforms as part of an attempt to improve economic conditions while maintaining the pillars of its Revolution. Cuba's success in forging this 'third way' hinges on whether the economic and political reforms undertaken will be sufficient to withstand international "homogenizing tendencies" and intensified U.S. economic aggression.¹ Accordingly, this paper does not attempt to answer definitively whether the Revolution will be able to resist these external forces, but rather to analyze the tensions and contradictions that these external forces are producing within the Cuban political economy.

Dependency theory, particularly the reformist perspective, provides a solid framework for the study of the impact of this changed international political economic order on Cuba's political economy. Its incorporation of a systems level of analysis facilitates analysis of the impact of international forces on Cuba's Revolution. Further, its recognition of the historical specificity of the state accommodates Cuba's unique situation as an ideologically isolated socialist country and former Soviet ally ninety miles off the U.S. coast.

Objective and Format

The objective of this chapter is to set out the theoretical framework that will be used to study Cuba's political economy. Modernization theory will first be discussed, as dependency theory evolved out of a rejection of this paradigm. The common principles

¹ In the form of the Helms-Burton Law.

of dependency theory will then be reviewed, followed by a more detailed discussion of the three schools of dependency theory, the structuralist, the Marxist and the reformist.

Modernization Theory and Its Critics

Dependency theory emerged out of a response to the perceived failings of modernization theory, the most widely accepted theory of development following World War II. The theory of modernization relies heavily on the work of economic theorist, Walter Rostow. Rostow developed the 'stage' theory of development, which he declared "constitutes, in the end, both a theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about modern history."² Basing his work on the historical process of economic development of Western Europe, Rostow claimed that in the transition from a 'backward' to a developed economy, a society passes through five stages. Rostow purported that the first stage typified 'traditional' society, whose "structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world."³ In the second stage, the foundation for self-sustained growth is laid and traditional values are challenged.⁴ By the third stage, countries enter into the 'take-off period.' This period, Rostow claimed, was the "interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome" and "the forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts and enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society."⁵ Rostow labelled the fourth stage "the drive to maturity." In this stage, "the make-up of the economy changes unceasingly as technique improves...The economy finds its place in the international economy...[and] the society makes such terms as it will with the requirements of modern production, balancing off the new against the older values and institutions..."⁶ Rostow stated that the fifth and final stage would be one which Western Europe had already

² Walter Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p.1.

³ Ibid., p.4.

⁴ Ibid., pp.6-7.

⁵ Ibid., p.7.

⁶ Ibid., p.9.

achieved; a situation of mass consumption, a shift from heavy industry to consumer durables and the development of a social welfare system.⁷

Modernizationists purported that economic development was not only a function of economic policy, but also of culture. Indeed, modernization theory is premised on the belief that the values held by traditional society perpetuate underdevelopment. Accordingly, modernizationists, such as Myron Weiner, argued that “attitudinal and value changes are prerequisites to creating a modern society, economic and political system.”⁸ As such, those in the less developed countries were counselled to emulate North American/Western European values in order to quicken the transition from stage to stage and to achieve what the theorists termed the ideal form of societal organization, “the liberal, democratic capitalist model of the West.”⁹ In his book, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*, Harrison listed these Northern values as: future orientation (as opposed to fatalism), rationality, rational religion, equality, fair play, self-discipline, compromise, co-operation, trust and a strong work ethic.¹⁰

In order to encourage the diffusion of Western cultural values, a variety of tools was suggested. In their overview of modernization theory, for example, Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela listed the commonly recommended instruments as “foreign aid, foreign educational opportunities, overseas business investments [and] mass media.”¹¹ Similarly, in *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*, Harrison suggested a program of reformed leadership, religion, development projects, education and training, media, management practices and child-rearing practices, to cultivate Northern values.¹²

With respect to Latin American economic development, specifically, modernizationists stated that the difference between the values transported by the British and the Spanish colonizers caused British North America’s economic growth to far exceed that of Latin America’s. Whereas the British transported an individualistic

⁷ Rostow, p.10.

⁸ Myron Weiner, *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth* (New York: Basic Books, 1966), p.6, cited in Anton Allahar, *Sociology and the Periphery* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995), p.18.

⁹ Lawrence Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America), p.167.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.5.

¹¹ J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives to the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment,” *From Dependency to Development*, ed. H. Munoz (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1981), p. 18.

¹² Harrison, pp.169-176.

Protestant ethic to North America, the Spanish transplanted a primitive capitalist Catholic hierarchical ethic to South America, resulting in the evolution of markedly different political and economic systems and institutions. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, remarked,

The overseas offspring of Great Britain seemingly had the advantage of values derived in part from the Protestant Ethic and from the formation of 'New Societies' in which feudal ascriptive elements were missing. Since Latin America, on the other hand is Catholic, it has been dominated for centuries by ruling elites who created a social structure congruent with feudal social values.¹³

The economic manifestations of these values were of particular significance to modernizationists. They argued that one of the greatest impediments to development was that these 'traditional' values conditioned Latin Americans to contradict the fundamental tenet of liberal capitalism, self-interest. For example, in their article, "Modernization and Dependency," Valenzuela and Valenzuela noted, "Bolivian businessmen will not take risks with their capital, preferring to put money in Swiss banks...Ecuadorians will study law rather than enter a more lucrative career in business or technology."¹⁴

Despite its widespread acceptance, modernization theory was condemned in various circles for its ahistoric, Eurocentric, statist approach to development. The aspect of modernization which attracted the most criticism was its lack of recognition of the role external forces play in shaping the development of LDCs (less developed countries). Its critics argued that external forces, particularly imperialism and the world capitalist system, played a significant role in shaping the political economies of LDCs, acting to constrain autonomous decision-making and limiting development. *Dependentista*, Paul Baran, for example, stated that "the violent, destructive and predatory opening up of the weaker countries by Western capitalism immeasurably distorted their development."¹⁵ To illustrate his point, he used the example of India, writing, "it would have been...an entirely different India...had she been allowed...to realize her destiny in her own way, to employ her resources for her own benefit, to harness her energies and abilities for the

¹³ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," *Elites in Latin America*, eds. Lipset and Solari (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 14, cited in Valenzuela and Valenzuela, p.22.

¹⁴ Valenzuela and Valenzuela, p.20.

¹⁵ Paul Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York: Prometheus, 1960), p.162.

advancement of her own people.”¹⁶ Similarly, scholar Andre Gunder Frank, rejected the theory because the “entire approach to economic development and cultural change attributes a history to the developed countries but denies all history to the under-developed one.”¹⁷ Others, such as Howard Wiarda, denounced the paradigm because it purported that there is only one single path to development and one corresponding universal end result.¹⁸

The economic foundation of modernization theory was also criticized. *Dependentistas* challenged modernization’s economic tenets of take-off/stage theory and comparative advantage. Paul Baran, for example, stated that “Rostovian stage theory, despite its comprehensive historic and sociological claims, reduces economic growth to a single pattern...within its extremely narrow limits Rostovian theory can neither explain nor predict without introducing considerations that are irrelevant to the stage schema.”¹⁹ Raul Prebisch, the former head of ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), devoted much of his work to refuting the theory of comparative advantage. His analysis of trade patterns revealed that prices of primary goods, the chief foreign exchange earners for LDCs, steadily decrease, whereas the prices of manufactured goods, the goods imported by LDCs, tend to rise or remain constant.²⁰ Thus, Prebisch concluded that primary exporting LDCs were doomed to continued underdevelopment because of declining terms of trade.

Modernization’s prescriptive capacity was similarly questioned. The desirability of foreign investment was viewed as particularly dubious. The *dependentistas* challenged the support for foreign investment on a variety of fronts. First, they claimed that the high incidence of profit repatriation resulted in foreign companies extracting a surplus from the host country, thereby discouraging re-investment in the economy.²¹ Furthermore, the

¹⁶ Baran, p.150.

¹⁷ Andre Gunder Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution?* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p.30, cited in ed. P.W. Preston, *Development Theory* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1976), p.172.

¹⁸ Howard J. Wiarda, “The Ethnocentrism of Social Science,” *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings*, eds. Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown (Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1986), p.470.

¹⁹ Baran, p.xxiii.

²⁰ See Raúl Prebisch, *Revista Económica* 1967, ser.2, No.1, pp.26-27.

²¹ Jorge Gilbert and Vassilis Haralambidis, *Economic and Cultural Dependence in Latin America* (Toronto: Two Thirds Editions, 1984), p.63.

small amount not repatriated remained largely in the hands of the elite, which tends to spend its money on imported luxury items rather than reinvesting in the domestic economy.²² Second, the *dependentistas* posited that there was very little appropriate technological transfer.²³ Third, foreign investment was viewed to be disadvantageous because cultural changes were brought about which were detrimental to the domestic economy, such as changes in tastes away from domestically produced goods.²⁴ Finally, a high degree of foreign penetration of the domestic economy was viewed to be disadvantageous because it facilitated foreign influence in domestic affairs.²⁵

Dependency Theory

The above-detailed rejection of modernization theory culminated in the formation of dependency theory, which represents the convergence of three schools of thought: the structuralist, the Marxist and the reformist.²⁶ Despite varying in their emphases and prescriptive capacities, all three perspectives accept a common definition of dependency, that is, “a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence...assumes the form of dependence when some countries can expand and be self-sustaining while other countries can only do this as a reflection of that expansion.”²⁷

Dependentistas divide the world into centre/core (the developed countries) and periphery (the underdeveloped countries). Through the implementation of a systems level of analysis, the *dependentistas* argue that the structures developed by the core, particularly the world capitalist system and imperialism, have served to underdevelop the periphery by restricting its autonomy. This restriction of autonomy has economic, political and cultural manifestations, which will be discussed in greater detail presently.

²² Celso Furtado, “The Concept of External Dependence in the Study of Underdevelopment,” The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. Charles Wilber (New York: Random House, 1973), pp.118-123, cited in Ronald Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment (London: Westview Press, 1984), p.121.

²³ Allahar, p.94.

²⁴ Gilbert and Halambidis, p.60.

²⁵ Ibid., p.70.

²⁶ This does not suggest that dependency was the sole critique of modernization.

²⁷ Theotonio dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” American Economic Review 60 May, p.231.

First, periphery markets develop to satisfy the material needs of the core, as opposed to those of the domestic market. Second, trans-national class coalitions emerge in which there is a coincidence of interests between the periphery's raw material-exporting bourgeoisie and the core's industrial bourgeoisie. As a result of this coincidence of interests, the periphery's political systems are structured to facilitate the perpetuation of the core's interests, which, in turn, creates crises of governmental legitimacy; there is a void of charismatic, legal-rational and performance legitimacy.²⁸ Internally, a situation of cultural dependency evolves, by which "an alien reality, reflecting only the patterns and interests of domination of that society," is imposed on the periphery, providing the "ideological support for maintaining the patterns of domination" internally.²⁹

In settling the colonies, the core's primary motivation was economic. The core attempted to increase its economic wealth through securing access to sources of cheap raw materials; these raw materials were imported to the core, refined/manufactured and then resold to captive periphery markets. This, in turn, *underdeveloped* the periphery economy because the periphery's economy evolved in accordance with the centre's requirements. The core determined which primary goods would be produced in the periphery and their prices, thereby preventing economic diversification and the development of manufacturing. In his book, *Sociology and the Periphery*, Anton Allahaar contrasted the results of this economic relationship between the core and the periphery, writing,

...a thriving internal market develops within the centres of advanced capitalism. Wages are increased, and the spread of commercial activity results in higher demand for various other goods and services, greater economic differentiation...Within the mining and plantation colonies...one finds rather backward techniques of land cultivation, low levels of technological and scientific development, a heavy concentration on raw or unfinished agricultural and mineral exports, very few centres of

²⁸ Cubanologist, Jorge Domínguez, has defined performance legitimacy as the widespread belief that those in power are enacting legislation reflective of popular demand. Jorge Domínguez, *Cuba: Between Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978), pp.28-30. Max Weber has defined legal legitimacy as "a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue command" and charismatic legitimacy as "devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed ordained by him." Max Weber, *Charisma and Institution Building* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p.46.

²⁹ Gilbert and Haralambidis, p.2.

industrial production, and highly labour-intensive methods of work.³⁰

The formation of trans-national class coalitions served to further underdevelop the periphery. According to the *dependentistas*, the transplantation of primitive capitalism from pre-industrial Spain created a raw material 'exporting bourgeoisie' in Latin America, rather than an industrial bourgeoisie. This comprador bourgeoisie's primary concern, namely, establishing foreign markets for its goods, meant that an alliance between the periphery's bourgeoisie and that of the core was easily consolidated. With the economic clout of both groups, a highly powerful trans-national class coalition was formed in which the patterns of domination were rearticulated internally.

The political-economic manifestations of this trans-national class coalition heightened economic dependency. The periphery government, which was controlled by the bourgeoisie, introduced economic policies which furthered the interests of the exporting class and simultaneously served to underdevelop the periphery economy. The policy of free trade provides one such example. The periphery bourgeoisie's desire to guarantee access to foreign markets and the core's need to maintain sources of cheap raw materials and captive markets for its goods, meant that free trade policies were highly popular with both groups and, consequently, were frequently implemented. However, reciprocal trade policies impeded economic development in the periphery; diversification was hampered as landowners concentrated on one crop destined for overseas markets, rather than cultivating diversified crops to satisfy the internal market. Further, possibilities for the development of manufacturing were effectively eradicated. Faced with unfettered competition from overseas producers, which had already achieved economies of scale, many would-be domestic manufacturers decided against entering the manufacturing industry. The negative terms of trade of primary goods compounded the problem, increasing economic dependency.

The manipulation of government to perpetuate patterns of domination internally resulted in a popularly-held negative perception of the state. Government was viewed as an instrument of transnationalized bourgeois interests, as opposed to an institutional reflection of periphery reality. As such, a void of legitimacy was created in which the

³⁰ Allahaar, p.111.

government lacked performance, legal-rational and charismatic legitimacy and there was a disassociation from the state. *Dependentistas* Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto have summarized the relationship between the trans-national class coalitions, the state and the rearticulation of patterns of domination internally, as follows,

Both the battle between classes and the basic dependency relationship find in the state a natural crossroads. The contradiction of a state that constitutes a nation without being sovereign is the nucleus of the subject matter of dependency...The majority...come to be looked upon as a resource for the accumulation of capital more than as the effective potential for the creation of a society modelled on its own interests. Under these conditions, the state and the nation have become separated: all that is authentically popular, even if lacking the character of specific class demands, has come under suspicion...³¹

Dependency Schools of Thought

It was Raul Prebisch's work refuting the economic tenets of modernization theory that spawned the earliest school of dependency, structuralism. Although its prescriptive capacity was rejected by numerous Latin Americanists, several scholars took the basic theoretical framework of dependency and applied different perspectives. Two more schools of dependency theory emerged from these writings: the Marxist and the reformist.

The structuralist school of thought asserted that the primary cause of underdevelopment was declining terms of trade. Accordingly, the structuralists argued that in order to overcome dependency, periphery countries would have to undergo rapid industrialization. The strategy they proposed was import substitution. Import substitution is essentially the imposition of tariffs on foreign manufactured goods in order to encourage domestic producers to enter the market.³² According to its proponents, the strategy is advisable because "the market is already there, and all a country's planners have to do is ensure that the domestic industry can compete effectively with the imported

³¹ Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979), pp. 200-201.

³² Malcolm Gillis, et. al., eds., *Economics of Development* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), p.321.

product.”³³ However, this strategy is widely regarded to have failed in practice. Publicly owned industries were rife with corruption, balance of payments problems arose, inappropriate technologies were imported and severe foreign exchange shortages resulted.³⁴ In Mexico, for example, “for every one dollar of manufactured good exported, Mexico spent six dollars to import intermediate and capital goods.”³⁵ Furthermore, the economies remained largely in foreign hands; branch plants proliferated as corporations attempted to surmount the tariff wall.³⁶

It was this prescriptive failure that gave rise to the Marxist and Reformist schools of dependency. Much of the writings from the Marxist school came out of CESO, the Centre of Socio-Economic Studies at the University of Chile in Santiago. This perspective, which includes the works of such scholars as Theotonio dos Santos and Andre Gunder Frank, built on the foundations of dependency theory as outlined by the structuralists. However, they incorporated additional facets; their two major contributions were the heavy emphases on class-based analysis and the role of the world capitalist system, and the prescription of socialism to break the cycle of dependency.

The Marxist *dependentistas* cited the world capitalist system as the primary cause of underdevelopment. They rejected suggestions of ‘stages of development,’ stating, “underdevelopment is not original or traditional... The now developed countries were never *underdeveloped*, though they may have been *undeveloped*.”³⁷ As with the other schools of dependency theory, the Marxists also employed a historical analysis. Marxist *dependentista*, Andre Gunder Frank, used a systems-level historical approach to illustrate capitalism’s negative impact on periphery economies. For example, he posited that when the periphery was the least integrated with the world capitalist system, periphery economies enjoyed the strongest economic growth.³⁸

³³ Gillis, p.65.

³⁴ M. Tavares, “The Growth and Decline of Import Substitution in Brazil,” Economic Bulletin For Latin America Vol. 9, No. 1, 1964.

³⁵ John Warnock, The Other Mexico (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1995), p.32.

³⁶ Osvaldo Sunkel, “*Política nacional de desarrollo y dependencia externa*,” Estudios Internacionales Vol. 1, No. 1, 1967, cited in Cristobal Kay, Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment (London: Routledge, 1989), p.130.

³⁷ Andre Gunder Frank, “The Development of Underdevelopment,” Monthly Review 18 September 1966, pp.15-16, cited in Chilcote, p.86.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.23-30 cited in Chilcote p.87.

The Marxist *dependentistas* also heavily emphasized the role of class systems in fostering underdevelopment. They posited that the local bourgeoisie is more concerned with satisfying foreign markets and forming alliances with foreign capital than in fostering domestic development, as was made evident by the widespread failure of import substitution. Further, the Marxists concluded that populist alliances have been unable to sustain power because the necessity of preventing a populist alliance, which may weaken bourgeois control and discourage foreign investment, causes the bourgeoisie to support fascist dictatorships aimed at suppressing populist movements.

As such, the Marxists claimed that development within the world capitalist system was impossible because, in order for the centre to develop under capitalism (the parameters of which are set by the core), the underdevelopment of the periphery is required. Accordingly, the Marxist *dependentistas* prescribed socialist revolution. They claimed that it was only through socialism that the periphery could experience development because a total break from the world capitalist system was required, and the only other alternative was fascism. Theotonio dos Santos stated the Marxist position clearly,

...the profound Latin American crisis cannot find a solution within capitalism. Either one advances in a revolutionary and decisive manner towards socialism and a path of development and progress for the vast masses in our countries is opened, or one appeals to fascist barbarism, the only alternative able to secure the conditions of political survival for capital for some time so that it can continue its dependent development, based on the over-exploitation of the workers, the denationalization of our economies, the exclusion of vast sectors of the petit-bourgeoisie, the export adventure in detriment of the consumption of the national masses.³⁹

The Marxist dependency school was the most radical of the three perspectives and attracted a great deal of criticism. Its critics claimed that it was “ahistorical,” “deterministic” and failed to recognize capitalism’s progressive role in Latin America. Professor Gabriel Palma of the University of London, for example, stated that the Marxist *dependentistas* “have been unable to see the specificity of [capitalism’s] historical

³⁹ Theotonio Dos Santos, *Imperialismo y Dependencia* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1978), p.471, cited in Kay, p.154.

progressiveness in Latin America. They have therefore thrown out the baby with the bathwater...” and “...contributed little to the study of development.”⁴⁰

It was in response to this perspective and the criticism that it provoked that the reformist school of dependency theory was formed. The 1971 publication of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s and Enzo Faletto’s *Dependency and Development in Latin America* laid the foundation for the reformist perspective, the third school of dependency theory. The reformist school differed from the structuralist and the Marxist in several ways. First, the reformists rejected the ‘universality’ of the Marxist approach, arguing that dependency could not be explained by the world capitalist system and the domestic class structure alone.⁴¹ Correspondingly, the reformists recognized the historical specificity of the Latin American state, explaining that,

to analyze development properly, we must consider in their totality the ‘historic specificities,’ both economic and social, underlying the development processes at the national and international levels. Within given structural situations, we must understand the conflict between social movements that are ‘set in motion’ by social classes in developing societies. Our approach must examine not only structural conditions and the ideologies of the social movements, but also their relations and their reciprocal determination.⁴²

In contrast to the other two schools of dependency theory, Faletto and Cardoso provided a more optimistic approach, arguing that dependency and development were not mutually exclusive and that it was possible for the periphery to increase its autonomy, thereby decreasing dependency. They posited that “associated-dependent development” could take place in the periphery and pointed to the high levels of growth achieved by various military dictatorships in Latin America as evidence. Further, Cardoso and Faletto cited the changing international political equilibrium as a source of opportunity for increased autonomy in the periphery. Using the examples of the OPEC crisis, “the impossibility of intervening in Africa” and U.S. failures in South-East Asia, Cardoso and Faletto argued that the international political equilibrium is in a constant state of flux and

⁴⁰ Gabriel Palma, “Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?” *World Development*, 6, 1978, p. 904.

⁴¹ Cardoso and Faletto, p.173.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.13.

that this creates opportunities for the periphery to pursue more autonomist policies.⁴³ Indeed, on page 185 of *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, they claimed that this dynamic nature of the international system helps to explain “the viability of the moderate and marginally autonomist policies of some peripheral countries: the international political equilibrium has been disrupted, and, as a result, more room to manoeuvre is open to new political situations in the Third World.” This optimism, however, relied heavily on the Cold War bi-polar structure; it was the persistent tug-of-war between the two superpowers which caused a constantly fluctuating political equilibrium. However, with the end of bi-polarity and the rapid pace of globalization, some of these windows of opportunity are closing. Controls over production are increasingly dictated outside the country and infant LDC industries are being forced to compete with those which already possess economies of scale. Yet, room for optimism remains. While uni-polarity has evolved and neo-liberalism appears to have “triumphed,” the international political economy is still subject to constant fluctuations. The formation of regional trading blocs is one source of disequilibrium; the European Union is one such example. The case of China provides another example; its tremendous military might, combined with its economic power, is causing some analysts to predict an international re-alignment of power.

Last, and again in contrast to both the Marxists and the structuralists, the reformists offered no prescription to eradicate dependency. They perceived neither the Marxists’ prescription of socialism nor the structuralists’ recommendation of import substitution to be viable solutions to dependency.⁴⁴ Rather, they concluded that the historical specificity of the state prevented the formulation of any universally applicable prescription.

Conclusion

As demonstrated above, dependency theory provides an effective framework for an analysis of how the changed international economic order is influencing Cuba’s success in pursuing an alternative to the neo-liberal path and the internal tensions and

⁴³ Cardoso and Faletto, p.184.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 4-5.

contradictions that it is producing. Dependency's systems level of analysis facilitates study of the international forces of neo-liberalism, globalization and uni-polarity on the Cuban political economy. In addition, its focus on unequal power relations is particularly relevant to the Cuban case, as the United States' economic aggression severely limits the options available to the Cubans. Further, the reformist perspective's acknowledgement of the historical specificity of the state and its rejection of economic determinism are particularly pertinent to the Cuban case. Indeed, it aids in avoiding the central theoretical shortcoming of many recent analyses which have been premised on the erroneous supposition that Cuba would necessarily follow the same path of Eastern Europe following the break up of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER TWO: PATTERNS OF DEPENDENCY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA (1492 TO 1959)

The 1959 victory of the Cuban Revolution attracted international attention. Although it came as a surprise to many, it was soon clear that it was the result of a historical process of underdevelopment and arrested autonomy. Following the incorporation of Cuba into the Spanish trading system in the 1700s, the island's economy had been persistently underdeveloped. Both Spain and the U.S. had actively constrained Cuban sovereignty, manipulating the economy and polity in order to further their own interests.

As in 1959, understanding of Cuba's current political economy requires analysis of its history of dependent development. Accordingly, this chapter provides a brief study of Cuba's underdevelopment from 1492 to 1959. It is clear that the decades of Spanish and U.S. domination, with a few brief exceptions, resulted in a high degree of economic, political and cultural dependency, due primarily to the constraints placed on Cuban autonomy. Indeed, from 1492 to 1959, Cuba's economy passed through two of the main stages of dependent development, namely, colonial dependency¹ and 'financial-industrial' dependency.²

Objective and Format

- This chapter puts forth the argument that Cuba's polity and economy were underdeveloped through a history of foreign domination. The results of both Spanish and U.S. intervention were the proliferation of monoculture, the prevention of economic diversification and industrialization, and the evolution of a polity at odds with the Cuban political economic milieu.

In this chapter, I attempt to outline and analyze the foundation of Cuba's dependent development and to identify the formation of various patterns. Particular

¹ In his book, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, Ronald Chilcote paraphrased dos Santos' writings on the three historical forms of dependency, explaining colonial dependency as the form of dependency "in which trade monopolies were established over the land, mines, and labour of colonial societies." Financial-industrial dependency is characterized by "the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centers and its expansion abroad." Ronald Chilcote, Theories of Development and Underdevelopment, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p.61.

² Financial-industrial dependency is characterized by "the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centers and its expansion abroad." Ibid.

attention is paid to the rise of sugar monoculture, the role of Spain and the U.S. in the island's political evolution, and the internal class system. In order to facilitate this analysis, I have divided the chapter into the following five periods: colonial dependency (1492 to 1749), the transition to financial-industrial dependent development (1750 to 1878), from Spanish to U.S. domination (1878 to 1895), independence without sovereignty (1896 to 1920) and, finally, a Revolutionary response to dependency (1920 to 1959).

1492 to 1749: From Inward-looking Development to Colonial Dependency

In settling Cuba, the Spanish sought to secure a strategic stronghold to protect the mineral riches of Mexico and Peru. Because the island did not offer mineral wealth comparable to other Spanish colonies, Cuba's population remained very small and developed a rather insular nature.³ This isolation had economic consequences in that a relatively inward-looking pattern of development emerged in which most *criollos*⁴ pursued diversified agriculture in order to satisfy the domestic market, allowing the foundation to be laid for the development of an internal market.⁵ However, a pattern of colonial dependent development evolved in the early 1700s, when the Spanish crown looked to Cuba as a source of income. As a result, the development of the internal market was arrested and agricultural diversification was suspended.

The onset of the first half of the eighteenth century dramatically altered Cuba's pattern of economic development when the Spanish incorporated the Cuban economy into its trading system. The Spanish acted as 'trade intermediaries,' forbidding all inter-American trade. Aided by the creation of monopolies, they purchased goods from the colonies at artificially low prices, refined them in Spain and then resold them to Europe and other colonies at substantially higher prices.⁶ Consequently, Cuba's autonomous

³ A small group of families controlled approximately 100 plantations. Unlike most of the Caribbean's plantation owners, few ever visited Spain and fewer still held hopes of returning to Spain. Leslie Bethell, *Cuba: A Short History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.4.

⁴ A *criollo* is defined as "a white born in the Spanish American empire." A *peninsular* is defined as "a white born in Europe who later came to [Spanish America]." E. Bradford Burns, *Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), pp.350-351.

⁵ Unlike the other Caribbean plantation owners who exported the vast majority of their produce, only 10 per cent of Cuban crops were exported. *Ibid.*

⁶ Jorge Gilbert and Vassilis Haralmbidis, *Economic and Cultural Dependence in Latin America* (Toronto: Two Thirds Editions, 1984), p.26.

economic development was constrained, as key economic decisions were made outside the country. The Spanish government determined what to produce, how much to produce and at what prices products would be sold.

In order to ensure access to raw materials at below-market prices, the Spanish employed a variety of methods; one of the more successful was the establishment of monopolies. One obvious example is tobacco. When tobacco production began to prove lucrative in the early 1700s, the Spanish crown intervened and established a monopoly, the *Factoría de Tabacos*. The Spanish government decreed Cuban tobacco leaves could be sold to no other entity than the *Factoría*. Consequently, the *Factoría de Tabacos* was able to set a below-market price for Cuban tobacco leaves, which were exported to Spain to be refined and subsequently sold to Europeans at a price ten times that which had been paid to the Cuban producers.⁷ Thus, the Spanish secured a cheap source of tobacco and were able to transfer the value-added content to Spain.⁸ In 1740, the *Factoría* was replaced by the Royal Company of Commerce. The Company was created to extend Spain's monopolistic control to include sugar and hides. In addition, the Royal Company of Commerce was made the chief importer, further stifling economic development. Not only were Cuban-produced goods purchased at artificially low prices, but Cubans were also charged grossly inflated prices for imports, including those goods necessary for sugar and tobacco cultivation.⁹

These policies had highly detrimental effects on the Cuban economy. The manipulation of Cuba's economy effectively cut off any potential for diversification, re-investment in the domestic economy and manufacturing. The high prices charged for imports and the low prices paid for Cuban-produced goods significantly reduced the Cuban farmers' profit margins and thus limited re-investment in the economy. Further, the input of value-added content in Spain, rather than Cuba, decreased the potential for diversification and manufacturing because spin-off industries were unable to develop. Indeed, the economy soon came to typify the colonial pattern of dependency, in which "one finds rather backward techniques of land cultivation, low levels of technological and

⁷ Bethell, p.4.

⁸ Louis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp.51-52.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.42.

scientific development, a heavy concentration on raw or unfinished agricultural and mineral exports, very few centres of industrial production, and highly labour-intensive methods of work.”¹⁰

As with other Spanish colonies, a relatively rigid class system evolved. At the top of the class structure were the Spanish-born *peninsulares*, the majority of whom were merchants and government officials.¹¹ The *criollo* elite, predominantly wealthy mine owners, sugar planters, cattle ranchers and tobacco farmers, comprised the second rung.¹² Third was the *criollo* upper middle class, the salaried professionals and tobacco and coffee farmers.¹³ Fourth on the class scale were the members of the military, followed by labourers.¹⁴ Fifth were the free Afro-Cubans and, last, were the slaves.¹⁵ As Cubanologist, Luis Pérez noted, “Cuban society was divided by class and colour. The lines crossed frequently...[but this is not to suggest] that they were crossed equally freely by all parties or that such crossing challenged the premises upon which they had been constructed.”¹⁶

The *criollo* elite and the *peninsulares* formed an uneasy alliance. The *criollos* relied on the *peninsulares* to market their goods and to provide them with imports, and the *peninsulares* needed the planters’ produce to sell. Accordingly, both groups were united in their support of slavery. In addition, the *peninsulares* were the main source of loans. This alliance, however, was highly tenuous. The *criollo* elite resented the artificially low prices paid for *criollo* produce, the high prices charged for imports and the exorbitant interest rates charged by the *peninsulares* for loans. Furthermore, the *criollo elite* objected to the *peninsulares*’ control of the political sphere; *criollos* were excluded from public office and, consequently, from economic decision-making.¹⁷ The creole middle class, on the other hand, was opposed to Spanish rule and thus resented the planters’ (the *criollo* elite) demands for reform and the *peninsulares*’ support for Spanish

¹⁰ Anton Allahar, *Sociology and the Periphery* (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1995), p.111.

¹¹ Pérez, p.93.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.93

¹³ *Ibid.*, p.94.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.95.

¹⁵ Beginning in the 1500s, slaves were brought over from Africa to work on Cuban plantations.

¹⁶ Pérez, p.92.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.94.

administration.¹⁸ Correspondingly, they were generally anti-slavery since they viewed it as the “system upon which rested the privilege and prosperity of local elites.”¹⁹ In addition, the creole middle class was staunchly anti-*peninsular* because they viewed the Spanish immigrants as unwanted competition for employment and because of the exorbitant prices charged by Spanish retailers to the *criollo* small farmers.

Although the creoles objected to *peninsular* dominance over Cuba’s politics, government had a very limited role on the island and was essentially confined to administrative duties. In contrast to the other Spanish colonies of Mexico and Peru, the island experienced little political intervention from or contact with Spain. Further, political decisions were required to be approved by the Viceroy in Mexico, who was weeks away, and the local representatives lacked both decision making authority and public recognition.²⁰ Local Cuban officials were poorly paid and graft was rampant; government was viewed as a means to enrich oneself.²¹

1750 to the Ten Years War (1868 – 1878): The Transition to Financial-Industrial Dependent Development

The second half of the eighteenth century proved to be another turning point in Cuba’s economic development; the island’s economy began the transition from a colonial to a financial-industrial pattern of dependent development. The previous monopolistic control of trade was replaced with more liberal trading policies, opening up the island’s economy to foreign interests and, accordingly, facilitating U.S. economic penetration of the island. U.S. control over the means of production increased, a high trading partner concentration with the U.S. began, and various economic reforms were instituted to ensure that Cuba remained a source of cheap raw materials, primarily sugar, and a captive market for U.S. goods. Also notable was the rapid growth of sugar monoculture, which helped limit the development of the internal economy.

In 1762, during the Seven Years War, the British navy occupied the port of Havana. Although British rule was brief (less than one year), the British instituted a

¹⁸ Pérez, p.95.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.95.

²⁰ Bethell, p.4.

²¹ Ibid., p.4.

variety of far-reaching reforms. Most importantly, they lifted trade restrictions. As a result, merchants poured in from all over the world, enabling Cubans to purchase manufactured goods at very low prices.²² These liberal trading policies also affected the slave trade; the British lifted the quota on slaves, allowing slaves to be sold at prices much lower than under Spanish rule.²³

When the British withdrew from the island and the Spanish regained control, the *criollos* demanded that Spain institute similar policies of reciprocal trade.²⁴ The Spanish government complied with these requests, removing several restrictions on trade, including limits on the number of slaves that were allowed to be brought into Cuba.²⁵ The results of these reforms were dramatic.

Most notably, within twenty years of the enactment of these reforms, Cuba was transformed from a somewhat diversified and self-sufficient agricultural economy to sugar monoculture. The rise of sugar monoculture, however, was also due to various external factors, including the British import of less expensive slave labour, the success of the U.S. and Haitian Revolutions, low international coffee prices and the decision to allow foreign nationals to purchase property in Cuba. The success of the U.S. Revolution meant that trade could be carried out without British intervention²⁶ and the devastation of Haiti's sugar plantations, brought about during its Revolution, left a void for Cuba to fill as the sugar bowl of the region.²⁷ In addition, the drop in international coffee prices caused many Cuban coffee plantation owners to make a rapid transition to sugar cultivation.²⁸ Further, the Spanish government's decision to allow foreign nationals to own property in Cuba not only increased monoculture, as Americans and British, in particular, bought and consolidated small sugar plantations, but also increased the repatriation of profit back to the core. Moreover, Cuban autonomy was restricted, as nationalistic policies became less feasible due to the increased likelihood of foreign

²² Jaime Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro (New York: Scribner, 1974), p.44.

²³ *Ibid.*,

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.58.

²⁵ Pérez, pp. 59-61.

²⁶ Philip Foner, A History of Cuba and Its Relations With the U.S. Vol. I 1492 – 1845 (New York: Internal Publishers, 1962), p.43.

²⁷ Suchlicki, p.44.

²⁸ Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and Beyond (London: Brassey's, 1997) p.46.

interference.²⁹ The output of sugar almost tripled from 1762 to 1792, increasing from 5,500 tonnes to 16,000 tonnes.³⁰ Correspondingly, the average size of sugar plantations more than doubled during the same period and the amount of acreage devoted to sugar cane cultivation increased 16 fold over thirty years, rising from 10,000 acres in 1762 to 160,000 acres in 1792.³¹

The Cuban economy's move towards export-led sugar monoculture impeded the development of an internal market. First, the move to sugar monoculture left the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in world market prices. Unlike manufactured goods, whose prices are relatively constant, prices of agricultural products fluctuate according to such uncontrollable and unforeseeable factors as inclement weather. The unpredictability of these price fluctuations impedes countries' abilities to undertake development plans because they cannot make adequate forecasts of their future economic circumstances. Second, unlike manufactured goods, raw materials are subject to declining terms of trade. Third, expansive amounts of land are needed to cultivate sugar and the harvest period is a mere four months.³² According to author, Carlos Franquí, this idle time and land usage resulted in the "misuse of energy, labour and arable land."³³ Cubanologist, Luis Pérez, has summed up the effects of the increasing sugar monoculture writing,

...sugar production expanded rapidly during these years, in the place of other forms of agriculture, in lieu of other forms of production. It served as a powerful centripetal force in the local economy; it concentrated capital, consolidated land, consumed labour. It was inimical to diversification, and almost everything else. As Cuba moved inexorably toward monoculture in the eighteenth century, dependency on imports – foodstuffs, clothing, manufactures – increased...³⁴

The connection between sugar and dependence was made further evident during the Ten Years War. After wresting control of the war from the exporting bourgeoisie, the Cuban *mambises* decreed a halt to all sugar production and later burned sugar plantations

²⁹ Cuban government feared provoking foreign investors into seeking foreign intervention in order to secure their investments. This fear was not unfounded; in 1921, the U.S. military landed in Santiago at the request of U.S. mill owners fearful of insurrections.

³⁰ Pérez, p.61.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Albert Robinson, *Cuba: Old and New* (Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970), p.214.

³³ Carlos Franquí, *A Family Portrait With Fidel* (New York: Random House, 1984), p.27.

³⁴ Pérez, p.28.

and mills, in an attempt to end foreign control, sugar monoculture and external development, and to reinforce the importance of land reform. The sugar production capacity of several areas was decimated; ninety-four percent of Holguin's sugar mills were destroyed, ninety-nine percent of Santiago de Cuba's mills were demolished, two thirds of Guines' mills were ruined and all of Bayamo's mills were devastated.³⁵

The brief British rule of the island also set the stage for increased U.S. economic penetration, as the British permitted U.S. ships to land at Cuban ports.³⁶ When the Spanish regained control of the island, they were not able to stop the already highly developed Cuban-U.S. trade. Cubanologist, Anton Allahar, for example, noted that "...even if the legal trade could have been stopped, there was no official remedy to counter the highly developed channels of contraband activities."³⁷ Accordingly, Spain relaxed its control of inter-American trade, and allowed close commercial relations between the U.S. and Cuba to develop.³⁸ These economic reforms, coupled with the growing strength of the U.S. economy and its geographical proximity, facilitated the United States' increased presence in Cuban economic and political affairs. Cuba's trading partner concentration with the United States increased substantially over this period and, by 1798, more sugar was sold to the U.S. than to any other country.³⁹ The economic implications of increasing trade with the U.S. were seen in 1807 when two thirds of Cuba's sugar crops remained unsold because the United States refused to trade with Cuba, plunging the economy into recession. Furthermore, the political impact of the U.S.'s position as Cuba's largest trading partner was evident by 1808, when the United States government made the first of a series of offers to purchase the island from Spain.⁴⁰

The evolution of the Cuban class system and its impact on the Cuban economic development deserves mention here, particularly because of its relevance to the *criollos'* demands for free trade. When the Spanish first began to settle in Cuba, Spain had not yet begun the early processes of industrialization, as other Western European countries had.

³⁵ Foner, p.127.

³⁶ Anton Allahar, Class Politics and Sugar in Colonial Cuba (Queenston, Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press, Ltd., 1990), p. 35.

³⁷ Ibid., p.36.

³⁸ Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro, p.45.

³⁹ Foner, p.68.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 125.

Rather than embarking on their own industrialization process, through the normal progression of capitalism, the Spanish were able to turn instead to trade intermediation as a source of wealth. The result was that the capitalism transported to Cuba was a “primitive capitalism,”⁴¹ because the Cuban bourgeoisie was primarily comprised of plantation owners and farmers rather than industrialists.⁴² Correspondingly, a trans-national class coalition was easily formed between the core’s industrial bourgeoisie and the periphery’s comprador bourgeoisie. The call for free trade by the comprador bourgeoisie illustrated the coincidence of interests between the two groups. In demanding reciprocal trade, the Cuban bourgeoisie’s principal goal was the establishment of secured access to core markets. The core, on the other hand, called for free trade in order to ensure that the island would continue to be a captive market for its manufactured goods and a cheap source of raw materials. The events that unfolded following trade liberalization, namely, the development of the Cuban economy according to external demand and the resultant decreased self-sufficiency and increased foreign economic penetration, fostered the island’s underdevelopment.⁴³

Politically, Cubans also exhibited a high degree of internal dependency. Simply put, the Spanish managed to cultivate a dependency mentality in the ruling class of Cubans, that is, a belief that they were unable to govern themselves. They were successful to such an extent that the Spanish referred to Cuba as “the ever faithful island.”⁴⁴ In the years leading up to the 10 Years War, three principal political groups emerged: those who sought more political freedom and equal rights for creoles and *peninsulares*, embodied in the Reformist Party, those who opposed any political or

⁴¹ Jorge Gilbert and Vassilis Haralambidis, Economic and Cultural Dependence in Latin America (Toronto: Two Thirds Editions, 1984).

⁴² Gilbert and Haralambidis have noted that “the bourgeoisie was born directly from the colonial period, without passing through the cycles of European development. Its condition of dependence and exclusive production of raw materials meant that the bourgeoisie did not acquire a modern physiognomy. It became a producer/exporter of raw materials, not an industrial bourgeoisie.” *Ibid.*, p.27.

⁴³ The example of the markedly different patterns of development which emerged in the Northern and Southern United States helps to illustrate the distinction between the industrial bourgeoisie and a comprador bourgeoisie. Prior to the U.S. Civil War, there existed two main opposing political/economic groups. The North was controlled largely by the industrial bourgeoisie. This class was highly protectionist and supported “breaking all ties with the metropolis,” whereas the Southern cotton producing bourgeoisie, who wanted secure access to foreign markets, were pro-European and supported free trade. *Ibid.*, p.24.

⁴⁴ Rafael E. Tarragó, Experiencias políticas de los Cubanos en la Cuba Española 1512 – 1898 (Barcelona: Purvill Libros, SA, 1996), p.54.

economic change, embodied in the *Partido Incondicional Español*, and those who supported annexation to the U.S. Both the Reformists and the annexationists were comprised of creole planters, while those who argued for the maintenance of Spanish rule over the island were largely *peninsulares*.⁴⁵

Above all, the Cuban bourgeoisie feared self-government because of the large numbers of slaves that were living on the island. Landowning Cubans were reluctant to press for political autonomy because of their fears of a Haitian-type slave revolt. The Spanish had fostered such fears through the imposition of quotas on the import of slaves in the name of preventing the “Africanization” of Cuba.⁴⁶ The Cuban plantation owners worried that without Spain’s sizeable army, they would be unable to suppress a slave uprising. It was also this desire to maintain slavery which spurred the exporting bourgeoisie’s call for annexation to the U.S. The Spanish government’s decree that the slave trade was to be made illegal caused many plantation owners to reject Spanish rule and to turn instead to the United States for annexation, further testifying to the cultivation of a ‘dependency mentality’ in that independence was viewed as a last resort. The lure of annexation proved to be sizeable as various organizations, such as the *Club de la Habana*, were formed by influential landowners to further the cause of annexation.⁴⁷ It was only the U.S. government’s prohibition of slavery, following the U.S. Civil War and the “Americanization” of the newly annexed states of Mexico, that diminished the exporting bourgeoisie’s call for annexation.⁴⁸

The events which unfolded during the first war for independence highlighted Cubans’ high level of internal dependence. The Spanish government’s dissolution of the *Junta de Información*, a political body set up to appease the creole elite, and the suspension of political freedoms,⁴⁹ coupled with the introduction of a new round of taxes and economic recession, culminated in the declaration of Cuban independence.⁵⁰ However, a deep divide formed within the Cuban ranks. While the Eastern half of the island supported independence, the wealthy *criollo* planter elite in the Western half of the

⁴⁵ Pérez, p.107

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Foner, p.110.

⁴⁸ Pérez, p.114.

⁴⁹ Suchlicki, *From Columbus to Castro*, p.63

⁵⁰ Geoff Simons *Cuba: From Conquistador to Castro* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), p.139.

island refused to support a total break with Spain, fearing the *mambíses* would establish a 'black Republic.'⁵¹ As a result of this dissension, the *mambíses* were unable to spread the War to the Western half of the country. The War ended in 1878 with the Spanish defeat of the *mambíses* and the signing of the pact of Zanjón, in which Spain committed to numerous political reforms.

1878 to the Second War of Independence: From Spanish to U.S. Domination

The 10 Years War had two contradictory effects on the island; economic dependence increased while internal dependence decreased. In fact, the trends that were established during the previous period, those of high level economic penetration by the U.S. and a high trading partner concentration, became even more pronounced. In the political realm, however, there were no calls made for annexation and there was strong support for self-government. Moreover, slavery was progressively curtailed, culminating in the prohibition of slavery in 1886.

Contrary to the *mambíses* desired effect, the burning of the sugar plantations and mills set the stage for increased U.S. penetration of the sugar industry. Many Cuban landowners suffered massive financial losses due to the destruction of their property and were subsequently forced into bankruptcy.⁵² The extension of credit to Cuban plantation-owners at extraordinarily high interest rates further augmented U.S. control of the sugar industry. Unable to meet payments on their debt, many Cubans lost their land when U.S. corporations foreclosed on the plantations.⁵³ Indeed, by 1895, the old plantation owning families comprised less than 20 per cent of mill owners while U.S. corporations, such as the United Fruit Company, rapidly gained control of the majority of Cuban mills and created massive plantations through consolidation.⁵⁴

This period was also marked by an increasing trade partner reliance on the U.S. This was primarily due to the rise in sugar beet production in Europe. As the European

⁵¹ Pérez, p.122.

⁵² Simons, p.178.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Pérez, p.138.

demand for Cuban sugar decreased, the United States became the largest buyer of Cuban sugar.⁵⁵

Internally, the pattern of dependence altered dramatically. First, attitudes towards slavery and Cuba's African population changed; slavery was strongly curtailed and eventually outlawed in 1886, and attempts were made to encourage Afro-Cuban participation in the independence movement.⁵⁶ These changes were due to a variety of factors, including the participation of Afro-Cubans in the war for independence and the subsiding of creole fears of an Afro-Cuban revolt.

The renewal of calls for self-government, coupled with the absence of calls for annexation to the U.S, provide further evidence of decreased internal dependency. Indeed, following the Treaty of Zanjón, three clear political groups emerged: those who advocated a limited form of independence, those who proposed the maintenance of the status quo, and those who supported complete independence. The *Partido Liberal Autonomista*, comprised mostly of wealth land-owning *criollos*, emerged as the main proponent of reform. They advocated home rule and free trade, but wanted continued ties to the Spanish crown.⁵⁷ The main political body of those who opposed any break with Spain was the *Partido Unión Constitucional*. The Party was overwhelmingly peninsular and was comprised of merchants, professionals, traders and government officials. Later, in 1892, the famous Cuban poet and author, José Martí, formed the Cuban Revolutionary Party (CRP), which sought complete independence from Spain and whose membership was primarily composed of "petit bourgeois elements, the impoverished gentry, an expatriate proletariat, blacks and peasants."⁵⁸ The main goal of the CRP was to "act as the principal unifying agent and [to] provide objectives around which to organize all sectors of the independence movement."⁵⁹

It was José Martí's Party, combined with the Autonomists' frustration over the *peninsulares'* political control and the economic crisis, which spurred the second Cuban war for independence. Martí arranged for uprisings to take place simultaneously all over

⁵⁵ Suchlicki, *From Columbus to Castro*, p.73.

⁵⁶ Pérez, p.147.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.140.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.148.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

the country. The uprisings began on February 24th, 1895 and the Cubans were quickly successful in capturing the Eastern part of the island. A constitution was drafted and a rebel government was set up which declared itself to be the government of the Republic of Cuba.⁶⁰

Despite their early success, the *mambises* ran into difficulty in the Western half of the island when Spain sent in re-inforcement troops under the guidance of General Weyler. The United States soon took advantage of this impasse. The U.S. seized Santiago de Cuba and broke all contact with Cuban leaders, refusing to recognize the rebel government.⁶¹ Months later, on December 10th, the War was brought to an end when a Peace Treaty was signed between the United States and Spain without any Cuban representatives present.⁶²

1898 to 1920: Independence Without Sovereignty

The 1898 Peace Treaty essentially transferred control of both the island's polity and economy from Spain to the U.S., and gave rise to one of the most severe patterns of external and internal dependence in Cuba's history. Luis Pérez explained the contradictory results of the Second War of Independence, writing, "Cubans had achieved self-government without self-determination and independence without sovereignty."⁶³

Internally, the level of dependence reached new heights, and the period gave rise to what has been termed the "Plattist mentality." Indeed, Cuban sovereignty was actively undermined. The U.S. established its political supremacy over the island, the Cubans' capacity to shape their political foundations was severely limited, the Cuban government suffered crises of legitimacy and Cubans succumbed to cultural dependency, questioning their ability to govern themselves.

The U.S. formally seized power of Cuba on January 1st, 1899. Officials immediately began assessing the island's 'readiness' for self-government and quickly determined that the results were overwhelmingly negative. Both military and political

⁶⁰ Bethell, p.30.

⁶¹ Simons, p.202.

⁶² Patricia Ruffin, Capitalism and Socialism in Cuba: A Study of Dependency, Development and Underdevelopment (London: The MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1990)p.203.

⁶³ Pérez, p.192.

officials declared Cubans incapable of self-government. General Samuel Young declared that Cubans were “a lot of degenerates, absolutely devoid of honour or gratitude. They are no more capable of self-government than the savages of Africa.”⁶⁴ This position was echoed in 1900 by Governor General Leonard Wood, who remarked, “The only people who are howling for self government, are those whose antecedents and actions demonstrate the impossibility of self-government at present.”⁶⁵ Given these concerns, the U.S. government sought to manipulate the results of upcoming elections. From the U.S. viewpoint, only the landowning class had any hope of leading responsible government, since its interests were largely in line with those of the U.S. Accordingly, when the U.S. government deemed the island ready for elections, it effectively guaranteed the outcome by setting both the timing and terms for the elections, and most importantly, limiting the number of those eligible to vote to a mere 5 per cent of the population.⁶⁶

Despite the U.S. manipulation of the electoral process, pro-Cuban candidates were highly successful, capturing the majority of the seats in government.⁶⁷ However, these nationalistic representatives quickly had their power curtailed when the U.S government demanded that a constitutional convention be held the following year.⁶⁸

The Cuban Constitution, drafted in 1901, enshrined the imperialistic relationship between the United States and Cuba. First, the U.S. government entrenched its political supremacy over the island by means of the Platt Amendment, attached to the Cuban Constitution in 1901.- Second, the U.S. restrained Cuban sovereignty by preventing the Cubans from laying their own political foundation. Instead, political structures reflective of U.S. political principles were constructed. As noted by Cubanologist, Rafael Tarragó, “the institutions of the Republic were not designed to solidify independence, but to prepare for annexation.”⁶⁹

The Platt Amendment enshrined U.S. control over both the island’s foreign and domestic affairs. Indeed, Article I of the Amendment explicitly gave the U.S. control over Cuba’s external affairs, stating, “The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any

⁶⁴ Pérez, p.180.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p.181.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.182.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Simons, p.209.

⁶⁹ Tarragó, p.382. Translation by Lucy Brown.

treaty or other compact with any foreign powers...” Similarly, the Cuban government’s authority to preside over its own domestic affairs was limited; Article III stated, “the Government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty...” In a telling move, this Amendment was ratified by a majority of elected Cuban officials.⁷⁰

The provisions of the Cuban Constitution merit attention. Political scientist, F.F. Ridley, has stated that “having a constitution...is a matter of self-respect; no state is properly dressed without.”⁷¹ Indeed, various political commentators have claimed that a constitution structures the polity in accordance with the principles held by the populace, writing, “a Constitution does not merely provide for the means of settling present disputes, it is a legal garment that reveals the values that we hold...”⁷² and further that “Constitutional design...is an act of political creation, an attempt to translate political principles into actual institutions of government.”⁷³ Accordingly, the Cuban Constitution of 1901 should have been reflective of Cuban principles and a source of national pride.

If an analysis of the Cuban Constitution was conducted in accordance with the above definitions, it would have to conclude that Cuban values and political principles were identical to those held in the United States, since the island’s political foundation, its Constitution, mirrored that of the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. government attempted to set the framework for the development of a polity similar to its own because of its concerns about Cubans’ capacity for self-government. For example, as with the U.S. Constitution, the Cuban Constitution provided for three branches of government, which were all to serve as checks and balances on each-other, and emphasized individual liberties rather than social reform. The difference between the 1901 and 1940 Constitutions makes evident the conflict between the 1901 Constitution and actual Cuban political ideals. In

⁷⁰ Simons, p.210.

⁷¹ F.F. Ridley, “There Is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s Clothes,” *Parliamentary Affairs* July 1988, Vol. 41, No. 3, p.340, cited in Ronald Landes, *The Canadian Polity: A Comparative Introduction* (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1991), p.65.

⁷² Thomas R. Berger, *Fragile Freedoms: Human Rights and Dissent in Canada* (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1981), p.xiv, cited in Landes, p.64.

⁷³ Landes, p.65.

contrast to the 1901 Constitution, which focused on individual liberties, the 1940 Constitution focused on social reform; the 1940 document provided for land reform, a minimum wage, pensions and the right to strike, universal suffrage and free elections.⁷⁴ The fate of the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes government further illustrates the divergence between the 1901 Constitution and actual Cuban principles. For example, according to one account, the de Céspedes government was brought down over “Céspedes’s refusal to abrogate the 1901 Constitution, which was regarded as too closely modeled after the United States Constitution and ill-adapted to Cuba’s cultural milieu.”⁷⁵

The necessity of obtaining U.S. approval of the government in power, and the U.S. government’s enshrined right to intervene should any government prove unsatisfactory, not only seriously constrained Cubans’ ability to enact legislation autonomously, but also made the polity highly unstable and volatile. The threat of U.S. intervention became a powerful tool for the opposition, and one which was frequently employed. Virtually every opposition party called for U.S. intervention over charges of alleged corruption against the government in power. For example, the insurrections led by the opposition parties and their demands for U.S. intervention caused the U.S. armed forces to intervene in 1906, 1912, 1917, 1922 and 1933.⁷⁶

As a result of all of these factors, the Cuban government suffered from a severe crisis of legitimacy. As Domínguez noted, even a basic charismatic legitimacy was lacking. The leaders who had enjoyed popular support and were linked to Cuba’s independence movement, such as national heroes, José Martí and Antonio Maceo, were dead. The leadership void was further compounded by the fact that any elected president required U.S. government approval, thus limiting potential nationalistic popular appeal.

Similarly, the government also lacked legal legitimacy. Legal legitimacy has been defined as the widespread recognition that government officials are in power “because the procedures under which they have reached office are widely accepted as appropriate.”⁷⁷ While Cubanologist, Jorge Domínguez, has claimed that the government enjoyed a relatively high degree of legal legitimacy, due to the fact that officials were

⁷⁴ Pérez, p.281.

⁷⁵ Suchlicki, From Columbus to Castro, p.108.

⁷⁶ Domínguez, pp.17-19.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.30.

elected in accordance with the Constitution, this assertion is highly questionable. First, the very Constitution itself lacked legitimacy since it was drafted according to U.S. demands and to legitimize and facilitate U.S. intervention. Second, the electoral process was shrouded in charges of corruption and interference by U.S. officials. Indeed, examples of corruption abound. For example, in 1916, 800,000 Cubans were registered on the voting list. However, in the 1919 census, it was revealed that only 477,786 Cubans were actually eligible to vote.⁷⁸ The overwhelming number of amnesties and presidential pardons that were awarded further illustrates the prevalence of corruption; presidential pardons averaged 30 per month under various presidencies.⁷⁹ Similarly, the constant switching between the Liberal and Conservative Parties suggests a frivolous approach to politics. For example, in three elections, one hundred percent of the re-elected House of Representatives members had switched parties.⁸⁰ In the Senate, this figure peaked at one hundred percent, and later at eighty-three percent.⁸¹ A former president of the House of Representatives, José Gonzales Lanuza, remarked, “there is nothing more conservative than a Liberal and vice versa.”⁸² Moreover, when the U.S. government was displeased with the results of elections, it occasionally chose to depose the government or to rewrite the elections. For example, in 1919, fearful of a repeat of the 1916 elections in which there was widespread corruption, the U.S. military conducted a census of the island and rewrote the election law.⁸³ It was decided that U.S. observers would oversee elections and when the 1921 elections also experienced high levels of fraud, the U.S. government decreed that new elections would be held in select ridings.⁸⁴

Last, the Cuban government also suffered from a lack of performance legitimacy. Indeed, the Cuban government made little attempt to regulate the economy. It had no control over the money supply, as U.S. currency was used throughout the island, and was subject to so much intervention that any protective economic measures were viewed to be unfeasible. A case in point was the government’s failure to protect Cuban landowners

⁷⁸ Domínguez, p.40.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.37.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.43.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.43.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.35.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

following the end of the Spanish American War. Unable to aid the desperate plantation owners through the introduction of various policies, such as tax exemptions, subsidies or loans, the planter class plunged into bankruptcy.⁸⁵ According to Luis Pérez, this inaction was the result of U.S. dominance,

the United States seized control of government, appropriated the means of policy formulation and enforcement, controlled the collection of revenues, and determined the disbursement of public funds. [This] meant that the only source capable of providing the financial support sufficient to save the planter class was beyond the control of the Creole bourgeoisie.⁸⁶

Another example is the lack of infrastructure investment that was undertaken by the government. Whereas other Latin American countries, such as Chile, were undertaking ambitious public works programs, the Cuban government left this domain open to U.S. corporations.

The U.S.'s political dominance over the island was easily translated into economic dependence, intensifying the three trends which secured Cuba's economic dependence, namely, U.S. economic penetration, trade partner concentration and sugar monoculture.

One observer claimed that the peace treaty "was formulated by North American leaders, who, upon undermining the sovereignty of the Cuban republic, sought to establish more stringent measures of control for the benefit of promoting North American capital investments."⁸⁷ Indeed, by 1899, U.S. firms controlled the vast majority of public utilities, tobacco, minerals and railways.⁸⁸ Similarly, the Constitution assured the U.S. government that no nationalistic legislation would be enacted. Not surprisingly, U.S. investment in the island rose dramatically. Between 1911 and 1925, investment increased five fold, from US\$175 million to US\$1.4 billion.⁸⁹ Not only was U.S. economic penetration aided by foreign investment-friendly legislation, but the volatility of the international sugar market forced most Cuban mill owners out of business.⁹⁰

⁸⁵ Pérez, p.194.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ruffin, p.57.

⁸⁸ Pérez, p.198.

⁸⁹ Domínguez, p.20.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.23.

Consequently, with little competition from Europe, owing in large part to the First World War, U.S. corporations were able to purchase and consolidate large sugar mills.

The 1903 and 1934 Reciprocity Treaties served to facilitate and strengthen U.S. economic penetration, trade partner concentration and sugar monoculture more than any other legislation. Indeed, analysts such as Jorge Domínguez have noted that the 1903 and 1934 Treaties, “institutionalized Cuba’s economic openness to the U.S. and its dependent position.”⁹¹ Moreover, U.S. officials themselves made the intentions of the Reciprocity Treaties explicit when they stated that their goals were to “restore North American primacy in Cuba’s foreign commerce...” and to “...give [the U.S.] practical control” of the Cuban market.⁹²

Under the 1903 Treaty, the U.S government agreed to reduce the tariffs on Cuban sugar by 20 per cent and the Cubans reduced the tariffs on imported U.S. items by 20 to 40 per cent, affecting a great many more U.S. goods than Cuban. Similarly, under the terms of the 1934 Reciprocity Treaty, the U.S. lowered tariffs on just 35 Cuban products, whereas the Cuban government lowered tariffs on 426 items from the U.S.⁹³ These Agreements resulted in a higher degree of trade partner reliance. Cuba’s trade vulnerability index rose steadily following each Treaty.⁹⁴

The most detrimental impact of the Reciprocity Agreements was that they served to increase sugar monoculture and to choke off any diversification or industrialization. With preferential treatment in the huge U.S. market and a limit on the amount of refined sugar that was allowed to be exported to the U.S., the Cuban economy focused on the export of unrefined sugar.⁹⁵ Sugar came to account for 80 per cent of Cuba’s exports, almost all of which was exported to the U.S. In fact, following the 1903 Treaty, sugar production doubled every decade.⁹⁶

Self-sufficiency, diversification and industrialization were rendered virtually impossible. Opportunities for domestic infant industries to be built were effectively

⁹¹ Domínguez, p.60.

⁹² Bethell, p.64.

⁹³ Domínguez, p.60.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.70.

⁹⁵ The 1903 Agreement added an 8 per cent duty on refined sugar and the 1934 Treaty limited refined sugar to 22 per cent of total sugar imports.

⁹⁶ Domínguez, p.23.

eradicated. The Cuban market was swamped with cheap U.S. manufactured goods from companies which had benefitted from policies of protectionism and had consequently been able to achieve economies of scale. As such, there was little incentive for domestic infant industries to develop, since they could not withstand the competition from U.S. producers.

Thus, the years following the Spanish American War established an imperialistic and dependent relationship between Cuba and the United States. A pattern of internal and external dependence resulted in which the U.S. had the right to intervene in Cuban domestic and external affairs, and in which the political foundations were formed to facilitate this intervention, rather than to satisfy and reflect the needs of Cubans. Furthermore, a 'Plattist' dependency mentality became entrenched in that U.S. intervention was persistently sought to 'protect' the political system and Cubans questioned their ability for self-government. This period also heightened the previous patterns of economic dependence, namely high U.S. economic penetration and sugar monoculture.

1920 to 1959: A Revolutionary Response to Dependency

The period from 1920 to 1959 was characterized by a low level of internal dependency. Nationalist groups formed to assert Cuban sovereignty in the political sphere. These efforts were met with brief periods of success, as a new Constitution, more reflective of Cuban principles, was created, and various nationalist economic policies were introduced. Economically, however, the island was stalled between the 'financial-industrial' and 'new dependency' patterns.⁹⁷ Unlike other Latin American countries, Cuba received little investment from multi-national corporations to spur industrialization, the economy remained tied to sugar, reliant on the U.S. as a source of imports and a market for its exports, and highly penetrated by U.S. corporations.

Politically, the period from 1920 to 1959 represented a tug of war between the nationalists and the U.S.-backed conservative elements of society. The tie between U.S. interests and conservative governments was made obvious in the late 1930s, when the

⁹⁷ The "new dependency" pattern is characterized by capital investment of multi-national corporations in industry oriented to the internal markets of underdeveloped countries." Chilcote, p.61.

then-U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles, complained, "I am being daily requested for decisions on all matters affecting the discipline of the Army to questions involving appointments in all branches of government."⁹⁸ Power passed back and forth between popular nationalist governments and U.S.-backed pro-business administrations. In 1924, for example, the U.S. government replaced the nationalist Alfredo Zayas government with Gerardo Machado, an authoritarian who had the support of the business and conservative sectors of society. Similarly, ten years later, the U.S. government secured the resignation of President Grau San Martín.⁹⁹ Grau San Martín had been brought to power by an alliance between the nationalist student element and the military, and had instituted widespread economic reforms, such as a maximum eight hour work day and a law which required a minimum of half the payroll of industrial and agricultural firms be allotted to Cubans.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the seizure of power by Revolutionary forces in 1959 marked the transfer of power back to the nationalist elements of society.

This battle against the U.S.-backed governments spawned numerous nationalist organizations, such as the *Organización Celular Radical Revolucionaria*, the *Ala Izquierda Estudiantil* and the *Directorio Estudiantil Universitario*, which helped to augment the power of traditional nationalist elements, such as the unions. Indeed, Castro's success in overthrowing the violent U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship marked the alliance of numerous pro-Cuban forces, the most prominent of which was Castro's own July 26th Movement.

In the economic sphere, however, Cuban economic dependency was intensified. In contrast to other Latin American countries, which were moving towards diversification and industrialization through the implementation of nationalist economic policies, the Cuban economy remained tied to sugar monoculture. By the late 1950s, sugar comprised approximately 77 per cent of total exports, 75 per cent of which was purchased by the United States.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the sugar industry was controlled by U.S. firms. In 1934, U.S.-owned sugar mills accounted for 68.1 per cent of the total harvest.¹⁰² By 1958, only

⁹⁸ Domínguez, p.58.

⁹⁹ Marifeli Pérez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins and Legacy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.42.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.41.

¹⁰¹ Mesa-Lago, p.83.

¹⁰² Domínguez, p.22.

three percent of sugar producers controlled 50 per cent of total sugar production and the large sugar companies owned approximately 75 per cent of arable land.¹⁰³

The case of sugar provides a particularly compelling example of the underdevelopment of the Cuban economy, as it shows both the limited vertical and horizontal economic development which resulted and the reluctance of government to intervene in the economy. Indeed, despite the fact that sugar was “the mainstay of the economic system,” neither the Cuban government nor the firms involved in the Cuban sugar industry set up any agricultural research institution.¹⁰⁴ As a result, “Cuba relied almost entirely on other countries for the development of new varieties of sugarcane.”¹⁰⁵

An equally relevant factor in Cuba’s underdevelopment, and likely the most significant economic cause of the Revolution, was the U.S. firms’ extraordinarily high level of penetration of the Cuban economy. While other Latin American governments were taking steps to exercise greater control over their countries’ infrastructure, the Cuban infrastructure was almost completely controlled by U.S. firms. Latin Americanist, E. Bradford Burns, for example, noted that by 1955, “U.S. capital controlled 90 per cent of telephone and electricity services in Cuba, 50 per cent of railroads...25 per cent of all bank deposits...”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, this foreign investment was met with even higher levels of profit repatriation. Indeed, in explaining the success of his Revolution to the United Nations General Assembly on September 26th, 1990, Castro drew a direct correlation between the island’s economic dependency on the U.S., particularly the high levels of profit repatriation, and the Cubans’ attempt to project their sovereignty, saying,

Public utilities, electricity and telephone companies were owned by United States monopolies. A large part of the banking and import business, the oil refineries, the greater part of the sugar production, the best land, and the chief industries of all types of Cuba belonged to United States companies. In the last ten years, the balance of payments between Cuba and the United States has been in the latter’s favour to the extent of \$1,000 million...The poor and underdeveloped country of the Caribbean, with 600,000 unemployed, contributing to the

¹⁰³ E. Bradford Burns, p.281

¹⁰⁴ Pérez, p.134.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Burns, p.281.

economic development of the most highly industrialized country in the world!¹⁰⁷

Conclusion

Through analysis of the period from 1492 to 1958, it is clear that Cuba's political and economic systems were shaped by the island's imperialistic relationships, first with Spain and later with the United States, to create an economic, political and cultural dependency. At virtually every point during its history, the Cuban economy and polity were forced to conform to the demands of these core countries. Cuba's economy was underdeveloped through foreign economic penetration, sugar monoculture and increased trade partner concentration. Further, its political system was manipulated so that Cubans were unable to build their own political foundations and structures, thereby usurping Cuban sovereignty, preventing the establishment of institutions reflective of the Cuban reality and most detrimental, fostering a cultural dependency in which Cubans questioned their capacity for self-government. This internal dependency, however, was punctuated by periods of intense nationalism, the most recent manifestation of which brought the Castro government to power.

¹⁰⁷ Burns, p.216.

CHAPTER THREE: DEPENDENCY IN REVOLUTIONARY CUBA: 1959 TO 1989

The 1959 Cuban Revolution's success was ushered in amidst proclamations of anti-imperialism and nationalism; its leaders renounced American domination and declared that the new revolutionary government would seek to rebuild the state on 'Cuban terms.' These proclamations of autonomy by the Castro government suggested the possibility that Cuba could end its cycle of dependency. However, analysis reveals that while the pattern of dependency changed, the situation persisted. The Soviets filled part of the void left by the United States, successfully encouraging Cuban economic reliance on the USSR by undermining Cuban attempts at industrialization and diversification. This economic reliance was then used as leverage to cement Cuba's status as a Soviet ally. However, the Cubans enjoyed considerable freedom in the political sphere, as the Soviets intended to uphold the island as a showcase of Soviet-style communism to the Western hemisphere.¹ Moreover, the limited Soviet attempts that were made to control the domestic polity were frequently thwarted by President Castro's adept political manoeuvring. As such, the Revolutionary government managed to develop considerable political autonomy, to achieve extremely high levels of legitimacy and to lower cultural dependency.

Objective and Format

This chapter aims to analyze Cuba's pattern of dependency during the period from 1959 to 1989. The argument put forth is that Cuba's pattern of dependency changed markedly following the Revolution, but that the situation of dependency persisted. Whereas the primary goal of the Americans was to extract an economic surplus from the island, the Soviets fostered Cuban economic dependency to gain leverage over the Cubans in order to further Soviet political goals. An alliance between the USSR and Cuba was highly valuable to the Soviets because the island helped the USSR to rival

¹ Nikita Krushchev made it clear that the Soviets intended to uphold Cuba as an example of Soviet socialism to the region, writing that Cuba, as a Soviet-allied socialist country, "right in front of the open jaws of predatory American imperialism is good propaganda for other Latin American countries, encouraging them to follow its example and to choose the course of socialism." Yuri Pavlov, The Soviet-Cuban Alliance 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 1994), p.70.

China's claims to communist leadership in the Third World, served as a constant *provocateur* to the U.S. government, and placed the Soviets in a strategic position to encourage a socialist domino effect in Latin America and the Caribbean. However, political dependency declined substantially from the pre-Revolutionary period, and Cuba experienced its lowest level of internal/cultural dependency since the arrival of Columbus. Further, the government achieved a high degree of what Max Weber and Jorge Domínguez have termed "charismatic," "performance" and "legal-rational" legitimacy through the formation of 'inclusive citizenship,' the promotion of Cuban achievements in the arts and athletics, and the implementation of an expansive social welfare system. These achievements served to diminish cultural dependency by cultivating a Cuban identity and fostering an intense sense of national pride.

This chapter first analyzes Cuba's pattern of economic dependency. The indicators used are the levels of trade partner concentration, indebtedness to one country, and reliance on one source of energy imports. The chapter then details how economic dependency was manifested in the political sphere through the use of such indicators as control over decision-making, the ability to maintain order and unity, and control of foreign policy. Last, the indicators of internal/cultural dependency, namely, governmental legitimacy and national pride, are used in order to assess the island's level of cultural dependency from 1959 to 1989.

Applicability of Dependency Theory

Analysis of Cuba from 1959 to 1989 presents a challenge to dependency theory. In fact, many have argued that dependency theory cannot be used as a framework to study Revolutionary Cuba because dependency theory was originally designed to explain development under capitalism, not socialism. Accordingly, it is purported that the difference between the two systems' views on development, namely, economic growth versus human development, prevents the same tool of analysis from being employed.

The use of dependency theory to analyze Revolutionary Cuba is particularly troublesome to the Marxist *dependentistas*. As explained in the first chapter, this school purported that socialist revolution would bring about an end to dependency. As such,

they have made no provision for the application of dependency theory to the study of socialist economies.

In view of such criticism, the relevancy of dependency theory's applicability to a socialist economy must first be established. As noted in the first chapter, dos Santos' definition of dependency states that situations of dependency arise when "some countries can expand and be self-sustaining while other countries can only do this as a reflection of that expansion..."² It is evident from this definition that the central issue is autonomy. Dependency relates to the ability of a country to control its *autonomous* development. Accordingly, dependency theory can be used to analyze the Cuban political economy; the question that must be asked is how the Soviet Union conditioned Cuba's political economy.

Economic Reliance

Cubanologist Carmelo Mesa-Lago has noted that a high concentration of trade with one partner is significant because "high reliance of a country on one or a few trading partners implies a high degree of dependence, while a large diversity of trade partners makes a country less vulnerable to political influence."³ Analysis of Cuba's trading patterns from 1959 to 1989 clearly illustrates that Cuba's trade was highly concentrated on the USSR. For example, from 1961 to 1978, trade with the Soviet Union constituted one half of total Cuban trade.⁴ Moreover, by the late 1980s, the situation had worsened to the point where trade with the USSR composed 85 per cent of total Cuban trade.⁵ The dependent nature of this trade relationship was more marked than that of the pre-Revolution American-Cuban relationship in which trade with the United States comprised approximately 70 per cent of total Cuban trade.⁶

Mesa-Lago's second indicator of economic dependency, dependency on imports and their mix, also suggests a high degree of Cuban reliance on the USSR. However,

² Theotonio dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60, May, p.231.

³ *Ibid.*, p.92.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.94.

⁵ Enrique Baloyra and Robert Lozano, "Soviet-Cuban Relations," Conflict and Change in Cuba, eds. Enrique Baloyra and James Morris (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p.266.

⁶ Jorge Domínguez, Cuba: Between Order and Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1978) p.149.

analysis of the composition of imports is integral to understanding the degree of dependency. For example, a high percentage of imported manufactured goods suggests a high degree of economic dependency, while a large number of capital goods, such as machinery, suggests that a country is pursuing a strategy of import substitution which will eventually result in a movement away from economic reliance.⁷ In the Cuban case, it is somewhat difficult to determine its degree of economic dependency. In descending order, the major import categories were as follows: foodstuffs, machinery and manufactures.⁸ While this would usually signify a limited degree of dependency, the reality is a little more complex. For example, Cuban import statistics include a separate column for 'others.' However, this category constitutes 23 per cent of Cuban imports and several economists claim that a large number of manufactured items were included in this category.⁹ A second complicating factor is that while machinery comprises a substantial percentage of Cuban imports, most of the machinery is for sugar cultivation.¹⁰ The impact of Cuba's reliance on sugar as the major foreign exchange earner will be discussed shortly.

Attention also needs to be paid to the import of energy. Economists widely accept that dependence on foreign energy is detrimental because it leaves a country vulnerable to swings in world prices.¹¹ In addition, reliance on one or a few exporters leaves a country susceptible to the use of oil exports, so fundamental to the industrialization process, for political leverage.¹² This indicator also suggests a large degree of economic reliance as Cuba is heavily dependent on imported energy. Indeed, Cuba is the seventh major oil importer in the world and, in a study conducted of 88 less developed countries (LDCs), Cuba was among the least able to "meet current and projected energy needs from domestic sources."¹³ Heightening the degree of dependency was the fact that the USSR was Cuba's principal source of oil; between 1961 and 1976,

⁷Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1981), p.85.

⁸Ibid., p.86.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p.85

¹¹ Ibid., p.99.

¹²Ibid., pp99-100.

¹³Ibid., p.99.

Soviet oil imports comprised 98 per cent of total Cuban oil imports and by 1989, that figure had increased to 100 per cent.¹⁴

Cuba's massive capital and foreign debt dependence on the Soviets also augmented its economic dependency. According to Mesa-Lago, this was manifested through annual credits to finance the Soviet-Cuban trade deficit, direct aid for economic development and subsidies to Cuban imports and exports.¹⁵ The concentration of capital dependency on one or a few countries is dangerous because the recipient country's economy becomes vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy of the donor country. For example, should the donor country experience a recession, it would likely cut back on its foreign aid, which would be detrimental to the recipient country's economy. Furthermore, it permits the donor country considerable potential political leverage over the recipient.

The annual credits extended by the Soviets were immense. It has been estimated that the total capital dependency on the Soviet Union was approximately \$1.42 billion *per annum* from 1961 to 1989, averaging approximately 25 per cent of Cuba's annual GDP.¹⁶ Further, by the mid-1980s, Cuba was the most indebted country (calculated by the debt/export ratio) in Latin America.¹⁷ It is here that the Cuban-Soviet economic relationship differs most markedly from that of the Cuban-American relationship. Unlike the Soviets, who injected huge subsidies into the Cuban economy, the Americans, as stated above, extracted an economic surplus from the island of approximately \$100 million per annum from 1949 to 1959.¹⁸

Subsidies to Cuban imports and exports also served to increase the island's dependency on the USSR. For example, from 1972 to 1975, the USSR purchased Cuban nickel at US\$5450 per tonne, when the world price was just \$3500, and from 1975 to 1980, the USSR purchased Cuban nickel at US\$1930 above the world market price.¹⁹ In

¹⁴Baloyra and Lozano, p.266.

¹⁵Mesa-Lago, p.102.

¹⁶"Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (July, 1997), p.38, Online, Internet. June 17, 1999.

Available: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latin/viewdocument-e.asp?continent=Latin&country=11&name=cuba

¹⁷Jorge Pérez-Lopez, "The Cuban Economy: Rectification in a Changing World," Cambridge Journal of Economics 1992, 16, p.119.

¹⁸E. Bradford Burns, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), p.216.

¹⁹Mesa-Lago, p.90.

fact, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), admittedly a somewhat dubious source, has estimated that between 1961 and 1976, the USSR subsidized Cuban sugar, nickel and oil to the extent of US\$3.6 billion dollars.²⁰

The extent of Cuba's economic reliance on the Soviet Union is perhaps best illustrated by the events that followed the USSR's collapse. According to a conservative estimate, the Cuban economy contracted by 20 per cent within the year.²¹ In addition, Cuba lost 73 per cent of its food imports and its oil imports dropped from 13,400,000 tonnes to 1,800,000 tonnes.²² This oil shortage, in turn, decimated Cuba's productive capacity, particularly with regard to sugar. Furthermore, the Cuban peso, valued at 6 pesos per 1 US dollar in 1989, plummeted to 150 pesos per 1 US dollar by 1993.²³ Moreover, many of the Cuban government's recent dramatic policy changes, such as its encouragement of foreign investment, the legalization of dollars and the legalization of some independent small businesses, are cited by many observers as the result of the economic hardships brought on by the Soviet Union's collapse.²⁴

Economic Reliance and Economic Development

As evidenced above, Cuba was clearly heavily dependent on the USSR for its economic well-being; it was reliant on the USSR as a primary market for its exports, as a principal source of its imports, particularly energy, for the subsidization of the Cuban economy and for the provision of credit. The effects of this relationship were not lost on Cuba's president, Fidel Castro, who in 1985 remarked, "the USSR constitutes the fundamental pillar of our present, and our future, of our development."²⁵ However, Castro has rejected the suggestion that this economic reliance on the Soviet Union had translated into a situation of dependency. On several occasions, he has stated that the dependency model is not applicable to Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union

²⁰Mesa-Lago, p.91

²¹Pérez-Lopez, p.116.

²²Louis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.383.

²³Frank T. Fitzgerald, The Cuban Revolution in Crisis: From Managing Socialism to Managing Survival (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994), p.185.

²⁴Joel Edelstein, "The Future of Democracy in Cuba," Latin American Perspectives 87, V.22, No.4, Fall 1995, p.7.

²⁵Sergio Roca, "The *Comandante* in His Labyrinth," Conflict and Change in Cuba, p.92.

because, unlike the Americans prior to the Revolution, the Russians did not own the means of production.²⁶ Furthermore, Castro has also rejected the suggestion of Cuban dependency claiming that the Cuban-Soviet relationship was not founded on exploitation; rather, the Soviets were ‘friends’ who did not extract an economic surplus from the island.²⁷ In order to assess the validity of Castro’s rejection of the applicability of the dependency model to Cuba, one must first determine whether Cuba’s economic reliance on the Soviet Union was used as leverage to shape the Cuban economy and polity according to the needs of the USSR.

A useful way to assess this is through examining the role of sugar in the Cuban economy. There is a popular saying in Cuba which illustrates the predominant role which sugar plays in Cuba, “sin azúcar, no hay país,” or “without sugar, there is no country.” However, the sugar industry has also been seen by many Cubans as “Cuba’s cancer.”²⁸ Indeed, sugar has had a highly symbolic role in the struggle for Cuban independence. Specifically with regard to the Afro-Cuban population, their slavery was seen as tied to sugar production since they were initially brought over from Africa to work on the sugar plantations.²⁹ Independence fighters, or *mambises*, burned sugar cane to protest Spanish rule.³⁰ Sugar persisted to be a symbol of the struggle for Cuban independence and was again burned in the various uprisings against American domination.

It is not surprising, given the symbolic importance of sugar to the independence movement and the economic difficulties it entails, that both Che Guevara, later the Minister of Industry, and Fidel Castro, rejected continued sugar monoculture upon seizing government.³¹

Both Guevara and Castro promoted economic diversification through the adoption of the Chinese, or Libermanist, economic model.³² Heavy investment in nickel

²⁶ The Soviets did not own a single mine, farm or business in Cuba. Patricia Ruffin, Capitalism and Socialism in Cuba: A Study of Dependency, Development and Underdevelopment (London: MacMillan, 1990), p.138.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Carlos Franquí, A Family Portrait With Fidel (New York: Random House, 1984), p.27.

²⁹ Ibid. p.26

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p.166.

³² W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence (Toronto: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p.37.

extraction was undertaken, as well as crop diversification. However, industrialization and diversification proved to be costly and slow processes. More importantly, the attempt at diversification entailed decreased sugar production. This decline in sugar production provoked the ire of the Soviets when Cuba failed to satisfy its export commitments. In response, the Soviets demanded that the Soviet economic model be adopted to ensure that export commitments were met and in order to facilitate Soviet intervention through the loosening of Castro's control over economic decision-making.³³ In July of 1970, the Cuban government complied with this request and the Soviet model was incorporated; decision-making was decentralized, limited market incentives were introduced and the former emphasis on the 'new Cuban person' to stimulate worker productivity was lessened.³⁴ These reforms served to undermine Cuban control over the economy. Political scientist, W. Raymond Duncan, noted that the reforms "...open[ed] the door to greater Soviet involvement in economic matters and consequently greater leverage for them in Cuba's economic administration and technical matters."³⁵

It was, however, the signing of the 1964 Moscow Accord which provides the most compelling illustration of the Soviets' manipulation of Cuba's economy to serve the USSR's interests. Under this Accord, the Cubans agreed to export fixed amounts of sugar to the USSR at an inflated price. Consequently, plans for industrialization and diversification were effectively abandoned and the island was relegated to sugar monoculture once again. Sugar exports comprised 82 per cent of Cuba's total exports from 1959 to 1976 and increased to 85 per cent of total exports by 1988.³⁶ It should be noted that this monoculture was even more severe than that which had existed under the American-Cuban relationship. In the years prior to the Revolution, sugar as a percentage of exports fluctuated around 77 per cent.³⁷

³³ According to W. Raymond Duncan, the Soviets were opposed to the virtual complete hold over economic decision making "vested in Castro himself or in his personal followers, rather than in specialists at the middle and lower levels of decision making." Duncan, p.98.

³⁴ Franqui, p.166.

³⁵ Duncan, p. 99.

³⁶ Pérez-Lopez, p.119.

³⁷ Mesa-Lago, p.83.

Economic Reliance as Leverage in the Political Sphere

Economic reliance was not translated solely into economic dependence. Examination of Cuban control over the decision-making process, its foreign policy and its security interests reveals that the Soviets used Cuba's economic reliance as a tool to undermine and limit Cuban sovereignty in order to ensure that Cuba pursued a similar foreign policy with regard to China and to help further Soviet security interests with respect to the U.S. However, the attempts made to expand Soviet control of the Cuban polity were limited and ineffective; instead, both political and cultural dependency declined during this period.

Analysis of the Cuban decision-making process reveals that while ultimate control over decision-making still rested largely in the hands of Fidel Castro, the structures of decision-making were shaped, in part, in accordance with Soviet demands. However, Soviet influence in this realm is often overstated. Two such examples are the creation of the Cuban Constitution and the institutionalization of the Cuban Communist Party.

In the years immediately following the Revolution, the Soviets expressed deep concerns over Castro's *caudillo*-like personal hold over the island. Indeed, in a speech to the Soviet delegation in New York, Khrushchev said that Castro was "like a young horse that hasn't been broken and needs some training...we'll have to be careful."³⁸ In an effort to ensure the survival of socialism by 'institutionalizing' it, the Soviets called for the creation of a new constitution to set out the structure and powers of the government.³⁹ The Soviets opted to have the Cuban constitution modelled after their own in the hopes that this would serve to dilute Castro's power and to make the island's political systems more susceptible to Russian influence. The constitution's provision for the establishment of various governmental bodies, such as the National Assembly of People's Power, the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, were patterned after the USSR's system. Further, Prof. Carmelo Mesa-Lago has noted that 32 per cent of the articles adopted were from the USSR's 1936 constitution.⁴⁰ However, the Cuban Constitution was also a reflection of the island's political economic history and was based on the principles of the

³⁸ Pavlov, p.84.

³⁹ Alfred Padula, "Cuban Socialism," Conflict and Change in Cuba, p.24.

⁴⁰ Ruffin, p.165.

1940 Constitution. Latin Americanist, E. Bradford Burns, for example, noted that, “40 per cent of [the 1976 Constitution] came from the Constitution of 1940.”⁴¹ Indeed, it borrowed heavily from the 1940 provisions, including state control of the sugar industry, the authorization of the state to provide for full employment and the empowerment of the government to “direct the course of the national economy for the benefit of the people.”⁴²

Similarly, the Soviet attempt to undermine Castro’s grip through the consolidation of the Cuban Communist Party, the PCC, as the only party in Cuba, is often cited as proof that Cuba’s domestic polity was subordinated to Soviet demands.⁴³ While it is likely that the Soviets exerted some influence in its creation, the one party system evolved as a product of Cuba’s historical experience and U.S. aggression, as will be discussed presently. Following a Soviet request to institutionalize the Cuban Communist Party by decentralizing powers from the executive (Castro) to the Party, the Cuban government embarked on a massive membership drive. By 1975, the Party’s 1970 membership had been doubled and that figure was quadrupled by 1982.⁴⁴ Further, the 1976 Constitution awarded sweeping powers to the Party, making it “responsible for controlling, maintaining and approving the various state functions.”⁴⁵

The institutionalization of the one party system is often pointed to as proof of the “Sovietization” of Cuba. However, it should be noted that the one party system is not foreign to Latin America. Mexico, for example, has effectively had a one party system since the 1929 creation of the PNR (*Partido Nacional Revolucionario*). Furthermore, the PNR has always relied heavily on the executive. As with the Cuban National Assembly, the Mexican legislature has never refused a motion emanating from the Executive. In addition, Cuban political scientists often criticize the suggestion that Cuba’s one party system is solely “a result of the history of the international Communist movement,” and point to the island’s political history and U.S. imperialism as primary factors.⁴⁶ The origins of the one party system can be found in the creation of José Martí’s *Partido*

⁴¹Burns, p.283.

⁴² Ibid., p.277.

⁴³Ruffin, p.165.

⁴⁴Duncan, p.108

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶ Fernando Martinez Heredia, “Cuban Socialism: Prospects and Challenges,” trans. Janell Pierce, Latin American Perspectives Issue 69, Vol. 18 No.2, Spring 1991, p.22.

Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) in 1892, prior to the second war for independence. José Martí founded this party to be reflective and inclusive of all Cubans, declaring it to be “born as one from all parts at once...The Cuban Revolutionary Party is the Cuban people.”⁴⁷ Moreover, Martí rejected the multi-party system, suggesting that it was a system whereby “certain Creoles defended themselves from others...in order to defeat a divided adversary the only thing needed is to unite.”⁴⁸ The events surrounding the Cuban revolution further supported the creation of a one party system. According to political economist Julio Carranza Valdés, the PCC represented a consolidation of the remaining political movements, (the Popular Socialist Party, the July 26 Movement and Revolutionary Student Directorate); there were no bourgeois opposition parties in place at that time because the leaders and most of their membership had fled to Miami.⁴⁹

The concern over U.S. aggression further pushed the polity toward a one party system. Given the intensity of U.S. hostility, the Cuban government feared the potential repercussions of any political fragmentation on the survival of the Revolution. In an interview with Bernard Shaw of CNN on October 22 of 1995, for example, Castro explained the roles of Cuba’s historical experience and U.S. aggression in the formation of the single party system, saying,

We are against the multi-party system...because we cannot fragment our population, we have to maintain unity and we can’t be divided in a thousand pieces...If we had been fragmented...we would not have been able to resist...the U.S. blockade for the last 35 years...[The one party system] is also in line with our tradition, because when Jose Martí organized the battle for independence, he organized one party.⁵⁰

The fact that the PCC remains the only official party in Cuba following the fall of the Soviet Union further testifies to its authenticity as a Cuban institution. However, it is also important to note that, despite these structural changes, little has altered with regard

⁴⁷ José Martí “The Cuban Revolutionary Party,” *Patria*, April 3, 1892, cited in *José Martí Reader: Writings on the Americas*, eds. Deborah Shnookal and Mirta Muñoz (New York: Ocean Press, 1999), p.155.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.154.

⁴⁹ Julio Carranza Valdés, “The Current Situation in Cuba and the Process of Change,” trans. Clare Weber, *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 69, Vol. 18, No.2, Spring 1991, p.15.

⁵⁰ *Fieles a nuestros principios* (La Habana: Editorial Capitán San Luis Dirección Política MININT, 1995), p.30. Translation by Lucy Brown.

to the actual decision-making process in practice. Indeed, many observers have concluded that most power still resides with Fidel Castro. Castro's charismatic leadership has won him the support of the majority of Cubans and his control over the internal workings of the government appears to remain absolute.⁵¹ W. Raymond Duncan, has noted, "Fidel ensured that party reorganization was conducted by officers loyal to the Castro brothers," and that "Fidel remained in multiple leadership positions...The structure of governmental decision making changed...but the substance of policy making remained in the hands who made the Revolution."⁵²

Study of the Cuban government's ability to project foreign policy interests suggests a varied level of dependency. Cuban and Soviet foreign policy interests clearly collided in the late 1960s. The Soviets used their economic leverage to subordinate Cuban foreign interests to those of the Soviet Union on three key issues: policies with regard to China, the promotion of violent revolution in Latin America, and Soviet security interests vis-à-vis the U.S. However, analysis of the projection of Cuban foreign policy interests in Angola, Granada and Nicaragua, suggests a high degree of autonomy.

The Cuban government's early refusal to recognize the Soviet Union as the leader of the communist world presented an obstacle to Soviet-Cuban relations. The Chinese and the Soviets had been constant rivals for Communist leadership in the Third World. The Cubans' refusal to recognize the Soviet's leadership and the Cubans' promotion of Chinese policies, particularly violent socialist revolution in the Third World, provoked the ire of the Soviets. The encouragement of socialist revolution was of particular significance to the Cubans, since they viewed their revolution to be an 'authentic' Third World revolution and sought to 'export' it to the rest of the South, claiming armed struggle to be necessary to break free from imperialism. In a 1962 speech in Punta del Este, for example, Castro expressed his commitment to armed insurrection, saying,

what is most important is to understand that it is neither just nor correct to maintain the empty and facile illusion that the people can wrest from the dominant classes by legal paths that may or may not exist...a power that the monopolies and oligarchies will defend by any means

⁵¹ "Singeing Castro's Beard," The Economist V.341, n.7992, Nov. 16, 1996.

⁵²Duncan, p.108.

necessary with their police and their armies...The duty of all revolutionaries is to make Revolution.⁵³

This stated commitment was followed through with military assistance to guerrilla movements overseas and the denunciation of the Latin-American pro-Soviet communist parties which were advocating non-violent parliamentary transitions to socialism.⁵⁴ While this was in line with the more aggressive Khrushchev internationalism, it was deemed unacceptable under the new Brezhnev leadership.⁵⁵ Brezhnev chose to support “united fronts” and “peaceful parliamentary change” rather than armed revolt.⁵⁶ This reluctance to support armed struggle and the decision to promote Soviet influence through establishing and consolidating trade and diplomatic ties was largely due to the successful U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic.⁵⁷

When the Cubans refused to denounce China and to discourage armed struggle, the Soviets responded by cutting their supply of oil to Cuba.⁵⁸ In response, Castro, according to a defector from Cuban intelligence, signed an agreement stating that he would comply with the Soviets’ demands provided they did not cut off economic or military aid in the future.⁵⁹ The defector’s claim appears legitimate; the Cuban government back-pedalled on its policies with regard to armed struggle and China, bringing its foreign policy in line with that of the Soviet Union.⁶⁰ In a press conference held on June 16th, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a senior PCC official, announced that the Cuban government agreed that armed struggle may not be necessary in the Third World and that electoral victories may be sufficient to end imperialism and to establish revolutionary governments.⁶¹ This was followed by the signing of the 1974 “Program of Peace” between Brezhnev and Castro, in which they declared the “complete unity of their views with regard to the present world situation and the foreign policy tasks of the

⁵³ Ezzedine Mestiri, *Les Cubains et L’Afrique* (Paris: Editions KARTHALA, 1981), p.87. Translation by Lucy Brown

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁵⁵ Pavlov, p.86.

⁵⁶ Duncan, pp.55-79.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p.52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.75.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.76.

⁶⁰ Pavlov, pp. 89-90.

⁶¹ Duncan, p.78.

socialist states.”⁶² Further, Castro officially recognized the USSR as the leader of the communist world, calling for support for the USSR over China in the 1969 Conference of Communist Parties.⁶³

In contrast, however, Cuba’s policies in Africa, Central America and the Caribbean illustrate a comparatively sizable degree of autonomy in the projection of its foreign policy interests. A case in point is Cuban activity in Angola. In this case, Cuba maintained a consistent policy of support for the Movement for Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), providing weaponry, training and Cuban troops to help win the civil war.⁶⁴ Unlike the Cubans, the Soviets had ceased their military aid to the MPLA by 1974, when the civil war broke out.⁶⁵ Moreover, when civil war did break out, the Soviets reportedly awarded the leader of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, a ‘chilly’ reception and publicly endorsed adherence to the Alvor Accord, an agreement which was ratified by all three opposing nationalist groups in the hopes of creating a peaceful democratic transition from Portugese rule to independence.⁶⁶ Furthermore, whereas an MPLA request for Soviet troops was refused, the Cuban government agreed to station 1500 Cuban military personnel in Angola.⁶⁷ Yuri Pavlov, the former Soviet Ambassador to Costa Rica and head of the Foreign Ministry’s Latin American Directorate responsible for Soviet-Cuban relations, confirmed Cuba’s autonomy with respect to its foreign policy in Africa, stating, “contrary to widely held opinions, [the Cubans] never subordinated their interests and policy in Africa to those of the Soviet Union.”⁶⁸

Cuba’s record of activity in the Caribbean provides further evidence of its ability to pursue an autonomous foreign policy, particularly in the case of the People’s Revolutionary Government (PRG) in Granada. With the success of his revolution in 1979, Maurice Bishop turned to Cuba and the Soviet Union for aid. The Soviets refused to meet “diplomatically at the highest levels or to show reciprocity in diplomatic

⁶² Pavlov, p.95.

⁶³ Duncan, p.78.

⁶⁴ Mestiri, p.105.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Duncan, p.129

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Pavlov, p.101.

protocol...⁶⁹ The Cuban government, on the other hand, established diplomatic relations within a month and supplied weapons, military advisors, construction workers, teachers and doctors.⁷⁰ Furthermore, when the USSR did establish relations months later, the discussions were conducted through Cuban channels.⁷¹ According to leaked KGB documents, it was only through the Cubans' intervention and pressure on the Soviet government that Soviet aid was eventually channelled to the island.⁷² The former Granadian Ambassador to Moscow, Richard Jacobs, substantiated this claim, stating, "if Cuba had not 'championed our cause,' the Soviet Union would have been unwilling to commit itself to Granada."⁷³

Study of Cuba's involvement in Nicaragua further illustrates Cuba's high degree of autonomy in foreign policy implementation. As noted in G. W. Sand's, *Soviet Aims in Central America*, pre-Revolutionary Nicaragua was a considerable security threat to Cuba; the US-backed Cuban exiles had launched their Bay of Pigs (*Playa Girón*) invasion of Cuba from Nicaragua. However, Cuban involvement in Nicaragua preceded the *Playa Girón* invasion. In February of 1959, for example, a call was made for the overthrow of the Somoza government. Within one year of that meeting, Castro had installed Quintín Pino Machado as the Cuban Ambassador to Nicaragua. Machado was instrumental in furthering Cuban revolutionary aims in Nicaragua, founding the Patriotic Youth organization. Fausto Amador, the brother of the former FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) leader, Carlos Fonseca, claimed that the Patriotic Youth provided the basis of the FSLN, and that Machado was instrumental in the selection of the group's leadership.⁷⁴ As with Granada, the Cubans guided Soviet policy with respect to Nicaragua. Indeed, the Cubans refused to hold discussions with Managua in the presence of the Soviets and discouraged direct interaction between the Soviets and the Nicaraguans. Yuri Pavlov, then the USSR's Ambassador to Costa Rica, noted that

⁶⁹Peter Shearman. The Soviet Union and Cuba (New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1987), p.63.

⁷⁰Ibid., p.62

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid., p.65

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴ G.W. Sand, Soviet Aims in Central America: The Case of Nicaragua (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), p.15.

There were no tripartite meetings at a political level of representatives of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union to coordinate their policies in Central America...Daniel Ortega kept no secrets from Castro, and Soviet representatives traveling to and from Managua via Havana were usually debriefed by the Cubans...Yet, Moscow had only rudimentary information on what was going on between Havana and Managua. The Nicaraguans and the Cubans were rarely forthcoming on the subject.⁷⁵

In contrast to the above indicators, analysis of Cuba's reliance on the USSR to protect the island from outside attack in order to secure the Revolution's continued existence clearly illustrates a high degree of dependency. Cuba was reliant on the Soviets for intelligence, expertise and weaponry. This was evidenced by the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. While the *Playa Girón* invasion was upheld as an example of Cuba's military strength and the commitment of its people to the principles of the Revolution, the Cuban victory was actually due in large part to Russian intervention. The Russian KGB provided the Cuban government with details of the American plan of attack in advance of the invasion, speedily issued free weaponry and also sent military generals to direct the Cuban army.⁷⁶ Moreover, the Soviets supplied Lieutenant Kije and General Ciutah who successfully "plot[ted] the strategy to defend Castro against the CIA landing."⁷⁷ Indeed, Soviet military aid to Cuba was immense, peaking at \$3.5 billion in the early 1970s,⁷⁸ and, at its lowest point, totalling \$1.2 billion.⁷⁹ In fact, the Soviets supplied the Cuban army, navy and air force with the majority of its equipment.⁸⁰ However, Cuba's tremendous military reliance on the Soviet Union was also used to as a tool to further the Soviets' security interests with respect to the U.S., thus usurping the Cubans' control over their own domestic security.

The events that unfolded during the Cuban Missile Crisis provide the most compelling illustration of the manipulation of Cuban defence interests to further Soviet

⁷⁵ Pavlov, p.101.

⁷⁶ Franquí, xv.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Total military aid was approximately 20% of the island's GDP. W. Raymond Duncan, "Cuban-U.S. Relations," *Conflict and Change in Cuba*, p.228.

⁷⁹ Susan Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.185.

⁸⁰ Duncan, *The Soviet Union and Cuba: Interests and Influence*, p.38.

aims. As is common knowledge, the Russian installation of intermediate-range and middle-range missiles in Cuba provoked the ire of the United States' government which demanded that the Soviets withdraw the missiles from the island.⁸¹ In response, Castro sent a series of messages to Khrushchev calling for him to refuse the U.S. demands.⁸² Despite Castro's entreaties, the Russians decided to remove the missiles. However, the Soviets' subordination of Cuban defence interests to those of their own was made further evident when the Soviets chose not to notify the Cuban President of their decision to withdraw the missiles until after the settlement was publicly announced.⁸³ In fact, the Soviets agreed to have American inspectors visit the island, without consulting Castro.⁸⁴ Carlos Franquí, editor of the Cuban newspaper *Revolución* and the first to inform Castro of the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles after it came across the press wires, reported Castro's response as follows, " 'Son of a bitch! Bastard! Asshole!' Fidel went on in that vein for quite some time. The Russians had abandoned us, made a deal with the Americans, and never even bothered to inform us. Fidel had no idea. He went on cursing..."⁸⁵

Cultural Dependency

Although economic dependency persisted under Castro's leadership, there was a dramatic decline in internal/cultural dependency. For the first time in its history, the Cuban government enjoyed legal-rational, charismatic and performance legitimacy. Furthermore, there was an increased sense of national pride, which was brought about through the successful implementation of progressive policies, including the institution of 'inclusive citizenship,' a large-scale promotion of Cuban culture, and the introduction of a wide-reaching social welfare system.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Cuban governments prior to 1959 had little to no charismatic, legal-rational or performance legitimacy. Governmental officials

⁸¹Graham Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Foreign Policy*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996), p.418.

⁸²Michael Hunt, *Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p.291.

⁸³Franquí, p.194.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid.

were viewed to be ineffective pro-U.S. members of the elite, as opposed to national heroes. Similarly, the government was viewed as having little legal-rational authority because the 1901 Constitution entrenched U.S. domination over the island and the 1940 Constitution was not heeded by politicians. Furthermore, there was little performance legitimacy since the government was perceived to be largely ineffective; politicians were constantly switching parties, the U.S. government exercised control over political outcomes and few policies were introduced to benefit the average Cuban. The success of the 1959 Revolution, however, reversed this. The Castro government achieved charismatic, legal-rational and performance legitimacy.

Castro's charismatic appeal was immediately apparent. He was popularly viewed as a national hero due to his victory in the Revolution, overthrow of a repressive dictator and liberation of the island from U.S. control. Castro's political skills compounded this perception. An outstanding orator, he kept his audiences captivated for hours and easily manipulated public opinion.⁸⁶

The new government's high ranking officials possessed similar charismatic authority. Two of the more prominent were Ernesto Che Guevara and Camilo Cienfuegos. As with Fidel Castro, these men were also Revolutionary heroes with a great deal of popular appeal.⁸⁷

The Revolutionary government also enjoyed a high degree of legal-rational legitimacy. As stated above, the 1901 Constitution had enshrined U.S. domination of the island through the attachment of the Platt Amendment. While the 1940 Constitution had dismantled the Amendment and instituted progressive reforms, successive governments

⁸⁶ His political adroitness furthered this charismatic appeal; Castro was able to institute several successful timely 'public relations' endeavours and to disarm foreign journalists. One example is Castro's arrival in New York in 1959. Carlos Franquí described it as follows, "Fidel...hired one of the best public relations firms in the United States...Afterward the public relations people admitted they had never handled such a consummate actor..." Franquí, pp.31. Similarly, in his book, *Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: Grove Press, 1998), Jon Lee Anderson further testifies to Castro's charismatic authority, detailing the visits of foreign journalists whom Castro successfully persuaded to become 'pro-Revolution.' Some of these journalists include: Jorge Ricardo Masetti, Jules Dubois and Carlos María Gutierrez.

⁸⁷ The extent of this "charismatic legitimacy" can be seen through the world's reaction to Cuba's leaders. Che Guevara, for example, left an indelible print on revolutionary world politics. Graham Greene, the British writer, noted his appeal, writing, "he represented the idea of gallantry, chivalry and adventure in a world more and more given up to business arrangements between the world powers."

had not abided by it and corruption continued to be rampant.⁸⁸ In contrast, Castro's government created a new Constitution, by which it abided.

Last, the government achieved considerable performance legitimacy, primarily through the implementation of mass democracy and the creation of an elaborate social welfare system. The new Constitution set up a political system which has been termed "mass democracy." This provision was particularly significant because the vast majority of Cubans had not viewed the previous liberal-democratic style of government to be very effective. In his article, "Cuba and the Battle for Democracy in Today's World," in *Cuba Socialista*, Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, President of the National Assembly of Popular Power, explained that Cubans viewed representative democracy to mean "injustice...corruption and....subordination to foreign powers."⁸⁹ Castro purported that the new system of 'mass democracy' alleviated these deficiencies, as it was moulded by public opinion and more accessible to the masses.

The perception that it was accessible to the masses helped solidify popular support for the new government. The 'authenticity' of this government was established, in part, through direct consultation with the masses. In the years immediately following the Revolution, Castro would frequently call mass rallies in order to determine public opinion with respect to a given issue. Latin Americanist, E. Bradford Burns, noted the effect of this style of public involvement, writing,

....to the peasants and workers, neglected or exploited in the past, (the public rallies) provided a participation in the governing process they had not previously known. The rallies brought them closer to the source of power than they had ever been. In short, most of them were able to identify with the aims and methods of the Castro government.⁹⁰

Later, in 1976, the Cuban government instituted workers' parliaments, Organs of Popular Power (OPPs), to allow the population to have a more organized and effective means of expressing its opinions. The OPPs were well organized and allowed for a high degree of control by the citizenry. Multi-candidate elections were held in which citizens voted for

⁸⁸ Burns, p.277.

⁸⁹ Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, "Cuba y la lucha para democracia en mundo de hoy," *Cuba Socialista* Havana: *Oficina Municipal de Prensa*, October 1995, p.12. Translation by Lucy Brown.

⁹⁰ Burns, pp.281-282.

their representatives. The representatives were required to report to their constituents several times per year. If the voters were dissatisfied with their representative's performance, they could recall them. Observers noted that the OPPs were highly effective; Cubanologist, Susan Eckstein, for example, wrote,

At the municipal level, the OPPs operated democratically in practice and not merely theory. Elections, for one, resulted in considerable municipal delegate turnover. Between 1976 and 1984, for example, about half the delegates voted into office changed hands each election, and over a tenth of elected delegates were recalled for failing at their job. Second, electoral turnout was high. Third, municipal meetings during these years were filled, in some instances, with intense discussions of constituent concerns, which contributed to policy reforms.⁹¹

The most important aspect of this system was that it was perceived to be *effective*. While inequality proliferated in the region's representative democracies, such as Jamaica, Costa Rica and Venezuela, the Cuban government carried out several reforms to alleviate such disparities. For example, education became free from primary school through to university, agrarian reform was undertaken, all forms of health care became free, and huge cuts in the prices of utilities were implemented; these policies were unparalleled elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁹²

Two examples provide useful illustrations of the government's high degree of legitimacy. Ironically, the government's decision to provide weaponry to the population serves as one such example. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban government supplied its population with a vast array of arms to 'protect the Revolution.' For a government not completely confident in its popular support, such a move would have been impossible and likely its downfall. Similarly, following the economic crisis of 1970, Castro held a rally during which he accepted personal responsibility for the economic hardships and offered his resignation. Despite the recession, the crowds would not allow Castro to resign, thereby re-affirming the legitimacy of both his leadership and his government.⁹³

⁹¹Susan Eckstein, Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.27.

⁹²Burns, pp.276-287.

⁹³Eckstein, p.41.

Not only did the Revolution bring about a dramatic increase in governmental legitimacy, it also significantly decreased cultural or 'internal' dependency. This was accomplished through the abolition of segregation/discrimination, the promotion of Cuban culture and the institution of the most expansive social welfare system in Latin America.

With the success of the Cuban Revolution, there was an immediate move toward the institution of what can be termed 'inclusive citizenship.' Indeed, the government moved to provide *all* citizens, most notably women, blacks and rural Cubans, with full citizenship rights. This endeavour had a variety of benefits. First, it cemented popular support for the government. Second, it helped release various sectors of society from a prevailing 'dependency mentality.' Third, it inadvertently fostered a sense of national pride; elements of Cuban society that had previously been ignored became celebrated facets of Cuban identity.

Cuba had had a long history of race relations problems. Although slavery was ended in 1886, Afro-Cubans continued to suffer from racism. In the early 1900s, for example, the Cuban Congress consistently refused to pass bills prohibiting racial discrimination.⁹⁴ Little changed in the years leading up to the Revolution. Racism and segregation continued unabated. As in the U.S. South, signs were posted in various Cuban establishments, such as restaurants, hotels and parks, prohibiting blacks from entering. One of the Revolution's key goals was to eradicate racism. As such, pillars of the formerly racist system were dismantled and the government actively undertook the promotion of Cuba's African heritage. The government also pursued a pro-African foreign policy overseas. Cuba sent thousands of doctors, teachers and engineers all over Africa, as well as military personnel to aid in the overthrow of 'imperialist' regimes. The Cuban government also granted asylum to numerous members of black activist groups, such as Huey Newton and Assata Shakur. While Cuba has not implemented an 'affirmative action program,' Afro-Cubans have been steadily entering the fields of medicine, biotechnology and culture in increasing numbers. Evidence of the Revolution's strides in eliminating racism can be seen in Castro's strong support from

⁹⁴ Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality 1886 – 1912 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p.122.

Cuba's black population and the comparatively few black Cubans leaving the island. Indeed, Lisa Brock, co-editor of *Between Race and Empire: African-Americans and Cubans Before the Cuban Revolution*, has concluded that "Cuba has come the furthest in the struggle against racism in the world, as a whole...By dealing with class, they did more for Blacks probably than a singular race-based affirmative action program in our society (U.S.)...would have been able to do."⁹⁵

Similarly, sexual discrimination was also prevalent in pre-Revolutionary Cuba. Machismo was pervasive, few women worked outside the home and the island was renowned for its astounding level of prostitution.⁹⁶ The Revolutionary government employed a similar strategy against sexism as it had against racism. The government officially outlawed sexual discrimination in its 1976 Constitution. It legislated equal rights for women in marriage, the workplace and education.⁹⁷ The punishment for sexual discrimination was the withholding of rations and/or imprisonment.⁹⁸ Moreover, the government actively sought to relieve the burden faced by working women. The number of day care facilities doubled in size each decade, household appliances to cut down on housework time were made available, women had the right to miss work if their children were ill and the Family Code required men to share housework duties.⁹⁹ Although it is difficult to enforce legislation within the home, the anti-discrimination policies were highly effective. By the 1970s, women were entering fields previously considered to have had a heavy 'male orientation' in droves. For example, women comprised 50 per cent of medical students at university, 42 per cent of economics students, 50 per cent of metallurgy students.¹⁰⁰

A less overt type of discrimination was also practiced against rural Cubans, as few resources were channelled outside Havana. A mere 60 per cent of the rural population was literate, malnutrition was commonplace and there were only three rural hospitals.¹⁰¹ The disparity between the rural and urban areas can be seen in the number

⁹⁵ Lori S. Robinson, "Race and Revolution: in Cuba, Racism Takes a Back Seat to Survival," Emerge: Ethnic News Watch Vol. 9, No. 6, April 30, 1998, p.56.

⁹⁶ Pérez, p.305.

⁹⁷ Eckstein, p.43.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.43.

¹⁰⁰ Pérez, p.370.

¹⁰¹ Fitzgerald, p.22.

of hospital beds available. For example, in 1958, Havana held 55 per cent of the country's hospital beds, yet its inhabitants comprised only 22 per cent of the country's population.¹⁰² Oriente province, by contrast, had 35 per cent of the population but only 15 per cent of the total number of hospital beds.¹⁰³ Castro's government, however, addressed this disparity by increasing the number of hospital beds in Havana by 8 per cent and in Camaguey and Oriente by 184 per cent and 147 per cent respectively.¹⁰⁴ Within eight years, the government had also wiped out illiteracy through the expansion of the educational system and the promotion of 'literacy brigades' which targeted the countryside. Malnutrition was also eradicated. In addition, significant agrarian reform was also undertaken to the benefit of the rural population. Prior to 1959, sugar companies owned 75 per cent of arable land.¹⁰⁵ By 1970, 34 per cent of Cuban arable land was divided into private family plots (to a maximum of 165 acres) and the remainder was turned into co-operatives to be worked by the rural proletariat.¹⁰⁶

In order to promote a sense of national pride, the government undertook a massive campaign to promote Cuban achievements in arts and sports. Cuban artists were awarded tremendous economic backing; arts-focused schools were built and an appreciation of Cuban art was encouraged through such endeavours as the elimination of entrance fees at art galleries and the inclusion of Cuban artistic achievements as part of the school curriculum. Similarly, Cuban film experienced a tremendous boost through the creation of the Cuban Film Institute; Cuban films came to be regularly featured at world film festivals. Dance also benefited; the National Ballet of Cuba, led by ballerina Alicia Alonso, became one of the world's foremost dance companies. A love of literature was also fostered; the number of titles printed rose eight-fold between 1958 and 1973, and the number of books printed rose from 900,000 to 28,000,000 over the same period.¹⁰⁷ Cuban musicians also benefited from the promotion of the arts. Not only was Cuban music, such as *el son*, *cha-cha-cha*, *salsa* and *merengue* promoted through

¹⁰² Malcolm Gillis, et al., eds., The Economics of Development (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), p.259.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Burns, p.279.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

training facilities, public concerts and a wide availability of titles, but popular Northern music, such as the Beatles, was banned.

The government also invested heavily in athletics. Numerous training facilities were built and athletes were upheld as role models. Cuban coaches, for example, received worldwide recognition of their achievements and were recruited internationally. Cuba also came to dominate such diverse athletic pursuits as Tae Kwon Do, baseball, boxing and track and field. The Cuban National baseball team, for example, has won ten Amateur Baseball World Series and four gold medals at the Pan American games.¹⁰⁸

Another important source of national pride, which served to diminish cultural/internal dependency, was the successful implementation of wide-ranging social welfare programs. The government relied on the participation of the masses to erect its 'pillars of the revolution.' The campaign against illiteracy is one such example. Given the particularly high rate of illiteracy amongst rural Cubans, the government organized a literacy brigade of young students to go into the countryside to teach basic literacy. It was through this type of popular participation that illiteracy was eradicated. It was a similar story in the field of health care. In 1959, Cuban doctors left the country in alarming numbers, approximately 7,000 in total, creating a vacuum of physicians.¹⁰⁹ Within 20 years, the number of physicians in the country had been restored to its pre-Revolutionary numbers.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the quality of Cuban health care was exceptionally high. The infant mortality rate plummeted to 12 per thousand, the crude death rate dropped to 7 per thousand and life expectancy increased to 76 years.¹¹¹ In fact, the World Health Organization recruited more doctors from Cuba than any other country. The effect of these achievements with respect to cultural dependency cannot be overstated. The fact that a small Caribbean island had achieved these results, unparalleled elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, had the effect of diminishing the pre-Revolutionary dependent mentality that Cubans had experienced, as detailed in the previous chapter. Cubans were clearly not only capable of governing themselves, but

¹⁰⁸ Burns, p.281.

¹⁰⁹ Gillis, p.260.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

also of achieving artistic, athletic and social results on a level equal to the economically powerful Western countries.

Conclusion

It is evident that from 1959 to 1989, Cuba experienced a situation of economic dependency. Indeed, the analysis presented above demonstrates that the Cuban situation meets Theotonio dos Santos' definition of dependency. Cuba could clearly only "expand...as a reflection" of Soviet economic expansion; the USSR dominated Cuban trade, was the primary source of vital Cuban imports, such as oil, owned Cuba's foreign debt and subsidized its economy. This economic dependency was used by the Soviets to mould the Cuban economy to serve its own interests. The economy was relegated to sugar monoculture and large-scale attempts at industrialization and diversification were halted. This heightened economic dependency was, in turn, used to further Soviet interests with respect to China and the U.S. Accordingly, Fidel Castro's assertion that his Revolution freed the country from dependency and subsequent exploitation is incorrect. However, the *pattern* of dependency was markedly different from that prior to the Revolution. In contrast with the U.S., the Soviets' interest in Cuba was primarily strategic. They extracted no economic surplus from the island, and, in fact, subsidized the economy to the extent of \$1.4 billion per annum.¹¹²

More importantly, the Revolution brought about a decreased political dependency and the country's lowest level of internal/cultural dependency. Indeed, for the first time in its history, the government achieved charismatic, legal-rational and performance legitimacy. Domestically, the rise in governmental legitimacy and the decrease in internal dependency helped to erase the remainders of the Plattist mentality and to end previous patterns of internal domination. Moreover, the Cold War Cuban example had important theoretical implications; it showed that cultural dependency could be overcome even in situations of high economic dependence.

¹¹²Burns, p.18.

CHAPTER FOUR: CUBA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMIC ORDER

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc's rapid transition to capitalism were foreseen by few observers, including Fidel Castro. Within a space of months, the Cuban government was forced to confront a radically different economic and political reality. Marcos Portal, the Cuban Minister of Basic Industries remarked, "We went to bed one night and when we woke up, the Soviet Union was gone, so we had to begin all over again. The same thing had occurred years before with the United States. This is not going to happen again to us."¹ Francisco López Segrera of UNESCO has summarized the sudden challenges faced by the Cubans: "the Cuban government has been dealing with the fall of the Eastern bloc, the U.S. blockade, the emergence of a uni-polar world, the economic and social crises of the south, the victory of neo-liberalism and the need to reintegrate Cuba into a new type of global market."²

On the heels of the developments in Eastern Europe, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, analysts were quick to predict the Cuban Revolution's impending demise. Titles and headlines such as "The Cuban Revolution is History," became *de rigueur*.³ The obvious fallacy of such statements and predictions underlines the uniqueness of the Cuban case and the limited use of analyses based on the Eastern European example. In order to understand what the implications of this changed international political economic order are for Cuba's future, an in-depth analysis of the current tensions and contradictions is necessary.

Taken from a broader perspective, the case of Cuba is highly relevant as it provides an example of the challenges that any Third World country may confront should it choose to pursue an alternative to the increasingly prevalent neo-liberal route. Francisco López Segrera of UNESCO has stated, "[I]f Cuba fails, it will have tragic

¹ Ana Julia Jatar-Hausmann, "What Cuba Can Teach Russia," *Foreign Policy* Winter 1998, p. 4.

² Francisco López Segrera, "Responses to Edelstein," *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 87, Vol 22, No.4, Fall 1995, p.36.

³ Marifeli Pérez-Stable, "Cuba: Prospects for Democracy," *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*, eds. Jorge I. Domínguez and Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp.185-198, cited in Anton Allahar, "Cuba and the Collapse of World Socialism in the 1990s," forthcoming.

consequences not only for the island but at a global level, both in the South and in the North.”⁴

As with previous periods of Cuban history, dependency theory, again, provides a useful vehicle for an in-depth analysis of the current Cuban crisis. Its use in the previous chapters has served to provide a solid understanding of the Cuban economy and polity by placing it within a historical and international context. In this chapter, dependency theory highlights the internal friction that is resulting as Cuba’s polity and economy adjust to the new international political economic order. Indeed, the analysis presented below concludes that Cuba’s pattern of dependency has again changed. It is clear that although the economy has diversified, it is still highly dependent on foreign investment for technology, foreign exchange and employment. However, in contrast with the 1959-89 period, and the experience of other Caribbean and Latin American countries, the government has successfully resisted influence attempts in the political domain, exhibiting a remarkably low level of political dependence. The greatest challenge to the government is the weakening of the link between the *patria* and the Revolution. The market reforms introduced to increase Cuba’s economic growth have undermined the pillars of the Revolution and clashed with the Revolutionary identity fostered by the government. This, in turn, has served to decrease governmental legitimacy and presents the largest threat to Castro’s leadership.

Objective and Format

In this chapter, I shall attempt to use dependency theory to explain the tensions and contradictions that Cuba faces as it attempts to create a “third way” for itself amidst a predominantly neo-liberal, uni-polar and globalized world. I shall first provide a brief outline of the results of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Cuba’s economy. I will then outline the economic reforms that have been undertaken, measure these against Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s indicators of economic dependency and introduce other indicators relevant to the current international economy. I will then analyze how this economic dependency and the international political order have shaped Cuba’s polity, highlighting the internal conflicts. Next, I will provide an analysis of internal dependency. Last, I will summarize

⁴ López Segrera, p. 36.

my findings and attempt to isolate the challenges that Cuba faces as it attempts to work the Revolution around its new economic and political reality and vice versa.

It should be noted that this chapter provides little by way of a comparison of the formerly socialist economies of Eastern Europe and Cuba. This is due to the substantially different political-economic histories of the countries. While both Cuba and Eastern Europe have been subjected to similar external pressures, their histories are significantly different. For example, unlike Eastern Europeans, Cubans viewed their Revolution to be an outgrowth of the assertion of their sovereignty, and “the redemption of *patria*, which implied above all independence, self-determination, and national sovereignty – specifically from the United States.”⁵ It is the refusal to acknowledge this link between the Castro government and the *patria* that has triggered the myriad of publications predicting the Cuban government’s imminent collapse.⁶ Mexico’s polity, however, serves as an informative source of comparison. As noted in the previous chapter, Mexico is effectively a one-party state, ruled by PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*). Further, the PRI evolved, as the late Mexican poet and commentator, Octavio Paz, noted, as an authentically Mexican institution that was shaped by Mexico’s unique historical experience. Both the PRI and the PCC evolved out of immensely popular revolutions which sought to assert national independence. For example, the PRI, particularly under Lazaro Cárdenas’ leadership, instituted numerous economic nationalist policies, such as the nationalization of Mexico’s lucrative oil industry. Further, the PRI-government has been subjected to considerable international, primarily U.S., pressure to develop a multi-party system.

Economic Crisis & Reform

As stated above, the fall of the Soviet Union came as a surprise to most observers. Rather than an armed coup, the Eastern European governments appeared to dissolve in the face of mass demonstrations. Castro himself admitted that he had not foreseen such a

⁵ Louis A. Pérez, Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 397.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.398

course of events.⁷ Accordingly, the Cuban economy was ill-prepared and was consequently devastated by the events which followed.

Due to their own financial constraints and pressure from the U.S., the Soviets refused to extend credits to Cuba and withdrew subsidies, the combined effect of which has been estimated at a loss of US\$2.1 billion per year.⁸ Further, the Russians demanded repayment of the 15 billion ruble debt in US dollars, rather than rubles, and stopped the shipment of arms.⁹ The Cuban debt to GDP ratio rapidly rose to 30 per cent.¹⁰ The exchange rate, which had been pegged at US\$1:1 Cuban peso, skyrocketed to 130 pesos to the U.S. dollar, providing the average Cuban with a monthly income equal to US\$2 per month.¹¹ Markets for Cuban goods were lost, decreasing exports by 80 per cent,¹² as well as sources of imports. Imports plunged by 75 per cent,¹³ including key imported commodities, such as oil, which was imported at 10 per cent of previous levels.¹⁴ Within three years, the Cubans lost 70 per cent of their purchasing power¹⁵ and the GDP decreased by approximately 50 per cent.¹⁶ In 1992, the Cuban government estimated the total cost of the collapse of Soviet bloc to Cuba's economy at US\$5.7 billion.¹⁷

The economic crisis was intensified by the United States' economic blockade of the island. Not only is the island cut off from the world's largest consumer market, it is unable to purchase goods made by U.S. firms and foreign firms conducting business in Cuba are subject to retaliatory measures. Furthermore, Cuba has been able to secure only limited aid and loans because of the U.S. government's refusal to participate in any organization which extends credit to the island. In December of 1998, Carlos Lage, Vice

⁷ Sergio Roca, "The *Comandante* in His Economic Labyrinth," *Conflict and Change in Cuba*, eds. Enrique Baloyra and James Morris (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1993) p.92.

⁸ Jatar-Hausmann, p. 88.

⁹ Susan Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.92.

¹⁰ Jatar-Hausmann, p. 88.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Pedro Monreal, "Sea Changes: the New Cuban Economy," *NACLA Report on the Americas* March-April, 1999, p.23.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Pérez, p.383.

¹⁵ Eckstein, p.93.

¹⁶ Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Hiram Marquetti Nodarse, "La economía Cubana. Actualidad y tendencias," *Economía y Desarrollo* September 1995, No. 1, p.33.

¹⁷ Eckstein, p.93.

President of the National Assembly, stated that the embargo costs the island approximately US\$800 million per year.¹⁸

The dissolution of the socialist camp, the U.S.-imposed embargo, the rise of globalization, and the emergence of uni-polarity have left Cuba with few alternatives. As a result, the government has declared a “special period in a time of peace.” As part of this special period, the government introduced austerity measures and some limited economic reforms. However, when riots broke out over power cuts and food shortages in Havana in August of 1994, the government chose to implement more far-reaching reforms.¹⁹ The aims of the reforms have been three-fold: to increase hard currency earnings, to cut the deficit and to increase the supply of goods and services.²⁰ These reforms have had the added performance requirement of minimizing the level of inequality while not jeopardizing political control of the regime.²¹

The government has adopted a six-pronged approach to its reforms. The most significant are: the legalization of dollars, the facilitation and pursuit of foreign investment, the promotion of hard currency earning sectors, decreased expenditures, the legalization of self-employment and agrarian reform. Three of the above reforms - the legalization of public possession of dollars, the pursuit of foreign investment and the promotion of the hard currency earning sectors - were introduced in order to increase the government’s foreign exchange earnings.

The government legalized public possession of dollars in August of 1993. The unofficial exchange rate was 130 pesos to US\$1 and black marketeering was rampant.²² This move capitalized on the potential of remittances from Miami. Indeed, within four years, these remittances accounted for 20 per cent of Cuba’s total dollar income.²³ The government then created various retail outlets at which Cubans could spend their dollars.

¹⁸ *Caribbean & Central America Report*, January 19, 1999. This figure represents approximately 40 per cent of Cuba’s total import bill. Julio Carranza Valdés, et al., *Cuba: Restructuring the Economy – A Contribution to the Debate*, trans. Ruth Pearson (London: The Institute of Latin American Studies, the University of London, 1996), p.9.

¹⁹ Carollee Bengelsdorf, “Responses to Edelstein,” *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 87, Vol 22, No. 4, Fall 1995, p.29.

²⁰ Jatar-Hausmann, p. 88.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

The prices at these stores were inflated so that the government could use the surplus for redistribution and other endeavours. These stores were moderately successful and, in 1997, accounted for 17 per cent of Cuba's total dollar income.²⁴

In an attempt to earn hard currency and also to boost fledgling industries, the Cuban government has aggressively courted foreign investment. In order to attract investors, the government has promised unlimited profit repatriation for the first ten years, generous tax holidays, duty free zones, investment security, the potential for 100 per cent ownership of enterprises, and has waived requirements for quotas of Cuban labour.²⁵ This endeavour has proved to be highly successful. The U.S.-Cuba Trade Council reported that from 1990 to 1999, announced foreign investment was US\$6.1 billion.²⁶ This investment is also notable because it is highly diversified in its origins. In descending order, the chief investors are: Canada, Mexico, Australia, South Africa, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Brazil and France.²⁷

In order to increase hard currency earnings, the government has also awarded priority to the tourism, biotechnology and sugar sectors of the economy. Since 1990, the tourism industry has grown steadily at a rate of approximately 19.3 per cent per year.²⁸ The number of tourists has increased from 243,026 in 1985 to over 1.4 million in 1998.²⁹ In December of 1998, the Tourism Minister, Osmany Cienfuegos, stated that the industry grossed US\$1.8 billion in 1998 alone, and accounted for 43 per cent of total revenues.³⁰ However, 70-per cent of the government's revenue from tourism has had to be spent on imports to support the industry.³¹

Biotechnology has been the recipient of sizable government investment. The government injected US\$800 million in 1990 alone.³² In fact, Cuba awards a higher

²⁴ Jatar-Hausmann, p.85.

²⁵ Frank T. Fitzgerald, The Cuban Revolution in Crisis: From Managing Socialism to Managing Survival (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994) p.175.

²⁶ "Foreign Investment and Cuba," The U.S.-Cuban Economic Council (1999) n. pag. Online. Internet. May 28, 1999.

Available: www.cubatrade.org/foreign.html

²⁷ "Foreign Investment and Cuba."

²⁸ "Cuba: Tourism Clinches Position as Engine of Growth," Inter Press Service January 6, 1999.

²⁹ Caribbean & Central America Report January 19, 1999.

³⁰ "Cuba: Tourism Clinches Position as Engine of Growth."

³¹ Ibid.

³² Eckstein, p.106.

priority to the development of biotechnology than any other country, with the exception of Japan.³³ This heavy investment appears to have paid off. By 1991, the industry was self-financing and medical developments, such as hepatitis B vaccines, meningitis B vaccines (the first in the world) and an epidermal growth factor for skin regeneration, were being exported to Russia, India, Brazil, Sweden, Finland, Mexico, Italy, Spain, Peru, Chile, Panama, Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela.³⁴ Further, by 1994, medical products were Cuba's fourth largest export earner.³⁵

The sugar industry, by contrast, has fared remarkably less well. New competitors, such as China, appeared, flooding the world sugar market and thereby dramatically reducing its price. Compounding the problem, the *zafra* (sugar harvest) has fallen short of targeted levels in every year since 1990. In 1991, Cuba produced 8.1 million tonnes of sugar.³⁶ This amount fell to 3.3 million tonnes in 1995 and has hovered around 3 million tonnes each year thereafter.³⁷ These developments cost the Cuban government an estimated US\$10 billion from 1992 to 1997.³⁸ In its publication, *Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business*, the Canadian government has cited the principal causes for this shortfall in output as inadequate supplies of inputs (particularly fertilizers) and excessive subsidization.³⁹ However, factors such as inclement weather, demoralization of the work force and shortages of pesticides have also presented obstacles.⁴⁰

The rapid rise of the Cuban deficit also spurred economic reform. The Russians' demand for the repayment of loans in dollars, rather than rubles, coupled with the drastic drop in the island's GDP, rapidly brought the Cuban debt to GDP ratio to 30 per cent, making Cuba the most indebted country in Latin America.⁴¹ In order to service the

³³ Eckstein, p.106.

³⁴ *Ibid.* and Fitzgerald, pps.177-178.

³⁵ "Cuba: Key Foreign Trade Data," *Centro para el desarrollo del comercio global* (1998) n. pag. Online. Internet. June 11, 1999.

Available: www.cgtd.com/global/caribe/cuba.htm#D

³⁶ Pérez, p.386.

³⁷ "Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business" Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (July, 1997), p.14. Online. Internet. June 17, 1999.

Available: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/latin/viewdocument-e.asp?continent=Latin&country=11&name=cuba

³⁷ "Foreign Investment and Cuba."

³⁸ Dalia Acosta, "Cuba-Sugar: Sacrificing This Year's Yield to Next Year's Comeback," *Inter Press Service* March 30, 1998.

³⁹ "Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business," p.14.

⁴⁰ Pérez, p.386.

⁴¹ Jatar-Hausmann, p. 88.

deficit, the government was required to engage in activities to increase its foreign currency earnings and to drastically curtail its spending, targeting social services, the provision of goods, and subsidies to non-productive state enterprises.

While the government has not shut down any hospitals or clinics, medical supplies are scarce. Medicines, such as insulin, are supplied regularly in the dollar pharmacies, but not in the peso pharmacies.⁴² Painkillers such as aspirin are equally difficult for the average Cuban to purchase.⁴³ As a result, Cubans are increasingly turning to the black market to purchase medicines. In addition, worker absenteeism has reached record levels in this sector due to meagre salaries, difficulties with travel to the workplace and deteriorating working conditions.

The education system has been similarly downscaled. No schools have been closed down, but basic educational necessities, such as pens, text books, and paper, are in short supply. In addition, grants to students entering university have been substantially reduced.

Provisions for the unemployed have also been drastically reduced. Massive lay-offs have taken place as the government has ended subsidies to and/or closed down its unproductive enterprises.⁴⁴ However, the compensation provided to unemployed workers has been scaled back. Whereas in the past the government provided unlimited unemployment benefits to workers who had been laid off, now those workers who do not accept a job offered to them by the state, or find an alternative source of employment, are entitled to a maximum of only one year of unemployment compensation.⁴⁵

The amount of goods and services supplied to the population as part of their *libreta*, or rations, has been cut in an effort to reduce the deficit.⁴⁶ Two hundred formerly readily available consumer goods were added to the ration list, along with 300 medicines.⁴⁷ Such staples as soap, razors and clothing became scarce. Food was rationed to such an extent that by 1993, the average caloric daily intake was 2000 calories, a thirty

⁴² Eckstein, p.113.

⁴³ Ibid., p.113.

⁴⁴ 80 per cent of state enterprises were operating at a loss. Jatar-Hausmann, p. 88.

⁴⁵ Sergio Díaz-Briquets and Jorge Pérez-López, "Cuba's Labour Adjustment Policies During the Special Period," Cuba at a Crossroads ed. Jorge Pérez-López (Miami: University Press of Florida, 1994), p.123.

⁴⁶ An additional 28 food products and 180 consumer products were rationed. Jorge Pérez-Lopez, *Cuba's Second Economy* (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 1995), p.130.

⁴⁷ Pérez, p.385.

percent decrease from 1989, and one fifth lower than what the World Health Organization considers necessary.⁴⁸ Rations of gas to both the public and private sector were reduced by 50 per cent.⁴⁹ Similarly, various services such as electricity and transportation were cut back. During 1993, the average household had access to electricity for approximately six to seven hours per day.⁵⁰ Bus services were reduced by 40.5 per cent and train services by 38.4 per cent due to the unavailability of mechanical parts for the buses and the energy shortage.⁵¹ This made travelling to work very cumbersome, as waits of up to 3 hours for buses were not uncommon.⁵²

From a purely economic point of view, these austerity measures appear to have worked. The deficit has decreased from 30 per cent of the GDP to 2 per cent (as of 1997).⁵³

In order to increase the supply of goods and services, the government has reformed the agricultural sector and legalized self-employment for certain occupations.

The agricultural sector was the subject of far-reaching reform. In September of 1993, the government divided up over half its land holdings in order to create thousands of co-operatives.⁵⁴ These co-operatives enjoy “unprecedented autonomy.”⁵⁵ The UBPCs (*Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa*) are in charge of their own finances and elect their own leaders.⁵⁶ They produce their own food but are required to fulfill their quota of produce to be sold to the state. By 1996, over 4,000 UBPCs were in operation on approximately 52 per cent of total state agricultural land.⁵⁷ In addition, the state legalized farmers markets (*agropecuarios*) in September 1994. This move has helped to decrease the food shortage and to make food available at prices considerably below those formerly prevailing on the black market.⁵⁸ Material incentives have also been introduced to raise agricultural workers’ salaries, in an effort both to entice the population to partake

⁴⁸ Eckstein, p.135.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.97.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Bengelsdorf, *The Problem of Democracy in Cuba*, p.167.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Jatar-Hausmann, p.88.

⁵⁴ Fitzgerald, p.183.

⁵⁵ Eckstein, p.108.

⁵⁶ Fitzgerald, p.183.

⁵⁷ “Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business,” p.30.

⁵⁸ Fitzgerald, p.175.

in agricultural work and to stimulate production.⁵⁹ The agrarian reform appears to have been effective; in 1996, agricultural production increased by 17.3 per cent.⁶⁰ Further, the success of these measures has prompted Canadian government sources to conclude that, “once the right incentives are in place, Cuba can produce most of its own food.”⁶¹

Self-employment has also been legalized in an attempt to provide a source of income for the government, as well as Cuban entrepreneurs, and to provide the general population with a wider array of services. The government uses this sector to augment its income through the monthly fees charged for licences and income tax. As of 1997, over 170 occupations were “authorized for self-employment.”⁶² These occupations included: hairdresser, plumber, mechanic and *paladares*, family-owned businesses. However, all professions requiring a university degree have been excluded from this list.⁶³ It is estimated that 15 per cent of the working population is involved either directly or indirectly with this sector.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, statistics of the revenue earned either by self-employed Cubans or the government in this sector are not available.

Indicators of Economic Dependency

The use of indicators of economic dependency in the current Cuban case is rather difficult. The economy is in a constant state of flux as it adjusts to the reforms, many of which are introduced and later reversed. In addition, the nature of the international economy has changed, making other indicators of economic dependency more relevant than those used in the past. Although Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s indicators of dependency were highly pertinent to the Cold War period, they are not as relevant to a post-Cold War period marked by the transnationalization of capital, globalization and “the victory of neo-liberalism.” Accordingly, it is necessary to introduce other indicators of dependency. Unfortunately, given the lack of dependency writing on the current period, there is no

⁵⁹ Havana residents, for example, have been offered the maximum salary provided by the state to work in agriculture for two years. In addition, bonus payments are also made to those who exceed the average deliveries to the state and the prices of food purchased from the farmers by the government have been raised. Eckstein, p.108.

⁶⁰ “Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business” p.14.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Jatar-Hausmann, p.85.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

commonly employed set of indicators. As such, this section will measure Post Cold-War economic dependency using both Carmelo Mesa-Lago's indicators, as well as the following: reliance on foreign investment for technology, economic growth and employment.

Cuba's economy fares particularly well against the indicator of trade partner concentration. As discussed in the preceding chapters, Cuba experienced a high trading partner concentration throughout its history; prior to 1990, 85 per cent of Cuba's trade was with the socialist bloc⁶⁵ and before the Revolution, trade with the United States comprised 70 per cent of total trade.⁶⁶ Following the break up of the Soviet Union, however, Cuba has been able to diversify its trading partners. Trade with Latin America and the Caribbean currently comprises 30 per cent of total trade⁶⁷ and trade with the European Union another 30 per cent.⁶⁸ The island's most significant trading partners are: Canada, Spain, Mexico, Russia and China.⁶⁹ Moreover, exports have been diversified, paving the way for the elimination of sugar monoculture. Comprising 80 per cent of total export earnings in 1990, sugar now constitutes just 46.6 per cent of export earnings.⁷⁰ Traditional exports, excluding sugar, now comprise 43.1 per cent of export earnings, followed by "new exports," such as biotechnology, at 10.3 per cent.⁷¹

However, it should also be recognized that through the proliferation of regional trading blocs and supranational organizations, such as the WTO, there has been a homogenizing of the international agenda, particularly with respect to the so-called 'triumph of neo-liberalism.'⁷² This has meant that although the number of trade partners

⁶⁵ Enrique Baloyra and Roberto Lozano, "Soviet-Cuban Relations: the New Environment and its Impact," *Conflict and Change in Cuba*, eds. Enrique Baloyra and James Morris (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), p. 266.

⁶⁶ Jorge Domínguez, *Cuba: Between Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1978), p.149.

⁶⁷ Patricia Grogg, "Admission to ALADI Boosts Ties with Region," *Inter Press Service* November 9, 1998.

⁶⁸ "Time Not Ripe for Cuba to Rejoin OAS," *Latin American Weekly Report* July 7, 1998, p.309.

⁶⁹ "Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business," p.24.

⁷⁰ Juan Triana Cordovi, "*Cuba 1998: la reanimación económica y las restricciones del crecimiento*" *Balance de la economía Cubana a finales de los 90's* (Universidad del La Habana: Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana, March, 1999), p.37.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Fernando Martínez Heredia, "Cuban Socialism: Prospects and Challenges," trans. Janell Pierce *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 69, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1991, p.35.

has increased substantially, their agendas are similar and combined influence attempts are possible, as the Gulf War example illustrates.

Analysis of the application of Mesa-Lago's second indicator, reliance on imports and their mix, presents inconclusive results. In descending order, the major import commodities are: petroleum, food, machinery and chemicals.⁷³ Although machinery continues to comprise a large percentage of imports, little of this machinery is being channelled to the sugar industry, as was the case in the Cold War period. In addition, much of this machinery is needed to replace defunct Soviet technology and for import substitution efforts.

The application of Mesa-Lago's indicator of energy import reliance also presents rather mixed results. Prior to 1990, the Soviets supplied 100 per cent of Cuba's oil.⁷⁴ While Russia is still Cuba's largest supplier of petroleum, Venezuela has come to be a major source and negotiations are underway to purchase more oil from PEMEX (*Petroleos Mexicanos*).⁷⁵ However, the country's high level of dependency on imported energy has been increased in some respects. Prior to 1990, the Russians supplied oil to Cuba through the generous terms of the sugar-for-oil swap, which satisfied domestic requirements and also provided the island with a source of foreign exchange through re-exporting barrels of oil. When this agreement was terminated by the Russians, Cuba was forced to purchase oil at prices prevailing on the world market. Despite cutting the private and public sector's supply by 50 per cent, half of *all* hard currency earnings were spent on the purchase of crude oil.⁷⁶ This increased expenditure, in turn, has meant that large-scale alternative energy projects, such as the *Juragua* nuclear reactor, which was expected to supply the equivalent of 1.2 million tonnes of oil per year, have been effectively abandoned.⁷⁷ However, the government has not completely discarded alternative energy projects. It has instead chosen to experiment with smaller-scale alternative sources of energy, such as hydro-electricity and solar power,⁷⁸ and officials at the Cuban Energy Commission have stated that they are aiming to develop alternative

⁷³ "Cuba: Key Foreign Trade Data."

⁷⁴ Baloyra and Lozano, p.266.

⁷⁵ "Venezuela, Cuba Talk Oil," *The Oil Daily* Vol. 49, No. 105, June 1999.

⁷⁶ "Commodities: Oil, the Achilles Heel of Cuba's Economy," *Inter Press Service* November 18, 1999.

⁷⁷ Eckstein, p.111.

⁷⁸ "Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Business," p.17.

energy sources to the point where they supply the equivalent of eight million tonnes of petroleum.⁷⁹ Further, domestic petroleum production capabilities are currently being built up; Marcos Portal has stated that oil production has more than quadrupled in numerous oil fields due to the investment in Western technology.⁸⁰ This investment appears to be paying off; domestic petroleum sources now supply 30 per cent of Cuba's electricity.⁸¹

Mesa-Lago's indicator of foreign debt dependence illustrates a reduced level of dependency. As explained in Chapter 3, the Soviet Union had been Cuba's primary creditor, subsidizing the economy and providing soft loans. However, Soviet aid to Cuba ceased following the break up of the Soviet Union and the aid that the island now receives is very small in scope, owing largely to the U.S. blockade. The Cuban government has been successful in repaying much of its Russian-owned debt and has managed to diversify its creditors. As of mid-1997, Japan was Cuba's largest creditor, owning 21.4 per cent of Cuba's debt, followed by Spain at 13 per cent, France at 12.8 per cent, and Argentina, Britain, Germany, Italy, Mexico and Switzerland.⁸²

Study of Cuba's level of economic dependency through the indicators suggested by Carmelo Mesa-Lago present a rather glowing picture of Cuba's reduced level of economic dependency. However, a deeper analysis, which takes greater account of post-Cold War international developments, presents a somewhat bleaker picture. Indeed, study of Cuban dependence on foreign sources for technology, economic growth and employment suggests a far greater level of economic dependency.

Reliance on the foreign sector as a source of employment is rather difficult to measure. There is no estimate published of the number of jobs created by foreign capital. However, statistics published by the Centre for Studies of the Cuban Economy (CEEC) show a rapidly increasing percentage of Cubans employed by the non-state sector. As of

⁷⁹Lila Haines, "Nuclear Plant Way Behind Schedule," Cuba Business June 1992, p.3, cited in Fitzgerald, p.179.

⁸⁰Fitzgerald, pp.179-180.

⁸¹"Cuban Oil Sector Slowly Reviving Despite U.S. Sanctions," Latin American Energy Alert, 1996.

⁸²Dalia Acosta, "Cuba-Economy: Government Scrambles as Foreign Debt Soars," Inter Press Service, July 11, 1997.

1997, 20 per cent of employed Cubans were working in the non-state sector, up four-fold from 1989.⁸³

The indicator of reliance on foreign capital for economic growth suggests a high degree of economic dependence. It is the large influx of remittances and investment that have bailed the economy out of its depression. Ironically, remittances from abroad, for example, are the island's largest source of hard currency, comprising approximately 20 per cent of the total.⁸⁴ Tourism is the second largest source of foreign exchange.⁸⁵

Further, many of the hard currency-earning traditional exports, such as rum, tobacco and citrus fruits have had their competitiveness increased by heavy foreign investment.⁸⁶

As with the indicator of reliance on foreign sources for domestic employment, the indicator of reliance on foreign sources for technology illustrates a mixed degree of dependency. It is clear that the island is highly dependent on foreign sources for technology for industrialization. This is made particularly acute because of the island's wide use of now defunct Soviet technology. In the areas of mining, telecommunications and petroleum, for example, the government has been forced to pursue foreign investment because of a lack of technology. In the oil and gas sector, the government has authorized Canadian, French, British and Swedish firms to operate 19 of 32 offshore and onshore exploration sites.⁸⁷ Correspondingly, as mentioned above, the replacement of Soviet technology has resulted in the quadrupling of output at numerous oil refineries.⁸⁸ However, it is important to note that this dependence is somewhat mitigated by the fact that Cuba is not reliant on any single source of technological transfer, as it was with the Soviet Union.

⁸³ Viviana Togores González "Cuba: efectos sociales de la crisis y el ajuste económico de los 90's" *Balace de la economía Cubana a finales de los 90's* (Universidad de la Habana: Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana, March 1999), p.106. This figure may be considerably higher, as it is unclear under which category various mixed enterprises, such as telecommunications, fall.

⁸⁴ Jatar-Haussman, p.88.

⁸⁵ Monreal, p.25.

⁸⁶ "Cuba: A Guide For Canadian Business," p.14.

⁸⁷ "Russia to Deliver 1.5 Million Tonnes of Oil to Cuba in 1999," *ITAR/ITASS News Agency*, June 18, 1999.

⁸⁸ Fitzgerald, pp.179-180.

Political Dependency

Analysis of the Cuban polity, based on the indicators used in Chapter 3, illustrate that despite the island's extensive reliance on foreign investment to stimulate the economy and intensified U.S. economic aggression, only a limited degree of political dependency has resulted. Indeed, the Cuban government has proved highly successful in resisting external influence attempts. In fact, the indicator of control over domestic decision-making suggests that the level of political dependency has decreased following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, measurement of Cuba's ability to maintain domestic order and unity and to project its foreign policy interests shows rather mixed results.

Analysis of the Cuban government's autonomous domestic decision-making capacity illustrates a very low level of dependency. Fidel Castro continues to direct policy and the government has resisted external changes to the decision-making structure. Notably, Castro has still retained his presidency despite the economic hardships. In addition, all high-ranking government officials are loyal *Fidelistas*. For example, Raúl Castro heads the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Ricardo Alarcón is the president of the National Assembly, and Carlos Lage is the Vice President, the National Bank President is Francisco Soberon and the Foreign Minister is Felipe Pérez Roque; all are renowned for their unwavering support of Fidel Castro. Furthermore, the National Assembly has never failed to unanimously approve a motion initiated by Fidel.

The 1992 Constitutional amendments further illustrate the government's limited political dependency. U.S. propaganda efforts⁸⁹ and international pressure have concentrated on influencing Castro to introduce a multi-party political system, although the Cuban population has not expressed a significant desire for this type of political system.⁹⁰ However, Castro has steadfastly refused to buckle under this pressure, introducing only limited steps towards decentralization after extensive consultation with the population through workers' parliaments. It is here that comparison to the PRI is particularly useful. The PRI has been able to maintain control over the polity while

⁸⁹ These include the promise of millions of dollars in aid in the event of Castro's overthrow.

⁹⁰ Peter Roman, "Workers Parliaments in Cuba," Latin American Perspectives Issue 87, Vol. 22, No.4, Fall 1995.

making the transition between dramatically different economic systems, such as the switch from import substitution to economic liberalization. However, closer relations with the United States, globalization and neo-liberalism have combined to lessen the PRI government's absolute control over the polity. For example, Mexico's recent local elections were overseen by international observers and witnessed the election of numerous non-PRI politicians, mostly from the right wing PAN (*Partido Acción Nacional*) and the leftist PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*).

Study of the government's ability to maintain domestic order and unity also presents somewhat mixed results. Several observers have pointed to governmental officials', particularly Castro's, frequent trips overseas as proof of their popular support. Indeed, leaders of governments that are unable to preserve domestic order will rarely take trips overseas for fear of rebellion in their absence. Further, the government has relaxed certain previous controls. Religious freedom is now permitted and the government has gone so far as to invite the Pope to give mass. However, although Cubans have taken to the streets *en masse* only once, the population has been engaging in indirect forms of resistance. In her book, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, Susan Eckstein listed the various forms of protest,

1. emigration
2. political protest
3. cultural resistance: the growing involvement of Cubans in Afro-Cuban cults, such as *santería* and other religious sects
4. labour disobedience: production has been sabotaged through absenteeism and petty theft; and defiance of the law, corruption, petty theft and black marketeering are at record levels.⁹¹

The government also continues to crack down on dissidents, imprisoning those who engage in 'counter-revolutionary' activities. The 1999 Penal Law, for example, has introduced harsher measures to deal with political opposition.⁹² However, it should be

⁹¹ Susan Eckstein, "Responses to Edelstein," Latin American Perspectives Issue 87, Vol.22, No.4, Fall 1995, pp.31-32.

⁹² Amnesty International has reported that the 1999 Penal Law has increased the number of crimes punishable by death from 23 in 1988 to 112. "Cuba: a Worrying Increase in the Use of the Death Penalty," Amnesty International Report AMR 25/29/99 (June 1999) n.pag. Online. Internet. July 22, 1999. Available: www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1999/AMR22502999.htm

noted that the government justifies such clamp-downs as necessary due to United States' aggressive campaign to remove the Castro government from power.

The third indicator, that of the government's ability to project its foreign policy interests, again suggests a varied level of dependency. While Cuba has had to dramatically scale back its internationalism, it has largely been successful in winning international condemnation of the United States' embargo and has managed to avoid isolation.

Cuba's internationalism has traditionally been viewed as an extension of its Revolution. As detailed in Chapter 3, Cubans have had an active role in revolutionary activities in Nicaragua, Grenada and Angola. However, internationalist efforts have been largely abandoned. Castro himself has stated that "[n]ow our internationalist efforts should be focused on defending and preserving the Cuban Revolution...Our greatest internationalist duty is to defend this trench, this bastion of socialism."⁹³ One such example of Cuba's reduced internationalism is the FZLN (*Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*) movement in the Mexican state of Chiapas.⁹⁴ This movement has declared its central goal to be "to struggle so that land, housing, work, food, health, education, information, culture, independence, democracy, justice, liberty and peace are made a reality for all Mexicans" and has denounced foreign intervention in Mexico.⁹⁵ It is highly likely that this movement would have won Cuban support prior to 1989, since its ideas and tactics were in line with Cuban principles for 'exporting revolution.' In 1997, for example, EZLN (*Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional*) Subcomandante Marcos stated that Che Guevara is a source of inspiration for his movement.⁹⁶ However, in June of 1998, Fidel Castro denounced Marcos' revolutionary tactics, and publicly stated that the best strategy is negotiation with the Mexican government, the *PRI*, a government notorious for its violent repression of the Mexican indigenous population. This refusal to

⁹³ Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p.106.

⁹⁴ In June of 1998, I spoke with Ana Maria Vera Smith, imprisoned for her leadership of the indigenous movement in the Mexican state of Oaxaca, in Mexico City. She reported that the Mexican indigenous movement looks to Cuba as an example.

⁹⁵"Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional," *FZLN* (October 22, 1996) n.pag. Internet. Online. July 14, 1999.

Available: www.ezln.org/fzln/fzln.html

⁹⁶"Mexico Guerilla Leader Marcos Says Che Lives On," *Reuters*, August 28, 1999.

encourage revolutionary methods was likely due to Castro's reluctance to alienate Cuba's second largest investor.

In addition, Cuba's economic hardships have led to the elimination of numerous small-scale internationalist programs, such as costly scholarship programs to African and Latin American students. Recently, however, the government has offered some scholarships to students in the region, although they have been on an *ad hoc* basis. Moreover, previously friendly governments, such as Angola, are going to great lengths to distance themselves from Cuba. In the case of Nicaragua, the Alemán government rebuffed Castro's offer of Cuban doctors to help in the hurricane-ravaged areas of the country.⁹⁷

Where the Castro government has shown a remarkable ability to project its foreign policy interests is in winning international condemnation of the United States' blockade of the island and avoiding isolation. For example, in the wake of the Helms-Burton Law, the European Union (EU) and Canada filed a suit at the World Trade Organization (WTO), declaring the Law's extra-territoriality to be a violation of international trade law. Similarly, the United Nations General Assembly has voted seven times, each time by an overwhelming majority, to call for an end to the U.S. economic blockade of the island.⁹⁸ The Pope's recent visit to Cuba further illustrates the international support for the island. Known for his intense anti-Communism, the Pope surprised audiences by calling for an end to the embargo, stating, "everyone can and ought to take steps towards [ending Cuba's isolation]."⁹⁹

Similarly, the United States' attempt at isolating Cuba, by refusing to participate in organizations in which Cuba has membership, is earning condemnation from its allies and causing some organizations to actively pursue Cuban membership. At the most recent Summit of the Americas, numerous heads of state condemned the U.S. government for refusing to permit Cuban membership. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, for example, denounced the U.S.'s action and, in a symbolic move, flew to

⁹⁷ "Nicaragua Rejects Cuban Offer," AP Online November 2, 1998. It is suspected that Alemán refused because of his connections to right-wing Cuban exile groups.

⁹⁸ Enrique Soria, "La ONU dice no al bloqueo contra Cuba," El Diario/La Prensa, October 15, 1998, p.6.

⁹⁹ Larry Rohter, "Pope Condemns Embargo, Castro Attends Mass," NY Times on the Web (January 28, 1998). n.pag. Online. Internet. July 18, 1999.

Available: channel.nytimes.com/library/world/012698pope-cuba-rdp.html

Cuba on completion of the OAS meeting. Similarly, Brazilian head of state, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, condemned Cuba's exclusion, referring to Castro as "the great absentee" and stating that his presence is necessary "for us to be able to say, tomorrow, that our America is one."¹⁰⁰ Cuba's exclusion from the OAS has been negated somewhat through ALADI's (the Latin American Integration Association) recent unanimous vote to include Cuba among its membership,¹⁰¹ and Cuba's 1994 inclusion into CARICOM (Caribbean Community) and the ACS (Association of Caribbean States) despite U.S. protests.¹⁰²

Internal Dependency

From 1959 to 1989, the Cuban Revolutionary government erected what have been termed the 'pillars of the Revolution,' as detailed in Chapter 3. These pillars included the creation of a universal health care system, an advanced educational system, and the universal provision of basic services. Further, the Revolution cultivated a Cuban identity, based on 'Revolutionary principles,' such as equality. The construction of these pillars and the fostering of a 'Revolutionary' identity, coupled with the declaration of 'Cuba for Cubans,' resulted in the establishment of a link between the Revolution and the *patria*. As political economist, Ruth Pearson, noted, "there was a substantial coincidence between individual and collective benefits and people saw a congruence between the maintenance of the Revolutionary system of economic organization and their own family's livelihood, prospects and strategies."¹⁰³ However, little remains of this coincidence of interests. The economic reforms put in place to mitigate the impact of the changed international political economic order have undermined the pillars of the Revolution and have clashed with the Cuban identity. The social welfare system has suffered from government expenditure cut-backs, as has the provision of basic goods and services. Moreover, the economic reforms have had the effect of creating an 'economic

¹⁰⁰ "Heeding Pope's Call to End Isolation," Latin American Weekly Report May 5, 1998, p.198.

¹⁰¹ Patricia Grogg, "Cuba: Admission to ALADI Boosts Ties With the Region," Inter Press Service November 9, 1998.

¹⁰² Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro and Beyond (Washington: Brassey's, 1997), p.228.

¹⁰³ Ruth Pearson, "The Political Economy of Social Reproduction: The Case of Cuba in the 1990s," New Political Economy July 1998, p.242.

apartheid.' Inequality has risen and the weight of the reforms has fallen disproportionately on women and Afro-Cubans. Moreover, Cubans have come to question the government's dedication to 'Cuba for Cubans' as elements of the pre-Revolutionary period re-emerge.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, the government is suffering a crisis of legitimacy, which presents the biggest challenge to the Castro leadership.

Many Cubanologists have cited the regime's continued legitimacy as the principal reason that Cuba has not experienced a fate similar to that of Eastern Europe. Indeed, the regime's continued legitimacy is key to its survival. Andrew Zimbalist, author of several reviews of the Cuban political economy, has stated that, "the Revolution's changing legitimacy in the eyes of the Cuban people and its ability to adapt to the new world circumstances will be telling factors."¹⁰⁵ However, closer study of performance, legal-rational and charismatic legitimacy reveals that the government's legitimacy is tenuous. While changes in the political system have helped to maintain a relatively high degree of legal-rational legitimacy, both performance and charismatic legitimacy have declined substantially.

It is performance legitimacy that is the most significant for maintaining the Revolution and it is also the area in which the government's authority is weakest. Latin Americanist Dick Parker has stated that "the erosion of popular support could assume dangerous proportions if...the population begins to feel that its basic interests are no longer adequately represented by the regime."¹⁰⁶ In his extensive chronicling of public meetings, Cubanologist, Joel Edelstein, has concluded that "the Revolution's legitimacy has been maintained through equality, health, education, secure employment, national sovereignty and dignity and an active role in international solidarity."¹⁰⁷ How, then, do the economic reforms imposed and the changed international political economic order affect these sources of legitimacy?

¹⁰⁴ These elements include prostitution, the prohibition of Cubans from certain tourist areas and the wider availability of better products and services to those Cubans in possession of dollars.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Zimbalist, "Responses to Edelstein," Latin American Perspectives Issue 87, Vol 22, No.4, Fall 1995, p.47.

¹⁰⁶ Dick Parker, "The Cuban Crisis and the Future of the Revolution: A Latin American Perspective," Latin American Research Review Volume 333, Number 1, 1998, p.249.

¹⁰⁷ Edelstein, p.16.

The Revolution can be viewed, to a degree, as a victim of its own success. As detailed in the previous chapter, the government's tremendous investment in social welfare programs has raised the island's human development index to a level equal to that of much of the West. An elaborate cradle-to-the-grave social welfare system has been developed, which has also included the elimination of unemployment. The construction of this system has had a significant impact on Cubans' political culture. Less than 30 per cent of the population can recall either capitalism or the early years of the Revolution,¹⁰⁸ and Cuban social scientists have found that such programs as zero unemployment, free education, free health care and heavily subsidized housing and utilities, are taken for granted and considered to be integral parts of Cuban reality.¹⁰⁹ These programs, however, are rapidly being eroded by a shortage of funds.

Castro has repeatedly pointed out that despite the tremendous economic hardships the island has faced, and continues to face, not one hospital or school has been closed down. While this is an accurate statement and a significant achievement, the scale of the programs has been severely reduced, as detailed above. In the field of health, both medical supplies and medicines are scarce, and medical staff are dispirited. However, what compounds the public disillusionment with these cut-backs is the fact that medicines are available in abundant supply in the dollar pharmacies. Similarly, the tourist hospitals are plush, employ top Cuban doctors and are amply supplied with medical equipment.

As detailed above, the educational system has suffered similar cutbacks. However, what is more significant is the government's changed approach to education. For example, in an attempt to win support for, or at least understanding for the cutbacks, the official Party newspaper, *Granma*, has been discussing the dangers of 'overeducating' youth.¹¹⁰ The government has also stated that there is no need to continue to track students towards universities when it is agricultural workers that are needed.¹¹¹ This is a

¹⁰⁸ Haroldo Dilla and Rafael Hernandez, "Political Culture and Popular Participation in Cuba," trans. Jennifer Abassi Dugan and Jean Díaz, *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 69, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1991, p.38.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.41.

¹¹⁰ Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p.99

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.99.

reversal of previous stated “Revolutionary principles” and has served to further alienate the younger generation.

Both unemployment and underemployment have also become pervasive. Cuban economists estimate that one third of the population is underemployed, as compared with 7 per cent in the late 1980s.¹¹² Moreover, those that are employed have widely expressed disillusionment. Their peso salaries range from US\$10 to \$20 per month, rations are scarce and travelling to work is an arduous task due to the frequent 3 to 4 hour waits for buses. These complaints were frequently voiced in the numerous workers parliaments of 1994. In one, for example, a *Partagás* cigar worker expressed his concerns, saying,

You say our biggest problem is absenteeism and you may be right. But I want to know why, given all the hard currency we earn for the country, we’re driven to work on a flat bed truck while others ride on buses!...You say our factory made a lot of hard currency? We didn’t make any hard currency; we made pesos and only pesos! Padrón [in charge of the tobacco export business] got the hard currency; the sales people who sell to the tourists got the hard currency; the thieves who steal the tobacco to sell on the black market got the hard currency; but this factory and this workforce, where the cigars are produced, didn’t see any hard currency!¹¹³

The government’s inability to provide for basic material necessities has also served to lower its performance legitimacy. In 1993, the food shortage became so severe that 50,000 islanders lost their eyesight that year due to optic neuritis, which is caused by nutritional deficiencies.¹¹⁴ In addition, as food scarcity has grown, queues have increased. In 1992, the average family spent 15 hours per week waiting in lines for basic foodstuffs.¹¹⁵ Again, the constant and abundant availability of such basic material goods in the dollar shops has increased disillusionment.¹¹⁶ There is also an important indirect effect. Cubans are increasingly coming to rely on a network of friends and family to satisfy their needs, as opposed to the government. In fact, the government has called on Cubans to tackle the shortfall in goods themselves by setting up their own gardens to

¹¹² Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, *Ibid.*, p.106.

¹¹³ Peter Roman, “Workers Parliaments in Cuba,” *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 87, Vol 22, No. 4, Fall 1995, p.47.

¹¹⁴ Pérez, p.385.

¹¹⁵ Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p.97.

¹¹⁶ Bengelsdorf, “Responses to Edelstein,” p.29.

grow food and to make their own items such as soap and candles, instead of waiting for the government to supply them.¹¹⁷

The government's reforms have also conflicted with the identity fostered by the Revolution. This identity has been founded on the principles of equality and national independence. Indeed, the issue of equality was raised in the numerous meetings held with the Cuban population in the many workers' parliaments of 1994. A survey published by the *Centro de Estudios Sociopolíticos y de Opinión*, in February of 1994, found that "to the question what was the greatest concern with regard to the economic measures, the new study produced a definite group of responses: the fate of surplus workers, the effects on low-income workers and their families, the enrichment of people making illegal sales and other crooks, and the effectiveness of the economic measures finally adopted."¹¹⁸ The so-called 'dollarization' of the economy has had the effect of creating an economic apartheid. The resulting inequality from the economic reforms adopted by the government and the hardships imposed from the fall of the Soviet Union have effectively punished the most revolutionary aspects of society and rewarded those with family in Miami and those involved in black market and other illegal activities.

The government's maintenance of progressive policies, such as the promotion of women's and racial issues, which are tied to the principle of equality, has also withered under the new economic realities, conflicting with the Cuban identity that had been cultivated. One such example is in the domain of women's rights. During the Cold War, the Castro government made tremendous strides in the promotion of women's issues. However, it would appear that in an attempt to attract the tourist dollar to Cuba, concerns over women's issues have been overridden. For example, in an effort to increase tourism to Cuba, the Cuban tourist authorities hosted a *Playboy* magazine tour of Cuba. The magazine later published a feature article entitled, "The Girls of Cuba." In addition, the national tourist authority sponsored an international advertising campaign targeted at single men between the ages of 18 and 40.¹¹⁹ The results of these measures undertaken to

¹¹⁷ Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p.113.

¹¹⁸ Roman, p.44.

¹¹⁹ The advertising campaign featured billboards of scantily clad Cuban women.

increase tourism have been a dramatic rise in sex tourists to the island and sky-rocketing levels of prostitution, comparable to those of the pre-Revolutionary period.¹²⁰

Correspondingly, in her analysis of the post 1989 Cuban political economy, Ruth Pearson noted the disproportionate impact of the market reforms on Cuban women. In the course of her research, Pearson found that “women do not have equal access to new opportunities created in the private sphere,” and further, that there is “an over-representation of women in the unemployed labour force and a notable exodus of older women from their posts, particularly in the civil service and the social sector.”¹²¹ Pearson also found that the burden of increased housework, due to the lack of availability of goods and services, has fallen disproportionately on women. While the government has taken steps to reduce this burden, these measures have not been sufficient to alleviate the disproportionality of the domestic responsibilities and have caused Pearson to conclude that “the current crisis has, it would seem, put a brake on the desired movement towards domestic equality.”¹²²

The economic crisis and reforms have also served to widen the racial divide. First, the majority of Cubans living in Miami are white (estimated at over 95 per cent).¹²³ This means that white Cubans are more likely to receive remittances from abroad, and thus have greater access to the products and services available only in dollars. Second, private enterprise has shown a preference for hiring whites over black Cubans.¹²⁴ Third, prostitution has become increasingly racialized, with more black women becoming involved in prostitution, led by the demand from foreign tourists.¹²⁵

Castro’s charismatic legitimacy has been a topic of much debate. Indeed, the findings of Cubanologists differ substantially on this point. While some point to “non-random” surveys in which the vast majority label him a “dictator,” others steadfastly affirm that he is widely viewed to be the “legitimate defender of Cuban sovereignty.”¹²⁶

¹²⁰ Pérez, p.392.

¹²¹ Pearson, p.246.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Mireya Navarro, “Black Cuban-Americans Face Bias in Two Worlds,” NY Times News Service September 12, 1997.

¹²⁴ Digna Castañeda Fuertes and Lisa Brock, eds. Between Race and Empire: African-Americans and Cubans Before the Cuban Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998)., p.283.

¹²⁵ Pearson, p.244.

¹²⁶ Andrew Zimbalist, “Cuba in the Age of Perestroika,” Latin American Perspectives Issue 76, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1993, p.55.

These differing viewpoints can be explained by the fact that while most Cubans view him to be a skilled leader and a genuine supporter of Cuban sovereignty, the recent economic developments have likely caused them to question his capacity for economic leadership. For example, on a walk through a section of Central Havana, Castro was met with chants of “*tenemos hambre*,” we are hungry.¹²⁷ What is clear is that “charisma hinges on proof of worth.”¹²⁸ Castro’s continued charismatic authority is relying heavily on his past overthrow of the Batista government and his adept defence of Cuban sovereignty, yet his government’s performance legitimacy needs to be increased in order to fully restore his own charismatic legitimacy.

The dramatic decline in the standard of living experienced by Cubans has also affected the government’s legal-rational legitimacy because it has caused many Cubans to re-evaluate the system of government. A belief that the political apparatus was overly centralized has been widely expressed.¹²⁹ Furthermore, there was a pervasive view that participation in the political process was highly ineffective, particularly at the decision-making stage, and that this was due, in large part, to the political institutions in place.¹³⁰ As one Cuban professor noted, the Organs of Popular Power were neither popular nor powerful.¹³¹ It should be noted here that this does not suggest that there was a popular desire for a multi-party liberal democracy. The past experience of the Cubans, as detailed in the second chapter, coupled with that of other Latin American countries more recently, have caused most Cubanologists to conclude that there was a popular desire for decentralization but not a shift away from a one-party system.

The Cuban government has taken numerous steps to maintain its legal-rational legitimacy. In the Constitutional convention of 1992, several important reforms were undertaken. First, religious believers were allowed to be candidates for election. Second,

¹²⁷ Carollee Bengelsdorf, “Responses to Edelstein,” Latin American Perspectives Issue 87, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 1995, p.29.

¹²⁸ Eckstein, Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro, p.116.

¹²⁹ Roman, p.56.

¹³⁰ In The Problem of Democracy in Cuba, Carollee Bengelsdorf noted that the Party’s meetings with Cubans across the island found “a litany of complaints...as well as a harsh critique of the institutions that were to be the means by which people participated in the decisions affecting their lives...The solution that by its very repetition found its way to the centre of every discussion, whether about a workplace or a political institution, seemed to be decentralization.” p.169.

¹³¹ Eckstein, Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro, p.27.

the Secretariat, Politburo and the Central Committee were streamlined; the Secretariat was eliminated in this process. In fact, the Party's payroll was reduced by two thirds.¹³² Third, the use of the secret ballot was declared to be mandatory in all elections of members and appointments to committees at every level.¹³³ Fourth, the Constitution was amended to eliminate all references to the "dictatorship of the proletariat."¹³⁴ Similarly, references to integration with the socialist bloc were replaced with references to integration with the Caribbean and Latin America, and the word "workers" was replaced with the word "people's."¹³⁵

The provincial systems of Popular Power were also amended significantly. Most importantly, Provincial Assembly delegates are now elected by popular vote, as opposed to appointed by municipal delegates. The Party has also limited its participation in the electoral commissions; the Party will no longer partake in the nomination of representatives. In addition, specific attempts were made to rejuvenate the institutional apparatus by incorporating youth. The Central Committee experienced a 53 per cent turnover rate¹³⁶ and the average age of National Assembly members was reduced to 43.¹³⁷

It remains to be seen whether the reforms discussed above will be substantial enough to maintain the perception that the political system is both effective and reflective of Cuban identity and reality. In one public meeting, a woman reporter highlighted the contradiction between the achievements of the Revolution and the inclusion of effective participation in the political process, stating that officials "...think that the people are in the '40s, the '50s or the '60s. They don't realize that the people have achieved an eighth or ninth grade education and that the leadership of this country has taught them to think."¹³⁸ However, an encouraging note is the 93 per cent turn-out rate at the December 1992 elections and the 88 per cent approval of the entire slate of candidates.¹³⁹

¹³² Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p.27

¹³³ Bengelsdorf, *The Problem of Democracy in Cuba*, bid., p.170.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.169.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ Eckstein, *Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro*, p. 116.

¹³⁸ Peter Roman, "Workers Parliaments in Cuba," p.49.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

Conclusion

It is clear that the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of a globalized, uni-polar, neo-liberal world has had profound effects on the Cuban political economy, and caused its pattern of dependency to change yet again. While both economic and political dependency have lessened, numerous tensions and contradictions have arisen. Analysis of internal dependency, in particular, reveals a conflict between the identity and expectations cultivated by the Revolution prior to 1989 and the government's activities following 1990. It is clear that the government's ability to deal with this conflict will have the greatest impact on its continued support from Cuban society.

CONCLUSION

“A conscience, a vocation and a revolutionary will were, are and always will be more important than money.”¹

As Cuba approaches the year 2000, it is clear that its Revolution faces new challenges. The Revolution has withstood the fall of its chief trading partner, source of economic support and ideological ally. Its economy has defied critics' predictions of impending collapse and has rebounded to reach levels of growth in excess of 3% per year over the past four years.² However, the new international political economic system is increasingly complex. It is marked by the rise and increasing predominance of political and economic systems that are at odds with the Revolution's political economic principles. Economically, the island faces tremendous hardships due to the U.S. embargo, its history of dependent development and globalization. Politically, it remains the target of U.S. aggression and has few ideological allies.

The object of this paper has not been to answer the question 'what will happen to Cuba,' but rather to analyze the tensions and contradictions that are being produced within Cuba as the Revolution pursues a third way within a globalized, uni-polar and increasingly neo-liberal international system. The study of these tensions and contradictions grows increasingly relevant as the electoral successes of the Venezuelan Chávez government and the Mexican PRD suggest that the former call for communism has been replaced with a growing desire within the LDCs to implement an option to the communist and neo-liberal paths. Accordingly, Cuba's success in charting a third way will provide an example to other underdeveloped countries of the challenges that the pursuit of such an option presents. In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of many recent analyses of Cuba's political economy, many of which have been premised on the Eastern European example and have ignored the specificity of the Cuban case, this thesis has

¹ Fidel Castro, cited in *Cuba Mi Amor*, ed. Gabriel García Marquez (Verona, Italy: Parise Press, 1990), p. 154.

² Juan Triana Cordoví, “*Cuba 1998: la reanimación económica y las restricciones del crecimiento*,” *Balance de la Economía Cubana a Finales de los 90's* University of Havana: *Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana*, March 1999, p.3.

aimed to provide a solid historical analytical framework through the use of dependency theory.

Through the application of dependency theory, it is clear that from 1492 to 1959, Cuba's economy was underdeveloped. The international capitalist system, imperialism and the transplantation of 'primitive' capitalism to Cuba combined to shape the Cuban political economy according to external (core) needs. As a result, diversification and industrialization were impeded, thereby hampering horizontal and vertical economic development. Politically, U.S. and Spanish governments shaped the Cuban polity to facilitate their intervention in Cuban affairs and to prevent the creation of political institutions reflective of Cuban principles and needs.

The Revolution evolved as an outgrowth of a rejection of centuries of this economic and political dependence and represented an attempt to assert Cuban sovereignty. Despite its proclamations of autonomy, the Castro government was unable to reverse this pattern of economic development; Soviet intervention and five centuries of underdevelopment combined to inhibit industrialization efforts. However, in the political sphere, the Castro government was remarkably successful in developing the polity to be reflective of and responsive to the needs of Cuban society. Indeed, the Revolutionary Government came to be widely recognized as the legitimate defender of Cuban sovereignty and as a source of progressive policies which benefited the masses, establishing a direct link between *patria* and the Revolution. -

As the Revolution approaches the year 2000, however, its biggest challenge is the weakening link between the *patria* and the government. There is a growing divide between the Cuban identity fostered by the Revolution, which is founded on principles of equality, and the impact of the economic reforms, which are increasing inequality.

Fidel Castro himself has recognized the direct connection between the Revolution and equality. Indeed, he has written,

The Revolution took place to end injustice. So that all children could have schools and teachers and books; so that all children could have doctors and medicines when they were sick; so that all children could grow up healthy; so that all children could have the same opportunities. So that there would be no more master and slave, rich and poor, exploiter and exploited. So that all children could go to high school, to a pre-university, to

a university; so that all parents could have work. So that every human being could achieve a worthwhile life.³

However, these achievements are rapidly crumbling due to the changed international system, as detailed in Chapter Four. Schools are suffering from a shortage of books, medicines are sporadically available and malnutrition has become commonplace in Cuban infants. More detrimental is the highly uneven standards of living that have arisen, conflicting with the central Revolutionary principle of equality. For example, those with access to dollars enjoy greater access to goods and services, such as food, medicines and transportation, of which the Revolution has been the principal source. This development, more than any other, has decreased the government's legitimacy and remains the biggest challenge to its continuance.

What, then, is the example to other Third World countries which seek to pursue a third way? Clearly, the Cuban experience shows that breaking from a history of underdevelopment is a long and daunting task. Even with the transition to socialism and the withdrawal of Soviet influence, Cuba is still reliant on primary exports. Furthermore, the Cuban case illustrates that uni-polarity has made the U.S. even more influential because there is no counterweight. Indeed, although Cuba no longer presents a security threat, it is still the target of an internationally-condemned embargo. However, the Cubans' ability to maintain a centrally planned economic system amidst U.S. aggression and an increasingly neo-liberal international realm suggests that there is a viable, if difficult, alternative to the neo-liberal structural adjustment policies frequently imposed on the LDCs. Politically, Cuba's example has been largely positive. Indeed, the island has been able to retain an autonomous political system impervious to international pressure for a multi-party representative democracy system and has retained domestic support because of its link to sovereignty. Furthermore, the Cuban government has been able to maintain its 'pillars of the Revolution' and political power, pursuing an economic strategy clearly at odds with the structural adjustment programs frequently imposed on LDCs.

³ Castro, cited in García Marquez, p.87.

In closing, no analysis of Cuba would be complete without a brief speculation of post-Castro Cuba. In keeping with the theme of this thesis, I believe that it is highly unlikely that Cuba would follow the Eastern European, or even Nicaraguan example. The experience of Eastern Europe and particularly Nicaragua, with their ever-widening inequalities and plummeting human development indices, contradicts the Cuban “world view,” in which “notions of a fixed income, social security, and the satisfaction of basic necessities have become part of the expectations of daily life.”⁴ Similarly, despite the Miami community’s tremendous wealth and support from the U.S. government, it is highly likely that its influence over Cuba’s political future will be limited because it represents a return to the pre-Castro era. Andrew Zimbalist, for example, has noted the perceived strong correlation between the Miami Cuban community and racism, concluding that “it is improbable in the extreme that the roughly 50% of the Cuban population that is black or mulatto will supinely accept the visions of Cuba’s future offered by right-wing, white Cuban exiles in Miami.”⁵

The choice of successor is key to a peaceful transition. While numerous Cuban political leaders, such as moderates Ricardo Alarcón and Carlos Lage, garner much popular support, Raúl Castro, Fidel’s brother and a hard-liner, is highly unpopular. In a January 1999 article in the *Economist*, for example, it was noted that “Raul Castro...is not popular, and...few think he would be able to hold on to power for long.”⁶ Accordingly, there is greater potential for an alliance among “top figures in the military, the economy and the legislature – the kind of ‘collective leadership’ that followed the deaths of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in China.”⁷

In the end, it is clear that “it is to the new class of young, sophisticated, and highly educated Cubans that we must look to lead the country.”⁸

⁴ Rafael Hernández and Haroldo Dilla, “Political Culture and Popular Participation in Cuba,” trans. Jennifer Dugan Abassi and Jean Diaz *Latin American Perspectives*, Issue 69, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 1991, p.41.

⁵ Andrew Zimbalist, “Cuba in the Age of Perestroika,” *Latin American Perspectives* Issue 76, Vol. 20, No. 1, Winter 1993, p.55.

⁶ “The Americas: What Follows Fidel?” *The Economist* January 2, 1999, Vol. 350, No. 8100, p.31.

⁷ Juan O. Tamayo, “Castro’s Successors,” *Miami Herald* News Analysis Section, September 1, 1997

⁸ Anton Allahar, “Cuba and the Collapse of World Socialism in the 1990s,” forthcoming.

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